


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# DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939

EDITED BY

E. L. WOODWARD, M.A., F.B.A.

*Professor of Modern History in the University  
of Oxford*

AND

ROHAN BUTLER, M.A.

*Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford*

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## PREFACE

WHEREAS Volume III of the First Series illustrated British policy in the Baltic and in Eastern Europe including Russia during the latter half of 1919, the present volume deals with British policy of that period in relation to the Adriatic and the Middle East including Persia.

Chapter I is designed as a British contribution towards filling a recognized gap in the documentation of the international negotiations in 1919 concerning the Question of the Adriatic, namely between June 28, when the Council of Four held its last meeting at the Peace Conference of Paris, and December 12, when the account of these negotiations is resumed in Cmd. 586 of 1920, *Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question* (see also Volume II, Chapter II). The intervening period was one of considerable importance for the negotiations, and included the occupation of Fiume by armed bands under Signor D'Annunzio on September 12, 1919.

The first chapter accordingly provides documents concerning the Question of the Adriatic from June 28 to December 12, 1919. The negotiations tended to a marked extent, however, to assume the form of an Italo-American negotiation, and the relevant archives of the Foreign Office would thus appear to be somewhat incomplete for the earlier part of the chapter, and for the month of August in particular, as indicated in footnotes. This chapter nevertheless presents new material regarding not only the main issue of the attribution of Fiume but also related questions in the Adriatic, and notably the Italian occupation of Albania at that time. Also printed are a certain number of documents illustrating the general background of the negotiations, including some concerning early fascist activities.

At the beginning of July 1919 Mr. Balfour, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'reminded the Conference of the accepted principle, that the Italian questions should be considered as a whole, and not settled piecemeal' (document No. 4). This and other documents concerning the Question of the Adriatic illustrate the way in which Italy's claims there were considered together with her claims elsewhere, as in Africa and, more particularly, in Asia Minor. This chapter thus forms a convenient introduction to the Middle Eastern questions treated in the remainder of the volume.

Chapter II illustrates the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Syria and Palestine from May 30, 1919, to February 12, 1920, the date of the opening of the First Conference of London. This conference was primarily devoted to the preparation of terms of peace with the broken Ottoman Empire, and was the first Allied conference held after the conclusion of the main session of the Paris Peace Conference on January 21, 1920. (The short meeting held in London during December 1919, and recorded in Volume II, had mainly taken the form of Anglo-French conversations parallel with the deliberations of the Council of Heads of Delegations, then still in session at

the Peace Conference.) Middle Eastern questions in general were necessarily taken up at the First Conference of London so that its opening constitutes an appropriate terminal date for Chapter II and succeeding chapters.

The introductory note to Chapter II includes the full text of the much discussed, but hitherto somewhat inaccessible, so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. This was one of the agreements which had a central bearing on the endeavours of His Majesty's Government in 1919, as now here illustrated, to fulfil their undertakings to the French Government and to both the Arab and the Zionist authorities. The documents disclose the important conversations held during the Emir Feisal's visit to London in the autumn of 1919, and their connexion with the Anglo-French negotiations. These negotiations concerning Syria and Palestine included not only the exchange of personal messages between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau at that time, but also the conversations between Lord Curzon, Mr. Balfour's successor, and M. Berthelot towards the end of the year. Conversations and correspondence with representatives of the Zionist Organization are also printed. Two additional documents of relevant interest have recently been located in the private papers of Lord Balfour, and are included in an appendix at the end of this volume. These two documents should thus be viewed in relation to those printed in Chapter II.

Chapter III comprises documents concerning Turkish affairs before the First Conference of London, and shows how Ottoman rule in Turkey itself was running down. This chapter correspondingly illustrates the origins of the movement of national revival under Kemal Atatürk, and thus has an important bearing upon those developments which subsequently superseded the Treaty of Peace with Turkey concluded at Sèvres in August 1920. The movement under Kemal Atatürk was opposed to the decision of the Peace Conference in May 1919 to sanction a Greek occupation of Smyrna: the present chapter demonstrates the view which British representatives in Turkey took of this decision. The chapter also contains records of preliminary discussions concerning the broad lines of a peace settlement with Turkey. The background to Allied policy towards Turkey at that time is illustrated in the introductory note to the chapter, which includes the full texts of two secret wartime agreements, the Constantinople Agreement of 1915, and the Agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne whereof the operative instrument had been signed in London in August 1917.

In preparing this chapter the Editor has consulted the archives of H.M. Legation at Athens which, exceptionally, are available for 1919 (cf. the Preface to Volume III). These archives were, however, found to contain no relevant matter of importance that was not included in the main archives of the Foreign Office, and accordingly no material is printed from this source.

Chapter IV illustrates the interrupted course of the Anglo-French negotiations concerning oil resources after the withdrawal of the Long-Béranger Agreement in the summer of 1919. The files of the Foreign Office would appear to be somewhat incomplete for the latter part of this negotiation.

The last chapter provides an account of Anglo-Persian relations after the signature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9, 1919. This agreement, which engaged the particular attention of Lord Curzon, incurred criticism from other Powers. The documents cover the visits to England in the autumn of 1919 of the Shah of Persia and of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose departure from London on December 21, 1919, marks the conclusion of this chapter.

The editorial method for this volume is in general the same as that described in the preface to Volume III. In particular, some documents are printed from the private papers of Lord Balfour, Lord Curzon and Sir Eyre Crowe. The relevant papers of Lord Balfour and of Sir Eyre Crowe are respectively filed, and are here cited, under references Confidential/General/229/4 and Confidential/General/236. The corresponding papers of Lord Curzon have not yet received definitive classification, but have been docketed broadly according to the countries to which the documents relate. These papers are thus cited as e.g. Curzon Papers/France.

This volume has been edited by Mr. Rohan Butler under the usual conditions of complete access to all Foreign Office documents and corresponding freedom in their selection and arrangement. Once again the Editor, while taking full responsibility for the volume, would like to emphasize his debt to the staff of the Reference Room of the Foreign Office Library, who have so readily added to their other work that of giving their indispensable help towards the preparation of this volume. This is unfortunately the last time that the Editor will be able to acknowledge his particular debt of gratitude to the Hon. Margaret Lambert, Ph.D., for her greatly appreciated assistance with this as with the previous volumes. He would equally like to thank Miss A. W. Orde for her most valuable work, especially in connexion with footnotes, and Miss E. McIntosh, M.B.E., whose help includes the preparation of the chapter summaries.

March, 1951

ROHAN BUTLER



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- 1. Alternative zones for Zara suggested in Italian pro-  
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- 2. Map appended to the 'Proposal for an Italo-Yugo-  
slav Agreement' concerning the Adriatic (August  
1919) . . . . . *Facing p. 52*

3. Annex B to Mr. Nicolson's memorandum of September 14, 1919, on an Adriatic settlement: frontiers proposed in the Adriatic . . . . . *Facing p. 60*
4. Annex C to Mr. Nicolson's memorandum of September 14, 1919, on an Adriatic settlement: proposed arrangement for Albania; Italian proposal for the hinterland of Valona . . . . . *Facing p. 60*
5. Italian map to explain American statement of October 27, 1919, concerning the Adriatic. . . . . *Facing p. 170*
6. Map to explain Italian proposals of November 11, 1919, concerning the Adriatic . . . . . *Facing p. 172*
7. Map of Thrace appended to Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 1764 of September 6, 1919, from Paris. . . . . *Facing p. 750*

# CHAPTER SUMMARIES

## CHAPTER I

### The Question of the Adriatic, June 28—December 12, 1919

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Introductory Note	1
1 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 96 B	June 28	Consideration of proposed statement to new Italian Delegation regarding Fiume and Asia Minor.	2
2 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 99 A	June 28	Approval of Anglo-French statement to new Italian Delegation regarding Fiume and Asia Minor.	3
3 SIR R. RODD Rome No. 288	June 30	Criticism and hostility to Signor Nitti's government continues; stringent governmental precautions in connexion with a meeting of military associations; members of the new government emphatically express friendship for Great Britain. <i>Note 4.</i> Report of June 12 by Sir R. Rodd on an alleged plot against the Italian Govt. by Signor Mussolini and associates; financing of military associations by big industry.	6
4 MR. BALFOUR Paris	July 4	Note of a private Allied meeting in Ministry of War on July 3 to discuss Italian claims in Asia Minor and the Adriatic.	10
5 CAPT. GOAD Sofia	July 6	Memorandum on the state of Italian feeling towards England; intensification of Italian nationalism; uncertain future orientation of Italy.	12
6 SIGNOR TITTONI Paris	July 7	Note to Mr. Lloyd George setting forth Italian Govt.'s views regarding the interpretation of the Treaty of London and other wartime agreements: Italian viewpoint regarding Fiume and Anatolia. <i>Note 9.</i> Franco-Italian agreement of July 26, 1917 <i>Note 10.</i> Note of Oct. 30, 1918, from Mr. Balfour to Marquis Imperiali concerning the Middle East. <i>Note 11.</i> Note of Nov. 16, 1918, from Marquis Imperiali to Mr. Balfour concerning the Middle East. <i>Note 14.</i> Allied conversations in London early in 1917 concerning Italian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. <i>Note 15.</i> Anglo-Italian conversation of Mar. 21, 1919: Italian occupation of Konia and Adalia.	16
			21
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NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
7 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 469	July 8	Serious Franco-Italian incidents at Fiume: grave view taken by French Embassy which fears further incidents might lead to rupture of Franco-Italian relations, and hopes that British and U.S. Govts. will support French representations to Italian Govt.: Sir R. Rodd asks for instructions.	27
8 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1132	July 8	French warship is being sent to Fiume: considers that H.M.G. should also send a ship.	28
9 To MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 959	July 9	Refers to No. 8: Admiralty have been requested to send a ship immediately to Fiume.	28
10 To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 4624	July 9	Transmits copy of letter from Sir H. Lamb to Sir G. Clerk describing conditions in Albania under Italian occupation: general feeling against idea of an Italian protectorate.	28
11 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 488	July 13	Naval Attaché reports from Fiume that authorities there have control of situation and that order has been restored.	32
12 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 54	July 15	Instructs Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to act in closest co-operation with French and U.S. colleagues regarding incidents at Fiume.	32
13 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 498	July 19	Considers it most desirable that status of Fiume should be settled before orders given for evacuation of Italian troops.	32
14 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 499	July 19	Naval Attaché, returned from Fiume, has pointed out exceptional capabilities of Klek as a harbour for Yugoslavia: Fiume would be of doubtful use to Yugoslavia.	33
15 To SIR C. DES GRAZ Belgrade Tel. No. 212	July 25	Italian Govt. have protested against action of Yugoslav troops in crossing eastern Albanian frontier: unofficial representations have been made to Yugoslav Delegation in Paris: sends instructions to make similar representations to Yugoslav Govt.	33
16 To SIGNOR TITTONI Paris	July 29	Note from M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour acknowledging No. 6, setting forth their views regarding Italian claims in the Adriatic, and annexing a reply to certain historical points raised in No. 6.	34
17 MR. BALFOUR Paris	Aug. 2	Memorandum for the Prime Minister on Italian situation and interests. <i>Note 7.</i> Italian claims to colonial compensation in Africa: report of the Colonial Commission of the Peace Conference.	39 40
18 MR. NICOLSON Paris	Aug. 6	Note of a meeting of an informal committee on the Italo-Yugoslav problem: Italian proposals presented by Signor Scialoja.	43

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
19 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 5498	Aug. 19	Transmits a 'Proposal for an Italo-Yugoslav Agreement' in the Adriatic: states that this document was communicated by editor of <i>The Times</i> who said it came from Yugoslav sources and that it constituted last word of Yugoslav Govt. in the matter.	50
20 ITALIAN DELEGATION Paris	Aug. 29	Italian draft proposals concerning the Adriatic for transmission by Mr. Folk to President Wilson.	53
21 Mr. KERR Hennequeville	Aug. 31	Note of a conversation between Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Tittoni at Hennequeville: Adriatic, Turkish and Colonial questions.	55
22 Mr. KENNARD Rome Unnumbered	Sept. 1	Letter to Mr. Phipps (Paris) regarding possibility of disturbances in Fiume: suggests warning should be given to Italian representatives.	57
23 Sir R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 577	Sept. 12	Reports press announcement that Signor D'Annunzio with a contingent of volunteers entered Fiume at dawn.	58
24 Col. PECK Fiume Tel. No. S 166	Sept. 12	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe (Paris) reporting arrival in Fiume of large numbers of Italian soldiers, presumed deserters.	58
25 Col. PECK Fiume Tel. No. S 167	Sept. 12	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe (Paris): Signor D'Annunzio in command of invaders who have taken over Italian billets and have been reinforced by large numbers of Italian troops.	58
26 Col. PECK Fiume Tel. No. S 170	Sept. 12	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe (Paris): General Pittaluga commanding Allied troops appears to be powerless: town practically in hands of invading forces.	59
27 Mr. KERR Paris	Sept. 12	Note on discussions in Paris in regard to the Adriatic.	59
28 Sir R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 579	Sept. 13	Reports situation in Fiume as described by Acting M.F.A.: General Badoglio has been sent there to restore order and discipline.	61
29 Sir R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 581A	Sept. 13	Summarizes statement in Italian Chamber by President of Council deplored events in Fiume and explaining attitude of Italian Govt.	62
30 Sir R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 584	Sept. 14	Refers to No. 29 and reports that President of Council stated in conclusion that he meant to see matter through and appealed to working classes and peasants to support him.	63
31 Col. PECK Fiume Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 14	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe (Paris): Gen. Pittaluga has officially closed headquarters of interallied corps of occupation and left Fiume: British and French troops to leave Fiume temporarily.	64

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
32	To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1157	Sept. 15	There is no intention of increasing British naval forces at Fiume; British troops there to be embarked for Malta if considered desirable.	64
33	COL. PECK Fiume Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 15	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe, Paris, reporting that General Badoglio is only attempting to blockade Fiume: proclamations will be dropped over town informing soldiers that if they do not return within five days they will be considered deserters.	65
34	M. VESNITCH Paris	Sept. 19	Letter to Sir E. Crowe, Paris, enclosing (1) copy of note to M. Clemenceau requesting protection of Peace Conference for Yugoslav population of Fiume and Zara; (2) copy of note to M. Pichon concerning situation in Zara and actions of Admiral Millo.	65
35	MR. KENNARD Rome No. 404	Sept. 21	Transmits report by Military Attaché on events in Fiume since arrival of Signor D'Annunzio: discusses attitude of Italian Govt. and public opinion regarding events: position of Signor Nitti: an extraordinary council under the King is to consider situation.	66
36	MR. KENNARD Rome No. 410	Sept. 24	Composition of Crown Council summoned to consider question of Fiume: comments on difficulties of situation and possible complications: possibility of military dictatorship in Italy.	72
37	MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 609	Sept. 24	Movement in favour of annexation of Fiume is rapidly developing into one which aspires to occupy Dalmatia: government no longer controls situation, which may precipitate country into dangerous position both at home and abroad.	75
38	To MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 771	Sept. 24	Admiralty have reliable information that Signor D'Annunzio will occupy Abbazia and further territory including Lovrana.	76
39	To SIR C. DES GRAZ Belgrade Tel. No. 275	Sept. 25	Instructions to express to Yugoslav Govt. hope, in view of Italian situation, that in their own interest and cause of peace they will be careful to maintain strictly correct attitude and avoid any untoward incident.	76
40	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1374	Sept. 25	Reports discussion of the five Allied plenipotentiaries regarding situation in Adriatic: statement made by American representative regarding instructions given to American force at Spalato.	76
41	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1375	Sept. 25	Refers to No. 40: has consulted naval and military advisers as to measures which could be taken to strengthen position in Adriatic and to co-operate actively with French and American authorities: quotes instructions by which British naval forces	77

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		there are now bound and suggests that matter receive careful attention of naval and military authorities.	
④ Mr. KENNARD Rome No. 413	Sept. 26	Reports conversation with Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who stated that it would be impossible for Signor D'Annunzio to occupy Abbazia and adjacent territory: French troops have embarked from Sussak: comments on general situation and position of Signor Nitti: rumours of possibility of a military <i>coup d'état</i> .	78
⑤ Sir E. Crowe Paris Tel. No. 1381	Sept. 27	Refers to No. 39 and reports that strong warning had already been conveyed to head of Yugoslav Delegation in Paris against allowing Yugoslav case to be prejudiced by any regrettable incident in Adriatic: Italian representative informed of advice given to Yugoslav Delegation.	82
⑥ Sir R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 623	Sept. 28	Summarizes speech of Signor Tittoni in Italian Chamber regarding Italy's international position resulting from Paris negotiations.	82
⑦ Sir R. RODD Rome No. 419	Sept. 29	Surveys extremely serious situation in Italy: Parliament no longer regarded as representative or authoritative and army appears to be entirely in sympathy with movement headed by Signor D'Annunzio: probable that Signor Nitti will resign despite division in Chamber which gave a majority to Government.	83
⑧ Sir R. RODD Rome Unnumbered	Sept. 29	Letter to Lord Curzon commenting on Signor Nitti's position and possible resignation: general sympathy is with Signor D'Annunzio.	86
⑨ To Sir E. Crowe Paris No. 6795	Sept. 29	Records account given by Mr. M. F. Eden, an interpreter employed in southern Albania, of situation in Albania: Mr. Eden considers that Italians have no claim to any part of Albania and believes that if they could obtain Fiume they would be willing to evacuate Albania.	87
⑩ M. VESNITCH Paris	Sept. 29	Letter to Sir E. Crowe enclosing copy of note addressed to M. Clemenceau concerning situation in Fiume and Dalmatia.	89
⑪ Mr. ATELSTAN-JOHNSON Belgrade Tel. No. 327	Sept. 30	Refers to No. 39 and reports assurance given by Acting M.F.A. that authorities in threatened districts had been strictly instructed to avoid all incidents and reassure civilian population.	90
⑫ To Sir E. Crowe Paris Tel. No. 1191	Sept. 30	Refers to No. 43 and approves action taken.	90

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
51 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1394	Sept. 30	Reports conversation between the five Allied representatives on Sept. 30 respecting situation in Italy: summarizes remarks made by U.S. representative after conversation and asks for instructions as to reply to be made to his general proposals, notably as to whether H.M.G. will reinforce their naval squadron in Adriatic and whether they will join in some definite declaration as regards Fiume such as Mr. Polk advocates.	90
52 SIR R. RODD Rome No. 423	Sept. 30	Transmits particulars regarding preparations made for Signor D'Annunzio's coup at Fiume: discusses political situation which has led to dissolution of Chamber: armed forces are no longer obeying directions.	92
53 MR. ATHELSTAN-JOHNSON Belgrade Tel. No. 328	Oct. 1	Visit to Fiume of Supreme Economic Council's delegate in Yugoslavia: relations between Italian loyalist officers and men and insurgents.	95
54 SIR R. RODD Rome No. 425	Oct. 2	Conversation with Acting M.F.A. who was anxious about position in Yugoslavia rather than about internal situation.	96
55 SIR R. RODD Rome Unnumbered	Oct. 2	Letter to Lord Curzon: considers that situation will resolve itself without an internal collision: position of Signor D'Annunzio in Fiume suggests that when moment comes Duke of Aosta might be substituted for Signor D'Annunzio if Powers could put Fiume provisionally under Italian occupation: support for Signor Nitti in country districts.	97
56 MR. ATHELSTAN-JOHNSON Belgrade No. 195	Oct. 3	Transmits aide-mémoire from Foreign Ministry respecting Italian military activities in Gulf of Cattaro, Vassoievic and regions around Moratche and Douga.	98
57 MR. ATHELSTAN-JOHNSON Belgrade Tel. No. 334	Oct. 3	M. Trumbitch anxious about Italian military activities on Adriatic coast and especially with regard to position at Cataro: M. Trumbitch would be glad to see one or two British cruisers in Bocche di Cattaro: he will continue to work for an amicable solution with Italy.	98
58 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1410	Oct. 3	U.S. representative has notified French and Italian representatives of President Wilson's decision regarding Fiume. Mr. Polk continues to press question as to whether H.M.G. will reinforce its naval forces in Adriatic: is disposed to share Mr. Polk's opinion that if British, French, and U.S. Govts. were to show united front it would help to keep situation quiet.	99
59 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1204	Oct. 4	Refers to No. 51 and transmits views in regard to proposals made by Mr. Polk: gravity of the situation has been represented to the Italian Ambassador in London.	100

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
60 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 636	Oct. 6	Communiqué has been published denying accusation of Yugoslav Govt. that Italy is preparing an attack on Yugoslav troops in Montenegro. M.F.A. confirmed that allegation was completely untrue.	101
61 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 637	Oct. 6	Reports conversation with M.F.A. concerning message conveyed by Lord Hardinge to Italian Ambassador regarding Fiume and alleged suggestion that prolongation of situation might involve dissociation of Italy from Alliance.	101
62 Sir R. Rodd Rome Unnumbered	Oct. 6	Letter to Lord Curzon expressing regret that friendly warning given to Italian Ambassador should have been published under guise of a telegram from London: comments on situation in Fiume.	102
63 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 639	Oct. 7	Refers to No. 61 and asks for exact terms of warning conveyed through Italian Ambassador.	104
64 To Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 795	Oct. 7	Records terms of warning conveyed to Italian Ambassador by Lord Hardinge and of the Ambassador's reply.	104
65 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 643	Oct. 8	Refers to No. 64: publication of an inaccurate version of communication has produced anti-British campaign: proposes to see Signor Nitti and draw his attention to serious effect that Government communiqué is having.	105
66 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 644	Oct. 8	Signor Nitti told a mutual friend that he was now optimistic about situation in Fiume and believes that movement will end in fiasco if no outside pressure is put upon country.	105
67 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 646	Oct. 8	Reports conversation with Signor Nitti who admitted that he was seriously anxious about condition of country: his only hope was that Allies would accept Signor Tittoni's latest proposal for solution of Fiume problem.	106
68 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 647	Oct. 9	Press campaign against Great Britain is very violent and newspapers are filled with extracts from French press dissociating France from alleged step taken by Great Britain.	107
69 To Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 799	Oct. 9	Refers to No. 65 and sends instructions to make strong representations to Italian Govt. regarding official communiqué made to press.	107
70 EARL OF DERBY Paris Unnumbered	Oct. 9	Letter to Lord Curzon: effect in Paris of statement reported to have been made to Italian Ambassador regarding Fiume: Col. House has left for United States.	108

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
71 To SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 798	Oct. 9	Refers to No. 57 and quotes two points in Adriatic situation about which Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires states his Government are very anxious: Yugoslav Govt. therefore ask British, French, and U.S. Govts. to send some warships to Adriatic to show that decisions of the conference must be respected.	109
72 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1427	Oct. 9	Italian Govt. deny absolutely that there is any foundation for report in No. 56.	109
73 SIR R. RODD Rome No. 442	Oct. 10	Reports conversation with M.F.A. regarding communiqué respecting warning conveyed to Italian Ambassador by Lord Hardinge: Signor Tittoni assumed responsibility for publication of communiqué and explained its purpose: he undertook to avoid the recurrence of such an incident and to issue a further communiqué which should clear away all impression of misunderstanding.	110
74 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 655	Oct. 11	M.F.A. stated that National Council at Fiume now willing to accept Italian Govt.'s latest proposal for an autonomous Fiume connected to Italy by a coastal strip: Signor Tittoni begged that H.M.G. would give proposal favourable consideration and press it on U.S. Govt.	113
75 To SIR R. RODD Rome No. 609	Oct. 11	Records conversation between Italian Ambassador and Lord Hardinge regarding publication of communication concerning Fiume: Italian Ambassador denied all knowledge of how it came to be published.	114
76 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 658	Oct. 11	Further communiqué has been issued to effect that M.F.A. has had a friendly conversation with H.M. Ambassador which has resulted in clearing up any misunderstanding, and made it clear that two countries will cordially collaborate to find solution for problems of peace.	115
77 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1154	Oct. 11	Refers to No. 67 and requests that French Govt. be asked whether they favour solution proposed by Signor Nitti and would be prepared to join H.M.G. in pressing it on U.S. Govt.	115
78 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1432	Oct. 11	Refers to No. 67 and reports conversation with Mr. Polk regarding fresh Italian proposal for solution of Adriatic question.	116
79 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1433	Oct. 11	Refers to No. 74: has received no definite information concerning Signor Tittoni's latest proposals and consequently cannot at present advise on them or press them upon Mr. Polk: suggests awaiting result of direct discussion with him and Signor Scialoja.	117

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
10	11 Sir E. Crowe Paris No. 1937	Oct. 13	Transmits memorandum, with appended documents, describing negotiations between Allied Governments since end of August in regard to Adriatic question.	117
11	11 Sir R. Rodd Rome Tel. No. 662	Oct. 14	Refers to No. 79: had understood from Signor Tittoni that present proposal with regard to Fiume was acceptance of last American proposal provided territory contiguous with Fiume along a coastal strip were ceded to Italy.	127
12	12 Mr. ATHELSTAN-JOHNSON Belgrade Tel. No. 344	Oct. 14	Reports conversation with M.F.A. who expressed gratification at communication made to Italian Ambassador in London regarding Fiume: M. Trumbitch reiterated his view that minimum that would satisfy Yugoslavia would be President Wilson's frontier line and Fiume a free port.	127
13	13 To Sir E. Crowe Paris Tel. No. 1236	Oct. 15	Refers to No. 79 and agrees as to awaiting result of direct discussion with Mr. Polk and Signor Scialoja.	128
14	14 M. DUTASTA Paris	Oct. 15	Transmits to British Peace Delegation a note from Albanian Delegation protesting against suggested attribution to Italy of a mandate for Albania.	128
15	15 To Mr. ATHELSTAN-JOHNSON Belgrade Tel. No. 305	Oct. 20	Refers to No. 57: Admiralty do not favour sending British warships to vicinity of Spalato and Cattaro.	130
16	16 Mr. RODD Rome	Oct. 25	Memorandum on Italian nationalist organizations and fascist activities.	130
17	17 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 674	Oct. 26	Reports conversation with Signor Tittoni when latter reviewed whole Fiume question and declared that his latest proposal constituted minimum concession that would satisfy Italian public opinion and afford possibility of evicting Signor D'Annunzio. French Ambassador at Washington had been instructed to support plan and Signor Tittoni hoped that similar instructions would be sent to H.M. Ambassador at Washington. <i>Note 3.</i> Correspondence of Oct. 20-22 regarding Signor Tittoni's latest proposal.	134
18	18 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 675	Oct. 27	Transmits translation of telegram from Signor Nitti to Mr. Lansing appealing for support of U.S. Govt. for Italian Govt.'s proposal for solution of Fiume problem.	135
19	19 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 676	Oct. 27	Refers to No. 88 and reports appeal by Count Sforza for H.M.G.'s support of suggested solution: he was personally strongly against annexing Fiume, but attitude of Italian armed forces uncertain.	136

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
90 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 677	Oct. 27	Refers to No. 89 and in company with French colleague, who is sending identic telegram to his Government, warns against possible disastrous consequences of U.S. rejection of Signor Tittoni's latest proposals.	137
91 MARQUIS IMPERIALI London	Oct. 27	Letter to Lord Hardinge enclosing memo. containing latest Italian proposals for settlement of Adriatic question: relies on co-operation of H.M.G.	138
92 SIGNOR NITTI Rome	Oct. 27	Telegram to Mr. Lloyd George: relies on his support at Washington for latest Italian proposals.	140
93 LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	Oct. 28	Note of a conversation with M. Cambon regarding attitude of U.S. Govt. to Signor Tittoni's latest proposals.	141
94 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 679	Oct. 29	Reports conversation with Signor Nitti who hoped that Prime Minister would use all his influence at Washington to induce President Wilson to reconsider his attitude regarding Fiume: Signor Nitti believed that unless Fiume question provoked some action on part of army he would be strong enough to maintain order and to put down any Bolshevik rising.	141
95 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 680	Oct. 29	Summarizes article in <i>Messagero</i> appreciating reception given to Gen. Diaz in London, but asking why England does not support Italy in her present dilemma: Sir G. Buchanan estimates beneficial effect on Anglo-Italian relations were H.M.G. able to induce U.S. Govt. to appreciate necessity of assisting Italian Govt. in finding a solution.	142
96 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 681	Oct. 30	Reports views of U.S. Chargé d'Affaires on attitude of French Govt. towards Fiume question.	143
97 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1310	Oct. 30	Instructions to report immediately views of Supreme Council on Signor Tittoni's latest Fiume proposals: asks what is last word of U.S. Delegation in matter.	144
98 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1505	Oct. 30	Question of Fiume has not come before Supreme Council and no communication has reached plenipotentiaries as to exact nature of Signor Tittoni's proposals: suggests that Sir G. Buchanan might be requested to intimate to Italian Govt. that if they want their proposals considered they should lay them before Supreme Council.	144
99 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1507	Oct. 31	American Delegation has received telegram stating that President Wilson will in no circumstances agree to Italian proposal for cession to Italy of coastal strip between Fiume and Italian boundary in Istria.	145

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
100 Sir E. Crowe Paris Tel. No. 1508	Oct. 31	Refers to No. 96 and fears that Sir G. Buchanan in expressing sympathy with French Govt. may be conveying impression that H.M.G. have considered Italian proposals and are favourably disposed towards them.	146
101 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 683	Oct. 31	Reports conversation of Naval Attaché with Minister of Marine who stated that solution of Fiume question in favour of Italy was essential if revolution was to be avoided, and regretted allegedly lukewarm attitude of H.M.G.	146
102 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 473	Oct. 31	Reports extravagant message of thanks from Signor D'Annunzio to Capt. Giulietti, secretary of Italian Seamen's Federation, for latter's action in diverting cargo of arms to Fiume.	146
		<i>Note 1.</i> Rome despatch No. 456 of Oct. 20: diversion of cargo of arms to Fiume: Fiume under martial law: views of French Ambassador on situation there.	146
103 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 474	Oct. 31	Surveys situation and stresses grave consequences likely to ensue if solution of Fiume question indefinitely postponed: urges that H.M.G. use all their influence to bring about settlement that would give reasonable satisfaction to national sentiment and enable Italian Govt. to devote its energies to reconstruction.	147
104 To Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 31	Refers to No. 92 and transmits message for Signor Nitti from Prime Minister stating that he is sending a personal telegram to President Wilson urging him to agree to meet Italian point of view.	150
105 To Viscount GREY Washington Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 31	Message from Prime Minister stressing reasons why President Wilson and U.S. Govt. should meet Italian point of view.	150
106 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 685	Oct. 31	Conveys thanks of Signor Nitti for Prime Minister's message: Signor Nitti stated that should President Wilson still prove obdurate only alternative would be for Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau to endeavour to induce Yugoslav Govt. to settle question by direct negotiation with Italy: Signor Nitto asks for permission to publish first half of Prime Minister's telegram with resumé of second: Sir G. Buchanan considers that publication would make good impression.	151
107 To Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 834	Nov. 1	Refers to No. 106 and explains why H.M.G. cannot consent to publication of Prime Minister's message to Signor Nitti.	152
108 To Mr. ATHELSTAN- JOHNSON Belgrade Tel. No. 316	Nov. 1	Instructions to express to Yugoslav Govt. confident hope that they will instruct their military authorities not to allow themselves to be drawn into a conflict however gross provocation offered by Signor D'Annunzio may appear to be.	152

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
109	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1511	Nov. 1	Reports U.S. attitude, as communicated by Mr. Polk, regarding Italian Govt.'s latest proposal: asks to be furnished with text of message sent to Signor Nitti by Prime Minister and for permission to show it to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk if necessary.	152
110	M. DUTASTA Paris	Nov. 2	Transmits to British Peace Delegation note to M. Clemenceau from Signor Tittoni protesting against Yugoslav allegations regarding Italian activities in Dalmatia.	154
111	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2073	Nov. 3	Transmits observations on report by Gen. Phillips on situation in Albania: Albanian feeling against an Italian mandate appears to be growing.	155
112	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 687	Nov. 3	Substance of No. 107 communicated to Signor Nitti: fact, however, that H.M. Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to support latest Italian proposal has been telegraphed from Paris and published in press.	156
113	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2081	Nov. 3	Refers to No. 109 and transmits summary paraphrase of telegram received by Mr. Polk defining attitude of U.S. Govt. in regard to Adriatic settlement: submits views, refers to lapses in Italian solidarity with Allies, and stresses importance of co-operation with U.S. Govt.	156
114	SIR E. CROWE Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 4	Letter to Lord Hardinge expressing his anxiety regarding outcome of Prime Minister's telegram to Signor Nitti and instructions to Lord Grey.	161
115	To SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 700	Nov. 7	Italian Ambassador has informed Lord Hardinge that in conversation with Prime Minister latter had suggested that it would be desirable that Zara should be allowed to choose its diplomatic representation: Signor Tittoni would agree provided other Italian demands were accepted.	162
116	SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 228	Nov. 7	Reports conversation with Assistant M.F.A. after presenting credentials on Nov. 6: M. Gavrilovich stated that stringent orders had been given to avoid conflict with Signor D'Annunzio's followers: transmits translation of decree of Nov. 4 declaring Sussak to be a separate township.	163
117	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1539	Nov. 8	Asks for guidance for a conversation with M. Clemenceau on Nov. 10 on subject of Signor Tittoni's proposals and President Wilson's appeal to Great Britain and France to support him in his attitude towards Italian Govt.	165
118	To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Nov. 9	Considerations advanced in Nos. 113 and 114 will be discussed with Prime Minister on Nov. 10 but they do not affect propriety of taking M. Clemenceau into confidence.	165

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
119 Sir E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1545	Nov. 10	Reports conversation with M. Clemenceau regarding question of Fiume and transmits memorandum handed to M. Clemenceau regarding telegrams exchanged between Signor Nitti and Prime Minister and latter's telegram to Washington: M. Clemenceau opposed to cession of coastal strip to Italy: it was agreed that precise statements should be obtained of Italian claims and of what President Wilson had agreed to accept. <i>Note 3.</i> Sir E. Crowe's telegram No. 1546 of Nov. 10: discussion between M. Clemenceau and Signor de Martino at meeting of Supreme Council that morning.	165
120 To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7480	Nov. 12	Transmits copies of correspondence with Prime Minister's private secretary regarding suggestion of Italian Ambassador that it might be possible for pressure to be put on Yugoslav Govt. to come to terms with Italian Govt. on basis of compromise proposed by Signor Tittoni.	169
121 Sir E. CROWE Paris No. 2142	Nov. 13	Submits critical observations on No. 91: transmits copies of Mr. Polk's memorandum on American attitude, and of statement of Italian demands furnished by Signor de Martino.	170
122 Sir E. CROWE Paris No. 2147	Nov. 14	Transmits memorandum of a conversation between Dr. Bowman of American Delegation and Mr. Leeper regarding Italian claims in Adriatic.	179
123 Mr. KERR London Unnumbered.	Nov. 14	Letter to Sir E. Crowe recording Prime Minister's views on Adriatic question.	182
124 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 695	Nov. 14	U.S. Chargé d'Affaires states that President Wilson has informed Italian Govt. that he cannot in any way consider Italian proposal regarding Fiume: Council of Ministers seriously considering situation.	183
125 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 696	Nov. 15	Signor D'Annunzio has sailed from Fiume to Zara: Signor Nitti optimistic as to result of elections: Sir G. Buchanan agrees with French Ambassador that only hope of a solution of Fiume question is in direct Italo-Yugoslav negotiations.	184
126 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 489	Nov. 15	Reports conversation with King of Italy on presentation of credentials: King complained that Italy had not received due recognition from Peace Conference: Adriatic question discussed.	184
127 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 699	Nov. 17	News regarding Zara likely to be published on November 18: Signor D'Annunzio reported to have returned to Fiume: Admiral Millo apparently went over to Signor D'Annunzio with five naval units.	187

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
128	SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 367	Nov. 17	Yugoslav Govt. have received information that Signor D'Annunzio has arrived at Zara with naval force: they have also heard that there are indications in Rome that Italian Govt. may proclaim annexation of Fiume.	187
129	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2168	Nov. 18	Transmits copies of two documents received from Mr. Polk: (1) detailed American commentary on Italian memorandum in No. 91: (2) memorandum setting forth final statement of position of U.S. Govt. on Adriatic question. Comments on documents and requests instructions if it is desired that he should take any further steps in matter.	187
130	SIR E. CROWE Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 18	Letter to Mr. Kerr acknowledging No. 123: all relevant material regarding Italian claims in Adriatic has now been submitted to F.O.: comments on Italian claims and procedure.	193
131	SIR E. CROWE Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 18	Letter to Lord Curzon: No. 129 completes information collected regarding Fiume negotiations: sends copies of Nos. 123 and 130 and states that he does not propose to take any further action unless directed.	193
132	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 701	Nov. 19	Refers to No. 127: information contained therein respecting Admiral Millo apparently incorrect: Naval Attaché informed by Minister of Marine that socialist electoral success had so incensed military party and adherents of Signor D'Annunzio that Government seriously feared action by him with view to provoking military pronunciamento and upsetting Government.	194
133	COL. PECK Abbazia Tel. No. S. 201	Nov. 19	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe, Paris: Signor D'Annunzio has appointed Admiral Millo first Governor of Dalmatia Italiana: Signor D'Annunzio has returned to Fiume and stated that question of Italian Adriatic would be settled with increased force of will and discipline.	195
134	SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 369	Nov. 19	Yugoslav Govt. have reason to believe that Signor D'Annunzio will make an attempt on Nov. 22 on Spalato where there are Yugoslav troops.	195
135	YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. 1590	Nov. 20	Note drawing attention of H.M.G. to danger of annexation of Fiume by Italy.	195
136	SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade No. 241	Nov. 22	One subject of paramount interest to Yugoslavia is Adriatic question: considers that although news of Signor D'Annunzio's exploits have been received with calm, there is an unshakable resolution to fight	196

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		sooner or later if Italy is kept in occupation or domination of Fiume: transmits Yugoslav press extract regarding events in Zara.	
137 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 379	Nov. 23	Crown Prince and Chief of General Staff told Military Attaché on Nov. 22 that if Italian forces crossed demarcation line at any one place, Yugoslavs would take offensive as being best defensive policy: records representations made to M.F.A. regarding matter.	199
138 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 707	Nov. 23	Reports conversation with Signor Nitti regarding Admiral Millo's conduct at Zara and possible future action of Signor D'Annunzio, who was stated to be encouraged by German admirers.	199
139 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 708	Nov. 23	Transmits summary of official communiqué regarding events at Zara and attitude of Italian Govt.	200
140 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 709	Nov. 23	Reports conversation with Signor Nitti regarding political situation and necessity for early solution of Fiume problem: Signor Nitti stated that latest Italian claim was minimum that would satisfy her and suggested that as U.S. seemed about to disinterest themselves in European questions, it would be easier for Great Britain and France to exert pressure on Yugoslavia.	202
141 To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7621	Nov. 24	Acknowledges No. 129 and agrees to allow U.S. Delegation to circulate memorandum in No. 91 as requested: authorizes discussion with U.S., French and Italian Delegates with view to arriving at just solution of problem at earliest possible date.	203
142 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1613	Nov. 25	Refers to No. 137: transmits and comments on communication from Yugoslav Peace Delegation calling attention to serious danger threatening from possible attempts of Signor D'Annunzio's forces on points within Yugoslav zone on Adriatic coast: reports conversation with M. Trumbitch.	204
143 GEN. DELME-RADCLIFFE Klagenfurt Tel. No. 11265	Nov. 25	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe, Paris: possibility that Signor D'Annunzio may be induced to leave Fiume and Italian troops with him may return to their duty: Gen. Badoglio negotiating with Signor D'Annunzio.	207
144 SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 497	Nov. 26	Draws attention to activities of Capt. Giulietti and his co-operation with Signor Mussolini and Signor D'Annunzio.	208
145 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 381	Nov. 26	French Minister having informed Yugoslav Govt. of Signor Nitti's pacific assurances, a semi-official communiqué has appeared to effect that there is no longer cause for same uneasiness.	210

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146	TO YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. 153959/W/3	Nov. 26	Note acknowledging No. 135: H.M.G. do not anticipate any action being taken by Italian Govt. of nature which Yugoslav Govt. appear to fear.	210
147	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 716	Nov. 27	Reports conversation with Signor Tittoni on his retirement from Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Signor Tittoni spoke of possibility of direct negotiations with Yugoslavia regarding Fiume if U.S. Govt. were to withdraw from Conference.	211
148	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 720	Nov. 28	Admiral Millo has not yet been recalled: Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs believed Italian Govt. intended to recall Admiral, and gave reason for delay.	212
149	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 724	Nov. 28	French Ambassador protested to Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs against what he considers an unjustifiable attack on Allies in Signor Nitti's message to American people: comments on message and states that he proposes to take no action unless instructed. <i>Note 1.</i> Rome telegram No. 723 of Nov. 28 summarizing account of interview granted by Signor Nitti to an agent of Associated Press.	212
150	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1630	Nov. 29	Refers to No. 141 and reports conversation with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk on Nov. 28: was agreed that a joint communication should be made to Italian delegate, and draft will shortly be despatched to F.O. for approval.	214
151	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1640	Dec. 2	Provisional draft of memorandum to be communicated to Italian delegate is being sent to F.O.: Signor Scialoja's forthcoming visit to London.	215
152	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2236	Dec. 2	Transmits preliminary draft of memorandum to Italian delegate.	215
153	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7760	Dec. 2	Transmits copy of Admiralty letter of Dec. 1: Admiralty consider that events in Adriatic now justify a reversal of their policy and despatch of a naval force to Adriatic: further consider that French Govt. should be asked to co-operate. <i>Note 1.</i> F.O. letter of Nov. 28 transmitting to Admiralty a copy of No. 142 and suggesting that an Anglo-French naval squadron should be sent to the Adriatic.	224
154	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1648	Dec. 3	M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk have approved draft memorandum to Italian delegate with only a few minor alterations: requests early authorization to sign memorandum together with Mr. Polk and M. Clemenceau so that it may be communicated to Signor Scialoja before his departure for London.	226

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
155 Sir A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 388	Dec. 3	French Minister learns that Yugoslav Minister in Rome has telegraphed to his Government that in his opinion favourable moment has arrived for it to enter into direct negotiations with Italy.	226
156 YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	Dec. 4	Memorandum advocating Allied naval action against activities of Signor D'Annunzio who was reported to be preparing further attacks.	226
157 COL. PECK Abbazia Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 5	Telegram to Sir E. Crowe transmitting text of Signor D'Annunzio's counter-proposals in reply to Gen. Badoglio: message placarded as well as dropped by aeroplane into Abbazia.	228
158 To Sir E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1444	Dec. 5	Refers to No. 153: it was decided on Dec. 4 that return of fleet to Corfu at present juncture would be inadvisable.	228
159 To Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 5	Asks opinion as to effect which proposal that British fleet should visit Corfu would have on Italian public opinion.	228
160 To Sir E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1445	Dec. 5	H.M.G. would prefer that presentation by Supreme Council of memorandum be deferred for moment: copy would be shown to Signor Scialoja unofficially on Dec. 8 and he would be told that H.M.G. regard it as a fair settlement which they see no reason why Italian Govt. should not accept.	229
161 Sir E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1665	Dec. 6	Refers to No. 160: M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk are disappointed with decision: urges that H.M.G. approve memorandum without awaiting result of proposed conversation with Signor Scialoja, so that memorandum can be signed by Mr. Polk before his departure from Paris.	229
162 Sir G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 6	Refers to No. 159 and considers proposal would create a deplorable impression in Italy: considers it better to leave Signor D'Annunzio alone in hope that Signor Nitti may induce him to leave Fiume.	230
163 GEN. DELME-RAD- CLIFFE Klagenfurt Tel. No. 11267	Dec. 7	Informs Sir E. Crowe, Paris, that Gen. Badoglio hopes to settle Fiume difficulty shortly and would then assume functions of Chief of Staff; Gen. Badoglio thinks Signor D'Annunzio is really anxious to leave Fiume.	231
164 M. DUTASTA Paris	Dec. 8	Transmits to British Peace Delegation copy of note from M. Pachitch warning M. Clemenceau of alleged plan for further operations by Signor D'Annunzio in Dalmatia.	231

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>165 To SIR G. BUCHANAN</b> Rome No. 806	Dec. 8	Records conversation with Signor Scialoja and Italian Ambassador regarding Allied note in reply to Italian proposals for settlement of Adriatic question: Italian M.F.A. criticized note and asked that it should not be presented: Signor Scialoja hoped that he might be invited to attend meeting with M. Clemenceau in London in order to discuss question.	232
<b>166 To SIR E. CROWE</b> Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 8	Instructions to see M. Clemenceau and impress upon him great danger of divulgation of contents of note in press or otherwise in Paris.	237
<b>167 To MARQUIS IMPERIALI</b> London Unnumbered	Dec. 8	Suggests that Ambassador might telegraph to Signor Nitti and ask him whether he has anything to put forward should a discussion with M. Clemenceau and Signor Scialoja take place regarding question of the Adriatic.	237
<b>168 SIR G. BUCHANAN</b> Rome Tel. No. 747	Dec. 9	Reports information from French Ambassador regarding Signor Nitti's negotiations with Signor D'Annunzio: on latter's departure he would recall Admiral Millo with a view to entering into direct negotiations with Yugoslav Govt.	237
<b>169 SIR E. CROWE</b> Paris Tel. No. 1674	Dec. 9	Allied note signed that day and will be handed to Signor Scialoja as soon as he returns to Paris.	238
<b>170 SIR G. BUCHANAN</b> Rome Tel. No. 748	Dec. 12	Message from Military Attaché: some difference of opinion known to exist between Signor D'Annunzio and some of his staff: Minister of War indicated that Italian army as a whole was sick of war, and he was optimistic of agreement between Italian Govt. and Signor D'Annunzio provided Government's position not compromised by threat of Allied force to settle question.	238
<b>171 SIR A. YOUNG</b> Belgrade No. 266	Dec. 12	Reports conversation with Assistant M.F.A. regarding prospects of solution of Adriatic question: question of direct Italo-Yugoslav negotiations: M. Miloyevitch privately inclined to prefer that Conference should be the arbiters.	239
<b>172 To SIR G. BUCHANAN</b> Rome Tel. No. 900	Dec. 15	At conference in Downing St. Allied note was formally presented to Signor Scialoja: Signor Nitti invited to attend forthcoming Allied conference to which he would bring Italian reply: meanwhile Signor Nitti was strongly urged to desist from any negotiations which might present Allies with a <i>fait accompli</i> negotiated with Signor D'Annunzio.	240

## CHAPTER II

Policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Syria and Palestine  
before the First Conference of London, May 30, 1919–February 12, 1920

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Introductory Note: correspondence embodying the Sykes-Picot Agreement: correspondence of April–May 1919 concerning negotiations between Emir Feisal and M. Clemenceau.	241
173 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 842	May 30	Records conversation with French Ambassador regarding mandates, attribution of military commands in Turkey, control of Heraclea port and coalmines and Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.	254
174 GEN. SIR E. ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. E.A. 2484	May 30	Transmits to Mr. Balfour (Paris) two telegrams from Emir Feisal regarding rumours of non-arrival of Interallied Commission, of arrival of big French army, and withdrawal of British troops from Syria: Gen. Allenby regards situation as extremely grave and states that unless he can reassure Emir Feisal, and tell him that Commission is coming, latter will raise Arabs against French and British.	256
175 GENERAL CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 508	May 30	Inquires of Mr. Balfour (Paris) whether American section of Interallied Commission to Near East is coming separately to Syria and Palestine: considers that the Commission should come as one body.	257
176 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris G.F. 43	May 31	Discussion regarding the proposed Interallied Commission to the Near East: correspondence with Gen. Allenby.	257
177 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 48	May 31	Telegram to Gen. Allenby (Cairo) explaining why British representatives on the Commission will not be sent: instructions to state on arrival of American members that H.M.G. will give fullest weight to advice which Supreme Council will receive from American Commissioners.	259
178 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 49	May 31	Informs Gen. Allenby (Cairo) that Commission will have no power to decide future of ex-Turkish territories, but will advise Supreme Council who will have to take final decision.	259
179 GEN. SIR E. ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. E.A. 2487	May 31	Telegram to Mr. Balfour (Paris) referring to No. 174 and repeating telegram sent to Emir Feisal acknowledging his two telegrams and urging him to await reply to his inquiries transmitted to F.O. and W.O.	259
180 MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 861	May 31	Transmits copies of correspondence between Mr. Frankfurter and President Wilson regarding the establishment of Palestine as Jewish National Home.	260

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181	GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. E.A. 2491	June 1	Reports information from M. Picot regarding alleged partition of Syria projected without knowledge of Emir Feisal: points out dangerous situation which will be created if Emir Feisal finds that fate of Syria has been decided without his knowledge and before Commission has made its report.	263
182	GEN. CLAYTON Cairo No. C.P.O. 93/2	June 5	Transmits report with enclosures from Deputy Chief Political Officer at Damascus regarding political situation in Syria, &c. <i>Note 3.</i> Cairo telegram No. E.A. 2457 of May 21: Emir Feisal's policy towards the French Govt.	263 265
183	GEN. CLAYTON Cairo No. C.P.O. 107/5	June 8	Stresses importance which people of Palestine and Syria attach to the Commission. <i>Note 1.</i> Cairo telegram No. C. 155 of May 2: strong Arab opposition in Palestine to the Zionist program.	272 272
184	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 876	June 11	Records observations made to French Ambassador regarding position of France in Syria and conduct of M. Picot.	274
185	GEN. SIR E. ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. E.A. 2529	June 12	Transmits texts of telegrams exchanged with Emir Feisal regarding functions of Commission being sent to Syria and question of future of the country: Syrian opposition to a French mandate: H.M.G. unwilling to accept the mandate.	275
186	TO GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 194	June 13	Zionist Organization has asked assistance of Treasury to enable large funds in Eastern Europe and Siberia to be made available for use in Palestine: asks for views.	276
187	GENERAL CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. E.A. 2536	June 15	Refers to No. 185 and transmits telegram received from Emir Feisal stating that Syrians will be unanimous in expressing to Commission their wish that Great Britain should take mandate for Syria.	277
188	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1053	June 16	Refers to request from Gen. Clayton that he might announce that Peace Conference and not only H.M.G. would attach fullest weight to American Commissioners' advice, and states that French Govt. would probably not agree to such an announcement.	277
189	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 22	June 16	Telegram to Gen. Clayton, Cairo: Zionist Organization in United States is sending two geologists to conduct investigations in Palestine with reference to oil and minerals: asks that necessary facilities may be given them.	277

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
190 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 605	June 17	Telegram to Lord Hardinge reporting that Capt. Yale is working with the American Commission and that his connexion with Standard Oil Company is known.	278
191 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 58	June 18	Telegram to Gen. Allenby, Cairo, transmitting message from Dr. Weizmann to Zionist Commission, Jaffa, regarding presentation of Zionist case to American Commissioners.	278
192 COL. CORNWALLIS Cairo	June	Memorandum recording the Emir Feisal's account of his conversation of M. Picot on June 18: discussion regarding future of Syria and the status of the American Commission.	273
193 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 347	June 19	Refers to No. 186: is not in a position to judge financial desirability of proposal but until future status of Palestine is decided there is no opening for investment of large funds in Palestine which is still under military administration.	280
194 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 350	June 19	Refers to No. 189: no objection to the geologists visiting Palestine provided they come in private capacity and render copies of their reports to the military administration.	280
195 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 348	June 19	Transmits information regarding draft ordinance providing for reopening of land transactions on limited scale under official control.	280
196 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo No. C.P.O. 190	June 19	Considers that unity of opinion among Allied Govts. on subject of Palestine is not a factor which tends to alleviate dislike of Palestinian Arabs for Zionist policy; they fear that decision will be forced upon them by Peace Conference before they have had an opportunity of expressing their aspirations.	281
<i>Note 4.</i> Despatch No. 760 of May 19 from Mr. Balfour, Paris: refers to No. 183, note 1, and makes suggestions with a view to allaying hostility to Zionism in Palestine.			
197 TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 4010	June 19	Transmits copies of correspondence exchanged with Mr. Herbert Samuel regarding hostility in Palestine towards Zionist program.	282
198 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 351	June 20	Reports proposed program of American Commissioners to Palestine and Syria who arrived at Jaffa on June 10: summarizes statement issued by Commissioners.	285
199 GEN. CLAYTON Cairo No. C.P.O. 311	June 23	Summarizes situation in Syria: seems little doubt that Emir Feisal has not changed his attitude of opposition to any form of French intervention in Syria; encloses records of conversations with Emir Feisal.	286

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
200	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1049	June 23	Transmits copy of note to Gen. Clayton, Cairo, regarding visit of Dr. Weizmann and Justice Brandeis to Palestine.	294
201	GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. E.A. 2555	June 24	Considers that in view of importance attached by people of Syria and Palestine to mission of American Commissioners no decision regarding future status of those countries should be published till Commission has reported.	295
202	GEN. SIR E. ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1028	June 24	Transmits paraphrase of message from King Hussein to Emir Feisal regarding course he should follow.	296
203	TO GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 205	June 24	Asks for views on suggestion of Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, that as Arab army is financed from H.M. Treasury, pressure should be brought to bear upon Emir Feisal to restrict his activities and those of his staff to Syria.	296
204	TO GEN. CLAYTON Cairo Tel. No. 207	June 24	Spread of Emir Feisal's propaganda for complete independence of Arabia is causing considerable apprehension in London and Bagdad: instructions to impress on British officers that movement should be strongly discouraged. <i>Note 2.</i> Memorandum of June 23 by Emir Feisal's Chief Aide-de-Camp advocating federal union of Arab states.	296
205	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 92	June 25	Statement by Mr. Lloyd George regarding the steps he had taken to make it clear that Great Britain would in no circumstances accept a mandate for Syria.	297
206	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 59	June 26	Telegram to Gen. Allenby, Cairo, reiterating that under no circumstances can Great Britain undertake a mandate for Syria and that Emir Feisal should be brought to appreciate fact.	298
207	COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 362	June 26	Refers to No. 203: fear of French mandate and knowledge of French propaganda has led Emir Feisal to adopt program for complete Arab independence: Commander-in-Chief is proceeding to Damascus shortly and will again impress on Emir Feisal importance of restraining activities of his agents.	299
208	COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 363	June 26	Refers to No. 204: agitation in question derives no support from British officers in Syria who limit themselves to assisting and advising Arab administrators.	299
209	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 4330	June 26	Transmits copy of a letter from W.O. stating that Army Council agree with Gen. Allenby that any increase of Jewish troops in Palestine is most undesirable.	299
210	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1132	July 1	Acknowledges No. 197 and suggests action which might be taken on Mr. Samuel's proposals.	300

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	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
211	Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1158	July 2	Transmits copy of memorandum of June 26 written by Mr. Balfour for Mr. Lloyd George regarding disposal of Turkish territories.	301
212	Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1148	July 2	Transmits copies of correspondence between Dr. Weizmann and Sir L. Mallet regarding proposed Zionist activities in Palestine.	303
213	Sir R. GRAHAM Foreign Office	July 2	Note of conversations with Mr. Samuel and Dr. Weizmann regarding situation in Palestine, which from Zionist point of view was most disquieting.	307
214	Gen. SIR E. ALLENBY Ramleh Tel. No. 1071	July 6	M. Picot intimates that King Hussein had suggested to him that French troops should be sent to Hejaz. Gen. Allenby doubts accuracy of intimation and in reply to question he informed M. Picot that he thought it inadvisable to send any troops to Hejaz.	308
215	Gen. SIR E. ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1074	July 6	M. Picot states that Emir Feisal had suggested to him that French should interest themselves in Mesopotamia: Gen. Allenby does not believe this.	309
216	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 858	July 7	Summarizes article by 'Pertinax' in <i>Echo de Paris</i> regarding French interests in former Turkish Empire.	309
217	COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 512578	July 7	Has visited Damascus and seen American Commissioners, who are making good progress; also saw Emir Feisal and advised him to return to Paris after Commissioners had finished their tour; Emir Feisal anxious that no decision regarding future of Palestine and Syria should be taken until Commission had reported.	310
218	To COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 218	July 9	Refers to No. 195: previously indicated limitations and general policy regarding land transactions should be borne in mind: requests that land ordinance be sent for approval before issue. <i>Note 2.</i> Despatch No. 678 of May 7 from Mr. Balfour, Paris, regarding implications of policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine.	310
219	COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 378	July 10	Reports on an interview between Emir Feisal and American Commissioners on July 3: summarizes written statement handed to American Commissioners by Emir Feisal.	311
220	Mr. GOSLING Prague No. 100	July 11	Reports proposals made by M. Trietsch, a prominent Zionist, regarding Jewish colonization of Cyprus, and the frontiers of Palestine; considers it desirable that genuine Zionists from Central Europe should be afforded facilities for return to Palestine in accordance with their strong desire.	313

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
221 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 66	July 15	Telegram to Gen. Allenby, Cairo, transmitting message from Col. T. E. Lawrence to Emir Feisal recommending that he should not come to Paris till September.	314
222 COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 385	July 17	Transmits telegram from Political Officer, Damascus, regarding visit to Paris of Emir Feisal, who stated that if his departure was prevented or unduly postponed he would feel bound to take defensive measures against a possible adverse decision by decreeing mobilization.	314
223 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 994	July 17	Col. Lawrence proposes to return to Paris to be with Emir Feisal; considers that further co-operation between them will cause serious embarrassment with French authorities; suggests that Col. Lawrence might be refused permission to return to Paris. <i>Note 1.</i> Reply of Aug. 13 from Mr. Balfour, stating that the services of Col. Lawrence are likely to be required in Paris.	315
224 COL. FRENCH Cairo No. C.P.O. 311	July 19	Summarizes most important ideas and conclusions of American Commissioners regarding Palestine and Syria.	315
225 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1001	July 21	Views on Emir Feisal's proposed visit to Paris.	316
226 COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 388	July 24	Refers to No. 225 and suggests that Emir Feisal be informed that H.M.G. do not consider his presence in Paris necessary till September or whatever date is decided.	316
227 MR. NOEL BAKER London Unnumbered	July 24	Letter to Mr. Forbes Adam, Paris, informing him of a decision that Commission on Mandates should draw up a draft Palestinian mandate and publish it at once; thinks it desirable that Mr. Forbes Adam should come to London for conversations.	317
228 SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 905	July 26	Summarizes article by M. de Caix in <i>Bulletin de l'Asie Française</i> violently attacking British propaganda against France in the Levant; also summarizes article in <i>Temps</i> of July 26 practically endorsing M. de Caix's views.	318
229 SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 738	July 27	Refers to No. 228 and comments on harmful effect on Anglo-French relations of the articles in question.	320
230 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1208	July 28	Transmits text of note received from M. Pichon complaining of action and policy of H.M.G. in Syria and the Hejaz: considers it desirable that the note should, if possible, receive an immediate and stiff reply.	321

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
231 Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1457	July 30	Transmits copy of letter from Dr. Weizmann to Mr. Forbes Adam regarding Jewish immigration and militia in Palestine: suggests reply to be returned and asks whether Lord Curzon concurs.	323
232 Gen. Sir E. ALLENBY Ramleh Tel. No. 1177	July 30	Summarizes article submitted to a Jewish paper in Palestine by Zionist organization; article implies unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine; it is urged that Zionists should be told to restrain their press supporters and to be moderate and cautious.	324
233 To COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 240	July 31	Zionist organization are pressing for facilities for entry into Palestine of commissions of experts to examine schemes for irrigation, &c.; it is proposed to grant facilities provided commissions are unofficial.	325
234 Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1485	Aug. 1	Transmits letter from Dr. Weizmann expressing hope that new appointments to official positions in Palestine will be given to persons who are in complete sympathy with policy of H.M.G. regarding Zionism; trusts that F.O. and W.O. will endeavour to meet Dr. Weizmann's wishes in matter of these new appointments.	326
235 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 5148	Aug. 1	Refers to No. 230 and transmits copy of note from M. Cambon on same subject; Gen. Allenby has been asked to telegraph his observations on French complaints and meanwhile question is being examined and detailed reply being prepared.	327
236 To COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 245	Aug. 4	Statement for information and guidance regarding H.M.G.'s policy respecting mandate for Palestine, which will embody substance of Balfour Declaration pledging support for establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home.	329
237 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Aug. 5	Questions propriety of giving preference to Mr. Samuel's Committee or to Zionist Organization in respect of privileged information concerning commercial and economic development of Palestine before mandate has been given.	329
238 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 5282	Aug. 8	Transmits minutes of a meeting between Gen. Clayton and Zionist Organization on July 9 to discuss Zionist questions.	330
239 To Sir G. GRAHAME Paris No. 1041	Aug. 8	Records protest made to M. de Fleurieu of French Embassy regarding unjustifiable attacks in French press on British administration and policy in Syria; sends instructions to make similar representations to French Govt.	335

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
240	To COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 250	Aug. 9	Requests information, for Peace Delegation, regarding (a) concessions in Syria or Palestine in which British interests participate; (b) concessions of any kind in Palestine.	337
241	COL. FRENCH Cairo No. C.P.O. 31/1	Aug. 11	Transmits copy of a despatch from Field-Marshal Allenby to Mr. Churchill regarding the visit to Palestine of Mr. Justice Brandeis.	338
242	MR. BALFOUR Paris	Aug. 11	Memorandum respecting Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.	340
243	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 791	Aug. 12	Reports representations made to M.F.A. regarding anti-British press campaign in connexion with Syria: M. Pichon declared French Government were unable to control press and appeared to be convinced that French authorities had good grounds for complaint.	349
244	COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 405	Aug. 13	Reports that Standard Oil Company have applied for permission to resume operations in Palestine, and asks whether this may be granted; Chief Administrator recommends that permission be given.	352
245	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Unnumbered	Aug. 14	Letter to Sir R. Graham suggesting that H.M.G. might give French Govt. to understand that if they want continued British support in Syria they should abate their pretensions about Tangier.	352
246	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 954	Aug. 14	Reports publication in <i>Intransigeant</i> of statement to effect that Lord Curzon stated in private conversation that H.M.G. had always denied any pretensions to Syria and had constantly supported French claims at Peace Conference.	353
247	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 805	Aug. 18	Summarizes article in <i>Journal des Débats</i> by M. de Caix commenting on denial recently given by Lord Curzon in regard to alleged British pretensions in Syria.	353
248	MR. CLARK-KERR Foreign Office No. 116059/ME. 44A	Aug. 21	Letter to Mr. Vansittart, Paris, expressing anxiety regarding activities of Col. Lawrence: prospect of his return to Paris in any capacity is viewed with grave misgivings.	354
249	To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5575	Aug. 21	Reports request of Dr. Weizmann for permission to publish a statement embodying substance of No. 236; points out that if statement is published it will probably be taken to represent not only views of H.M.G. but also of Peace Conference; suggests Field-Marshal Allenby might be consulted.	355
250	To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5636	Aug. 25	Refers to No. 235 and transmits correspondence with W.O. and French Ambassador concerning French representations regarding action and policy of H.M.G. in Syria and Hejaz.	355

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
21	21 FRENCH EMBASSY London	Aug. 25	Note stating that King Hussein has requested the supply of four French tanks for protection of pilgrims on Medina road and that M. Pichon does not consider it opportune to grant this request.	359
22	22 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Aug. 26	Refers to No. 237: it has been decided to take no further action for the present.	360
23	23 COL. FRENCH Cairo No. C.P.O. 31/110	Aug. 26	Transmits report of Aug. 12 from Assistant Political Officer at Jerusalem regarding Arab movement and Zionism: facts may be taken as indicative of widespread antagonism and organization against Zionist programme throughout Palestine at present juncture.	360
24	24 To F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 986	Aug. 29	Asks whether he can confirm that King Hussein has asked French for despatch of four French tanks for protection of pilgrims on Medina road.	365
25	25 COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 414	Aug. 29	Summarizes memorandum received by Field-Marshal Allenby from Emir Feisal warning him that if country is divided or a mandate given contrary to wishes of people there will be a general Arab rising.	365
26	26 To COL. FRENCH Cairo Tel. No. 271	Aug. 30	Refers to No. 244 and states that permission for Standard Oil Company to resume operations in Palestine cannot be granted until question of mandate has been settled.	366
27	27 COL. FRENCH Cairo No. C.P.O. 311	Aug. 30	Summarizes present situation in Syria and Palestine.	367
28	28 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 418	Sept. 3	Report from Damascus that volunteers are being enrolled and swearing to defend country against partition; Field-Marshal Allenby has telegraphed to Emir Feisal disapproving of movement and expressing hope that he will use his influence against it.	370
29	29 MR. VANSITTART Paris Unnumbered	Sept. 3	Letter to Mr. Clark-Kerr acknowledging No. 248; Col. Lawrence should be considered as being under F.O.; his presence in Paris is considered desirable in order to promote an agreement between Emir Feisal and French Govt.	370
30	30 SIR M. CHEETHAM Cairo Tel. No. 1332	Sept. 5	Refers to No. 254: British Agent at Jeddah has been unable to obtain any confirmation of request for French tanks.	371
31	31 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London No. 121038/ME. 44A	Sept. 6	Refers to Ambassador's note enclosed in No. 235 and communicates report of military authorities regarding equipment of an Arab mixed brigade and gendarmerie, and arrest of certain Arabs.	371

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>262 FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES</b> London	Sept. 8	Note regarding desire of an Anglo-French group to carry out researches for petroleum in Palestine and Akaba district; states sympathetic views of French Govt. and asks for those of H.M.G..	372
<b>263 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN</b> Cairo Tel. No. 422	Sept. 8	Urge that Emir Feisal be allowed to go to Paris without delay if Mr. Lloyd George is proceeding there to confer on Syrian question.	373
<b>264 TO MR. BALFOUR</b> Paris Tel. No. 1140	Sept. 9	Refers to No. 263 and states that Prime Minister considers suggestion an excellent one; Lord Curzon has pointed out that assent of French Govt. should be obtained.	373
<b>265 MR. BALFOUR</b> Paris	Sept. 9	Memorandum on difficulties to be borne in mind in any Syrian negotiations.	373
<b>266 SIR M. CHEETHAM</b> Cairo Tel. No. 1341	Sept. 9	Transmits telegram from King Hussein for transmission to His Majesty regarding Arab aspirations.	374
<b>267 DELEGATION OF THE HEJAZ</b> Paris	Sept. 10	Transmits memorandum to Secretary of British Delegation regarding future of Syria and other Arab territories.	375
<b>268 SIR G. GRAHAME</b> Paris No. 888	Sept. 10	Summarizes article by M. Capus in <i>Figaro</i> emphasizing importance of Franco-British friendship; comments on article and on previous articles criticizing British action in Syria.	377
<b>269 MR. BALFOUR</b> Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 11	Transmits message from Prime Minister for Emir Feisal advising him to come to Paris at once.	379
<b>270 MR. LLOYD GEORGE</b> Deauville Unnumbered	Sept. 11	Message for M. Clemenceau regarding discussion of Syrian and Armenian questions in Paris. Prime Minister proposes to arrive on Sept. 12 and informs M. Clemenceau of invitation extended to Emir Feisal.	379
<b>271 M. CLEMENCEAU</b> Paris	Sept. 11	Message for Mr. Lloyd George stating that in M. Clemenceau's opinion it is impossible to isolate question of Syria from other questions connected with final liquidation of Ottoman Empire; question of relief of British forces in Syria really only concerns French and British Govts.; in the circumstances the journey of Emir Feisal at this juncture would not appear to have any definite object in view.	380
<b>272 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN</b> Cairo Tel. No. 429	Sept. 11	Reports on meeting with Emir Feisal and M. Laforcade at Damascus on Sept. 9 when fresh exchange of views took place.	381
<b>273 MR. BALFOUR</b> Paris No. 1797	Sept. 11	Refers to No. 249 and withdraws consent to publication of statement desired by Dr. Weizmann.	381

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
274 To COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 283	Sept. 11	Zionist organization in Odessa desire to repatriate to Palestine 350 Jewish refugees expelled by Turks in 1915; asks whether anything can be done.	382
275 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 431	Sept. 12	Refers to No. 256 and asks whether geographical survey is included in refusal for Standard Oil Company to resume operations in Palestine at present.	382
276 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 443	Sept. 12	Refers to No. 272 and reports discussion with Emir Feisal wherein he reaffirmed his policy of a united Syria to absolute exclusion of France and everything French; urges H.M.G. to give clear assurance to Emir Feisal that they still adhere to 1918 Agreement and that no Syrian settlement will be made contrary to wishes of people.	382
277 Sir M. CHEETHAM Ramleh Tel. No. 1362	Sept. 13	Transmits text of telegram from King Hussein to Emir Feisal directing him to inform Peace Conference that if country is partitioned he will resign.	383
278 Sir M. HANKEY London No. 18/Q/252	Sept. 17	Memorandum summarizing proceedings in Paris in regard to military occupation of Syria, Cilicia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia; appends a letter from Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George, and a record of a statement made by Emir Feisal to Field-Marshal Allenby's Chief of Staff.	384
279 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Sept. 17	Acknowledges No. 262 and explains why H.M.G. is at present unable to grant the permission requested by the Anglo-French group.	391
280 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 440	Sept. 17	Message for Dr. Weizmann asking him to come to Palestine as soon as possible, accompanied by Prof. Frankfurter.	391
281 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 444	Sept. 18	Refers to No. 274: no objection to return of genuine refugees from Russia provided Dr. Weizmann guarantees that they are not Bolsheviks and on understanding that administration is not put to any expense.	392
282 Sir G. GRAHAME Paris No. 909	Sept. 18	Summarizes French press comment on provisional agreement for relief of British by French troops in Syria.	392
283 Sir M. HANKEY London Unnumbered	Sept. 19	Letter to Sir E. Crowe, Paris, transmitting notes of a meeting in Downing St. between British representatives and Emir Feisal: question as to whether these notes should be communicated to M. Clemenceau.	395
284 EMIR ZEID Damascus	Sept. 20	Letter to King Hussein regarding grave situation in Syria and intensity of Arab national feeling.	405
285 To COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 297	Sept. 20	Refers to No. 275: refusal equally applies to all surveys.	406

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
286 EMIR FEISAL London	Sept. 21	Letter to Prime Minister criticizing aide-mémoire received from him regarding military occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending a decision in regard to mandates.	406
287 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 450	Sept. 22	Reports incident indicating determination of Arabs to oppose French, and suggests that latter be warned of consequences likely to follow evacuation of British troops from Syria.	409
288 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 452	Sept. 23	Transmits telegram from Emir Zeid to Emir Feisal regarding disturbances which will follow British withdrawal. <i>Note 2.</i> Tel. No. E.A. 2703 of Sept. 23 from British G.H.Q., Cairo: views on Emir Zeid's telegram and on position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.	410
289 SIR M. CHEETHAM Ramleh Tel. No. 1385	Sept. 23	Transmits paraphrase of telegram from Emir Feisal to King Hussein announcing his arrival in London and meeting with Cabinet, and asking for date of treaty sent to him on July 17.	411
290 SIR M. CHEETHAM Ramleh Tel. No. 1386	Sept. 23	Transmits paraphrase of telegram from Emir Feisal to King Hussein asking for all correspondence with British authorities from earliest negotiations.	411
291 SIR M. CHEETHAM Cairo Tel. No. 1387	Sept. 23	Transmits paraphrase of telegram from Emir Feisal to King Hussein referring to No. 290: dates and numbers are required on account of a difference which has arisen on question of Syrian coasts.	412
292 EMIR FEISAL London	Sept. 23	Letter to Mr. Lloyd George explaining his refusal to discuss with F.-M. Allenby question of British evacuation of Syria.	412
293 ANGLO-ARAB MEETING London	Sept. 23	Notes of a further meeting: questions of alleged treaty between King Hussein and H.M.G., and of withdrawal of British forces from Syria.	413
294 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 6206	Sept. 24	Records conversation of Lord Hardinge with French Ambassador when Lord Hardinge complained of French press attacks against British policy in Syria: attention of French Ambassador also drawn to hostile attitude of French Minister in Tehran regarding Anglo-Persian Agreement.	419
295 COL. CORNWALLIS London	Sept. 25	Note on conversations with Emir Feisal: if reply of H.M.G. unsatisfactory to Emir Feisal he intends to make a further appeal to Prime Minister and to place before him certain alternative proposals: discussions between Emir Feisal and Dr. Weizmann.	421

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
26	COL LAWRENCE London Unnumbered	Sept. 25	Letter to Lord Curzon setting forth advice which he would give to Emir Feisal: suggests manner in which Hejaz subsidy might be regulated: advocates progressively liberal British administration in Mesopotamia.	422
27	SIR M. CHEETHAM Cairo Tel. No. 1400	Sept. 25	Transmits text of King Hussein's reply to Emir Feisal's telegrams in Nos. 289-91.	424
28	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. C.P.O. 31/1	Sept. 26	Transmits observations on state of Zionism in Palestine.	425
29	MR. FORBES ADAM Paris	Sept. 26	Memorandum enclosing two drafts for Palestine mandate drawn up by Political Section of British Delegation and by Zionist Organization respectively.	428
30	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 1879	Sept. 29	Transmits minute by Mr. Forbes Adam on conversation with Maronite Patriarch of Antioch: claims of Lebanese Christians.	439
31	SIR M. CHEETHAM Cairo Tel. No. 1414	Sept. 29	Transmits paraphrase of Emir Feisal's telegram to Emir Abdulla regarding his negotiations in London.	440
32	TO COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. 527	Oct. 1	Asks as to approximate number of Jews who have entered Palestine since beginning of British occupation.	441
33	SIR M. CHEETHAM Alexandria Tel. No. 1428	Oct. 2	Transmits paraphrase of Emir Feisal's telegram to King Hussein regarding Sir H. McMahon's letter of March 10, 1916	441
34	SIR M. CHEETHAM Ramleh Tel. No. 1438	Oct. 4	Transmits paraphrase of King Hussein's telegram to Emir Feisal replying to that in No. 303.	442
35	SIR M. CHEETHAM Ramleh Tel. No. 1439	Oct. 4	Transmits message from Emir Abdulla to Prime Minister stating that Arab nation is much perturbed by press statements regarding future of Arab countries and hoping that Mr. Lloyd George will assist Emir Feisal in securing fulfilment of Arab hopes.	442
36	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 466	Oct. 7	Acting C.-in-C. has ordered that Dr. Weizmann be refused admittance to Palestine unless F.-M. Allenby approves: hopes that F.-M. Allenby's approval will be telegraphed urgently.	442
37	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 467	Oct. 7	Transmits report that Vatican circles deprecate Zionism which they regard as blow to Christian conscience.	443
38	EMIR FEISAL London	Oct. 9	Letter to Mr. Lloyd George proposing (1) that arrangement for relief of British troops in Syria by French troops should be cancelled or at least suspended, and (2) that whole question be placed before Peace Conference for final settlement without delay.	443

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
309 To EMIR FEISAL London	Oct. 9	Acknowledges No. 286 and refers to Hussein-McMahon correspondence: explains reasons for relief of British troops in Syria, and urges acceptance of temporary arrangement proposed: military resistance would be fatal to Arab aspirations and prosperity.	44
310 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 977	Oct. 9	Gen. Gouraud appointed French High Commissioner and C.-in-C. in Syria: comments on Gen. Gouraud's experience and popularity.	44
311 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 469	Oct. 10	Transmits message for His Majesty from Lebanese Civil Defence Committee through Emir Zeid stating that Druses of Lebanon are now under French and Maronite pressure and asking that withdrawal of British troops be stopped: points out dangerous situation of country.	45
312 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Alexandria Tel. No. 470	Oct. 10	Refers to No. 311: little doubt that French policy has favoured Maronites at expense of Druses in Lebanon and that armed conflicts inevitable on withdrawal of British forces.	45
313 MR. LLOYD GEORGE London	Oct. 10	Letter to Emir Feisal acknowledging No. 308 and informing him that it is impossible for H.M.G. to withdraw their proposals for dealing with Syrian problem in interim until Peace Conference can settle it: H.M.G. would, however, be glad to arrange meeting between Emir Feisal and French, British and American representatives to adjust problems involved in impending British withdrawal.	45
314 SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 1931	Oct. 10	Transmits reply of French Govt. to British memorandum of Sept. 13 respecting Syria.	45
315 COL. CORNWALLIS London	Oct. 11	Notes on conversation of Col. de Meru and Col. Fagalde with Emir Feisal regarding relief of British by French forces in Syria.	45
316 MR. VAUGHAN Santiago Tel. No. 242	Oct. 11	Jewish community has invited him to celebration in honour of Great Britain on anniversary of the Balfour Declaration: asks for information as to future status of Palestine.	45
317 SIR M. CHEETHAM Ramleh Tel. No. 1468	Oct. 12	Transmits paraphrase of telegram from King Hussein to Emir Feisal stressing necessity of settling Syrian question in one of two ways.	45
318 ANGLO-ARAB MEETING London	Oct. 13	Notes of a meeting at 4 p.m. when Emir Feisal presented his reply to No. 313: question of conference between Emir Feisal and French, American and British representatives to adjust problems involved by impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria on Nov. 1.	45

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
319 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1160	Oct. 13	Transmits message from Prime Minister for M. Clemenceau urging him to send Gen. Gouraud to London at once to discuss with Emir Feisal and F.-M. Allenby military arrangements for occupation of Syria after withdrawal of British troops: Emir Feisal anxious that American representative should be present.	463
320 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 13	Transmits private message from Prime Minister to be given to M. Clemenceau at same time as that in No. 319: negotiations with Emir Feisal have been very difficult: considers that participation of an American representative would help matters.	463
321 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1091	Oct. 13	Message for Prime Minister: telegram in No. 319 will be given to M. Clemenceau first thing on Oct. 14: fears that Gen. Gouraud will in any case not be able to start for London on Oct. 14.	464
322 Sir E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1439	Oct. 13	Reports conversation with Marshal Foch who urged importance of not allowing Anglo-French controversy over Syria to continue, and considered that direct negotiations should be opened in London or Paris without further delay.	464
323 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 993	Oct. 13	Transmits text of press interview given by Gen. Gouraud regarding political and military policy which he proposes to follow in Syria: M. de Caix appointed secretary general to mission of French High Commissioner in Syria.	464
324 Sir E. CROWE Paris No. 1945	Oct. 13	Transmits minute by Mr. Forbes Adam recording points made by M. Millet of <i>Temps</i> in conversation concerning Anglo-French relations regarding Mosul and Palestine: considerations regarding Tangiers, Gambia, French possessions in India, &c.	465
325 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1095	Oct. 14	Refers to No. 321: in spite of repeated inquiries he has been unable to elicit reply from M. Clemenceau: Gen. Gouraud left Paris for Strassburg on Oct. 13.	467
326 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 996	Oct. 14	Transmits reply from M. Clemenceau to Nos. 319 and 320: M. Clemenceau unable to agree to proposed meeting and suggests that Emir Feisal should be told he must negotiate direct with France.	467
327 To COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 321	Oct. 14	Refers to No. 306: Acting C.-in-C. was instructed telegraphically on Oct. 8 that Dr. Weizmann must be well received and given every assistance.	469
328 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. C.P.O. 31/1	Oct. 14	Transmits draft declaration on Zionism as proposed in No. 298: stresses necessity for early publication.	470

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
329 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1167	Oct. 15	Message from Prime Minister for M. Clemenceau: has received message in No. 326 with surprise and regret: full reply will be sent later: Emir Feisal informed of M. Clemenceau's willingness to see him.	475
330 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Unnumbered	Oct. 16	Letter discussing M. Clemenceau's attitude to Syrian question and correspondence with Prime Minister: Emir Feisal has been induced to go to Paris to meet M. Clemenceau.	474
331 EMIR FEISAL London	Oct. 16	Acknowledges No. 309 and is content with Lord Curzon's appreciation of his cause.	476
332 SIR M. CHEETHAM Ramleh No. 508	Oct. 16	King Hussein may announce his resignation at any time: would be advantageous to establish his successor with as little delay as possible: Emir Abdulla would be most suitable successor.	476
333 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 478	Oct. 18	Arab authorities at Aleppo likely to evacuate rather than accept responsibility of maintaining order after British evacuation: suggests French authorities be advised to arrange for Gen. Gouraud's arrival some days before evacuation begins. <i>Note 1.</i> Cairo telegram No. 475 of Oct. 17: disorders likely to ensue after British withdrawal from Syria.	478
		<i>Note 2.</i> Proclamation by Mustafa Kemal Pasha inciting the Syrian population.	478
334 To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1257	Oct. 18	Transmits full reply of Prime Minister to No. 326: explains British policy regarding Syria.	479
335 EMIR FEISAL London	Oct. 19	Informs Prime Minister of proposed visit to Paris to see M. Clemenceau, and urges Mr. Lloyd George that Syrian question be separated from Turkish question and discussed on its own merits.	489
336 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 479	Oct. 20	Yassin Pasha has refused to accept responsibility for maintenance of order if British troops are withdrawn from Syria.	490
337 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1018	Oct. 20	Summarizes article by M. Barrès regarding British and French interests in Middle East and criticizing British policy and relations with Emir Feisal.	490
338 To MR. FORBES ADAM Paris No. 141423/M.E. 44A	Oct. 20	Letter from Mr. Peterson transmitting minutes on No. 324. <i>Note 5.</i> British note of Oct. 14, and enclosed memorandum, to French Govt. on Tangiers and Moroccan questions.	492
339 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 480	Oct. 21	Refers to Nos. 333 and 336: indications that all Syrian, Palestinian, and Mesopotamian independent parties are now working in conjunction: whole movement is Pan-Islamic but pro-Turk and anti-Sherifian: Yassin Pasha believed to be moving spirit.	495

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
30	MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 670	Oct. 21	Italian Govt. inquire whether Russian Jews interned at Asinara can be admitted into Palestine: if they go to Russia they expect to be massacred.	495
31	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1266	Oct. 22	Records conversation with French Ambassador when complaint made to M. Cambon regarding tone of recent French notes and in particular of one which had been returned to French Embassy: question of anti-British press attacks also raised: views of M. Cambon.	495
32	To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7152	Oct. 23	Transmits copy of French note alleging that British officers are supplying arms to Arab forces whose avowed object is to oppose French troops when latter take over occupation of Syria: note was returned to M. de Fleuriau as being unacceptable.	497
33	SIR M. CHEETHAM Cairo Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 24	Transmits paraphrase of Emir Feisal's telegram to King Hussein stating that committee will be formed to examine question of British withdrawal and that situation is improving.	499
34	To MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 825	Oct. 25	Refers to No. 340 and states conditions on which Jews in question can be admitted to Palestine.	499
35	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 489	Oct. 27	Transmits telegram from Emir Zeid for Emir Feisal stating that he will not hold himself responsible for what may happen if French authorities take over Syria: urges that subsidy should not be stopped.	499
36	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1129	Oct. 28	Represents on behalf of F.-M. Allenby that British occupation of Syria should continue until French can take over, which they should be urged to do at earliest: otherwise probability of massacre of Christians, and Arab resistance to French forces.	500
37	To VISCOUNT GREY Washington No. 681	Oct. 30	Records conversation with U.S. Ambassador who made representations regarding British refusal to allow representatives of Standard Oil Co. to make investigations in Palestine: attention of U.S. Ambassador was drawn to unfriendly attitude of U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople.	501
38	U.S. AMBASSADOR London	Oct. 31	Refers to alleged discrimination against a representative of Standard Oil Co. in Mesopotamia: renews suggestion of drawing a distinction between operation and investigation of oil properties.	503
39	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. C.P.O. 297	Nov. 1	Refers to No. 240: unable to trace any British concessions in Syria or Palestine: transmits list of other concessions.	504
40	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1295	Nov. 3	Refers to No. 346: W.O. have issued orders in sense suggested by F.-M. Allenby.	505

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAC
351	FRENCH CHARGÉ d'AFFAIRES London	Nov. 4	Draws attention to an alleged mistake in the line of demarcation for the British withdrawal from Syria.	5c
352	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2077	Nov. 5	Transmits letter from Turkish M.F.A. enclosing note to French High Commissioner on subject of replacement of British troops by French in Cilicia.	50
353	To F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1216	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 328 and transmits amended draft of declaration regarding Zionism: asks for views as to publication.	50
354	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1324	Nov. 7	Instructions to inform French Govt. and Emir Feisal that from Nov. 1 monthly subsidy of £150,000 paid to latter will be reduced to £75,000: French Govt. should be reminded of undertaking that French Govt. would be responsible for similar amount.	50
355	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 7	Letter to Lord Hardinge transmitting letter for Prime Minister from Emir Feisal concerning his negotiations in Paris, and informing him that he has referred entire matter to Supreme Council: encloses copies of correspondence with M. Clemenceau and note to Supreme Council.	51c
356	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 9	Letter to Mr. Campbell commenting on Emir Feisal's talk with Gen. Gouraud and his likely position in relation to the French administration.	519
357	M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Nov. 9	Letter to Mr. Lloyd George stating that he has never doubted sincerity of sentiments of H.M.G. and attributing dissensions to subordinate officers in Syria: cannot altogether accept point about Mosul: still hopes to convert Emir Feisal to an agreement: French Govt. resolved to remain in full agreement with H.M.G.	520
358	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. C.P.O. 311	Nov. 10	Reports on present situation in Syria and Palestine: Turkish influence and Pan-Islamic feeling growing in Syria: considers anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine largely artificial and suggests that Zionists should be allowed to start specified measures for building up their national home.	522
359	SIR M. CHEETHAM Cairo Tel. No. 1568	Nov. 11	Transmits paraphrase of telegram from Emir Feisal to Emir Zeid: French Govt. has refused to form committee to study question of British withdrawal: he awaits decision of Supreme Council to whom he has appealed.	527
360	MR. FORBES ADAM Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 11	Letter to Mr. Kidston transmitting minute of a conversation with M. de Caix concerning Emir Feisal and Syrian situation.	528

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
31 Col. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 495	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 353: C.-in-C. agrees with draft declaration subject to one alteration: proposes publication on receipt of assent to alteration.	529
32 FRENCH PEACE DELEGATION Paris	Nov. 13	Note to Supreme Council in reply to that submitted to it by Emir Feisal and enclosed in No. 355.	530
33 To Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. Unnumbered	Nov. 14	Outlines situation in Mesopotamia, which H.M.G. regard with anxiety: first condition of recovered confidence and of future settlement is his return as High Commissioner: asks for views on action which should be taken before his arrival in order to meet legitimate criticism and pave way for constitutional development.	531
34 To F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo No. 623	Nov. 15	Question of possible abdication of King Hussein and nomination of his successor: asks for views.	532
35 Col. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 499	Nov. 17	Transmits message from Emir Zeid for Emir Feisal regarding hostilities which will ensue if French forces advance from present lines.	533
36 Col. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. C.P.O. 181	Nov. 17	Transmits observations on future boundaries of Palestine.	533
37 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2166	Nov. 19	Transmits list of places whence have arrived telegrams of protest against French occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash; also translation of pronouncement by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on same subject.	535
38 Sir E. CROWE Paris No. 2179	Nov. 20	Transmits copies of Armenian note to M. Clemenceau regarding deplorable situation in Cilicia.	539
39 To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 2081	Nov. 20	Asks whether, in view of British evacuation of Syria, U.S. consent can be obtained for U.S. Consuls temporarily to take over British interests at Aleppo and other towns in Arab zone.	541
40 To U.S. AMBASSADOR London No. 148099/M.E. 44A	Nov. 21	Reply to U.S. Ambassador's representations regarding question of permitting investigations or operations for oil in Palestine and Mesopotamia.	541
41 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Nov. 21	Refutes allegations regarding supply of guns, aeroplanes, &c. to Arab Army.	542
42 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1187	Nov. 21	Reports interview with Emir Feisal who complained of treatment he had received from French authorities: transmits substance of letter to M. Clemenceau from Emir Feisal to which he has received no official reply: Emir asks that arrangements be made for him to return to Syria in a British ship. <i>Note 2.</i> Letter from Col. Joyce, Paris, to Col. Gribbon, W.O., concerning Emir Feisal's negotiations in Paris.	543

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>373 EMIR FEISAL Paris</b>	Nov. 21	Transmits to Lord Derby (1) letter for P.M. protesting against French occupation of certain districts where H.M.G. had allegedly undertaken to establish an independent Arab State; (2) letter of Nov. 20 to M. Clemenceau setting forth his views and proposals for a temporary solution.	545
<b>374 F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1614</b>	Nov. 21	Has returned to British Agent, Jeddah, a letter from King Hussein sent under open cover for forwarding to Emir Feisal: letter contained statement that if Syrians decided to fight for their independence King Hussein would co-operate as an individual Arab.	549
<b>375 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London</b>	Nov. 22	Refers to communications passing between British and French military authorities with regard to evacuation by British troops of coastal areas in Syria as defined in provisional agreement recently concluded in Paris: places on record that it is being carried out by H.M.G. without prejudice to future determination of northern and eastern boundaries of Palestine.	550
<b>376 Sir P. Cox Hamadan Tel. Unnumbered</b>	Nov. 23	Refers to No. 363 and transmits observations thereon.	550
<b>377 MR. KERR London</b>	Nov. 27	Letter to Mr. Campbell enclosing telegram from King Hussein to Prime Minister threatening to abdicate unless he has a reply within thirty days to his request that a high official should be sent for consultation.	553
<b>378 F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1642</b>	Nov. 28	Transmits paraphrase of King Hussein's telegram to Emir Feisal stating that people north-west of Aleppo are in negotiation with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and referring to previous neglect of his warning regarding Smyrna.	553
<b>379 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1284</b>	Nov. 28	Expresses anxiety regarding report that Gen. Gouraud, apparently acting under fresh instructions, intends to occupy Bukaa: requests Lord Derby to ascertain urgently facts regarding matter.	554
<b>380 EMIR FEISAL Paris</b>	Nov. 28	Thanks Lord Curzon for his help and encloses copies of correspondence exchanged with French Govt. regarding agreement entered into with them.	554
<b>381 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1201</b>	Nov. 29	Refers to No. 379: according to correspondence between Emir Feisal and French Govt., French troops will not at present occupy Bukaa plain: will endeavour to see M. Berthelot regarding matter.	558

PAGE	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
35	30 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1202	Nov. 29	M. Berthelot confirms information in No. 381: necessary instructions were sent to Gen. Gouraud on evening of Nov. 27.	559
36	31 LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	Nov. 29	Note of conversation with French Ambassador regarding questions referred to in Nos. 380-2.	559
37	32 LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	Nov. 29	Additional note of conversation with French Ambassador concerning occupation of southern portion of Blue Zone and in particular region of Tyre.	560
38	33 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 504	Nov. 29	M. Picot is proceeding home via Asia Minor and has arranged to meet Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the way: action lends colour to report that French policy in Near East is to win over Arabs and Turks with view to throwing whole weight of combination against British influence and interests.	560
39	34 F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1645	Nov. 30	Suggests that invitation to Emir Abdulla to visit Cairo might prevent King Hussein from abdicating: strong note has been addressed to King Hussein on question of transfer of subsidy money to Syria.	560
40	35 Mr. CAMPBELL Foreign Office Unnumbered	Dec. 1	Letter to Mr. Kerr referring to No. 377 and enclosing copy of a telegram just sent to F.-M. Allenby with copy of instructions to Col. Wilson to which it refers: suggests reply for Prime Minister to King Hussein's telegram.	561
41	36 F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1649	Dec. 1	Transmits paraphrase of King Hussein's telegram to Emir Feisal stating that it is impossible for him to accept his position in Hejaz if any partition takes place and suggesting that Emir Feisal should return.	564
42	37 F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1652	Dec. 2	Transmits paraphrase of King Hussein's telegram to Emir Feisal stating that Emir Zeid has informed him of British withdrawal from Syria and arrest of Yassin Pasha.	564
43	38 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 507	Dec. 2	C.-in-C. wishes to invite Mr. H. Samuel to visit Palestine with view to investigation and advice regarding future policy in development and administration of Palestine: requests that, if Lord Curzon concurs, he will forward invitation.	565
44	39 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. C.P.O. 92	Dec. 2	Transmits report of Oct. 15 from Political Officer, Damascus, regarding political situation in Damascus and Syria generally, and enclosing report on Mesopotamian League.	565
45	40 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1209	Dec. 4	Emir Feisal distressed at report that Yassin Pasha has been removed from his post and deported from Damascus: asks whether report is true.	569

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAG
393	To F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1300	Dec. 4	Transmits Prime Minister's reply to King Hussein's telegram in No. 377: Col. Wilson returning to Jeddah with messages from H.M.G. which Mr. Lloyd George hopes will be satisfactory to King Hussein.	57
394	F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1666	Dec. 5	Considers that Emir Abdulla's visit to Cairo would be helpful in preparing ground for meeting between King Hussein and Ibn Saud: proposes rewording of Prime Minister's message in No. 393.	57
395	To COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 351	Dec. 5	Asks whether declaration in No. 361 has been published and if so with what results.	57
396	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 513	Dec. 9	Refers to No. 395: declaration not yet published and it may now be undesirable to do so.	57
397	FOREIGN OFFICE	Dec. 11	Draft mandate for Palestine provisionally agreed with Zionist Organization.	57
398	M. BERTHELOT	Dec. 12	Second part of M. Berthelot's note, concerning proposed settlement as regards Arab countries, with comments of Political Section of British Peace Delegation.	57
399	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2321	Dec. 12	Transmits translation of further telegram from Mustafa Kemal Pasha complaining of proceedings of French authorities at Adana: comments on attitude of French authorities in Turkey.	58
400	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1479	Dec. 17	Transmits copy of letter of Dec. 8 from W.O. on subject of boundary between spheres of British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria: H.M.G. have decided to make a concession to Arab feelings: expresses hope that French Govt., who should be informed, will raise no objection.	58
401	EMIR FEISAL Paris	Dec. 19	Protests against alleged French attack against Bukaa and requests assistance of H.M.G. <i>Note 1.</i> Note of Dec. 24 by Mr. Kidston that he had informed Gen. Haddad Pasha that he did not see how H.M.G. could intervene in any way.	59
402	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1237	Dec. 20	French Govt. have put forward to Emir Feisal their proposal for permanent Syrian arrangement apparently amounting to a French protectorate: Emir does not intend to sign and wonders whether he should return at once to Syria: advice given to him to return thither. <i>Note 2.</i> Text of above-mentioned French proposal.	59
403	F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1743	Dec. 22	King Hussein greatly gratified at F.-M. Allenby's forthcoming visit.	595

NO.	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
404	ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING London	Dec. 23	Notes of a meeting at F.O. at 11.30 a.m.: discussions regarding Arab countries, Mosul and oil, and frontiers of Palestine.	595
405	ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING London	Dec. 23	Notes of a meeting at F.O. at 3 p.m. in continuation of No. 404.	599
406	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1235	Dec. 27	Transmits copy of French note stating that French Govt. cannot accept boundary suggested in No. 400: Gen. Gouraud must carry out decision of Supreme Council.	604
407	To MR. BAYLEY New York Tel. No. 724	Dec. 27	Transmits message for Mr. Frankfurter of Zionist Organization from Mr. H. Samuel stating that negotiations about to begin in Paris and explaining attitude of British and French Govts. regarding Palestinian boundaries: is going to Palestine to advise on future administration and finance.	605
408	F.M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 1766	Dec. 29	Transmits paraphrases of telegrams recently sent to Mecca by Emir Zeid.	605
409	MR. FORBES ADAM Foreign Office	Dec. 30	Memorandum on French attitude towards northern frontier of Palestine: compares British and French attitudes to Zionism.	607
410	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 67	1920	Jan. 8 Acknowledges No. 406: explains why H.M.G. hope that French Govt. will agree to maintenance of present administrative boundary pending final decision of Peace Conference, and sends instructions to reply to French Govt. accordingly.	610
411	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 33	Jan. 8	Reports statement in <i>Temps</i> of Jan. 7 regarding alleged agreement between Emir Feisal and French Govt. concerning Syria: statement contradicted in an official communiqué but <i>Temps</i> nevertheless asserts that its information is correct.	611
412	MR. FORBES ADAM Paris Unnumbered	Jan. 12	Letter to Major Young reporting gist of alleged secret agreement between Emir Feisal and French Govt.	612
413	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. F.O. 10	Jan. 13	Reports on recent events in Syria, Trans-jordan, and Palestine	613
414	F.M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Khartoum No. 74	Jan. 15	Reports on his recent visit to Jeddah and transmits text of message delivered to King Hussein regarding question of his relations with Ibn Saud: King Hussein had desired to discuss Syrian problem but agreed to meet Ibn Saud at Jeddah.	617
415	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo No. F.O. 11	Jan. 16	Transmits report from Col. Waters-Taylor regarding his interviews with Gen. Gouraud and M. de Caix when questions of arrest of Yassin Pasha, appointment of a British liaison officer in Damascus, subsidy to Arab Govt. discussed: comments on French attitude towards British policy in M.E.	620

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAG
<b>416</b> MR. VANSITTART Paris No. 5	Jan. 17	Transmits text of proposed agreement between French Govt. and Emir Feisal, as communicated by Gen. Haddad Pasha.	62
<b>417</b> MR. VANSITTART Paris Tel. No. 3	Jan. 17	Message for Mr. Kidston: agreement in No. 416 stated to be French draft which has not been signed by Emir Feisal, who took draft back with him to Syria.	62
<b>418</b> F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. Unnumbered	Jan. 18	Draws attention to W.O. telegram of Jan. 15 stating that three oil experts from Persia are to be sent to G.H.Q., Bagdad, in connexion with a certain survey.	62
<b>419</b> SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 52	Jan. 24	Transmits communication from Central Committee of Zionist Organization in Poland expressing their gratitude on second anniversary of Balfour Declaration and their hope that project in question may shortly be carried into effect.	62
<b>420</b> To F.-M. VISCOUNT ALLENBY Cairo Tel. No. 69	Jan. 26	Refers to No. 418 and states that action was taken with concurrence of F.O.: investigation is being undertaken on behalf of H.M.G. whose intentions for the present are to utilize to their own advantage oil products discovered in occupied territory.	62
<b>421</b> COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 531	Jan. 26	Reports principal points of draft agreement between Emir Feisal and French Govt. as received from Col. Waters-Taylor who met Emir at Beyrouth on Jan. 14.	62
<b>422</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 277	Feb. 2	Refers to No. 410 and transmits French note recording point of view of French Govt. regarding boundary between spheres of temporary British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria: French Govt. cannot consent to a modification of the dispositions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in this respect.	630
<b>423</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 102	Feb. 4	Reports information received from Gen. Gouraud regarding serious situation which has arisen in area north of Aleppo arising from events at Marash: Admiral de Robeck contemplates making representations, in support of his French colleague, to Turkish Govt. regarding activities of Turkish nationalist bands against forces of Gen. Gouraud.	631
<b>424</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 119	Feb. 10	Transmits description of disturbed situation at Marash from member of American Relief Mission: inhabitants of some seven Armenian villages massacred, two American relief workers murdered.	633
<b>425</b> SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 385	Feb. 10	Reports message conveyed by U.S. Ambassador from President Wilson regarding boundaries of Palestine: hoped that British and French Govts. were not carrying out Sykes-Picot Agreement to detriment of Balfour Declaration.	634

### CHAPTER III

#### Conversations and correspondence concerning Turkish affairs before the First Conference of London, June 25, 1919–February 12, 1920

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Introductory Note: correspondence embodying Constantinople Agreement and Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne.	635
66 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 92	June 25	Discussion regarding peace terms for Turkey: President Wilson in favour of expelling Turkish Govt. from Constantinople: Allied reply to Turkish delegates: Turkish memorandum on new organization of Ottoman Empire.	643
67 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1330	June 25	Transmits message for Anglo-Persian Oil Co. regarding concessions issued to Standard Oil Co. for Marmora, Syria, and Dead Sea.	651
68 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1333	June 26	So far as is known no concessions have been granted by Turkish Govt. since Armistice to either British or Americans: scramble for concessions has begun.	651
69 To Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 909	June 26	Inquires whether reply can be suggested to question to be asked in House of Commons as to (1) why it was necessary for Greek troops to land at Smyrna and advance inland, and (2) what is Allied policy with regard to Smyrna.	652
70 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 96	June 27	Agreed that further consideration of peace treaty with Turkey be suspended until known whether U.S.A. could accept a mandate for a portion of former Turkish Empire: Turkish Delegation to be invited to return to Turkey.	652
71 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Versailles C.F. 99	June 28	Approval of letter to Turkish Delegation thanking them for their statements and informing them that some delay inevitable in the final settlement of peace: in circumstances nothing would be gained by longer stay in Paris of Turkish Delegation.	653
72 Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1105	June 28	Refers to No. 429 and suggests reply to be returned to question.	654
73 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Unnumbered	June 28	Letter to Sir R. Graham regarding increase of friction between Greeks and Turks, which dates back to Greek occupation of Smyrna: activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha: stresses necessity for early conclusion of peace with Turkey. <i>Note 5. Constantinople tel. No. 1320 of June 23: nationalist activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.</i>	654
74 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1356	June 29	Expresses anxiety over Greek and Turkish counter-accusations: only very early declaration of peace terms might yet check bloodshed.	657

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
435	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 47	June 29	Telegram to Admiral Calthorpe, Constantinople, informing him of M. Venizelos' orders to Greek troops to advance, as result of alleged Turkish advance against Greek zone, and asking him for his views and those of local authorities regarding matter.	658
436	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 99	July 1	Refers to No. 435 and transmits views to Mr. Balfour, Paris: advocates that definite boundary be set to Greek occupation and undertaking given that this shall not be passed without authority of British Senior Naval Officer.	658
437	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1398	July 4	Transmits message from Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna regarding Turkish attack on Greeks in occupation of Aidin and his views as to how situation should be dealt with.	659
438	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 50	July 4	Telegram to Admiral Calthorpe, Constantinople: can be no question of delimiting a zone of Italian occupation in western Asia Minor since it would be regarded as tantamount to recognition of that occupation.	660
439	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 956	July 4	Records conversation with French Ambassador regarding (1) appointment by Persian Govt. of French professors at Tehran; (2) French propaganda in Constantinople designed to convince Turks that they should put their interests exclusively in French hands.	660
440	TO ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1116	July 4	Refers to No. 427 and requests full particulars of concessions referred to.	662
441	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1144	July 5	Transmits report by British Repatriation Officer at Samsoun regarding visit of U.S. High Commissioner and business men.	663
442	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1152	July 5	Transmits memorandum to Commodore commanding British Aegean Squadron relative to measures to be taken as result of Italian decree establishing naval base in Dodecanese.	663
443	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1402	July 5	Message from Mr. Morgan, Smyrna: Greek forces have retaken Aidin.	665
444	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1412	July 7	Commodore Fitzmaurice reports Aidin reoccupied by Greek troops on M. Venizelos' direct orders. <i>Note 1.</i> Conversation in Paris between Mr. Kerr and M. Venizelos on July 7 regarding Greek advance against Aidin.	666

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
45 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 110	July 8	Reminds Mr. Balfour, Paris, of urgency of taking definite decision as to limits of Greek occupation: Italian occupation also causing Turks serious misgivings: considers country now confronted with possibility of rapid disintegration of all authority and security.	666
46 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1420	July 8	Visit received from Grand Vizier and M.F.A. who had been sent by Sultan to represent impossible state of things now existing: comments on activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Crown Prince.	667
47 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1421	July 8	Private message received from Sultan regarding alleged Armenian preparation to attack Erzerum and Greek excesses in Aidin Vilayet.	668
48 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1429	July 9	Has requested recall of Turkish general at Samsoun who protested regarding disembarkation there of British troops: Mustafa Kemal Pasha to be outlawed.	668
49 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 53	July 9	Telegram to Admiral Calthorpe, Constantinople: cannot entertain proposal to attach British officers to H.Q. of Greek army of Occupation, as it would tend to give colour to erroneous belief that Greek occupation was result of a British, not an allied, decision.	669
50 M. DUTASTA Paris	July 9	Transmits to British Peace Delegation copy of memorandum from Russian Political Conference in Paris regarding peace terms with Turkey and Russian interests.	669
51 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1437	July 10	Kurdish affairs: reports action taken regarding assistance given to certain Kurdish chiefs to return to Kurdistan.	678
52 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 116	July 10	Transmits to Mr. Balfour, Paris, message from Commodore Fitzmaurice, Smyrna: Greco-Italian incident: Greek troops have crossed river south of Aidin despite his orders to contrary: Greek High Commissioner has been requested that they be immediately withdrawn.	680
53 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 54	July 11	Informs Admiral Calthorpe, Constantinople, of contacts with M. Venizelos with object of agreeing limits of Greek occupation: asks for information on certain points and views regarding M. Venizelos's observations.	680
54 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1191	July 11	Transmits report from British representative at Smyrna regarding unfriendly treatment of British subjects by Greek soldiers: permanent installation of Greek authority in Smyrna district regarded by local British opinion with general hostility and apprehension.	682

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAG
455	To MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 974	July 12	Refers to No. 445 and urges necessity for putting limit to Greek aggression: delay in Turkish settlement points to desirability of a provisional understanding pending final solution.	68
456	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. Unnumbered	July 13	Acknowledges No. 455 and refers to apparent conflict of reports: whole matter is being carefully examined and representatives in Smyrna have been asked for full account of what has actually passed between them and Greek authorities.	68
457	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 129. Part I	July 16	Refers to No. 453 and transmits to Mr. Balfour, Paris, observations and proposals of S.N.O., Smyrna, regarding Greek occupation.	68
458	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 129. Part II	July 16	Endorses views of S.N.O., Smyrna, and urges adoption of his proposals: urges that identical instructions be sent to Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to present a joint note to Turkish Govt.	68
459	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1164	July 16	Reports discussion on situation in Asia Minor and hearing of M. Venizelos before Supreme Council. <i>Note 1.</i> Record by Mr. Balfour of a conversation with Signor Tittoni on July 1 regarding Italian and Greek interests in Asia Minor.	68
460	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1230	July 17	Transmits correspondence with M.F.A. relative to removal of Generals Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Djemal Pasha from their posts.	68
461	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 60	July 21	Refers to Nos. 457 and 458, informs Admiral Calthorpe, Constantinople, of resolutions passed by Supreme Council on July 18, and sends instructions: Council has approved agreement reached between Signor Tittoni and M. Venizelos.	691
462	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1180	July 21	Italian occupation in Asia Minor has never received encouragement or tacit sanction from Supreme Council.	692
463	LORD ACTON Berne No. 460	July 21	Is informed by Greek Minister that President Wilson told M. Venizelos confidentially that although he would now conform to attitude of Great Britain, France, and Japan over Greek territorial claims in Asia Minor and elsewhere, he was personally averse from assigning to another state territory inhabited by an alien race: Mr. Wilson now realized his mistake in advocating union of German South Tyrol to Italy.	693
464	MR. HOHLER Constantinople Unnumbered	July 21	Letter to Sir J. Tilley discussing Kurdish affairs: considers Major Noel excessively sympathetic to the Kurdish viewpoint.	693

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
46 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1525	July 23	Has agreed with French colleague on five points of general policy: stresses difficulties of Turkish Govt. owing to prolongation of armistice: Mustafa Kemal Pasha said to be convoking congresses at Sivas and Erzeroum and one of subjects for discussion was declaration of an Anatolia independent of Constantinople.	696
46 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1286	July 26	Transmits report by British liaison officer on journey of Turkish Delegation from Paris to Constantinople.	698
47 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1548	July 27	Refers to No. 465 and explains reasons for characterising local situation as one of extreme gravity.	703
48 To MR. BARCLAY Washington No. 419	July 28	Instructions to ascertain by unofficial inquiry whether U.S. Govt. are making any preparations to send U.S. troops to Turkish Armenia in event of their deciding to accept mandate for that country.	704
49 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1559	July 29	Reports on seriousness of situation along Armenian-Turkish frontier: Kurds to number of 10,000 threatening to rise against Armenians: publication of peace terms favourable to Christians and unfavourable to Moslems without first taking steps to ensure their execution would cause most serious danger.	704
50 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1422	July 30	Summarizes reports by members of High Commission who recently visited certain of Black Sea coast provinces of Turkey, regarding public security, restitution of property, recovery of Islamized women and children, and relief.	705
51 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1353	July 31	Transmits memorandum by Mr. Hohler of a conversation with Grand Vizier wherein latter stated that situation was fast becoming impossible: Admiral Calthorpe comments on general situation.	707
52 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1328	Aug. 1	Note 3. Extract from Mr. Balfour's letter of instruction of Nov. 9, 1918, to British High Commissioner. Transmits memorandum on a Turkish political manifesto, and circular issued by Grand Vizier regarding situation in Anatolia: present government viewed with hostility by all parties and chauvinism appears to be in ascendency.	709
53 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1593	Aug. 3	Greek Rear-Admiral in Constantinople pessimistic and has suggested to M. Venizelos that 100,000 men be raised amongst native Greek and Armenian population, officered and commanded by British, to repress Turks and maintain order in Asia Minor.	712
		Note 1. Identical letter of July 14 from Allied	715
		Note 2. Extract from Mr. Balfour's letter of instruction of Nov. 9, 1918, to British High Commissioner.	716

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		representatives in Smyrna to High Commissioners, criticizing results of Greek occupation of Aidin Vilayet, and submitting proposals.	
474 MR. HOHLER Constantinople Unnumbered	Aug. 4	Letter to Mr. Kidston: things are perhaps a little worse than ever: reported massacre in Nakhchevan: details measures agreed with French High Commissioner to assist present Government.	716
475 ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople No. 1368	Aug. 5	Reports measures agreed with French colleague to assist government: Mustafa Kemal Pasha apparently organizing forces at Erzeroum: only suggestion Gen. Milne had to make was that port of Trebizond might be occupied. <i>Note 3.</i> Allied note of Aug. 2 to Turkish Govt. relative to delimitation of Greek and Italian zones of occupation.	717
476 To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5252	Aug. 7	Records conversation of French Ambassador with Sir R. Graham regarding spheres of command in Turkey and Gen. Milne's appointment to supreme command of Turkey in Asia.	719
477 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1396	Aug. 8	Transmits report of July 29 from Relief Officer at Samsoun relative to activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Raouf Bey in that district.	720
478 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1417	Aug. 9	Transmits account of conversation of Mr. Ryan with Crown Prince when latter gave his views regarding situation: reports result of advice to Grand Vizier to proceed with greater severity against those connected with Unionist Party: stresses complexity of situation with government too weak to ensure execution of its orders.	721
479 To ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1327	Aug. 9	Instructions to urge strongly upon Turkish Govt. that massacres of Christians can only harden opinion against Turkey.	727
480 To ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1329	Aug. 9	Instructions to transmit all available information regarding concessions in any part of late Ottoman Empire, other than Syria and Palestine, in which British interests participate.	727
481 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 526	Aug. 10	Refers to No. 442: abrogation of Italian decree establishing naval base in Dodecanese.	727
482 To ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1336	Aug. 12	Asks for considered views on future of Kurdistan and Armenia.	728
483 To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5363	Aug. 14	Refers to No. 476 and records interview of M. de Fleuriau with Sir R. Graham regarding military spheres in Turkey: transmits copy of note on this subject left by M. de Fleuriau.	728

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44	To MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1585	Aug. 15	Requests forecast regarding (1) date by which U.S. Govt. will be in a position to ratify peace with Germany; (2) prospects of U.S. Govt. accepting a mandate for some part of former Turkish Empire.	729
45	MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1275	Aug. 16	Refers to No. 484 and transmits information available: from general impressions considers acceptance of any mandate most unlikely.	730
46	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1457	Aug. 17	Considers that difficult situation with which Allies are now faced in Turkey would greatly improve if both Greek and Italian troops were entirely withdrawn from Asia Minor.	730
47	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Unnumbered	Aug. 17	Letter to Sir E. Crowe, Paris: Admiral Calthorpe, on relinquishing present command, will proceed to Paris: only hope for comparative peace in Asia Minor is withdrawal of Greek and Italian forces: relations with French High Commission now on best possible footing.	733
48	Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1277	Aug. 18	Has gathered impression that Mr. Polk considers it unlikely U.S. Govt. will ratify treaty with Germany before end of Sept. and increasingly improbable that they will accept mandate for any part of former Turkish Empire.	734
49	To ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1369	Aug. 18	Approves proposal to ensure Sultan's safety and principles agreed on with French High Commissioner: force should, however, on no account be used to prevent accession to power of Committee of Union and Progress, nor against individual supporters of Committee as such.	734
50	Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1281	Aug. 19	Refers to questions raised in No. 484: difficult to express an opinion that would not be so purely speculative as to be practically useless.	735
51	Mr. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 70	Aug. 19	Informs Admiral Webb, Constantinople, that U.S. Govt. are sending mission under Gen. Harbord to inquire into situation in Armenia: all facilities should be granted to party.	735
52	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1676	Aug. 19	Refers to No. 482 and transmits views on settlement of Kurdish and Armenian affairs.	735
53	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1704	Aug. 22	Transmits communication handed on Aug. 21 to Grand Vizier by American High Commissioner warning Turkish Govt. against further massacres of Armenians: Grand Vizier alarmed: situation created by Mustafa Kemal Pasha appears now to be less acute.	736
54	Mr. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1298	Aug. 25	Refers to No. 468: no military preparations for any action in Armenian Turkey are being made or contemplated by U.S. War Dept.	738

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495	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1525	Aug. 25	Transmits note from Grand Vizier pointing out difficulties in administration of country pending conclusion of peace, and asking that Turkish Delegates be recalled to Paris.	735
496	M. NABOKOFF London No. 929	Aug. 26	Letter to Sir R. Graham transmitting memorandum from M. Sazonov requesting that desperate position of Armenian population in Caucasus upon withdrawal of British forces may receive sympathetic consideration of H.M.G.	741
497	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1729	Aug. 27	Grand Vizier anxious that question of Moslem population between the Maritza, Karassu, Rhodope and Aegean should receive careful attention of Peace Conference: Grand Vizier advocates a republic under British protection.	741
498	MR. HOHLER Constantinople Unnumbered	Aug. 27	Letter to Mr. Clark Kerr discussing question of frontiers of Armenia, Kurdistan and Mesopotamia and enclosing draft telegram containing his views.	742
499	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1309	Aug. 29	Transmits message for Cabinet regarding question of sending troops to Armenia to replace British troops now in course of evacuation: M. Clemenceau announced that about 12,000 French troops would be sent.	743
500	MR. RUSSELL Athens No. 161	Aug. 31	Refers to No. 454 and expresses surprise at statements recorded therein regarding Greek attitude towards British subjects: comments on aspects of Greek and Turkish rule.	744
501	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1312	Aug. 31	Message for W.O. urging that French authorities be assisted in their effort to deal with situation threatening Armenians.	745
502	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1317	Sept. 2	Message for C.I.G.S. suggesting that best way of dealing with technical questions regarding passage of a French army to Armenia would be to send a military representative to Paris to discuss matter: cannot see any danger on broad question of policy. <i>Note 1.</i> Telephone message of Sept. 2 from C.I.G.S. to Mr. Balfour regarding proposed French relief expedition to Armenia.	746
503	To MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1128	Sept. 2	Reports opinion of Cabinet regarding French plan to assist Armenians: outlines alternative plan which Cabinet considers would be more likely to achieve object in view.	747
504	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1319	Sept. 3	Agrees with criticisms expressed in No. 503, which are, however, essentially military: begs that C.I.G.S. should come to Paris without delay to discuss question with French authorities: meanwhile proposes to maintain his attitude of general political approval of French proposal.	748

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
56 Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1764	Sept. 6	Reports on discussions and decision of Supreme Council regarding southern frontier of Bulgaria and records reasons which have rendered impossible any more complete or satisfactory solution.	748
56 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1624	Sept. 7	Comments on local reports regarding situation in Anatolia since Greek landing at Smyrna: only acceptable solution is a British or American mandate.	751
57 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1633	Sept. 8	Reports suggestion of Grand Vizier that Turkey should come to a secret understanding with Great Britain: has negatived proposal. <i>Note 3.</i> Draft Turkish proposals for a peace settlement, communicated to Admiral Calthorpe on Mar. 30, 1919.	753 754
58 To Mr. CAMPBELL Foreign Office Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 8	Lord Curzon expresses views regarding French plan to assist Armenians.	756
59 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 1651	Sept. 10	Transmits report from Military Control Officer at Akhissar regarding constitution and organization of the irregular Turkey army.	756
60 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1812	Sept. 13	Reports conversation with Grand Vizier concerning steps which might be taken in regard to Mustafa Kemal Pasha to whose activities Grand Vizier attaches increasing importance.	760
61 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1818	Sept. 15	Suggests another possible motive for French proposal to land troops in Cilicia and send them through Asia Minor to Armenia.	761
62 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1830	Sept. 17	Sivas Congress has issued proclamation breaking off relations with Turkish Govt.: enumerates points on which he and French High Commissioner are in entire agreement.	761
63 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1831	Sept. 17	Refers to No. 512 and discusses situation: considers that continued Greek and Italian possession of sections of Asia Minor can lead to nothing but unending strife. <i>Note 7.</i> Gen. Milne's telegram No. I. 7104 of Sept. 17 to W.O. requesting instructions as to his attitude towards Turkish nationalist movement along the Anatolian railway.	763 764
64 SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 1835	Sept. 18	Transmits telegram from Admiral de Robeck to Mr. Balfour reporting that one reason for Gen. Franchet d'Esperey's visit to Paris is to obtain recall of Gen. Milne: transmits also memorandum on this subject by Secretary of State for War in reply to a French memorandum, also enclosed.	766
65 Mr. VANSITTART Paris Unnumbered	Sept. 20	Letter to Sir J. Tilley: no likelihood of treaty with Turkey being signed within next two or three months.	771

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516	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1843	Sept. 20	Indicates that a minimum of £2,000,000 Turkish monthly is necessary for next six months to prevent a complete breakdown of Turkish administration.	77
517	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1723	Sept. 21	Refers to No. 480 and transmits particulars of concessions in which British interests participate.	77
518	FRENCH GOVERNMENT Paris	Sept. 21	Note respecting spheres of command in Turkey.	77
519	M. DUTASTA Paris	Sept. 22	Transmits letter of Sept. 20 from Armenian Delegation to Peace Conference regarding allegedly desperate situation in Armenia.	77
520	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1854	Sept. 23	Refers to No. 516 and transmits proposal for financial assistance for Turkish Govt.: identic telegrams have been sent by Allied colleagues to their respective governments.	77
521	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1858	Sept. 23	Refers to No. 513 and discusses attitude of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and difficulties of Turkish Govt. owing to nationalist movement: stresses urgent necessity for speedy termination of armistice and withdrawal of Greek and Italian troops from Asia Minor.	78c
522	To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 559	Sept. 23	Refers to No. 507 and approves attitude adopted by Admiral Webb in conversation with Grand Vizier.	781
523	COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 455	Sept. 27	Major Noel appears to be conducting dangerous form of anti-Turkish and pro-Kurdish propaganda: he has been ordered with his party to return to Aleppo: inquires wishes as to Major Noel's future movements.	782
524	To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 6781	Sept. 29	Transmits information regarding question of validity of oil concessions granted to Standard Oil Company before the war in the Gallipoli district.	782
525	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1199	Sept. 29	Refers to visit to Paris of Gen. Franchet d'Esperey and states that H.M.G. have no intention of recalling Gen. Milne.	783
526	LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	Sept. 29	Note of a conversation with French Ambassador regarding note addressed by Prime Minister on Sept. 15 to M. Clemenceau and latter's reply of Sept. 21 relating to division of spheres at Constantinople.	784
527	EARL GRANVILLE Athens Tel. No. 422	Sept. 29	Transmits from Constantinople telegram reporting information from Smyrna that strong campaign is being run in Greek Army against M. Venizelos and asking whether this can be confirmed.	784
528	EARL GRANVILLE Athens Tel. No. 421	Sept. 29	Refers to No. 527 and transmits copy of telegram to Constantinople: unable to obtain confirmation of rumour: Acting	784

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<b>52</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1889	Sept. 30	President of Council aware that there are Constantinists in army, but he did not view situation seriously.	785
<b>53</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1902	Oct. 2	Mustafa Kemal Pasha's influence continues to spread and situation in Anatolia according to Grand Vizier continues to deteriorate: advice and assurances given to Grand Vizier, who is expected to resign.	787
<b>54</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1907	Oct. 3	Transmits list of members of new Turkish Cabinet.	787
<b>55</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1908	Oct. 3	Comments on composition of new Cabinet.	787
<b>56</b> MR. HOHLER Constantinople Unnumbered	Oct. 4	Letter to Mr. Kidston commenting on situation and possibilities of new Government: suggests that it should be publicly emphasized that occupation of Smyrna was a Peace Conference decision.	788
<b>57</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1823	Oct. 6	Transmits account of interview of Military Attaché with A.D.C. of late Grand Vizier: A.D.C. obviously in close touch with nationalist leaders.	791
<b>58</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1858	Oct. 6	Reports conversation with new M.F.A.: latter said new government looked above all to Great Britain for assistance and advice, and expected matters could be arranged with Mustafa Kemal Pasha without serious trouble.	794
<b>59</b> SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1418	Oct. 7	Reports result of discussion in Supreme Council regarding delimitation of lines between Greek, Italian and Turkish forces in Asia Minor.	796
<b>60</b> VISCOUNT GREY Washington No. 663	Oct. 7	Comments on joint resolution introduced in Senate on Sept. 9, seeking to authorize use of American troops in Armenia.	797
<b>61</b> ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1933	Oct. 8	Ex-Grand Vizier is uneasy as to safety of Sultan: does not seem possible to take any steps to prevent his dethronement should Nationalist Party decide on that: asks whether permission may be granted for journey of Ferid Pasha to England and France.	798
<b>62</b> SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1426	Oct. 9	Refers to No. 536 and expresses hope that, Supreme Council having decided in favour of interallied occupation of that portion of the Meander valley which is not to remain in exclusively Greek occupation, H.M.G. will sanction employment of a small British force for this purpose.	798

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540	To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1216	Oct. 9	Transmits text of memorandum from Italian Ambassador advocating that when evacuation of Aidin takes place Italian troops should be sent there to maintain order: assumes no attention will be paid to Italian suggestion.	799
541	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1941	Oct. 10	Mustafa Kemal Pasha is demanding immediate elections and arrest and trial of certain members of late Government: M.F.A. warned that Allies would not countenance any measures of violence against members of late Government and that such action would have most unfavourable effect upon Turkish cause.	799
542	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1885	Oct. 10	Transmits, and comments on, summary of telegram from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to government containing his terms for co-operation: facilities being granted to Ex-Grand Vizier and Ali Kemal Bey to leave country. <i>Note 2.</i> Telegram of Sept. 25 from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Gen. Solly Flood.	800
543	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1836	Oct. 10	Reviews general course of recent events: political situation consequent on delay in conclusion of peace has enabled Nationalist movement to gather strength and is increasing the difficulty of subsequently enforcing peace terms: British standing in Turkey.	802
544	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1879	Oct. 12	Reports a general conversation with new Grand Vizier and M.F.A.: Grand Vizier appealed for British help.	810
545	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 1939	Oct. 12	Discusses future of Kurdistan and Armenia, and whether Great Britain should accept a mandate for Kurdistan as desired by Gen. Chérif Pasha. <i>Note 2.</i> India Office letter of Aug. 1 to Lord Hardinge regarding the possible assumption of some British responsibility for Kurdistan.	813
546	VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1447	Oct. 13	Transmits an American view that it is out of question that any mandate will be conceded by Senate to present administration, but possible that Gen. Leonard Wood might be next President and might obtain an American mandate for Constantinople, &c.: this chance makes it worth while, if possible, to make temporary arrangements for Constantinople.	815
547	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1435	Oct. 13	Refers to No. 540 and states that suggestions in question were put forward by Italian military representative at a meeting of Supreme Council and were unanimously rejected.	816

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50 Sir E. Crowe Paris No. 1972	Oct. 17	Transmits, and comments on, copy of a letter from Mr. Buckler of American Peace Commission enclosing a report from Gen. Harbord regarding his recent visit to Turkey and Caucasus.	816
50 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1939	Oct. 18	Transmits accounts of a conversation between Mr. Hohler and Chief of Staff to Gen. Harbord, and of a conversation between a British Officer and an Intelligence Officer to Admiral Bristol: comments on American attitude towards British policy, and on American sympathies with the nationalist movement.	819
50 To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1887	Oct. 18	Comments on No. 546: delay in settlement caused by American exigencies already producing lamentable consequences and may gravely imperil chances of peace treaty with Turkey.	826
51 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1249	Oct. 18	Refers to No. 539: W.O. deprecate most strongly use of British troops in Meander valley: they consider it essential that Gen. Milne's status in Asia Minor should be clearly defined and recognized.	827
52 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1978	Oct. 19	The Armenian and the Acting Greek Patriarchs called together on High Commissions on Oct. 17 to represent danger of situation created for Christian population by triumph of national movement and recent change of government.	827
53 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1926	Oct. 19	Transmits memorandum by Mr. Ryan recording a conversation with Grand Vizier on Oct. 16 regarding position of nationalist forces in relation to effective strength of Turkish regular army.	828
54 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1929	Oct. 19	Describes cartoon, banned by Allied censorship, illustrating spirit and ideals of the Turkish national movement.	830
55 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1935	Oct. 20	Transmits report from representative at Smyrna regarding local Italian activity: report emphasizes once again desirability of early withdrawal from Asia Minor of both Greek and Italian troops.	831
56 Sir E. Crowe Paris Tel. No. 1464	Oct. 20	Refers to No. 551 and advances reasons why views of W.O. should not be acted on.	833
57 LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	Oct. 20	Note of conversation with French Ambassador regarding question of command at Constantinople: M. Cambon asked that reply should be returned to M. Clemenceau's note (No. 518).	835
58 To EARL GRANVILLE Athens No. 258	Oct. 21	Records conversation with M. Venizelos who urged Greek claims in Thrace and expressed his views regarding future of	835

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		Constantinople from which he considered the Turkish Govt. should be removed. <i>Note 2.</i> Conversation of Oct. 20 between M. Venizelos and Mr. Kidston: M. Venizelos considered it absolutely necessary to crush Mustafa Kemal Pasha's movement.	83
559 EARL GRANVILLE Athens Tel. No. 441	Oct. 21	Urges that refusal now to cede Tenedos, Imbros and Lemnos to Greece would come as a most unexpected blow to her.	83
560 To MR. KENNARD Rome No. 658	Oct. 22	Records conversation with Italian Ambassador who was much concerned at Sir E. Crowe's opposition in Supreme Council to proposal to include Italian troops in those occupying Aidin: Ambassador referred to a letter of 1917 from Mr. Balfour favouring Italian claims in Asia Minor: Ambassador also spoke of desirability of speedy conclusion of peace with Turkey.	83
561 COL. MEINERTZHAGEN Cairo Tel. No. 483	Oct. 22	Transmits information from Damascus regarding alleged understanding between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Italians in Konia: reported that Kemal Pasha will recognize Italian occupation of specified areas in return for moral support against Greeks.	839
562 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1958	Oct. 22	Transmits correspondence regarding an agreement entered into between Deutsche Bank and Banca Italiana di Sconto at Constantinople. <i>Note 1.</i> Report of Jan. 16, 1920, from H.M. Ambassador in Rome on relations between Italian and German banks.	840
563 VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1475	Oct. 22	Refers to No. 550: Secretary of State confirms impression that there is no chance of Congress authorizing acceptance of mandates for Constantinople, &c.	842
564 VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1481	Oct. 23	Mr. Morgenthau thinks that after Senate has ratified Treaty of Versailles he may be able with help of Gen. Harbord to create a wave of idealism in favour of mandate for Constantinople and Armenia: Mr. Morgenthau suggests Anglo-American or international control of Straits of Gibraltar, and favours similar control of Panama Canal: anything that H.M.G. can do to show goodwill towards Armenia would be useful.	843
565 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 186	Oct. 23	Informs Sir E. Crowe, Paris, of Col. Haskell's opinion that Gen. Harbord appears to have gathered erroneous impression of state of things in Anatolia and Caucasus: agrees with Col. Haskell that situation is extremely precarious and that delay in announcing peace terms is having worst possible effect.	843

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
56 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London No. 141416/M.E/ 44	Oct. 23	Note to effect that H.M.G. propose to inform Admiral de Robeck that they cannot contemplate giving any financial assistance to Turkish Govt. during present state of war: hopes that French Govt. will take similar steps: similar note is being sent to Italian Ambassador.	844
57 To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1577	Oct. 26	W.O. propose to instruct Gen. Milne that force should not be used to support civil administration along Anatolian railway and that all detachments should be withdrawn if their maintenance would mean danger of their being involved in open hostility with nationalists: Lord Curzon concurs.	845
58 To EARL GRANVILLE Athens Tel. No. 438	Oct. 27	Refers to No. 559 and records view of Peace Delegation, with which Secretary of State agrees, regarding disposal of islands in question.	845
59 ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London No. 3266	Oct. 28	Memorandum referring to proposal to replace Greek troops in Smyrna by Allied troops and stating that Signor Tittoni would not agree to exclusion of Italian troops from interallied occupation as happened in case of Aidin.	846
60 SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 385/3/3/19917	Oct. 28	Letter to Mr. Wellesley expressing his embarrassment in being asked to suggest terms of a reply to Admiral Webb as to probable date of announcement of terms of peace with Turkey: suggests that F.O. are in a better position to answer this question.	846
61 To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 650	Oct. 29	Acknowledges No. 543 and states that there appears to be no prospect of concluding peace with Turkey within period contemplated in despatch under reply.	847
62 To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7289	Oct. 30	Prime Minister is receiving numerous telegraphic appeals from Moslems in India with regard to Turkish settlement: expresses personal view that this Pan-Islamic agitation is being engineered from Great Britain by Sheikh Kidwai and associates.	847
63 To ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London No. 144808/M.E.44	Oct. 31	Letter from Sir J. Tilley regarding letter of 1917 from Mr. Balfour to Italian Ambassador concerning Italian claims in Asia Minor. <i>Note 3.</i> Mr. Balfour's letter of April 12, 1917, to Italian Ambassador concerning Italian claims in Asia Minor.	848
64 ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London No. 3291	Oct. 31	Refers to copy of No. 566 and states that Italian Govt. share the opinion of H.M.G. in the matter.	851
65 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1325	Nov. 3	Refers to No. 536: is informed that French Govt. cannot spare any troops to take part in Allied occupation of Meander valley.	852

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAG
<b>576</b> To SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 839	Nov. 4	Instructions to inform Italian Govt. why Gen. Milne has been authorized to withdraw detachments guarding Anatolian railway at his discretion: Italian detachment at Konia considered to be under Gen. Milne's orders.	85
<b>577</b> To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1727	Nov. 4	Owing to delay of U.S. Govt. in deciding as to mandates, coupled with illness of President, it is unlikely that any definite terms of peace with Turkey can be announced for some time to come.	85
<b>578</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2066	Nov. 4	Reports reply of M.F.A. to question as to accuracy of report that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had demanded of government that new parliament should meet at Broussa: transmits memorandum by Mr. Hohler on question of expulsion of Turks from Constantinople.	85
<b>579</b> SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 689	Nov. 5	Refers to No. 576: M.F.A. concurs in general but suggests that Gen. Milne should, if necessary, consult Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople, who, M.F.A. was convinced, would raise no difficulties.	85
<b>580</b> SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1523	Nov. 5	Refers to No. 575 and expresses opinion that French refusal to contribute to interallied force may be ultimately advantageous: hopes that question of interallied occupation of Meander valley will not be reopened but that Gen. Milne will be authorized, if necessary, to employ a second British battalion.	85
<b>581</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2033	Nov. 5	Greek Govt. evidently endeavouring to substitute authority of its representative at Smyrna for that of Allied High Commissioners and Turkish Govt.: requests that suitable steps may be taken by Supreme Council to ensure that Greek representative shall modify his attitude: identical telegrams sent by French and Italian High Commissioners to their governments.	85
<b>582</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2040	Nov. 7	Informed from Smyrna that Greek Military Commander on Oct. 30 wrote to Vali forbidding holding of elections in Greek zone.	85
<b>583</b> SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2123	Nov. 10	Reports in detail attitude which he adopted in discussion of report of Smyrna Commission on Nov. 10 by Supreme Council: records Council's decision in the matter: transmits an earlier memorandum by Mr. Kerr and other documents concerning the Greek occupation of Smyrna.	85
<b>584</b> ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2052	Nov. 10	Refers to No. 577 and details some of principal difficulties consequent on a prolongation of armistice: submits recommendations, including recall of Gen. Franchet d'Esperey.	86

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95 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2110	Nov. 11	Draws attention to the increasing sufferings of Christian refugees in Turkey owing to delay in conclusion of peace: urges that Great Britain, either alone or in concert with her Allies, should assume responsibility for relief of Christians.	873
96 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2054	Nov. 11	Fighting began on Oct. 31 between Greek and Turkish troops in area between Bergamos and Soma, as result of Greek C.-in-C. ordering an advance without awaiting Gen. Milne's orders: deplorable effect produced.	877
97 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1555	Nov. 12	Informed Supreme Council that H.M.G. would not furnish contingent for proposed interallied occupation of Aidin region, in the absence of a French contingent: Council accordingly authorized Greek Govt. to maintain their existing occupation of the district.	877
98 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2057	Nov. 12	Transmits Smyrna telegram: Turkish national leader has warned Greek general that if oppression of Moslems in Greek zone continues he will take reprisals on Greek Christians in Moslem areas.	877
99 EARL CURZON Foreign Office	Nov. 12	Note of general conversation with French M.F.A. and French Ambassador concerning Middle Eastern questions: Lord Curzon proposed early conference in London to discuss peace terms with Turkey.	878
100 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2058	Nov. 13	Submits representations against W.O. decision to demobilize British personnel on Anatolian Railway.	881
101 EARL GRANVILLE Athens No. 215	Nov. 14	Transmits British military report on royalist movement in Greek army: reports comments of Vice-President of Council on report, summary of which was read to him.	882
102 To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1779	Nov. 15	Refers to No. 562: transfer of Deutsche Bank to Banca Italiana di Sconto should not be permitted during armistice.	886
103 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2137	Nov. 16	Refers to No. 562: Allied High Commissioners recently decided to approve agreement in question.	886
104 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2143	Nov. 16	Transmits translations of purported telegrams between Minister of Marine and central government during Minister's mission to the 'National Forces': comments on negotiations between government and leaders of national movement.	887
105 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Nov. 17	Telegram to Lord Hardinge referring to contemplated cessions to Italy on west frontier of Egypt and in Jubaland and to understanding in Paris that no definite cession would be made except as part of	891

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		general arrangement which would include questions of Adriatic and Asia Minor: trusts that there will be no departure from this understanding.	
<b>596 SIR E. CROWE</b> Paris No. 342/1/6/20367	Nov. 17	Letter to Mr. Kidston commenting on and criticizing W.O. letter of Oct. 23 regarding (a) immediate question of helping Armenian republic with arms and (b) future treatment of Armenia by conference dealing with Turkish peace.	891
<b>597 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK</b> Constantinople Unnumbered	Nov. 18	Letter to Lord Curzon expressing his anxiety at delay in settling Turkish treaty: refers to possibility of considerable embarrassment to Allies should Mustafa Kemal Pasha decide to resist peace terms.	892
<b>598 To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK</b> Constantinople Tel. No. 1793	Nov. 19	Importance of point raised in No. 584 is fully realized: any suggestions made to meet the difficulties arising from the indefinite prolongation of armistice will receive immediate consideration: H.M.G. have been pressing for early commencement of peace negotiations with Turkey.	896
<b>599 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK</b> Constantinople No. 2185	Nov. 20	Transmits copy of note to M.F.A. on subject of Turkish authorities obtaining from reluctant Christian communities signed statements expressing satisfaction as regards present state of affairs.	897
<b>600 M. DUTASTA</b> Paris	Nov. 20	Transmits to Secretary-General of British Peace Delegation a telegram from Grand Vizier to M. Clemenceau asking that date be fixed for Turkish Delegation to return to Paris.	898
<b>601 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK</b> Constantinople No. 2204	Nov. 22	Reports conversation with Tewfik Pasha who urged that peace should be made whatever terms might be, and spoke of special relations of Turkey and Great Britain.	898
<b>602 MR. NORMAN</b> Paris	Nov. 22	Transmits to M. Dutasta British note relative to an attempt to introduce Bolshevik propaganda from Russia into Turkey through Germany by wireless.	900
<b>603 VISCOUNT GREY</b> Washington Tel. No. 1593	Nov. 23	Is informed by Secretary of State that President has not yet been able to decide about proceeding with Turkish treaty: sees no course open to other Governments except to proceed with negotiations.	901
<b>604 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK</b> Constantinople Tel. No. 2093	Nov. 24	Refers to No. 592: assent was given to German bank premises being taken over by Italian bank, Italian High Commissioner having given assurance that there should be no connexion between the two: would be difficult now to withdraw this assent unless by order of Peace Conference.	902

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605	To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1391	Nov. 25	Records conversation with French Ambassador regarding British proposal to transfer to London meetings of conference to deal with Turkish peace treaty: attitude of U.S. Senate towards League of Nations Covenant discussed.	902
606	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2109	Nov. 26	Supports M. Venizelos' contention that he was not warned of provisional nature of occupation of Smyrna before occupation took place: transmits relevant correspondence.	904
607	To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1813	Nov. 26	Refers to No. 590 and forwards W.O. reasons for proposed withdrawal of British personnel and detachments from Anatolian railway: asks for observations.	906
608	To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1821	Nov. 28	Present intention of H.M.G. is not to accept a mandate for Turkey even if it were offered them.	906
609	To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 153371/M.E.58	Nov. 28	Letter from Mr. Kidston replying to No. 596: discusses Armenian questions and future of Turkey: deprecates proposal that Col. Haskell be given control in name of Allies of relations between Caucasian republics: cannot agree that Smyrna incident played minor part in bringing about present situation: refers to policy in Central Asia. <i>Note 16. Correspondence relative to Soviet activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia.</i>	907
610	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2219	Nov. 29	Refers to No. 607 and points out danger of allowing Mustafa Kemal Pasha to control Anatolian Railway: comments on Turkish national movement.	911
611	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 342/1/6/20832	Dec. 1	Letter to Mr. Kidston acknowledging No. 609 and expressing views regarding future of Armenians and peace settlement with Turkey: emphasizes desirability of American participation therein: inclined to think Greek occupation of Smyrna was good policy.	912
612	To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 1	Instructions to consult M. Clemenceau regarding arrangements for forthcoming discussions on Turkish question in either London or Paris.	915
613	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2252	Dec. 2	Reports local opposition to nationalist movement in Anatolia: transmits translation of petition from local notables protesting against nationalist activities in Bozgir district, and requesting British assistance.	915
614	To MR. WISE Paris No. 154459/M.E.44	Dec. 3	Letter from Sir J. Tilley asking that serious attention of Supreme Economic Council be drawn to critical state of destitution among Greeks and Armenians in Turkey with a view to adoption of relief measures.	917

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615 SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2248	Dec. 3	Refers to No. 605 and reports M. Clemenceau's uncompromising attitude to proposal to transfer peace negotiations to London: suggests possible compromise.	918
616 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2271	Dec. 4	Transmits memorandum by Mr. Ryan recording a conversation with Turkish M.F.A. during which Mr. Ryan explained British attitude towards Kurdish affairs: Turkish M.F.A. criticized general British policy: again stresses necessity for early peace settlement with Turkey.	920
617 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 4	Instructions to press M. Clemenceau to adhere to his original offer and come to London as soon as possible, accompanied by M. Pichon, in view of extreme gravity of general situation.	924
618 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 4	Refers to No. 617: pending Anglo-French meeting he should not agree to any course involving H.M.G. in military commitments.	924
619 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 5	Refers to No. 617: decisions now to be taken should be taken only by ministers representing their governments: conference with M. Clemenceau essential.	925
620 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2311	Dec. 9	Transmits report of a conversation between Mr. Hohler and Kurdish chief on Kurdish affairs: latter stated that Turkish Govt. had offered Kurds administrative autonomy, and asked for advice of H.M.G.: agreement entered into between Armenians and Kurds.	925
621 To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1863	Dec. 10	Asks for views on memorandum presented to Peace Conference by Armenian and Kurdish representatives demanding freedom from Turkey for a unified independent Armenia and an independent Kurdistan under one mandatory.	928
622 To U.S. AMBASSADOR London No. 156699/M.E.44	Dec. 11	Transmits correspondence between H.M. High Commissioner and U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople regarding anti-British news items disseminated through agency of U.S. Navy Radio Press: distribution in Constantinople liable to lead to misunderstanding.	928
623 To MR. VANSITTART Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Dec. 11	Telegram from Sir E. Crowe, F.O.: M. Clemenceau has proposed complete scheme for dealing with Turkish question: requests that Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Forbes Adam come to London at once.	930
624 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2137	Dec. 11	Refers to No. 607 and tabulates further reasons why British military control of Anatolian railway should not be withdrawn: Gen. Milne concurs.	931

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62	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2325	Dec. 12	New impetus recently to protests from places in interior of Turkey against Greek occupation of Smyrna: transmits telegram from Mustafa Kemal Pasha in this connexion.	932
63	SIR TO VISCOUNT GREY Washington No. 824	Dec. 13	Instructions to approach U.S. Govt. to ascertain whether they can prevent circulation of anti-British reports by U.S. Navy Radio Press in Constantinople.	933
67	To VISCOUNT GREY Washington No. 828	Dec. 15	Records action taken by Allied Governments regarding mining and industrial concessions granted by Turkish Govt. to enemy and neutral subjects during the war: question of concessions granted to American nationals may give rise to difficulties.	934
68	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2150	Dec. 15	Reports negative attitude adopted to Sultan's expressed desire for a meeting.	936
69	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2295	Dec. 16	Advocates that Lemnos be restored to Greece at once.	936
70	U.S. AMBASSADOR London	Dec. 19	Letter to Lord Curzon acknowledging No. 622 and stating that correspondence in question has been communicated to Admiral Knapp for such action as he may deem advisable.	937
61	ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING London	Dec. 22	Minutes of first meeting of an Anglo-French conference regarding the Turkish settlement: consideration of annexed first part of M. Berthelot's note of Dec. 12 and British comments thereon.	938
62	ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING London	Dec. 22	Minutes of second meeting of the Anglo-French conference: general discussion regarding the Turkish settlement: annexed French memorandum concerning Armenia.	956
63	ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING London	Dec. 23	Minutes of third meeting of Anglo-French conference: Kurdistan and the Caucasus.	966
64	FRENCH DELEGATION London	Dec. 23	Note on future organization of Kurdistan.	969
65	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2384	Dec. 23	Transmits details regarding strength of British forces in Turkey: appears essential that Allies be prepared to show the necessary strength at Constantinople when peace terms are handed to Turkey.	970
66	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 2177	Dec. 23	Reports conversation with Grand Vizier and M.F.A. regarding alleged Greek intention to proclaim annexation of Smyrna at New Year.	972
67	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2399	Dec. 26	Refers to Pan-Islamic congress to be held at Sivas under Turkish nationalist auspices: discusses tendency throughout all Moslem countries of Middle East to react against European domination and control: encloses three reports.	974

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638	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2401	Dec. 27	Transmits copy of letter to Gen. Milne regarding W.O. suggestions on question of more active operations against Mustafa Kemal Pasha, such as, possibly, blowing up Dardanelles forts.	97
639	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2403	Dec. 27	Comments on reports regarding deplorable situation in Kaimakchi area and at Odemish and Tireh as a result of rectification in Greek line: cannot but reflect how opposed these proceedings are to Allied principles and ideals during the war.	97
640	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2416	Dec. 29	Transmits letter from M.F.A. protesting against continued Greek occupation of Smyrna despite unfavourable report issued by Allied Commission of Inquiry.	979
641	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2412	Dec. 29	Transmits report by Cmdr. Luke regarding conditions in Thrace: encloses French proclamation on government of Western Thrace.	980
642	To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 795 <sup>1</sup>	Dec. 29	Refers to No. 629: in view of probable early announcement of Turkish peace terms it is considered better to treat restoration of Lemnos as part of general settlement and to postpone action for present.	989
643	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 2425	Dec. 30	Transmits letter from Gen. Milne regarding neglect of Turkish Minister of War to comply with orders from Gen. Milne: reports action taken.	989
644	To ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1909	Dec. 31	Refers to publication in French press of intimation that removal of Turkish Govt. from Constantinople has been decided on in principle: gives facts of case.	991
645	SIR J. TILLEY Foreign Office	Dec. 31	Note of a conversation with Italian Ambassador who mentioned that it was a pity that M. Clemenceau had spoken as he did about the Turkish negotiations in London: Marquis Imperiali looked forward to Signor Nitti's meeting with Secretary of State: he referred to rumour of alleged Greek intention to declare annexation of Smyrna.	992
1920				
646	EARL CURZON Foreign Office	Jan. 4	Memorandum on future of Constantinople, favouring expulsion of the Turkish Govt., and referring to recent Anglo-French negotiations: replies to arguments adduced by Secretary of State for India. <i>Note 12.</i> Gen. Milne's despatch of Oct. 20 regarding Turkish nationalist movement: refers to possible necessity of using military force, and to question of Smyrna.	992
647	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 17	Jan. 4	Transmits report by Cmdr. Luke on effects of Bolshevism on British Empire, and memorandum by Mr. Ryan commenting on above report.	1000

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68 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 14	Jan. 4	Reports conversation between High Commissioner and Tewfik Pasha on general situation: Tewfik Pasha stressed unimportance of Parliament for any purpose except that of ratifying peace, and non-representative character of national movement: considers visit of Tewfik Pasha designed to convince High Commissioner that all would be well with Turkey if only England would help.	1005
69 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 13	Jan. 5	Refers to No. 606 and states that local Greek authorities publicly proclaimed at time of occupation that it in no way prejudged final fate of Smyrna area: refers to improbable report of alleged Greek intention to proclaim annexation of Smyrna.	1007
70 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 25	Jan. 6	Transmits protest by Vali of Smyrna relative to plight of Ottoman refugees who have been evicted from their homes by Greeks in occupied area of Aidin Vilayet.	1009
71 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 31	Jan. 6	Reports on strength of Turkish Army and invites comparison with No. 635.	1010
72 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 28	Jan. 6	Reports suggestion in press for creation of a Ministry of National Economy and, in view of possibility of an Anglo-French condominium in Turkey, outlines a division of work between such a ministry and Ministry of Finance under British and French control respectively.	1011
73 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 22	Jan. 8	Summarizes note from M.F.A. to Allied High Commissioners regarding reforms which Turkish Govt. desire to initiate, with request that it may be submitted to Peace Conference: note already published in press.	1012
74 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 24	Jan. 9	Transmits press comments on proposal to transfer capital from Constantinople: emphasizes desirability of Allied solidarity in this regard.	1013
75 To ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 25	Jan. 9	Asks for views on Gen. Milne's recommendations to W.O. (1) that Turkish Minister of War and Chief of Staff should be removed, (2) that Supreme War Council should as preliminary condition of peace demand surrender of any Turk charged with breach of military clauses of armistice.	1014
76 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 31	Jan. 10	Refers to No. 653: French High Commissioner takes exception to precipitate publication of note: collective Allied note being sent to M.F.A.	1014
77 EARL GRANVILLE Athens Tel. No. 9	Jan. 10	Reports assurance from M.F.A. that there was no truth whatever in rumour that annexation of Smyrna to Greece was to be proclaimed.	1015

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658	MR. VANSITTART Paris No. 2	Jan. 12	Transmits French note outlining principles of settlement of eastern question: discusses problems of (a) Constantinople and the Straits; (b) Anatolia and Asia Minor; (c) Armenia.	1016
659	MR. FORBES ADAM Paris Unnumbered	Jan. 13	Letter to Mr. Kidston transmitting memorandum written for Lord Curzon on Jan. 10, emphasizing disadvantages of proposal to retain Turkish Govt. in Constantinople: Mr. Lloyd George has instructed Mr. Montagu to draw up counter-draft to French note in No. 658.	1026
660	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 122	Jan. 16	Transmits document describing aims and organization of a new Pan-Islamic Association known as 'Mouvahidin': association is clearly evolved by C.U.P. and Turkish nationalists to enlist support and coordinate efforts of all anti-foreign and disaffected elements in Islamic countries.	1028
661	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 100	Jan. 17	Comments on report by Lieut. Slade on a tour in Vilayet of Castamouni; large proportion of persons elected to parliament in those districts were of criminal character: report illustrates success with which National Defence nominees were forced on the reluctant people.	1032
662	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 45	Jan. 17	Refers to No. 655 and reports decision of Allied High Commissioners to demand removal of Minister of War and Chief of Staff: collective note to Porte will be presented as soon as possible.	1032
663	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 47	Jan. 17	Refers to No. 662 and summarizes collective note: Italian High Commissioner only agreed to note after strenuous opposition.	1033
664	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 102	Jan. 18	Comments on a military report on nationalist movement in Turkey: if it is intended to enforce drastic peace terms in Anatolia, Allies must be prepared to support their decision by force.	1035
665	MR. FORBES ADAM Paris Unnumbered	Jan. 19	Letter to Mr. Phipps informing him of progress of work in connexion with Turkish treaty and enclosing draft by Mr. Montagu, counterdraft thereto and memoranda by M. Venizelos.	1036
666	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 61	Jan. 20	Transmits report of a meeting of Turkish ministers on Jan. 4 and of an alleged understanding between government and Mustafa Kemal Pasha as to action to be taken if Smyrna is given to Greece or if Constantinople is detached from Turkey.	1061
667	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 115	Jan. 20	Transmits report regarding business transacted at a Cabinet Council on Jan. 4.	1062
668	ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 114	Jan. 20	Transmits report of matters dealt with at a military conference in Sultan's palace on night of Jan. 4.	1065

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⑥ ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 64	Jan. 21	Minister for War and Chief of Staff have resigned: cabinet has received severe shock.	1068
⑦ EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 80	Jan. 21	Transmits report by Lord Curzon on final session of Supreme Council on Jan. 21: approved note to U.S. Govt. inviting its co-operation in Turkish peace negotiations but intimating necessity of proceeding even in their absence: agreed that these negotiations should be opened in London at earliest date.	1068
⑧ Mr. VANSITTART Paris Tel. No. 6	Jan. 22	Refers to No. 670 and reports difference of opinion with French Govt. regarding wording of message to U.S. Govt.: transmits text of proposed message.	1069
⑨ Mr. VANSITTART Paris Unnumbered	Jan. 22	Letter to Lord Hardinge: French Govt. have not assented to transfer to London of whole Peace Conference for discussion of Turkish question: they could only agree to general discussions in London after which drafting and elaboration of details should be resumed in Paris: transmits note from M. Berthelot on subject, and commentary thereon by Lord Curzon.	1071
⑩ ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 131	Jan. 22	Transmits report on a meeting to discuss Pan-Islamic activities connected with Mesopotamia, India and Afghanistan which is reported to have been held at Sultan's palace about Jan. 7 and to have been attended by representatives of Turkish War Ministry, the National Forces, and Sultan's staff.	1074
⑪ ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople No. 125	Jan. 22	Transmits report by British relief officer on general situation in Italian-occupied districts of Asia Minor: Naval C.-in-C. has been asked to detail a warship to pay constant visits along coast between Smyrna and Adalia.	1076
⑫ To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 103	Jan. 23	Refers to No. 672: Prime Minister considers that question of where Turkish negotiations are to be carried on can only be decided by Prime Ministers and that it is unnecessary to refer to it in telegram to U.S. Govt.	1080
⑬ To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 153	Jan. 30	Signor Nitti hopes to be able to come to London soon after Feb. 3: instructions to endeavour to persuade French Prime Minister to come as soon as possible.	1081
⑭ EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 118	Jan. 31	Refers to No. 676: M. Millerand objects to any idea of transferring to London the Allied Conference for making peace with Turkey: will come to London only to discuss general principles.	1081

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
678	To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 170	Feb. 2	Message from Prime Minister instructing Lord Derby to inform M. Millerand that he is much surprised at his attitude: is willing that formal and final stages of conclusion of peace with Turkey, and such intermediate work as convenient, should be carried through in Paris, but negotiations necessitating presence of British and Italian Ministers should be conducted in London: refers to alternative possibility of unilateral termination of state of war with Turkey.	1082
679	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 132	Feb. 4	M. Millerand agrees to Prime Minister's views regarding venue for Turkish peace negotiations, and will cross Channel on Feb. 12.	1083
680	MR. VANSITTART Paris Unnumbered	Feb. 4	Letter to Lord Hardinge advancing considerations regarding French attitude towards Turkish negotiations, and describing arrangements made for personnel during their transfer to London: transmits copy of letter from M. Millerand to Lord Derby.	1083
681	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 109	Feb. 6	Refers to incidents at Marash: discusses generally grave situation and necessity of being prepared for every eventuality: if peace terms are severe Allies must be prepared to impose them by force. <i>Note 4.</i> Athens telegram No. 20 of Jan. 27: French Minister affirms Greek nervousness regarding Turkish military concentrations in Asia Minor.	1085 1086
682	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 161	Feb. 9	Refers to No. 679 and transmits extract from <i>Le Temps</i> regarding venue for Turkish peace negotiations.	1087
683	ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 118	Feb. 10	Refers to No. 681 and reports that government have made terms with nationalists by consenting to jettison certain ministers: result is that nationalist leaders have established complete hold on government.	1088

#### CHAPTER IV

Anglo-French negotiations concerning oil resources, from the withdrawal of the Long-Bérenger Agreement to the opening of the First Conference of London, June 17, 1919–February 12, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
684	To MR. KERR Paris Unnumbered	June 17	Introductory Note: text of Long-Bérenger Agreement. Letter from Sir G. Clerk referring to message from Prime Minister stating that he had cancelled negotiations regarding Anglo-French oil agreement, and transmitting statement on these negotiations for Prime Minister's information.	1089 1092

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
65 Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1097	June 26	<i>Note 2.</i> Letter of May 21 from Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau withdrawing proposed Anglo-French arrangement regarding oil.	1092
66 To MR. KERR Paris No. 94556/C/117	July 4	Transmits copy of letter sent to Mr. Summers of U.S. Delegation informing him that Anglo-French negotiations regarding oil in Rumania are at present in abeyance and suggesting that if the U.S. Govt. have any proposals to make they should communicate them to the F.O. <i>Note 1.</i> Correspondence of May 13-23 between British and U.S. Delegations regarding oil negotiations.	1095
67 To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 4576	July 8	Memorandum from Sir G. Clerk asking whether Prime Minister desires that Govt. Depts. concerned and French Ambassador in London should be notified of withdrawal of Long-Bérenger Agreement. <i>Note 2.</i> Letter of June 5 from Lord E. Percy to Sir G. Clerk: Prime Minister's attitude towards Long-Bérenger Agreement.	1096
68 Mr. BALFOUR Paris No. 1279	July 11	Refers to No. 685 and transmits copy of letter from Petroleum Executive deprecating any communication of Long-Bérenger Agreement to U.S. Peace Delegation, and referring to inquiries by Standard Oil Co.: concurs in terms of letter to Mr. Summers.	1097
69 Mr. DAVIES London Unnumbered	July 11	Transmits further correspondence with Mr. Summers regarding Anglo-French oil agreement with particular reference to Rumania.	1098
70 To MR. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 333	July 18	Letter to Lord Curzon acknowledging memorandum on Long-Bérenger Agreement and informing him of reasons for Prime Minister's withdrawal of it. Refers to acceptance by Rumanian Govt. of offer of French and British Govts. to co-operate in development of Rumanian oil industry and sends instructions to renew representations to Rumanian Govt. against 20 per cent. export tax.	1100
71 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London No. 102249/C/117	July 22	Notifies withdrawal of Long-Bérenger Agreement and asks that note of May 16 confirming terms of agreement be annulled.	1101
72 Sir G. CLERK Paris Unnumbered	July 22	Letter to Mr. Kidston informing him of Mr. Balfour's anxiety regarding the various current oil negotiations and of his view that all speculative oil dealings in any way connected with Mesopotamia or Syria should be discouraged for the present: asks for any details regarding oil matters.	1101
73 To Sir G. CLERK Paris Unnumbered	July 29	Letter from Mr. Kidston acknowledging No. 692 and explaining position so far as F.O. is concerned.	1102

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAC
<b>694</b> To Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest No. 33 Commercial	July 29	Refers to No. 690 and transmits copy of letter from Petroleum Executive enclosing memorandum of Apr. 4 to form basis of oil negotiations under discussion between British, French and Rumanian Govts.: instructions to approach Rumanian Govt. and ascertain whether they are prepared to resume discussion of this subject.	110
<b>695</b> To Sir G. CLERK Paris Unnumbered	Aug. 1	Letter from Mr. Kidston referring to 110 No. 693 and transmitting a minute by Mr. Weakley on oil situation.	110
<b>696</b> Mr. LINDSAY Washington No. 550	Aug. 2	Comments on speech by Senator Phelan 110 regarding acquisition of oil properties by British interests and reports that general question of oil production is exciting considerable interest among members of administration.	110
<b>697</b> Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 389	Aug. 7	Refers to No. 690 and reports action 110 taken.	110
<b>698</b> Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest No. 17 Commercial	Aug. 7	Refers to No. 694 and reports that as 110 French Minister has received similar instructions a joint note has been addressed to Rumanian Govt. asking whether they are prepared to resume discussions begun in Paris.	110
<b>699</b> Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 392	Aug. 8	M. Bratianu has informed French Minister 110c of American threat to cut off further supplies and any financial help to Rumania if any arrangement regarding Anglo-French co-operation in Rumanian oil industry were made to exclusion of American interests.	110c
<b>700</b> Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 393	Aug. 9	Reports removal till further notice of 110g 20 per cent. tax on oil exports.	110g
<b>701</b> Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest No. 129	Aug. 9	Transmits note from M. Bratianu stating 110g that he is unable to resume conversations begun in Paris regarding Anglo-French co-operation in oil industry, in view of action taken by U.S. Govt.	110g
<b>702</b> FRENCH CHARGÉ d'AFFAIRES London	Aug. 12	Transmits note from M. Pichon acknowledging receipt of No. 691 and confirming withdrawal of Long-Bérenger Agreement: considers Sykes-Picot Agreement only possible remaining basis for settlement of affairs of Asia Minor.	1110
<b>703</b> MR. WEAKLEY Foreign Office	Dec. 13	Memorandum on M. Bérenger's note to 1111 M. Clemenceau regarding petroleum.	1111
<b>704</b> SIR J. TILLEY Foreign Office	Dec. 18	Minute regarding object of M. Bérenger's 1113 visit to London: is to discuss oil affairs of South Russia, and M. Berthelot those of Mesopotamia.	1113
<b>705</b> SIR H. GREENWOOD and M. BÉRENGER	Dec. 21	Memorandum of provisional Anglo-French 1114 agreement regarding oil resources in Rumania, Russia, Mesopotamia, and French and British colonies.	1114

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
70 To Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 2	Jan. 1 1920	Asks for views as to probability of obtaining Rumanian consent to transfer by Deutsche Bank of their holding of 51 per cent. in Steaua Romana to Anglo-French group.	1117
71 Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 17	Jan. 9	Refers to No. 706 and expresses opinion that moment is not propitious to broach this question: suggests that Rumanian Prime Minister who is going to Paris shortly might be sounded there.	1117
72 Mr. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 22	Jan. 11	Refers to No. 707: seems to be universally held in Bucharest that such enemy holdings have become Rumanian property: gathers that Prime Minister when in Paris hopes to arrange a foreign loan and to use these holdings as part security.	1117
73 To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 185	Jan. 15	Refers to provisional Anglo-French oil agreement of Dec. 21, which Mr. Lloyd George may wish to discuss with M. Clemenceau, and calls attention to a point regarding Morocco which may lead to future difficulties.	1118

## CHAPTER V

Anglo-Persian relations after the signature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919  
August 9-December 21, 1919

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
70 EARL CURZON Foreign Office	1919 Aug. 9	Memorandum on Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1119
71 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 534	Aug. 9	Two agreements with Persian Govt. and four separate letters have been duly signed with two verbal alterations previously reported. <i>Note 1.</i> F.O. telegram No. 424 of Aug. 8 to Tehran enumerating agreements and letters which Sir P. Cox was thereby authorized to sign.	1122
72 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 431	Aug. 11	Congratulates on conclusion of agreement and asks for particulars regarding publication: inquires whether Sir P. Cox has any comments on proposed invitation to Mushaver-el-Mamalek to visit London.	1123
73 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 535	Aug. 11	Stresses necessity for early appointment of Financial Adviser and assembly of Military Commission: transmits views regarding latter.	1124
74 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 540	Aug. 12	Refers to No. 712 and reports two principal documents already published.	1125

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
715 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 433	Aug. 12	Records position in regard to subsidy to Shah.	1121
716 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 541	Aug. 13	Transmits observations and suggestions in connexion with satisfactory attitude of Belgian, and unsatisfactory attitude of French ministers.	1121
717 To SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 1061	Aug. 13	Records observations made to M. de Fleuriau regarding report of impending despatch of French judicial mission to Tehran: general sketch of contents of Anglo-Persian Agreement given to M. de Fleuriau: attention of Minister drawn to hostile propaganda in French press regarding British policy in Middle East.	1121
718 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 435	Aug. 14	Refers to No. 714: four principal documents of the agreement will be published on Aug. 16.	1130
719 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 543	Aug. 14	Refers to No. 712: after consultation with Prime Minister they both consider that invitation to Mushaver-el-Mamalek to London would be advantageous: suggests line to be taken with him.	1130
720 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 545	Aug. 14	Reports action taken regarding proposed allocation of an advance on British loan to Persian Govt.	1131
721 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 546	Aug. 15	Requests that Imperial Bank of Persia be paid £131,147 as first instalment on account of British loan.	1131
722 SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Aug. 15	Mushaver-el-Mamalek regrets he is unable to accept invitation to visit London: is about to proceed to Constantinople to meet Shah.	1131
723 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 550	Aug. 16	Requests authority to continue monthly payment of 100,000 tomans for Cossack Division.	1132
724 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 554	Aug. 16	Suggests communiqués which Reuter might send regarding Agreement, Shah's visit to Europe, and Mushaver-el-Mamalek's visit to London.	1132
725 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 439	Aug. 16	Published texts of agreement generally well received: <i>Journal des Débats</i> bitter and states agreement not well received in Persia: asks for facts.	1133
726 SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 960	† Aug. 17	Summarizes leading article in <i>Le Temps</i> criticizing Anglo-Persian Agreement, regarding it as prejudicial to Persian independence, and drawing attention to fact that it does not legally exist till passed by Persian National Assembly.	1133
727 To MR. LINDSAY Washington No. 477	† Aug. 18	Records conversation with U.S. Ambassador acquainting him with conclusion of Anglo-Persian Agreement: Ambassador informed that Lord Curzon had earlier mentioned nature of these negotiations to	1135

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
72 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 443	Aug. 19	Col. House: Ambassador thought agreement excellent and agreed to suggest that U.S. Minister in Tehran be advised to facilitate its acceptance.	
73 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 561	x Aug. 19	Refers to No. 716: French Govt. have been asked to instruct the French Minister in Tehran to alter his attitude.	1136
74 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 445	x Aug. 21	Transmits summary of Soviet activities in Central Asia during past month.	1136
75 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 571	Aug. 22	Message regarding communication to be made to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh concerning anti-British activities of certain Persian representatives in Paris.	1137
76 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 569	Aug. 22	Out of question that Mushaver-el-Mamalek should return to Persia now and if he shows any intention of so doing Persian Govt. will do the necessary and should have British support.	1138
77 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 570	Aug. 22	Reception of agreement in Tehran is somewhat better than anticipated being mainly favourable but various categories opposed to it: attitude of French, American and Russian Legations unfriendly.	1138
78 Sir P. Cox Tehran No. 143	Aug. 22	Reports opinion in provinces regarding agreement: reception generally favourable.	1139
79 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 574	Aug. 22	Transmits texts of Anglo-Persian Agreement and connected documents. <i>Note 2.</i> Text, as sent, of Sir P. Cox's letter of Aug. 9 to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh respecting the Shah and his successors.	1140
80 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1722	Aug. 24	Transmits names of proposed Persian delegates to League of Nations: asks for views of H.M.G.	1142
81 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 579	Aug. 26	Persian M.F.A. is somewhat perturbed by French press criticisms of Anglo-Persian Agreement: transmits summary of interview regarding agreement which M.F.A. has given to <i>Wakt</i> newspaper.	1142
82 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 584	Aug. 28	Suggests that Nosret-ed-Dowleh be invited directly to London for advice which would help him to withstand possible intrigues in Paris.	1143
83 Mr. G. P. CHURCHILL Foreign Office	Aug. 28	Reports further unsatisfactory activity of French Minister in connexion with Anglo-Persian Agreement: inquires real position as regards attitude of French and American Govts. towards agreement.	1143
	Aug. 28	Note of a conversation with Mr. Williams of U.S. Embassy regarding press report about Shah's intention to visit U.S. before coming to England: possibility of his being invited by U.S. Govt.	1144

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAC
740 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 580	Aug. 28	Reports and comments on request of Persian Govt. that, having regard to British withdrawal from Caspian, H.M.G. will consider possibility of providing officers to organize naval detachment on principles of recent agreement, and of acquiring for Persian Govt. services of two or three armed vessels now on Caspian.	114
741 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 585	Aug. 29	Reports attitude of Russian Commander of Cossack Division, and of Russian Chargé d'Affaires regarding Anglo-Persian Agreement: no further opposition anticipated for the present.	114
742 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 586	Aug. 29	Reports reply given to Russian Chargé d'Affaires in answer to question as to whether, in pursuance of agreement, H.M.G. proposed to alter their policy with regard to Russian interests in north Persia: would be glad if H.M.G. would consider question.	114
743 ADMIRAL WEBB Constantinople Tel. No. 1746	Aug. 29	Refers to No. 736 and reports anxiety of Persian M.F.A. regarding criticism of agreement in French and American press: latter urged desirability of considering best means of counteracting this criticism.	114
744 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 591	Aug. 29	Reports two arguments used against agreement: (1) that signature should have been postponed pending assembly of Majlis; (2) that no time limit is attached to it: suggests concession regarding latter point.	114
745 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 590	Aug. 30	Inquires whether report that, in reply to protests of French Govt., H.M.G. have agreed to submit agreement to League of Nations is true, and, if so, whether it is possible or likely that League of Nations will be in a position to upset it.	114
746 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 593	Aug. 30	Persian Prime Minister urges necessity for taking prompt measures to interpret agreement into action and asks whether H.M.G. will be prepared to inaugurate discussion on measures for realization of three Persian desiderata.	114
747 SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 846A	Aug. 30	Reports speech of M. Albert Thomas in Chamber of Deputies criticizing Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1149
748 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 458	Sept. 1	Refers to No. 738 and states that French Govt. have not protested against agreement and that French Minister's attitude is not in accordance with wishes of his Govt.: U.S. Ambassador in London said he thought the agreement excellent.	1150
749 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 595	Sept. 1	Summarizes feeling in country regarding agreement: deputation of Persian notables protested to Prime Minister against it: French Legation apparently less active as	1150

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
30 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 463	Sept. 2	regards critical publicity but Russian Legation apparently looks to French for support in their opposition to it.	1151
31 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 465	Sept. 2	Refers to No. 741 and approves language held to Commander of Cossack Division and Russian Chargé d'Affaires: moment does not appear to be opportune for raising future of Cossack Division with M. Sazonov.	1151
32 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 462	Sept. 2	Refers to No. 742 and approves reply to Russian Chargé d'Affaires.	1151
33 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 460	Sept. 2	Refers to No. 740: according to Senior Naval Officer, Caspian, vessels in question were handed over on Aug. 29 to Gen. Denikin's authorities: nothing can therefore now be done in matter.	1152
34 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 602	Sept. 3	Refers to No. 746 and suggests that it would be better to await termination of Peace Conference before discussing Persia's desiderata: if, however, it is considered desirable to discuss matter at once it is proposed that ex-Regent would be suitable representative to discuss matter in London.	1152
35 Sir R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 566	Sept. 3	Refers to No. 748 and reports request of Persian Prime Minister that if possible a communiqué should be inspired contradicting reports of French and American hostility towards agreement: suggests that, if possible, M. Sazonov might be asked to expedite M. Minorski's departure.	1152
36 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 472	Sept. 4	According to Lt.-Col. Wickham, who travelled with Shah from Tehran to Taranto, latter has no intention of going to U.S.	1153
37 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 606	Sept. 5	Transmits substance of wireless proclamation issued by Soviet Govt. on Aug. 20 denouncing Anglo-Persian Agreement and accusing Persian Govt. of selling country to England.	1153
38 Mr. G. P. CHURCHILL Foreign Office	Sept. 5	Transmits suggestions regarding motor transport services and railway construction.	1154
39 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 475	Sept. 5	Note of conversation with Mr. Williams of U.S. Embassy who now believed there would be no question of an invitation to Shah to visit U.S.	1155
		Refers to No. 745 and states views regarding submission of agreement to League of Nations.	1155
		<i>Note 2.</i> Letters of Sept. 1 and 3 from Sir E. Drummond concerning question of submitting the agreement to the League of Nations.	1155

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAG
760	SIR H. RUMBOLD Berne Tel. No. 1226	Sept. 6	Nosret-ed-Dowleh will leave Switzerland on Sept. 9 and reach London on Sept. 11: Nosret-ed-Dowleh seemed much perturbed by Swiss press campaign against Anglo-Persian Agreement.	115
761	SIR H. RUMBOLD Berne Tel. No. 1227	Sept. 7	Refers to No. 760 and reports conversation with Nosret-ed-Dowleh regarding his visit to London.	115
762	To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 478	Sept. 8	Refers to No. 735: expresses dislike of appointments and surprise that they have been actually made: proposes to discuss matter with Persian M.F.A. when in London.	115
763	To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 479	Sept. 8	Refers to No. 744 and agrees that terms of agreement contain their own time limits: would greatly prefer that no alteration be made in agreement.	115
764	To SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 1073	Sept. 9	Message for Nosret-ed-Dowleh regarding arrangements for his visit to London.	115
765	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 613	Sept. 9	Refers to No. 753: Persian Prime Minister agrees to appointment of ex-Regent for purpose in question.	115
766	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 614	Sept. 9	Refers to No. 763: question of inducing Persian Prime Minister to drop request.	115
767	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 621	Sept. 10	Refers to No. 730 and reports action taken: suggests that Samad Khan is not altogether friendly element.	115
768	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 624	Sept. 10	Refers to No. 752: ships clearly not handed over to Gen. Denikin on Aug. 29: expresses view that British-Persian interests have been unnecessarily sacrificed.	115
769	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 618	Sept. 10	Reports action taken by Persian Prime Minister against five agitators against agreement: has had excellent effect.	116
770	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 619	Sept. 10	Transmits text of communiqué issued by U.S. Minister in Tehran to press regarding U.S. Govt.'s attitude towards Persia and Anglo-Persian Agreement: comments thereon.	116
771	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 622	Sept. 10	No copy of U.S. communiqué was addressed to Persian Govt.: hopes H.M.G. will feel able to inform U.S. Govt. that should any lawless opposition result from their Minister's action, such steps as may be necessary to safeguard British interests and uphold agreement will be taken by H.M.G.	116
772	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 625	Sept. 11	Persian Prime Minister states that employees of U.S. Legation have distributed great number of copies of U.S. communiqué.	116

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
773 Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 626	Sept. 11	Simultaneously with American communiqué, French Legation issued communiqué stating that French Govt. have placed French vessel at disposal of Persian Peace Delegation and that they have conferred Legion of Honour on Mushaver-el-Mamalek.	1163
774 To AMERICAN AMBASSADOR London	Sept. 11	Complains of action of American Minister at Tehran: describes circumstances in which U.S. Govt. were kept informed of conclusion of Anglo-Persian Agreement which is compared with U.S.-Liberian Agreement: suggests action by U.S. Govt. to clear up apparent misunderstanding.	1163
775 Sir G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 1007	Sept. 11	Persian M.F.A. now proposes to leave for London on Sept. 15 or 16.	1166
776 To Sir G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 1078	Sept. 11	Refers to No. 775 and expresses hope that Persian M.F.A. will arrive on Sept. 14 or 15.	1166
777 Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 628	Sept. 12	Question of position of Belgian nationals under Anglo-Persian Agreement: some announcement desirable.	1166
778 AMERICAN AMBASSADOR London	Sept. 12	Refers to No. 774 and records unsavourable view of President and Secretary of State of what they conceived to be the secrecy with which the Anglo-Persian Agreement was negotiated.	1167
779 Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 633	Sept. 13	Reports French activities in connexion with gendarmerie: local papers have replied strongly and effectively to American communiqué and American Minister's procedure in distributing it is adversely criticized.	1168
To AMERICAN AMBASSADOR London	Sept. 14	Refers to No. 778 and states circumstances in which Lord Curzon told Col. House in Paris of negotiations for Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1169
Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 634	Sept. 15	Persian Minister at Washington reports inspired section of American press strongly opposed to agreement and that it is proposed to raise a protest in Senate: situation in Tehran now satisfactory but both Cabinet and newspaper editors anxious that unfriendly activities of French and American representatives be terminated.	1169
Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 636	Sept. 16	Reports information regarding instructions sent to Persian Minister in Paris to complain to French Govt. of objectionable attitude of M. Bonin.	1170
To Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 492	Sept. 17	Refers to No. 777: Belgian Chargé d'Affaires informed that H.M.G. had no designs of any description against Belgian officials now employed in Persia of whose loyal co-operation they are very sensible.	1170

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
784	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 640	Sept. 19	Feeling regarding agreement continues generally satisfactory but American and French Legations still active against it: refers to hostile European press comments and Persian M.F.A.'s reports thereon.	1170
785	SIR P. COX Tehran No. 150	Sept. 19	Transmits text of letter of Sept. 9 to Persian Prime Minister rebutting criticism of a certain faction of Persian people against agreement: letter published in Press with excellent effect.	1171
786	MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1373	Sept. 21	Reports reactions in U.S. generally to Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1173
787	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 644	Sept. 22	Enumerates fourteen questions asked by editor of <i>Raad</i> as to future British policy in Persia.	1173
788	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 652	Sept. 22	Transmits message from Gen. Malleson's Mission at Meshed regarding meeting held under Bolshevik auspices in Askabad when Anglo-Persian Agreement attacked.	1174
789	EARL CURZON Foreign Office	Sept. 23	Note on general conversation with Persian M.F.A. regarding matters connected with execution of Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1175
790	To SIR P. COX Tehran No. 194	Sept. 24	Transmits account of conversation between Persian M.F.A. and Sir J. Tilley on Sept. 15: Shah's visit, Anglo-Persian Agreement, French attitude thereto and desirability of maintaining British naval personnel in Caspian were among subjects discussed.	1178
791	To SIR P. COX Tehran No. 195	Sept. 24	Transmits account of general conversation of Persian M.F.A. with Mr. Oliphant on Sept. 16 regarding agreement: Nosret-ed-Dowleh drew attention to three points which he hoped Lord Curzon would emphasize in his forthcoming speech.	1180
792	To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 503	Sept. 24	Sept. instalment of subsidy has been paid for Shah in London.	1183
793	To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 506	Sept. 25	On Sept. 22 Lord Hardinge called attention of French Ambassador to active campaign of hostile propaganda now being carried on in Tehran and headed by French and U.S. Ministers: Ambassador agreed to bring French Minister's activities to notice of French Govt.	1183
794	VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1392	Sept. 28	Anglo-Persian Agreement has not attracted much attention in press but feeling very strong in State Dept.: suggests that U.S. Govt. might be asked to share in the agreement and loan: also suggests that Americans be employed by Persian Govt.	1184
795	To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 508	Sept. 29	Refers to No. 784: Persian M.F.A.'s visit to London and Lord Curzon's speech on Sept. 18 have cleared the air: considers that former will no longer be so pessimistic.	1185

No.	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
76	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 30	Transmits message from Persian M.F.A. regarding Russian intrigue against Persian Govt. and the agreement.	1186
77	To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 510	Sept. 30	Refers to No. 723: authorizes advance to Persian Govt. of 100,000 tomans monthly up to Dec. 31 for upkeep of Cossack Division.	1186
78	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 665	Sept. 30	As far as Persian public is concerned agreement may be regarded as accepted: unfriendly propaganda from French and American Legations has ceased and only cause of anxiety is opposition from several Russian elements interested.	1187
79	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 666	Sept. 30	Refers to No. 798 and summarizes letter to Persian Prime Minister from Commander of Cossack Division wherein latter stresses communist activities in northern provinces and suggests role which Cossack Division should play.	1187
80	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 668	Oct. 1	Refers to No. 798 and comments on activities of Russian elements: Persian Prime Minister asks H.M.G. to recognize that prompt steps should be taken to secure position both as regards communist menace in northern provinces, and in regard to Cossack Division, whose loyalty can no longer be relied on.	1189
81	To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 513	Oct. 1	Records observations of Persian M.F.A. regarding presentation of Persian case to Peace Conference.	1190
82	SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 1	Telegram to Lord Hardinge expressing views regarding certain subsidies.	1190
83	To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1789	Oct. 1	Refers to No. 794: preliminary comments on proposals as to American participation in agreement, which is not favoured.	1191
84	VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1404	Oct. 2	Refers to No. 801 and inquires whether U.S. Govt. may be informed that should Persian Govt. apply afresh to be heard at Peace Conference H.M.G. would probably not object.	1191
85	To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1121	Oct. 3	The King has invited Shah to visit England from Oct. 31 to Nov. 3.	1192
86	VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1421	Oct. 4	Refers to No. 803 and explains reasons for raising matter.	1192
87	To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1809	Oct. 6	Refers to No. 804: Lord Grey may go further in making such a statement.	1192
88	AMERICAN AMBASSADOR London No. 679	Oct. 7	Transmits views of U.S. Govt. regarding Anglo-Persian Agreement and examines question of action taken by American Minister at Tehran: argues against Liberian analogy: U.S. Govt. cannot approve agreement till it is clear that Persian authorities and people unitedly approve it.	1193

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
809 MR. OLIPHANT Foreign Office	Oct. 7	Note of a conversation with Persian Minister regarding Shah's state visit to London.	1196
810 LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	Oct. 8	Note of a conversation with Persian Minister regarding dates of Shah's proposed visit.	1197
811 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1075	Oct. 9	Shah accepts His Majesty's invitation for Oct. 31.	1198
812 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 673	Oct. 9	Agrees with views expressed in No. 803 regarding Lord Grey's proposal for American participation in agreement, and adds further comments.	1198
813 VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1442	Oct. 10	Reports conversation regarding Anglo-Persian Agreement with Mr. Engert, who is going as secretary to American Legation at Tehran.	1200
814 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 675	Oct. 10	Persian Prime Minister appeals urgently for reconsideration of proposal to make current subventions to Persian Govt. a first charge on loan: supports Prime Minister's appeal.	1201
815 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 678	Oct. 11	Refers to No. 787 and suggests replies to fourteen questions asked by editor of <i>Raad</i> .	1201
816 SIR P. COX Tehran No. 163	Oct. 15	Transmits translation of note from Persian Prime Minister acknowledging in appreciative terms references to Persia and to recent agreement in Lord Curzon's speech at dinner to Persian M.F.A. on Sept. 18.	1203
817 To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1867	Oct. 15	Refers to No. 812: agrees with opinions expressed therein which he hopes may be of use should matter again be broached.	1205
818 VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1463	Oct. 17	Refers to No. 817 and asks for answer as to whether agreement or British policy is opposed to Persian Govt. employing individual Americans if they desire: considers that Sir P. Cox advocates a virtual British protectorate of Persia and dwells on difficulties of situation.	1205
819 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 551	Oct. 18	Refers to Nos. 787 and 815 and comments on proposed replies to editor of <i>Raad</i> : suggests interview should be avoided if possible.	1206
820 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 689	Oct. 19	Reports minatory representations from Russian Chargé d'Affaires regarding possible Persian recognition of Azerbaijan Govt.	1207
821 SIR P. COX Tehran No. 169	Oct. 21	Transmits translation from an Azerbaijan newspaper purporting to be a declaration of Soviet policy towards Persia: refuses to recognize Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1207
822 To SIR P. COX Tehran No. 229	Oct. 21	Records interview with Persian M.F.A. who expressed views regarding Commander of Cossack Division, arms for	1209

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
⑬ To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 557	Oct. 21	Persian forces, number of Russian representatives in Persia, question of Azerbaijan, and possible grant of Garter to Shah.	1211
⑭ To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1899	Oct. 21	Records result of interdepartmental meeting held at F.O. to consider question of roads and railways in Persia.	1212
⑮ To EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1271	Oct. 25	Refers to No. 818: reviews situation and replies to Lord Grey's objections: answers question regarding employment of Americans.	1212
⑯ VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1502	Oct. 27	Question of rectification of Persian frontiers in Turkestan and Kurdistan: instructions to inform Persian M.F.A. that Lord Curzon would be glad to learn Persian desiderata in order that question of support of H.M.G. may be considered.	1213
⑰ To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 571	Oct. 27	Refers to No. 824 and expresses doubts as to policy behind Anglo-Persian Agreement and how it will be worked: considers U.S. influence in Persia would be helpful.	1214
⑱ To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 574	Oct. 27	Programme of Shah's visit, Oct. 31-Nov. 8.	1215
⑲ To M. SABLINE London No. 143404/M.E.58	Oct. 29	Transmits W.O. views regarding Cossack Division and future military arrangements in Persia.	1215
⑳ Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 708	Oct. 29	Letter from Mr. Oliphant asking that notice of M. Sazonov be drawn to minatory attitude of Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, as reported in No. 820, and to its danger.	1216
㉑ Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 31	Refers to No. 823 and reports on Col. Wallace's negotiations with Persian Govt. regarding railway construction: project stated to have been accepted in principle by cabinet.	1217
㉒ To Sir P. COX Tehran No. 236	Oct. 31	Refers to No. 830 and suggests explanation for precipitate action of cabinet in accepting project.	1217
㉓ To Sir P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 577	Nov. 1	Records French Ambassador's excuses for non-publication in France of complete text of Lord Curzon's speech on Sept. 18: instructions sent to French Minister in Tehran to co-operate with Sir P. Cox and not to allow unfavourable comments on Anglo-Persian Agreement.	1218
		Plenty of officers and men could be spared from Royal Navy to assist in developing Persian marine: views of Persian Govt. should be ascertained: inquires whether <i>Parabonia</i> has yet been handed over to Persian Govt.	1218

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
834 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 715	Nov. 3	Refers to No. 833 and inquires whether contemplated sphere of Persian marine would include Caspian.	1219
835 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 716	Nov. 3	Transmits report from Merv regarding communist activities and anti-British propaganda.	1219
836 SIR M. FINDLAY Christiania No. 204	Nov. 4	Reports press interview given by Chief Custodian of Persian Parliament, who stated that Anglo-Persian Agreement had been concluded without approval of Parliament and was as yet not legally valid.	1220
837 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 719	Nov. 6	Governor-General of Khorassan reports to Persian Govt. gave appreciation of situation, and of communist menace, by Gen. Malleson: Persian Prime Minister requests financial assistance to defend Khorassan.	1220
838 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 586	Nov. 6	Refers to No. 830: instructions to inform Persian Prime Minister of Persian M.F.A.'s opinion that, in view of impending further discussions regarding railways in London, negotiations with Col. Wallace should be suspended.	1221
839 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 726	Nov. 8	Refers to No. 838 and reports reply of Persian Prime Minister to M.F.A.'s telegram: Prime Minister considers it important that line from Mohammerah should be started forthwith.	1222
840 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 727	Nov. 8	Summarizes article in <i>Raad</i> supporting agreement and commenting on American and French attitude towards Persia.	1222
841 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 592	Nov. 8	Refers to No. 813 and records remarks made to Mr. Engert regarding employment of Americans in Persia: Mr. Engert promised full support for agreement.	1224
842 SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 732	Nov. 10	Asks that terms of Financial Adviser's contract be telegraphed before it is concluded: stresses importance of his being given adequate powers.	1224
843 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 599	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 837 and previously authorized advance of 20,000 tomans monthly for defence of Khorassan: asks what further sum is necessary to meet communist menace.	1225
844 To SIR P. COX Tehran Tel. No. 601	Nov. 12	Refers to possible appointment of Sarem-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Tabriz: his successor as Minister of Finance should be carefully chosen in view of advent of British Adviser.	1225
845 To SIR P. COX Tehran No. 249	Nov. 13	Records conversation with Persian M.F.A. when Persian territorial claims, railways, and defence of Khorassan discussed.	1225

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
16 Persian Foreign Minister London	Nov. 13	Memorandum regarding Persian territorial claims and rectification of frontiers: encloses memorandum representing political desires of Azerbaijan Delegation in Paris.	1228
17 To Sir P. Cox Tehran No. 243	Nov. 14	Records conversation at F.O. of Persian M.F.A. regarding Financial Adviser, differences between Persian Prime Minister and Sarem-ed-Dowleh, employment of civil engineers, air service, arms and ammunition, railways, appointment of Mushaver-el-Mamalek to Constantinople, and situation in Khorassan.	1232
18 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 607	Nov. 15	Bolshevism in Persian Azerbaijan: W.O. have been asked to authorize action proposed by G.O.C., Mesopotamia.	1235
19 Persian Foreign Minister London	Nov. 17	Note amplifying No. 846 regarding Persia's territorial claims.	1235
20 Persian Foreign Minister London	Nov. 17	Note regarding Persia's interest in Azerbaijan and her desire for closer relations.	1239
21 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 745	Nov. 20	Refers to No. 828 and comments on certain points therein.	1241
22 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 747	Nov. 21	Transmits observations on situation in northern Persia and military measures called for.	1241
23 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 620	Nov. 22	Refers to No. 823 and transmits W.O. observations regarding motor transport and railways.	1244
24 To Sir P. Cox Tehran No. 259	Nov. 28	Records conversation with Persian M.F.A. regarding Persia's territorial claims: Nosret-ed-Dowleh informed claims were mainly too wide and could not be supported.	1245
25 Mr. Wardrop Tiflis No. 102	Nov. 28	Transmits copies of two letters from Prince Mirza Riza Khan regarding (1) dissatisfaction of Persian colony in Tiflis with Anglo-Persian Agreement and steps he has taken to allay this feeling; (2) visit of M. Vekilof, Azerbaijan representative: discussion of possible confederation of Azerbaijan.	1249
26 Mr. Wardrop Tiflis No. 103	Nov. 29	Refers to No. 855: Prince Mirza Riza Khan considers there was no real opposition in Persia to British policy, but that Persian Govt. considered they had an opportunity of permanently establishing their power and evicting their rivals.	1251
27 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 758	Dec. 1	Urges that stipulations in Anglo-Persian Agreement be promptly carried out: inquires when Financial Adviser will arrive and whether members of Military Commission have left England.	1251

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
858 SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 759	Dec. 1	Reports attitude of Persian Govt. to appointment of advisers other than financial and military: suggests possible action.	1252
859 SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 768	Dec. 4	Refers to No. 833 and suggests that a naval officer be associated with Military Commission.	1253
860 SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 765	Dec. 4	Certain Russian consulates are to be closed: comments on activities of Gen. Denikin to restore or strengthen Russian position in North Persia and requests instructions in certain matters.	1254
861 To SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 638	Dec. 4	Refers to No. 851: H.M.G. are anxious to discontinue subsidy for Cossack Division: understands Persian M.F.A. is proposing to Persian Prime Minister that he should dismiss Col. Starosselsky.	1254
862 To SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 640	Dec. 5	Question of wireless: asks for views regarding India Office suggestion that agreement be made with Persian Govt. for erection of medium-power installation as a first step towards establishment of a British-controlled wireless telegraph system in Persia.	1255
863 To SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 643	Dec. 6	Refers to No. 857: every effort being made to hasten execution of agreement: records position regarding Financial Adviser, Military Commission, tariff revision, aviation, and railways.	1255
864 To SIR P. Cox Tehran No. 265	Dec. 6	Records conversation at F.O. with Persian M.F.A. regarding territorial claims, arms, engineers, and claims of British subjects for losses suffered in Persia.	1256
865 To SIR P. Cox Tehran No. 264	Dec. 6	Records conversation at F.O. with Persian M.F.A. regarding Azerbaijan, oil shares, and schools in Tehran: decoration for Persian Prime Minister.	1257
866 To SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 645	Dec. 8	Persian M.F.A. has formally notified Secretary of League of Nations of Persia's adhesion.	1260
867 SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 776	Dec. 9	Transmits extract from Tashkent <i>Turkistan Communist</i> , received from Gen. Malle son, regarding Soviet relations with Persia.	1260
868 SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 786	Dec. 14	Persian Prime Minister urges importance of demonstrating that H.M.G. is giving substantial help in regard to question of rectification of Persian frontiers.	1261
869 To SIR P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 654	Dec. 15	Asks for views on Persian M.F.A.'s suggestion that Commander of Cossack Division should be dismissed and a British officer appointed in his place.	1261
870 Mr. OLIPHANT Foreign Office	Dec. 15	Note of a conversation with M. Sabline who asked whether Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 had been denounced: M. Sabline told that it had not but that Persian Govt. had been informed that H.M.G. regarded it as 'in suspense'.	1261

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
81 To PERSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER	Dec. 19	H.M.G. would be unable to support Persian Govt. in their comprehensive territorial claims: Lord Curzon prepared, however, to do what is possible to support Persian Govt.'s interests on western frontier of Persia.	1262
82 Mr. OLIPHANT Foreign Office	Dec. 20	Note of a conversation with Persian M.F.A. regarding Persia's territorial claims: latter anxious to be guided by Lord Curzon's advice and left a note (annexed) in reply to No. 871.	1263
83 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 662	Dec. 20	India Office refuse to share in monthly subsidy to Cossack Division any longer and it cannot be continued after end of December: Persian Govt. should be informed accordingly.	1266
84 To Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 665	Dec. 20	Sir P. Cox may continue to pay Persian Govt. 350,000 tomans monthly until Feb. 20.	1266
85 To Sir P. Cox Tehran No. 280	Dec. 20	Records conversation of Persian M.F.A. at F.O. regarding reported offer of advisers by other Powers: M.F.A. considered it would be beneficial to interest U.S. in north Persia: questions relating to Azerbaijan and railways.	1266
86 Sir P. Cox Tehran Tel. No. 796	Dec. 21	Inquires whether there have been any further developments or discussions with U.S. Govt. regarding Anglo-Persian Agreement, as American Minister has stated that he has promoted modifications of agreement. <i>Note 2.</i> F.O. reply of Dec. 25 to above.	1268
87 To Sir P. Cox Tehran No. 284	Dec. 30	Records conversation of Persian M.F.A. with Lord Hardinge on Dec. 16 when Persian territorial claims were discussed and a telegram from Persian Prime Minister was communicated urging that H.M.G. support Persian claims.	1268
88 To PERSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER	1920 Jan. 5	Comments on Persian claims for rectification of frontiers as set forth in note of Dec. 20 (enclosure in No. 872) and states in what respects Lord Curzon would feel able to support them. Two additional documents relative to British policy in regard to Syria and Palestine, June 1919.	1273 1275
APPENDIX			



## CHAPTER I

# The Question of the Adriatic

June 28—December 12, 1919

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

Shortly after the opening of the Peace Conference at Paris the Italian Delegation had, in a memorandum of February 7, 1919, advanced certain territorial claims in the area of the Adriatic. These claims were partly to territories conceded to Italy by the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915 (Cmd. 671 of 1920), and partly to territories not so conceded. In this latter category was the port of Fiume, which was occupied by an Allied force under the command of an Italian general. The attribution of Fiume became a leading issue in the ensuing negotiations relative to the question of the Adriatic.

The British, French, and Italian Governments had, together with the Imperial Russian Government, been signatories to the Treaty of London. The Government of the United States had not been a signatory to this secret treaty, and at the Peace Conference the American Commission to Negotiate Peace maintained its liberty of action in the question of the Adriatic, having regard, more particularly, to its view as to the application of President Wilson's Fourteen Points to the peace settlements with Austria and Hungary.

The negotiations at Paris in the early part of 1919 relative to the question of the Adriatic were interrupted on April 23 when President Wilson published a declaration on this question, and the Italian Delegation temporarily withdrew from Paris in protest. Shortly afterwards, however, negotiations were resumed and the so-called Miller-Macchi Di Cellere Plan and Tardieu Plan were successively elaborated. Neither of these plans led to a settlement of the question, which remained undecided when the Italian Government under Signor Orlando resigned on June 19, 1919. Signor Orlando and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Sonnino, who had hitherto been the chief Italian delegates at Paris, were succeeded by Signor Nitti and Signor Tittoni respectively.

In Paris it was decided between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau that, in order to facilitate the initiation of negotiations with the new Italian Delegation, it should be presented with a joint memorandum defining the views of the British and French Governments: see document No. 1.

No. 1

*Notes of a Meeting held at Mr. Lloyd George's Residence at 23 Rue Nitot  
Paris, Saturday, June 28, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>*

C.F. 96 B [Secret/General/162]

Present:

*U.S.A.*: President Wilson.

*British Empire*: Mr. Lloyd George.

*France*: M. Clemenceau.

*Secretary*: Sir M. Hankey.

*Interpreter*: Professor Mantoux.

*Asia Minor. Proposed statement to the new Italian Delegation*

1. PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft of instructions to the United States Delegation which he had prepared.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not think that the Allies ought to insist on the evacuation of Fiume. They had no right to demand this. What they had a right to complain of was the assumption that the Italians were masters there and could issue orders in the name of the King of Italy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Italy had no more right to issue proclamations at Fiume in the name of the King of Italy than France had in the name of the President of the Republic, or Great Britain in the name of King George.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the difficulty was to make the Italians recognise this. All the evidence we had was that the Italians had issued orders and proclamations for the action of their troops in the name of the King of Italy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood that it had been arranged informally on the previous day that President Wilson on the one part and Great Britain and France on the other part were to present M. Tittoni on his arrival with written memoranda explaining the attitude of their respective Governments. He thought this would make it easier for Mr. Lansing and Mr. Balfour who, though plenipotentiaries, were not Heads of States, in dealing with Italy.<sup>2</sup>

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had thought the best plan would be to give written instructions to his colleagues who could then inform the Italian Delegation that they had instructions in this sense.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought their position would be stronger still if they were left a document which they were to hand to the Italian Delegation.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it possible that M. Tittoni might use the document in the press to the disadvantage of the Allied and Associated Powers.

SIR M. HANKEY, at Mr. Lloyd George's request, read aloud a draft statement to M. Tittoni on behalf of the British and French Governments, prepared by Mr. Balfour. The draft was not quite complete.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Washington, 1942 f.), vol. vi, pp. 738-9.

<sup>2</sup> President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were due to leave Paris after the signature that afternoon of the Treaty of Versailles. Thereafter Mr. Lansing and Mr. Balfour became the respective heads of the American and the British Peace Delegations in Paris.

<sup>3</sup> For the final text see No. 2, appendix I.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE thought the draft was admirable, but pointed out that the operative words were lacking. He would like to conclude the memorandum by stating that it was no use to have a discussion with the Italian Delegation while their troops remained in Asia Minor, and that before any discussion of Italian claims took place, we must insist on their moving out.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to ask Mr. Balfour to draft the last paragraph in the sense of Mr. Lloyd George's remarks, combined with the first paragraph of President Wilson's instructions to his colleague.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, June 28, 1919

## No. 2

*Notes of a Meeting held in the Foyer of the Senate House in the Chateau at Versailles, Saturday, June 28, 1919, at 6 p.m.<sup>1</sup>*

C.F. 99 A [Secret/General/162]

Present:

U.S.A.: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George; Mr. Philip Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Captain Portier.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

### *Asia Minor. Proposed Statement to the New Italian Delegation*

1. With reference to C.F. 96B,<sup>2</sup> Minute 1,

PRESIDENT WILSON read aloud a re-draft of the proposed statement to the Italian Government, prepared by Mr. Balfour.

*Note.*—During the Meeting Baron Makino<sup>3</sup> and Baron Sonnino<sup>4</sup> arrived, but Mr. Lloyd George left the room to explain to them that the subject under consideration was Declarations by France and Great Britain on the one hand, and by the United States of America on the other hand, to the new Italian Delegation, and they withdrew.

The above statement was approved, subject to some small amendments, the most important of which was the omission of a reference to the Dodecanese, which, it was considered, might be interpreted as a repudiation of the Treaty of London.<sup>5</sup>

The draft, as finally approved, is attached in Appendix I. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to obtain the signature of Mr. Lloyd George before his departure, and subsequently that of M. Clemenceau, who undertook to communicate it to the Italians.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 759–62.

<sup>2</sup> No. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Japanese representative on the Supreme Council.

<sup>4</sup> Baron Sonnino, the former Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (cf. Introductory Note), had been authorized by his successor, Signor Tittoni, to sign the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of Italy.

<sup>5</sup> The text of the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, is printed in Cmd. 671 of 1920.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was forwarding a separate statement, which he intended should contain a reference to the Dodecanese, as he was not bound by the Treaty of London.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, June 28, 1919

APPENDIX I TO NO. 2

*June 28, 1919*

The change in the Italian Delegation has occurred at a moment in which the associates of Italy were feeling considerable anxiety with regard to the part she was playing in the common cause. While nothing could be more friendly than the personal relations which have united the representatives of the five Powers through many months of anxious discussion, and while we gladly recognise the aid and co-operation which the Italian Delegation have rendered in the framing of the peace with Germany, we feel less happy about the general course of the negotiations affecting other aspects of the world settlement.

There is no doubt that the present uncomfortable condition of affairs is largely due to the complications which the development of political and military events has brought about since the Treaty of London was signed in 1915. Since then the aspect of the world has changed. The Treaty was contracted with Russia, France and Britain, but Russia is no longer in the war. It contemplated a victorious peace with the Austro-Hungarian Empire; but while victory of the completest kind has been achieved, the Austro-Hungarian Empire has ceased to exist. It assumed that if Turkey was completely defeated, fragments of the Turkish Empire might be assigned to the victors; but while Turkey has indeed been completely defeated, and the alien peoples which she misgoverned are to be separated from her Empire, they are not to be handed over in possession to the conquerors, while any spheres of influence which the latter may acquire will be held by them not independently, but as trustees or mandatories of the League of Nations. In 1915 America was neutral; but in 1917 she entered the war unhampered by any treaty, and at a period when the development of this order of political ideas, to which she gave a most powerful impulse, was in process of rapid accomplishment.

It is not surprising that the situation thus created presents complexities which only the utmost good-will and the most transparent loyalty can successfully deal with. The Treaty of London with which the history may be said to open was from the very beginning not strictly observed. Italy had undertaken to employ all her resources in prosecuting the war in common with her Allies against all their enemies. But she did not declare war on Germany for more than a year, and she took no part in the war against Turkey. By the Treaty of London, the central portion of Albania was to be made into an autonomous State under Italian protection; while northern and southern Albania were under certain circumstances to fall respectively to Serbia and Greece. But in 1917 Italy declared a Protectorate over the

whole country—a Protectorate which she seems to have exercised ever since. By the Treaty of London Fiume was, with Italy's consent, assigned to Croatia. But since the armistice, Italy has been accumulating troops in that neighbourhood, and local laws appear to have been promulgated in the name of the Italian King. Meanwhile America, which, unlike France and Britain, was not a party to the Treaty of London, has, in conformity with the general principles of settlement on which all the Allied and Associated Powers, including Italy, are agreed, declined to hand over reluctant Slav majorities in the Eastern Adriatic to Italian rule, and no arrangement on this vexed question has been arrived at.

Evidently the situation thus described is one of peculiar difficulty; but we feel bound to add that the difficulties have been greatly augmented by the policy pursued in Asia Minor by the Italian Government and Italian troops. This matter, as perhaps your Excellency is aware, was the subject of warm debate in the Council of Four. President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George complained in the strongest terms of the proceedings at Scala Nuova and elsewhere in South-Western Anatolia.

They drew the sharpest contrast between the policy of the Greek Government, which moved no troops except with the cognisance, and usually at the request of the Allied and Associated Powers, including, of course, Italy herself, while Italy, which was one of those Powers, and as such cognisant of all that was being done by her friends, landed troops and occupied important positions without giving the least inkling of her proceedings to those whose counsels she shared, whose general policy she professed to support, but whose remonstrances on this point she persistently ignored.<sup>6</sup>

We find it difficult fully to understand this action on the part of a friendly Power. At first sight it might seem to be animated by the idea that territories occupied by troops of a given nationality would be assigned to that nationality by the final terms of Peace. But this has never been the view of the other Allied and Associated Powers, and we had the best reason for supposing that it was not the view of Italy. We venture to quote a paragraph on the subject to which the Italian representative gave his adhesion:—

No State will be rewarded for prolonging the horrors of war by any increase of territory; nor will the Allied and Associated Powers be induced to alter decisions made in the interests of peace and justice by the unscrupulous use of military methods.<sup>7</sup>

It is needless to say that we have not made the recital of our common difficulties for any other purpose than to contribute to their removal. The Treaty of London, the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918,<sup>8</sup> President Wilson's fourteen points all bear on the situation, all have in

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume I in this series, No. 10, note 8.

<sup>7</sup> The quotation is from a telegram of June 13, 1919, sent by the Supreme Council to the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Rumanian Governments: cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 411.

<sup>8</sup> This declaration of November 7, 1918, is printed in *Parl. Debts., 5th Series, H. of C.*, 145, col. 36.

different ways to be considered when Italy is discussing with her Allies and Associates the aspects of the final settlements which most nearly concern her. But they cannot be treated as contracts susceptible only of a strict legal interpretation. Italy herself has not so treated them; and if her partners attempted the task an amicable settlement would seem beyond the wit of men. For, as has been pointed out, they were framed in different periods in a rapidly changing world and under the stress of widely different motives. They could not be and are not in all respects consistent. They are in part obsolete or obsolescent, and cannot in their entirety be carried out. What in those circumstances seems to be required is a re-survey of the whole situation. Let the four Great Powers of the West, America, France, Britain and Italy, consider together with a fresh mind and perfect frankness, whether some solution cannot be found which is consistent both with the material interests of Italy, her enduring aspirations and the rights and susceptibilities of her neighbours. The difficulties in the way of such a solution may be great. But they should not be insuperable. We feel, however, compelled to add that it is wholly useless in our judgment to discuss Peace Terms in Paris as friends and associates, while one of our number is elsewhere pursuing an independent and even antagonistic course of action. If, for example, Italy insists, after our earnest protests, on maintaining troops in Anatolia, it can only be because she intends to obtain by force all she claims to be hers by right. This is quite inconsistent with genuine alliance; its inevitable end is complete isolation. It is for Italian statesmen to say whether or not this is in Italy's interests. To us and the world the loss will be immense, for the aid which Italy can render to mankind by helping in the establishment of a durable Peace through international co-operation is beyond price. To Italy it will mean the loss of all claim to further assistance or aid from those who were once proud to be her associates. To us such a consummation seems to be disastrous, but if Italian policy runs its course unchanged it seems also to be inevitable.

### No. 3

*Sir R. Rodd<sup>1</sup> (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received July 3)*

*No. 288 [97580/731/22]*

*ROME, June 30, 1919*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 278<sup>2</sup> of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that the general tone of criticism and hostility in the country to Signor Nitti's Government, which I have reported, continues. The papers which supported Sonnino and Orlando are now outspoken about the past and insinuate Nitti was a supporter of Bissolati<sup>3</sup> in reducing Italy's claims on the other side of the Adriatic, and that not only was he not keen about the war in the earlier phases, but that he was actually opposed to the final offensive which ended so successfully with the overwhelming victory of Vittorio

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Ambassador at Rome.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> A leader of the Italian reformist socialists (*Riformisti*).

Veneto. This is so far true as he displayed undue nervousness as to the military situation and was only disposed to favour an advance if a certain number of American divisions were sent to Italy to constitute a reserve.

A scene which occurred in Rome the evening before last has not added to his popularity. A big meeting of the 'Combattenti', the military associations, had been convened at which D'Annunzio was announced to speak. The poet did not however appear and it is generally assumed that he had been 'squared' in some fashion or another. Officers in uniform were refused permission at the door to enter, and the speeches which were not of a remarkable character or of importance, were led by a certain Sinigaglia, who has placed himself at the head of the organisation of the wounded soldiers in Rome. Sinigaglia worked under Nitti in the Ministry of the Treasury during the war and was regarded as a strong partisan of the Minister, but it seems that he being really a business man was so impressed with what he regarded as the want of method and capacity displayed in that Ministry, that he is now taking a leading part in opposing the premiership of his former chief. After the meeting it was proposed to march to Nitti's hotel. But the troops who had been out all day, barred all the approaches over such a large area that the Romans found themselves prevented from returning to their houses in the central quarters of Rome until a late hour. There were a few scuffles and a small number of arrests, but nothing of a serious character, and the magnitude of the precautions taken has excited unfavourable comment.

The military organisations which are opposing the Government do not at present seem to have developed a more practical programme than that of holding rather ineffectual meetings, where the speeches are divided between criticism of the Ministry and assertion of the Italian claims to Fiume. At present it seems as if they lacked leadership and discretion. They have apparently large funds at their disposal collected, as I have already indicated,<sup>4</sup> from the big industrial companies. While the ostensible object for

<sup>4</sup> In Rome despatch No. 248 of June 12, 1919 (received in Foreign Office, June 16). This despatch read as follows: 'My Lord, A very sensational story is being discussed in the press here and will, if not stopped by the Censor, no doubt find its way to other countries. It is at any rate significant of the general unrest prevailing here and of the tendency among the public to show their impatience with present modes of Government and the degeneracy of Parliament in this country. However preposterous the story may sound and be, there are one or two points of actuality behind it, which I will indicate after describing the report which so far is being treated for the most part as an amusing anecdote.'

I have in previous correspondence several times referred to the military organisations of soldiers which have I believe been largely formed under the inspiration of the militant interventionist socialist Mussolini, who would seem rather to have transferred his activities from socialist to nationalist and chauvinistic objects. Prominent among these organisations are the groups of the "Arditi", the picked troops to whom desperate enterprises were entrusted during the war, and who, undoubtedly brave, are generally reckless and unscrupulous in their methods and who might easily degenerate into groups of bravos without other regular occupation.

A new agency the day before yesterday circulated a report of a far-reaching plot against the Government and the present Parliament, of which the censorship prohibited the

which these funds were subscribed was political organisation and propaganda, it was understood by the subscribers that they were to be utilised for combatting bolshevism and anarchy, and for keeping the demobilised soldiers in hand. It would look as though the leaders of the military organisations

(Note 4 cont.)

publication in the *Avanti*, the advanced socialist organ. It has however now come out in several other papers without any apparent intervention of the Censor.

'The object in view was said to be to substitute a Government composed of military elements, with the assistance of the military organisations above referred to, for the present parliamentary Government.

'The moving spirit was reported to be General Giardino, who was for a few days only Minister of War in 1917 and who had to retire for reasons of health because he had assured the Chamber that the military situation was impregnable, when as a fact the Italian line had already been broken at Caporetto. He afterwards distinguished himself in active warfare on the Grappa. Co-operating with him as prime movers were d'Annunzio and a Nationalist deputy easily to be identified as Signor Federzoni.

'The practical application of the plot was to begin with a hostile demonstration on a large scale when Signor Orlando and the other delegates returned, to be followed by a sort of *coup de main* against the Ministry of the Interior and Parliament. The constituted authorities were to be deposed, the deputies informed that their mandate had ceased, and those who were regarded as responsible for the disasters of the country, especially the Giolittians and the socialists, were to be arrested. New elections would then be held and if the Crown opposed the programme, elections for a constituent assembly also. A state of war on the eastern frontier would also be resumed. The executive agents of the plot would be the military associations, which had 800,000 members enrolled, with a fund at their disposal of twelve million lire, subscribed by the great industrial houses in Lombardy, Liguria and Piedmont.

'D'Annunzio has published a message to the press stigmatising this story as a perfidious manœuvre. Mussolini's paper, the *Popolo d'Italia*, similarly described it as an inane device invented by the Ministry of the Interior to divert attention from the persons really responsible for the misfortunes of Italy. Signor Federzoni not only repudiates the idea of his having a connection with any conspiracy but has given notice of a question in the Chamber asking how the censorship could allow publicity to be given to such rubbish. In a conversation with General Giardino published by the *Corriere della Sera* the latter described the story as too idiotic to be worth denying, and at the same time takes the opportunity to explain his political programme.

'Now it would perhaps be superfluous to have submitted to you in an official despatch a story which is naturally regarded as fantastic, were it not that there is apparently a little bit of truth behind it, and that the elaboration of the supposed conspiracy has been built on a certain foundation of fact.

'Information has recently reached me, which I cannot question, because it comes from a source directly concerned, to the effect that the most powerful industrial firms and combinations in Italy have recently raised by subscription among themselves a very large fund with a view to defending their interests against Bolshevism and anarchical movements. The firm to which my informant belongs had itself placed a sum of two hundred thousand lire at the disposal of the organisation. We have already seen on one or two occasions in Milan mass meetings which had been called by the advanced Socialists dispersed by the military associations and the Arditi, who blocked the roads of access to the meeting place and did not hesitate to use violent means to prevent any such assemblies taking place. I understand that the prevailing idea of the organisers of the anti-Bolshevist movement is that in the absence of any confidence in the administrative power, violence can only be dealt with by counter violence, and that they are working with, and prepared to use and finance, the military associations for this purpose. A want of any faith in the Government and a conviction that a dangerous situation is being produced by Bolshevik and anarchical

were really going to use them for the object for which they were nominally designed, namely political propaganda.

It is rumoured that the Chamber will meet on the 8th July, and that the question of the reform of the constituencies will be at once submitted. A vote of confidence will be invited, and opinions are diverse as to the results of a division. Signor Nitti himself, however, appears to have no misgivings about his majority.

All the members of the new Government with whom we have as yet been in contact are full of professions of friendship and expressions of their conviction that there is no road of safety for Italy but that of close and constant association with Great Britain. Not least is the new Minister of Commerce emphatic in pronouncing such to be his views. Much satisfaction has been given by the resolution which has been taken at home to renew Italian bills over a succession of terms. As I have already observed, I do not think the new Prime Minister has any definite programme in regard to matters which affect our interests. He is, with all his ability, impulsive and susceptible to influence. If he is surrounded by good influence, he may through his energy and determination achieve a good deal, and I am of the opinion that with a little support and good will in the moment of his difficulties we may be able to make a useful friend of him. But other influences will be at work, and in the present mood of the country, no doubt a considerable effect will be produced by the inundation of cheap German goods which, according to the circulars already being distributed, are waiting to flood the country the moment their entry is permitted.

I have, &c.,  
RENNELL RODD.

Note 4 (cont.)

propaganda is their justification. The danger of such a programme is obvious, but I have little doubt that it exists. Characteristic of this movement is also the overlapping of the two tendencies, the one for the defence of order and property, the other for the assertion of Italy's international and political claims.

As regards the various personages whose names have been put forward in connection with the supposed conspiracy, General Giardino is said recently to have been very active in the lobbies of the Senate denouncing the Government and promoting combinations to substitute for them. Mussolini is regarded as the organiser of the military associations, no doubt with a view to using them for his own purposes. Federzoni is an editor of the most typically chauvinistic paper in Italy, the *Idea Nazionale*. And finally d'Annunzio, whose recent performances I have several times referred to, left Rome after a meeting which he was to address had been prohibited, calling on the people to support him in his campaign for the rights of Italy, with a suggestion of "meet me again at Philippi", in his farewell speech at the station.

There are rumours in the air of other combinations to force the hands of the Government, all of them pointing, as I suggested at the beginning of this despatch, to a want of confidence in the administration and not less in parliamentary control, which had [sic] degenerated greatly in public esteem in the hands of the present representatives.

'I have, &c.,  
'RENNELL RODD.'

No. 4

*Note by Mr. Balfour of a Meeting held in the Ministry of War at Paris on  
July 3, 1919<sup>1</sup>  
[101439/731/22]*

*July 4, 1919*

At the request of Signor Tittoni, the Representatives of the Four Powers<sup>2</sup> had a private and informal meeting at the Ministère de la Guerre, no one else being present but Monsieur Mantoux, the interpreter. It was quite understood that the conversation was non-committal, and had no other purpose than to prepare the ground for more formal decisions.

Signor Tittoni made it clear that he disapproved of the policy of his predecessors in sending troops to Asia Minor. He was prepared to give the most explicit pledges that their number would not be increased, and that they would not advance further into the country than their present positions. But he begged that the Allies would not insist on their immediate withdrawal, as this would involve humiliation for Italy, would make his own position impossible, and would serve no useful purpose. He was, he added, quite well aware that the presence of troops in any particular district did not pre-judge the destinies of that district. He fully accepted the doctrines on this subject laid down by the Conference.

He proceeded to say that territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor seemed to him of little value to Italy. He repeated to us what he had already said to me,<sup>3</sup> that coal and raw materials were Italy's real needs, not fresh territorial responsibilities. When asked where this raw material was to come from, he said that coal could be obtained in the neighbourhood of Heraclea, oil in the neighbourhood of Lake Van, and what he desired was that Italy should

<sup>1</sup> This note was transmitted by Mr. Balfour to Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office as an enclosure in a formal covering despatch, No. 1257 of July 10, 1919 (received July 11). In this despatch the meeting is recorded as having been held on 'the 4th instant'. It would appear, however, that the meeting was in fact held on July 3. That is the date given in Mr. Lansing's note of this meeting printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vii, pp. 17-19. (The hour of the meeting is there given as 2.30 p.m.) The date of July 3 for this meeting is independently confirmed by S. Crespi, *Alla difesa d'Italia in guerra e a Versailles* (Milan, 1937), p. 687.

<sup>2</sup> France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States.

<sup>3</sup> In the first conversation between Mr. Balfour and Signor Tittoni on the morning of July 1, 1919: cf. No. 459, note 1. Mr. Balfour further recorded of this conversation: 'I was afraid that there might be some awkwardness in the interview, seeing that he had only received late the night before the views of the three Allies upon Italian policy during the Peace negotiations [see No. 2, appendix I], which I had myself drafted in a style of somewhat undiplomatic candour. Signor Tittoni, however, was quite unembarrassed and appeared to be in a high good humour. He said he had had a satisfactory interview with M. Clemenceau, and expressed his intention of dealing with the controversial points raised by the Allied Memorandum in as uncontroversial a fashion as possible. . . . His general tone was in the highest degree friendly and conciliatory, and he expressed in quite unmistakable language his earnest desire for a complete and friendly understanding with England and France.' Mr. Balfour's record of this conversation contained no specific reference to the question of the Adriatic. Cf., further, No. 17, note 7.

obtain the use of all that part of the Heraclean coal field not already occupied by the French Company, and that in the Van district she should be secured a full and fair share of any oil that might be found there.

M. Clemenceau received this proposal for settling Italy's claims in Anatolia in no very friendly spirit. He made a very characteristic speech pointing out that Italy, having landed troops in Anatolia in flat opposition to the policy of her allies, now wished to be rewarded for not advancing these troops beyond positions which they ought never to have occupied, by obtaining the right to plant a ring of new Italian coal mines round the one which the French were already working. Mr. Lansing, on his part, expressed considerable sympathy with the Italian desire for Turkish coal, but no sympathy whatever with the Italian desire for Armenian oil.

At this point it became clear to me that no discussion carried on in this tone was likely to be profitable at the moment. I, therefore, reminded the Conference of the accepted principle, that the Italian questions should be considered as a whole, and not settled piecemeal. It would, therefore, be very desirable to take advantage of this informal meeting and find out what Signor Tittoni's views were upon the Adriatic question. Mr. Lansing, who is nothing if not a lawyer, asked Signor Tittoni, without further preamble, whether Italy stood by the Treaty of London, or whether she did not. If she did, all Italian claims on Fiume must obviously be abandoned. If, on the other hand, Italy maintained her claim to Fiume, she thereby tore up the Treaty of London, and had no right to appeal to it on any other point. Signor Tittoni, poor man, was a good deal embarrassed by a question (which, however, he must certainly have foreseen) and for obvious reasons I thought it not inopportune to ask Mr. Lansing whether, if the Italians did fall back on the Treaty of London, the Americans were prepared to accept it as it stood. Mr. Lansing, in his wisdom, said that this was a second question which could most properly be dealt with after the first question had been answered. The matter evidently could not be left there, so without replying to Mr. Lansing, I asked Signor Tittoni whether he did not think it would be wise to approach the whole problem 'on its merits', without enquiring too closely into the precise conformity of any given proposal with the Treaty of London, or any other diplomatic instrument. England, France, and Italy had signed the Treaty of London, and though the Italians had shown no great respect for its provisions, it was not for France or England to say that it had lost all validity. On the other hand it must be perfectly clear after what had passed, that the Americans would not accept the Treaty of London as it stood. Now a settlement which America did not accept was no settlement at all; and it therefore seemed to me that the first thing for Signor Tittoni to do was to come to an agreement with Mr. Lansing. It was very unlikely that any arrangement about the Adriatic which commended itself to America and Italy would be unfavourably regarded by Britain and France. This suggestion was not formally rejected, but M. Clemenceau pointed out that Signor Orlando had been constantly pressed by his three colleagues in the Council of Four to make proposals, and that he has never done so. M.

Clemenceau hoped that Signor Tittoni would take a different line. He felt sure that if Italy made proposals, they would be considered in a candid spirit by President Wilson; and he quoted at some length his own experience with regard to the eastern frontier of France. He told us how he had originally desired to obtain the frontier of 1814, how this had been opposed by President Wilson, how he (Monsieur Clemenceau) had yielded, but had finally obtained a compromise not, he ventured to think, unfavourable to his country. He believed that if Signor Tittoni was equally reasonable he would, in the end, be equally successful.

I expressed no opinion upon these roseate hopes; but was quite ready to fall in with the proposal finally accepted, which was that Signor Tittoni should set to work and frame concrete proposals for our further consideration. If these failed, he claimed the right still to fall back upon the Treaty of London; on which M. Clemenceau again observed that unless the Americans were prepared to accept the Treaty of London, this would get us no nearer a general settlement.

In consequence of some information I had obtained from General Thwaites,<sup>4</sup> I asked Signor Tittoni whether it was true that the Italians had finally determined not to accept any responsibilities in the Caucasus. I gathered from Signor Tittoni that this was the fact, that they found it would take (I think he said) 40,000 men to hold the country, and that this was more than Italy could afford. This statement was, of course, quite informal; and it may be worth while for the Foreign Office to find out officially precisely how the matter stands.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> British Director of Military Intelligence.

<sup>5</sup> This note was minuted as follows by Lord Curzon:

'There was some excellent plain speaking to the Italians at Paris & an unreported but violent explosion of temper by M. Clemenceau.'

'There is no need to repeat the question about the Caucasus. Mr. Balfour put it & got a clear reply. All I need do is to congratulate Marquis Imperiali on this belated & solitary act of prudence. C.' (Cf. Volume III, No. 330.)

## No. 5

### *Memorandum by Captain Goad on the state of Italian Public Feeling towards England<sup>1</sup>*

[112395/731/22]

ITALIAN HEADQUARTERS, SOFIA, July 6, 1919

1. My post as liaison officer with the Italian Expeditionary Force has given me, during the last three years, unique opportunities of studying Italian

<sup>1</sup> The title follows that of the original. It may be noticed, however, that the memorandum deals more particularly with the state of feeling towards England in the Italian Army. This memorandum was transmitted to the Director of Military Intelligence by General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, Head of the British Mission with the Allied Armies of the Orient, under cover of the following despatch dated from Constantinople on July 11, 1919: 'I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum by Captain H. E. Goad, our liaison officer with the Italian Expeditionary Force in Bulgaria. Captain Goad is in extremely close touch

character and the working of the Italian political mind. I have lived with the Italian troops in the trenches, their battalion and regimental messes, and have sent in to general headquarters from time to time reports on the life of the Italian soldier, his *moral* and methods of fighting, on the different types of officers, the traditions of different regiments, customs prevailing in the army, and so forth.

During the last eight months in Sophia I have listened to innumerable political discussions, only intervening when the attitude of England in particular was criticised, and then trying to put the British point of view as clearly and quietly as possible.

The present state of feeling towards England may be gauged by a conversation between two senior officers at the headquarters mess last night. One said, 'They say that Malta is seething with discontent.' 'So are Egypt and India and Ireland,' said the other. 'Some day we shall have to go to war to free all the nations oppressed by England. So much for this boasted principle of nationality!' Perhaps this is an extreme case. None the less, many newspapers are saying practically the same thing. Most of the officers of the division are as cordial to me as ever; some, however, have lately shown a distinct coolness, which is in no way a personal matter. On the other hand, they all practically refuse to go to the Allied club now because the rooms are full of French officers. The feeling against the French is even stronger than against us.

Several officers have said to me, 'We came in voluntarily to save you, and now we are isolated while you truck with our worst enemies, the Jugo-Slavs, as if they, instead of fighting against us, had been your Allies.'

Every day the solution of the Adriatic question is postponed the feeling grows stronger. One officer, the major commanding the Carabinieri, said the other day to me, 'If you don't settle it soon, do you know what will happen? We shall send a large force into Fiume and Dalmatia, formally annex them, and leave it to you to turn us out.' He said this quietly and with conviction.

I propose in this report briefly to analyse this present state of Italian feeling, and to trace the origin and development of the main motives or currents in it. Seldom has any nation been so much at one as Italy to-day, and what is true of the individual mind so easy to affirm with confidence of the whole nation.

### *Italians Abroad*

2. I have been given a printed copy of a lecture delivered in Sophia on the 12th June by an Italian staff officer in presence of the General Officer Commanding, practically all the Italian officers of the garrison, and the principal members of the Italian colony. The lecture was called 'Italians Abroad.' Its object was to prove how, at all costs, it is necessary for Italy to

win Italy and Italians; his views are almost theirs. The memorandum is interesting, therefore, as being written from the point of view of the average Italian officer.' The Director of Military Intelligence transmitted a copy of this memorandum to the Foreign Office on August 5, 1919 (received August 6).

insist upon ‘the integrity of her national aspirations and the inflexibility of her national resolve.’ As this lecture sums up and elaborates what I have heard in different forms a hundred times during my three years with the division, I propose to give a résumé of its main ideas.

Before the war Italy and the Italians were mainly known to the richer races of Europe—England, France, Germany, Russia, and America—from two points of view: that of the holiday traveller seeking out through the older and less progressive provinces of Italy the ancient and mediæval art treasures, and that of the more or less ignorant home dweller who saw with a mixture of pity and contempt the poorest class of Neapolitan emigrant begging in the streets or earning his living by the humblest kind of work. The traveller returned with the impression of a formerly great artistic nation now sunk in decadence and living on the masterpieces of its ancestors, for the only types of Italians that he met were the swarms of ‘sycophants,’ hotel-keepers, waiters, cabmen, guides, and vendors of artistic souvenirs. The average Italian knew little of these types, though bitterly despising them. It was D’Annunzio who first awakened him to the fact that his country was regarded abroad merely as a museum or a pleasant retreat for honeymooning. Young Italy grew up deliberately ‘Philistine’ and hostile to all that attracted the foreigner and gave her ‘sycophants’ a reason to exist.

Only recently have Italians begun to travel. The lecturer described, in words of incredible bitterness, the shame he felt when he learned how his countrymen were regarded in richer lands. Contact with troops of other nations in Italy, France, and Macedonia, journeys about the world on military missions for hundreds of hitherto home-staying young men, a new knowledge of the foreign press and public opinion, has brought home to these people, as by a sudden revelation, the aspect under which Italians were known abroad. The revelation has come at a moment when after three years of tremendous sacrifices in food, in blood, and money, the nation is flushed with the exultation of its overwhelming victory and a tremendous reaction against those Allies that made use of Italy, ‘but never regarded her as an equal,’ has united the whole country in a passion of self-assertion and insistence of the recognition of her due place in the world.

As General Petitti<sup>2</sup> once said at mess, ‘They were glad enough of our assistance that saved them, although they did think us a nation of waiters and organ grinders. Well, they will see!’ The victory has come, and now Italians think their Allies will not see it.

This is the first motive force in the wave of so-called ‘Italian Imperialism.’

#### *Italian Surplus Population*

3. Another contributory feeling in the Italian mind is this. The Italian soldier is immensely critical of the troops of other nations, judging them naturally according to his own standards. At any rate, in the Balkans and also in Italy he has learnt to despise the French because of their lack of discipline, self-restraint, and of what he calls ‘education,’ an intense regard

<sup>2</sup> Formerly in command of Italian forces in Macedonia.

for which is the very root of Italian character. By 'education' he means a sort of refinement of manners, 'decency,' and a knowledge of how to behave oneself. British soldiers are said to be 'decent,' even when drunk, and the popularity of the British soldier is probably the reason why national feeling to-day is turned less against England than against France. None the less, many educated Italians are saying that the Italian proletariat is the most civilised in Europe. Yet they say northern nations profess to despise the Italians and class them with Greeks and other Balkan peoples, unworthy to govern undeveloped regions. (I am tired of telling them that is not the case.)

It has long been recognised as an economic fact that there are 10,000,000 too many inhabitants in Italy for a country by no means uniformly fertile and possessing no coal and minerals whatever. Italians are determined to get a national outlet: coal mines to help them to develop industries and support their present population in ordinary well-being, and colonies to which her surplus labourers can emigrate, and be no longer the slaves of richer nations, whom they now regard as comparatively 'barbarous.'

The treatment of the Italian operatives in France, Germany, and Austria has long been a source of intense irritation to Italian national feeling. For many years probably Italian labourers will not go to the two latter countries. Negotiations for the equal treatment of Italian workmen with French workmen in France are now being carried on, but the insistence upon this is felt to be humiliating. Trade with the Balkans, especially Bulgaria, will give a small outlet. But it is not generally recognised abroad how vital are these interests to Italian national life.

#### *The position of the young Italian Patriot*

4 Another side of the matter is this. Five years ago Italy was making unprecedented strides in industry and commerce. What she required was peace above all else. That she was dragged into the war by little short of revolution was the work of a small group of young idealist patriots, headed by D'Annunzio, the poet. These young men (I know a considerable number of them), filling the country with their clamour and rhetoric, carried away the excitable and impressionable people, who paid little heed then to the tempting offers of von Bülow<sup>3</sup> and the prospects of enormous gains as the greatest neutral Power. Italy came in with a rush, but half prepared, at a moment when the Russian armies were in full retreat. But no one dreamed that the war would last as it has done, or that the sacrifices would be one-tenth as great as they have been. Sonnino naturally made a compact with the Allies guaranteeing to his country something more than what Austria and von Bülow offered. After the intensity of the struggle and their great

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Italian Green Book of May 20, 1915: *Diplomatic Documents submitted to the Italian Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs: Austria-Hungary* (English translation, London, 1915, *passim*; also the Austro-Hungarian Red Book: *Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns zu Italien in der Zeit vom 20 Juli 1914 bis 23 Mai 1915* (Vienna, 1915, *passim*). Cf., further, A. Salandra: *L'Intervento (1915)* (Verona, 1930), pp. 83 f. (Condensed English translation: *Italy and the Great War*—London, 1932—pp. 220 f.)

victory the Italian people find themselves with ruined industries, gigantic debts, half a million producers dead and a million mutilated, with no assets except the soil they have tilled for centuries and the peasants' labour.

As one major said to me not long ago, 'If we had not fought, we should now be one of the richest nations in Europe. We should have manufactured munitions and equipment for the combatants, and established our industries on a solid permanent footing. Our currency, instead of being 50 per cent. lower, would have been at least as high as that of Switzerland. The war might have been longer, but it would not have been we, but our Allies, who would have suffered. Personally, he concluded, I was never in favour of intervention, and my friends admit to-day that I was right.'

What, then, is the position of those young idealists who dragged Italy into war? One can well understand D'Annunzio's diatribes and the enormous effect they are having upon the excited and disillusioned people.

#### *The future—Whose Ally?*

The Italians have no faith whatever in the power or justice of the 'League of Nations.' They are a nation of realists. They cannot believe that to the Anglo-Saxon races (whom they think 'practical') this solemn covenant is anything but a hypocritical blind.

They hate and dread pan-Slav union as a far more formidable neighbour than the decadent Austrian Empire. The Jugo-Slavs at the moment of the Austrian collapse put forward preposterous claims to cities, such as Udine, which have always formed part of Italy, and such as Trieste, which was notoriously one of Italy's chief aspirations. They foresee the need of still greater armaments, and will never listen to the abandonment of national service—so easy for England or America. They look round for new Allies. France has enlisted England and America to ensure her frontiers. Who is to assist Italy in maintaining the rights of her subjects in the East and of her Italian populations on the east of the Adriatic?

The hatred of the Germans is to-day less intense in Italy than the hatred of the French. The disappointment with England is growing. It is not a pleasant situation for the well-wishers of Italy to contemplate.

H. E. GOAD, *Captain,  
Liaison Officer, Italian Expeditionary Force.*

#### No. 6

*Note from Signor Tittoni to Mr. Lloyd George<sup>1</sup>*

[97/1/5/14808]

PARIS, le 7 juillet 1919

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Ce n'est pas sans un pénible sentiment de surprise que j'ai reçu, au

<sup>1</sup> This note was received by the British Delegation in Paris on July 9, 1919. An identic note was addressed to M. Clemenceau. The note is printed by T. Tittoni and V. Scialoja: *L'Italia alla Conferenza della Pace* (Rome, 1921), pp. 117-23.

lendemain même de mon arrivée à Paris, la note du 28 juin<sup>2</sup> adressée à la Délégation italienne par M. le Premier Ministre Lloyd George et par M. le Président du Conseil Clemenceau.

La nouvelle Délégation italienne se disposait à entreprendre les travaux de la Conférence avec les meilleures intentions pour aboutir au règlement amical des questions italiennes, en prenant pour point de départ la base solide des traités et des accords précédents établis avec les Alliés. La Note du 28 juin m'a produit l'impression que ses auteurs aient voulu mettre en doute le fondement même des négociations ultérieures. Je veux croire, toutefois, que cette impression ne soit pas entièrement correspondante à l'intention de M. le Premier Ministre Lloyd George et de M. le Président Clemenceau. Ce serait, en effet, contraire à leurs même[s] déclarations, qui ont été répétées récemment, tandis que les événements politiques et militaires qui se sont déroulé[s] depuis la signature du Traité de Londres en 1915, loin de diminuer les droits que les traités reconnaissent à l'Italie, justifient, au contraire, une plus large et plus équitable considération de ces droits. Si la victoire a été plus grande de ce qu'on avait espéré, si, à cause de l'écroulement des forces militaires de la Russie, les sacrifices de l'Italie et la durée de la guerre ont surpassé tout ce qui avait été prévu, il ne serait ni logique ni juste que le résultat pour l'Italie fût une diminution des droits qui lui ont été garantis.

La Note même reconnaît que la Délégation italienne jusqu'ici a donné son aide et sa plus loyale coopération dans l'élaboration de la paix avec l'Allemagne, où il s'agissait d'attribuer à ses Alliés les fruits de la victoire commune. La Délégation italienne se refuse de croire que les Puissances alliées veulent nier aujourd'hui, à propos des questions italiennes, la force des conventions juridiques qui ont réglé auparavant les rapports des États alliés et les négociations de la Conférence.

Néanmoins, je pense qu'il soit utile de répondre distinctement aux différents points qui ont été exposés dans la Note du 28 juin.

Cette Note vise en premier lieu à mettre en contestation la validité actuelle du Traité de Londres du 26 avril 1915, se basant sur la politique suivie par le Gouvernement italien après la conclusion de ce Traité et sur les événements qui se sont vérifiés depuis la même date. Deuxièmement la note soumet à examen les occupations militaires de l'Italie en Asie Mineure et attribue au Gouvernement royal des projets de conquête et d'annexion en cette région. En dernier lieu la Note des Gouvernements alliés envisage l'opportunité d'un nouvel examen d'ensemble de la situation sur la base du Traité de Londres, de la Déclaration anglo-française de novembre 1918<sup>3</sup> et des quatorze points du Président Wilson, tout en déclarant que ces actes sont, par endroits, périmés ou sur le point de l'être. La Note conclut avec la menace à l'Italie de la perte de tout droit à un appui ou à une aide ultérieure si elle persiste à maintenir des troupes en Anatolie.

J'ai l'honneur de répondre comme suit :

1. *Déclaration de guerre contre l'Allemagne.*—Le Traité de Londres ne spécifie pas l'époque à laquelle l'Italie devait entrer en guerre avec l'Allemagne.

<sup>2</sup> No. 2, appendix I.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 2, note 8.

L'article 2 stipule que l'Italie 's'engage à employer la totalité de ses ressources à poursuivre la guerre en commun avec la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie contre tous leurs ennemis'. En ce but l'Italie a bien employé la totalité de ses ressources et la guerre contre l'Allemagne fut précisément déclarée au moment où les conditions indispensables de la préparation militaire ont permis d'y faire face sans encourir le risque certain d'un désastre, qui aurait été en même temps le désastre des Alliés. Il est connu en effet que le Gouvernement italien décida d'attaquer l'Autriche-Hongrie, à l'échéance stipulée précisément par le Traité de Londres,<sup>4</sup> bien avant que la préparation militaire ne fût accomplie et dans des conditions telles qu'une contre-offensive de la part de l'Allemagne l'eût exposée aux pires conséquences, tandis que, à ce moment, l'armée russe était battue par l'armée allemande.

Il faut également tenir compte du fait qu'au moment de l'entrée en campagne de l'Italie, l'armée serbe sur laquelle on comptait pour une action simultanée contre l'ennemi commun, garda une attitude d'inaction complète. Il est même venu récemment à notre connaissance que, à ce moment, les autorités militaires serbes et austro-hongroises avaient entrepris des pourparlers en vue de la conclusion secrète d'une suspension d'armes (*Waffenruhe*) de la durée de trois mois.

Après la déclaration de guerre à l'Allemagne l'Italie a voulu participer directement à la guerre sur le front français en un premier temps par l'envoi de soldats travailleurs (T.A.I.F.), ouvriers militaires et centuries qui ont atteint le chiffre de 61,000 hommes, et ensuite par l'envoi d'un entier corps d'armée de 53,000 hommes.

2. *Article 1<sup>er</sup> du Traité de Londres.*—Cet article établit qu'une convention militaire fixera le minimum des forces militaires que la Russie devra employer contre l'Autriche-Hongrie 'afin d'empêcher cette Puissance de concentrer tous ses efforts contre l'Italie'. Il arriva par contre que, la Russie ayant été écrasée, ce fut précisément la totalité des forces austro-hongroises qui se tourna contre l'Italie. A ce moment l'Italie aurait pu invoquer, sur la base de l'article 1<sup>er</sup> du Traité de Londres, ce même argument de la fin de la Russie qui forme un point principal de la note à laquelle j'ai l'honneur de répondre, et qui servit également ensuite à contester la validité de l'Accord de Londres d'août 1917.<sup>5</sup> L'Italie aurait pu, en effet, vis-à-vis des nouvelles conditions de fait qui s'étaient produites par le désistement de l'Allié, sur les forces duquel elle avait le droit de compter davantage, demander une révision du Traité de Londres pour le mettre en harmonie avec la prolongation inattendue de la guerre et le plus grand effort qu'elle devait désormais soutenir. Mais l'Italie n'eut point recours à ce moyen, ne voulant pas marchander dans un moment critique son concours à la cause de la justice et de la liberté pour laquelle luttaient ses Alliés.

<sup>4</sup> For the relevant provisions of the Treaty of London see Cmd. 671 of 1920. Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915, on Turkey on August 20, 1915, and on Germany on August 27, 1916.

<sup>5</sup> The agreement usually referred to as the Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne: see Introductory Note to Chap. III.

Pour ces raisons également je n'hésite pas à refuser comme injustifiée l'accusation à l'Italie de ne pas avoir fait honneur à ses obligations d'alliance par suite du retard apporté à la déclaration de guerre contre l'Allemagne.

D'ailleurs les Alliés n'ont jamais douté jusqu'ici de la complète exécution donnée par l'Italie à ses obligations contractuelles et n'ont jamais fait un acte de mise en demeure envers elle. Au contraire l'Angleterre et la France ont loyalement reconnu le Traité de Londres tout récemment, et l'Italie, de son côté, a loyalement donné son assentiment à l'attribution à ses Alliés de tous les prix de la victoire qui leur revenaient en conformité des pactes qui ont suivi le Traité de Londres dont ils sont l'application. Je ne veux pas croire que des doutes commencent à surgir au moment où il s'agit de reconnaître à l'Italie ce qui lui est dû aux termes du Traité même.

3. *Guerre contre la Turquie*.—La note de MM. Lloyd George et Clemenceau affirme que l'Italie n'a pris aucune part à la guerre contre la Turquie. Il est à remarquer d'abord que la guerre contre la Turquie fut déclarée le 20 août 1915, c'est à dire peu de mois après l'entrée en campagne. Au début de la guerre l'armée italienne ne se trouvait nullement en condition de détacher des contingents pour les envoyer en Turquie, mais l'Italie envoya un corps d'expédition de 47,000 hommes en Macédoine, sans compter les 100,000 hommes qui formaient le corps d'expédition en Albanie. La Macédoine et l'Albanie faisaient partie du théâtre de guerre d'Orient. Ces troupes furent constamment maintenues dans toute leur valeur combattive.

Il ne faut pas oublier aussi que l'Italie a construit et entretenu avec des milliers d'ouvriers les grandes routes de communication des armées alliées.

Après l'expédition des Dardanelles, la guerre contre la Turquie fut poursuivie en Mésopotamie et en Palestine. Il est à présumer que la Grande-Bretagne n'eût pas agréé l'envoi de troupes italiennes en Mésopotamie, mais, quant à la Palestine, à l'égard de laquelle un régime international était envisagé, l'Italie offrit à plusieurs reprises le concours de ses forces armées, notamment au cours de la Conférence de Londres du mois d'août 1917.<sup>6</sup>

La guerre contre les Turcs fut aussi poursuivie en Libye, où les Gouvernements allemand et ottoman ne cessèrent d'envoyer armes, argent et officiers par sous-marins afin d'encourager la résistance des indigènes. Le Gouvernement italien maintint en Libye un corps d'occupation de 40,000 hommes. Par cela les opérations de guerre en Cyrénaïque et en Tripolitaine eurent pour effet d'empêcher des contingents de rebelles de se tourner contre l'Égypte et la Tunisie. Il est à remarquer en outre que l'Italie n'eut aucun concours de forces de la part de ses colonies, mais dut, au contraire, les défendre avec le corps d'occupation susdit, sans compter la charge de la vigilance maritime.

4. *Albanie*.—Il est vrai que la proclamation adressée le 3 juin 1917 par le Général Commandant italien à la population albanaise parle de [l']'unité et indépendance de toute l'Albanie sous l'égide et la protection du Royaume d'Italie<sup>7</sup>. Mais cette proclamation des autorités militaires fut interprétée et expliquée par le discours du Baron Sonnino à la Chambre des Députés du

<sup>6</sup> Cf. note 5 above.

20 juin 1917 avec l'affirmation que l'Italie n'a d'autres visées que l'indépendance de l'Albanie et la défense contre les ingérences et les intrigues des États voisins. Le Ministre ajoutait qu'il appartiendra aux Puissances, au moment de la paix, de fixer les frontières de l'État albanais. D'ailleurs la proclamation susdite parlait de protection et non de protectorat. Quant au Traité de Londres 1915, l'article 7 établit que l'Italie 'ne s'opposera pas à ce que les parties septentrionales et méridionales de l'Albanie soient partagées entre la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Grèce' si tel est le désir des Alliés. Cette formule démontre suffisamment que l'Italie se préoccupe surtout de sauvegarder autant que possible le droit à l'existence de la nation albanaise, ce qui correspond également à ses propres intérêts dans l'Adriatique.

5. *Question de Fiume*.—A ce propos je rappellerai que Fiume fut attribué par le Traité de Londres à la Croatie parce que cette dernière y était considérée comme séparée de la Serbie, ainsi qu'en force de considérations d'égards envers la Russie. Au contraire actuellement, la Croatie étant réunie à la Serbie, elle pourra profiter des ports attribués à la Serbie. Du reste la question de Fiume ne se rattache pas au Traité de Londres, vu que les Puissances se sont trouvées en face de la volonté de la population de cette ville qui jouissait déjà de son autonomie sous la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise comme *corpus separatum*. L'Italie, d'autre part, a toujours affirmé sa ferme intention de garantir à la Croatie et aux autres Pays dont le commerce pourrait aboutir à Fiume toutes les facilitations désirables.

Contrairement à ce qui est énoncé dans la Note, aucune loi locale n'a été promulguée à Fiume par le Gouvernement italien, ni même par le Gouvernement local, au nom du Roi d'Italie. Il est vrai que le Conseil National de Fiume, qui exerce dans cette ville les droits de souveraineté, a décrété que les sentences du Tribunal local devaient être prononcées avec la formule italienne. Mais cela prouve seulement les sentiments nationaux du Gouvernement local et ne constitue aucun acte d'ingérence de la part de l'Italie.

Pour ce qui concerne les Slaves qui resteraient compris dans la limite des frontières italiennes, il est à remarquer qu'à l'occasion du règlement territorial adopté par la Conférence pour la Pologne, la Tchéco-Slovaquie, la Roumanie et la Yougo-Slavie le nombre respectif des allophones incorporés dans ces pays est infiniment supérieur en comparaison des allophones que le règlement des frontières italiennes attribuerait à l'Italie.

6. *Question d'Anatolie*.—Cette question est envisagée en plusieurs endroits de la note du 28 juin.

D'une manière générale je dois ici affirmer le droit de l'Italie de maintenir sa position de Puissance méditerranéenne. Un des buts principaux que l'Italie s'est proposé en prenant part volontairement à la guerre européenne consiste précisément dans la nécessité de sauvegarder ses intérêts vitaux dans la Méditerranée orientale. On ne saurait envisager la possibilité que ces intérêts soient compromis par le règlement général de la paix qui devra clore la guerre victorieuse à laquelle l'Italie a participé avec tant de sacrifices. Ce droit essentiel découle naturellement d'un ensemble de considérations générales de justice et même de simple équité en dehors de tout traité ou

arrangement international, et le Gouvernement des États-Unis ne pourrait refuser d'en tenir compte de même qu'il a tenu compte des intérêts vitaux des autres Puissances associées. Mais, en outre, vis-à-vis des Alliés il existe des accords spécifiques dont je tiens à faire ici l'énumération: Article IX du Traité de Londres du 26 avril 1915,<sup>7</sup> Arrangement de Saint Jean de Maurienne du 19 avril 1917,<sup>8</sup> Accord italo-français du 26 juillet 1917,<sup>9</sup> Accord anglo-franco-italien du 18 août 1917.<sup>5</sup>

Le Gouvernement britannique a déclaré à maintes reprises, et en particulier par sa Note du 30 octobre dernier, que: 'It is of course unnecessary to say that there is no intention by initiating such a discussion to call in question the validity of the Treaty of London 1915, which remains in full force and

<sup>7</sup> Text printed in Volume I, pp. 84-5.

<sup>8</sup> See Introductory Note to Chap. III.

<sup>9</sup> The reference was to the following exchange of notes:

(i) *M. Ribot to Signor Raggi (Italian Ambassador in Paris)*

'PARIS, le 26 juillet, 1917

M. l'Ambassadeur,

'M. le Secrétaire général de mon Département m'a rendu compte de la conversation qu'il a eue ce matin avec votre Excellence et au cours de laquelle il est tombé d'accord avec vous pour proposer que la ligne frontière des zones française et italienne en Asie Mineure, à partir de la mer, suive le cours de la rivière Lamas, à l'ouest de Mersina, depuis son embouchure jusqu'à sa source, pour rejoindre ensuite directement la frontière franco-italienne déjà indiquée sur la chaîne du Taurus.

Je m'empresse de faire connaître à votre Excellence que je donne mon assentiment à cette proposition et que l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres sera autorisé à en faire part à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Italie. M. Paul Cambon sera, en outre, chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

'Veuillez, &c.

'RIBOT'

(ii) *Signor Raggi to M. Ribot*

'AMBASSADE D'ITALIE, PARIS, le 27 juillet, 1917

M. le Président,

'Je viens de recevoir et de communiquer à son Excellence le Baron Sonnino la note par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu m'informer que M. le Secrétaire général de votre Département vous a rendu compte de la conversation qu'il a eue avec moi hier matin et au cours de laquelle il est tombé d'accord avec moi pour proposer que la ligne frontière des zones française et italienne en Asie Mineure, à partir de la mer, suive le cours de la rivière Lamas, à l'ouest de Mersina, depuis son embouchure jusqu'à sa source, pour rejoindre ensuite directement la frontière franco-italienne déjà indiquée sur la chaîne du Taurus.

'Votre Excellence a bien voulu ajouter qu'elle donne son assentiment à cette proposition et que son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres sera autorisé à en faire part à l'Ambassadeur d'Italie, et que M. Paul Cambon sera, en outre, chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

'Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères me charge de vous informer qu'il donne son assentiment à la proposition dont il s'agit et que l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Londres sera autorisé à en faire part à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France. Le Marquis Imperiali sera, en outre, chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

'Veuillez, &c.

'SALVAGO RAGGI'

effect'.<sup>10</sup> Toutefois le Gouvernement britannique a cru pouvoir contester la validité de l'accord de Londres d'août 1917 pour la raison que l'assentiment du Gouvernement russe avait fait défaut. Le Gouvernement français, de son côté, nous assura de son opinion opposée à cette manière de voir. Partageant entièrement le point de vue soutenu par le Gouvernement royal je dois déclarer que je ne pourrais accepter le fondement de cette argumentation. L'assentiment de la Russie était prévu ayant égard aux intérêts de cet État allié; en effet la clause en faveur de la Russie est expressément formulée comme une réserve. La Russie ne pouvait plus donner son assentiment et ne pouvait non plus le refuser pour la simple raison qu'elle avait cessé d'être un État allié. C'est pourquoi cet assentiment ne lui fut pas même demandé, du moment qu'elle avait perdu le droit de faire valoir ses intérêts dans l'alliance. Cela ne peut aucunement infirmer la force de l'accord entre les parties contractantes.

<sup>10</sup> This quotation was from the following note from Mr. Balfour to the Marquis Imperiali:

'FOREIGN OFFICE, October 30, 1918

'Your Excellency,

'With reference to the note which Prince Borghese was good enough to address to me on the 11th October, informing me of the concurrence of the Italian Government in the terms of the draft of the *modus vivendi* which it was proposed to conclude with the French Government for the conduct of our relations with the Arabs in certain districts, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government have now informed the French Government that they are prepared to accept the arrangement contemplated in the draft upon the understanding that it is to be treated solely as providing for the situation caused by the recent advance of General Allenby's force into Syria, and is to be deemed to refer only to the territories occupied, or to be occupied, by that force. At the same time His Majesty's Government have intimated that with regard to the future government of the other territories mentioned in the Anglo-French Convention of 1916, the general position has so much changed since that Agreement was entered into that its provisions no longer appear suitable to present conditions. Not only has the military position in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria completely altered, but two political changes of vast importance have taken place. The United States have come into the war and Russia has gone out. It is manifest on the one hand that America must have a voice in any settlement of the future of these countries, and on the other that the arrangements contemplated for the north-eastern part of Armenia have been completely upset by the collapse of Russia. His Majesty's Government feel that any settlement of these points must form the subject of fresh conversations in which the Governments of Italy and the United States, as well as the French and British Governments, should be invited to take part.'

'2. I have every reason to believe that the French Government accept this view of the situation.

'3. I have the honour to express the hope that when the moment arrives the Italian Government on their part will be willing to join in such discussion. It is of course unnecessary to say that there is no intention by initiating such a discussion to call in question the validity of the Treaty of London 1915, which remains in full force and effect. In the meanwhile the French and British Governments propose to issue a declaration in the terms annexed.'

'I have, &c.

'(For the Secretary of State),

'ROBERT CECIL'

The declaration referred to in the last sentence of this note was the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918, for which see No. 2, note 8.

La Note du 28 juin expose que ‘toutes les sphères d'influence que pourront acquérir ces derniers (les “conquérants”) ne deviendront pas leur pleine propriété; ils ne les détiendront qu'à titre de “Trustees” (Fidéicommissaires) ou de mandataires de la Ligue des Nations.’ Plus loin la note rappelle la déclaration des Gouvernements alliés et associés en force de laquelle ‘aucun “accroissement” de territoire ne viendra récompenser un État quelconque pour avoir prolongé les horreurs de la guerre.’ Finalement, la note exprime la supposition que l'Italie a l'intention d'obtenir par la force ce qu'elle revendique comme lui appartenant de droit.

Or, il doit être clairement entendu que l'Italie n'a aucune visée de conquête violente ou d'annexion arbitraire en Anatolie. Sa ferme intention de se ranger aux principes humanitaires proclamés par le Président Wilson et adoptés par les Alliés, résulte de la Note italienne en date du 16 novembre dernier adressée au Foreign Office<sup>11</sup> (et communiquée au Gouvernement français) qui affirme précisément les principes contenus dans la déclaration

<sup>11</sup> This note from the Marquis Imperiali to Mr. Balfour read as follows in translation:

ITALIAN EMBASSY, November 16, 1918

Sir,  
In a note dated the 30th October last [see note 10 above] your Excellency informed me that the British Government considered it advisable to initiate conversations between the Governments of Italy, the United States, France, and Great Britain regarding the territories mentioned in the Franco-British Agreement of 1916.

In accordance with instructions received, I hasten to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government is disposed to participate in these discussions as proposed, with which, as you inform me, the French Government will be associated.

The Italian Government takes act of your Excellency's declaration to the effect that, in opening these discussions, there is no intention of questioning the validity of the Treaty of London of 1915, which will remain in full force and effect.

The Italian Government adds, however, that until a subsequent agreement is reached it must consider as valid the agreement concluded at London in August 1917 between the British, French, and Italian Governments, when the Italian Government gave its adherence to the Franco-British Agreement of 1916 and obtained the recognition of its interests in Anatolia, Arabia, and the Red Sea. Advantage is taken of this opportunity to state that, in the view of the Italian Government and in conformity with a reasonable interpretation of justice, the reservation in regard to Russian consent made in the Agreement of 1917 cannot in any way invalidate it, inasmuch as Russia has ceased to exist as a contracting Government, and is not, therefore, in a position to express herself on the question.

I am further instructed to point out to your Excellency that, in giving its adherence to your Excellency's request regarding a *modus vivendi* between Great Britain and France for the conduct of relations with the Arabs in certain districts, the Italian Government must assume that not only the Franco-British Agreement of 1916, but also the Agreement of August 1917 remain valid.

On its part, the Italian Government wishes to declare that it pursues no objects in the Anatolian districts covered by the Agreement of 1917 other than to promote the establishment of a Government and national Administration supported by the free will of the people, with a view of assuring, with its support and effective assistance, the normal operation of justice, security, and civil progress, and to promote the development of the country's economic resources.

‘I have, &c.

‘IMPERIALI’

franco-anglaise de novembre 1918 citée par la note à laquelle j'ai l'honneur de répondre.

Du reste, pour enlever toute possibilité de doute à cet égard, je tiens à déclarer ici que je fais pleine adhésion, pour ce qui concerne les revendications de l'Italie, à cette déclaration qui se rapporte aux modes d'administration de la Syrie et de la Mésopotamie.

Les occupations militaires italiennes en Anatolie, et celle de Scalanova en particulier, donnent occasion à des expressions très fortes dans la Note des Gouvernements alliés, expressions que je ne peux à moins de relever. J'ai bien pris connaissance du compte-rendu de la séance au Conseil des Quatre du 19 mai dernier<sup>12</sup> et je ne peux dissimuler l'impression de douloureuse surprise que la lecture de ce document m'a produite. Le représentant de l'Italie y est traité comme pourrait l'être celui d'un État ennemi et vaincu sommé de rendre compte d'agissements criminels.

L'occupation de Scalanova qui souleva les protestations les plus vives de la part des Gouvernements alliés et associés fut décidée en vue du maintien de l'ordre public et doit être considérée comme conséquence directe de l'occupation de Smyrne de la part des Grecs. Il est vrai que le Gouvernement grec fut invité à occuper cette ville et la région environnante, mais cette invitation a été faite pendant l'absence de Paris de la Délégation italienne. Cette dernière donna, à son retour en France, son consentement, et des forces italiennes participèrent à l'occupation des forts de Smyrne avec les troupes alliées<sup>13</sup> mais cela n'empêche pas que le Gouvernement italien n'eût pas le droit et le devoir de se préoccuper des graves conséquences qu'une extension de l'occupation grecque menaçait aux intérêts essentiels de l'Italie en cette région. En effet il est bien connu que toute la côte depuis la rivière Lamas jusqu'à Smyrne est dépourvue d'un port pouvant servir de débouché vers l'intérieur. Seulement Scalanova pourrait avoir cette fonction à l'avenir, à la suite de travaux considérables, et le Gouvernement britannique, avant l'accord d'août 1917 qui attribuait Smyrne à l'Italie, formula la proposition d'attribuer Scalanova à l'Italie (février 1917).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The minute of this meeting is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, pp. 716 f.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Volume I, No. 10, note 8.

<sup>14</sup> On January 29, 1917, a quadripartite conversation had been initiated at the Foreign Office in London between British, French, Italian, and Russian representatives 'to discuss the course that should be adopted with regard to Italian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean'. In Foreign Office despatch No. 39 of February 12, 1917, to Rome, Mr. Balfour informed Sir R. Rodd that 'the representatives of the three Allied Powers met me this afternoon in the Foreign Office to continue the discussion begun on the 29th of January last.... On that occasion I promised to have a map prepared, marking out for purposes of discussion an Italian sphere of influence in South-West Anatolia, which should be equal in importance to the French sphere, but should not interfere with it. This work was carried out by Sir Louis Mallet, and the suggested sphere may be roughly described as the area bounded on the East by the French sphere, on the South by the Mediterranean Sea, on the West by the Aegean Sea and on the North by a line going nearly east and west from Scala Nova through Urgub.' (This line was further defined in a Foreign Office memorandum of February 16, 1917, as 'emerging in Scala Nova Bay, just south of the peninsula which forms

La Note à laquelle j'ai l'honneur de répondre ne mentionne pas la circonstance que l'occupation de la ville de Konia fut exécutée par l'Italie sur la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne d'accord avec la France et les États-Unis.<sup>15</sup> Mais, quant aux autres occupations, il est opportun de citer la disposition suivante de l'article IX du Traité de Londres de 1915:<sup>7</sup> 'Si la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie occupent des territoires de la Turquie d'Asie pendant la durée de la guerre, la région méditerranéenne avoisinant la province d'Adalia dans les limites indiquées ci-dessus sera réservée à l'Italie qui aura le droit de l'occuper.'

Je ne pourrais consentir à admettre 'le contraste frappant qui existe entre la politique italienne et la politique du Gouvernement grec'. J'admetts qu'il

the southern shore of the Smyrna Gulf'). Mr. Balfour further reported of this meeting that 'in opening the conversation, I pointed out that I had no right to acquiesce in Italy's obtaining this sphere of influence without consultation with my Colleagues, and that, as the Representatives of France, Italy, and Russia were probably similarly circumstanced, I did not desire more on the present occasion than to have a friendly discussion upon the merits of this particular solution of the problem with which it was our duty to deal. The Italian Ambassador, however, at once declared, with great emphasis, that he was not in a position even to discuss any plan which differed so widely from the territorial arrangements advocated in the Italian Memorandum of November 1916. In this memorandum the Italian Government not only claimed an '*equitable*' share of Turkish territory, as they were entitled to do under the Treaty of London of the 26th April, 1915, but they claimed that this share should contain regions already assigned to the French, which the French were not likely to surrender without long and embittered discussion.' The Marquis Imperiali was supported in his attitude by Baron Sonnino and further negotiation was rendered difficult (cf. No. 573, note 3) pending the Allied conference at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, for which see the Introductory Note to Chap. III.

<sup>15</sup> On March 21, 1919, Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino, in conversation with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour at Paris, had renewed previous representations that Italian forces should be permitted to occupy Adalia. The minute of this conversation (as cited by Mr. Vansittart, a member of the Political Section of the British Delegation in Paris, in a note of July 28, 1919, on the Italian occupation of Adalia and Konia) recorded: 'Mr. Balfour then asked the question whether this was desired for military or political reasons. M. Orlando said it was for both. Mr. Balfour pointed out that if it were for political reasons, or partly for political reasons, it was a matter that must be discussed at the Conference. If Italy's object was to establish a claim to Adalia by putting in a garrison, then the Conference ought to be informed before anything was done.'

The Prime Minister pointed out that General Allenby could not really make any military excuse for sending Italian troops to Adalia. We should not be keeping good faith with the Americans if we allowed the question of Adalia to be prejudiced by putting in an Italian garrison simply as an arrangement between the British and Italian Governments.

Konia, however, it was agreed, was on a different footing. There was already an allied garrison in Konia, and General Allenby would be entitled to put an Italian garrison there. The Prime Minister pointed out, however, that General Allenby asked for really good troops.'

Mr. Vansittart's note (cf. above) continued: 'This seems to have been followed by correspondence between our and the Italian Military Authorities and the result was that the Italians did not arrive at Konia until towards the end of April. Meanwhile the Italians landed at Adalia as well, without any permission or encouragement, and in fact in the teeth of the refusal at the meeting of March 21 already quoted. As a matter of fact the Italians actually landed on March 28. I cannot find that any severe notice was taken of this until the meeting of the Council of Four on May 19.'

y a un contraste, mais c'est dans les conséquences des occupations militaires respectives. Tandis que les troupes italiennes ont été partout accueillies avec des marques de sincère amitié par les populations locales, la conquête grecque (car tout fait penser à une véritable conquête) a donné lieu à de nombreux massacres, pillages et incendies commis par les Grecs avec la révolte de la population turque qui forme l'immense majorité de la région.

7. *Recherche d'une solution possible.*—Je suis et serai toujours animé des dispositions les plus conciliantes dans le but d'arriver au règlement définitif des intérêts italiens. La note du 28 juin affirme que le Traité de Londres, la Déclaration anglo-française de novembre 1918 et les quatorze points du Président Wilson devraient être pris en considération, bien que de façon différente.

Pour ce qui concerne la Déclaration de novembre 1918 je confirme que j'y fais pleine adhésion ainsi qu'il est dit plus haut.

Pour ce qui concerne les quatorze points du Président Wilson, qui forment dans leur ensemble un monument de sagesse politique, je dois rappeler que le Gouvernement italien formula en son temps une réserve expresse par rapport à la formule employée vis-à-vis de certains intérêts italiens.<sup>16</sup>

Quant au Traité de Londres de 1915, il s'agit, à la différence des deux actes susnommés, d'un traité en bonne et due forme. Aucune espèce de justification ne pourrait légitimer l'affirmation que ce traité est par endroits périmé ou sur le point de l'être. Si des conditions de fait existant en 1915 ont subi des changements, il est facile d'en tenir compte, mais il y a loin de là à vouloir altérer l'esprit du traité jusqu'à priver un seul des contractants des fruits de la victoire remportée en commun.

Me rapportant à la conclusion de la Note de MM. Clemenceau et Lloyd George je suis tout disposé à envisager, d'accord avec les Gouvernements alliés et associés, l'ensemble de la question de Turquie, dans la ferme confiance que les intérêts légitimes de l'Italie trouveront auprès de ces Gouvernements la considération qui leur est due. Mais il est de mon devoir de repousser la menace de la 'perte de tous droits à un appui ou à une aide ultérieure'. Le sens de cette phrase n'est pas clair. Peut-être fait-on allusion à la possibilité de soumettre l'Italie à la famine, par le retrait du ravitaillement, si elle ne renonçait pas à ses droits, à ses intérêts légitimes sanctionnés par des Traités solennels, à sa dignité nationale? Si on devait en venir à pareille extrémité, l'Italie, après s'être jetée volontairement dans la fournaise de cette longue guerre, après avoir sacrifié à la cause commune le meilleur de la génération actuelle et sa richesse nationale toute entière, l'Italie ne pourrait néanmoins consentir à des renonciations contraires à son honneur, et l'histoire porterait son appréciation infaillible sur l'injustice dont mon pays aura été la victime.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

TITTONI.

<sup>16</sup> For reservations to the Fourteen Points advanced by Baron Sonnino at meetings of the Allied Supreme War Council, October 29–November 3, 1918, see C. Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (London, 1928), vol. iv, pp. 172–83.

No. 7

Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9)

No. 469 Telegraphic [99847/123/3]

ROME, July 8, 1919

Serious Franco-Italian incidents have taken place within last few days at Fiume in last of which nine French soldiers were killed and several wounded.<sup>1</sup> Italian press maintained that these incidents were engineered by French and have published violent Francophobe articles on subject.

Counsellor of French Embassy under instructions from French Ambassador informed Mr. Kennard<sup>2</sup> today that they consider situation most grave. He showed him most recent telegrams received from French General at Fiume which indicated that incidents were provoked by Italians and that Italian General had suggested that French troops should be moved outside town to which French General would not agree though he was prepared to move them to another part of the town. Telegrams further state that Admiral Sinclair<sup>3</sup> and United States Consul are also of opinion that fault lay with Italians.

French Counsellor stated French soldiers have also been attacked in Italy more especially at Genoa and that an Italian newspaper had suggested that there might be a repetition of 'Sicilian Vespers' if there were a renewal of such incidents.

Monsieur Charles Roux stated that Signor Tittoni was returning from Paris to Rome in connection with this question and that presumably an International Commission of enquiry would be instituted. In the meantime, however, anti-French feeling was running so high that some grave incident might occur in Italy where there were large numbers of French soldiers who might come into conflict with Italian troops and that he feared that any such incident attended by serious bloodshed might lead to a rupture of relations between Italy and France. French fears may prove exaggerated but it seems necessary to report them to you as given by French Embassy. He therefore hopes that British and United States Governments would support French in representing to Italy gravity of situation and I should be glad of immediate instructions as to whether I should approach my American colleague with a view to making joint representation in the sense desired by French Embassy.<sup>4</sup>

In the meantime internal situation while calmer has not sensibly improved (see my telegram immediately succeeding)<sup>5</sup> though M. Charles Roux thinks that Signor Nitti will have a majority in Chamber which meets tomorrow.

<sup>1</sup> For an account of these incidents see the report of the Allied Commission appointed to inquire into them (cf. No. 8, note 3); this report is printed in Volume I, No. 42, appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Rome.

<sup>3</sup> Rear-Admiral commanding the British Third Light Cruiser Squadron in the Mediterranean.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office telegram No. 632 of July 9, 1919, to Rome: 'You may approach your United States colleague and act in concert with him.' Lord Curzon added: 'Please keep me fully informed.'

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

It seems essential that some report from an unprejudiced quarter should be made as soon as possible as to degree of responsibility for these incidents as it is impossible to judge from either Italian or French sources with whom fault really lies and I would therefore suggest that British Military Mission at Fiume should be at once instructed to send full telegraphic reports to Military Attaché here who at present receives no such reports and is unable to visit front himself owing to War Office instructions.

Addressed to F.O. Sent to Peace Delegation.

No. 8

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 8)*

*No. 1132 Telegraphic [99837/123/3]*

PARIS, July 8, 1919

Monsieur Clemenceau is deeply moved by further reports of Fiume incident which he thinks refer to a second and later scene of rioting and murder.<sup>1</sup> I am not sure of this but as I have no independent information I am obliged to rely upon contradictory reports of French, Americans and Italians.

Whatever the truth may be Monsieur Clemenceau is determined to send a French man-of-war to Fiume: it will arrive from Constantinople in four days. Mr. Lansing and I have told him we see no objection.<sup>2</sup>

The enquiry will of course still go on.<sup>3</sup> I am disposed to think that we should also send ship. It would probably have a calming effect.

<sup>1</sup> See Volume I, No. 5, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume I, No. 6.

<sup>3</sup> The Supreme Council (Heads of Delegations) in Paris had decided on July 7, 1919, that an Allied Commission should be appointed to inquire into the incidents at Fiume and to recommend means of improving the situation there: see Volume I, No. 4, minute 1.

No. 9

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 959 Telegraphic [99847/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 1132<sup>1</sup> (of July 8th. Fiume incidents).

I have asked War Office to instruct British Military Mission at Fiume to telegraph detailed reports on the situation, and have requested Admiralty to send a ship immediately to Fiume to watch situation and report.

Repeated to Rome, No. 631. Repeated to Washington, No. 1439.

<sup>1</sup> No. 8.

No. 10

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 4624 [76/2/3/14896]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 9, 1919

Earl Curzon of Kedleston presents his compliments to the Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith for Mr. Balfour's consideration copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Name and Date	Subject
Sir H. Lamb <sup>1</sup> to Sir G. Clerk, <sup>2</sup> of June 20.	Albania under Italian rule.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 10

*Letter from Sir H. Lamb to Sir G. Clerk*

SOFIA, June 20, 1919

Dear Sir George,

I have just returned from a trip to Valona and back, which has been extremely satisfactory to myself, since it has enabled me to clear myself from entanglements in that depressing locality that had been a nightmare to me for the past four years, and also very interesting to me in other ways. Unfortunately my time was limited and the household problems occupied rather more of it than I had calculated, so that I felt constrained rather to rush the journey; otherwise it might have been worth while to spend a few more days on the road.

So far as it was possible for me to diagnose it, feeling in Albania varies considerably from place to place but is practically everywhere *against* the Italian Protectorate. The general aspiration is for 'Independence' with a European, or preferably American, High Commissioner. Failing an American they ask for an Englishman. If a Protectorate is considered inevitable, an Anglo-Saxon one would be accepted with satisfaction or a French one with equanimity, but *all* are against the Italians, the strength of their animosity being in direct proportion to the closeness of the present contact.

Valona itself, which is the Italians' principal base and where in consequence the administration is almost undisguisedly Italian (and military at that), is literally seething with discontent and nobody has a good word for the rulers. Something of this discontent may of course be discounted, the Albanian, like the Irishman, being constitutionally 'agin the Government' of the moment, however, or of whomsoever it may be constituted, but there is much that is really well grounded. The complaints that appeared to me to have some justification may be grouped under three heads:—

- (1) restriction of liberty;
- (2) disregard for proprietary rights; and
- (3) attempts at denationalisation.

As regards (1) Valona seems to be policed very much as Dalmatia and Bosnia were under the Hapsburg or Constantinople under the Hamidian regime. Persons suspected of nationalistic ardour, or even of lukewarm

<sup>1</sup> Sir H. Lamb, formerly British Commissioner on the International Commission of Control in Albania (1913-14), was at that time attached to the British Military Mission to Sofia.

<sup>2</sup> Private Secretary to Lord Curzon.

devotion towards the 'madre patria' (as the Italian Press, with an absence of humour worthy of the *Daily Mail* or the *Telegraph* at their fulsomest, delight to designate Italy in relation to Albania, Tripoli or even Erythrea) are deported, if they desire to reside there, compelled to reside there, if they wish to go abroad, and even imprisoned on the slightest pretext. Permits to circulate, to trade or to do anything for which a permit can possibly be made obligatory, are granted grudgingly and only after long enquiry. The people, of course, have been disarmed. This is perhaps no great misfortune and, in this part of the country, is not so deeply resented; the Ghegs,<sup>3</sup> on the other hand, have so far refused to surrender their weapons.

As regards (2) the Italians plume themselves, with some reason, on the numerous roads and edifices which they have constructed throughout the country during the past four years, but the natives point out, with some reason too, that the buildings erected are exclusively for the use of the Italian administration or the Italian troops in occupation, whilst even the roads are mainly such as are of direct strategic interest, neither one nor the other having been built with any eye to the interests or requirements of the population. The first objection appeared to me to be valid; the second is also true in a sense, since the Italians necessarily commenced with the main lines of communication and have not yet had the time to get down to the side-tracks, but it remains indisputable that the country must derive considerable benefit from the construction of some thousand kilometres of main-road and also from their maintenance, for tinkering at which a considerable proportion of the female and infant population (few men were working on the roads) derive a direct revenue. But, on the other hand, the Italians have, for the purposes of their construction, resorted relentlessly to requisition, cutting up fields and felling trees, orchards and even olive groves, with little or no pretence at compensation. General Piacentini<sup>4</sup> himself conducted us over a saw-mill on the mountain side, which has already disposed of about half of one of the few fine forests that still survived in this region, complacently remarking that the forest belonged to the Commune of Dukati, the inhabitants of which had been too ignorant or too indolent to utilise it, wherefore they (the Italians) were showing them how it could be done. The views of the said inhabitants at seeing their fine old pinewoods swept away to make planks for the construction of barracks and hospitals for Italian troops in occupation will be easily understood by anyone who has had any connection with the defence of 'rights of common' or especially who knows the Albanian dread of foreign exploitation.

Coming to (3), the Italians plume themselves almost equally on the schools, which they have established in all the towns and in many villages throughout the occupied district, and on the devotion of the teachers, who have come from Italy to carry on, under circumstances undoubtedly of great discomfort, the work of education and civilisation. The natives, on the other hand, complain that the instruction given is purely Italian, intended to

<sup>3</sup> Northern Albanian highlanders.

<sup>4</sup> General commanding Italian forces in Albania.

denationalise and Italianise the rising generation, the teaching of Albanian, which was at first collateral with Italian, having gradually been restricted until it has been almost altogether eliminated.

They also accuse the Italians of following the old Hamidian or Macchiavellian policy of 'divide et impera' by insidiously setting the Christians and Mussulmans by the ears, telling the latter that the former are striving to bring in again the Greeks to perpetrate fresh massacres, whilst they assure the Christians that their Mussulman fellow-countrymen advocate autonomy solely because, in an autonomous state, they count on securing a predominant position, which would enable them to perpetuate the old Mahomedan regime. They even go so far as to accuse them of forming, or encouraging the formation of, bands to commit acts of violence and thereby create dissension, in short of doing everything in their power for the purpose of dividing the people into factions and to obviate the possibility of collaboration for nationalist ends. Finally they declare that, if the Italian protectorate is confirmed by the Conference, they will resort to insurrection, assassination—one man said even Bolshevik anarchy—rather than submit to it.

Personally I do not believe that they will go further than, perhaps, an occasional attempt at the second (they very recently shot at and wounded the Italian Prefect of Berat) but I quote this language as undoubtedly indicative of the feelings now prevalent.

At Argyrocastro, where the Italian hand is lighter, where some semblance of Albanian home-rule is maintained and where the dread of a fresh Greek occupation is strong, the anti-Italian feeling appeared less violent, but 'autonomy' under an American protectorate (if any) is the cry.

In the Korytza district, where the people are more enlightened and the dread of a return of 'Hellenic culture' still more deadly, an Italian Protectorate (if so decreed) would, it seemed to me, be accepted with resignation as an alternative to partition, on the understanding that *all* Albania should be included under it; by 'all Albania' being meant at least the frontiers of the London Conference of 1913.

This district (pace the Greek press) is at present a model of contentment so far as is compatible with the all-engrossing anxiety in regard to the future settlement and relative prosperity under a local administration guided by the French Commandant de Place (Comm. l'Espinasse) who struck me as an exceptionally reasonable and fair-minded man and who appeared to enjoy the confidence and respect of the people.

Northwards of Korytza, where the Serbian occupation begins, and where a few months back there appears to have been some fighting between the Amaouts<sup>4</sup> of Lower Dibra and the troops, I was told that the Serbs have recently somewhat relaxed their oppressive attitude towards the inhabitants, in proportion as the anti-Italian feeling appears to spread.

In the Durazzo district, I was told, people openly talk of calling in the Serbs, if the Italian Protectorate be confirmed, but this again was denied by others and seems to me improbable, or at least, if true at all, it could only be

<sup>4</sup> A Turkish designation of Albanians.

a sporadic outcome of propaganda by or through agents of Essad Pasha,<sup>6</sup> but the latter, I was told, has recently been to some extent taken up again by Turkhan Pasha<sup>7</sup> and the Italians and anyhow is now without influence or followers even in Tirana.

In fine, the feeling common throughout Albania, a feeling indeed which one encounters almost everywhere, is anxiety as to the decisions of the Conference and dread of their probable results—(there is little optimism anywhere), coupled in many cases with a longing at least to know the worst quickly and get it over. . . .<sup>8</sup>

Your sincerely,

HARRY H. LAMB

<sup>6</sup> An Albanian autonomist leader.

<sup>7</sup> Head of a provisional Albanian administration constituted by Albanian notables at the end of 1918.

<sup>8</sup> The last two paragraphs of this letter related to other matters.

### No. 11

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received July 14)*

*No. 488 Telegraphic [102175/123/3]*

ROME, July 13, 1919

My telegram No. 480.<sup>1</sup>

Naval Attaché reports from Fiume on July 12th that authorities there have control of situation and that order has been restored.

No British were involved in disturbances of which a renewal is unlikely.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

### No. 12

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Sir R. Rodd (Rome)*

*No. 54 Telegraphic [89/1/7/14869]*

PARIS, July 15, 1919

In view of importance of showing united front as regards Fiume incidents, French Government have asked that you and your United States colleague may be instructed to concert with your French colleague as to any declarations or actions which situation may necessitate.

I quite agree, and you should act in closest co-operation with your French and United States colleagues.

Repeated to Foreign Office, 1154.

### No. 13

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received July 20)*

*No. 498 Telegraphic [104761/123/3]*

ROME, July 19, 1919

In view of dangers and difficulties in internal (?) situation here I think it most desirable that a settlement of Fiume question either one way or the

other should if possible precede any decision by Commission of Admirals<sup>1</sup> which might result in pressure for evacuation of Italian troops.

Various influences which are working for disorder in this country such as cost of living, discontent with Allies and Bolshevik propaganda are so intermixed though all tending in same direction of opposition to authority that I fear what consequences might be of orders to evacuate before future status of Fiume were determined. After a decision it would produce less effect.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> The reference was apparently to a Commission set up on December 2, 1918, to report on conditions in the Adriatic. See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. i, p. 341.

### No. 14

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received July 20)*

*No. 499 Telegraphic [104762/123/3]*

ROME, July 19, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Naval Attaché who has returned from Fiume has pointed out exceptional capabilities of Klek as a harbour for Jugo-Slavia (see Admiralty chart No. 1582—harbours on East shore of Adriatic). He gathered Jugo-Slav State would not make much use of Fiume even if it were assigned to them as it is commanded from Italian heights and it would chiefly serve Hungary.<sup>2</sup> Klek is only 8 miles from existing railway system, perfectly protected with deep water and its development had been contemplated by Austrians. His report<sup>3</sup> follows by messenger.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 13.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter of July 17, 1919, to Mr. Balfour in Paris (not printed), Sir Rennell Rodd had further stated that the British Naval Attaché 'seems to think that the native inhabitants of Fiume, whether Italian or Slovene, are really more interested in themselves and in their own than in the question of annexation either to Italy or to Jugo-Slavia and that, if the autonomy solution be eventually carried out, they would settle down under it some day and dispose their differences, which have been no doubt largely fomented by those interested in the agitation. Of course the Italians argue that they would never agree. In any case the fact of the port being commanded by the high ground which will become Italian makes it as desirable as a possession to the Yugo-Slavs.'

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

### No. 15

*Earl Curzon to Sir C. Des Graz<sup>1</sup> (Belgrade)*

*No. 212 Telegraphic: by bag [106525/1130/19]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1919

Italian Government have protested against action of Serbian troops in crossing Eastern Albanian frontier, alleging that this action is not in accordance with military arrangements arrived at in autumn of 1918.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Belgrade.

<sup>2</sup> On July 26, 1919, Mr. Howard Smith, a member of the War Department of the Foreign

This complaint would appear to be well-founded, but at the same time Italians are at fault in sending troops into Scutari district which was internationalised under the same agreement. Italians have themselves, therefore, violated spirit of arrangements made by Supreme Council at Versailles.

Italian Government have addressed protest to Serbian Government and have asked His Majesty's Government to support it.

I feel that we cannot join in representations at Belgrade until it is certain that Serbian Government will not withdraw troops from invaded districts of Albania of their own accord. Mr. Balfour has, however, caused unofficial representations to be made to Serbian Delegations at Paris, and has warned them that His Majesty's Government could not encourage or defend this occupation, and that it would be preferable if they would withdraw their forces before international pressure had to be applied. Serbian Delegation promised to telegraph to Marshal Mishitch<sup>3</sup> and urge these views.

You should hold similar language to Serbian Government.

Office, wrote to Mr. Harold Nicolson, a member of the Political Section of the British Delegation in Paris, asking for a copy of these arrangements. In reply Mr. Nicolson stated in a letter of July 28 to Mr. Howard Smith: 'I fear we have no copy of the arrangements made by the Supreme Council at Versailles last November for the occupation of Albania. The arrangement provided apparently for the evacuation of the whole of Albania by Serbian troops, as also for the international occupation of Scutari. The situation is perfectly plain to us. The Italians never rendered their occupation very effective except at certain vital centres. They have recently been pushing detachments towards the northern and eastern frontiers and at Kukos and Klegne they were pained to discover small Yugoslav detachments established. A few shots were exchanged but no very violent fighting took place. We have told the Serbian Delegation very frankly that they had better clear out of Albania at once, as otherwise they would be made to do so by the Conference. I think they may do this of their own accord, and meanwhile we are suspending action. The Italians are also in the wrong from having sent detachments into the Scutari region. As usual, both sides are to blame.'

<sup>3</sup> Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Army.

## No. 16

*Note from M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Signor Tittoni<sup>1</sup>*

[97/1/3/16777]

PARIS, le 29 juillet, 1919

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de la réponse de Votre Excellence<sup>2</sup> à la note collective signée par les Présidents du Conseil de France et d'Angleterre et adressée le 28 juin<sup>3</sup> au prédécesseur de V. E. le Baron Sonnino. La plus grande partie de cette réponse a trait à certaines questions de controverse historique soulevées par la note collective. Nous nous proposons de traiter ces questions rapidement dans une autre communication.<sup>4</sup> Mais pour le moment, il nous paraît indispensable d'isoler le plus important des

<sup>1</sup> On August 1, 1919, Mr. Nicolson noted on the file copy of this document: 'This was handed to M. Tittoni on July 31.' The note had been drafted by Mr. Balfour (cf. D. H. Miller: *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, vol. xx, pp. 360-3): the present French text is the filed copy of the note as presented to Signor Tittoni.

<sup>2</sup> No. 6.

<sup>3</sup> No. 2, appendix I.

<sup>4</sup> See the enclosure below.

problèmes dont la solution s'impose et d'exposer à Votre Excellence la nature exacte des difficultés qui rendent si ardue à résoudre la question de l'Adriatique.

Il nous faut au préalable, rectifier une erreur sérieuse dans laquelle est tombée Votre Excellence. Vous dites explicitement dans une de vos phrases et vous laissez constamment entendre que nous ne considérons plus le Traité de Londres comme liant les Puissances qui y sont parties. Nous n'avons jamais dit cela. Ce que nous avons dit, c'est que l'Italie a agi et agit en ce moment même comme si ce traité ne liait plus les Parties contractantes; ce qui est tout différent. Les déclarations de ses hommes d'État, les articles de ses journaux, les manifestations de son Parlement et les incidents, souvent des plus regrettables, qui sont survenus chez elle, tout contribue à prouver que dans l'opinion de son peuple la question de Fiume est une question ouverte et que, si l'Italie désire Fiume, il n'y a pas de raison valable pour qu'elle ne l'obtienne pas. Mais d'après le Traité de Londres, la question de Fiume n'est pas ouverte; et ceux qui sont prêts à renier le traité en ce qui concerne Fiume après avoir sous leur propre signature donné cette ville à la Croatie, n'ont évidemment aucun droit à l'invoquer lorsque ses dispositions répondent davantage à leurs désirs.

Nous sommes assurés que Votre Excellence ne croira pas que nous soulevions cette question, quelque importante qu'elle soit, dans le seul but d'engager une controverse. Notre but est très différent. Nous désirons convaincre Votre Excellence qu'une solution satisfaisante de la question Adriatique doit tenir compte d'éléments autres que le Traité de Londres, et nous rappeler que dans cette opinion, bien que se plaçant à un autre point de vue, Votre Excellence et toute l'Italie sont d'accord avec nous.

La difficulté du problème apparaît entière dès que nous énumérons toutes les conditions auxquelles, pour être complète, sa solution doit satisfaire. L'une de ces conditions doit être considérée comme irréductible. Le règlement, quel qu'en soit la nature, doit être accepté par toutes les Puissances associées d'Occident. Autrement ce ne serait pas un règlement, mais un aveu public et déshonorant d'insuccès diplomatique. Il est d'autres conditions dont le caractère est peut-être moins absolu, mais dont chacune, prise séparément, doit être comprise dans un arrangement parfaitement satisfaisant. Un tel arrangement permettrait à chaque Puissance de remplir toutes les obligations auxquelles elle s'est soumise, de maintenir tous les principes qu'elle a proclamés, de satisfaire toutes les espérances qu'elle a exprimées et toutes les ambitions qu'elle a nourries. Jusqu'à quel point pouvons-nous nous approcher de cet idéal? Voilà la question.

Qu'il soit très difficile de donner une réponse à cette question, cela est évident si nous la considérons du point de vue de la Puissance la plus directement intéressée. L'Italie désire maintenir le Traité de Londres; elle désire aussi obtenir Fiume. De toute évidence, elle ne peut pas faire les deux. L'Italie veut régler les frontières de l'Europe d'après le principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, et en même temps elle veut obtenir une partie considérable de la côte dalmate et des îles adjacentes. Encore une fois, elle ne peut faire les deux.

L'Italie reconnaît la nécessité d'admettre l'Amérique à tout règlement qui pourra être atteint, mais elle désire aussi obtenir des territoires qui ne peuvent pas lui appartenir avec le consentement des États-Unis, ceux-ci s'en tenant à l'interprétation que le Président Wilson a donné de ses 14 points. Il nous faut de nouveau faire observer que personne jusqu'à présent n'a pu proposer un moyen de concilier ces deux incompatibilités évidentes.

Les difficultés que nous venons d'énumérer sont bien connues de V. E. et il est hors de doute que toutes les autres Puissances associées se trouvent, comme l'Italie et à des degrés divers, en face de problèmes résultant des développements historiques imprévus des quatre dernières années. Mais du moins pour ce qui est de la question adriatique, c'est l'Italie qui devrait nous fournir une solution. Car là l'Italie, seule des Puissances occidentales associées, a des ambitions matérielles à satisfaire. Les quatre puissances se sont faites les défenseurs du principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes; trois d'entre elles ont signé le Traité de Londres. Mais que ce soit au point de vue territorial ou militaire, naval ou économique, le règlement qui en fin de compte sera adopté n'intéressera que l'Italie. Que ce soit donc l'Italie qui suggère une politique qui, tout en tenant compte de ses intérêts, soit d'accord avec ses principes et avec les nôtres.

Le mémorandum de V. E. soulève une autre discussion accessoire dont il nous faut dire un mot avant de terminer cette partie de notre réponse.

V. E. s'exprime comme si l'Italie était traitée par ses associés avec moins d'égards que les autres États alliés et, en particulier, comme si le principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et celui des nationalités lui étaient opposés avec une rigidité d'interprétation que l'on ne retrouve pas, par exemple, dans le cas de la Pologne ou de la Bohême.

Il nous est impossible de partager cette manière de voir. Il est évident que, dans ce monde de rapports complexes, nulle règle abstraite ne peut être appliquée simplement et d'une manière pour ainsi dire mécanique. Des considérations découlant de l'histoire et de l'ethnologie, de la religion, de la culture et du langage, des nécessités administratives, de la solidarité économique et de la sécurité militaire, peuvent unir des régions qui, autrement, seraient séparées et séparer des régions qui, autrement, seraient réunies. La fixation de la nouvelle frontière du Nord de l'Italie offre un exemple de cette manière d'agir qui a causé une pénible surprise à beaucoup d'admirateurs de l'Italie. Ils disent, et ils ont raison, que si la langue, la race et le vœu des populations avaient déterminé la décision de la Conférence, le Tyrol du Sud n'aurait jamais été italien. Quoi qu'il en soit le principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et le principe des nationalités ont cédé devant les nécessités stratégiques et l'Italie a obtenu ce qu'elle désirait à la frontière des Alpes.

Le cas de la Bohême, également, présente des difficultés. Ici aussi une région allemande se trouve englobée dans un État non-allemand — et ici aussi des raisons géographiques et stratégiques peuvent être sincèrement invoquées en faveur de cette anomalie. Mais les considérations historiques et économiques ont plus de poids encore. Depuis le Moyen Age, la Bohême

a formé une unité politique. Tantôt elle a été un royaume séparé et indépendant, tantôt un royaume indépendant mais uni à ses voisins dans la personne de son souverain; tantôt elle a fait partie du Saint Empire Romain et tantôt elle en a été séparée: en dernier lieu elle était comprise dans la moitié autrichienne de la Monarchie Dualiste. Mais à travers tous ces changements elle n'a pas cessé de conserver son unité et son territoire a de temps immémorial été isolé de l'Allemagne proprement dite par la chaîne de montagnes qui l'encercle. Diviser ce territoire en deux par une frontière uniquement linguistique, au mépris des sentiments historiques et des courants économiques, aurait été manifestement faire un mauvais usage du principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes. Nous sommes certains que V. E. est d'accord avec nous sur ce point. Nous ne doutons pas non plus que vous estimiez comme nous qu'il n'est pas possible de trouver une situation analogue parmi les populations italiennes éparses cù et là le long de la côte dalmate.

A part ces deux exceptions — le Tyrol du Sud et la Bohème de langue allemande — nous ne connaissons pas un cas où les frontières aient été tracées de telle façon que des districts importants soient restés du côté de la ligne que leurs habitants auraient estimé être le *mauvais* côté. Sans doute des groupements isolés ont fréquemment dû être laissés au milieu d'une population étrangère. Cela est inévitable. Sans doute aussi des raisons géographiques, économiques ou stratégiques ont parfois eu assez de poids pour amener la Conférence à sanctionner délibérément de légères modifications à la frontière ethnographique. Mais d'une manière générale, nous ne voyons pas que V. E. soit fondée à insinuer que nos principes ne deviennent inflexibles que lorsque l'Italie est en jeu. Nous estimons au contraire, que si l'Italie voulait appliquer à la ligne côtière de l'Istrie et de la Dalmatie au sud de Pola les mêmes méthodes que, d'accord avec ses alliés, elle a appliquées ailleurs, la question adriatique n'existerait pas.

#### ENCLOSURE IN No. 16

##### *Note Annexe*

PARIS, le 29 juillet, 1919

La note remise le 7 juillet par Son Excellence Monsieur Tittoni touche à un certain nombre de points sur lesquels des observations et rectifications doivent être présentées.

C'est ainsi que:

a) l'accord de Londres du 26 avril 1915, bien qu'il ne formule pas dans les articles 1, 2 et 3 de délai pour l'entrée en guerre et la poursuite de la guerre par l'Italie contre tous nos ennemis, contient cependant *in fine* un engagement formel de l'Italie, se référant à ces mêmes articles, et fixant un délai ne pouvant excéder un mois après la signature de l'accord;

b) la convention militaire fixant le minimum des forces que la Russie devra employer contre l'Autriche-Hongrie est prévue explicitement pour le cas où la Russie déciderait de porter son principal effort contre l'Allemagne, et n'est ainsi applicable que par interprétation au cas de force

majeure d'écroulement de la Russie, qui aurait pu difficilement être imputé à la France et à l'Angleterre et être invoqué par l'Italie pour se délier de ses engagements.

c) la défense de la colonie italienne de Libya et de la région albanaise de Vallona invoquée comme action contre la Turquie, la date tardive de déclaration de guerre à la Turquie, les conditions de la participation à l'expédition de Salonique prêteraient également à des discussions si l'on devait relever les conditions, les réserves, les délais et les refus intervenus;

d) la concession même de Fiume ne paraît pas pouvoir être présentée comme ne s'appliquant qu'à la Croatie séparée de la Serbie, puisque la note de l'article 5<sup>5</sup> énumère les territoires de l'Adriatique non cédés à l'Italie comme devant être attribués globalement 'par les quatre puissances alliées à la Croatie, à la Serbie et au Monténégro', réservant par là toute organisation éventuelle ultérieure de la Croatie, de la Serbie, et du Monténégro;

e) on ne saurait nier que le mémorandum concernant les résultats des conversations de St. Jean de Maurienne du 8 [? 18] août 1917<sup>6</sup> ne débute par la réserve générale suivante qui s'applique ainsi à l'ensemble des dispositions: 'Sous réserve de l'assentiment du Gouvernement russe', et ne soit clos par un article neuf ainsi conçu: 'Il est entendu que le présent mémorandum sera communiqué au gouvernement russe afin de lui permettre de faire connaître ses vues', double réserve que les évènements ont laissée en suspens;

f) le premier débarquement à Scala Nova, opéré sans prévenir les alliés malgré des réunions quotidiennes, n'a nullement été motivé par l'occupation de Smyrne par les Grecs puisqu'il a eu lieu antérieurement, du fait du cuirassé *Regina Elena*, et qu'il l'a ainsi précédée de même que les occupations de Marmaris et de Boudroun;<sup>7</sup>

g) l'occupation même de Smyrne n'a pas eu lieu en l'absence des délégués italiens, puisque M. Orlando, mis au courant du projet des puissances, a demandé un délai pour l'examiner et y a souscrit dans la séance suivante ainsi que M. Sonnino qu'il avait demandé à consulter dans l'intervalle, et que les troupes italiennes y ont participé.<sup>8</sup>

D'autres observations pourraient encore être présentées sur un certain nombre des faits allégués par V. E. mais ni l'Angleterre ni la France n'ont l'intention de poursuivre une discussion de ce genre avec l'Italie puisque leur seul désir est de trouver une solution tenant compte à la fois des principes qui dominent les négociations de la paix, des engagements respectifs qui les lient et de la nécessité d'obtenir l'adhésion des États-Unis.

<sup>5</sup> Of the Treaty of London.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 6, note 5.

<sup>7</sup> Italian forces had disembarked at Marmaris, Budrum, and Scalanova on May 11, 1919, and succeeding days. Greek and other Allied Forces disembarked at Smyrna on May 15.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. No. 6, note 13.

No. 17

*Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) for Mr. Lloyd George*

[*Confidential/General/229/4*]

*Notes for the Prime Minister on the Italian Situation*

August 2, 1919

S[ignor] Tittoni has not spoken to me about his intended visit to London,<sup>1</sup> so that I have no hint or suggestion as to what he wants to talk over in Downing Street. I rather suspect, however, that his main theme will be the economic difficulties of Italy, taken in connection with her internal situation. I have a strong suspicion, though no proof, that one of the reasons why Italy is at this moment taking up a much more conciliatory attitude with regard to Greece,<sup>2</sup> and is ceasing to obstruct the machinery of the Conference on other subjects, is that the present Italian Government clearly see what Sonnino never did—namely, that it is sheer lunacy for Italy to quarrel more than she can help on questions of useless territory with those on whom she absolutely depends for her economic restoration. If I am right in my conjecture, S. Tittoni's principal theme is quite outside my province. I will only observe, what my colleagues in the Cabinet know as well as I, that it is quite impossible for England to carry Italy on her back, after Peace is declared, in the way she did when we were all at war.

It may be, however, that S. Tittoni wishes to discuss in London some of the subjects with which we are occupied at the present moment in Paris. In view of this possibility, I send the following notes on the present situation:—

Italy's special interests in international problems are four-fold:—

1. Her relations with Jugo-Slavia, including the Adriatic question and Albania.
2. Her relations with Greece.<sup>2</sup>
3. The question of Colonial readjustment; and
4. Her ambitions in Asia Minor.

1. *Jugo-Slavia*

Since June 28th little of importance has happened in this region of diplomatic negotiations. One of S. Tittoni's earliest proceedings was to hand in a reply<sup>3</sup> to the Note which I drafted for the 'Four',<sup>4</sup> and which was given to S. Orlando(?) [sic] shortly before he left.

To this reply Monsieur Clemenceau and I have sent a rejoinder in two parts.<sup>5</sup> The smaller of these parts was drafted in the French Foreign Office and consists of a brief refutation of the various excuses which Italy has presented for those proceedings in the past which have given just umbrage

<sup>1</sup> Signor Tittoni was due to arrive in London on a brief visit on August 6, 1919. This visit coincided with that of Signor Schanzer, Italian Minister of the Treasury, who signed in London, on August 8, 1919, an Anglo-Italian Financial Agreement.

<sup>2</sup> Over such questions as Asia Minor, the Dodecanese, and Albania: cf. the Tittoni-Venezolo Agreement of July 29, 1919, printed by A. Giannini: *I documenti diplomatici della Accademia* (Rome, 1922), pp. 27-30.

<sup>3</sup> No. 6.

<sup>4</sup> No. 2, appendix I.

<sup>5</sup> No. 16.

to her allies. The longer part was drafted by myself, and, from the point of view of this paper, is the more important of the two, since it gives with some elaboration my view of the existing controversy about the Adriatic as this is affected by the Treaty of London, by the general principles adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers in their territorial settlement of Europe, and by the attitude adopted by President Wilson and the United States Delegation.

I think you ought to glance your eye through this before seeing Signor Tittoni, for although it contains nothing particularly new, it brings to a point some converging lines of argument. Both these replies, I may parenthetically remark, were handed to Signor Tittoni in French and in English, signed by Monsieur Clemenceau and myself.

Signor Tittoni has made no sign as to the view he takes of this last phase of our controversy, but he asked me privately at the Conference yesterday whether I had any objection to the Italian Government publishing *in extenso* the Treaty of London, which his predecessor in office had always insisted should be regarded as a confidential document. I at once assented, remembering in the first place that we ourselves had long ago suggested the publication, that we have no love of secret diplomacy, and that if we had, the whole document with (if I remember right) some inaccuracies has already been published by the Russian Bolsheviks.

### 3. [sic] *The Question of Colonial Readjustment*

On this matter there is little to be said and still less which you cannot get better from Milner<sup>6</sup> than from me.

Broadly speaking, Signor Tittoni in private conversation has expressed himself as satisfied with the British proposals for meeting Italy's claim.<sup>7</sup> I

<sup>6</sup> Secretary of State for the Colonies.

<sup>7</sup> The Italian claim to colonial compensation in Africa was based upon article 13 of the Treaty of London. This claim had been admitted in principle at a meeting of the Council of Four on May 7, 1919, and a Colonial Commission of representatives of the British Empire, France and Italy was appointed to consider the application of the article in question (see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, pp. 507-8). This Commission met in Paris on May 15, 19, 27, and 30, 1919, under the chairmanship of the chief British representative, Lord Milner; the chief French and Italian representatives were M. Simon and Signor Crespi respectively. At its last meeting on May 30, 1919, the Colonial Commission, being unable to reach agreement, decided to submit to the Supreme Council a joint report summarizing its deliberations. This report (official French text) stated:

'M. Crespi a exposé, dès la première séance, les revendications de son Gouvernement, qui tendaient:

'<sup>1</sup> A une rectification de la frontière franco-italienne et italo-anglo-égyptienne de la Libye;

'<sup>2</sup> A l'incorporation de la Somalie française et de la Somalie anglaise dans les possessions italiennes, y compris les ports de Djibouti, de Zeilah et de Berbérâh et le chemin de fer franco-éthiopien;

'<sup>3</sup> A une cession de territoire comprenant la rive droite du Djouba, le port de Kismayo et une contrée d'environ 65.000 milles carrés appartenant à la colonie du British East Africa.

rather think something of the sort has been said in the Italian Chamber. No such satisfaction is either expressed or felt with regard to the policy of France, and I have some suspicion that the French, who are very reluctant to carry out their side of the bargain, are looking round for some other method of satisfying Italian appetites.

(Note 7 cont.)

'Le Représentant du Gouvernement français a donné son assentiment à la rectification de frontière demandée pour la Libye, sauf à faire déterminer sur les lieux le tracé nouveau de la limite qui, dans tous les cas, laisserait à la France Hassi-Imoulaï et Djanet, ainsi que la route caravanière unissant ces deux points.

'Le Représentant du Gouvernement britannique a accepté, de même, la rectification de la frontière séparant la Libye et l'Égypte y compris l'oasis de Djerboub. Le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne a déclaré, en outre, consentir au profit de l'Italie, sous réserve de certaines garanties en faveur des nationaux anglais, à la cession du port de Kismayo, de la rive droite du Djouba et d'un territoire à l'ouest de ce fleuve dépendant de la vallée du Djouba et représentant une étendue d'environ 31.000 milles carrés.

Mais les représentants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ont fait remarquer que l'incorporation totale de la Somalie française et de la Somalie anglaise dans les possessions italiennes dépasserait la portée des rectifications de limites envisagées par l'article 13 du Traité de 1915. Cette concession aurait, en outre, pour effet d'encercler complètement l'Éthiopie dans les possessions italiennes, malgré les garanties que les trois puissances se sont réciproquement assurées par l'accord du 13 décembre 1906. La France serait d'ailleurs dans l'impossibilité complète de faire abandon de Djibouti en raison des intérêts majeurs que ce point représente pour elle.

Ces intérêts consistent principalement dans le fait que le port de Djibouti est la seule voie que la France possède sur la route de l'Extrême-Orient et de Madagascar.

En outre, le chemin de fer de Djibouti à Addis-Abéba est d'autant plus important que c'est la seule voie ferrée existante entre la côte orientale de l'Afrique et l'Éthiopie. La France qui eut le mérite de construire cette ligne, en la perdant, renoncerait du même coup, contrairement à l'esprit général de l'accord de 1906, à l'influence et aux intérêts économiques qu'elle s'est assurés en Éthiopie.

Le Représentant britannique, vu que le Gouvernement français, pour des raisons dont il reconnaissait le bien-fondé, ne se croyait pas à même de céder quoi que ce fût dans la côte française des Somalis, déclarait n'être disposé à faire aucune concession dans le Somaliland britannique, les ports de Zeilah et de Berbéra étant nécessaires à la Grande-Bretagne pour pouvoir maintenir des relations entre l'Éthiopie et le golfe d'Aden.

M. Crespi, en constatant que les Représentants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ne croyaient pas pouvoir donner leur adhésion complète aux demandes italiennes, a néanmoins insisté pour que ces revendications fussent accueillies intégralement, l'article 13 du Traité de Londres ne devant pas, selon lui, être considéré dans son sens littéral, principalement pour les raisons suivantes :

'<sup>o</sup> L'article 13 établit que des *compensations équitables* seraient dues à l'Italie dans le cas où la France et la Grande-Bretagne augmenteraient leurs domaines coloniaux d'Afrique aux dépens de l'Allemagne.

'Le même article ajoute, il est vrai, à titre indicatif, que l'Italie aurait le droit "notamment" de réclamer le règlement en sa faveur des questions concernant les frontières de ses colonies. Mais un principe général subsiste, c'est que l'Italie doit recevoir en Afrique une compensation *équitable*, c'est-à-dire *proportionnelle* d'un côté à ses sacrifices et à sa contribution à la guerre commune, de l'autre côté, aux avantages acquis par les Alliés.

'<sup>o</sup> Le programme italien n'avait nullement pour but une suprématie politique en Éthiopie et une atteinte quelconque à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de cet État. L'Italie visait seulement, de façon toute rationnelle, à mettre en valeur ses colonies de l'Érythrée et de la Somalie en les rattachant aux colonies avoisinantes, celles de la côte

The Portuguese Plenipotentiary came to me a few days ago much disquieted over an article on this subject which appeared in *Le Temps*. *Le Temps* is one of the newpapers which is alleged, I believe truly, to have been bought by the Italians, and the article which aroused the Portuguese susceptibilities was one which suggested that if Italy could not have her African

(Note 7 cont.)

française des Somalis et du Somaliland britannique, pour en faire un tout organique et fécond.

‘<sup>3º</sup> Les objections du Gouvernement français concernant la nécessité de l'escale de Djibouti et la propriété du chemin de fer d'Addis-Abéba ne semblaient pas au Gouvernement italien de nature à empêcher la France d'adhérer à la demande italienne. L'Italie serait prête à céder à la France, dans le territoire même de Djibouti, le terrain nécessaire à l'établissement d'un entrepôt de charbon et des magasins nécessaires à son commerce. Quant au chemin de fer, l'Italie en opèrerait le rachat, en dédommagerait tous les intéressés.

Les Représentants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, pour demeurer dans la limite du mandat donné à la Commission, n'ont pas voulu opposer aux observations générales présentées par M. Crespi des considérations de même ordre, en rappelant notamment les sacrifices que la guerre avait imposés à leurs propres pays. Le Représentant de la France cependant, pour marquer son désir de solution conciliante, et participer davantage à la compensation réclamée, a offert d'accroître l'importance de la rectification de la limite demandée par l'Italie à l'ouest et au sud de la Libye, de façon à incorporer dans cette possession l'oasis de Bardaï et une partie du Tibesti. Le Représentant de l'Italie a considéré que cette proposition n'offrait pas pour son Gouvernement un intérêt suffisamment appréciable. Il a déclaré, en outre, en présence du refus réitéré de la France de céder Djibouti, renoncer, au nom de son Gouvernement, à la rectification de la frontière occidentale de Libye, préférant que la question coloniale restât ouverte entre les deux Gouvernements français et italien, indépendamment du Traité de Paix.

M. Crespi a pourtant ajouté qu'il était prêt à faire abandon de toute revendication sur la Somalie française et sur la Somalie anglaise, si le Togo, ancienne colonie allemande, était placé sous l'administration de l'Italie. A ce propos, le Représentant de l'Italie a rappelé que, dans la séance du 7 mai dernier au Conseil Suprême, M. Orlando avait fait observer que l'Italie n'aurait pas dû être exclue de la participation aux mandats coloniaux car “si le mandat est une charge, elle est prête à en accepter sa part; si, au contraire le mandat offre des avantages, l'Italie a le droit d'y participer”.

Il a paru tout à fait impossible aux Représentants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne d'accueillir cette demande nouvelle pour les deux raisons suivantes:

‘D'un côté, la revendication italienne sur le Togo, en se substituant à celle qui tendait à l'incorporation de la Somalie française et anglaise, leur semblait devoir être également écartée, comme excédant de même la portée des rectifications de limites prévues. En outre, d'un autre côté, si elle participait au Togo à la répartition des anciennes colonies de l'Allemagne, l'Italie ne pourrait plus se prévaloir de l'article 13 du Traité de 1915. Les termes mêmes de cet article, en effet, selon les Représentants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, n'ouvrent pour l'Italie de droits à compensations territoriales que si cette Puissance est exclue de l'administration des anciennes colonies de l'Allemagne.

En constatant la divergence de ces points de vue, les Représentants des Gouvernements intéressés ont résolu de renvoyer toute décision au Conseil Suprême Interallié, en résumant comme suit l'état exact de la discussion auquel la Commission était arrivée au moment de la suspension de ses travaux:

‘<sup>1º</sup> L'Italie accepte, sous certaines réserves à définir ensuite entre les deux Gouvernements, la proposition britannique concernant le Djoubaland;

‘<sup>2º</sup> L'Italie accepte de la Grande-Bretagne la rectification de la frontière entre la Cyrénaïque et l'Égypte;

‘<sup>3º</sup> La France et la Grande-Bretagne ne croient pas pouvoir donner leur adhésion à

ambitions satisfied out of French territory, it might be possible to obtain for her what she wanted out of Portuguese. The particular Colony mentioned was Angora [?Angola], and I need hardly say that no such transfer of international duties is likely to be approved by the Government at Lisbon.

(Note 7 cont.)

l'incorporation de la Somalie française et de la Somalie anglaise dans les possessions italiennes;

'<sup>4</sup> L'Italie n'accepte pas la partie du Tibesti offerte par la France et retire la demande qu'elle avait adressée à cette Puissance en vue d'une rectification de la frontière occidentale et méridionale de la Libye; l'Italie entend, par là, garder la question coloniale africaine ouverte entre elle et la France;

'<sup>5</sup> L'Italie serait prête à renoncer à toute prétention sur la côte française des Somalis et sur le Somaliland britannique si l'administration de l'ancienne colonie allemande du Togo lui était confiée;

'<sup>6</sup> Les Représentants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne considèrent cette demande comme inconciliable avec le mandat qu'ils ont reçu du Conseil Suprême Interallié le 7 mai 1919;

'<sup>7</sup> La France accepte la rectification de la frontière occidentale de la Libye, qui lui avait été primitivement demandée, et elle maintient l'offre qu'elle a présentée à l'Italie en vue de rechercher les bases d'une délimitation nouvelle dans la région du Tibesti.'

Mr. Balfour recorded in his note, dated at Paris, July 1, 1919, of a general conversation which he had had there that morning with Signor Tittoni (cf. No. 4, note 3): 'On the Colonial re-adjustments referred to in the Treaty of London, he [Signor Tittoni] expressed complete satisfaction with Lord Milner's tentative proposals for Great Britain. He quite realised that we did not think it our business to relieve the French of their share of responsibility in carrying out these provisions of the Treaty, and he admitted that, so far, the French had made no satisfactory proposals. He did not seem to despair, however, of coming to a reasonable arrangement with them. Could this be done, it would be desirable in his opinion to make a more or less public announcement that Italy's claims were satisfied. He thought it would be a great pity to wait until all the controverted questions in which Italy was concerned were finally settled. One of the things which had caused most dissatisfaction in Italy was the belief that France, and to a less extent England, were getting all they wanted, while Italy was left out in the cold. It would probably greatly smooth the path to a full settlement of Italian claims if a satisfactory beginning could be made in such fashion as would smooth the ruffled feelings of the Italian people.'

Subsequent negotiations on this question of colonial readjustment (cf. No. 595) were conducted through normal diplomatic channels as Anglo-Italian and Franco-Italian negotiations. The Anglo-Italian negotiations, which were protracted, resulted in the cession by the United Kingdom to Italy of Jubaland by virtue of the Anglo-Italian Treaty signed at London on July 15, 1924. (Cmd. 2427 of 1925.) A Franco-Italian exchange of notes of September 12, 1919, recording preliminary agreement on certain points in connexion with the Italian claims is printed in *Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. III (Rome, 1931), pp. 3-7.

## No. 18

### *Note by Mr. Nicolson of an Allied Meeting in Paris*

[97/1/8/17299]

The first meeting of the informal Committee appointed to find a solution of the Italo-Yugoslav problem<sup>1</sup> was held today<sup>2</sup> at M. Tardieu's office.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No record of the appointment of this informal committee has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> August 6, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> M. Tardieu was a French Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference and Chairman of the Central Territorial Committee of the Conference.

There were present, besides M. Tardieu and myself, Major Johnson (U.S.A.) and Signor Scialoja (Italy).

M. Scialoja made the following proposals on behalf of the Italian Government:—

### *1. Fiume and Istria*

The Italian Government were perfectly prepared to abandon their claim to Fiume and proposed that the port of Fiume and the adjoining district should be constituted into a free state within the limits shown by the green line on the attached map.<sup>4</sup>

The boundaries of this free state of Fiume suggested by the Italians differ from those originally proposed by President Wilson as regards the western and southern limits. In the south, President Wilson had wished to include the Islands of Cherso and Lussin within the state of Fiume. In the west he had drawn a line which, while giving Italy control over the railway from Trieste to Pola, would leave within the state of Fiume the ridge of Monte Maggiore and the lignite mines of Albona, together with the purely Slovene populations inhabiting the whole region.

The Italian desire to run the line further east is dictated by the following motives:

- (1) To annex to Italy the Islands of Cherso and Lussin;
- (2) To command the harbour of Fiume by holding the crest of the Monte Maggiore;
- (3) To retain the lignite mines at Albona;
- (4) To obtain complete strategic control of the railway from Fiume to Laibach (marked in yellow on the map).<sup>4</sup>

As regards the status of Fiume, Signor Scialoja indicated that the town and western suburbs of Fiume (i.e. excluding Susac) should retain within the free state of Fiume the former status of a 'corpus separatum'. The general scheme for the administration of the free state of Fiume is outlined in the Memorandum, of which a copy is annexed.<sup>5</sup>

### *2. Counties of Gorizia and Gradisca*

The Italian Government wish to alter the line of the Treaty of London (as interpreted by them as shown by a dotted red line on the map)<sup>4</sup> to a line approaching the junction at Assling and enabling them by the construction of a short branch to have a direct line in Italian territory from Trieste to Villach, while leaving to the Yugoslavs the direct line from Fiume via Laibach to Klagenfurt.

The population involved in this alteration of the Treaty of London line would be about 14,000, of whom 11,000 are Slovenes.

### *3. Dalmatia*

The Italian Government are prepared to abandon their claim to Dalmatia

<sup>4</sup> Not appended to filed original.

<sup>5</sup> Appendix I below. This was evidently an Italian memorandum.

(including Sebenico but excluding Zara). They will ask however that the whole of the Dalmatian coast be neutralised.

As regards Zara, they suggest three alternative zones, as shown on the accompanying map 2.<sup>6</sup> In the event of either of the two larger zones being accepted, they would be prepared to constitute Zara and district into a free state under Italian protection, with special municipal rights for the town of Zara itself.

In the event of the smallest zone being accepted, they feel that this zone should be placed completely under Italian sovereignty. The population involved would be some 9,209 Italians against 7,476 Yugoslavs.

M. Tardieu made it quite clear that the creation of a free state of Zara in such close proximity to the free state of Fiume appeared a too elaborate solution, and that he would prefer Italy to have complete sovereignty over the smallest of the three zones suggested.

#### *+ The Islands*

The Italians desire to annex the islands of Cherso and Lussin, together with the group of islands opposite Zara. (Population: Cherso, 2,296 Italians; 5,708 Yugoslavs. Lussin, 7,588 Italians, 4,219 Yugoslavs.)

#### *‡ Montenegro*

The Italian Government are prepared to disinterest themselves in the future of Montenegro, provided they are given a mandate over Albania.

#### *§ Cattaro*

The Italians do not claim Cattaro, but are evidently prepared to make concessions elsewhere if Cattaro, together with Mt. Lovcen, is accorded to them.

#### *¶ Albania*

The Italians desire a mandate over Albania under the following conditions:

- (1) The frontier in the north to be that of 1913;
- (2) The southern frontier (the frontier with Greece) to be reserved for agreement between Greece and Italy;
- (3) Vallona, with the small back-country, to be given to Italy in complete sovereignty.

Having made his exposition Signor Scialoja withdrew, and the discussion was continued between M. Tardieu, Major Johnson and myself.

M. Tardieu is evidently anxious to secure an agreement on any terms. Major Johnson is evidently determined not to go a particle beyond President Wilson's original suggestions. Thus he absolutely refuses to consider the annexation to Italy of Cherso and Lussin, the grant to Italy of the Monte Maggiore frontier in Istria and above all, the rectification demanded by Italy in the Assling triangle. He is also opposed to Italy being granted Zara

<sup>6</sup> Facing p. 46.

on any conditions or to her obtaining any of the islands except Lissa. He will not hear of the question of Cattaro being brought into the negotiations, but is probably prepared to give way about Albania and Vallona.

My own view is:

(1) That Major Johnson is right in contending that the Italian line in Istria and at Assling has been conceived solely with the purpose of being able to command both the port of Fiume and the railway from Fiume to Klagenfurt. I feel therefore that in this case we should make a firm stand.

(2) As regards the islands of Lussin and Cherso, which certainly do contain a large Italian population, I should be prepared to give way to the Italians.

(3) As regards Dalmatia, I see no hope for it but to agree with M. Tardieu and give the Italians the town of Zara in complete sovereignty.

(4) As regards the islands opposite Zara, I see no reason whatsoever why the Italians should have them.

(5) In regard to Albania and Montenegro, I see no difficulty in accepting the Italian view, but agree with Major Johnson that Cattaro should be kept firmly out of the discussion.

I should be glad to learn whether this represents the views of my superiors.

HAROLD NICOLSON.<sup>7</sup>

August 6, 1919

#### APPENDIX I TO NO. 18

##### I

*The Free State of Fiume is constituted.—It is composed:*

- (1) of the free city of Fiume and its district following the boundaries of the present Municipal Statute;
- (2) of the judicial districts of Adelsberg and Bistriza (Carniola), part of Castelnuovo, Volosca (Istria), of the communes and sub-communes crossed by the Laybach-St. Peter-Fiume railway outlined in the plan annexed hereto;<sup>4</sup>
- (3) of the district of Sussack (Croatia) minus the communes of Buccariza, Hreglin, Portoré and Crassiza;
- (4) of the Island of Veglia.

A Commission appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers will define on the spot the limits of the administrative districts which are not included in the new State in their entirety.

<sup>7</sup> This note was minuted as follows by Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Balfour:

'I think that the course proposed by Mr. Nicolson should be approved as governing the present state of the negotiations. The fact that the Italians now demand, as regards the northern Adriatic, more than even Sonnino had been willing to accept in his discussions with President Wilson, justifies our supporting the American view for the present.'

E. A. C.

'Aug. 6.


'Read.

'This file suggests too many questions to be dealt with in a minute. We must have oral discussion.'

'A. J. B.'

## MAP II

46



C.B.H. 16310



## II

The territories indicated in article I are perpetually neutralised. It is prohibited to maintain or construct therein any fortifications or other military works, to maintain therein military forces either permanent or temporary, or to execute therein any works or other preparations of a military character.

All signatory Powers are bound to respect this neutrality.

## III

The status of a free city is recognized and confirmed to the city of Fiume as well as the surrounding district, (*Corpus Separatum*), with all the rights and privileges as a State and as a Municipality conferred on the city by its Statutes.

The principle that the boundaries of the city and its districts cannot be changed and that none of its existing laws and by-laws can be modified by new laws without the previous consent of the representatives of the city and district of Fiume, stands in full force.

The right of the city of Fiume to the official use of the Italian language in the commune and all its dependencies is assured even in its intercourse with the different State bodies, and this same right to the use of the Italian language is assured to all the authorities in the territory of the commune of Fiume.

The consent of the Representatives of the above-mentioned commune will be required for the institution of schools in the territory of the commune of Fiume.

The provisions contained in the Municipal Statute of Fiume and in the laws of the Kingdom of Hungary concerning the rights of the Governor (Hungarian) on the commune of Fiume, as well as the laws on the rights and privileges of the State officials in so far as they concern the laws pertaining to the Municipality, are annulled.

## IV

For the administration of the territories in question, the following districts will be formed around the free city of Fiume and its district:

the district of St. Peter for the territories hitherto belonging to the provinces of Carniola and of Istria;

the district of Sussak for the territory hitherto belonging to Croatia;

the district of Veglia for the island of the same name.

For each of the three above-mentioned districts a representative body of the district, entrusted to co-operate with the Government in the administration of the respective territories and particularly in all matters relating to acts of a legislative character, with due regard to the 'de jure' and 'de facto' conditions of each of these territories, will be composed of the delegates representing the commune[s] which form part thereof.

## V

The Government of the free State of Fiume will be entrusted to a Commission composed of five members appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, two members of which will be designated by the Government of the Kingdom of Italy, one by the Government of the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, one by the representatives of the free city of Fiume and one by the other districts of this free State.

The same procedure will be followed in case of absence or inability to attend, for the appointment of substitutes for each of these five members of the commission.

## VI

The President of the Government, elected among these members of the Commission by a majority vote, will exercise the executive power.

## VII

The members of the Government will remain in office for a period of three years.

When this period of three years expires, the members and their substitutes can be reconfirmed in their appointment by those who have the right to appoint them and who can at any time substitute them with other members, even during the above-stated period of three years.

The members of the Government will be entitled to a salary to be determined by the Council of the League of Nations.

## VIII

The Government of the State of Fiume will provide for the representation and protection abroad of the interests of the territories it administers and of the inhabitants of same.

## IX

The laws and by-laws which existed before the war in the different territories in question will remain in force.

The Government, however, will have power to modify them, provided the provisions contained in articles three and four are observed.

## X

The inhabitants of the above-mentioned territories are exempted from all military obligations.

The pre-existing fiscal régime will be maintained and adapted to meet the requirements of the administration.

## XI

A Police force will be established by the Government for the maintenance of public order.

## XII

Fiume is declared a free port.

The boundaries of the port will also include railways and harbour accommodation situated in the commune of Sussak, inasmuch as they form part of the port of Fiume.

## XIII

A special convention between the Government of the State of Fiume and the Kingdom of Italy will assure the service of the Laybach-St. Peter railway, the liberty and absolute equality of traffic to and from Trieste and in particular at

the station of St. Peter, guaranteeing in every respect equality of treatment for the ports of Trieste and Fiume. The above guarantees, however, will not prevent the possible adoption of general and more favourable arrangements in the railway service on the ex-Austro-Hungarian territories, should an opportunity for doing so arise.

#### XIV

The Government of the State of Fiume shall, upon request of the Italian Government, give its assent to the construction of a junction between the St. Peter-Fiume and the Herpelje-Pola railway lines, equality of conditions being assured to traffic to and from Fiume.

#### XV

The relations resulting from the separation of the respective territories from Hungary, Croatia, Istria and Carniola will be regulated by special conventions.

The provisions contained in the present treaty in favour of the territories formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and assigned to Italy or to the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, will be applied, as far as possible, to the above-mentioned territories, to their public institutions and to their citizens (persons real and corporate).<sup>8</sup>

#### APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 18

[Translation]

*Annex to index 11589 of August 4, 1919<sup>9</sup>*

PARIS, August 4, 1919

##### District of Radmannsdorf

##### Statistical Data on Area and Population

1. Part of the triangle of Assling to be included in the boundaries of Italy .....	Km. 451	Population 9,554
2. Wochein basin .....	Km. 303	„ 4,708
Total.....	Km. 754	Population 14,362 [sic]

The data on the area are calculated on the annexed sketch,<sup>4</sup> with geometrical measurements. The data on the population are taken from the Austrian statistics referring to the census of 1910.—*The population is almost entirely Slovene with some German infiltration and a very sparse Italian representation.*

<sup>1</sup> On the return of Signor Tittoni from London (no record of his conversations there has been traced) to Paris, he apparently put forward a six-point project for a settlement in the Istratic; this project, which appears to have been generally in accordance with the Italian proposals as cited above by Mr. Nicolson, is stated to have been presented by Signor Tittoni at a private meeting of the Heads of Delegations in Paris on August 12, 1919 (cf. Volume I, No. 33, minute 6). No record of this meeting has been traced in Foreign Office archives. For this meeting and the six-point project, see R. Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p. 244. Cf. also Signor Tittoni's reference, in his parliamentary speech of September 27, 1919, to a private meeting held on August 13: *Atti del Parlamento Italiano: Camera dei Deputati: Sessione 1913-19: Discorsi*, vol. xix (Rome, 1919), p. 21297.

<sup>2</sup> This document is translated from the original Italian of a table filed together with the immediately preceding documents.

*Zone 1*

Part of the triangle of Assling to be included in  
the boundaries of Italy  
Area Km. 451

	<i>Population</i>
Kronau .....	1,480 inhabitants
Langelfeld .....	1,528     ,,
Goriach .....	3,056     ,,
Reifen .....	1,507     ,,
Weldes .....	1,983     ,,
Total .....	<u>9,554 inhabitants</u>

*Zone 2*

Wochein Basin  
Area Km. 303

	<i>Population</i>
Mitterdorf .....	2,601 inhabitants
Wocheiner Feistritz .....	2,107     ,,
Total .....	<u>4,708 inhabitants</u>

No. 19

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 5498 [115972/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 19, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a document entitled 'Proposal for an Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement', regarding the settlement of Fiume and the Northern Adriatic.

2. This document was communicated to me by the editor of *The Times*, who stated that it must be regarded as the last word of the Jugo-Slav Government in the matter of the boundaries between the new State and Italy, and that the document came from Jugo-Slav sources.

3. I understand that a copy thereof has been communicated to Signor Tittoni, and a copy has been shown to the Italian Ambassador in London,<sup>1</sup> but I am of the opinion that it would be better to regard it as confidential for the present.

4. A similar despatch has been addressed to His Majesty's Representatives at Rome and Belgrade.

I have, &c.

[For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

GERALD SPICER]<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In view of the understanding that the document in question had previously been communicated to Signor Tittoni, Sir R. Graham, Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the absence of Lord Hardinge in Paris, 'showed it to Marquis Imperiali, who did not seem hopeful that it would lead to an agreement'. (Minute by Sir R. Graham, dated August 15.)

<sup>2</sup> Signature supplied from the files of the British Delegation in Paris.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 19

*Proposal for an Italo-Jugoslav Agreement*

By the agreement here proposed the Italians will attain to the complete fulfilment of their national programme in the Adriatic, and precisely:

1. The geographical frontiers of the Julian Alps and of the Quarnero.
2. Uncontested supremacy in the Adriatic.
3. Complete security from all attacks on the part of Jugoslavia.
4. All guarantees for the commercial future of Trieste, and in particular:
  - a. Uninterrupted liberty of transit on the Trieste-Villacco line through Assling, and
  - b. Assurance against the competition of Fiume by means of the Südbahn.
5. The preservation of the Italian character (*Italianità*) of Fiume and Zara.
6. The safeguarding of the Italian minorities on the eastern shores of the Adriatic.

For the sake of peace and of the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, the Jugoslavs are ready to make all sacrifices which may be necessary for the satisfaction of Italian demands.

They ask, however, that nothing more than is strictly necessary for this object shall be demanded of them, and that the clauses of the agreement shall contain nothing harmful to the sovereignty or the vital interests of their state.

The agreement, tending to secure, in this spirit of conciliation, the realisation of the above-mentioned six points of the Italian programme, shall be translated into practice in the following terms:—

*Point One.* The Jugoslavs accept as [?] the definite frontier the geographical boundaries from the Julian Alps to the Arsa, marked in red on the attached map.<sup>3</sup> The Italian request to include in the Italian boundaries—and hence, to detach in permanency from Jugoslavia—vast regions of territory situated east of this line cannot be granted, since it does not correspond with the above-mentioned geographical and historical reasons. For never, in the course of the centuries, did the Italian frontiers stretch beyond the Triglav, the Nanos, the Arsa and the Quarnero; never did the basin of the Upper Save, the Gulf of Fiume, and the islands of the Dalmatian Archipelago—that there is now a question of annexing to Italy, thereby breaking the indissoluble bonds of geography and history which attach them to the Illyrian peninsula—never [*sic*] form a part of Italian territory.

The frontier accepted by the Jugoslavs—this also is worthy of note—leaves within the boundaries of Italy more than 420,000 Jugoslavs, that is to say, a number nearly three times larger than that of the Germans in the Upper Adige, whom the German nation is absolutely unwilling to give up. From this fact the sacrifices which the Jugoslavs are ready to make may be judged, sacrifices which appear all the greater when it is borne in mind that beyond the proposed Italian frontier there would be left only 59,000 Italians of whom 36,000 would live in free Italian municipalities (Fiume and Zara),

<sup>3</sup> Facing p. 52.

while only 23,000 would remain subjects of the Jugoslav régime. That is to say, for every Italian left to Jugoslavia, this latter country must sacrifice twenty of her sons—and she is prepared to make this immense sacrifice.

To demand from Jugoslavia greater renunciation than this is to wish for the impossible.

*Point Two.* The supremacy in the Adriatic is assured to Italy by the possession of Pola and Vallona, and by the immense superiority of the Italian fleet, which can be assured for the future also by adequate international guarantees. If she does not consider even this as sufficient she can have recourse to the neutralisation in accordance with Point Three.

*Point Three.* An agreement eliminating all differences between the two states is the best guarantee of future peace. Nevertheless, if Italy considers it necessary for the safety of her territorial and maritime frontiers to have still further guarantees, the Jugoslavs will not oppose the permanent neutralisation of the boundary zone between the frontier accepted by the Jugoslavs and that proposed by the Italians, nor to [*sic*] the similar neutralisation of all the Istrian and Dalmatian islands.

The complete security of Italy against all eventual aggression may be obtained without there being any necessity to extend the sovereignty of Italy beyond the Quarnero nor beyond the Adriatic, which the Jugoslavs could not accept in any circumstances.

*Point Four.* As long as the sovereignty and integrity of their state is not imperilled, the Jugoslavs are prepared, by means of international treaties, to give, by special conventions and if necessary all the guarantees which shall be asked of them to assure the commercial future of Trieste, which in any case will remain the outlet of vast Jugoslav regions. This applies especially to the unhindered traffic on the Trieste–Villacco line through Jugoslav territory as well as to the assurance of equality of treatment of the ports of Trieste and Fiume as the maritime outlets of the Südbahn.

In consequence, not even from this point of view does the suggested Italian annexation to Italy of the Jugoslav territories crossed by the Sankt Peter-Trieste, Santa Lucia-Assling and Assling–Tarvis railways appear indispensable and, still less, justified.

*Point Five.* The municipal territory of Fiume shall form an autonomous state not subject to Jugoslav sovereignty but placed under the protection of the League of Nations. With regard to the port, the railways, and customs, the relations between the city-state of Fiume and the Jugoslav state should be regulated on the basis of the Statute of Dantzig, with an international treaty which should guarantee the Italian character (*Italianità*) of Fiume.

The city of Zara would enjoy the privileges of a free city with extensive local autonomy under Jugoslav sovereignty also with international guarantees not only for the autonomy but also for the Italian character (*Italianità*) of the city.

In this way the Italian character (*Italianità*) of Fiume and Zara would be guaranteed and assured also for the future and without any prejudice to the economic interests of the two cities which are indissolubly bound to




Tableau  
indiquant le nombre  
des Yugoslaves sur les  
territoires revendiqués  
par l'Italie

Table  
showing the number  
of Yugoslavs in the  
territories claimed by  
Italy

- I le 8 Avril 1915 de l'Autriche-Hongrie.  
claimed from Austro-Hungary on  
April 8<sup>th</sup> 1915.
- II le 26 Avril 1915 lors de la conclusion  
du Traité de Londres.  
claimed the 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1915 after  
the Treaty of London was concluded.
- III en 1919 à la Conférence de la Paix  
à Paris.  
claimed in 1919 at the Peace  
Conference in Paris.

	Carinthie Carinthia	Goritz *) Gorice *)	Trieste	Istrie Istria	Carniole Carmiola	Croatie (y compris Riska) Croatia (including Riska-Piône)	Dalmatie Dalmatia	Bosnie Bosnia	Total **)
I	1.440	76.736	—	—	—	—	49.091	—	127.267
II	1.440	153.486	59.319	203.919	39.881	—	293.116	—	751.161
III	1.541	153.486	59.319	203.919	83.960	41.094	293.116	331	836.766

\*) La partie de Goritz revendiquée par les Yugoslaves - The part of Gorice claimed by the Yugoslavs.

\*\*) D'après le recensement de 1910. N'y sont pas compris les Slovènes du royaume d'Italie, dont la statistique officielle italienne de 1910 a compté 56.944.

According to the census of 1910. There are not included the Slovenians of the kingdom of Italy whom the official Italian statistics number 56.944.



the Jugoslav territory surrounding them. Only in this way can one avoid the unfortunate consequences of forced annexation to Italy of Slav territories beyond the geographical frontier, without which it is materially impossible to join the two cities to the Kingdom of Italy.

*Point Six.* To the Italian minorities in Jugoslavia (5,000 in Liburnia, 13,000 on the islands and 5,000 on the mainland of Dalmatia excluding Zara) there should be given and guaranteed on the basis of entire reciprocity, all the linguistic rights that might be granted to the 420,000 Jugoslavs in Italy although the number of the latter is twenty times greater than that of the former and although the former are not a number of small dispersed groups but the immense majority of entire districts and provinces.

This plan, which forms one integral whole, is intended to lead to an agreement, both definite and lasting, between the two states bordering on the Adriatic. The idea of a buffer state should be entirely abandoned since, instead of solving the conflict, it perpetuates it, or at least it defers the solution, and, what is worse, renders it more acute by the delay.

The interests of both states require instead a speedy solution of all existing differences.

The time for bargaining is over. The matter must be settled without delay.

The Jugoslavs, in order to live in peace with Italy, do not shrink from the gravest sacrifices, from the most painful renunciations.

If Italy favours this agreement she, besides seeing all her aspirations in the Adriatic fulfilled beyond her most sanguine hopes, will also obtain from it immense political and economic advantages the importance of which it is unnecessary to emphasize.

For both the states there will open a new era of their history with this agreement—for Jugoslavia an era of peace and progress, for Italy an era of prosperity and greatness.

Without this agreement, both states will be on the road to a catastrophe.

## No. 20

### *Italian Memorandum<sup>1</sup>*

[97/1/9/18472]

[PARIS,] 29 août [1919]

*Projet de Note pour M. Polk*

#### 1. *Ligne du Président Wilson*

L'Italie accepte comme frontière est la ligne du Président Wilson. Elle demande seulement qu'au nord d'Albona cette ligne rejoigne la mer au

<sup>1</sup> The course of events immediately antecedent to the presentation of these Italian draft proposals is not entirely clear from the available documents. See, however, D. H. Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. xx, pp. 393-5 for a telegram of August 22, 1919, to Washington from Mr. Polk (who succeeded Mr. Lansing in Paris) submitting new American draft proposals for a solution of the question. Cf. also the reported 'scheme . . . published on the 25th August which emanated from Washington', as indicated by H. W. V. Temperley: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920 f.), vol. iv, p. 310. It appears that

sud de la route Chersano-Fianona, laissant par conséquent à l'Italie la ville d'Albona qui est italienne et d'où sont partis de nombreux volontaires italiens.

## 2. *Fiume*

En ce qui concerne Fiume, deux solutions sont possibles :

(a) l'État indépendant dans les limites fixées par le Président Wilson (sauf la petite rectification d'Albona), l'île de Cherso faisant partie de l'État indépendant, conformément à la ligne du Président Wilson; statut spécial pour la ville de Fiume;

(b) la ville même de Fiume donnée en toute propriété à l'Italie, le district administratif de Susac restant à la Yougo-Slavie. Dans cette hypothèse pas d'État indépendant, tout le territoire à l'est de la ligne du Président Wilson, et l'île de Cherso aux Yougo-Slaves. Comme garanties militaires, l'Italie demande que, dans ce cas, toute la partie du territoire yougo-slave, qui dans l'autre solution aurait constitué l'État indépendant, soit neutralisée;

(c) dans les deux cas garanties très précises pour les minorités ethniques.

## 3. *Dalmatie*

Toute la Dalmatie aux Yougo-Slaves, moins la ville de Zara et l'île d'Uglian, immédiatement voisine de Zara, qui seront placées sous la souveraineté italienne.

Les intérêts économiques de l'Italie existant en Dalmatie et les droits des minorités italiennes en Dalmatie seront garantis.

## 4. *Îles*

Les seules îles italiennes seraient par conséquent Lussin, Unie, Lissa, Lagosta et Uglian.

## 5. *Albanie*

Mandat à l'Italie dans les limites de 1913.

## 6. *Vallona*

Souveraineté italienne sur la ville avec l'hinterland strictement nécessaire à sa vie économique et à sa sécurité.

negotiations on the question, in which Mr. Polk and Signor Tittoni participated, were being currently conducted in Paris: cf. Mr. Polk's reference on August 27 to these negotiations, as printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. xi, p. 396. For Signor Tittoni's submission of the present Italian draft proposals of August 29 for the approval of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau prior to their communication to Mr. Polk for transmission to President Wilson, and for subsequent concerted action by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in regard to the modification and transmission of the proposals, see No. 80 (also, *ibid.*, a British analysis of these Italian proposals. Cf. also No. 27). It further appears, however, that on August 30 M. Clemenceau, after a meeting with Mr. Balfour and Signor Tittoni, communicated to Mr. Polk the unrevised Italian proposals of August 29, which were telegraphed by him to President Wilson on August 31. This telegram of August 31, together with President Wilson's reply of September 2 to Mr. Polk, is printed by D. H Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. xx, pp. 400-3.

#### *7. Chemins de fer*

Pour le chemin de fer d'Assling, l'Italie ne présente plus de demande territoriale, mais demande seulement des garanties précises pour l'usage de la ligne. En contre-partie aucune cession territoriale ne sera consentie aux Yougo-Slaves dans la vallée du Drin, mais ils y recevront, en ce qui concerne l'usage du chemin de fer à construire, les mêmes garanties qui seraient données à l'Italie pour le chemin de fer d'Assling.

#### *8. Neutralisation*

L'Italie propose la neutralisation générale de toute la côte et les îles depuis la pointe sud de l'Istrie jusqu'à Cattaro.

#### *9. Résumé*

L'Italie fait les concessions suivantes :

- (a) elle retire sa demande territoriale concernant le triangle d'Assling;
- (b) elle accepte la ligne du Président Wilson depuis Idria jusqu'au nord d'Albona;
- (c) elle accepte que l'île de Cherso fasse partie soit de l'État indépendant, soit de la Yougo-Slavie;
- (d) elle abandonne toute la Dalmatie moins Zara et l'île d'Uglian.

En contre-partie, elle demande la souveraineté de Zara (avec l'île d'Uglian) et le mandat albanais (dans les limites de 1913) et Vallona avec son hinterland.

Pour la frontière albanaise du côté de la Grèce, l'Italie accepte qu'au lieu de la frontière de 1913 soit adoptée celle proposée par la délégation américaine à la Conférence qui laisse Koritza à l'Albanie et donne Argyrocastro à la Grèce.

### No. 21

*Note by Mr. Kerr<sup>1</sup> of an interview between Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Tittoni at the Manoir de Clairfontaine, Hennequeville,<sup>2</sup> on Sunday, August 31, 1919*

*[Confidential/General/229/4]*

The Prime Minister and Monsieur Tittoni had a general discussion covering the Adriatic, Asia Minor and Turkey.

In regard to the Adriatic, M. Tittoni showed the Prime Minister the proposed basis of a settlement drafted by M. Clemenceau<sup>3</sup> and asked him whether he would support it and wire to President Wilson urging him to accept it. The Prime Minister, after reading through the document, said that he would be quite willing to sign a telegram in this sense to President Wilson provided two alterations were made. In the first place, he thought

<sup>1</sup> Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lloyd George was at that time on holiday in the neighbourhood of Deauville.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a slightly modified redraft of the Italian proposals of August 29 printed as No. 20. Cf. No. 27, note 1.

that Italy ought not to ask for Zara and the island opposite in sovereignty, but should be content with holding them as the mandatory from the League of Nations. He felt sure that a change of this kind would make it much more likely that President Wilson would accept the proposal. Secondly, in regard to Fiume, he said that he was not favourably impressed by the second of the alternatives, namely, that Fiume town should go to Italy, Susak to Jugoslavia and the port and the railway to the League of Nations. He preferred the first alternative, that Fiume and district and the Island of Veglia should be constituted as a Free City. He asked Signor Tittoni, however, what was meant by the provision that there should be a special statute for the town of Fiume. Did it mean that the State of Fiume would have full power of developing the port and expropriating the necessary districts in Fiume to make that possible? Signor Tittoni replied that by the special régime he meant that the inhabitants of Fiume should have full control of their purely municipal affairs, such as education, tramways and city Government. The state would have full powers of developing the port in any way which was necessary. The Prime Minister said that he thought that this was of the utmost importance and would make all the difference in President Wilson's attitude. In any telegram which was sent to President Wilson in his name it would be necessary to bring out clearly that under the arrangement proposed there would be every facility for developing Fiume as the port, not only of Croatia but of Hungary. Signor Tittoni indicated his assent to this view.

In regard to Turkey, I was not present at the beginning of the discussion, but when I came into the room, the Prime Minister was pressing strongly on Signor Tittoni how fatal it would be if Italy endeavoured to secure any rights in Southern Anatolia which involved her keeping there a garrison. The Prime Minister pointed out that there was a fundamental difference between the territories inhabited by Arabs and those inhabited by the Turks. The Arabs had been under foreign rule for many centuries. They were clearly unable under existing conditions to stand alone. Outside protection and assistance was vital to them and involved no change in status. The Turks, on the other hand, had for centuries been a governing race. So far from being under external control, they had managed, however badly, a great Empire. In his opinion they would never submit to the partitioning of their country or to its permanent occupation by another Power. If Italy occupied Southern Anatolia some other power would inevitably occupy Northern Anatolia. The consequences would not only be continual unrest and rebellion in Anatolia itself, but would probably impose upon Italy the burden of maintaining an army of at least 200,000 men in the country, and might even provoke a general Mohammedan movement all over the world. He could not face a prospect of this kind. He, therefore, urged Signor Tittoni to content himself with securing for Italy prior rights of developing railways, mines and industries in Southern Anatolia.

Signor Tittoni did not seem entirely satisfied with this proposal, but promised to prepare a project on these lines for the consideration of the Prime Minister and the British Government as soon as possible.

Monsieur de Martino<sup>4</sup> pointed out that such an arrangement would be satisfactory to Italy provided that other powers, notably France, did not extend their territorial possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean. If, however, France secured such a position Italian public opinion would never be satisfied unless it also obtained an equivalent one. To this the Prime Minister replied that this did not seem to be any argument for partitioning Anatolia and imposing upon Italy responsibilities which would probably involve the permanent maintenance of an army of 200,000 men in Anatolia.

In regard to the colonial question, Signor Tittoni expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the British proposals. The Prime Minister pointed out that the British proposals were contingent upon a satisfactory general settlement being made and further pointed out that the French were equally bound to make concessions to Italy in this sphere. He enquired what the French had done. Signor Tittoni said that the French had not done very much, but they had agreed among other things to extend certain rights to the Italian population in Tunis.

P. H. KERR.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Signor de Martino, who evidently accompanied Signor Tittoni, was Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Italian Delegation to the Peace Conference.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Signor Tittoni's allusion to this conversation of August 31 in his parliamentary speech of September 27, 1919: *Atti del Parlamento Italiano: Camera dei Deputati: Sessione 1913-19: Discussioni*, vol. xix, p. 21297.

## No. 22

*Letter from Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Mr. Phipps<sup>1</sup>  
(Paris. Received September 5)*

*Unnumbered [89/1/7/18638]*

ROME, September 1, 1919

Dear Phipps,

I think it is as well to send you a line warning you that I hear through the British Military Mission at Fiume that General Grazioli, commanding the Italian troops there, is said to have stated that if a decision adverse to the Italians is given at Paris, he will not be responsible for what may happen there, as he does not propose to stay there. It seems to me that there may be some misunderstanding, as I read in the Italian press that under the new military arrangements at Fiume all the military contingents are to be reduced, and that as the Italian forces will only consist of a brigade, General Grazioli is to leave. There may, therefore, be some misinterpretation of what he said but there is of course always the possibility that the Fiumani, who are the most miserable set of rogues, may get up some anti-Allied demonstration, which might lead to incidents more serious than those which occurred at the beginning of last month. In the Ambassador's absence I have suggested to the Military Attaché that he should, quite privately, sound the Ministry of War as to what steps they are taking to meet any possibility of this kind; and,

<sup>1</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

while I do not know what decision may be taken at Paris, it seems as well that any possibility of serious disturbances there should be avoided by a timely warning to the Italian Representatives.

Yours sincerely,  
H. W. KENNARD.

No. 23

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)*  
*No. 577 Telegraphic [129004/123/3]*

ROME, September 12, 1919

Late editions of papers this evening announced that D'Annunzio, with a contingent of volunteers, entered Fiume at dawn this morning, after a night march, and that other volunteer troops are preparing to join him.

We have received (no) information from Fiume.

Nothing is known of this as yet at Italian Foreign Office. Ministry of Interior state he is known to have left Venice yesterday, but so far as they know he has not reached Fiume.

Sent to Peace Conference.

No. 24

*Colonel Peck<sup>1</sup> (Fiume) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 13)*  
*No. S 166 Telegraphic [89/1/6/18878]*

FIUME, September 12, 1919

Large numbers of armed Italian soldiers arrived at 11 o'clock in Fiume in lorries together with squadron of cavalry. General Pittaluga<sup>2</sup> reports that they are about 1,000 in number and thinks that they are deserters from Istria. He reports their intention is to capture the town. There are some officers with them. They have promised him not to molest the British and the French. Car of British Naval Transport Officer has been damaged. No casualties have been reported. The invaders have stationed motor machine guns in front of Palace.

<sup>1</sup> Chief of the British Military Mission at Fiume.

<sup>2</sup> General Pittaluga had recently succeeded General Grazioli in the command of Allied forces in Fiume.

No. 25

*Colonel Peck (Fiume) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 13)*  
*No. S 167 Telegraphic [89/1/6/18878]*

FIUME, September 12, 1919

Further my telegram No. S 166.<sup>1</sup> General Pittaluga reports Gabriel D'Annunzio is in command of invaders. General Pittaluga . . .<sup>2</sup> audience with him. He told General Pittaluga that he did not recognise him. Invaders

<sup>1</sup> No. 24.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

have taken over the Italian billets and have been reinforced by large numbers of Italian troops.

General Pittaluga keeps command of the few faithful survivors. Today invaders will intimate their terms to all concerned.

### No. 26

*Colonel Peck (Fiume) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 13)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. S 170 Telegraphic [89/1/6/1888g]*

FIUME, September 12, 1919

The town is now<sup>2</sup> practically in the hands of the invading Italian troops. There are many Italian officers with the invaders. General Pittaluga at the request of invaders has hauled down British, French and American flags from Interallied headquarters and appears to be powerless.<sup>3</sup> Situation is critical. The British troops will concentrate in the docks near cruiser if necessary. There is nothing to show whether this is revolution in the Italian army or an attempt to seize town for Italy. Town is short of food which troops may start pillaging.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and the British Military Attaché at Rome.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was dispatched on September 12 at one minute before midnight.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. General Pittaluga's narrative of developments at Fiume at that time, as printed by G. Benedetti: *La pace di Fiume dalla conferenza di Parigi al trattato di Roma* (Bologna, 1924), pp. 252-8.

### No. 27

*Note by Mr. Kerr of discussions in Paris in regard to the Adriatic*

*[76/1/5/1894]*

On September 8th, Mr. Balfour, after discussions with Mr. Lloyd George, suggested certain modifications in the draft telegram from Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau to President Wilson<sup>1</sup> in order to bring the Italian nearer the American point of view (Appendix A).<sup>2</sup> M. Tittoni, first of all, accepted them (Appendix B),<sup>3</sup> but at a subsequent meeting between him, M. Tardieu and myself, made it clear that he had not understood that there was to be no Free State of Fiume at all, but only an independent Fiume *corpus separatum*. This he could not accept. Accordingly we reverted to the original proposed alternative solutions, with certain modifications as set forth in the draft telegram in its final form. (Appendix C).<sup>4</sup> The following day, however, Mr. Polk stated both to the French and the British that he was satisfied that the proposal in its present form would not be acceptable to the President. He said that he thought that, apart from the question of the Albanian

<sup>1</sup> This draft telegram of September 5, 1919, modified on September 7, put forward a redraft of Signor Tittoni's proposals of August 29 (No. 20); see No. 80, annexes 2 and 3.

<sup>2</sup> Lacking in filed original. Cf., however, No. 80, annex 4.

<sup>3</sup> Lacking in filed original. Cf. No. 80, annex 4 and note 8.

<sup>4</sup> Lacking in filed original. Cf. No. 80, annex 5.

mandate to which the President was hostile, though no alternative seemed possible, there were three principal objections to the draft. The first related to Fiume, the second to Zara and the third to the Islands. In response to enquiry he stated that he thought that a settlement of the Fiume question was possible on the basis of the first solution proposed in the telegram. It provided that Fiume town and district *corpus separatum* was to be set up as an independent Free State under the League of Nations and not placed under Italian sovereignty. In regard to Zara, he said that he thought the President would accept a solution which, while leaving Zara within the Jugoslav state, made provisions for its Italian character being preserved under guarantee of the League of Nations. As regards the Islands, the only Islands to be asked for were Unie, Lissa, Lussin and Pelagosa. He further made clear that provided these concessions were made the whole weight of the American Delegation would be thrown into the scale in order to urge President Wilson to accept the settlement including the Albanian mandate.

After this a meeting was held on Tuesday afternoon, September 9th between Mr. Balfour, M. Tardieu and M. Tittoni. Mr. Polk's views were communicated to M. Tittoni who asked whether this represented a definite statement as to what President Wilson was prepared to accept. He could not make any further advances if this was simply to be accepted as a further basis on which to start negotiations. He must know definitely whether President Wilson would settle on Mr. Polk's basis. Accordingly the meeting adjourned to the Hotel Crillon<sup>5</sup> and asked Mr. Polk whether he would telegraph to President Wilson substantially as follows: that he had been put in possession confidentially of a draft telegram (Appendix C)<sup>4</sup> which Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau proposed to send to the President; that he had informed them that he was certain that the settlement proposed would prove unacceptable to the President in the three respects above mentioned; that he had further stated that he thought a settlement was possible provided the amendments also mentioned above were made. He, therefore, wished to enquire of the President whether he was correct in his interpretation of his attitude in order that he might communicate with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Polk agreed to make these enquiries and to let M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George know whether the President would settle on these terms.

September 12, 1919

P. H. K[ERR]<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Headquarters of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>6</sup> This note by Mr. Kerr was filed in original as 'Annex A' to a memorandum by Mr. Nicolson, dated September 14, on the 'Adriatic settlement'. This memorandum was subtitled 'Summary of proposals which Mr. Polk is understood to have urged on President Wilson', and began as follows: 'N.B. The final stages by which these proposals were elaborated are recorded in the memo. figuring as annex "A". They have been accepted by the French and British, and M. Tittoni has indicated his willingness to accept them also if he can be assured that they represent a final agreement and not merely a stage for further negotiation. The telegram was sent to the President last Monday: he has not yet replied.' It appears that the reference to 'last Monday' must be to Monday, September 8, and Mr. Nicolson's summary, as printed below, was apparently based upon the Lloyd George-Balfour



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modifications of that date (see No. 80, annex 4) rather than upon the Clemenceau-Lloyd George proposals of September 10 (see No. 80, annex 5), which superseded the earlier modifications and thus constituted the terms finally submitted to President Wilson. (It is evident that there was some contemporary uncertainty in the British Delegation as to the exact course of these somewhat intricate negotiations on September 8-9: cf. No. 80, para. 4. Compare, also, Mr. Polk's statement printed in Volume I, No. 58, minute 2.) Mr. Nicolson's summary read as follows: '(1) *Istria*. The frontier between Italy and Jugo Slavia to be that proposed by President Wilson subject to a slight rectification in the South such as will give Italy Albona and its lignite mines. This frontier to be permanently demilitarised. (2) *Fiume*. Fiume town and district to be a sovereign city state within the limits of the old "corpus separatum". The port to be handed over with full facilities for its development to the League of Nations who may make any arrangements they may think best for turning it to the best account for the districts it can serve as well as for the town of Fiume itself. (3) *Dalmatia*. All Dalmatia to go to the Jugo Slavs. Italian commercial and ethnic interests to be guaranteed. The Italian character of Zara to be preserved by making it a free and autonomous city under the League of Nations who shall recognise and foster its intimate connexion with the Italian State and culture. (4) *Islands*. All the Islands to go to Jugo Slavia except Lussin, Unie, Lissa, Lagosta, Uglian, and Pelagosa. (5) *Albania*. An Italian mandate within the frontiers of 1913. As regards the southern Albanian frontier Italy agrees that the region of Argyrocastro should be given to Greece as proposed by the United States Delegation on the Greek Committee. (6) *Vallona*. Italian sovereignty of the town and such contiguous territory as is strictly necessary to its economic life and security. (7) *Railways*. (a) Italy makes no territorial demand for the Assling Railway but asks for specific guarantees for the use of the line by Italy. (b) In return the Jugo Slavs will be given no territorial sovereignty over the Drin valley, but be accorded similar specific guarantees for the use of the Railway which may be constructed. (8) *Neutralisation*. The whole of the eastern coast together with the islands from Istria to Cattaro to be neutralised.'

Further annexed to Mr. Nicolson's memorandum, as Annexes B and C respectively, were the two maps facing p. 60. The map at Annex B was inscribed on the back: 'Ethnographical map showing frontiers proposed.' That at Annex C was inscribed on the back: 'Map showing proposed arrangement for Albania. N.B. The trace for the Vallona hinterland is an Italian proposal and appears unjustifiably extensive.' The inscription on the map itself, 'Annexe No. 4 au Mémoire sur la question Adriatique', would seem to indicate that it was taken from an earlier memorandum, not filed with these papers.

## No. 28

Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 14)

No. 579 Telegraphic [129005/123/3]

ROME, September 13, 1919

Fiume. I have just seen Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs who thus described situation.

Some considerable numbers of population have made common cause with raiders who entered the town. Amongst these are two or three hundred grenadiers from regiment recently at Fiume and a certain number of sailors who swam ashore from their ships to join expedition. Insurrectionary force is more numerous than was at first anticipated. They effected removal of British and French flags from Government buildings with military honours.

Italian Government have decided that first duty is to restore order and discipline. Painful as it may be to have to use force against their own countrymen it would be more painful still that this should have to be done

by Red contingents. General Badoglio who is a strict disciplinarian has been sent to Fiume. He will demand submission of insurrectionary bands who will it is anticipated refuse and in that case he will have to compel it by force. British and French troops have meanwhile been confined to barracks.

Government had understood D'Annunzio had renounced his intention of giving trouble when it was arranged that he should conduct an air expedition to Japan on which Government have spent great deal of money and for which 100,000 francs have been expended in telegrams alone. It now seems as if his acceptance had only been a blind to deceive Government.

President of the Council is greatly upset by this unexpected development as was also Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and they are conscious of their serious responsibility before the country.

With the exception of Baron Sonnino's organ attitude of Rome press this morning is fairly satisfactory pointing out prejudice which will be created to Italian cause and inappropriateness of leadership of such a movement by D'Annunzio.

I feel some doubt as to whether Italian troops will obey orders to fire on their countrymen. But Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me General Badoglio will act strictly from point of view of military (? discipline).

Repeated to Peace Conference.

#### No. 29

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16)*

*No. 581 A Telegraphic [129476/123/3]*

*ROME, September 13, 1919*

President of Council made a statement in Chamber today on events at Fiume. Information was received yesterday that a battalion of Grenadiers had started from Monfalcone with camions and five hundred volunteers had left Fiume simultaneously. Italian General in command had asked for reinforcement of gendarmes, announcing later that forces above referred to had entered town with machine guns and armoured cars and that order would be restored. General commanding army corps confirmed movement of troops calculated to compromise international situation further telegrams [*sic*] reported measures taken to repress movement and ascertain responsibility. Commanding officers of Grenadiers this morning proceeded to Fiume to urge troops to desist from enterprise. Reports from other sources spoke of large bodies of men advancing towards Fiume; d'Annunzio had announced his intention of taking command; at present two thousand six hundred had entered Fiume illicitly; General in command would act as circumstances indicated. Facts narrated were occasion to President of Council of profound regret and also of humiliation since for the first time sedition had been manifested by the army whose sole duty was obedience; he could only qualify result as deplorable in face of nation and its allies whom he saluted. If Italian aspirations were disputed this was partly due to elements whose attitude justified in other eyes charges of imperialism. The fortune of the

country could not be advanced by literary romantic enterprises; the Government had done all that was possible to prevent such an occurrence. All necessary measures had been taken in the kingdom itself but in the Armistice zone it was unfortunately military elements which had tolerated and encouraged such events. This was the first symptom of militarism manifested in Italy; he was deeply concerned with their responsibility before the world. To break engagements to one's allies was reprehensible as well as foolish as had been certain acts and protests against France and the United States; they were traitors to their country's interests who inspired such agitation in the name of patriotism and imperilled the credit without which the country would perish.

Repeated to Paris.

No. 30

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 22)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 584 Telegraphic [131914/123/3]*

ROME, September 14, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>2</sup>

President of Council concluded by saying he had warned Military Authorities of what was being prepared and had received reassuring answer; now he meant to see this matter through. The interests of the country could not be trifled with; he had instructed the military command to act without weakness. Those who reproached him with lukewarm patriotism and thought gallant adventures more important than food and coal for the people he was entitled to charge with folly. Italy had grain and coal for three weeks only. The Government trusted in the people to do their duty. The Allies must know investigations to be made both here and at the military headquarters. As regards the young soldiers who had been recklessly misled the article of the military penal code would be applied making them deserters if within five days they had not returned to duty. Let Parliament recall them from a fratricidal struggle. He appealed to the working classes and the peasants to support him. Italy must spare no effort in her will for peace.<sup>3</sup>

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> It was noted on the file copy that this telegram had been 'delayed 6 days, presumably owing to the telegraph operators' strike in Italy.'

<sup>2</sup> Noted on original: '581 A?', i.e. No. 29.

<sup>3</sup> In Rome despatch No. 394 of even date (received September 18) Sir R. Rodd further reported: 'Signor Nitti used the word "deplorable" to stigmatise the action of d'Annunzio, and this in Italian is the strongest expression of condemnation which can be employed. It implies far more than our "deplorable", and connotes dishonesty of purpose. The last time it was heard in the Chamber was when the scandals of the Banca Romana were denounced many years ago. This vigorous language carried four-fifths of the Chamber with him.'

No. 31

*Colonel Peck (Fiume) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 15)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [89/1/6/18921]*

FIUME, September 14, 1919

General Pittaluga officially closed the headquarters of the Inter-Allied Corps of occupation and left Fiume today. Most of the Italian troops have joined the invaders. I attended Inter-Allied meeting today at Headquarters of 8th Italian Army with Admirals Hope and Andrews.<sup>1</sup> It was decided that it was most desirable for the British and French troops to leave Fiume temporarily in order that the Italian 8th Army could deal with rebels. British battalion embarks in H.M.S. *Ceres* and H.M.S. *Cardiff* early tomorrow. British Mission embarks in H.M.S. *Torch*. These ships will remain in the vicinity of Fiume. Italian Army Commander signed statement that the British and French left Fiume at his request they did not (?) so without prejudice to the future of Inter-Allied occupation of it.

Future communications care of Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.

<sup>1</sup> Rear-Admiral Hope succeeded Rear-Admiral Sinclair (cf. No. 7, note 3) in the command of the British Third Light Cruiser Squadron in the Mediterranean. Admiral Andrews commanded a United States naval squadron in the Adriatic.

No. 32

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*No. 1157 Telegraphic [129005/123/2]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 15, 1919

Situation at Fiume.

Admiralty have telegraphed to Senior Naval Officer at Fiume that instructions sent on May 7th<sup>1</sup> that British ships are to avoid being drawn into a conflict and if necessary to put to sea remain in force. There is no intention to increase British naval forces at Fiume. If Officer in command of troops considers it desirable that troops should embark, Naval Officer is to comply and sail for Malta.<sup>2</sup>

I assume that you will inform French Government of these instructions if you consider it necessary.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. S 178 of September 18, 1919, from the British Military Mission at Fiume to the War Office and the British Delegation in Paris (received September 19) reported: '8th York and Lancaster Regiment proceeding to Malta today less transport and details which remain at Abbazia. British Mission moves to Abbazia. Colonel Peck leaves for Paris to report on situation.'

No. 33

Colonel Peck (Fiume) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 16)<sup>1</sup>

Unnumbered. Telegraphic [97/1/22/19189]

FIUME, September 15, 1919

I have had interview with General (? Badoglio), Chief of the Staff, Italian army, today.

Future policy consists in simply attempting to blockade town. Proclamations will be dropped over Fiume informing soldiers that if they did not return within five days they would be considered deserters. Apparently he has taken command instead of General De Robilant.<sup>2</sup> Italian policy appears to have been weakened by the change.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and the British Military Attaché in Rome.

<sup>2</sup> General commanding the Italian 8th Army in occupation of the district around Fiume.

No. 34

M. Vesnitch<sup>1</sup> to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)<sup>2</sup>

[97/1/2/19175]

PARIS, September 19, 1919

My dear Colleague,

I have the honour to forward enclosed a copy of a note (1) for your personal information which I have sent yesterday to His Excellency, Monsieur G. Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference, concerning the last events in Fiume, as well as a copy of a note (2) sent to His Excellency, Monsieur Pichon,<sup>3</sup> concerning the situation in Zara (Zadar), Dalmatia.

I have, &c.

MIL. R. VESNITCH.<sup>4</sup>

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 34

M. Vesnitch to M. Clemenceau

PARIS, le 18 septembre, 1919

Monsieur le President,

The movement provoked by the last events in Fiume is menacing the order and peace in Dalmatia and Istria. The Serbo-Croato population of Fiume and Zara (Zadar) request the protection of the Peace Conference against the dealings of Mr. D'Annunzio and his followers including even the Italian Admiral Millo of Zara.

Believe me, &c.

<sup>1</sup> Yugoslav Minister in Paris and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>2</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain. The note was, however, initialled in the British Delegation on September 22.

<sup>3</sup> French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>4</sup> In a formal acknowledgement of this note, under date of September 26, 1919, Sir Eyre Crowe stated: 'I need scarcely assure you that I shall give the closest attention to the observations which you have furnished.'

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 34

*Yugoslav Delegation to M. Pichon*

PARIS, 18th September, 1919

Monsieur le Ministre,

Our authorities informed us upon the 15th inst. of the following incidents which occurred at Zara in the night from Friday to Saturday last<sup>s</sup> at about 4 a.m. All the church bells were set ringing and the military and municipal bands marched through the town accompanied by the delirious cheering of the Italian partisans.

The Yougoslavs only learned the meaning of all this in the morning, namely, that the Italian military authorities had received the telegram of D'Annunzio's landing at Fiume with his volunteers, of his occupation of the town and the capture of the Allied troops there. The nocturnal march was headed by the Italian Admiral Millo, Commander of Zilloto.

The Admiral addressed the people and explained these events as the beginning of the victory of the Italian ideas, which are going to spread all over the occupied territories.

In the morning posters were placarded all over the town, calling upon citizens born in the years between 1879 and 1901 to enlist at once in the Legion.

Attacks on the Yougoslavs have already begun. It appears that the volunteers intend to take over the power of the authorities in the occupied town and its environs.

Jugoslav life and property are in the greatest danger from the fanatic and excited crowds which have already given way to many excesses.

<sup>s</sup> September 12-13, 1919.

No. 35

*Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Earl Curzon. (Received September 26)*

*No. 404 [134012/123/3]*

ROME, September 21, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Sir Rennell Rodd's despatch No. 394<sup>1</sup> of the 14th instant I have the honour to report that the situation at Fiume has not appreciably altered during the past few days. I transmit, herewith, a report by the military attaché to this Embassy on events there since d'Annunzio started on his adventure. It is difficult to ascertain how it was planned or what is actually occurring in Fiume and its immediate neighbourhood, as the Government have imposed a rigorous censorship on all news regarding affairs there. The press, however, is flooded with grandiloquent manifestoes which have been issued by the poet, and moving accounts of the wonderful enthusiasm which prevails amongst his followers, who are said to be increasing rapidly. The policy of the Government hitherto has been to isolate Fiume with a view to

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 30, note 3.

preventing further adherents joining d'Annunzio's forces and to reducing the latter to submission by starvation. They state, however, that they have no intention of permitting the inhabitants to run short of supplies and that the Italian Red Cross will, if necessary, provide for their needs. General Badoglio, who as General Diaz's Chief of Staff enjoys a great reputation as a disciplinarian, has attempted to induce the deserters in Fiume to return to their regiments, but without any success apparently as yet. Vice-Admiral Cassanova, who landed at the port with a view to calling the sailors there to reason, was detained and it is uncertain whether he has yet been liberated. It is said that the naval authorities dare not permit any small craft to go to sea for minesweeping and other operations owing to the fear of their proceeding to join d'Annunzio at Fiume. A similar state of affairs is said to obtain in the aviation camps, where flying is now forbidden. Amongst others, Luigi Rizzo, the famous naval officer who sank the Austrian dreadnought *Szent Istvan*, has arrived at Fiume from Trieste in a motor-boat. It is impossible to ascertain the actual size of d'Annunzio's force, though the Government communiqués put it at about 2,000 and state that a certain number of soldiers have returned to their regiments. The general impression seems to be that the Government is powerless and will be unable to impose its authority on d'Annunzio and his men. It was rumoured yesterday that Admiral Cagni, who is generally considered the finest officer in the Italian navy, is now being sent on a new mission to Fiume. It may be remembered that this officer was relieved of his command in the Adriatic during the spring on account of his pronounced anti-Jugo-Slav attitude, and it is difficult to understand what his present mission could be. It is now, however, announced that he has returned to his home in Piedmont after consulting the authorities. General de Robilant, who commanded the VIIIth army, which occupies the district round Fiume, has been relieved of his command and is succeeded by General Badoglio.

Reports have lately appeared regarding Jugo-Slav intentions to seize Fiume, and an attempted landing on the Dalmatian coast. The Italian Government, apparently, believe, or affect to believe, that something of the kind was on foot.

It is difficult to ascertain any reliable information regarding the inception of d'Annunzio's scheme, which clearly came as a complete surprise to everyone. The Government had hoped that he had found full scope for his activity in the projected air-flight to Tokyo, on preparations for which they had spent large sums, but the poet must have completely hoodwinked them, though Signor Nitti has been accused, without any foundation I think, of being cognisant of the scheme. The Prefect of Venice, where the scheme was apparently organised, has been relieved of his duties, and certain other officers have been dismissed.

The feeling in the country generally has certainly rallied in favour of d'Annunzio, or at any rate of the Italian occupation of Fiume, and the position of Signor Nitti has been much weakened by the drastic manner in which he condemned the enterprise in his speech in the Chamber, reported

on in Sir R. Rodd's telegrams Nos. 581<sup>2</sup> and 584<sup>3</sup> of the 13th and 14th September respectively, and his despatch under reference.<sup>1</sup> It was certainly a tactical blunder, and has been fully exploited by his enemies. His remarks regarding the need of grain and coal and by [sic] his apparent subservience to the Allies, have also been greatly criticised. Baron Sonnino's organ, the *Giornale d'Italia*, published a leading article headed: 'One cannot live on bread alone, Signor Nitti,' in which it was suggested that if the Allies were to cut off supplies, Italy could find coal in Germany and grain in Russia. The general tone of the press has been satisfactory with the exception of the *Giornale d'Italia*, the *Idea Nazionale*, the *Popolo d'Italia*, and the *Epoca*. These are the organs of the 'Fascio'<sup>4</sup> (National Defence Party), the Nationalist and Militarist Parties, and are exploiting the situation with a view to causing the downfall of Signor Nitti. The attitude of the press otherwise has been, while sympathising with the spirit of d'Annunzio's enterprise, to condemn it as calculated to impair military discipline, and to place Italy in an embarrassing position as regards her Allies. The Extreme Socialist *Avanti* has taken the opportunity to renew its attacks on the army, and to point out that, as the soldiers no longer obey the Government or its officers, the situation is much the same as in Russia when the soldiers took the law into their own hands. The fact remains that sympathy is generally with d'Annunzio, though many feel, as a Socialist Deputy has put it, that there is a vast difference between Giuseppe Garibaldi and Aspromonte, and Giuseppe Rapagnetta (d'Annunzio's real name) and Fiume. The latter has, however, as Sir R. Rodd has explained in his despatch No. 225<sup>5</sup> of the 31st May, despite his unsavoury past, theatrical manners and colossal conceit, the power of swaying the Italian people to an extraordinary degree. He has succeeded in arousing their enthusiasm as he did in 1915, and Signor Nitti's enemies, of whom he has many, have placed the Government in a most awkward position by their appeals against the aggressive attitude of the President of the Council.

On the other hand the Nationalist and Militarist efforts to make political capital out of the situation may disgust the more sober-minded elements in public opinion here, and d'Annunzio's appeals, which closely resemble incitements to revolution against the Government, are viewed with some alarm by people who take an intelligent and far-sighted view of the present state of affairs.

There are those who predict that the Government will fall when Signor Tittoni makes his statement to the Chamber next week on the results of his efforts at Paris. While the newspapers generally report that England and France support a solution of the Fiume question favourable to Italy, the silence of President Wilson is considered ominous, and it is not thought that Signor Tittoni will have any particularly gratifying announcement to make on the subject. While it is true that the treaties with Germany and Austria have to be ratified before the close of the session, the present Chamber, which is about to go out of existence, is chiefly interested in the coming

<sup>2</sup> Evidently No. 29.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 86.

<sup>3</sup> No. 30.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

elections of next November, and cares little about what may happen at Montecitorio<sup>6</sup> now. Signor Nitti has skilfully extricated himself from several critical positions since he has been in office, and it is to be expected that he may do so again.

He is one of the few statesmen in this country who fully realise how serious the financial and economic situation in Italy is to-day and how necessary foreign assistance is to her. Negotiations have apparently lately been proceeding with the American International Corporation, which established the great shipbuilding yards at Hog Island, for a scheme embracing the development of the port of Genoa and similar work in Sicily, the development of electric power in the Trentino, and the electrification of the Italian railways, the whole scheme to cost about £60,000,000. The corporation are further to make a loan of £80,000,000 to the Italian Government. The contracts have not apparently been signed, and it has not been possible to obtain full details as yet as to the scheme. It is, of course, unpopular with the large Italian industrial trusts, which would therefore welcome Signor Nitti's fall and the consequent abandonment of the scheme.

It is suggested that Signor Nitti, seeing himself powerless to control the situation and public opinion rising against him, may, being an opportunist, veer round to condoning d'Annunzio's venture and may identify himself with the Nationalist movement, but there are at present no signs of such a possibility.

A satisfactory feature of the situation has been the lack of feeling against the Allies and the appreciation of their attitude towards the Italian Government in their awkward predicament. Beyond certain references to the British policing Fiume, which is not to be considered as Bagdad, I have seen no remarks in the press to which exception could be taken.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the British Peace Delegation in Paris.

I have, &c.  
H. W. KENNARD

P.S.—My French colleague tells me that he has just seen Signor Tittoni, who informs him that owing to the Government being powerless to deal with the situation at Fiume it has been decided to postpone the meeting of the Chamber which was to have taken place on Wednesday<sup>7</sup> until Saturday.<sup>8</sup> Signor Tittoni was to have made a statement on Wednesday regarding the result of his conferences at Paris, and more especially as regards the Allied attitude towards the Fiume question.

It has now been decided that an extraordinary council of the principal statesmen, naval, and military officers is to be summoned on Thursday under the presidency of the King to consider the situation. It is understood that no such council has ever been summoned since the establishment of the United Kingdom of Italy, and it is sufficient evidence of the gravity of the

<sup>6</sup> i.e. in the Italian parliament.

<sup>7</sup> September 27, 1919.

<sup>8</sup> September 24, 1919.

situation that it should be found necessary to resort to a measure of this kind. I understand that an announcement on the subject may be expected in the press to-day or to-morrow.

H. W. K.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 35

*Major Rocke to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office*

No. 1210

Sir,

ROME, September 22, 1919

In continuation of my despatch dated the 15th September<sup>s</sup> I have the honour to give you a short summary of the Fiume incident from its inception to the present date. To avoid reduplication, no incidents are mentioned which have already been reported by Colonel Peck, Officer Commanding British Mission, Fiume.

I have endeavoured to obtain an official diary from the Ministero della Guerra, but I am told that such a record does not exist; on the other hand, the Chief of the Staff always gives me access to all his telegrams, and the few particulars here given have been obtained from that source, and may therefore be looked upon as official.

There is nothing to show that General Albricci, the War Minister, was in any way cognisant of d'Annunzio's project, on the other hand, it is impossible to believe that there were not several highly placed officers who knew of it. I received a private letter from Venice, dated the 10th of September, in which I was told that feeling about Fiume was running very high there and that something startling was going to happen the next day. I am certain that if the writer of this letter knew of the plan it must have been considerably discussed in Venice.

The official records at the Ministero della Guerra do not show when d'Annunzio started, but merely that he arrived at Fiume by motor on the afternoon of the 12th September. If my correspondent was correct, he probably left Venice on the 11th.

Apparently when he was met by the Fiume volunteers he had some ten lorries with him containing about 300 Granatieri.<sup>9</sup> The subsequent arrivals from the regular army in the course of the next twenty-four hours were 300 additional Granatieri, 600 Arditi, 150 Cyclist Bersaglieri, 300 Brigata Lombardia, added to which were the 600 men of the Brigata Sessa, who formed General Pittaluga's force, and who went over to d'Annunzio *en bloc*. The four mountain guns he has with him were presumably also part of General Pittaluga's command. There are said to be some twenty machine guns also in the city.

It appears that General Badoglio's proclamation resulted in some 300 Granatieri and twenty-five Cyclists returning to their units—on the other hand, about 150 additional Arditi went over to d'Annunzio and several aeroplanes have reached him.

<sup>9</sup> Grenadiers.

The present figures of the regular troops, which include sailors that deserted from Italian warships in the harbour are as follows:—

Arditi . . . . .	750
Granatieri . . . . .	300
Brigata Sessa . . . . .	600
Brigata Lombardia . . . . .	300
Bersaglieri Cyclists . . . . .	120
Sailors . . . . .	<u>400</u>
	<u>2,470</u>
Mountain guns . . . . .	4
Machine guns . . . . .	20?
Aeroplanes . . . . .	?
Small Arms Ammunition is apparently plentiful.	
Armed Fiume Volunteers . . . . .	1,200

The Ministero della Guerra consider there are about two and a half months' supplies of all sorts in Fiume. It is not clear whether these include the supplies stored in the French base. The Ministero believe that the French left a Serbian guard over their depot in Fiume.

The Fiume deputy Ossoinach is reported to have promised to hand over to General Gandolfo<sup>10</sup> on the 17th instant definite documentary proofs that a Jugo-Slav plan to occupy Fiume was forestalled by d'Annunzio occupying it himself. He further states that he considers the only solution will be to consign the port to the League of Nations for ninety-nine years, and leave the city to Italy.

It is stated that General Badoglio and Admiral Cusani—in command at Pola—agreed that whilst the blockade on land would be complete, that on sea would be limited to an attitude of watchfulness so as to avoid international complications.

Trains were apparently still running on the 17th instant between Trieste and Fiume.

Croatian inhabitants in the surrounding country were still bringing milk and eggs into Fiume to sell, and did not seem very disturbed at the recent events.

An unusually large crowd assembled outside the Porta Pia for the 20th September celebrations<sup>11</sup> yesterday afternoon. The popular cries were 'Long live the army!' 'Long live d'Annunzio!' 'Down with Nitti!' Nothing was said against the Allies.

Nitti has personally lost much of his popularity amongst the masses by his describing the regular soldiers who went over to d'Annunzio as deserters, and by threatening to apply severe measures to force the surrender of d'Annunzio and his company.

D'Annunzio, by his *coup de main*, has swung by far the greater portion of the people with him, and it would be useless to deny that his action is

<sup>10</sup> General commanding at Abbazia, headquarters of the Italian 24th Army Corps.

<sup>11</sup> In commemoration of the anniversary of the entry into Rome of Italian forces in 1870.

disapproved [sic]. The tone of the press, with the exception of the papers mentioned in my despatch of the 15th September,<sup>5</sup> continue[s] moderate in tone.

I have, &c.

CYRIL ROCKE

No. 36

*Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 29)*

No. 410 [134830/123/3]

My Lord,

ROME, September 24, 1919

With reference to my despatch No. 404<sup>1</sup> of the 21st September, respecting the situation as regards Fiume, I have the honour to report that the Crown Council, which will meet to-morrow, will consist of the following:—

Signor Nitti, President of the Council.

Signor Tittoni, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

General Albricci, Minister for War.

Admiral Secchi, Minister of Marine.

Signori Marcora and Benasi, Presidents of the Chamber and Senate.

Signori Giolitti, Luzzatti, Salandra, Boselli, Orlando, and Baron Sonnino, ex-Presidents of the Council.

The following deputies, Signori Bissolati, Meda, Sacchi, and Federzoni, representing the Reformist Socialists, Catholics, Radical, and Nationalist Parties, and Signor Barzilai. General Diaz and Admiral Thaon de Revel, Chiefs of the Staffs of the Army and Navy. Signor Turati was invited to attend the Council as representative of the Official Socialist Party (Parliamentary Group), but refused, as the Socialist Party's policy has been to abstain from participation in the Government.

It is said that a similar Council was summoned in 1882, when England proposed that Italy should participate in the Egyptian Expedition, and it was decided not to accept the proposal; but there appears to be no other precedent on record. The summoning of the Council is generally approved, though the nationalist and militarist press condemn it as an attempt on the part of Signor Nitti to evade responsibility for the present situation. The Socialists also condemn it as an unconstitutional expedient of the *bourgeoisie*. It is thought that Signor Nitti will represent to the Council that he cannot stay in office unless coercive measures are taken against D'Annunzio, and that, if it is decided that such a course is impossible, some other Government must be formed. I fail to see what other statesman can deal with the situation less ineffectually, though it is true that Signor Nitti is now universally unpopular on account of the attitude which he has taken up with regard to the occupation of Fiume.

The whole country has now been carried away by such a wave of enthusiasm as is only possible with this excitable race. Signor Nitti's enemies and the nationalist and militarist press are, of course, exploiting the situation to

<sup>1</sup> No. 35.

the full, but the contagion is spreading to the more serious organs, and the chief danger now is that D'Annunzio and the Italian people will not be content with the annexation of Fiume and its port, but will, despite the Government's efforts, insist on further encroachments in Dalmatia. When I suggested this to the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, he stated that this was certainly the main danger, and he realised how embarrassing such an encroachment would be for the Government *vis-à-vis* the Allies.

Count Sforza informed me that he had received serious reports of collisions between Italian and Serbian troops at Cattaro and Antivari, and that the attitude of the Serbian detachments in Montenegro was most provocative. He has sent instructions to the Italian representative in Belgrade to impress upon the Serbian Government how necessary it is at the present moment to avoid such incidents. Count Sforza suggested that I should warn your Lordship that every effort should be made to restrain Serbia under the present circumstances, as the spread of any anti-Italian movement to the neighbourhood of Fiume might lead to disastrous results.<sup>2</sup>

I asked Count Sforza if there were not a danger of a serious Socialist or even Bolshevik reaction following on the present nationalist and militarist outburst. He said that he foresaw the possibility of a civil war in Italy, in which 20 millions would be in favour of the annexation of Fiume and an aggressive policy, and 20 millions would resist any attempt to launch Italy into a second war abroad.

The French Ambassador, who has just returned from leave, told me to-day that he had seen the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that neither of them had been able to indicate any possibility of a solution to the present crisis. M. Barrère hoped that the Crown Council to-morrow would decide to issue an appeal to the people to preserve calm and have confidence in the action of the Government. If it was decided that Signor Nitti's resignation was desirable, he could not think of any successor who could deal with the situation. Signor Luzzatti, a possible candidate, was wretchedly weak and certainly had not the energy to impose his authority on the Militarist Party.

M. Barrère foresaw that it would be necessary for the Allies to intervene at some future date in the crisis, should D'Annunzio and his supporters get completely out of hand, but he agreed that for the moment there was nothing to be done, and any intervention on our part would have to be carefully thought out before any steps in that direction could be taken.

It may no doubt be thought inconceivable that a first-class European Power should have thus drifted into a situation, which must forfeit her the sympathy of her Allies and which may lead to serious internal troubles at a moment when, financially and economically, she must above all things return to normal peace conditions if she is to emerge from her present

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Kennard had previously transmitted this warning to Lord Curzon in telegram No. 607 of September 23 from Rome (received that day) which forwarded part of the information given at length in the present despatch.

embarrassments with success. One has, however, to reckon with the temperament of the Italian people. I cannot do better than to refer to Sir R. Rodd's despatches Nos. 186, 192, 214<sup>3</sup> and 286,<sup>4</sup> of the 11th, 13th and 23rd May, and the 30th June, in this connection. It is possible that eight months ago the average 'man in the street' here had no clear ideas as to Fiume, and it was only when President Wilson made his unfortunate declaration,<sup>5</sup> which to the Italian mind involved an unwarrantable interference in the affairs of the country, that the question became prominent. For the next two months every possible kind of abuse was heaped on the President, and the country then sank into a state of hopeless depression imagining that the Allies were treating Italy as worse than an enemy and that she had gone through the sacrifices of the war for no purpose. A few weeks ago the Government, at any rate, seemed resigned to the fact that they had lost Fiume through the incompetence of their representatives at Paris. The spark, however, lit by D'Annunzio's venture and fanned by Signor Nitti's severe condemnation and apparent subservience to the Allies, has burst into a flame which has now swept the whole country. The moderate press and intelligent, sober-minded individuals were, during the first few days after D'Annunzio's dramatic appearance in Fiume, inclined to blame the poet for shattering the discipline of the army and leading the country into a dangerous enterprise, only to indulge his vanity and propensity to theatrical attitudinising. This saner point of view has, however, completely disappeared by no argumentative process, and has given place to the present wave of unreasoning enthusiasm, which was increased when it became evident that the sentiment of the army and navy were entirely with D'Annunzio, and that the Government were powerless. Public opinion is at any rate now for the annexation of Fiume, and it is only to be hoped that it may stop there. A symptom of the present fanaticism is the fact that the *Popolo d'Italia*, the militarist organ, has succeeded in raising a pro-Fiume subscription of 400,000 lire in four days, which is unparalleled in the history of Italian public subscriptions.

It is true of course that, with this emotional people, there may be at any time a *revirement*, but for the moment the country has practically become demented and has become beyond control. Should it be realised that this attitude may lead to complications, involving hostilities abroad, it may have a steadyng tendency. The average peasant and the industrial classes would bitterly oppose any possibility of another war, and the extreme Socialists would take advantage of the situation to weaken the authority of the army and spread anarchy throughout the country. At the same time it would be very difficult to make the country realise, without aggravating the situation, that their attitude may lead to complications abroad.

Signor Nitti has made a mistake in apparently exaggerating the country's

<sup>3</sup> These three despatches are not printed. They reported, in general, upon Italian dissatisfaction with the peace terms, and growing Italian resentment against the allies of Italy.

<sup>4</sup> This despatch, which was in the same general sense as those noted above, is printed in Volume V, Chap. I.

<sup>5</sup> President Wilson's declaration of April 23, 1919: see Introductory Note.

immediate need of supplies from abroad, and they no longer trust his statements that there is only sufficient coal in Italy for three weeks and that bankruptcy and starvation stare them in the face. They will now only realise it when the shoe actually pinches, and the people see no signs of want of any kind for the moment.

A military dictatorship would be of course disastrous to the country, but it is difficult to see any other alternative unless some unforeseen contingency should arise to help the Government out of its difficulties. The reaction to a military dictatorship would no doubt be extreme socialism. Count Sforza warned me, when discussing this phase of the question, that the outbreak of internal disturbances in Italy could not but prove contagious to the rest of Europe.

I have, &c.

H. W. KENNARD

### No. 37

*Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 24)*

*No. 609 Telegraphic [133315/123/3]*

ROME, September 24, 1919

My telegram No. 607.<sup>1</sup>

It is evident from tone of press that movement in favour of annexation of Fiume is rapidly developing into one which aspires to occupy Dalmatia. I gather attitude of Allies hitherto has been to leave Italian Government to deal with situation itself. It is now clear that Government is powerless and that general feeling in the country is so intense that it will be unable to find any solution satisfactory at once to Allies and Italian people.

Had it been possible ten days ago to arrive at a compromise which would have assured Italian sovereignty over Fiume and an International Port, I think nation would have accepted it. But such a wave of feeling has now spread over the country that they would give d'Annunzio their support in any aggression against Yugo-Slavia as I reported in my telegram above mentioned. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed with me that this was gravest danger with which Government was . . .<sup>2</sup> and fully realized what effect must be on Allied attitude towards Italy.

I do not think any action here on our part would be effective, as Government no longer controls situation, which, as far as it is concerned, was compromised by Signor Nitti's first speech in which he maintained his position *vis-à-vis* of Allies at expense of his support in the country. Result of deliberations of Royal Council which is to meet tomorrow must be awaited but in the meantime I think it as well to warn you of gravity of situation which may precipitate country into a dangerous position both at home and abroad.

Sent to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 36, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 38

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard<sup>1</sup> (Rome)*

*No. 771 Telegraphic [132980/132980/19]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 24, 1919

Admiralty have reliable information from His Majesty's Ship *Seraph* that d'Annunzio will occupy Abbazia and further territory, including Lovrana.

Repeated to Belgrade No. 271.

<sup>1</sup> In the original this telegram was officially headed as to Sir R. Rodd who was, however, at that time on a brief visit to London, returning to Rome on September 27, 1919.

No. 39

*Earl Curzon to Sir C. Des Graz (Belgrade)*

*No. 275 Telegraphic [132898/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 25, 1919

Sir R. Rodd's telegrams Nos. 605 and 607<sup>1</sup> (of September 23rd. Fiume).

Situation in Italy appears such that any precipitate action by Jugo-Slav troops may lead to grave incidents.

Please express to Serbian Government hope that in their own interest and in general cause of peace, they will be careful to maintain strictly correct attitude and avoid any untoward incident.

Repeated to Peace Delegation No. 1177, Rome No. 772, Washington No. 1760.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Rome telegram 605 was similar to 607 (for which cf. No. 36, note 2) and reported in particular: 'It is rumoured that there is a possibility of a military *coup d'état* which would involve the annexation of Fiume. The whole country is now overwhelmingly in favour of d'Annunzio's enterprise and the press is wavering. There are indications that his activities will now not be confined to the occupation of Fiume.'

No. 40

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)*

*No. 1374 Telegraphic: by bag [134199/123/3]*

PARIS, September 25, 1919

After today's meeting of council of five over which Monsieur Tardieu presided,<sup>1</sup> as both M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon had to attend the sitting of the Chamber, the five plenipotentiaries had a conversation, without their secretaries and staffs, to discuss the situation in the Adriatic.<sup>2</sup> From reports

<sup>1</sup> See Volume I, No. 64.

<sup>2</sup> At two earlier meetings of the Supreme Council on the morning and afternoon of September 15, 1919, during a brief visit of Mr. Lloyd George to Paris, there had been further discussion as to a possible settlement in the Adriatic, more particularly with reference to new proposals by Signor Tittoni in modification of those submitted to President Wilson on September 10 (cf. No. 27, note 6). For this phase of the negotiations see Volume I, No. 57, minute 12, and No. 58, minute 2 and appendix A; also in the present volume No. 80. See also Volume I, No. 58, minute 3 for discussion in the Supreme Council on September 15 of an Allied blockade of Fiume.

furnished to us by Serbo-Croat delegation, there appears to be serious danger of repetition of d'Annunzio's manœuvre at other points on the Adriatic coast.

2. Mr. Polk notably called attention to the situation at Spalato where at present an American force was stationed charged by the Supreme Council with the duty of enforcing the armistice. There were also 2,000 Yugoslav troops in the town. Two American men-of-war were on the spot, which would shortly be reinforced by two additional ships. Mr. Polk conceived the duty of these American military and naval forces to be to maintain order and to put down disorder and he had conveyed directions to the American commanders to act accordingly. It was therefore clearly of the utmost importance for the Italian Government to prevent any incident from arising that would lead to disturbances in which the American forces would inevitably be involved. Whilst calling the Italian delegate's attention to this situation, Mr. Polk definitely asked that the Council of Five should declare whether the instructions given to the American commanders correctly represented their position and duties.

3. The Italian plenipotentiary agreed with the other four that this was the case. He appeared rather to welcome the American statement, and in order to show how anxious the Italian Government were to rely on the cooperation of the Allied Powers in the solution of the Adriatic difficulty, he explained that they had already requested the French Government to keep their ships for the maintenance of order at Cattaro whence the Italian troops had been withdrawn.

4. Mr. Polk further begged the Italian plenipotentiary to urge upon the Government the necessity of preventing any Italian ships proceeding to Spalato. It had been easy for d'Annunzio and his followers to get into Fiume by land as the place was so close to the Italian border. But any raid on the other Dalmatian ports, entirely surrounded as they were by Yugoslav territory, would have to come by sea. It was unfortunately clear that in present circumstances no Italian ship could be relied on not to throw in her lot with d'Annunzio's party.

5. Signor Scialoja undertook to convey all these warnings to his government.

6. M. Tardieu then raised the question whether the Council of Five should not invite the respective naval and military advisers to indicate what, if any, further measures it might be possible to take with the view of assisting effectively in the prevention of further disturbances. It was agreed to discuss this aspect of the matter at tomorrow's meeting.

#### No. 41

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)*

*No. 1375 Telegraphic: by bag [134200/123/3]*

*PARIS, September 25, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

I have consulted with my naval and military advisers as to the measures

<sup>1</sup> No. 40.

which it would be in our power to take in the event of His Majesty's Government deciding in favour of strengthening our position in the Adriatic and of co-operating actively with the French and Americans in preventing further incidents of the d'Annunzio type.

I understand that our naval force in those waters at the present moment consists of one light cruiser at Abbazia flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Hope and two destroyers. A second light cruiser, and possibly a Dreadnought, are probably available at Malta. Of troops, there is the one battalion recently transported from Fiume to Malta. It could no doubt, if necessary, be re-embarked, and placed at such Adriatic port as may be thought desirable.

The instructions by which our naval forces in the Adriatic are now bound are those contained in Admiralty telegram of May 7 which ran as follows:

'In the event of conflict arising between Italians and others in the Adriatic, the policy of His Majesty's Government is that British naval forces should not intervene even if requested to do so by either side. Ships should proceed to sea rather than be drawn into active interference.'

It is clear that if H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] were to decide upon some form of active co-operation with the French and Americans, the above instructions would require modification.

I do not propose at tomorrow's meeting either to disclose the nature of the above instructions—which might serve as an encouragement to the Italians in any adventurous line of policy—or to offer any definite proposals for the bringing up of British naval or military forces, but will explain that I cannot make any useful suggestion without authority from my Government. But I venture to suggest that meanwhile the matter receive the careful attention of the naval and military authorities.

#### No. 42

*Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 30)*

*No. 413 [135270/123/3]*

My Lord,

ROME, September 26, 1919

With reference to my despatch No. 410<sup>1</sup> of the 24th instant regarding the present Italian crisis, I have the honour to report that on the receipt of your telegram No. 771<sup>2</sup> of the 24th September I enquired of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether there was any truth in the rumour that d'Annunzio intended to occupy Abbazia and the adjacent territory. Count Sforza assured me that such action on his part would be impossible, as Abbazia is within the zone occupied by the VIIIth Army, under General Badoglio. I did not venture to suggest that General Badoglio's troops might be not very reliable if appealed to by the poet.

As regards the incident at Trau,<sup>3</sup> Count Sforza stated that this was an old Venetian town with which a certain Count Fanfogna had family connections. The Count had succeeded in persuading about 100 of the Italian troops in

<sup>1</sup> No. 36.

<sup>2</sup> No. 38.

<sup>3</sup> See below.

the armistice lines to the north of Trau to occupy it. The military authorities had, however, at once taken active steps, and the town has been evacuated, the occupying troops having returned to their lines. There was no connection between this incident and the situation at Fiume, which was 150 miles further up the coast.

Count Sforza could tell me nothing regarding the Crown Council which was then sitting, but stated that he thought that the general position was a little easier, though popular feeling still ran very high, as was instanced by a letter which he had just received from his brother who was in the army, and who accused him of cowardice because he had not taken up the cause of Fiume.

I asked Count Sforza if he had any news regarding the collisions between Italian and Serbian troops, and was told that no further reports had been received. The naval attaché at this embassy, who has just returned from Bucharest, states that while at Vinkovsci, the large Serbian railway junction, he saw three trains laden with troops and artillery proceeding westward. Serbian officers at the station and on the train on which he was travelling stated that they were going to Dalmatia with a view to opposing any Italian advance from Fiume. Commander Diggle is further informed that 40,000 regular Serbian troops, apart from volunteers, are in the vicinity of Fiume and Zagreb, 70,000 to 80,000 in Dalmatia, divided up between what is known as the 'three towns' area (Sebenico, Ragusa, and Spalato), 40,000 on the Hungarian front and 70,000 on the Roumanian front. He understands that feeling against the British in Northern Italy is now more hostile, and that recently two British officers were ejected from a train between Venice and Milan by a threatening crowd. It is possible that owing to a similarity of uniform they were taken for American officers. He has also been informed by Italian naval officers at Trieste and Fiume that no Italian ships or troops would obey any orders directing them to operate against d'Annunzio, and that the supposed blockade of Fiume is a farce, as vessels go in and out as they like. I have the honour to enclose copy of a despatch<sup>4</sup> from His Majesty's consul-general at Trieste regarding an anti-French demonstration at that port.

The French Embassy inform me that the French troops who were supposed to be in Sussak, and were guarding the Fiume base of the 'Armée de l'Orient', have now embarked, and that the *Condorcet*, the only French warship there, has also left. The Embassy have warned the Italian Government that the French Government will hold them responsible for the safety of the supplies in this base.

There is little other news regarding the actual situation at Fiume, though it is now reported that Admiral Cagni (see my despatch No. 404<sup>5</sup> of the 21st September) has proceeded to Fiume on an unofficial mission of conciliation. It is generally thought that the Admiral is being sent to take over command there in case D'Annunzio be persuaded to leave.

No reliable information is yet to be obtained regarding the deliberations

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> No. 35.

of the Crown Council, which held two meetings yesterday. Count Sforza told me that even he did not know what had passed, as it had been decided to preserve the most rigid secrecy as to the results of these proceedings until the moment is considered opportune for some announcement to be made. In any case, the Council was only to act in an advisory capacity. All those invited attended the Council apparently with the exception of Baron Sonnino on the plea of ill-health, Signor Colajanni on account of his Republican prejudices, and Signor Turati, as I have already reported, in view of the Socialist attitude. Signor Pelloux, who was Premier from 1898 to 1900, has protested at not having received an invitation. It is not surprising that he should have been forgotten, as he has taken little part in politics since he was in office. It is rumoured that Signor Giolitti proposed at the Council that the Chamber should be dissolved and that the general elections should take place immediately, the new electoral machinery, which is in no way ready, being applied. Signor Giolitti, no doubt with his usual appreciation of parliamentary tactics, hoped to profit by the chaos which must result from such a procedure.

The Ministerial organs announce that the Chamber is to reassemble to-morrow and that Signor Tittoni will make a statement on foreign affairs, and more especially regarding the attitude of the Peace Conference to the Fiume question. It is possible that the Treaties of Peace with Germany and Austria may also come up for discussion. Signor Nitti will ask for a vote of confidence, and if he obtains a substantial majority the Chamber will be dissolved and the elections will take place about the middle of November. If the vote is unfavourable, Signor Nitti will resign, and the solution of the present crisis will be left to his successor. There seems little doubt that Signor Nitti will have a majority, unless the unforeseen occurs.

Even in this case, however, the problem of the actual occupation of Fiume remains unsolved, as Signor Nitti has to reckon with the feeling in the country at large. I gather that the Government are endeavouring to find some compromise by which they can obtain control of affairs there, but no one can suggest any real remedy. In the meantime rumours are continually being circulated regarding the possibility of a military *coup d'état*, and the names of Generals Caviglia and Giardino are mentioned in connection therewith.

The former commanded the troops which broke the resistance of the Austrian army at Vittorio Veneto, the decisive battle in the Italian campaign, and has since taken up politics. He made a speech last week in his native town which might have been that of a Cabinet Minister announcing his programme, and which must be regarded as significant at the present time. General Giardino was relieved of his command after Caporetto, and has continuously intrigued against the Government since that time. The army is much incensed at the drastic dismissal by Signor Nitti of various officers of high rank within the past few days, and a military *coup d'état* is not outside the bounds of possibility. It has even been suggested that the King may abdicate, and the Duke of Aosta, who is very popular with the army, may

act as Regent. I only mention such rumours as indicating the sultriness of the political atmosphere.

There is little doubt that, should the army attempt any extreme measure, there would be a violent Socialist reaction, which would probably commence by a general strike. A leading article appears in the *Giornale del Popolo*, a moderate Socialist and anti-Bolshevist organ, to-day, entitled 'Maestà, la rivoluzione!' ('Your Majesty, the revolution!'), warning the people against launching Italy into another war, which cannot but be followed by a revolution.

The local press to-day publish telegrams from Paris reporting the purport of President Wilson's reply,<sup>6</sup> which is stated to be to the following effect: Fiume and its port is to be the independent centre of a small buffer State, which is to be created between Italy and Croatia. The local council is to preserve the rights of autonomy acquired under the decree of Maria Theresa, and the proposed plebiscite within fifteen years is to be abandoned. An improvement in the eastern boundary of Istria in favour of Italy is suggested by extending it to Punta Fianova, and comprising the district of Albona.

I asked my American colleague if he had any official confirmation of this report, and was informed by Mr. Jay that he had received no telegram from Washington or Paris on the subject, and that Count Sforza had stated this morning that the Italian Government had not received any such reply officially. It seems, however, to be generally thought that the President has replied on these lines. It is too early to form any opinion as to the attitude of the Italian press to this proposal, though it is obvious that it cannot have a favourable reception.

There are perhaps some signs of a *détente* in public opinion at the present moment, and a slight modification of the extreme feeling which has dominated the country during the past few days. It is recognised by thinking individuals that there can be no more satisfactory alternative to the present administration, and it is realised that the counter-effect of military government cannot but be disastrous. The fact remains, however, that no satisfactory way out from the present predicament, in which d'Annunzio and the hotheads of the army and navy have plunged the country, can be suggested by any of those who have carefully studied the question, and the events of the next few days are awaited with intense anxiety.

The naval attaché at this Embassy has shown me the reports of the Rear-Admiral commanding the Third Light Cruiser Squadron of the 15th and 18th September respectively.<sup>7</sup> These reports show clearly what occurred in Fiume, as far as the British forces were concerned, after d'Annunzio's arrival, and copies have no doubt been communicated to your Lordship by the Admiralty.

(Copy sent to Paris.)

I have, &c.

H. W. KENNARD

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 40, note 2 and No. 51, note 2.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. For local events in Fiume at that time, cf. No. 24 and succeeding documents.

No. 43

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 29)*

*No. 1381 Telegraphic: by bag [134659/123/3]*

PARIS, September 27, 1919

Your telegram No. 1177<sup>1</sup> (of September 25th, Italian situation).

In view of gravity of situation I had already anticipated your instructions and had conveyed to the Head of the Serbian Delegation in Paris a strong but unofficial warning against allowing the Jugo-Slav case to be prejudiced by any regrettable incident in the Adriatic.

M. Vesnitch stated that he quite appreciated the spirit in which my warning was conveyed and that he would at once telegraph to Belgrade in the sense of my representation. He added that he felt I would not misunderstand him if he expressed the view that the Allies should in justice make a similar intimation to Italy. I accordingly took the occasion to inform the Italian representative on the Supreme Council of the advice I had given the Serbian Delegation and I added that if regrettable incidents were to be avoided it was incumbent on the Italian authorities to take the same precautions and to show the same moderation as I had urged upon the Serbian Government.

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to the British Delegation in Paris of No. 39.

No. 44

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 29)*

*No. 623 Telegraphic [135016/123/3]*

ROME, September 28, 1919

Proceedings in Italian Chamber yesterday were confined to a long (? exposition) by Signor Tittoni of international situation for Italy resulting from Paris negotiations.

He pointed out that President of United States had (?) always declared from the first that United States did not recognise any secret treaties concluded amongst allies and that it was decided on January 17th that decisions of conference must be unanimous.<sup>1</sup> Italy had made no reservation. Treaty of London was therefore subordinated to these premises. When new Italian delegates arrived in Paris relations with allied delegates were (?) quickly improved but position had been from the first compromised with the man who was the dominant factor at Conference. Europe could not live without America, and Italy least of all. He confirmed all that President of the Council had said regarding necessity for maintaining friendship with United States of America. If France and Great Britain had recognised Italian character of Fiume their attitude was conditional on acceptance by President of United States of America of formula recently drawn up. President's reply<sup>2</sup> had somewhat improved situation but he still opposed annexation of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iii, p. 610.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 42, note 6.

Fiume which must remain a free city. Could Italy if dissatisfied proceed to annex Fiume without authority of Conference? He held she could not and some of the most influential . . .<sup>3</sup> such as Salandra shared this opinion. An annexation without assent of Conference would place them outside concert of nations and might compromise what had already been gained elsewhere.

In Dalmatia they must be satisfied with Zara, three islands and guarantees for interests of Italian minorities. In exchange they would have neutralization of Jugo Slavs and Dalmatian coasts and Corfu Channel. A manifestation of Parliament while re(? affirming) Italian character of Fiume must not imply their abandonment of conference which would involve isolation and renunciation of their position as a Great Power. The war had created a solidarity amongst Allies which bound them together whether they liked it or not. They had of their own free will broken former alliance and must know that in doing so they had engaged themselves in definite orientation for many years to come. Italy must remain in close union with its Allies. Signor Tittoni explained results hitherto attained regarding concessions in Africa and aims of Italy in Asia Minor, negotiations regarding which would be resumed at end of October.

His speech lasting upwards of two hours was generally well received.

Discussion will be resumed today and it is anticipated that Government majority is assured on a division.

Sent to Peace Delegation.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

#### No. 45

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 3)*

*No. 419 [136571/123/3]*

My Lord,

ROME, September 29, 1919

I have the honour to report that on my return to Italy, after hardly two weeks' absence, I have found an extremely serious situation prevailing. The gravity of it lies more particularly in the fact that the issue is now one between certain groups in the country rather than in Parliament, which is no longer regarded as representative or authoritative.

There appears to be little doubt that the army, which represents so large a section of the country, is entirely in sympathy with the movement headed by d'Annunzio. Against it, because of its essentially military character and the danger of an eventual renewal of fighting, are the official Socialists and the extremist elements, who see their opportunity in the detachment of the army from the Government, which, after taking strong repressive measures during the recent troubles, is in danger of being reduced to impotence. Between the two opposing groups are those who, with the present Government, realise the impossible situation which would result from a defiance of the Allies and the menace of bankruptcy and famine in isolation.

The President of the Council, who had taken over the administration under critical internal conditions, had begun with considerable success and

had restored order in the country with firmness and courage. The Chamber had pronounced itself unequivocally in his favour, and its verdict appeared to be supported by the general opinion of the country. In Paris also the efforts of the new delegates appeared to have established a more promising situation, and there was reasonable hope that an acceptable situation might be found for the Adriatic question, which has during the past months so deeply roused public feeling in this country. Then suddenly came d'Annunzio's *coup de main*, undoubtedly as a complete surprise to the Government, who believed that they discounted any adventures on his part by placing him at the head of civil aviation and arranging for the flight which he was to conduct to Japan.

The President of the Council in the Chamber stigmatised his action in uncompromising terms, but in so doing he used certain expressions and adopted a menacing tone, which not only offended the army but also the general sentiment of the country, which is either openly or tacitly in sympathy with the Fiume adventure. The announcement that all who had followed d'Annunzio would be treated as deserters if they had not made their submission within five days appeared to Italian sentimentality a particularly unfortunate mode of dealing with men who, it must be assumed, were acting from purely patriotic motives and risking everything for an ideal which, if mistaken, was at least sincere and disinterested. Most especially resented was the charge of militarism and the call to the peasants and working classes to support his Government in resisting it, as it appeared to be an appeal to the forces of Socialism to range themselves against his [*sic*] army. Signor Nitti, I have no doubt, had in mind not only the necessity of vindicating the authority of Government, but also was anxious to make it perfectly clear to the Allies that there had been no collusion on the part of the Administration, but he entirely failed to realise the effect his language would have upon his emotional countrymen. There has been a strong revulsion of feeling against him and a further accretion of sympathy to d'Annunzio when the latter refused to treat with a man who had used such language of the army and had sought to create a dissension between the soldiers and the nation.

The Patriotic Federation of National Defence, which commands some hundred odd votes in the Chamber, took up the challenge, and it seemed at one time doubtful whether the Government would obtain a majority if they stuck to their guns and declined to consider the proposal advocated by that group for an immediate declaration of the annexation of Fiume.

As has been already reported to your Lordship, a Crown Council was summoned to advise on the situation. Little has been allowed to become public regarding the views there expressed, and public interest was centred on the discussion in the Chamber announced for the 27th instant. Rumours were rife regarding the resignation of Nitti and, independently, of Tittoni. No one, however, appeared to have any definite ideas as to the soundest policy to adopt. All agreed that a solution must be found, and that at once, for an impossible situation which could not be prolonged; but no practical

solution was put forward beyond that of the *fascio* for the immediate annexation of Fiume. There was general agreement that violence could not be used against d'Annunzio and his followers, both on general grounds and because the army would not obey if ordered to use force, and a large section of public opinion inclined to the view that Nitti must go, that being a preliminary condition to any possible arrangement with the usurpers of power of Fiume.

The Socialists accused the military groups of recklessly endangering a renewal of hostilities, while some of the organs of the latter have openly advocated resistance to the Government and defiance of the Allies. The danger of civil war has been freely ventilated in public discussion.

It was with partisan passions throughout the country thus roused to fever heat that the Chamber met on the 27th. Signor Tittoni then made a long and carefully considered exposition of the history of negotiations at the Peace Conference at Paris, the substance of which I have reported to your Lordship by telegraph. His declarations, which it took him upwards of two hours to deliver, exercised a calming effect on the Chamber on their first day's sitting. He said much that was convincing if little that was consoling to the *amour-propre* of the country, and his clear pronouncement in favour of solidarity with the Allies was generally well received. I have the honour to transmit herewith a French summary of his speech<sup>1</sup> from the press, with an additional note<sup>1</sup> giving more fully the passages relating to Asia Minor and the Turkish Empire, which are dismissed with only a few lines in the press report.

Yesterday the sitting was resumed under conditions of feverish excitement.

After a speech from the Socialist leader Turati, who laid about him freely in criticising both sides, and suggested that the consideration of the Peace Treaties should be left to the new Chamber, Signor Orlando rose and made an eloquent defence of his own action and policy, winning a large measure of applause by the patriotic phrases in the opportune introduction of which he is master, and reasserting the claims of Italy to Dalmatia. He had adroitly gauged the temper of the House and scored an oratorical success, but his speech, when carefully studied, is devoid of substance, and he put forward no suggestions for an issue from the present difficult situation.

Signor Nitti then made a brief but incisive and effective speech. He admitted that in moments of heat men were betrayed into language stronger than the occasion demanded, and he could plead guilty to this error himself. But it could not be denied that the army was in an unsettled state, for which all of them must bear some responsibility. All must co-operate in maintaining discipline, and in eliminating this spirit of unrest. He had admitted no renunciation of Fiume, and had only worked for a solution in conformity with the country's just aspirations. The most representative men who could be found in Italy were doing all that was possible in Paris. If the opposition were not satisfied let them say plainly without euphemisms what his Government ought to do. If any present had the courage to demand the immediate

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The full text of this speech is printed in *Atti del Parlamento Italiano: Camera dei Deputati: Sessione 1913-19: Discussioni*, vol. xix, pp. 21292-308.

annexation of Fiume, let them at once take over from him the responsibilities which such a step involved. He asked for a clear vote of confidence.

Signor Raimondo who followed, speaking on behalf of the Federation of National Defence, admitted that the moment could not be regarded as opportune for a forcible annexation of Fiume, and he directed his artillery against the person of the President of the Council, who was, he plainly told him, after all that had happened, not the man to cope with the present grave issue.

The division, which was taken at a late hour last night, gave a majority of 60 out of 356 members who took part in it, to the Government. When it is borne in mind that this figure includes the Ministers and their Under-Secretaries of State, it is clear that it can hardly be regarded as reinforcing the position of the Government, many of whose supporters either failed to vote or voted with the Opposition. The Socialists, it is true, only opposed in fidelity to their party creed of refusing support to all Governments in office, and thus found themselves associated with their most irreconcilable adversaries of the Right.

Signor Nitti proposed that the public sittings of the Chamber should be adjourned for forty-eight hours, to give the Government time to consider their position in view of the defection of many of their supporters.

The result has thus not in any way advanced matters towards a solution of the present critical situation. It has, in fact, rather shown that the personality of Signor Nitti is an obstacle to any solution, the only practical suggestion for which seems to be the substitution of Italian occupation of Fiume, recognised as temporary but legitimatised by the Allies, for that of d'Annunzio and his volunteers. It is probable that, under the circumstances, Signor Nitti will resign. In his own interests it is no doubt the best course which he can take in order to ensure a return to power at an early date, which should be easy for him to accomplish if he uses his opportunity and makes patriotic profession of his readiness to sacrifice himself in order to save the country. With any other chief of Government there is a fair possibility that d'Annunzio will show readiness to compromise.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD

#### No. 46

*Letter from Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/Italy & Vatican]*

ROME, September 29, 1919

My dear George,

I have come back to find things in a greater mess than ever. Nitti has unfortunately alienated the army and all the nation except the Socialists by certain remarks which he made in stigmatising the d'Annunzio adventure,

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not indicated. It seems probable, however, that this letter was sent by the same bag as No. 45, received on October 3.

and though it is realised that some arrangement must be made with the latter at once to get him out of Fiume, it seems to be almost impossible for Nitti to make it. What he said was sound and right in the main, but tacitly at least when not openly, everyone sympathises with d'Annunzio, while wishing it might have been someone else, such as the young Garibaldi,<sup>2</sup> and they can't forgive Nitti for denouncing as deserters and militarists men who risked their necks and their prospects, and had no personal gain to look to. They see these things through the emotions and the sentiments, and while people cannot approve what took place they really admire the 'geste', and persuade themselves something had to be done to get away from the eternal condition of drift.

I am sorry about Nitti. He had done so well, and he is right into the bargain, but he did not understand the mentality of his countrymen. If he resigns now and makes a profession of sacrificing himself *pro bono publico*, he will win back and very likely regain his position at the elections—though these are full of uncertainties, as yet. It matters less who comes in to occupy the position for the brief interval before the elections, but I think it will become necessary to a solution that Nitti should go. Then I expect a compromise with d'Annunzio will be more easily arranged, especially if the allies will allow a provisional Italian military occupation, under some good man like Badoglio.

Ever yours,  
RENNELL RODD

<sup>1</sup> Probably General Giuseppe Garibaldi, grandson of the nineteenth-century Italian patriot.

No. 47

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 6795 [133792/1130/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1919

Sir,

Mr. Eden,<sup>1</sup> who is employed by the War Office in Southern Albania as an interpreter, called at the Foreign Office on September 25 and communicated certain interesting details with regard to affairs in Albania.

He said that the accounts given by the Italians of their hostile encounters with the Serbs at Kukus and Mura and south of Dibra<sup>2</sup> are largely exaggerated. What really happened was that when the Armistice was concluded the Serbs removed from Salonika Essad's Albanian contingent whom they centred in the region of Dibra and they then employed a certain Alik Lesh, a comitadji leader, to make periodical descents upon various parts of Albania in the Serb interest. No Serbian regular troops accompanied these raids, but there is no doubt that they were for a time engaged by the Serbian Commander at Dibra, who has since been removed. Now that the Serbs have their hands full with Montenegro they are adopting a much more conciliatory attitude as regards Albania.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. M. F. Eden.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 15.

As regards the Italians, Mr. Eden said that they started quite well. Their discipline is good and they have generally treated the Albanians with fairness and paid for their requisitions; while up to the time of the Armistice, the Albanians were quite content with them. Now, however, that they have announced their intention of permanently occupying Valona and the hinterland, the Albanians' national feeling is becoming very strongly aroused and the Albanians become daily more and more disgusted with the Italians for having no definite policy. One Italian leader wishes to make friends with the Mussulmans, while another will concentrate on making friends with the Orthodox Albanians. The rank and file of the Italian soldiers give it clearly to be understood that they do not care two straws for Albania or for the welfare of its inhabitants.

The thinking Albanians, therefore, have come to the conclusion that there are only two courses open to them, either to come to terms with the Serbs, when they hope that they will be able to exercise some influence in the Jugoslav State, or to try to arrange some understanding with the Greeks.

As regards the first alternative, Mr. Eden thinks that it would only be a matter of time for the Serbs entirely to wipe out the able-bodied Albanians, and to Serbise the remainder of the population, and that such an idea should not be encouraged. He has more hope of the Greek solution, because although there has been and still is considerable feeling over the question of Koritsa, the Albanians are at the moment satisfied with an assurance which has been given to them by the Italian Foreign Office that the Greeks will not be allowed to occupy the town and district, except in accordance with the decision of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Eden considers that it must in time become clear to the Italians that they cannot hope to hold Valona, except by force; and the position of Valona is such that it would require continual expeditions for the Italians to preserve a base there, since it is surrounded by hills and the Albanians will be able to obtain artillery both from the Serbs and from the Greeks while the Italian soldier has a constitutional dread of venturing into the mountains. Mr. Eden also thinks that Italian public opinion would never agree to a war in Albania. They do not really care enough about the country and they are concentrating upon the acquisition of Fiume. Nor is it to the interest of the Greeks to have the Italians at Valona; and Mr. Eden is of opinion that the Greeks would be ready to make concessions in the Koritsa region if Italy would leave Valona and content herself merely with a naval base on the island of Saseno. In any case, Albanian national sentiment becomes every day more aroused and the Albanians are determined if possible to resist partition, and certainly to resist an Italian mandate. They would accept either Great Britain or the United States as mandatories.

As regards Essad, Mr. Eden said that he had little, if any, political importance in the country; but that he is a strong man and is being used by the Serbs for their own purposes. Wherever he appears, he collects adherents by a few summary hangings and keeps order in the district. What he is aiming at is a small Mussulman State centred round Elbasan and Tirana.

To summarize Mr. Eden's opinion, the Italians have no claim whatsoever to any part of Albania, while they have a just claim to Fiume, and he believes that if they could obtain Fiume definitely, they would be willing to evacuate Albania.

I am, &c.,  
(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)  
V. WELLESLEY

No. 48

*M. Vesnitch to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 30)*

*No. 3892 [97/1/22/19339]*

PARIS, September 29, 1919

My dear Sir Eyre Crowe,

I have the honour to forward enclosed the copy of a note which I sent today to His Excellency G. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, concerning the situation in Fiume and in Dalmatia to [for] your personal use and information.

Believe me, &c.  
MIL. R. VESNITCH

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 48

*M. Vesnitch to M. Clemenceau*

*Translation*

PARIS, September 29, 1919

Monsieur le Président,

The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by order of the Royal Government begs His Excellency to forward the following to the benevolent consideration of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

The act[s] of M. d'Annunzio at Fiume (Rieka) at Suchak and in their neighbourhood have produced in our country a most painful impression. The hope that the Peace Conference will find the means to stop rapidly this adventure was the only reason why this impression did not provoke a most serious crisis. The Royal Government has been sharing this confidence in the authority of the Peace Conference. The events which occurred at Trau<sup>1</sup> (Trogir) and which are symptomatical for the state of mind of the Italian troops in Dalmatia as well as the various manifestations in Italy and the declarations of responsible people, are evidently proving that the danger is more and more growing.

This movement has provoked in our country an intensive feeling of dissatisfaction and our Government is left to a most delicate task to calm this feeling of dissatisfaction. I am entrusted to draw the attention of Your Excellency on the serious consequences of the above movement to which they

<sup>1</sup> See No. 42.

will necessarily put the Royal Government, if the Peace Conference is not going to put an end to this situation prejudicial [sic] to the peace as well as to its authority.

Yours, &c.

No. 49

*Mr. Athelstan-Johnson<sup>1</sup> (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received October 1)*  
*No. 327 Telegraphic [136873/123/3]*

BELGRADE, September 30, 1919

Your telegram No. 275<sup>2</sup> received today.

I saw Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening and spoke to him in the sense (? desired).

M. Gavrilovitch assured me that strictest ( . . . ? instructions)<sup>3</sup> had been sent to civil and military authorities in threatened districts to avoid all incidents and reassure civilian population who are in a state of énervement by telling them to be patient and have faith in justice of future decision of Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Acting First Secretary in charge of H. M. Legation in Belgrade pending the arrival of Sir Alban Young, H.M. Minister at Belgrade in succession to Sir Charles Des Graz.

<sup>2</sup> No. 39.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 50

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*  
*No. 1191 Telegraphic [134659/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 30, 1919

Your telegram No. 1381<sup>1</sup> (of 27th September, Fiume).

Your action entirely approved.

<sup>1</sup> No. 43.

No. 51

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 2)*  
*No. 1394 Telegraphic: by bag [136009/123/3]*

PARIS, September 30, 1919

After today's meeting of Supreme Council<sup>1</sup> a short conversation took place between the Five respecting the situation in Italy. M. Clemenceau read a telegram just received announcing the dissolution of the Italian Parliament, the new chambers being convoked for November 16. I called attention to grave danger of this interregnum being used by irresponsible persons to provoke incidents with the Yugo-Slavs which would afford pretext for Italy entering upon open hostilities, and asked whether something could not be done by the Supreme Council to mitigate this danger. M. Clemenceau said very bluntly that Italy seemed quite determined to go to war with the Yugo-

<sup>1</sup> See Volume I, No. 68.

Slavs. He quoted a statement made by the Italian General Gandolfo that Italy would at once annex Fiume, and make war not only upon the Yugoslavs, but also upon France as France and England were at present weak and incapable of taking any action.

M. Clemenceau said he had brought this incident to the notice of the Italian Government, but expressed the opinion that in the absence of any real government in Italy the Supreme Council was powerless to do anything for the moment. The present Cabinet had no power and the Army refused to obey. The attention of Signor Scialoja was called to the fact attested from all sides that the alleged blockade of Fiume was a transparent sham. The town was being freely supplied and Italian troops and officials passed in and out without any hindrance. M. Clemenceau added that he had recalled all the French troops from Fiume and had although most reluctantly asked the Italian Government to take over the custody of the French magazines and stores which were very important.

Signor Scialoja had nothing whatever to say beyond that he had considered the situation very critical.

Later on Mr. Polk spoke to me alone and urged me to consider whether in spite of M. Clemenceau's view that nothing useful could be done, it was not probable that Italy would keep quiet if America, England and France made it quite clear that they would not tolerate the outbreak of a new war, and that the annexation of Fiume would lead to a definite break between them and Italy. He said President Wilson seemed quite determined not to allow Italy to annex Fiume.<sup>2</sup> So strongly did he feel on the subject that he was even considering the possibility of sending American troops back to Europe. In any case he would probably order a concentration of American naval forces in the Adriatic. Mr. Polk hoped that we would take similar action. If at the same time the American, British and French Governments made a declaration placing before the Italians the choice of accepting the Adriatic compromise elaborated at the Conference or definitely breaking with the Allies, Mr. Polk felt sure a strong movement would declare itself in Italy against any policy involving a fresh war against the Yugoslavs and an isolation of Italy which might easily assume the shape of an economic blockade. He said he had information that the Italian socialists were determined, should any party in Italy try to drag the country into a new war, to start a revolution.

Both Mr. Polk and I have been in communication with the Yugoslav delegation here, strongly advising the utmost patience and exhorting them to go all possible lengths in avoiding any local conflicts or provocation. There can be no doubt that the Yugoslavs have up to now been most exemplary in their attitude, and they realize that it is the Italian game to egg them on into some unfortunate incident which would allow Italy to represent herself as warding off an attack.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 58 and No. 80, annex 7. Cf. also Signor Nitti's message of September 23, 1919, to President Wilson and the latter's reply of September 24, as printed by D. H. Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. xx, pp. 423-5. See further, *ibid.*, p. 436, a telegram of September 29 from Mr. Polk.

Mr. Polk thought it would be well if the English as well as the American press were to give prominence to the obvious manœuvre of the Italians, and dwell on the fact that if, in these circumstances Italy were to proceed to hostilities, public opinion all over the world would refuse to exonerate her from full responsibility for such a catastrophe as the renewal of a general war.

There seems to me much force in this particular suggestion and I have asked Mr. Thorold<sup>3</sup> to communicate with the Political Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office with the view of giving a lead to the British press in the matter on the above lines, should this meet with Your Lordship's approval.

I should be glad to receive your instructions as to what I may say in reply to Mr. Polk's general proposals, and notably whether I may hold out hopes that His Majesty's Government will substantially reinforce their naval squadron in the Adriatic and that they will join in some definite declaration or announcement of policy as regards Fiume and the danger of war between Italy and the Yugoslavs such as Mr. Polk advocates.

<sup>3</sup> Head of the Press Section of the British Delegation in Paris.

## No. 52

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6)*

*No. 423 [137519/123/3]*

My Lord,

ROME, September 30, 1919

In continuation of my reports upon the abnormal situation prevailing in this country, I have the honour to point out that among the many criticisms which are being directed against the President of the Council is that of having allowed himself to be taken by surprise by the adventure of Signor d'Annunzio, which many people profess now to have suspected or known to be imminent. There is, however, good reason to believe that the movement in question was impulsive and spontaneous. It is true that many months ago he had in a public speech used language which suggested defiance of authority. But he had subsequently accepted the post of Director of Civil Aviation, and had undertaken to conduct a flight from Italy to Japan, in preparing for which the Government had incurred very large expenditure.

Intervention at Fiume was, however, it seems, being secretly prepared by the association known as the 'Trento and Trieste', which had been enrolling large numbers of volunteers for the purpose, and making every preparation for an opportune moment. The enterprise was, it is said, to be conducted by the rival dramatic author and poet, Sem Benelli. These preparations were apparently known to the Government, and were being carefully watched. D'Annunzio, on the other hand, was no longer suspected. It appears, however, that after the decision of the Committee of Admirals was made known and the greater part of the Italian garrison at Fiume was withdrawn, a plot was hatched among the officers and men of the grenadier regiment which had just left Fiume, and that they invited d'Annunzio to place himself at

their head and return with them. He accepted the invitation, and all the arrangements for the raid were, I am informed, made in three or four days. This would account for the Government being taken by surprise.

At the present moment the actual interest of the super-excited public is rather being diverted from the future of Fiume to the political situation, and to denunciation of the President of the Council. The final sitting of the Chamber closed in a scene of wild disorder with manifestations of personal violence. The Government, indeed, secured a majority, but when the votes of the Ministers and the Under-Secretaries of State are subtracted from the total of sixty of which that majority was composed it remains a very small one, and it was made up of the adherents of Giolitti and the various elements who were known to have been defeatist or pacifist during the war. The patriotic group of the Federation of National Defence were especially bitter against the President of the Council, and by a strange anomaly they found themselves voting in company with the official Socialists, who have made it a principle to oppose whatever Government may be in office, though the leaders, Turati, Modigliani, and others, are really supporting Signor Nitti outside the Chamber. The Opposition, through their spokesman on this occasion, Signor Raimondo, renounced the idea of a forcible annexation of Fiume, which they had been advocating in the newspapers and in the street, and though they had no solution of the problem to offer, they clamoured for the head of the President of the Council. The parliamentary situation had become wholly insincere and untenable, and only two courses seemed possible. One was that Signor Nitti, having realised that his personality offered an obstacle to the restoration of such serenity of outlook as might make it possible to deal with the critical conditions of an army and navy frankly out of hand, might resign, and that a national or coalition Government might come in to tide over the brief interval before the coming elections. The other was to submit to the Sovereign an immediate dissolution of the Chamber.

I am informed that the former alternative was seriously considered by Signor Nitti, whose political future might possibly have been made more secure by a magnanimous profession of readiness to sacrifice himself in the interests of his country. On the other hand it was represented to him that such a course would be construed as an act of timidity and a capitulation to d'Annunzio. The second alternative was therefore chosen.

The Ministry disproved the rumours freely circulated of internal dissensions by all of them signing the representation to the Sovereign inviting His Majesty to dissolve the Chamber. The step is perfectly constitutional in view of the Government having obtained a vote of confidence. But that composition of the vote when analysed shows the confidence to have been more apparent than real, and under all the circumstances the step partakes somewhat of the nature of a *coup d'état*. The papers which have supported the Government generally approve the measure, recognising that the Chamber was virtually extinct already, but the *Corriere della Sera* regrets that the new elections should have to take place under the control of a Government which

had obtained a majority composed almost entirely of former neutralists. At the same time it admits that this result was largely due to the mistakes and extravagancies of the patriotic party. The Opposition organs are disconcerted and rabid in their denunciations of Signor Nitti, who is stigmatised as prepotent, cynical, and wanting in all ideality, and who has made any solution of the Adriatic issue impossible, while he has hurried the country into an electoral conflict during a moment of intense tension and internal convulsion. His decision is, of course, attributed by them to his desire to cling to power and to control the elections in his own interest. Such critics appear to forget that the mandate of the Chamber expired in any case on the 26th October, and that the general election was bound to ensue immediately after the expiry of a time which it would not have been justifiable to prolong in view of the state to which the Assembly have now been reduced. Not many days ago Nitti and Tittoni admitted to my French colleague that they could see no issue from the *impasse* which the Fiume situation presented, and that the fact that the army could not be counted upon to intervene, while the navy was openly on the side of d'Annunzio, deprived them of the only means of compulsion of which a Government could dispose.

The Government in the address submitted to the King maintain that it is not necessary to obtain the ratification of the Chamber for the Peace Treaties, and that precedent here is in favour of the approval of important treaties by the Sovereign, the royal approval being if necessary subsequently submitted to Parliament in accordance with the terms of Article 5 of the Constitution. Article 5 lays down that executive power belongs to the King alone, and after defining the royal attributes it concludes, 'Treaties which involve financial obligations or modifications of the territories of the State can only have effect after the assent of the Chamber has been obtained.' Now, as regards the Peace Treaty with Germany, which entails neither financial obligations nor modifications of Italian territory, it would appear that the ratification by the Sovereign would suffice. As regards the Austrian Peace Treaty the position is different, and it is contended that the royal approval would not suffice to give effect to it without the consent of Parliament, which could not now be obtained until after the new Chamber meets on the 1st December.

It may be argued on the other hand that the Chamber by legislation in 1915 ceded its legislative powers to the Government which, for the duration of the war, was empowered to legislate by decrees having the full force of law. It seems doubtful, however, whether that measure really connoted an extension of legislative power to cover such cases as the one under consideration. This question will no doubt lead to protracted controversy.

The issue which now preoccupies everyone is what action the army will take, and whether or not the danger exists of a military *pronunciamiento*. The arrogation to itself of unconstitutional powers by the army would at once provoke counter-action by the Socialist Party, and entail a danger of civil war. It is evident that directions given to the military forces are no longer being obeyed. An instruction has been issued to put the military aeroplanes

out of action by the removal of essential pieces, but I am informed by the air attaché that this instruction has been ignored, and that some thirty aeroplanes have already gone to Fiume. It is even rumoured to be doubtful whether the Carabinieri, the one arm on which the Government have hitherto been able to rely, can altogether be counted upon. It is the continuance in office of Signor Nitti on which the whole issue turns, and as he has decided not to resign, and has dissolved the Chamber, the situation is undoubtedly extremely grave. The old opposition between the North and South is having its influence, and the most irreconcilable opposition is to be anticipated from Genoa and Milan against a Minister who is said to have surrounded himself with adjutants from the Southern provinces to which he belongs.

There would appear now to be only two possible issues from the present intolerable situation. The one is the sacrifice of Signor Nitti, which the recent action of the Government seems to preclude. The other would be the rapid settlement of the Fiume question by an acceptable compromise, and the entrusting of the temporary control of the city by the Allies to a regular Italian force under an officer in whom the army has entire confidence, such as, for instance, the Duke of Aosta. If that could be contemplated it is probable that d'Annunzio would agree to terminate the irregular situation and withdraw. Signor Nitti has done his best to maintain international decisions, and has deserved well of the Allies. He needs this assistance to save him from the consequences of his action.

I have, &c.  
RENNELL RODD

### No. 53

*Mr. Athelstan-Johnson (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received October 2)*

*No. 328 Telegraphic [136235/123/3]*

BELGRADE, October 1, 1919

Major Hanau, delegate in Serbia of Supreme Economic Council in Paris, returned to Belgrade yesterday from Fiume.

He had gone there to (? control)<sup>1</sup> British relief stores and to make arrangements for landing of cattle which are gift of Agricultural Relief of<sup>2</sup> Allies Committee to Serbia. He succeeded in placing stores in place safely<sup>3</sup> under French guard with the exception of one truck of hospital stores to<sup>4</sup> half a truck of boots (which had been?) looted. He reports trains are passing freely from Italy into Fiume and that there is free access of goods and passenger traffic. 27 trucks of foodstuffs entered Fiume from Italy on September 21st and September 22nd.

<sup>1</sup> The text of this telegram as received by the British Delegation in Paris here read '... to safeguard British relief stores', &c.

<sup>2</sup> This word was omitted from the text received in Paris.

<sup>3</sup> The text received in Paris here read '... in place of safety', &c.

<sup>4</sup> The text received in Paris here read '... stores and half a truck', &c.

From conversations with General Savey commanding French troops and from what he himself saw in the town he is of opinion that there is harmony<sup>5</sup> between Italian loyalist officers and men and insurgents.

I am reporting fully by next bag.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>5</sup> The text received in Paris here read '... that there is collusion between', &c.

No. 54

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6)*

*No. 425 [137521/123/3]*

*ROME, October 2, 1919*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 423<sup>1</sup> of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have just had a conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the situation here. I asked Count Sforza whether he was seriously preoccupied. He said that he felt he ought to be, but that nevertheless he was not, and he remained optimistic about the internal conditions.

What at the present moment gave him most cause for anxiety was the position in Jugo-Slavia itself. The dominance of the Slavians was being so ruthlessly and tyrannically imposed upon the other elements that the Croatians were almost disposed to show a certain sympathy towards the Italians. He feared that the spirit of irreconcilability which had been engendered might, in order to distract attention from internal divergencies, encourage the idea of uniting in an attack on the Italians, which would be disastrous. I said I thought that the Jugo-Slav leaders were much too shrewd to do anything which would bring them to loggerheads with the Great Powers. Count Sforza said that he had been a good deal in the Balkans, and his experience there filled him with misgivings. These peoples still believed in nothing but force. They might, for their own purposes, appear to accept the principle of the League of Nations, but they had absolutely no faith in ideal solutions, and were still in the mentality of the *condottieri* of the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. They held that they could only, and would only, gain their ends by violent methods, and they would always appeal to these when it suited their interest. He had been some years at the legation at Belgrade, and had often discussed the possible future union of the Southern Slavs with Servians, who foresaw the difficulties which would be presented by differences of religion and varying degrees of civilisation. The only remedy they anticipated was a violent one, and they had been putting their principles into practice in Montenegro and Croatia. One of the unfortunate results of the European war was that there were now komitajis operating within 20 miles of Trieste.

Count Sforza admitted that Signor Nitti had been infelicitous in his first announcement regarding the raid on Fiume and had given great offence to

<sup>1</sup> No. 52.

the army. The seriousness with which the matter had been taken up and the consequent unpopularity of the Prime Minister was a measure of the intensity of feeling in this country on the Adriatic question.

In confirmation of his optimism, he added that the King, whom he had just seen, was in excellent spirits and did not seem at all depressed by the situation.

I have, &c.  
RENNELL RODD

No. 55

*Letter from Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/Italy & Vatican]*

ROME, October 2, 1919

My dear George,

Although the ferment here continues as great as ever and the language of everyone you meet is hyperbolical and extravagant I still feel that when sufficient steam has been let off we shall get through without an internal collision. Nitti has won the first hand in the game by dissolving the Chamber which has visibly upset the opposition, who have evidently been disconcerted and do not quite know what their next step should be. My greatest fear is that the Jugo Slavs in view of their internal difficulties and quarrels might unite to fight the Italians.

Nitti seems to think that divergencies are beginning to grow up between d'Annunzio and the National Council at Fiume and that with time it will be possible to create a conflict there, and eventually to get rid of him.

I think it would be possible when the opportune moment comes to bring the army into line under the Duke of Aosta, who is immensely popular with them, and substitute him for d'Annunzio if the powers could put Fiume provisionally under Italian occupation.

I hear privately from sources in the country districts that many of the returned soldiers are really for Nitti as their one object is to be demobilised as soon as possible. It is rather in the cities where the military associations have been formed that the anti-Nitti movement is being stirred up by the men who don't wish to lose their military jobs. I expect Nitti knows pretty well what the majority of the ex-soldiers feel. But at present his difficulty is that the officers are against him, and that being so the army as a whole cannot be counted on. It is a dreadful mess and I shall be glad to be relieved of any sense of responsibility for things here.<sup>2</sup> On the whole I put my trust in the sense of the masses and the want of 'guts' for further trouble. The Catholic party is gaining ground everywhere and the elections will I expect produce surprises. There is little doubt that Nitti has come to terms with the Vatican.

Ever yours,  
RENNELL RODD

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not indicated. It would seem probable, however, that this letter was dispatched by the same bag as No. 54, received on October 6.

<sup>2</sup> Sir R. Rodd had recently been appointed to serve on Lord Milner's Mission to Egypt.

No. 56

Mr. Athelstan-Johnson (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)

No. 195 [139023/136740/19]

BELGRADE, October 3, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 333<sup>1</sup> of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward herein copy of the *aide-mémoire* I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting Italian military activities on the Gulf of Cattaro, Vassoievic, and the regions round about Moratche and Douga.

Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that this *aide-mémoire* had been drawn up by Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the S.H.S.<sup>2</sup> Government were becoming seriously alarmed at these Italian preparations, the more so as the S.H.S. military authorities had made it plain to the Italian commanders that they intended to resist any further encroachments on their territory by force of arms.

I have, &c.

W. ATHELSTAN-JOHNSON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 56

*Aide-mémoire*

D'après les informations reçues, le Prince Pierre de Monténégro se trouve actuellement à Saint-Jean-de-Medua. Les Italiens préparent, pour le 3 octobre le plus tard, une attaque contre les troupes royales — attaque qui commencerait aux Bouches de Cattaro, entre Herzog-Novи et Rissan, où de nombreuses troupes italiennes sont déjà amenées. Au moment de l'attaque, le Général Véchovitch, qui organise une brigade à Vassoiévivi et qui sera chef de l'expédition, se portera énergiquement au secours des Italiens. Le Général Miloche Médénitza s'occupe du recrutement des insurgés dans la région de Moratche; le Capitaine Mata Todorovitch se trouve à Douga avec quarante brigands. Les magasins italiens aux Virovi Kastratski fournissent les armes et les munitions en abondance. Avant l'attaque, on prépare le massacre des officiers, des députés, des maires et de tous les notables.

BELGRADE, le 2 octobre 1919

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received in the Foreign Office on October 3, 1919) summarized the information given in the present despatch and enclosure.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. Serbo-Croat-Slovene.

No. 57

Mr. Athelstan-Johnson (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received October 4)

No. 334 Telegraphic [137157/123/3]

BELGRADE, October 3, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

M. Trumbitch<sup>2</sup> sent for me this evening and spoke to me about Italian

<sup>1</sup> See No. 56, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs.

military activities on Adriatic coast. He said that though d'Annunzio's *Ardenti* had yesterday fired on and pillaged village of Zameta and position at Spalato gave him some cause for anxiety, he felt convinced Serb-Croat-Slovene authorities had situation well in hand. But that, with regard to Cattaro, position was (? different). It was far from Belgrade, and orders took time to reach borders of Montenegro, often due to defective telegraphic communication. He had reason to believe Italian Navy was showing itself predisposed towards d'Annunzio's soldiery and he requested me to inform you that 'he would be glad to see one or two cruisers in Bocche di Cattaro in order to guard against any possibility of unfortunate incidents.'

He desired me to say he would continue to work for an amicable solution of difficulties between Italy and this country.

Repeated to Peace Conference with my immediately preceding telegram.

No. 58

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 4)*

No. 1410 Telegraphic [136781/123/3]

PARIS, October 3, 1919

Fiume.

Mr. Polk has notified French and Italian representatives of President Wilson's decision regarding Fiume.<sup>1</sup> President categorically rejects any scheme which hands over Fiume to Italy in any form. He is willing to return to idea of Buffer State and to abandon stipulation of plebiscite after 15 years, also, although reluctant, to consent to Italian mandate for Albania but on very precise conditions. Monsieur Martino who has returned from Rome came to see me and said Italian Government determined to seek solution of Fiume question before election.

Monsieur Clemenceau with whom I discussed situation this morning expressed opinion that Italians would accept this Fiume arrangement. He informed me at the same time that Monsieur Scialoia has definitely stated that Italy would ratify German treaty without waiting for assent (? of) Parliament. Monsieur Clemenceau considers situation on the whole decidedly more favourable provided always no incident takes place.

Memorandum follows by bag explaining fully exact position of Fiume negotiations at the moment.

Mr. Polk, who continues to press me on question whether England will re-inforce her naval forces in Adriatic, told me he had also asked Monsieur Clemenceau whether French would do the same to which Monsieur Clemenceau had replied that he was most reluctant to do so. Possibly however this may not be Monsieur Clemenceau's final decision and I am disposed to share Mr. Polk's opinion that if British, French and United States Governments were to show united front and clearly manifest their determination to have peace kept between Italians and Jugo-Slavs it would help to keep situation quiet.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 51, note 2.

Colonel House<sup>2</sup> whom I saw subsequently spoke to me in same sense and expressed earnest hope that America, England and France would stand and act together in this matter.

<sup>2</sup> Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Peace Conference.

No. 59

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 1204 Telegraphic [136009/123/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 4, 1919

Your telegram No. 1394<sup>1</sup> (of September 30th. Situation in Italy and Adriatic).

Following are my views in regard to proposals made to you by Mr. Polk.

1. Press on the whole have taken a sufficiently sensible line about the Italian raid. Assumption of rôle of sole monitor to Italy would not be good propaganda, which would in any case have to be limited. I think British Press would be placed in unnecessarily invidious position.

2. Naval and military authorities were immediately consulted on receipt of your telegrams Nos. 1374<sup>2</sup> and 1375<sup>3</sup> (of September 25th) as to whether co-operation with French and American forces in the Adriatic in preventing further incidents would be possible. Army Council deprecate despatch of isolated battalions as not being able to cope with disturbances when they arise and as being therefore either left in difficulty or subjected to hasty withdrawal. No troops are available for employment in Adriatic unless taken from Army of the Rhine, Dantzig, Memel, Silesia or other places in Central Europe. Admiralty do not propose to amend instructions already issued to Senior Naval Officer in Adriatic until some modification of present policy in regard to Adriatic is communicated to them. While the employment of British troops in the Adriatic seems undesirable, question of British naval co-operation with American squadron would be for the Admiralty to decide when a decision as to policy has been reached at Paris.

3. I see no objection to a definite declaration of policy by Supreme Council, which would thereby only be fulfilling its *raison d'être*. While not taking initiative, if a proposal is put forward for a joint representation to the Italian Government by either the French or United States Delegates, you should not decline to consider it, but should telegraph text to Foreign Office and await further instructions. Matter can then be laid before War Cabinet for decision.

In the meantime representations as to the gravity of the situation have been made to the Italian Ambassador here.

<sup>1</sup> No. 51.

<sup>2</sup> No. 40.

<sup>3</sup> No. 41.

No. 60

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6)*

*No. 636 Telegraphic [137719/136740/19]*

ROME, October 6, 1919

Belgrade telegram No. 333.<sup>1</sup>

Italian Government have today caused to be published in Press message dated Paris to the effect that Serbian Government have communicated to Allied Legations with the exception of Italy a memorandum (?) alleging that Italy is preparing an attack on Serbian troops in Montenegro. Italian delegation at Paris had been instructed to declare this information to be entirely false.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that before issuing this message President of Council and himself had sent for Chiefs of Military and Naval Staffs and asked them for positive assurances on subject and whether they could be certain that nothing of the kind was being organized without their knowledge. Both of them had given their word of honour that allegations were completely untrue.

I told him I had heard from Paris that Prince Peter of (? Montenegro) had gone to Medurap [? Medua]<sup>2</sup>. He said he could not undertake responsibility for what Montenegrin princes or others might do. He could only affirm that (? Italian)s were not implicated.

Addressed to Foreign Office: sent to Belgrade.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 56, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. enclosure in No. 56.

No. 61

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)*

*No. 637 Telegraphic [138209/123/3]*

ROME, October 6, 1919

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me this morning about message conveyed by Lord Hardinge to Italian Ambassador regarding Fiume<sup>1</sup> and suggestion that prolongation of situation might involve dissociation of Italy from Alliance.

He said message was based on supposition that Government were doing nothing to remedy situation and if there were reasons to believe they were in any way in collusion he would have understood it. But they were doing all that they could in an extremely difficult position. It was humiliating to have to confess it but Army and Navy would refuse to obey if ordered to take forcible measures and Government was driven to such expedients as they could employ. They were making every endeavour to reach a settlement, but such action as they could take had necessarily to be kept secret and must be slow. They were now endeavouring to create a divergence or conflict between local Government and d'Annunzio which would bring about his withdrawal. If they could get hold of him they would bring him to trial but

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Nos. 59 and 64.

they were precluded from using force against him because they could not induce Army to take any action. If they could secure his withdrawal and if Powers would (?) 'allow' omitted) Italian troops to remain provisionally in occupation as mandatory of Conference under orders of a General or a Prince, and he mentioned Duke d'Aosta, he believed position could be saved. President of United States had already shown some disposition to modify his former attitude and, with one or two minor retouches to save face, he thought compromise which had been put forward could be accepted.

But pressure put on Italian Government at this juncture could not improve matters. It could only have for result either that Italian Government must resign and they might only be succeeded by a less amenable one, or it would encourage prospect of revolution here which could hardly be to advantage of Allies in view of effect which it would have in other countries. He did not cease to represent urgency of at once regularizing situation since to leave things as they are (?) must encourage all Powers to try and realize their particular aims by establishing a *fait accompli*.

I said I regretted that a communication should have been made to Press under form of a telegram from London stating it was understood British Government were about to express surprise at prolongation of an irregular situation which might have for its effect to separate Italy from Alliance.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had hesitated as to whether to pass communication but he had ended by thinking it was probably best that country should be warned of gravity of situation.

I said that while that was perhaps desirable I regretted that there should have been a communication which had the effect with Italians of emphasising apparent hostility of Great Britain while France was represented as having come round to Italian point of view.

Italian Government are undoubtedly doing what they can to remedy a situation which they deplore but their position and that of country is so critical that I should regret any active pressure unless there is good reason to believe it can produce a result which in view of attitude of Army seems more than doubtful.

Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted message had been conveyed in a most friendly manner but communication to Press here being only from a . . .<sup>2</sup> does not reveal this.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Peace Delegation.

\* The text here is uncertain.

## No. 62

*Letter from Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/Italy & Vatican]*

My dear George,

ROME, October 6, 1919

You will have realised from my telegram today<sup>2</sup> that things have not gone as I could have wished here. What was apparently a friendly warning given

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably No. 61.

to the Italian Govt. through Imperiali appeared to them here to give an opportunity to themselves of strengthening their hand, and a communication was put into the press under the guise of a telegram from London, announcing that it was understood that H.M.G. were contemplating telling the Italian Government what you in fact, through Imperiali, had already told them.

This of course has started all the press off again—announcing that we are against Italy etc., etc., while the French are now posing as their friends and the supporters of their point of view.

You may perhaps have thought that this Government were really rather satisfied with what has happened at Fiume, and ready if not anxious to prolong the situation. But I can assure you they are doing all they can to remedy it. The difficulty is that they are well nigh impotent. The army is out of hand and the navy is all for d'Annunzio. They have no expedient but time and what they can hope for from differences in Fiume itself which they are doing their best to foster, and I understand with considerable success. They have already approached the Duke of Aosta, I gather, to ascertain whether he would be ready to step in.

Latest information shows that the people of Fiume are getting tired of the equivocal position and the cessation of employment and wages and there is good hope that it will not be long before they have had enough of d'Annunzio, when they see no results. My French colleague who is following the situation very closely also believes that the only way out is to allow time.

We are so near a serious crisis here, that anything which tended to accelerate a collision between the military element, which is practically in mutiny against the Government, and the Socialists, who really support Nitti, is very dangerous. I gave Nitti to understand that I did not think it justifiable to have made the use they have done of your warning. It may help to bring certain elements in the country to reason, but of course its first effect has been an excited outcry against us. The people here have been so nervously stimulated that they cannot see anything in proportion just now, and are always off their balance on the slightest provocation.

The postponement of the departure of the Commission<sup>3</sup> has not a little disconcerted me. Only some ten days ago Milner gave me to understand he had definitely decided to start. I have to leave this for somewhere, and don't want to convey my family under present ruinous conditions on unnecessary journeys. So we hardly know what to do for the best, and I am involved in a little matter of two hundred pounds for the places engaged for the 15th at Naples!

It has been very trying packing up in the great heat here, but now that is done and we hope to go. The question is where to.

Ever yours,  
RENNELL RODD

<sup>3</sup> i.e. the Milner Mission to Egypt.

No. 63

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)*

*No. 639 Telegraphic [138211/123/3]*

My telegram No. 637.<sup>1</sup>

ROME, October 7, 1919

It would be useful to me to know exact (?) terms of warning conveyed through Italian Ambassador. The curt and infelicitous communication made to Press here has given impression that such an official warning has actually been conveyed and is not, as there suggested, only contemplated. One paper pretends that it threatens Italy with exclusion from League of Nations and another assumes that warning was really of a (?) more formidable character than communication to Press admitted.

<sup>1</sup> No. 61.

No. 64

*Earl Curzon to Sir R. Rodd (Rome)*

*No. 795 Telegraphic [137641/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 7, 1919

At Lord Hardinge's request Italian Ambassador called here on the 4th October and was informed that His Majesty's Government were greatly concerned at the recent proceedings at Fiume and at the attitude of the Italian Government, which in present circumstances seemed to be one of *laissez-faire*. I had therefore requested Lord Hardinge to impress upon him that, from the fact that neither I nor Lord Hardinge had so far said anything to him on the subject, he and his Government should not consider that the recent transactions at Fiume had the tacit approval of His Majesty's Government.

Lord Hardinge had also been instructed to warn his Excellency in a friendly way of the danger which his country was running, danger of complete external isolation as well as of internal trouble, of which he was in a better position to judge than His Majesty's Government. Lord Hardinge impressed upon him that this warning was given by me in a friendly sense, and with a desire to strengthen the Italian Government in acting in accordance with the declared views of the Allies, and said that I was anxious that the Italian Ambassador and his Government should understand that His Majesty's Government neither approve nor condone the present situation at Fiume.

Italian Ambassador replied that, in his own personal opinion, in view of the pacificatory assurances and the whole tenour of M. Tittoni's recent speech, wherein stress was laid upon the importance of Italy remaining within the Alliance, he himself would have preferred that this communication had not been made to him. He added that he knew it to be part of the policy of which Paris is the fountain-head.

Italian Ambassador asked Lord Hardinge to convey the above message to me; he was evidently agitated.

No. 65

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 8)*

No. 643 Telegraphic [138661/123/3]

ROME, October 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 795.<sup>1</sup>

Communication made to Italian Ambassador is quite different in spirit, and, as regards one point, in sense, from what has been suggested in communiqué to press published here, which has produced profound impression and given occasion to very exaggerated interpretations.

Literal translation (?) of this communiqué is as follows:—

'It is understood in official circles that British Government intend to express to Italian Government their surprise at prolongation of an illegal situation at Fiume. (? British Government) consider continuance of such an illegal situation may involve Italy in risk of separating from Alliance.'

It has been universally assumed that (?) this was intended to convey that such a warning had already been given, and in some comments it has been interpreted as a threat of expulsion from League of Nations if a remedy be not found for situation.

Result has been violent anti-British campaign in Opposition press. Government organs have been more reserved, but express note of alarm, and there seems no doubt that occasion has been deliberately made use of to impress the country by over-emphasising Note [sic] of a communication not meant for publication at all.

Simultaneously, press is pointing out contrast of friendly attitude of France, which it is encouraged to do by messages from Paris, where feeling is (?) described as now wholly favourable to Italy.

I shall see President of the Council this afternoon, and intend to (?) draw his attention to terms of Government communiqué to press and serious effect which it is having.

<sup>1</sup> No. 64.

No. 66

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)*

No. 644 Telegraphic [139077/123/3]

ROME, October 8, 1919

Telegram from Astoria No. 1410.<sup>1</sup>

Proposed reinforcement of naval forces in Adriatic.

President of the Council yesterday told a mutual friend who has no political interests that he was now optimistic about situation at Fiume where as anticipated violent divisions have arisen and d'Annunzio has had to assume position of mediator between extravagant partisans and moderates. Discontent is increasing and his belief was that movement would end in fiasco if only no outside pressure was put upon country which would rally public opinion to opposition.

<sup>1</sup> No. 58.

Italian Intelligence also report that d'Annunzio is losing control over troops and that situation is getting out of hand.

No. 67

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)*

*No. 646 Telegraphic [138728/123/3]*

ROME, October 8, 1919

President of the Council whom I have just seen was very depressed and admitted that he was seriously anxious about condition of country. His only hope was in help of Allies.

He admitted divergences had arisen in Fiume but he still did not see how he was able to get rid of d'Annunzio.

Latter was without moral sense to appeal to and acted only from a morbid sense of vanity.

Yet he could not use force because his orders would not be obeyed.

In all other respects army would respond and rank and file of regiments not at front were sound, but officer class had lost reason on this particular point. It was a sentimental madness and this was most difficult thing to deal with in a country which was moved by sentiment and it was impervious to argument or logic.

(? And) yet issue of Fiume must be settled at once. Tension in country was so acute that it could not go on for more than another fortnight. The labouring classes were on his side because they knew he would (? not) agree to any action which would endanger renewal of war. But army at front on this particular point was out of hand and he believed his presence at head of Government alone stood between them and revolution. Revolution in Italy would react on the other countries and he considered there was great danger of its effect in France.

Anything in nature of outside pressure on Italy just now would only precipitate matters and he saw no way of avoiding danger but in help of Allies. On my asking what he meant by our help, he referred to Tittoni's last proposal. If Allies would accept and press on United States to accept principle of Fiume becoming a free state, altogether autonomous, with territorial contact with Italy even in a small strip along coast in order to satisfy sentiment here he could control situation and would agree to that solution.

He would undertake at expense of Italy and with Italian labour (? which he) would be glad to employ for internal reasons to convert Buccari into better port than Fiume to content Jugo-Slavs.

Technical disadvantage of Buccari could be overcome by adequate engineering works which he would guarantee.

He begged me earnestly to urge acceptance of this proposal which offered only issue from a desperate situation for this country.

I spoke to him of communiqué to Press referred to in my telegram No. 643<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 65.

and informed him of real nature of language used to Italian Ambassador which did not justify interpretations which had been attributed to it. He said Ministry of Foreign Affairs were responsible for terms of communiqué and he thought storm had now blown over. I cannot altogether agree with him.

Finally he said French Government were ready to support latest proposal and he hoped that we would also urge its acceptance by United States in view of grave danger which situation now presented.

Sent to Paris.

### No. 68

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)*

*No. 647 Telegraphic [139454/123/3]*

ROME, October 9, 1919

1. Anticipation of President of the Council that storm raised by announcement of warning from Great Britain was now over proves incorrect. Campaign is very violent, and papers are filled with extracts from French press dissociating France from alleged step taken by Great Britain, and maintaining that France remains friendly to Italy. They also publish telegram from Paris announcing that Polk has explicitly informed American journalists that step taken in London was in no way influenced by United States. These messages form text for extravagant comments and hypothesis, with result that responsibility for acute tension arising over Fiume in country is transferred to our shoulders.

Wireless summary (*sic*) yesterday quotes message from Reuter Agency correct (? ing) report abroad concerning alleged action of Great Britain. This message has not been published here, and may have been withheld, as it is not in conformation in [? with] communication made by Government here for their own purposes. But I am informed Opposition newspapers have ascertained that there has been a Reuter message in this sense, and will now attack Government communication as having given misleading version.

I have shown wireless publication of telegram to *Corriere della Sera*.

2. Papers regarded as Government organs have used word 'ultimatum' in regard to communication made here to press.

Sent to Peace Delegation.

### No. 69

*Earl Curzon to Sir R. Rodd (Rome)*

*No. 799 Telegraphic [138661/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 643<sup>1</sup> (of 8th October).

From announcements made in Press at Rome and here it would appear that garbled and erroneous statements as to nature of communication made

<sup>1</sup> No. 65.

by Lord Hardinge to Italian Ambassador on October 4th assumed two forms. (1) A telegram alleged to have been sent to Rome through Stefani Agency here: (2) an official communiqué made to Italian Press by Italian Government. Italian Ambassador has denied in conversation with Lord Hardinge that there was any leakage in Italian Embassy here, or that Stefani Agency sent alleged message. Unfortunately I have reason to doubt these statements, having good authority for belief that Ambassador after his first interview with Lord Hardinge himself visited London offices of *Secolo* and Stefani Agency while latter was directly cited as authority by Italian Press.

At Roman end proceedings appear to have been equally questionable, the communiqué issued by the Italian Government finding no justification either in Lord Hardinge's remarks to Italian Ambassador or in latter's telegram to his Government substance of which he has since read at Foreign Office, and being obviously designed to create prejudice against Great Britain.

If you have not already done so you should, without disclosing secret action of Ambassador here, make strong representations to Italian Government about a procedure so calculated to prejudice relations between our two Governments, and if you think it desirable should ask that official correction be made. If such divulgations, whether correct or incorrect and still more, if incorrect, continue to be made, friendly communication between two Governments becomes wellnigh impossible.

At same time I make no qualifications whatsoever of exceedingly moderate and friendly terms of original communication to Italian Ambassador.

## No. 70

*Letter from the Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/France]*

PARIS, October 9, 1919

My dear George,

. . . There<sup>2</sup> is a good bit of excitement here about the statement—presumably made, not by you but by somebody in the Foreign Office—with regard to Fiume. At first the French were rather inclined to be huffy at our having taken any such action without consultation with them but their attitude is now changed and they are apparently very pleased because they see that the Italians are very much annoyed about it and very irritated with us and it is their game at the present moment to pass as Italy's great friend. If this particular statement was unauthorised I think it should if possible be contradicted because people returning from Italy, both English and French, tell me it has created a great deal of feeling in Italy.

Colonel House as you doubtless know left for America on Sunday.<sup>3</sup> I saw

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of this letter related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> October 5, 1919.

him before he went and he was obviously very anxious with regard to the President's health. He seemed to think it would be a very considerable time before he would be able to take any public participation in affairs though I rather gathered from House that he is going over so as to be in very close touch with the President and as far as possible to pull the strings. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Yours ever,

D.

No. 71

*Earl Curzon to Sir R. Rodd (Rome)*

No. 798 Telegraphic [137157/123/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 9, 1919

Belgrade Telegram No. 334<sup>1</sup> (of October 3rd. Adriatic).

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Chargé d'Affaires states that his Government are very anxious about two points in the Adriatic situation:

(1) Lest the Italian troops who have been recalled by their Government from Bocche di Cattaro should refuse to leave and endeavour to hold the town.

(2) Lest d'Annunzio's friends should cross the Dalmatian frontier in the direction of Spalato.

When questioned on the point he gave assurance that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government were doing all in their power to preserve peace and had purposely stationed few troops in those regions, but that they feared what might happen.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government therefore asked the British, French and United States Governments to send some warships to the Adriatic in order to show that the decisions of the Conference must be respected.

Chargé d'Affaires realised that it was mainly a matter for the Conference to decide.

Copy to Peace Delegation by bag No. 1217.

Repeated to Bucharest [sic]<sup>2</sup> No. 417.

<sup>1</sup> No. 57.

<sup>2</sup> It appears that this telegram was repeated to Bucharest in error for Belgrade.

No. 72

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)*

No. 1427 Telegraphic: by bag [139636/136740/19]

PARIS, October 9, 1919

Mr. Athelstan-Johnson's telegram No. 333<sup>1</sup> (of October 3).

Signor Brambilla of the Italian Delegation called on October 7 with two telegrams from Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to the *aide-mémoire* referred to. Italian Government deny absolutely that there is any foundation for the report and point to fact that General Piacentini left Cattaro with his troops on October 4.

Italian Government refer to this report as proof of nervous state of Serbs.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 56, note 1.

No. 73

Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20)

No. 442 [143371/123/3]

ROME, October 10, 1919

My Lord,

My recent telegrams will have fully informed your Lordship as to the course of the unfortunate episode which arose as a result of the conversation between Lord Hardinge and the Italian Ambassador on the 4th instant. The communication issued by the official Stefani Agency on the 6th in the form of a telegram from London, dated the 4th October, was, as I had at once assumed on reading it, drafted in Rome after the receipt of a telegram from the Italian Ambassador reporting what had been said to him. On the same morning on which it appeared, and before I had received from your Lordship a report of the real nature of the conversation, I expressed to Signor Tittoni my regret that such a communication should have been issued in view of the effect which it must inevitably produce in this country. He said that perhaps he had made a mistake in 'passing' it, but that he had thought it would serve a useful purpose here to make it generally understood that the Allies, in allowing Italy to deal with the situation created at Fiume by the adventure of d'Annunzio, were not disposed to acquiesce in the prolongation of the situation. As I was not then in possession of the actual terms of the observations which had been made by Lord Hardinge, I was not in a position to criticise the actual wording of the communication, but could only deplore its publication. I also spoke to the President of the Council on the subject shortly afterwards, and he suggested that I should see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, as the responsibility for the communication rested with his Department.

The effect of the publication was disastrous. The Opposition papers spoke of an ultimatum having been delivered to Italy, and the French press, according to the telegrams received here, began with almost indecent haste and zeal to bid for the goodwill of Italians by entirely dissociating France from the British *démarche*. A similar attitude was attributed to Mr. Polk in telegrams received from Paris. My French colleague, whom I have not since been able to see, as he left immediately afterwards for Southern Italy, was reported by the papers to have called at the Foreign Office, and to have renewed assurances of the friendly sentiments of France.

The information published by Reuter regarding the real nature of the interview, which seems to have been issued on the 7th, and which first reached us in the radiographic summary the following morning, was not published here until the evening of the 8th.

This message and the storm which the publication of the original communiqué had aroused in this country no doubt caused some preoccupation at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the official Stefani Agency consequently issued the second communication, a translation of which was forwarded to you in my telegram No. 651<sup>1</sup> of the 10th October.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received October 10) gave the following text of the second

This communication did not appear altogether satisfactory, because its tenor suggested that the Reuter message had explained and 'rectified' what was described as the 'manifestation' of the British Government.

I then received your Lordship's telegram No. 799<sup>2</sup> of the 9th instant, instructing me to speak seriously to the Italian Government in the sense indicated. As regards that part of the telegram the sense was perfectly clear, but certain other passages reached me in a very corrupt form. I gathered, however, that an impression prevailed that there had been in the first instance two Italian communiqüs, one emanating from the Government here and one from the Stefani Agency in London, which it was assumed must have been due to the inspiration of the Italian Ambassador. There had, in fact, been only one published on the 6th October, but though drafted here it appeared in the ostensible form of a telegram from London, dated the 4th October.

Signor Tittoni was confined to his bed throughout the day on the 10th instant. He nevertheless agreed to see me on my representing the matter as urgent, and I called upon him in the evening. I first asked him whether the message given to the press on the 6th had really come from London as it purported to do, because in that case it could only have been given to Stefani by the Italian Embassy, or whether it had been drafted here. Embarrassing as the question must have been to him, he at once said that the Italian Ambassador had had nothing whatever to do with it, and took the responsibility on himself. He said that it had been assumed by Italians that because the Allies had left Italy to deal with the situation produced at Fiume by the adventure of d'Annunzio, that they had disinterested themselves in what was going on, and he thought it important to warn the country that this was not by any means the case. He had, perhaps, acted without reflecting sufficiently on the other effects which such a statement would have in Italy, but nothing was further from his thoughts than to seek to prejudice the relations between our countries. On the contrary, he had great need of our assistance, and had from the first fully appreciated the dangers of the precedent created by d'Annunzio's defiance, and the pernicious example it might offer to other countries, who would be tempted to further their own ambitions by an appeal to the *fait accompli*.

It was clear, therefore, that Signor Tittoni was responsible for this most unfortunate step, and that the conclusion which we had come to here was correct, namely, that the Italian Government had made a quite unjustifiable use of the opportunity afforded by Lord Hardinge's conversation with the Italian Ambassador for their own purposes, and in order to produce a certain effect upon opinion here.

communiqué of the Stefani Agency: 'Reuters' telegram no doubt reflects the views of the British Government and [text uncertain] first and last sentence and the implied explanation and rectification of any previous manifestation on their part. Italian public opinion can only take [text uncertain] this with satisfaction having learnt that in order to arrive at suitable solution of Fiume question we may still hope for cordial co-operation of all our Allies.'

<sup>2</sup> No. 69.

I pointed out to Signor Tittoni the very serious nature of such action. Not only had the impression been conveyed here that a friendly conversation, designed to support the Italian Government in taking the proper measures, had been something in the nature of an ultimatum, but the suggestion that a prolongation of the present situation at Fiume might lead to the eventual isolation of Italy had been perverted into signifying the separation of Italy from the Alliance, which was of course interpreted here as a threat of expulsion. If such a use was made of friendly conversations between Governments and Ambassadors, there was an end to all frankness in international relations.

Signor Tittoni, who was evidently much disturbed, said that they had already corrected the first impression by a message published through the Stefani Agency. I replied that this message did not in my opinion greatly mend the situation, inasmuch as it suggested that we had made rectifications in what had been originally advanced, and I thought that this impression should be corrected. He said he would at once issue a further communiqué, which should clear away all impression of misunderstanding. I urged that it should contain something to make it clear that there had never been any suggestion of Italy going out of the Alliance. Signor Tittoni asked me not to urge this, as it would at once rouse again the whole newspaper controversy and only envenom the situation. His real meaning was, of course, that the Government would find great difficulty in admitting that the terms of their first communication had been misleading, a conclusion which was by now, moreover, being adopted by most of the Opposition press.

I said that in any case I must ask him to give me an assurance that communications would never again be made to the press on the subject of conversations between Ambassadors and Governments without a preliminary understanding between the two Governments concerned, as without such an assurance all exchanges of views in future would become impossible. Signor Tittoni at once frankly recognised that such a request was just and reasonable, and authorised me to give your Lordship a most definite assurance to that effect.

The communication which he at once made through the Stefani Agency after our interview is only in very general terms, and it throws no direct light on the responsibility of the Italian Government for the incident. He could not, however, have admitted the part he had played in this unfortunate affair without resigning office. I think the general public have formed a pretty shrewd appreciation of what really occurred, and that perhaps in the end the episode may be of service in assisting people here to realise the gravity of the situation and the urgency of terminating the present abnormal conditions at Fiume.

In evidence of the effect which the communiqué of the 6th October produced here, I may mention that some members of the Italo-Britannic Institute sent in their resignations to the secretary as a result of its publication.

How far the President of the Council was cognisant of the action of Signor Tittoni, I cannot say. As I have reported above, on my approaching the

subject before your Lordship's instructions had reached me, he referred me to Signor Tittoni, who was, he said, responsible for the communication to the press.

Of Signor Tittoni's diplomatic procedure, I have experience dating from long ago which has always left me mistrustful. His mentality is profoundly Roman and Jesuitical, and the present episode is another instance of his conception that any means are justifiable to secure an end which is, from his point of view, desirable. At the same time I have no doubt as to his real anxiety to find a solution of a question which is making the restoration of internal security and reconstruction impossible in this country, and I believe that he is doing his best to find a way out and to get rid of the incubus of d'Annunzio at Fiume.

When our conversation regarding this unpleasant matter was concluded, he returned to the latter point, and made a strong appeal for the support of His Majesty's Government, as he had already secured that of M. Clemenceau, in order to press on the Government of the United States the acceptance of the compromise which he has now advanced, and which he believed offered the only way of combining the essential points of President Wilson's requirements with the minimum demands which alone would satisfy public opinion here, and thus enable us to get rid of this troublesome issue.

If it be true that the National Council of Fiume are now ready to accept the solution of autonomy, progress has evidently been made in this direction.

I have reported the latter part of our conversation in my telegram No. 655<sup>3</sup> of the 10th instant.

I have, &c.  
RENNELL RODD

<sup>3</sup> No. 74.

#### No. 74

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*

*No. 655 Telegraphic [140132/123/3]*

ROME, October 11, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that General Grazioli who had just returned from neighbourhood of Fiume reported that d'Annunzio begins to recognise that position was unsustainable. Money was practically exhausted, troops were becoming insubordinate, and population had no work and could not go on much longer.

An emissary of Government had been in communication with National Council who would now accept proposal to become an autonomous state provided Allies would agree to continuity of territory to be established by a littoral strip of land along coast. Concession would save face and appease public opinion here which could not otherwise be satisfied. Acceptance of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This Rome telegram No. 654 of October 10 (received October 11) had briefly reported the earlier part of the conversation, given in full in No. 73.

National Council would cut away ground from feet of d'Annunzio whose presence there would have no more reason.

M. Clemenceau would agree to this solution and support it and he begged for our support also with United States. Proposed small concession to save appearances had no substantial importance and it would be of such incalculable advantage to Italy and to everyone else to get rid of this troublesome question. He saw no other way. He might of course resign if his proposal was not acceptable but question would still remain unsolved and his resignation would not improve prospects.

He earnestly begged us to give favourable consideration to this solution and to press it on United States and thus help Italy to escape from an intolerable situation.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Peace Conference.

No. 75

*Earl Curzon to Sir R. Rodd (Rome)*

No. 609 [139666/123/3]

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 11, 1919<sup>1</sup>

With reference to my telegram No. 795<sup>2</sup> of the 7th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that the Italian Ambassador called here again at Lord Hardinge's request on the 8th October, and was shown extracts from the daily press here referring to the message from London which had appeared in the Italian press relating to the situation at Fiume.

Lord Hardinge pointed out to his Excellency that in a message to the *Times* it was stated that the communication was received from the Stefani Agency, and said that, whatever the terms of the message may have been, it was evidently extremely incorrect, since the English press contained a quotation in the words 'threatened her exclusion from the Peace Conference', which the Marquis Imperiali knew had never been used in the previous conversation between him and Lord Hardinge. It was evident that the communication had been the cause of a certain amount of agitation in Italy, and I had therefore instructed Lord Hardinge to ask his Excellency whether he could explain how the Stefani Agency came into possession of information upon which this message was based.

The Marquis Imperiali declared that he knew nothing at all about it; that he would guarantee that as far as his Embassy was concerned there had been no leakage whatsoever; and he added that the manager of the Stefani Agency had come to him on the previous day and expressed astonishment that the newspapers of Rome should have published a message from London in that sense purporting to have come through his agency when no such message had been sent. His Excellency assured Lord Hardinge that he had absolutely no idea whatever as to what was the origin of the message, which he fully realised was of an unfortunate character. In order to convince

<sup>1</sup> This despatch was drafted on October 10, 1919, before receipt of Rome telegram No. 654: cf. No. 74, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> No. 64.

Lord Hardinge that the telegram which he had sent to Rome tallied exactly with the communication made to him, he read to Lord Hardinge the text, which he had brought in his pocket. It was practically in the sense of Lord Hardinge's communication, though it contained one or two expressions rather more harsh than those which had been used by Lord Hardinge, a fact which may be attributed to the Neapolitan habit of exaggeration.

Lord Hardinge enquired whether it was possible that a communication had been issued from the Government Offices of Rome, and had been disguised by a pretence that the message had come from London. His Excellency did not know and could express no opinion. Lord Hardinge therefore presumed that the Italian Government had done this in order to impress public opinion of the gravity of the situation created by d'Annunzio at Fiume. (Very Confidential.)

Lord Hardinge has since heard from an excellent source that, after seeing him on the 4th October, the Marquis Imperiali went straight to the office of *Il Secolo* in a very excited state, and later to the Stefani Agency; also that M. Tittoni, on receiving the Marquis Imperiali's telegram, made a communication to the Italian press.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

#### No. 76

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)*

*No. 658 Telegraphic [140166/123/3]*

My telegram No. 654.<sup>1</sup>

ROME, October 11, 1919

Italian Government have issued a further communiqué to the effect that Minister for Foreign Affairs had had a friendly conversation with British Ambassador which has resulted in clearing up any misunderstanding and made it clear that the two countries will cordially collaborate to find a solution for problems of peace.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 74, note 1.

#### No. 77

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1154 Telegraphic: by bag [138728/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 11, 1919

Rome telegram No. 646<sup>1</sup> (Secret of 8th October. Fiume and Buccari).

Please ascertain whether French Government favour solution proposed by Signor Nitti, and would be prepared to join His Majesty's Government in pressing it on United States Government.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 67.

<sup>2</sup> In a telegram of October 14, 1919 (received that day) Lord Derby informed Lord Curzon that in view of Sir E. Crowe's telegrams of October 11 (Nos. 78 and 79) he had referred the present telegram to Sir E. Crowe 'for necessary action'.

No. 78

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*

*No. 1432 Telegraphic: by bag [140316/123/3]*

*PARIS, October 11, 1919*

Fiume.

Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 646<sup>1</sup> of 8th October.

I asked Mr. Polk today whether he could give me any information respecting the particular solution of the Adriatic question which the Italians were now contemplating. I had [in] a recent telegram from our Ambassador at Rome see[n] references to some fresh proposals by Signor Tittoni, but these references were of so vague a character that I could not understand what exactly was proposed.

Mr. Polk said that it was time (true) that Signor Scialoja had made a fresh proposal to him, but Mr. Polk seemed himself somewhat uncertain as to its precise scope. Apparently Italy would now accept the free State of Fiume under the League of Nations within the limits originally agreed upon when this scheme was telegraphed to President Wilson. But this acceptance was now made subject to several conditions. One was, so far as Mr. Polk could understand, that the coast strip uniting the Italian part of the Istrian peninsula with the town of Fiume should become Italian, so that the town was territorially connected with Italy, the free State losing the seaboard between the two ports. Mr. Polk promptly told Signor Scialoja that it was quite useless to put this forward. He refused categorically to consider it. Then Italy wanted the town of Zara to be diplomatically represented by the Italian Government in its relations with other States. Mr. Polk pointed out that Zara would be quite free to make her own arrangements. The town was claimed as being purely Italian. If that were so, and she desired to be diplomatically represented by Italy, she could no doubt decide accordingly. There was no occasion to make this the subject of an agreement between the Powers now.

A third Italian condition was that some further island should be allocated to Italy. Mr. Polk was unable to remember which island it was, and said he had not yet studied the exact bearing or importance of this demand.

Mr. Polk gave it as his impression that the Italians were really anxious to arrive at a settlement, and were now merely bargaining in their usual persistent way for further concessions. They had apparently been successful in creating local difficulties at Fiume between d'Annunzio and the inhabitants, the latter being made gradually to realise that the town was being involved in serious financial and economical losses. Signor Scialoja expressed himself to Mr. Polk as confident that d'Annunzio would be got rid of, and hoped this end would be the more easily and rapidly attained if the territorial question could be settled in a way that would prove acceptable to the Fiumeans themselves as a definite solution. Mr. Polk asked privately whether Signor Scialoja suggested that his new territorial proposal was to be the

<sup>1</sup> No. 67.

price to be paid by the Allies for the disappearance of d'Annunzio, but Signor Scialoja repudiated any such connection between the two questions. The Italian Government would, he said, in any case, do their best to get d'Annunzio out of Fiume.

No. 79

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)*

No. 1433 Telegraphic [140152/123/3]

PARIS, October 11, 1919

Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 655.<sup>1</sup>

I have so far received no information concerning Signor Tittoni's latest Fiume proposals beyond rather vague indication given to me confidentially by Mr. Polk which I have reported to Your Lordship.

I do not know whether you or Prime Minister, who took an active and personal part in preceding negotiations, wish me to put forward any particular views to Mr. (? Polk). I would myself be disposed to wait and see result of direct discussion with him and Signor Scialoia.

But in any case I could not form an opinion on merits of proposals or advise upon them still less press particular solution on Mr. Polk without having a precise and authentic statement of what is in fact proposed. The short references to proposals in Sir R. Rodd's telegram do not of course purport to give this and since Italian delegate has preserved absolute silence to me on the subject I do not propose to intrude myself at this stage of negotiations by asking him.

<sup>1</sup> No. 74.

No. 80

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

No. 1937 [141415/123/3]

My Lord,

PARIS, October 13, 1919

I have the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information the accompanying memorandum containing an exact account, so far as it has been possible to group all the relevant proposals, of the negotiations which took place between the end of August and the present date between the Allied Governments in regard to the Adriatic question and the future of Fiume.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 80

*Memorandum respecting Negotiations between the Allied Governments in regard to the Adriatic Question and the future of Fiume*

On the 29th August Signor Tittoni submitted for the approval of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau a note containing certain new proposals with regard to the settlement of the Adriatic question which he was anxious, in the event of the British and French Prime Ministers giving it their approval,

should be handed to Mr. Polk to be transmitted to President Wilson for his consideration. The text of the proposals is attached as Annex 1.<sup>1</sup> The new proposals marked a great stage on the part of the Italian Government towards a moderate and reasonable point of view. According to the plan proposed by them, Italian claims to Dalmatia, in so far as these were endorsed by the Treaty of London, were entirely abandoned except as regards the town of Zara and the island of Ugliano. One or two small outer islands were also claimed. In Istria also the Italian Government expressed itself willing to accept the frontier proposed by President Wilson, with the small modification that the town of Albona to the east of the River Arsa (which had been fixed by the President as the frontier line) should be added to the territory annexed to Italy.

The only seriously contentious question left in existence by the Italian note was that of Fiume. As to this, Signor Tittoni proposed two alternative solutions:—

- (a) That Fiume, with a special status of its own, should be included in an independent buffer State, comprising a strip of territory stretching northwards to the railway junction of St. Peter and including also the island of Cherso.
- (b) That the city of Fiume should be directly annexed by Italy, while all the other territory, included under proposal (a) in the buffer State, should be given to Jugo-Slavia. This territory in such case would, however, be neutralised.

2. After full consideration the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau on the 5th September agreed to propose to President Wilson, through the medium of Mr. Polk, the modified text of Signor Tittoni's original draft (this modified text is attached herewith as Annex 2). It differs little from the original Italian proposal. The chief variance is that the new text contains only the first of the two alternative proposals with regard to the status of Fiume, the idea of annexation to Italy of the city being excluded; also the words 'apart from the port' introduce an idea omitted from the Italian draft. Other small points of variance are those concerning Northern Epirus and some of the smaller Adriatic islands.

3. As, however, it appeared unwise to transmit to President Wilson any new proposals which he would almost certainly refuse, the opinion of the American expert adviser, Mr. Johnson, was asked by Mr. Philip Kerr as to the new plan. After discussion with Mr. Johnson on the 5th September, various modifications were suggested to the Prime Minister, and his approval of them obtained on the 7th September. These proposals were originally in the form shown in Annex 3 (an improved text, afterwards accepted both by the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, will be found in Annex 4). On the 7th September they were, by the Prime Minister's wish, communicated by Mr. Leeper<sup>2</sup> to M. Tardieu, who promised to try to obtain Signor Tittoni's

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. For the text of these proposals see No. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. A. W. A. Leeper was a member of the Political Section of the British Delegation.

acceptance of them, though he held out no great hopes that this would be obtained.

4. The exact course of events during the 8th and 9th September it is not possible entirely to elucidate.<sup>3</sup> The main fact is clear, namely, that Signor Tittoni, when approached with these new proposals, which were modifications of his original draft, insisted that he could not entirely accept them, and that he felt that in the case of Fiume the President should have before him the two alternatives originally proposed by the Italian Government, not merely the one proposed (whether in its form in Annex 2 or in Annex 4). As it was obviously impossible to transmit to the President the proposals which the Italians themselves would not accept, Signor Tittoni's demand was admitted. The exact proposals sent on the 10th September to the President are attached hereto as Annex 5. They will be seen to be almost identical with the original proposals of Signor Tittoni, except that—

- (1) The order of the two alternative solutions for the Fiume question is inverted, annexation to Italy being described as the first solution;
- (2) In this first solution (of annexation) is incorporated the demand that the port of Fiume should be handed over to the League of Nations;
- (3) In the case of the second solution for Fiume, more specific stipulations are made as to the sovereignty of the League of Nations and the nature of its control over the buffer State;
- (4) In the case of Dalmatia, instead of Zara and Ugliano being annexed to Italy, they are to be made into a free autonomous city State under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which shall recognise and encourage their Italian character;
- (5) Nothing is said about the frontiers of Albania.

5. On the occasion of the Prime Minister's recent visit to Paris the Adriatic question was once again brought up for discussion before the Supreme Council on the 15th September.<sup>4</sup> M. Clemenceau expressed his opinion that the best solution was to hand the city of Fiume over to Italy, leaving the port and railway to the League of Nations, and all the other territory in question to Jugo-Slavia. He suggested that Mr. Lloyd George and himself should definitely propose this to President Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George, on his part, expressed his readiness to accept the new proposal if President Wilson would agree to it. (The exact terms of the proposal are attached as Annex 6<sup>5</sup>). Mr. Polk showed the greatest diffidence as to what the result of sending this fresh suggestion to the President would be at a time when he was actually considering the telegram sent on the 10th September; however, in deference to the wishes expressed, he agreed to send it.

6. Events showed that Mr. Polk had rightly gauged the mind of the President. He received from the President on the 22nd September a telegram,

<sup>3</sup> Cf., however, No. 27.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume I, No. 57, minute 12, and No. 58, minutes 2 and 3.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This annex was identical with appendix A to No. 58 in Volume I.

the gist of which, as communicated confidentially to the British Delegation on the 2nd October, is contained in Annex 7. It will be seen that the President definitely refuses in it to accept Italian sovereignty over Fiume in any form whatsoever. He expresses himself as willing to accept the second solution embodied in the telegram of the 10th September (Annex 5) and to abandon the idea of a plebiscite in the buffer State after fifteen years.

7. It was after receipt of this decision that Signor Tittoni, on his return to Rome, made his statement in the Italian Chamber with regard to the Fiume negotiations, the details of which are known and published.

8. Considerable confusion has arisen in the course of negotiations through the inaccurate use of the phrase 'free State of Fiume.' This is generally meant to refer to the buffer State suggested many months ago by M. Tardieu,<sup>6</sup> and now accepted by President Wilson. Its area would be considerable, as it would include all the territory stretching from St. Peter in the north to Fianona in the south-west and Fiume in the south-east. On the other hand, the proposal embodied in Annexes 3 and 4 would have done away with the idea of a buffer State (except in so far as this area was to be permanently demilitarised) and would merely have created a free city State of Fiume comprising the small area which has always historically belonged to the *corpus separatum* of Fiume.

In conclusion, attention may be called to the letter addressed on the 5th September by Mr. Polk to Mr. Balfour (Annex 8) which throws valuable light on the attitude of the President towards the question.

PARIS, October 11, 1919

#### ANNEX 2<sup>7</sup> TO NO. 80

##### *Projet de Câble au Président Wilson par MM. Clemenceau et Lloyd George*

L'attitude adoptée par M. Tittoni depuis son arrivée à Paris est nettement différente de celle de MM. Orlando et Sonnino. Il a montré les dispositions les plus conciliantes et un esprit d'étroite solidarité avec les Alliés.

D'une part, au lieu d'invoquer, comme ses prédécesseurs, le Traité de Londres (tout en réclamant sa violation à Fiume), M. Tittoni s'est placé sur le terrain des principes généraux de la Conférence (ethnographiques et économiques).

D'autre part, sur cette base même, il a consenti, depuis le début de nos conversations avec lui, des sacrifices importants par rapport à ses demandes initiales.

Nous nous souvenons du vif désir que vous avez marqué, pendant votre séjour à Paris, d'aider à une solution juste du problème adriatique. Seule l'obstination de MM. Orlando et Sonnino ne nous a pas permis d'aboutir.

Au point où en sont les négociations de Paix, il est urgent de conclure dans le triple intérêt de la tranquillité locale dans ces régions, de la paix générale de l'Europe et de la solidarité nécessaire des pays fondateurs de la Société des Nations.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Introductory Note.

<sup>7</sup> For the omission of Annex 1 see note 1 above.

Pour ces raisons, nous recommandons de façon pressante à votre approbation la solution ci-dess[o]us:

1. *Ligne du Président Wilson*

L'Italie accepte comme frontière est, la ligne du Président Wilson. Elle demande seulement qu'au nord d'Albona cette ligne rejoigne la mer au sud de la route Chersano-Fianona, laissant par conséquent à l'Italie la ville d'Albona, qui est essentiellement italienne et d'où sont partis de nombreux volontaires italiens.

2. *Fiume*

L'Italie accepte:

L'État indépendant dans les limites fixées par le Président Wilson (sauf la petite rectification d'Albona), l'île de Cherso faisant partie de l'État indépendant, conformément à la ligne du Président Wilson; statut spécial pour la ville de Fiume, en dehors du port.

Pour Fiume et l'État indépendant, garanties pour les minorités ethniques.

3. *Dalmatie*

Toute la Dalmatie aux Yougo-Slaves, moins la ville de Zara et l'île d'Ugliano, immédiatement voisine de Zara, qui seront sous le protectorat de l'Italie, toutes garanties étant données au commerce de l'hinterland.

Les intérêts économiques de l'Italie existant en Dalmatie et les droits des minorités italiennes en Dalmatie seront garantis.

4. *Iles*

Les seules îles italiennes seraient par conséquent Lussin, Unie, Lissa, avec les petits îlots de Busi, St. Andrea, Pomo, Pelagossa, Lagosta, avec les petits îlots de Carrio et de Carriola, et Ugliano.

5. *Albanie*

Mandat à l'Italie dans les limites des frontières de 1913.

Pour la frontière du côté de la Grèce, l'Italie accepte qu'au lieu de la frontière de 1913, soit adoptée celle proposée par la Délégation américaine qui laisse Koritza à l'Albanie et donne Argyrokastron à la Grèce.

6. *Vallona*

Souveraineté italienne sur la ville avec l'hinterland strictement nécessaire à sa vie économique et à sa sécurité.

7. *Chemins de fer*

Pour le chemin de fer d'Assling, l'Italie ne présente plus de demande territoriale, mais demande seulement les garanties précises pour l'usage de la ligne en territoire yougo-slave. En contre-partie, aucune cession territoriale ne sera consentie aux Yougo-Slaves dans la vallée du Drin, mais il[s] y recevront, en ce qui concerne l'usage du chemin de fer à construire, les mêmes garanties qui seraient données à l'Italie pour le chemin de fer d'Assling.

### *8. Neutralisation*

L'Italie propose la neutralisation générale de toute la côte et des îles depuis la pointe sud de l'Istrie jusqu'à Cattaro inclus.

### *9. Résumé*

L'Italie fait les concessions suivantes:

- (a) Elle retire sa demande territoriale concernant le triangle d'Assling.
- (b) Elle accepte la ligne du Président Wilson depuis Idria jusqu'au nord d'Albona.
- (c) Elle accepte que l'île de Cherso fasse partie soit de l'État indépendant, soit de la Yougo-Slavie.
- (d) Elle abandonne toute la Dalmatie, moins Zara et l'île d'Ugliano.
- (e) Elle accepte la neutralisation générale.

En contre-partie, l'Italie demande le protectorat italien à Zara (avec l'île d'Ugliano), le mandat albanais (dans les limites de 1913) et Vallona avec son hinterland.

*Le 5 septembre, 1919*

### **ANNEX 3 TO NO. 80**

*Modifications accepted by the Prime Minister on September 7 as a result of Mr. Kerr's conversation with Mr. Johnson*

1. Fiume, *corpus separatum*, to be a sovereign city State, subject to the lease to the Jugo-Slavs of the port (except a quay for its own use), and to full facilities being given for its development.

(Modification added by Prime Minister:—

'Conditions to be laid down by the Council of the League of Nations, so as to protect the rights of Hungary.'

2. The area within President Wilson's line to be permanently demilitarised.

3. Zara to be an autonomous Italian city under the guarantee of the League of Nations. (Amended by the Prime Minister to read: 'The Italian character of Zara to be preserved by making it an autonomous city under the guarantee of the League of Nations.'

4. Islands either as in original draft, *i.e.*, Lussin, Unie, Lissa, Lagosta, and Ugliano, or drop Lagosta for Pelagosa, &c.

### **ANNEX 4 TO NO. 80**

#### **Appendix (B)<sup>8</sup>**

*Modifications proposed by the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour*

1. Fiume town and district, *corpus separatum*, to be a sovereign city State. The port to be handed over with full facilities for its development to the League of Nations, who may make any arrangements they think best for

<sup>8</sup> Thus in original. It seems possible that this reference corresponded to that in No. 27: cf. No. 27, note 3.

turning it to the best account for the districts it can serve, as well as for the town of Fiume itself.

2. The area within President Wilson's line to be permanently demilitarised.

3. The Italian character of Zara to be preserved by making it a free and autonomous city under the guarantee of the League of Nations, who shall recognise and foster its intimate connection with the Italian State and culture.

4. The islands to be as in the original draft, i.e., Lussin, Unie, Lissa, Lagosta, Ugliano, and Pelagosa.

#### ANNEX 5 TO NO. 80

*The Clemenceau-Lloyd George Proposals as submitted to the President on September 10, 1919*

The attitude adopted by Signor Tittoni since his arrival in Paris is distinctly different from that of Signor Orlando and Sonnino. He has shown the most conciliatory disposition and a spirit of close solidarity with the Allies.

On one hand, instead of invoking, as did his predecessors, the Treaty of London (while claiming its violation at Fiume), Signor Tittoni has taken his stand on the general principles of the Conference (ethnographic and economic).

On the one hand [sic], on this same basis, he has consented, since the beginning of our conversations with him, to important sacrifices as compared with his first demands.

We remember the keen desire that you showed during your stay in Paris to assist in a just solution of the Adriatic problem. Only the obstinacy of Signor Orlando and Sonnino prevented us from succeeding.

From the point of view of the peace negotiations, it is urgent to come to a conclusion, in the triple interest of the local calm in these regions, of the general peace of Europe and of the necessary solidarity of the countries founding the League of Nations.

For these reasons we urgently recommend to your approval the following solution:

##### 1. Line of President Wilson

Italy accepts as eastern frontier the line of President Wilson. She only demands that to the north of Albôna this line shall join the sea south of the Chersano-Fianona road, thus leaving to Italy the city of Albona, which is essentially Italian, and whence there have come numerous Italian volunteers.

##### 2. For Fiume two Solutions are Suggested:

*First Solution.*—The city and district of Fiume *corpus separatum* shall be placed under the sovereignty of Italy. In this hypothesis, there will be no

independent State of Fiume. Jugo-Slavia will receive all the territories comprised in this State according to the line of President Wilson (including the island of Cherso, and excepting only Albona).

On the other hand, all the territories in question, that is, those that would have formed part of the independent State, will be demilitarised permanently.

Still in the same hypothesis, the port of Fiume will be handed over, with all facilities for its development, as well as for that of the railways terminating there, to the League of Nations, which will make such arrangements as it may see fit, for the country for which this port is the outlet, as well as for the city of Fiume itself.

*Second Solution.*—Fiume shall be constituted an independent State within the boundaries fixed by President Wilson (with the single rectification of Albona). This State shall be placed under the sovereignty of the League of Nations, which shall assure its administration under a Commission of Government, and shall control the port and the railroads as much in the interest of the countries of which they are the outlet as in the interest of the city itself. All facilities shall be furnished for the development of the port and the railways terminating there.

A special statute protecting the Italianity of the *corpus separatum* of Fiume shall be established by the Commission of Government.

(In both cases the rights of ethnical minorities shall be guaranteed.)

### 3. Dalmatia

All Dalmatia to the Jugo-Slavs except the city of Zara and the island of Ugliano, immediate neighbour of Zara, which shall be submitted to a special régime. Their Italian character shall be protected by constituting Zara a free and autonomous city, under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which shall recognise and encourage its intimate connection with the Italian State and Italian culture. (Every facility shall be furnished to the commerce of the hinterland.) The economic interests of Italy which exist in Dalmatia and the Italian minority rights shall be guaranteed.

### 4. Islands

The only Italian islands would be Lussin, Unie, Lissa, and Pelagosa.

### 5. Albania

Mandate to Italy.

### 6. Vallyona

Italian sovereignty over the city with the hinterland strictly necessary to its economic life and to its security.

### 7. Railroads

Concerning the Assling railroad, Italy no longer presents territorial demands, but only asks for precise guarantees for the use of the line in

Jugo-Slav territory. As a counter, no territorial cession shall be granted the Jugo-Slavs in the Drin Valley, but they shall be accorded a reciprocal use of the railroad to be constructed and the same guarantees which would be given to Italy regarding the Assling railroad.

8. *Neutralisation*

Italy proposes the general neutralisation of all the coast and the islands from the south point of Istria as far as and including Cattaro.

9. *Résumé*

Italy therefore makes the following concessions:—

- (a) She withdraws her territorial demands concerning the Assling triangle;
- (b) She accepts the President Wilson line from Idria as far as the north of Albona;
- (c) She accepts that the Cherso Island constitute either a part of the independent State or of Jugo-Slavia;
- (d) She abandons all Dalmatia;
- (e) She accepts general neutralisation.

ANNEX 7<sup>o</sup> TO NO. 80

*Substance of telegram from President Wilson to Mr. Polk dated September 22.  
(Communicated by Mr. Polk, October 2, 1919)*

The President expressed his amazement and deep distress that Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau should now discuss the question of Fiume passing under the sovereignty of Italy. He remarked that it was the one point upon which they were firm when he discussed this subject with them. He said he could under no circumstances consent to Italian sovereignty over Fiume in any form whatever. He was surprised and disappointed that Tittoni rejected the last proposals, which were a slight modification of the proposals made by Tittoni himself. He stated that he understood he was accepting the second solution in regard to a free state of Fiume with the single addition of a plebiscite, and added, that if it would help he would be willing to accept the so-called second solution without the question of plebiscite, leaving the question of the future of the free State to the League of Nations, provided that it is understood that the Tittoni proposal as to the protection of the Italianity of the *corpus separatum* of Fiume meant only that it should be for the same degree of autonomy that it had in Hungary, and no more.

The President asked me to express to Signor Tittoni his warm appreciation of the friendly spirit that prompted his message, and his great desire to serve Italy in any way consistent with the principles which had been adopted. He pointed out the uselessness of continuing these attempts at a middle course, and further stated that a mandate over Albania is a big price to pay for the Italian acceptance.

\* For the omission of Annex 6 see note 5 above.

ANNEX 8 TO NO. 80

*Letter from Mr. Polk to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

(Personal and Confidential.)

Dear Mr. Balfour,

September 5, 1919

I understand that the enclosed project for the cablegram to President Wilson<sup>10</sup> is to be amended before its transmission. May I take this opportunity to point out that the text contains an apparent contradiction between paragraphs 2 and 9 (c), evidently due to recasting the earlier form of the project, and that in several respects it is not in accord with the results of conversations between Mr. White and Mr. Johnson, of our Delegation, and M. Tittoni. Also, I understand that a new effort is being made to find formulas for Zara and Fiume which the President could accept, and I suppose you may wish to await the result of this effort before addressing a final project to the President.

No member of our Delegation has the slightest doubt that the President will reject the proposal as it now stands. Personally I should be glad to see a solution reached for this difficult problem, and therefore would welcome any modification of the Italian demands which might reduce the number of points to which the President must take exception, and which would thus increase the chance of meeting a favourable response from him. May I, without in any wise prejudicing your own opinion on the matter, point out what seems to me to be the chief difficulties with the present proposal?

Paragraph 2 means in the Italian view (and should therefore clearly state) that the independent state of Fiume is to be permanent and definitive, without right of plebiscite. The President has taken the firm position that he cannot accept the permanent alienation from the Jugo-Slav State of this great mass of Slav people unless they themselves so vote. The only valid ground for the Italian demand seems to be to provide a neutral zone east of President Wilson's line in order to afford Italy additional military protection, and to meet this need the President would probably accept neutralisation of the entire area. Aside from this, Italy's interest is confined to safeguarding the Italian population of Fiume, an end which might fully be achieved by giving to Fiume itself the status of Danzig, or by making of it an independent city republic under the League of Nations, on condition that it leased the port and port facilities to Jugo-Slavia for a period of years.

In paragraph 3 the island of Uglian is still claimed, although M. Tittoni stated to Mr. White and Mr. Johnson his willingness to renounce any claim to that wholly Slav island. The inclusion of a claim to this island, and the formula 'Italian Protectorate' over Zara, cannot fail to produce an unfavourable impression upon the President. Would it not be wiser to omit in the first instance a claim to an island which M. Tittoni is willing eventually to renounce, and to find for Zara a specific formula which will safeguard all legitimate Italian interests in the town without implying any form of Italian sovereignty over it?

<sup>10</sup> See Annex 2 above.

Paragraph 4 includes a claim to a number of islands (Busi, St. Andrea, Pomo, and Pelagosa) which did not figure in the original memorandum, but which Mr. Johnson told M. Tittoni he would urge the President to grant to Italy providing M. Tittoni would renounce his claim to Lagosta. Unfortunately Lagosta also figures in the present claim, with the further addition of certain other adjacent islands not included in the original proposal. This increases, instead of reducing, our difficulties. If M. Tittoni will restrict his claim to the Lissa and Pelagosa groups, he might hope for a favourable response. The President would probably accept a plebiscite in regard to the Lussin group, despite the fact that the possession of that group by Italy would place the port of Fiume in a difficult position strategically.

I must not conceal from you my anxiety as to the probable attitude of the President regarding an Italian mandate in Albania, but if only this one point stood between us and a satisfactory settlement of the Adriatic problem I should use my personal influence to secure a successful termination to the negotiations. It is for this reason that I am particularly anxious that the other points of difficulty should be resolved along the lines above indicated before the President is asked to give his decision on the project.

Faithfully yours,  
(Unsigned).

#### No. 81

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

*No. 662 Telegraphic [141301/123/3]*

*ROME, October 14, 1919*

Astoria telegram No. 79 to Rome<sup>1</sup> of October 11th.

I understood from Signor Tittoni that his present proposal with regard to Fiume was acceptance of last American proposal for an Adriatic settlement provided territory contiguous with Fiume were accepted along a strip of coast line.

I gather he will submit this on return of (?) from Paris. My French colleague who saw him just before he left was informed by him that latest news he had received from Washington was more favourable to a settlement on these lines. Proposal is said by my French colleague to be known to Monsieur Clemenceau.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to Rome of No. 79.

#### No. 82

*Mr. Athelstan-Johnson (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

*No. 344 Telegraphic [141678/123/3]*

*BELGRADE, October 14, 1919*

Monsieur Trumbitch who has been indisposed during past week asked me to call on him today.

He begged me to express to Your Lordship his gratification at note His

Majesty's Government had addressed to Italian Ambassador in London<sup>1</sup> on question of Fiume and at same time his regret that owing to ministerial crisis which is still unsolved he would be unable to be in Paris on return of Tittoni from Rome.

He desired me to reiterate views he had so often expressed at Paris and which had been more than confirmed by his prolonged stay at Belgrade that minimum that would satisfy S.H.S. Nation would be President Wilson's frontier line, and Fiume a free port in no way whatever under Italian control. He could promise that S.H.S. Government would grant all facilities for passenger and goods traffic to Vienna and Budapest from Fiume.

As to a buffer State, if this was to be maintained only for a period of three years and a plebiscite held at the end of that time he thought his Government might perhaps accept this solution.

My French colleague having told me yesterday that he believed there was a Serbian-Italian détente on question of Fiume I sounded Monsieur Trumbitch over again. He repeated what he had previously told me that in his opinion Italian Navy was still doing its utmost to secretly help d'Annunzio's forces and that at present he could see no signs of Italy holding out an olive branch.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> The reference was apparently to the conversation recorded in No. 64.

### No. 83

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*No. 1236 Telegraphic [140152/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 15, 1919

Your telegram No. 1433<sup>1</sup> (of 11th October. Fiume).

I share your view—see last sentence of second paragraph—and shall not move in the matter.

<sup>1</sup> No. 79.

### No. 84

*M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received October 17)*

*[76/2/3/19647]*

PARIS, le 15 octobre, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au secrétariat de la Délégation britannique copie d'une note de la Délégation albanaise en date du 9 octobre 1919 protestant contre l'attribution du mandat sur l'Albanie à l'Italie.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On October 17 the secretariat-general of the Peace Conference further transmitted to the secretariat of the British Delegation (received October 18) 'copie d'un télégramme des comités nationaux albanais, en date du 12 octobre, protestant contre un mandat éventuel de l'Italie sur l'Albanie'.

**ENCLOSURE IN NO. 84**

*The President of the Albanian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference*

Délégation Albanaise  
à la Conférence de la  
Paix.

PARIS, le 9 octobre, 1919

Monsieur le Président,

Dans son discours prononcé à la Chambre italienne le 27 du mois passé,<sup>2</sup> le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Italie, M. Tittoni, a déclaré, entre autres, que dans les deux arrangements envisagés pour la solution de la question de l'Adriatique 'le mandat sur l'Albanie aurait été confié à l'Italie, Valona lui aurait été reconnue et le canal de Corfou neutralisé'.

Sur la façon dont l'Italie se propose d'exercer ce mandat en Albanie, M. Tittoni s'est empressé d'en donner lui-même les détails en communiquant à la Chambre certains arrangements économiques concernant l'Albanie qu'il a conclus à la suite d'un échange de lettres entre lui et M. Venizelos à la date du 11 septembre dernier et à l'insu et au détriment du peuple albanais.

La Délégation albanaise, vivement impressionnée par les susdites déclarations, proteste énergiquement devant le Conseil Suprême de la Conférence contre toutes ces décisions, qui portent une grave atteinte à l'intégrité, à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté du peuple albanais et qui sont contraires aux principes de justice et aux droits des petits peuples solennellement proclamés par les Grandes Puissances alliées et associées. D'autre part, elle croit de son devoir de faire les déclarations suivantes:

1. Le peuple albanais ne reconnaîtra jamais à l'Italie la possession de Valona, ce qui porterait atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Albanie dont Valona fait partie intégrante. Les nécessités stratégiques et navales sur lesquelles l'Italie base ses prétentions sur cette ville n'ont plus aucune raison d'être depuis la disparition de l'Autriche-Hongrie, la prise de possession par l'Italie de la position fortifiée de Pola ainsi que quelques îles dalmates et la neutralisation du reste de la côte orientale de l'Adriatique.

2. Le peuple albanais, qui s'attendait à la réalisation de ses légitimes revendications nationales, ne se soumettra jamais à une nouvelle mutilation de sa patrie par l'attribution d'une partie de l'Epire du Nord à la Grèce, mutilation qui paraît ressortir du fait de la neutralisation du canal de Corfou demandée par l'Italie.

3. Le peuple albanais ne se croira jamais lié par des arrangements économiques conclus à son insu et à son détriment, tels que ceux comprenant:

(a) la construction de la ligne du chemin de fer Valona-Monastir,  
(b) l'accord intervenu entre Monsieur Tittoni et Monsieur Venizelos pour la construction d'une autre ligne joignant Valona à Athènes et dont le tronçon à travers le territoire albanais serait construit par le Gouvernement italien.

4. Le peuple albanais ne se soumettra jamais à l'humiliation d'un mandat

<sup>2</sup> See No. 45, note 1.

par lequel la Haute-Assemblée se propose de lui ravir la souveraineté et l'indépendance que lui avait reconnues la Conférence de Londres de 1913. Il est à remarquer que la méconnaissance de ses droits se produit au moment même où s'affirment le triomphe des nationalités et l'indépendance des petits peuples.

Pour ce qui a trait à l'intention qu'on aurait d'accorder à l'Albanie une assistance bienveillante et temporaire, la Délégation albanaise estime qu'on pourrait très facilement parvenir à ce but, sans avoir recours à un mandat et tout en respectant l'indépendance et la souveraineté de l'Albanie, par un remaniement raisonnable et conforme à l'esprit du temps et aux besoins du pays, des dispositions de la Conférence de Londres de 1913 sur la constitution de l'Etat albanais.

La Délégation albanaise se réserve le droit de proposer les modalités de ce remaniement, et, à cet effet, elle prie la Haute Conférence de vouloir bien l'admettre à exprimer ses vœux sur le sort futur de sa patrie.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer etc.

Le Président de la Délégation albanaise

BUMÇI<sup>3</sup>

Evêque d'Alessio

<sup>3</sup> This signature was incorrectly transcribed as Bumei in the filed original. (For earlier representations against the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement submitted by Monsignor Bumçi to the Peace Conference, cf. A. Giannini: *L'Albania dall' indipendenza all' unione con l'Italia 1913-1939*—4th ed. 1940—p. 79.)

### No. 85

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Athelstan-Johnson (Belgrade)*

No. 305 Telegraphic: by bag [141705/123/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 334<sup>1</sup> (of October 3rd: Italian military activities on Adriatic coast).

Admiralty consider that presence of British men-of-war in the vicinity of Spalato and Cattaro would be likely to lead to incidents and to risk of that interference which they desire to avoid. It would be difficult at the present juncture for Navy to give proper support.

<sup>1</sup> No. 57.

### No. 86

*Memorandum by Mr. Rodd<sup>1</sup> on the Nationalist Party in Italy<sup>2</sup>*

[147419/4998/22]

[ROME,] October 25, 1919

1. It would be incorrect in the first place to talk of a nationalist party in Italy since an organisation in this form does not in reality exist. The various

<sup>1</sup> Mr. F. J. R. Rodd, son of Sir R. Rodd, was Third Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Rome.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum was transmitted to the Foreign Office under Rome covering despatch No. 460 of October 25, 1919 (received October 31).

elements which together go to form the nationalist sentiment in the country are organised in various ways.

During the last legislature a group of members in the Chamber who had been violently interventionist in 1914 and 1915 formed themselves into a Fascio di Difesa or Group to carry the country through the period of crisis which followed the disaster of Caporetto. There were in all some 60 deputies who subscribed to the doctrines of the organisers and they grouped themselves together on the extreme right of the Chamber. This led to a Parliamentary organisation but there was for some time no corresponding political organisation in the country, since the Patriotic Leagues formed to maintain the morale of Italy after the disaster were primarily non-political.

With the advent of demobilisation Leagues of ex-Fighting Soldiers were formed and have increased in numbers all over Italy. Considerable confusion has arisen over the Associazione Nazionale di Combattenti or Associations of ex-Fighting Soldiers, the Fascii [*sic*] di Combattenti or local groups of ex-fighting soldiers, and the Opera Nazionale dei Combattenti. The former is a Union of demobilised officers and men with political and economic objectives. The latter is a large charitable organisation which has received Government recognition, for assisting men to find employment and similar objects. It is non-political as a whole in colour or rather the political tenets of its members vary considerably from district to district, and each political party is claiming to be supported by the members of the Opera. The 'Fascii' or local groups, are political organisations which as a whole are nationalist in sentiment though occasional Fasci of clerical or Socialist doctrines have expressed their disapproval of the other groups.

2. The Parliamentary Nationalist group ceased to exist when the Chamber was dissolved.

The prominent members, as has been previously reported, were Federzoni, the nominal leader, who attended the Crown Council on the 26th September in this capacity, Foscari, who considered that he ought to have been invited instead of the former, Raimondo, Cicotti, Mazzolani, di Cesaro, Cottafavi, Tasca, Girardini and Negrotto.

A Central Committee of action for the elections was formed in the Parliamentary group in Rome on the 30th September.

3. The principal organs of the Nationalists in Italy are the *Idea Nazionale* of Rome, *Popolo d'Italia* of Milan and *Azione* of Genoa. The editors are Corradini, Mussolini and Orazio Raimondo, the Deputy, respectively. Corradini and Mussolini will be referred to later. Many other papers in Italy have however taken up a nationalist attitude over the Fiume affair without being actually organs of the party; among others may be quoted the *Epoca* of Rome, the *Giornale d'Italia* of Rome, the *Resto del Carlino* of Bologna and the *Gazzetta di Venezia* of Venice. The *Gazzetta del Popolo*, the organ of the Unione Socialista Italiana (Reformist Socialists), also became nationalist over this question.

4. The importance of the nationalist element in Italy which, with the coming of the election, is rapidly assuming the form of a party, lies not in the

old Parliamentary Fascio but in the Local Fascii. The formation and organisation of these is largely due to Benito Mussolini, Corradini and Marinetti the famous 'futurist'. The former is an unscrupulous politician of Socialist leanings, who is ready to adopt any policy which would pay. He is violently nationalist at present but more by choice than by conviction. He is commonly believed to have been in the pay of the French Embassy at the beginning of the war. The policy of the party is too well known to discuss. They are violently nationalist and chauvinist in sentiment. The Fiume affair gave its organs the excuse to vituperate the Allies in general. The party, headed by Mussolini, have indulged in language of the foulest description when referring to the Official Socialist Party and the Partito Popolare Italiano. Their programme and election policy was laid down in their recent congress in Florence. On the occasion of the dissolution of the Chamber a manifesto to the country was published, a translation of which is given in Appendix A.

The violent tone adopted by the Nationalists after d'Annunzio entered Fiume provoked much indignation among the Socialists in Italy and the fear of a further war gave rise to frequent disturbances. The leaders decided that their language on this subject was liable to provoke too much reaction on the part of the Socialists who were using this as a pretext to obtain the support of the people. In consequence the accusation that the Nationalists wanted to stop demobilisation led to a counter attack by Mussolini in the *Popolo d'Italia* on the 3rd October and subsequent days on the Government, calling for more rapid demobilisation and repudiating indignantly the charge of desiring another war. Disturbances in Rome alone previous to this had occurred for ten days running near the Chamber between Socialists and Nationalists.

The attitude of the Fascio towards Signor Nitti's Government was fully reported in Sir R. Rodd's despatch No. 423<sup>3</sup> of the 30th September.

The Political Secretary General of the party is Umberto Pasella. The Central Committee of the Associazione Nazionale dei Combattenti is in Rome and the Political Secretary of this Committee is Renato Zavattaro.

5. The Congress of the Fascii met in Florence on the 9th and 10th October to decide on the policy of the party. The session was open to all members of any group but only the representatives duly accredited were allowed to speak. The number of group representatives present was over 125, including some from Trieste, Rovigno (Istria), Dignano (Istria), Trent and Zara. Forty-five sections telegraphed their solidarity but were unable to send representatives.

The Secretary General reported the existence of 148 Fascii and 68 in formation. There were in all 42,386 members.

Mussolini, who had recently returned from Fiume,<sup>4</sup> opened the proceed-

<sup>3</sup> No. 52.

<sup>4</sup> On September 11, 1919, Signor D'Annunzio had sent Signor Mussolini a message in which the former announced his intention of occupying Fiume and asked for support from Signor Mussolini. This message is printed by F. Curato: *La Conferenza della Pace, 1919-1920* (Milan, 1942), vol. ii, p. 409.

ings with a speech describing the situation in Fiume and commenting on the Socialist Congress. He warned his audience to beware of economic revolutions though he did not wish to defend plutocracy in any way. The policy decided on briefly may be stated as:—

1. Electoral age to be lowered to 18 and that of deputies to 25.
2. Abolition of the Senate and formation of technical labour, industrial and commercial central Soviets.
3. Recognition abroad of Italy's effort.
4. Various social laws for improvement of labour conditions, etc., insurance, etc.
5. Short period of military service.
6. Progressive capital tax.
7. Sequestration of all Church property.
8. Revision of war contracts and sequestration of 85% of all war profits.

Marinetti proposed a motion for the expulsion of the Papacy from Italy. A motion for the formation of a constituent assembly to revise the constitution which has been infringed by the late Government was carried unanimously: the elections to be for an assembly of this nature followed by another election of the Chamber after such revision.

6. The election policy of the Fascii is to stand alone where they are strong enough to influence public opinion, but to enter into alliance, when this is not the case, with any other group provided it is nationalistic in general sentiment and that its members were in favour of the war.

It is not anticipated the Fascii will succeed in sending many members to parliament entirely on their own programme. The Nationalist element in the new Chamber will more probably consist of members of other parties rather than representatives of the Fascii.

The Nationalists will oppose the late Chamber in general and Nitti's Government and candidates in particular. The elections are, however, not to be fought on the question of intervention or of Fiume.

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 86

#### *Nationalist Manifesto to the Country*

*Rome, September 30, 1919*

The Central Committee of the Associazione Nationale dei Combattenti has issued the following circular to its regional delegates, sections and subsections:—

Men of Italy, Companions of the Trenches! The Chamber is dissolved. It went down in the last spasms of a death struggle artificially prolonged by men who were overpassed but would not die. For us the Chamber was long since dead. As an outward expression of shady interests and ignoble competition, the Chamber for us was the survival of a decrepit world far gone in putrefaction. The eve of the elections has come which for us must be the rejuvenation of Italian consciousness. The new order

of things has grown from the burst of shells and the victorious march of our infantry. Let anyone who attempts to depreciate the victorious sacrifices of our men be very wary. They represent the great mass of the people of Italy against all who wanted the war and took no part but turned it to their advantage, and against those who did not want the war and corrupted our unity of purpose. We represent those who saw the safety of Italy in labour, who but yesterday left field and workshop to resist the menace of Teuton barbarity and to-morrow will return to resume their labours on the land and in the factories.

Here follows an appeal to remember the dead and cripples and continue fighting for Italy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Thus in original.

### No. 87

*Sir G. Buchanan<sup>1</sup> (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 26)*

*No. 674 Telegraphic [145700/123/3]*

ROME, October 26, 1919

In a conversation which I had with him on Thursday<sup>2</sup> morning at Paris Signor Tittoni reviewed the whole Fiume question and after indicating on map territory to be ceded to Italy declared that his latest proposal constituted minimum concession that would satisfy Italian public opinion and that would render it possible to (?) get rid of D'Annunzio. French Ambassador at Washington he said would be instructed to support this solution of question and he expressed the hope that similar instructions would be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador.

I told him that when I left London Your Lordship had not yet received the text of his proposal and had consequently been unable to move in the matter.<sup>3</sup> His Excellency replied that he would at once send you the text

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Ambassador at Rome in succession to Sir R. Rodd.

<sup>2</sup> October 23, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 658 of October 22, 1919, to Mr. Kennard at Rome, Lord Curzon had reported a general conversation which he had had that afternoon with the Italian Ambassador in London. In the course of this conversation there was some mention of Signor Tittoni's 'latest proposal': see No. 560.

Mr. Kennard, in Rome despatch No. 456 of October 20, 1919 (received October 24), reported that 'news is anxiously awaited as to the attitude of the United States Government to Signor Tittoni's latest proposal, which is said to be on the following lines:—

'1. Fiume to be a free city under the temporary control of the League of Nations.

'2. The mandate for Fiume to be assumed directly and exclusively by Italy without the intervention of any other Power.

'3. Fiume to be joined to Italian territory by a strip along the Istrian coast including Volosca.

'The opinion is expressed in the local press that France would be favourable to such an arrangement, that England would subordinate her approval to the views of Washington, and that it will be no doubt difficult to overcome the objections of President Wilson's advisers to any connection of Fiume with Italian territory. It is hoped, however, that the Italian delegates in Paris will be able to effect a settlement on these lines before the general elections take place in November.'

through the Italian Ambassador and on my suggesting that a proposal to make frontiers of Italy and Fiume conterminous might be interpreted in some quarters as covering a design for an eventual annexation of latter by Italy, he said in order to remove any such apprehension he had already informed the United States Government that he would have no objection to territory in question being neutralized.

On my pointing out all political and economic advantages which Italy would gain by cultivating friendly relations with Jugo-Slavs, Tittoni concurred but remarked that if Fiume question were left unsolved it would be source of constant friction if not of actual conflict in future.

His Excellency next spoke of our refusal to allow Italian troops to co-operate with British and French and Greek troops in Aidin district.<sup>4</sup> He was, he said, at a loss to explain grounds on which this decision had been based.

He had no intention of demanding execution of all terms of St. Jean de Maurienne agreement but it was but natural that he should wish to know what was in contemplation as it almost looked at present as if Allies intended to exclude Italy altogether from participation in affairs of Asia Minor.

His Excellency returned to subject in a second conversation which I had with him in afternoon when I repeated to him explanation given to me in the meanwhile by Sir E. Crowe as to impossibility of allowing Italian troops to occupy ground which Greeks had evacuated at request of Allies, I added that as discussion of all questions connected with Ottoman Empire was to be postponed till United States representatives were in a position to take part in it, it would be premature to discuss particular points raised by His Excellency though I personally believed that His Excellency's apprehensions were unfounded.

End of Part 1, part 2 follows.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See Chap. III.

<sup>5</sup> Part 2 of this telegram was apparently sent as No. 675: see document No. 88.

## No. 88

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

*No. 675 Telegraphic [146172/123/3]*

*ROME, October 27, 1919*

My telegram No. 674.<sup>1</sup>

Following is translation of telegram which President of the Council has addressed to Mr. Lansing.<sup>2</sup> (Begins.)

Allowance<sup>3</sup> to add my own appeal to that of Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>4</sup>

Is it possible that anyone in America can believe we covet small miserable strip of land from territorial ambition? No territory would compensate us

<sup>1</sup> No. 87.

<sup>2</sup> The Italian text of this telegram is printed by G. Benedetti: *op. cit.*, pp. 55-6. An Italian translation of President Wilson's reply is printed *ibid.*, pp. 56-7.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the file copy that this should read: 'Allow me . . .'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 89, also Signor Tittoni's telegram of October 10, 1919, to the Italian Ambassador at Washington: *ibid.*, pp. 54-5.

for terrible moral and material damage which is caused by present situation. But we are obliged to ask for this strip because otherwise Italian people would be convinced that we had betrayed Fiume, that Fiume would be bereft of its independence. Sentiments are same as those which made Belgium sacred question in Italy.

Knowing your moral integrity it has seemed to me that your hesitation to answer must have been due to sense of regard for ideals of President who is now ill.

But allow me to point out that (?) I have always respected)<sup>5</sup> at great personal sacrifice conceived ideals of President but that whole problem is now reversed. Over and above immense interest that you share with us that peace and order should reign in Italy and East there has arisen for you to-day new high moral duty, that of recognising proportion which exists between new question and of preventing Italy (which for four years has given all its blood to the allie(?)s) from being destroyed.

I confess to you, Mr. Lansing, that matter is following:—if moral order is not established here immediately I have no illusions as to grave situation of Italy.

Among all great American source(?)s of moral strength I place most highly and admire most deeply your religious sense of moral responsibility. I appeal to your most exalted sentiments. You must not allow President or American people to bear weight of having in order keep up [sic] question very trifling in itself (and for which we are ready to give any sort of guarantee) thrown into disorder and into a most grave crisis people who have already arrived at extreme limit of resistance through four years of war against common enemy.

You are bound to help us to save Italy but you are bound also to save America from terrible historical responsibility. Excuse rough frankness of my words but my thoughts are of Italy which has placed all her faith in the Allies and which may be put in danger under their very eyes.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain.

## No. 89

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

*No. 676 Telegraphic [146284/123/3]*

*ROME, October 27, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

In handing copy of telegram to me Count Sforza remarked that Signor Nitti's appeal for annexation (?) 'was' omitted with equal reason addressed to His Majesty's Government as an Ally with whom Italy had contracted a treaty. . . .<sup>2</sup> He was not asking them to fulfil all terms of pact of London but to hold out a helping hand to Italy and to save her from destruction with which she was threatened. The fleet was entirely out of hand, army sympathized with D'Annunzio and could not be relied on and if Signor Tittoni's

<sup>1</sup> No. 88.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

proposal for his solution of Fiume question were rejected it was impossible to say what might happen.

I expressed earnest hope that Government would not (? take) any precipitate action such as declaring annexation of Fiume (? as that) would (? mean) a rupture with Allies.

His Excellency said that he could not speak for Government but that he was personally strongly against annexation. He believed that Government would remain in Conference and bear with resignation and patience whatever might happen.

But they could not answer for nation, army or fleet, and if Italy was faced with revolution and disaster she might as well have satisfaction (? of) annexing Fiume before going under altogether.

Naval Attaché gives me (? following) information which he has received from Ministry of Marine: Petty Officers of an Italian cruiser and torpedo boat have compelled their officers to take vessels to Fiume to join D'Annunzio.

Three other men-of-war have had to be (? remov)ed from Adriatic and sent to Eastern squadron to avoid similar occurrence. Others are being sent to Venice from Pola to escape D'Annunzio's influence and morale of navy is generally completely undermined.

Sent to Foreign Office. Repeated to Peace Conference.

#### No. 90

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

*No. 677 Telegraphic [146285/123/3]*

*ROME, October 27, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

After discussing serious situation that will be created by refusal of Signor Tittoni[']s latest proposal with American and French Chargé d'Affaires I and latter have decided to address following identic telegram to our respective Governments. (? Former) for obvious reasons was unable to associate himself with it.

Begins.

We learn from reliable source that United States Government have rejected counter proposals of Signor Tittoni regarding Fiume. We consider it our duty to call serious attention of our respective Governments to possible consequences of this rejection which may have disastrous effect on internal and diplomatic situation of Italy.

If one considers state of Italian public opinion one must agree that Signor Tittoni's proposals constituted last effort of Italian Government to find solution of Fiume question which could be accepted by majority of people without however satisfying nationalist element. Failure of this effort therefore (? implies) that it has been impossible for Italian Government to obtain acceptance by Peace Conference of conditions which are considered by Cabinet as moderate as that of Signor Nitti as minimum necessary to enable

<sup>1</sup> No. 89.

him to dominate internal (?) situation) in Italy, to find solution for local situation at Fiume and to maintain intact (?) Italy's relations with Allied and Associated Powers. Effect of such a situation on Government itself and on public opinion inspires us with considerable alarm. It is to be feared that Signor Nitti (?) "s' omitted colleagues will find it impossible to remain any longer in power or that they will decide to act as regards Fiume without approval of Conference. Realization of either of these hypotheses extremely dangerous. (?) We cannot) but consider with some anxiety Government crisis when electoral campaign is in full swing in country where situation is already as disturbed as it is in Italy, where Army shows mutinous spirit, where Navy is in even more undisciplined state and where official Socialists may take advantage of this state of things to bring about revolution. We must moreover regard with grave preoccupation possibility of isolated action on the part of Italian Government in question which has already been submitted to decision of Peace Conference, such for instance as annexation of Fiume which would be calculated to provoke hostilities with Yugo-Slavia and to place Italy and her Allies in most delicate situation. Refusal of United States Government to accept Signor Tittoni's proposal may therefore bring about in Italy (?) internal disturbances and in Europe external complications (?) whose extent appears to us to far exceed those local interests involved in question of Fiume itself still more in narrow strip of territory claim(?)ed by Italian Government to ensure continuity between its territory and that of Fiume. We feel it our duty to state that we do not see in present circumstances what means remain to Italian Government to re-establish order in country, discipline in army and navy, to cause abandonment of Fiume by d'Annunzio and his partisans or to avoid issue (?) at elections being extremely unfavourable to maintenance of intimate relations between Italy and her Allies.

We consider it our duty to warn respective Governments against these eventualities.

#### No. 91

*The Marquis Imperiali to Lord Hardinge (Received October 28)<sup>1</sup>*

[146288/123/3]

ITALIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, October 27, 1919

My dear Lord Hardinge,

I enclose herewith the memorandum on the Adriatic question. You will greatly oblige me by submitting it to Lord Curzon's consideration.

It seems necessary for me to insist again on the paramount importance of the Adriatic question for my Government and country.

In view of our far-reaching concessions and the extreme moderation of Signor Tittoni's three additional proposals, may I express the trust that the most valuable co-operation of our British Allies will greatly help us to reach a prompt and satisfactory settlement.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of this note and enclosure were sent to Sir E. Crowe at Paris under formal covering despatch No. 7349 of November 3, 1919 (received in Paris, November 5).

I know by experience that I can rely on your personal sympathy, and I thank you cordially for it.

Believe me, ever sincerely yours,  
IMPERIALI

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 91

*Memorandum*

In his answer to the telegram sent to him by M. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau,<sup>2</sup> President Wilson accepted:—

1. The *corpus separatum* of Fiume—as a free town enjoying the privileges granted by Maria Teresa, the harbour and the railways being administered by the League of Nations.
2. The free State of Fiume, without plebiscite. This State would include the islands of Veglia and Cherso. Its frontiers towards Italy would be as follows: beginning from Punta Fianona, in Istria, and following the line of Monte Maggiore would reach the frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia to the north of Idria, including Castelnuovo, Adelsberg, and Idria in the free State.
3. Zara free town and the rest of Dalmatia to be assigned to the Jugo-Slavs.
4. The islands of Lussin, Unie, Lissa, and Pelagosa to be assigned to Italy.
5. The possession of Vallona to be recognised to Italy; the mandate on Albania to be given to Italy.
6. The whole free State of Fiume and the whole coast, as well as the islands of the Quarnero and of Dalmatia up to Cattaro, included, to be neutralised and demilitarised.
7. All the economic Italian interests already existing in Dalmatia to be safeguarded, and Italian minorities protected.

In order that Signor Tittoni might assume the responsibility of giving his assent to the aforesaid arrangement before the Conference and subsequently to submit it to the Italian Parliament, it is absolutely indispensable to obtain the following additions:—

1. That the town of Fiume, besides the privileges of Maria Teresa, should receive a special statute, which could safeguard its absolute independence.
2. That the *corpus separatum* of Fiume and the territory of Italy should be contiguous. Such contiguity can be secured by assigning to Italy, in addition to the rest of Istria already assigned to her, the small littoral strip of territory from Fianona to Volosca included.
3. That the diplomatic representation of the free city of Zara should be entrusted to Italy, and the island of Lagosta also assigned to Italy. These two clauses were already included in the proposal which President Wilson submitted to Signor Orlando on the 7th June last.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 80, annex 5.

Signor Tittoni's last proposals could not be more conciliatory. The three additions are fully justified by reasons of deeply-rooted Italian sentiment as well as of national tranquillity and international peace. Just because of these sentimental reasons, it is absolutely indispensable that the contiguity of Fiume with Italian territory be secured.

In view of this vital importance for Italy of a prompt settlement of the Adriatic question on the lines stated above, Marquis Imperiali ventures to express the trust that the British Government will consider with cordial sympathy the three additional proposals made by Signor Tittoni, and will see their way to instruct the British representatives both at the Paris Conference and at Washington to give their strong support to the said proposals.

LONDON, October 27, 1919

No. 92

*Signor Nitti to Mr. Lloyd George<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [148330/123/3]*

ROME, October 27, 1919

Allow me to address myself personally to you. Internal situation in Italy owing to the attitude of the Allies in the Fiume question grows every day more dangerous and deprives the Government of the complete control of the Army and the Navy. You know the moderation of my views. You also know that I have always opposed every demand which I deemed not just. But the question of Fiume is now for Italy a highly sentimental one. The Italians are deeply humiliated that this feeling of theirs should not be understood by the Allies. You have been for four years our Allies in war and I trust that you will not allow a further increase in the acerbity of a question which is becoming intolerable. Our demands have no economical value for us. After all the sacrifices endured by Italy will you assume the responsibility of a situation which may resolve itself in a serious danger for Italy and not for Italy alone? If I use these words it is only because I am conscious of the imperative necessity, which compels me to do so. You have always shown me the most friendly dispositions. I rely not only on your cordial co-operation, but on your action at Washington in order to enlighten the American Government on the reality of our situation. Tittoni's demands are modest to a point that makes difficult to understand the persisting objections if one considers that internal order in a great and friendly power as well as peace in the Near East are at stake. I sincerely trust in your cordial co-operation.

NITTI

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt by Mr. Lloyd George is not noted on the file. A copy of this telegram was communicated to the Foreign Office on November 3, 1919.

### No. 93

*Note by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with M. Cambon  
on October 28, 1919<sup>1</sup>*

[147488/123/3]

M. Cambon called this afternoon and read me some telegrams which he had received by courier from Paris.

From these it would appear that a few days ago Signor Tittoni had an interview with M. Pichon in which the former told him that he understood that the American Government, who were already in possession of Signor Tittoni's new proposals, were disposed to accept them and were in a far better frame of mind towards the Italians. He therefore asked M. Pichon to telegraph to the French Ambassador in Washington to urge him to press the United States Government to accept Signor Tittoni's last proposal for the solution of the question of Fiume. M. Pichon thereupon telegraphed to M. Jusserand to ask whether the attitude of the United States Government upon this subject had been correctly described by Signor Tittoni.

In an interview which M. Jusserand had had with Mr. Lansing the latter had stated that although the internationalisation of Fiume was a point on which there appeared to be no objection, nothing on earth would induce him to agree to the band of Italian territory connecting Fiume with Istria, for which he saw absolutely no reason whatever.

As M. Jusserand said, the attitude of the United States Government was not as Signor Tittoni had described it.

H.

October 28, 1919

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note was transmitted to Sir E. Crowe at Paris under formal covering despatch No. 7342 of November 1, 1919. This note was further embodied in despatch No. 689 of November 4 to Rome, and No. 696 of November 5 to Washington.

### No. 94

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 30)*

No. 679 Telegraphic [147163/123/3]

ROME, October 29, 1919

My telegram No. 677.<sup>1</sup>

President of the Council with whom I had long and friendly conversation yesterday evening expressed earnest hope that Prime Minister would use all his influence at Washington with a view to inducing President Wilson to reconsider his attitude with regard to Fiume. He could not, he said, believe President Wilson would persist in his present policy if he could be made to understand that it might in end provoke war and plunge Italy in revolution. He admitted in itself Fiume was neither economically nor strategically of vital importance to Italy. It was rather a question of sentiment but that sentiment had taken such a hold on national conscience that no Italian

<sup>1</sup> No. 90.

Government could ignore it. He had denounced D'Annunzio and in consequence himself been denounced as unpatriotic but he could not forcibly remove D'Annunzio for if he attempted to do so army would not obey him. He could in fact do nothing without first satisfying Fiumani as well as Italian public opinion by securing assent of Allied Governments to latest Italian proposal.

On my asking what would be his position when he presented himself to new Chamber in December were Fiume question still unsolved His Excellency said that this was question which he could not answer. He was about to publish his election address and programme and he was confident he would obtain large majority. He could count upon support of Catholic party and on majority of working classes. Nationalists would oppose him and Socialists would vote against him on some questions but they looked on him as exercising a moderating influence in politics and would not join any attempt to overthrow him. He would therefore be strong enough to maintain order at home and to put down any Bolshevik rising provided always that Fiume question did not provoke some action on the part of army. In latter case he would be powerless and country would be faced with revolution. There was one thing however which he would not do, namely declare annexation of Fiume. It would be different were Jugo-Slavs to attempt to expel D'Annunzio by force of arms as then nothing would prevent army going to latter's assistance. He had already reduced strength of army to 800,000 and he wanted to reduce it by another 500,000 but he could not do this so long as Fiume question remained unsolved as reduction of army might encourage Jugo-Slavs to attack Italians at Fiume. He was, he assured me, most anxious to cultivate good relations with Jugo-Slavs as soon. . . .<sup>2</sup>

French Chargé d'Affaires tells me President of Council, whom he saw yesterday, urged on him importance of French and British Governments not only taking action at Washington but also of bringing pressure to bear on Jugo-Slavs in order to induce them to come to a friendly understanding with Italy about Fiume and other cognate questions.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the filed copy that the sense should be ' . . . as soon as Fiume question was settled.'

#### No. 95

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 30)*

*No. 680 Telegraphic [147000/123/3]*

*ROME, October 29, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Article appears in ministerial organ *Messagero* today expressing an appreciation of reception given to General Diaz in London<sup>2</sup> and emphasizing bonds of friendship which have existed and must exist in future between

<sup>1</sup> No. 94.

<sup>2</sup> General Diaz, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Army, had recently arrived in London on a visit.

Italy and England. It then enquires how it is that England with her sense of justice and friendship for Italy does not support her in present dilemma.

It seems to be inferred by Italian Press generally that present difficulty of finding satisfactory solution of Fiume question is entirely due to United States Government and surprise is expressed that interests of Europe generally should be entirely subordinated to personal views of President Wilson and his advisers.

In the circumstances there is no doubt that were it possible for His Majesty's Government to induce United States Government to realize how necessary it is for general peace of Europe to assist Italian Government in finding some practical solution of present impasse England would regain her position as real friend of Italy which she has always held in the past.

At present much as Italian people may be gratified by honour shown to their General in London they feel it is a time for deeds not words and that as long as their material interests are continually neglected by Peace Conference they have little hope of extricating themselves from their present difficulties by help of their Allies.

#### No. 96

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 30)*

*No. 681 Telegraphic [147181/123/3]*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

ROME, October 30, 1919

(? United States Chargé d'Affaires) spoke to me this morning about attitude of French Government on Fiume question and said that they were bent on creating impression here that France was friendly and warm supporter of Italy whereas Great Britain was but a cold and callous spectator of crisis through which Italy was (? passing). Mr. (? Jay) remarked that this was very regrettable and that there ought to be complete solidarity between Allied Governments. He rather suggested that I should impress this view on French Chargé d'Affaires.

I said that I was aware that above impression existed in many quarters here and that tone of French press was calculated to confirm it. I was afraid, however, that any representations which I might make to French Embassy might be imputed to personal jealousy of Monsieur Barrère's position. If therefore my Government thought it desirable to call attention of French Government to matter I would prefer their doing so through His Majesty's Embassy at Paris. If, however, I might quite frankly (? confess) I could not but sympathise with feelings of French Government. France was Italy's next door neighbour and would be first to feel repercussion of any revolutionary movement in this country. Much as I regretted contrast that was being drawn between our attitude and that (? of) French Government I took such a serious view of situation here that on this particular question all my personal sympathies were with French rather than with United States Government.

Sent to Foreign Office, repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 95.

No. 97

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 1310 Telegraphic [146288/123/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 30, 1919

Please report immediately by telegraph views of Supreme Council on Signor Tittoni's latest Fiume proposal.

What is the last word of the United States Delegation in the matter?  
Repeated to Washington No. 1952 and Rome No. 808.

No. 98

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)*

No. 1505 Telegraphic: by bag [147535/123/3]

PARIS, October 30, 1919

Your telegram No. 1310<sup>1</sup> of to-day.

Question of Fiume has not come before Supreme Council, nor has any communication reached the plenipotentiaries as to the exact nature of Signor Tittoni's proposal.

I reported in my telegram No. 1432<sup>2</sup> of October 11th what I had been able to gather from Mr. Polk. Signor Tittoni who sits next to me at daily meetings of Supreme Council and has had plenty of occasions to speak to me, has remained dumb on the subject.

I tried to raise it at our meeting on October 25th, when Signor Tittoni proposed that the Albanian question should be referred to a committee.<sup>3</sup> I then pointed out that no progress could be made with any point of the Adriatic settlement until it could be discussed as a whole and I appealed to Signor Tittoni to inform the Supreme Council how the question of this Adriatic settlement stood. He countered this by saying that he hoped very shortly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with the United States and would then be ready to open a discussion.

I subsequently spoke to M. Pichon and pointed out how unsatisfactory was the position in which the Supreme Council, and I in particular, were placed owing to the mystification in which the Italian negotiation was enveloped. I asked him whether he minded telling me exactly what he knew and what the attitude of the French Government was. M. Pichon referred me to M. Berthelot who, he said, would gladly give me the fullest information.

M. Berthelot to whom I then applied, said that Signor Tittoni had not communicated any text and it was exceedingly difficult to understand what his proposal amounted to. He, M. Berthelot, had used every effort to get a clear idea of what was proposed, but in order to arrive at anything precise he had to use indications derived from various sources, chiefly from reports sent by the French Ambassador at Washington who had had conversations with his Italian colleague. He said that so far as he could make out there

<sup>1</sup> No. 97.

<sup>2</sup> No. 78.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 6, minute 11.

were five distinct new demands made by Italy. He added that he was actually engaged in piecing all his information together and promised to let me know the result. But he said he could not guarantee that his statement would be regarded as authentic by the Italians.

I am still waiting for this statement. I will now at once make another effort to obtain more precise information from Mr. Polk.

I think you will agree that the Italians are clearly not taking a straightforward course in this matter. It is not easily explicable why they deliberately wrap their action in mystery except on the hypothesis that they look for some advantage in not committing themselves to anything precise, and meanwhile seeking to obtain promises of support in London on incomplete information.

Sir G. Buchanan in his telegram No. 111<sup>4</sup> of October 26th reported a promise from Signor Tittoni that Marquis Imperiali would at once communicate to Your Lordship the text of the Italian proposal. I gather from your present telegram that this has not been done.

It would be difficult to get the Supreme Council to take up the Fiume question so long as the Italian plenipotentiary opposes a discussion. It will be remembered that the Italians from the very beginning of the Conference and throughout its course have balked all formal debate on the subject of their settlement with the Yugo-Slavs in the Adriatic.

I venture to suggest that Sir G. Buchanan might be requested to intimate clearly to the Italian Government that if they want to have their proposals properly considered, their best course is to state them in precise language and lay them before the Supreme Council.

\* Repetition to Paris of No. 87.

### No. 99

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 3)*

*No. 1507 Telegraphic: by bag [148166/123/3]*

PARIS, October 31, 1919

Fiume. My telegram No. 1505<sup>1</sup> of yesterday. Confidential. I have not yet been able to see Mr. Polk but one of our officers happened to be at the American delegation yesterday just as a telegram from Washington was received conveying the most categorical decision of President Wilson that in no circumstances whatever will he agree to the Italian proposal for the cession to Italy of the coast strip between Fiume and the Italian boundary in Istria as hitherto accepted.

In view of the manner in which this information has reached me I beg that it may be treated as strictly confidential.

\* No. 98.

No. 100

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 3)*

*No. 1508 Telegraphic: by bag [148167/123/3]*

PARIS, October 31, 1919

Fiume.

Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 681<sup>1</sup> of October 30th.

I am much afraid that Sir G. Buchanan in expressing sympathy with the attitude of the French government, who are almost certainly trying to make the Italian government believe that they would support the latter's proposals were it not for England and America, may be conveying the impression that His Majesty's Government on their part have really considered the Italian proposals and are favourably disposed towards them, whereas in fact the proposals have not been considered because they have never been clearly stated, certainly not to us.

<sup>1</sup> No. 96.

No. 101

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)*

*No. 683 Telegraphic [147545/123/3]*

ROME, October 31, 1919

My telegram No. 681.<sup>1</sup>

Minister of Marine in conversation with Naval Attaché to-day stated that solution of Fiume question in favour of Italy was essential if revolution were to be avoided and that strained relations with United States were preferable to abandonment of Fiume as latter would involve disintegration of the country.

Italy was prepared to reduce her fleet to pre-war standing as compared with any other Mediterranean Power especially France whose predominant position she was prepared to acknowledge.

Minister of Marine who is very Anglophil regrets lukewarm or even neutral support given by us to Italy's claim which was in marked contrast with their support of [*sic*] France.

He much appreciated General Diaz's reception in London which seemed the more inexplicable in view of His Majesty's Government's lack of support.

Sent to Foreign Office. Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 96.

No. 102

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7)*

*No. 473 [149665/123/3]*

My Lord,

ROME, October 31, 1919

With reference to Mr. Kennard's despatch No. 456<sup>1</sup> of October 20, I have

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (cf. No. 87, note 3). In this despatch Mr. Kennard had referred to a curious incident, namely, 'the diversion to Fiume of the ex-Austrian steamship *Persia*,

the honour to report that d'Annunzio has surpassed himself in his latest Fiume manifesto, which appears in the form of a message to Captain Giulietti, the secretary of the Seamen's Federation, in connection with the latter's action in diverting the S.S. *Persia* to Fiume. After referring to the services thus rendered in diverting the arms which formed the vessel's cargo to the cause of justice and liberty from that of an obscure reactionary enterprise against another nation, whose name is not disclosed (presumably Russia), the poet continues: 'The cause of Fiume is not that of the earth, but that of the spirit and of immortality. Fools and knaves do not and will not realise this. All my troops have understood it, and it is well that you, workers of the sea, have realised it to such a degree. From the indomitable Sinn Feiner in Ireland to the red flag which in Egypt unites the crescent and the cross, all the insurrections of the spirit against the devourers of raw flesh are about to gain fire from our sparks which fly far.'

This passage is censored in certain newspapers, but appears in the *Tribuna* to-night, which indicates that the censorship is not very carefully exercised. I drew the attention of the President of the Council to the matter in the course of my conversation with him this evening. He appeared somewhat embarrassed, and stated that this was no doubt due to the laxity of the censorship authorities.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

which was believed to be loaded with arms and munitions for Russia from Spezia, though ostensibly bound for China. It appears that Giulietti, the well-known secretary of the Seamen's Federation, arranged that the vessel should proceed to Fiume instead of her intended destination, and that her cargo should be placed at the disposal of d'Annunzio.

'D'Annunzio has now published an order declaring Fiume to be under martial law, and anyone professing sentiments hostile to the cause of Fiume to be punishable with death. The French Ambassador expressed the opinion this morning that the Fiumani might be proving restive under d'Annunzio's dictatorship, and would be only too pleased to be under a proper administration such as that of the regular Italian army. In this case General Badoglio, who commands the troops in the vicinity of Fiume, might be able to obtain control there. M. Barrère stated that it had been hoped that it might be possible to send the Duke of Aosta, who is very popular with the army, on a mission of this kind, but that the King had not approved the proposal. M. Barrère expressed great indignation at an electoral speech which had just been made by Signor Grassi, the Under-Secretary of the Interior, and in which he spoke very warmly in support of the Italian claim to Fiume.'

### No. 103

Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7)

No. 474 [149666/123/3]

ROME, October 31, 1919

My Lord,

Though I cannot claim to speak with the same authority as my predecessor, after having passed but a single week in this country, I have in the telegrams which I have had the honour to address to your Lordship summarised my personal impressions of the actual situation, and called attention to its extreme gravity. Those impressions have been derived from the conversations which I have had with members of the Government, such as Signor

Tittoni, Signor Nitti, and Count Sforza, with the French and American Chargés d'Affaires, with representatives of the most important organs of the press, with Cardinal Jacquet, as well as with private persons.

After making due allowance for any tendency on the part of Italians to frighten us with the bogey of Revolution, it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the grave consequences which are bound to ensue if the solution of the Fiume question is indefinitely postponed. As Signor Nitti frankly admitted in the course of our conversation, the possession of Fiume is of no great importance to Italy either economically or politically, but it has nevertheless appealed so strongly to national sentiment that it has acquired in the eyes of the Italian people an importance out of all proportion to its intrinsic value. Its occupation by d'Annunzio has fired the popular imagination, and, like a magnet, Fiume is attracting all the patriotic forces of the country. More than one ship of war has already gone over to him, and steps have had to be taken to remove other naval units from his dangerous neighbourhood. The army is equally unreliable; its sympathies are with d'Annunzio; its discipline is seriously impaired; and it would never consent to be used as the instrument for his expulsion. There are therefore but two courses open to the Government—either to adopt a passive attitude and to wait upon events or to declare the annexation of Fiume.

Fortunately for us and for Italy Signor Nitti is not the man to launch his country on a policy of adventure or to risk a rupture with the Allies by opting for annexation. He will therefore, as he has told me, adopt the former course. He is awaiting the result of the approaching elections with a calm confidence that has much impressed me, and is convinced that he will dispose of a large majority in the new Chamber. He seems indeed to regard himself as indispensable at the present juncture, and believes that the majority of the electors share this view. Though he is generally regarded, and probably with reason, as ambitious, unscrupulous, and an opportunist, he nevertheless strikes me as a man with considerable strength of character, and possessed of a good stock of sound common sense. He takes a hopeful view of the internal situation and of his ability to cope with it, provided that it is not complicated by some rash action on the part of the army. Fiume is for him a matter of secondary importance, except in so far as it affects the general situation. He has denounced d'Annunzio for having undermined the discipline of the army by occupying Fiume with regular troops, and he has consequently exposed himself to the charge of a lack of patriotism. But he realises now that it is no longer a mere question of what may happen to Fiume, but of whether Italy will be able to weather the storm that threatens to engulf her. He foresees an indefinite prolongation of the present situation in the danger of a conflict with the Yugo-Slavs, as he fears that should the latter take the law into their own hands, and endeavour to expel d'Annunzio by force, the military party would gain the upper hand and plunge Italy into a new war. Nor would this be all, for such a favourable opportunity would not be let slip by the Socialists, and a war-weary people might easily be won over by the revolutionary propaganda of the extremists.

Apart, moreover, from the danger of Italy drifting into a war with the Yugo-Slavs, any unforeseen incident might in the present feverish state of public opinion start a movement that would bring the country within sight of revolution. From the purely objective point of view of our national interests, as well as of the world's peace, I feel that it is incumbent on us to use all our influence to bring about a solution of the Fiume question that, by putting an end to an intolerable situation, and by giving reasonable satisfaction to the national sentiment, would enable the Government to devote all its energies to the work of reconstruction, and to grappling with the serious economic and financial problems which Italy has to face as a consequence of the war. I am aware that Italy has on several occasions placed herself in the wrong, and pursued a policy that is calculated to inspire mistrust, but her position has been a difficult one owing to the altered conditions which have rendered impossible the integral execution of some of the agreements which the Allies had made with her. She has, as I told Signor Nitti, played her cards badly, and both he and Signor Tittoni admitted that their predecessors in office had committed grave mistakes. The Italian public, however, from whom the whole truth has been concealed, have unfortunately gained the impression that British sympathies have throughout been on the side of their old enemies, the Croats, and that their own services and sacrifices are being ignored. The inevitable result has been a cooling of the feelings of sympathy and friendship which the Italian people have so long entertained for our country. Though I personally, on account of the speech which I delivered before leaving England,<sup>1</sup> have been welcomed as a friend and sympathiser, and have so far had 'a good press', the same cannot be said of the attitude either of the press or the public towards us as a nation. This fact has been brought home to me by the conversations which I have had with several leading journalists, who nearly all pressed me to say something to show that His Majesty's Government were in full sympathy with Italy's claims to Fiume. It is much to be regretted that our attitude on this question has been unfavourably contrasted with that of the French, and all the more so because the latter are exploiting the situation, and trying to convince the Italian public that France and not Great Britain is the friend to whom they can always look for sympathy and support. It is unnecessary for me to dwell on the importance of correcting this impression, for the international situation is not such that we can afford to lose the friendship of Italy. The Prime Minister's cordial telegram to Signor Nitti,<sup>2</sup> which I rejoiced to receive this afternoon, has come at a most opportune moment, and will, I trust, go far to convince the Italian Government and people that British friendship for Italy is as warm now as it was in the early days of the Risorgimento.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

<sup>1</sup> Sir G. Buchanan had delivered a speech at a dinner given by the British-Italian League on October 9, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> No. 104.

No. 104

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [147000/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 31, 1919

Please give the following to Signor Nitti from Prime Minister.

Begins. It is impossible for me to receive so strongly worded a telegram<sup>2</sup> from a colleague for whom I have high personal esteem and who is the Prime Minister of Italy, the valued ally of the British Empire in the great war, without doing my utmost to help towards a solution of present difficulties. I agree with you in thinking that it is of great importance to Italy, to the allied powers, and to the peace of Europe, that the Adriatic question should be settled without any further delay. I am therefore sending an urgent personal telegram to President Wilson pointing out to him the tremendous sacrifices made by Italy for the liberation of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, the moderation of the views of your government as compared with those of your predecessors, and pressing him, in view of the narrow margin that now separates your two points of view, to meet you on the lines you suggest. I earnestly trust that this action may contribute to bring about a prompt and satisfactory solution of the problems which now confront you.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Washington as No. 1972.

<sup>2</sup> No. 92.

No. 105

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [147000/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 31, 1919

Following from Prime Minister.

I am advised from authoritative quarters that the situation in Italy has now reached a point which seriously endangers not only the internal stability of the country, but the permanent relations of Italy with the rest of the allies. I would therefore press very strongly on the President the importance of not precipitating a serious crisis over points which are not of real principle. Signor Nitti has never shared Sonnino's Imperialist ambitions. He has in fact been a consistent opponent of that policy. He is, I am convinced, doing his best to fight the jingo and militarist spirit of his opponents, and to keep on good terms both with the Yugo-Slavs and the allies. His government have greatly abated the original claims, and are now genuinely endeavouring to find a way out.

If we can help him to make a moderate settlement I think we ought to do so, for the quarrel is keeping all Europe in a ferment and appears to have brought Italy to the brink of a revolution. According to the terms which he proposes Italy will give up practically all she gained in the Adriatic by the 1915 Agreement under which she entered the war. Italian sovereignty

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Rome as No. 812.

will disappear from all non-Italian territory in these parts except one or two islands. This is the really fundamental point of principle gained.

I would like to urge this further consideration. At the back of the Italian mind is the feeling that the Jugo-Slavs would never have gained their freedom or their unity without the efforts and sacrifices made by the Italians in the great war. This is true. The Croats and Slovenes fought for the Hapsburg and against their liberation to the last day. They are now reaping the fruits of Italian sacrifices. The Italians have to bear an enormous burden left upon their shoulders by the war of liberation. The Jugo-Slavs start upon their career of freedom with hardly any war burden at all. As between the two, therefore, it is the Italians who have the prior title to have their feelings and desires considered where points of fundamental principle are not concerned. The points for which the Italians are now standing out may not seem to be worth the national excitement they undoubtedly cause. But they have in view of past controversies and present concessions now become points of honour. On the other hand I do not think they are vital to the Jugo-Slavs, for as far as I understand the arrangement, the Port of Fiume can be effectively developed by the League of Nations, as the port of northern Jugo-Slavia and Hungary. It does not, therefore, seem to me that the outstanding differences are worth the risk of precipitating serious trouble in Italy, or the estrangement of Italy from the Allies. I would, therefore, urge on the President and the American Government that it should meet Signor Nitti on what I understand are the three outstanding points, namely, that the town of Fiume (excluding the port and facilities for its development) should receive a special statute safeguarding its independence, that a small strip of littoral to bring Italian territory to the borders of the independent state of Fiume should be conceded, and the diplomatic representation of the free town of Zara and the island of Lagosta should be assigned to Italy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In Washington despatch No. 688 of November 1, 1919, Lord Grey reported that he had 'lost no time' in communicating a paraphrase of this telegram to the State Department.

### No. 106

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)*

*No. 685 Telegraphic [147546/123/3]*

*ROME, October 31, 1919*

Your telegram very urgent of to-day.<sup>1</sup>

President of the Council to whom I communicated translation of Prime Minister's telegram, begged me to convey latter's (*sic*) expression of his warm personal thanks and gratitude. He added that should President Wilson still prove obdurate the only alternative would be for Prime Minister and Monsieur Clemenceau to endeavour to induce Yugo-Slavs to settle question in a friendly spirit by direct negotiation with Italy.

He would like he said to publish first part of Prime Minister's telegram

<sup>1</sup> No. 104.

together with a résumé of second, as (?) reference) to his moderate views might provoke attacks on him from nationalists.

I said I would ask for necessary authorization and let him know as soon as possible. Publication would I think make a good impression.

Sent to Foreign Office. Repeated to Peace Conference.

### No. 107

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)*

*No. 834 Telegraphic [147546/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1919

Your telegram No. 685<sup>1</sup> (of 31st October. Adriatic).

Prime Minister's message to Signor Nitti was private and personal, being a reply to Signor Nitti's personal telegram to Prime Minister.

In these circumstances we regret that we cannot consent to publication which would, in our opinion, create unfortunate impression in United States as being liable to construction that His Majesty's Government are endeavouring to mobilise public opinion in a question on which President of United States is acting as impartial arbitrator. This is of course far from the case. Prime Minister has merely sent a personal message to President Wilson indicating his own opinion that Signor Nitti's Government are handling this delicate question with moderation and it would serve no useful purpose for his friendly action to be given publicity at present. It might indeed greatly increase difficulties of President of United States and of Serb-Croat-Slovene Government who are also using moderation.

<sup>1</sup> No. 106.

### No. 108

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Athelstan-Johnson (Belgrade)*

*No. 316 Telegraphic [147163/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1919

Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 679<sup>1</sup> (of October 29th. Fiume).

You should express confident hope that Yugo-Slav Government will instruct their military authorities on the spot not to allow themselves, on any account, to be drawn into a conflict however gross the provocation offered by D'Annunzio may appear to be.

Repeated to Rome No. 835 and Washington No. 1982.

<sup>1</sup> No. 94.

### No. 109

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 3)*

*No. 1511 Telegraphic: by bag [148215/123/3]*

PARIS, November 1, 1919

Fiume. I spoke to Mr. Polk to-day and begged him to let me know

exactly where his Government stood in the matter of the Adriatic negotiation, as my Government was not unnaturally getting somewhat impatient at being left in the dark in regard to a question in which they were bound to take a serious interest. I reminded him that he had promised to let me have a statement of the precise Italian demands as soon as these had been clearly formulated.

2. Mr. Polk disclaimed any idea of keeping back information. He said his difficulty was that the Italians had never put their proposals in tangible form. As he could not well give the necessary consideration to statements which were vague and not always consistent, he had repeatedly asked to have some precise text, and this had been promised him. But nothing has been forthcoming and meanwhile the Italian delegates insisted on continuing conversations on the basis of their vaguely adumbrated demands. Nor had any precise proposal been made to M. Clemenceau which confirms what I was told by M. Berthelot.

3. Mr. Polk then explained that the essential demand of the Italian Government was that for the coast strip connecting Italian Istria with Fiume. This was quite unacceptable. He read to me a long telegram from the State Department which he had just received. He could not let me have a copy as it was in cypher but promised to send me a summary or paraphrase. It consisted of a closely argued statement analysing the continuous growth of the Italian demands. It enumerated the important concessions successively made to Italy by President Wilson, and recalled, giving full particulars, that on each occasion, without exception, the concession offered had become the starting point for a fresh Italian demand. On more than one recent occasion it was explicitly intimated to the Italians that the concessions made and compromises offered must be considered the last word. Nevertheless the game of asking for more continued. The President and the State Department were now quite determined to cry a halt to this series of concessions, and to go no further.

4. Mr. Polk was instructed to make an earnest appeal to the British and French delegations to stand together in this matter. The Italians were clearly trying to play off one ally against another, they were addressing misleading communications to Washington and London whilst refusing to put their exact demands into writing. Mr. Polk remains convinced that the only course open to the three Allies is to inform the Italian Government very firmly that they are united in refusing to give way to Italy's entirely unjustified demands. The United States Government must ask France and England either to maintain as towards Italy on this question the same policy or to let America dissociate herself entirely from the whole settlement with Italy in which case the United States Government will repudiate all responsibility whatever other arrangement may be made for the consequences if such arrangement breaks down and retain full liberty to act in whatever way they may think right in the circumstances.

5. Mr. Polk informed me that he had spoken to Monsieur Clemenceau. The latter had agreed that the Italian proposal concerning the coast strip

was unacceptable. Monsieur Clemenceau added he now recognised that a serious mistake had been made when he and Mr. Lloyd George declared their readiness to make further concessions to Italy on the subject of Fiume after the submission to President Wilson of the two alternative solutions put forward by Signor Tittoni. He was turning the whole question over in his mind and still hoped to find some way out of the difficulty.

6. I spoke to M. Clemenceau himself between two meetings of the Supreme Council to-day. He said he was anxious to discuss the matter with me at length and would ask me shortly to come and see him for the purpose.

7. I find it difficult to believe, in the light of the above, that the Italian Government are justified in continuously urging upon Sir G. Buchanan the contrast between the alleged lukewarm attitude of the British as against the warm support of the French Government.

8. I gather from Your Lordship's telegram to Sir G. Buchanan No. 685<sup>1</sup> of yesterday that the Prime Minister has sent a telegram to Signor Nitti on this subject. I should be grateful if I could be furnished with the text of that message and that if necessary I may communicate it to Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr. Polk as I fear further difficulty might arise if the Italians were to convey an impression that they were now receiving support from the British Government in a sense not known to the French and United States Governments.

It seems essential at this moment to have all the cards on the table.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This reference should apparently have been to Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 685, i.e. to No. 106 above.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was minuted as follows by Lords Curzon and Hardinge: 'Very few of Sir G. Buchanan's telegrams are here [i.e. in the dossier submitted to Lord Curzon]. But I am under the impression that he has been a little over-rapturous in endorsing the Italian point of view about everything, and I would like Lord Hardinge—on re-perusing them—to consider whether a word of confidential caution to him may be wise.'

'C. 3/11.

'Done. Nov. 5. H.'

Lord Hardinge's private letter to Sir G. Buchanan was not entered on the file.

## No. 110

*M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received November 4)*

[97/1/5/20132]

PARIS, le 2 novembre, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation de l'Empire britannique, copie d'une lettre en date du 29/10, adressée à M. le Président de la Conférence de la Paix, par M. Tittoni, au sujet de la situation en Dalmatie.

## ENCLOSURE IN NO. 110

Monsieur le Président,

PARIS, le 23 [sic] octobre, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence a bien voulu me donner communication d'une lettre adressée à Votre Excellence par la Délégation serbo-

croato-slovène en date du 21 courant,<sup>1</sup> dans laquelle on affirme que la sécurité des populations slaves en Dalmatie est fortement menacée à cause de la présence dans la région d'un grand nombre de soldats *arditi* insurgés.

Permettez-moi, Monsieur le Président, de protester vivement contre ces allégations, qui ne répondent nullement à la vérité.

Sur la base des renseignements que je viens de recevoir de notre Commandement Naval à Zara, je suis à même d'assurer la Conférence que dans la partie de la Dalmatie occupée par nos troupes règne une tranquillité absolue et il n'y a pas de soldats insurgés ou d'agents provocateurs.

Les populations locales, sous la protection de nos autorités, sont à l'abri de toute menace et elles sympathisent avec les troupes italiennes, ainsi que l'ont pu constater tous les journalistes étrangers impartiaux, qui ont voyage en Dalmatie.

Les rares cas de brigandage qui se sont vérifiés près de la frontière de démarcation étaient provoqués ou encouragés par des éléments serbo-croates, mais ils ont pu être immédiatement réprimés, grâce à l'intervention énergique de nos troupes.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

TITTONI

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

### No. 111

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 5)*

*No. 2073 [148752/1130/19]*

PARIS, November 3, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship the following observations on Your Lordship's despatch No. 7171<sup>1</sup> (143125/W/19) of October 23, enclosing a copy of a report<sup>1</sup> by Brigadier General G. F. Phillips<sup>2</sup> on the situation in Albania.

2. I would express my agreement with the general contention of General Phillips that any step calculated to maintain peace in Albania is certainly deserving of encouragement. At the same time, I feel grave doubts whether His Majesty's Government should either support, or allow it to appear that they support, any such 'Bessa'<sup>3</sup> as is described by General Phillips, the 'clearly stated object' of which he reports to be 'unity against both the Serbs and Italians'. I would venture to remind Your Lordship that, rightly or wrongly, His Majesty's Government have most certainly allowed the Italian Government to believe that there is every readiness on the part of the British Government to support an Italian mandate for Albania. Such support was clearly foreshadowed in the various proposals which the Prime Minister, as well as M. Clemenceau, promised Signor Tittoni to forward to President Wilson as endorsed by them.

3. The support for an Italian mandate in Albania was, on the other hand,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Chief of the British Military Mission in Albania.

<sup>3</sup> A compact between Albanian chieftains.

always conditional on a general settlement of the whole Adriatic question being arrived at by agreement of all the Great Powers interested, including the United States. Until, then, such an agreement has been reached, it would seem to me difficult for His Majesty's Government to prejudge the question of Albania in such a way as to exclude all possibility of a settlement of the claims of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in this connection. For this reason, I venture to deprecate any assurance at this stage being given by General Phillips to the effect that Yugo-Slav claims in Northern Albania have been definitely set aside.

4. I feel bound to call Your Lordship's attention to the fact that according to such information as has reached this delegation, feeling in Albania appears to be increasingly against the idea of such a mandate. The Albanians seem to have abandoned all belief in the Italians as their disinterested defenders, and since the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement and Signor Tittoni's speech in the Italian Chamber,<sup>4</sup> have come to look on them as no less a danger to the cause of Albanian independence than they have always considered Serbia and Greece. In conversation with members of this delegation, Albanian representatives in Paris who were formerly noted for their pro-Italian feeling have so strongly asserted their complete hostility to any idea of an Italian mandate in Albania as to lead me to feel that while it may be necessary for His Majesty's Government to continue to support such a mandate as the only alternative in the circumstances of the moment, the mandate itself, if accorded to Italy, will rouse the most extreme opposition among the Albanian people.

I have, &c.,  
EYRE A. CROWE

<sup>4</sup> See No. 45, note 1.

### No. 112

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 4)*  
*No. 687 Telegraphic [148326/123/3]*

ROME, November 3, 1919

I communicated to Signor Nitti yesterday in a private letter the substance of your telegram No. 834.<sup>1</sup> Fact, however, that His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to support latest Italian proposal with regard to Fiume has been telegraphed from Paris and published in the Press.

Sent to Foreign Office, repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 107.

### No. 113

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 5)*  
*No. 2081 [148760/123/3]*

My Lord,

I had the honour, in my telegram No. 1511<sup>1</sup> of the 1st November, to refer

<sup>1</sup> No. 109.

PARIS, November 3, 1919

to a telegram read to me by Mr. Polk, in which the United States Government defined their attitude in regard to Fiume and the Adriatic settlement. I have now received from my American colleague a summary paraphrase of that telegram, of which I transmit a copy herewith, with the request that, in accordance with Mr. Polk's express wish, the document may be treated as confidential, since he did not consider himself specially authorised to communicate it.

2. I venture to submit that in this matter of the Adriatic settlement we are under some obligation to the United States Government, which we ought to bear in mind in considering how far we can go in meeting the Italians. We went into the Conference tied by our agreement with Italy of 1915. We realised that the territorial arrangements contemplated by that agreement could not be carried out without gravely affecting, not to our advantage, the whole situation in the Adriatic and the former Habsburg dominions. Being tied as we were, we had to look, and did look, to the United States, whose hands were free, to stand out, in the Conference, for a settlement on lines more conformable to what in our eyes would be a satisfactory solution with some elements of permanency.

3. President Wilson undoubtedly did his best, by moral and political pressure, to win over the Italians to a policy involving a renunciation on her part of much that she had hoped to secure under the Pact of London. To that extent—and this is not a small extent—the policy pursued consistently by President Wilson has been one from which Great Britain has clearly benefited, if a just and lasting settlement between Italy and the Jugo-Slavs is a British interest, as your Lordship will no doubt agree it is.

4. On the question of Fiume, on the necessity of leaving to the Jugo-Slavs this their only great seaport of any value, the British and the American delegations have throughout the Conference stood united. The United States Government are therefore on strong ground when they appeal to His Majesty's Government to give them their earnest support in pressing upon Italy the definite acceptance of the terms of settlement which we have agreed in regarding as the best and most equitable.

5. I leave aside for the moment all consideration of what may be due on our part to the Jugo-Slavs, whom we have certainly led to believe that in this question, so vital to their national interests, the British Government entirely upheld their just claims. We have had some difficulty in getting the Jugo-Slavs to accept the terms of the Austrian Treaty, which undoubtedly imposes upon them many sacrifices. We have just reached a stage in our discussions with them which makes us hope to obtain their signature at an early date. If at this moment they were to find us making further concessions to Italy on the question of the Adriatic, it will become exceedingly problematical whether they will sign the treaty.

6. I think the United States Government are justified in looking with some suspicion on the attitude adopted and the course of action followed by Signor Nitti's Government. I alluded in my telegram of the 1st November<sup>1</sup> to the danger of the Italian Government utilising the message addressed to

them by Mr. Lloyd George to create further discord between England and America. I find my suspicions confirmed by a telegram from Rome which appeared in to-day's edition of the *Matin*, and which reports Signor Nitti as having declared that the British Government had definitely taken sides with Italy in the Fiume question. A cutting from the *Matin* is sent here-with.

7. There is a bad tradition at Rome as regards loyalty to the common interests of the Allies. We have experienced this repeatedly in many quarters where Allied co-operation constituted the most elementary of duties. At Bucharest, the Italian Government have quite recently gone far to defeat the decision of the Supreme Council to force the Roumanian Government to declare, definitely and unequivocally, whether they mean to abide by the wishes of the Conference, or defy its decisions and stand outside the alliance. It was brought to the notice of the Supreme Council to-day that the Italian Minister at Bucharest refused to join his colleagues in communicating to the Roumanian Government the ultimatum which the Supreme Council had addressed to them.<sup>2</sup> The result is that the Roumanian Government have considered themselves justified in declaring that they had not yet received the intimation of the decision of the Conference, since the Italian signature had not yet been appended to the communication which purported to speak in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

8. Another instance of the inveterate Italian habit of thwarting the decisions of the Council is the refusal of the Italian General, commanding in Asia Minor, to acknowledge the authority of General Milne.<sup>3</sup> Here again the Italian General defends this refusal on the ground that he has no instructions from his Government to give effect to the resolution of the Supreme Council, and no explanation of the extraordinary conduct of the Italian Government is forthcoming.

9. I mention these incidents in the present connection merely in order to call attention to the harm done by allowing Italy to treat the decisions and views of the Allies, even when formally concurred in by their own plenipotentiaries, with open disrespect.

10. The British and American Delegations have consistently stood together in resisting these Italian manœuvres. It is likely to create a deplorable impression in America if, in the most important of the Italian controversies, and one in regard to which Great Britain and the United States have closely co-operated in perfect harmony so far, we were now to abandon the Americans and leave them alone to stand the brunt of the conflict in which hitherto we have professed the American cause to be our own, and have acted loyally on our profession.

11. I am sending to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome a copy of the present despatch.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

<sup>2</sup> See Volume II, No. 12, minute 3.

<sup>3</sup> Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Black Sea.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 113

*Extract from the 'Matin' of November 3, 1919*

Le Problème de Fiume

*Rome, 2 novembre.*—Les Ministres se sont réunis en Conseil ce matin. M. Nitti, m'a déclaré un personnage bien informé, a fait part à ses collègues d'un important fait nouveau.

L'Angleterre, qui jusqu'ici, dans la question de Fiume, avait adopté une attitude de sympathie passive, vient de donner comme instructions à son représentant aux États-Unis de soutenir le point de vue italien.

Un autre fait nouveau résulte de la notification faite à l'Entente, par le nouveau Conseil national de Fiume, de l'ordre du jour voté le 30 octobre dernier.<sup>4</sup> Le fait d'accuser officiellement réception au Conseil national de sa communication pourrait servir de point de départ pour un nouvel examen de la part des Puissances de tout l'ensemble du problème.

Ici la France, dont nous connaissons les efforts, pourrait se faire l'initiatrice du nouveau projet qui viendrait à surgir. En attendant, notre Ambassadeur nous informe que des pourparlers se poursuivent toujours avec une grande activité à Washington.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 113

*Telegram received by Mr. Polk from the State Department at Washington*

[Paraphrase]

(Communicated confidentially to Sir Eyre Crowe, November 3, 1919)

The decision as to Dalmatia is one of the most serious which has confronted the Peace Conference. Indeed, it is nothing less than the decision as to whether or not such terms of settlement are to be secured as can be honourably guaranteed by the United States, or whether France and Great Britain, together with Italy, feel compelled to insist on terms so fundamentally dangerous and unjust that the United States of necessity cannot be a party to any compact whose purpose is to maintain and enforce them.

As to the inherent merits of Italy's demands in the Adriatic, there is no dispute between ourselves and the British and French. Great Britain and France have been substantially in accord with the United States in viewing the attitude of Italy as unwise and out of harmony with the changed conditions, and with the principles of generosity acknowledged by the Allied and Associated Powers, including Italy herself. A more considerate attitude has repeatedly been urged by them upon Italy. A lack of sympathy for Italy, or generosity in meeting her demands, cannot be ascribed to us. Unjustly,

<sup>4</sup> The reference was apparently to the so-called Richard Plan of October 11, 1919, which originated in Fiume and bore reference to the order of the day voted by the National Council of Fiume on October 30, 1918, and proclaiming the annexation of Fiume to Italy. The plan in question was called after a French intermediary. This plan, which may be compared with the proposals of the Italian Government, was transmitted to M. Deschanel, President of the French Chamber of Deputies, together with a personal appeal to him from Signor d'Annunzio. M. Deschanel acknowledged receipt of this plan on October 23 and stated that he had communicated it to M. Clemenceau: see G. Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 51 f.

we think, Italy insisted upon a strategic frontier on the Brenner Pass; in spite of the fact that this demand involved annexing to Italy a purely German region with a population of over 200,000, we acceded to it. Again, we think, unnecessarily, Italy demanded a good strategic eastern frontier, and this, too, we agreed to in spite of the fact that a large and compact Slav population of several hundred thousand was thereby subjected to an alien rule. Furthermore, a demand for the redemption of her brothers suffering under a foreign yoke was made by Italy, and such redemption was granted by us, even to a point where it became necessary to place vastly greater numbers of Slavs under the Italian yoke in order to save scattered groups of Italians. Complete naval control of the Adriatic was insisted upon by Italy. We consented to this, thereby according to Italy the keys of the Adriatic, Valona, Pola, as well as a central independent base.

Actuated by a desire to deal more than justly, even more than generously, with Italy, we yielded to the demands which she made for an Italian mandate over a people who do not desire her rule and in a region where the peace of the Balkans must be endangered by that rule. The Italian demands were not satisfied even by this. Concession after concession was added by us, at the Sexten Valley, at Tarvis, at Albona, in the Lussin Islands, in the terms relative to the free city of Fiume, and elsewhere. We were always hoping that a real response to our efforts at conciliation would be made at the hands of the statesmen of Italy. On the contrary, our concessions are used merely as a point of departure for new and entirely unwarranted demands, and this at a time when we had arrived at the verge of a compromise which we were given to understand included the final demands of Italy. We have already gone much farther than can be justified on the principles of right in our sincere desire to meet Italy's claims in a most generous spirit. Well behind us lies the line of a just compromise. We ought to retreat to that line. Certainly it is impossible for us to take another step in the wrong direction. No longer is it merely a question of provisions at Fiume and Zara which subordinate justice to expediency, nor of sacrificing 10,000 more Slavs to Italian ambition. In effect, Italy is asking that the United States should assist her in dealing with a territorial situation which inevitably must bring Italian propaganda and agitation to the very outskirts of the port which is the only natural outlet for Jugo-Slavia and other hinterland countries, and which, at the same time, must closely threaten, if it does not actually cut, one of the two railways which are vital to the maintenance of, as well as the defence of the port. This is coupled with the additional demands that the United States should give to Italy aid in her unjust and dangerous attempt to create at Zara and at Fiume political conditions calculated to strengthen the interference of Italy in regions which politically, economically, and geographically are isolated from Italy, and the freedom of which from such interference is demanded by the future peace of the world. Fundamental principles of right are touched by these demands. The very foundation of an enlightened policy in the Adriatic is imperilled by them. Such demands should not and cannot be granted.

It is time frankly to say to our colleagues of Great Britain and France that they must accord us their earnest and untiring support in inducing the representatives of Italy to accept terms which we all recognise are generous to Italy, and which are the maximum terms which we can consent to guarantee, if these colleagues desire our support in enforcing the terms of the European settlement. Even if she desired to do so, America cannot become the guarantor of a settlement which would put her under an obligation to enforce terms which she considers in principle to be unjust, and in practice certain to jeopardise the peace of Europe.

If the Government of Italy has allowed and encouraged popular agitation in Italy to the degree that the acceptance by it of such generous terms as we have accorded will produce consequences of a serious character, the Italian Government alone must bear the responsibility for these consequences. I recommend that you try to see the British and French with the object of impressing upon them the greatness of the concessions we have made and the absolute impossibility of our making any more, and if possible secure their firm stand with us in inducing the acceptance of the terms by Italy.

It should be made clear to them that if they do not stand with us, our guarantee and support would not be accorded to the settlement reached.

No. 114

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Confidential/General/236]*

PARIS, November 4, 1919

My dear Hardinge,

I have now received copy of the Prime Minister's telegram to Signor Nitti<sup>2</sup> and the instructions to Lord Grey.<sup>3</sup> I confess to being very much perturbed. It seems to me that we have allowed ourselves to be rushed at a moment when the greatest caution was necessary.

It was clear from Monsieur Cambon's message on October 28th<sup>4</sup> that Tittoni was lying to you. The Prime Minister says the Italian proposal involves practically nothing important, and commits himself to supporting it. Yet he does not even now know exactly what the proposal is,<sup>5</sup> and, in face of the Italian's untrue statements, I should have thought it was very necessary to be on our guard. The Prime Minister talks of the 'coast strip'. What is this 'coast strip'? How far inland does it extend? When the Italians claimed merely the town of Fiume in the first instance, it was discovered that their claim covered a considerable hinterland extending east, west and north. No one can say whether the coast-strip is a matter of great importance or not until it is known what it is meant to include. In any event it must include 2 or 3 towns whose Yugoslav inhabitants outnumber the Italian inhabitants of Fiume!

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not noted.      <sup>2</sup> No. 104.      <sup>3</sup> No. 105.      <sup>4</sup> No. 93.

<sup>5</sup> It may be noticed that at the time of writing Sir E. Crowe had not yet received a copy of No. 91: cf. No. 91, note 1.

But the mischief is now done. I am seriously apprehensive of the consequences. I believe the Americans will almost certainly withdraw entirely from the Adriatic settlement. You will then get no American signature to the treaty. Nor can we hope for the Yugoslav signature. The conference will come to a definite rupture on one of its most important subjects. I think we must face this situation. But this is not all. If Italy is seen to have succeeded in defying the conference, I have very little hope of the Roumanians showing greater readiness to obey the conference. I now regard it as exceedingly likely that Roumania will stand out. With this will go all hope of a settlement with Bulgaria and Hungary. The impression of everyone at the conference here is that those countries have only been waiting to see what happened about Fiume in order to shape their course. They may be expected to read the lesson.

The argument which we now press upon the Americans, that the Yugoslavs do not deserve our support against the Italians because they have fought them in the war, runs directly counter to the whole of our policy towards the Yugoslavs hitherto. On this view we ought never to have supported them, and the fact that we have supported them remains inexplicable and unjustifiable. I am afraid it was a dangerous argument to use.

Please forgive my expressing my thoughts so bluntly. I am not only perplexed. I am in a difficult position towards Mr. Polk and M. Clemenceau owing to this entirely unexpected and complete volte-face in our policy and attitude. What am I to say to them? I hope I may be authorised to show them the telegram to Signor Nitti and also the telegram to Lord Grey. We ought at least to be frank and open in abandoning our previous policy.

I wonder what Mr. Balfour says to all this. I presume Sir G. Buchanan has fluttered the dove-cot with his alarmist telegrams. I do not believe in the correctness of his diagnosis. The Italians have always threatened us with dire mishaps in their own country if we did not make concessions on questions of foreign policy. *C'est vieux jeu.*

Yours always,  
EYRE A. CROWE

No. 115

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)<sup>1</sup>*

No. 700 [149310/123/3]

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 7, 1919

The Italian Ambassador called here on the 4th November, and informed Lord Hardinge of Penshurst that in conversation the other day with the Prime Minister, the latter had suggested that it would be desirable that the town of Zara should be allowed to choose its own diplomatic representation, which would look better than forcing upon it that of Italy.

2. The Marquis Imperiali read to Lord Hardinge a telegram from Signor Tittoni to the effect that he would be ready to agree to this, provided that the other demands he had put forward for the settlement of the Fiume

<sup>1</sup> Copies of this despatch were sent to Sir E. Crowe at Paris and Lord Grey at Washington.

question were accepted *in toto*. The Marquis Imperiali asked whether it would not be possible to obtain the consent of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to Signor Tittoni's proposals. Lord Hardinge replied that he did not think it would be of very great use so long as the United States Government raised objections to them.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 116

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)*

No. 228 [151909/123/3]

My Lord,

BELGRADE, November 7, 1919

I had the honour to receive as late as the 6th November your telegrams Nos. 315<sup>1</sup> and 316<sup>2</sup> of the 1st November, respectively repeating Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 679<sup>3</sup> of the 29th October, reporting his serious conversation with the President of the Council at Rome, and giving me your instructions to represent to the S.H.S. Government the grave necessity of avoiding any conflict with the followers of d'Annunzio.

I was presenting my credentials on the morning of the 6th November, and at the Palace I begged the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs to receive me on the same afternoon, in order that I might deliver your Lordship's message.

As reported in my telegram No. 360<sup>4</sup> of the 7th November, M. Gavrilovitch on learning the anxiety of His Majesty's Government in regard to the dangers of any violent act in connection with the Fiume incident, begged me to assure your Lordship that the most stringent orders had been given for some time past to the military authorities in the desired sense. The Government of the S.H.S. was fully alive to the danger to their own interests of allowing anything to occur which might excite the Italian army, or consolidate Italian national feeling against the Jugo-Slavs, and provocative acts might indeed be engineered by interested parties in order to bring about that very result. His Excellency pointed out the success with which the Government had prevented any public manifestations or violent press articles in this country, though Signor Nitti was apt to forget that if he had the internal situation in his country to consider, the Serbian Government had also similar anxieties in connection with the effect on public opinion of the present irritating situation. Incidentally I may mention that I had a conversation in the train with the manager of the Croatian Landes-Bank of Agram, who said that everybody's blood was boiling at the wantonness of the action excluding the Jugo-Slavs from their only available port.

On the previous day to my interview with M. Gavrilovitch, General Plunkett<sup>5</sup> had received a telegram enquiring as to an alleged concentration of Jugo-Slav troops in the district of Klagenfurt, and by his resulting con-

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to Belgrade of No. 94 (cf. below).      <sup>2</sup> No. 108.      <sup>3</sup> No. 94.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This telegram, which briefly summarized the information reported below, was received in the Foreign Office on November 7, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> British Military Attaché at Belgrade.

versation with Colonel Kalafatovitch, chief of the general staff, was convinced that the Serbian military authorities were maintaining their attitude of extreme patience, and that orders had been issued not to permit any act of violence on the part of the S.H.S. military, even in the face of such provocation as the passage of Italian aeroplanes of observation. The troops had all been withdrawn to a distance of 3 to 5 kilom. behind the line of demarcation.

General Plunkett, however, understands that to meet the event of a repetition on the Dalmatian coast of d'Annunzio's adventure, local resistance has been organised by the S.H.S. Government.

With reference to my telegram No. 359<sup>6</sup> of the 4th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a decree which appeared in the 'Official Journal' of the 4th November declaring Susak, as well as another commune of no political importance, to be raised to the rank of a separate township in virtue of a Croatian Law of 1895. The local press qualified this decree as an important decision of the Crown Prince. It is difficult to gauge its motive or significance, but as it appeared to be an executive act asserting the authority of the Jugo-Slav Government over a suburb of Fiume, I thought it worthy of being brought to your attention by telegraph.

I asked the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was paying me a visit on the day the decree appeared, what might be its significance, and he professed entire ignorance of its issue or origin.

I have, &c.

ALBAN YOUNG

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 116

*Decree*

(Translation.)

In the name of His Majesty Peter I, by the grace of God and the will of the people King of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes, we Alexander, heir to the throne, at the proposal of our Minister of the Interior and with the approval of our Council of Ministers, have decided and decide:

The Municipality of Susak is declared a town in the sense of paragraph 2 of the law of the 21st June, 1895, on the organisation of town municipalities in Croatia and Slavonia.

To the territories of the town Municipality of Susak are included all the territories of the hitherto Municipality of Susak.

All provisions of the law of the 21st June, 1895, on the organisation of town municipalities, respecting towns mentioned under paragraph 2 of that law are valid, in the future, also for the town of Susak.

Our Minister of the Interior should carry out this decree.

Minister of the Interior,

Sv. PRIBICEVIC.

BELGRADE, October 23, 1919

(A similar decree was issued on the same day respecting the Municipality of Vukovar.)

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

ALEXANDER

No. 117

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)*

*No. 1539 Telegraphic [150258/123/3]*

PARIS, November 8, 1919

Fiume. Monsieur Clemenceau has asked me to speak to him at 2 p.m. on Monday<sup>1</sup> on the subject of the Tittoni proposals and President Wilson's appeal to England and France to support him in his attitude towards Italian Government.

I earnestly beg for some directions for my guidance. I presume I should put forward and urge views on this question expressed in your telegram to Lord Grey and Prime Minister's message to Senor [sic] Nitti, but I am in ignorance whether these views and commitments involved are known to Monsieur Clemenceau. I must regard this as likely since neither Washington nor Rome may be expected to have preserved secrecy towards French representative in those capitals; but should value your express authority to communicate to Monsieur Clemenceau the text of the two telegrams. In any case if it be desired that I should not betray knowledge on the subject of those messages, I should be glad to be so told.

May I ask for an answer not later than Monday morning?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> November 10, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 1341 of November 9, 1919, instructed Sir Eyre Crowe that he might 'inform M. Clemenceau of text of the two telegrams in question'.

No. 118

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [150258/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 9, 1919

My telegram No. 1341.<sup>1</sup>

Considerations named in your Despatch No. 2081<sup>2</sup> of November 3rd and in your private letter to Lord Hardinge<sup>3</sup> are not absent from my mind and will be discussed by me with Prime Minister tomorrow November 10th. But they do not affect propriety of taking Clemenceau into confidence.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 117, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> No. 113.

<sup>3</sup> No. 114.

No. 119

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11)*

*No. 1545 Telegraphic: by bag [150968/123/3]*

PARIS, November 10, 1919

Fiume. Your telegram No. 1341<sup>1</sup> and your private telegram<sup>2</sup> of yesterday.

I saw M. Clemenceau at his request this afternoon. He had at the meeting of the Supreme Council this morning given vent to a violent outburst against the Italian plenipotentiary—(who had proposed the adjournment of the

<sup>1</sup> See No. 117, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> No. 118.

Conference)—saying that the present position at Fiume could not be allowed to continue indefinitely.<sup>3</sup> He reminded his Italian colleague that he personally was in favour of giving satisfaction to the Italian demands as far as possible, but he expected Italy, on her part, to regularise the situation at Fiume.

Remembering this incident, I expected M. Clemenceau when I called on him to intimate his readiness to agree in the main with the later Italian demands. Instead of this he began by telling me that he would never agree to the cession to Italy of the coast strip connecting Italian Istria with Fiume. He considered the adoption of this proposal as out of the question. He hoped, however, to find some other way of proving to Italy his sincere desire

<sup>3</sup> In his telegram No. 1546 of even date Sir E. Crowe reported:

'At the meeting of the Supreme Council this morning Mr. de Martino enquired, on behalf of Mr. Tittoni, who is about to return to Rome, whether it would not be possible to adjourn the conference until the important questions of peace with Turkey and Hungary, and that of the Adriatic, were ready for discussion and in the meanwhile to entrust to the Committee of Ambassadors the task of settling the smaller points which were still outstanding or which might arise in connection with the execution of the various treaties.'

'Mr. Clemenceau protested violently against this suggestion. He said that the treaty with Hungary was practically ready for presentation, while he, for his part, could see no reason why work on the treaty with Turkey should not be begun at once. If delay was necessary in connection with the settlement of the Adriatic problem, the fault was entirely that of Italy, and her Allies were in no way to blame. In order to arrive at a solution of this question the first thing required was that there should be a Government in Italy. The present Italian Government was unable to make itself obeyed by the army or the navy and therefore could not properly be called a Government at all.'

'Mr. de Martino demurred indignantly to this assertion, but Mr. Clemenceau retorted, when pleading for the exercise of patience and forbearance on the part of the Allies in dealing with this question, Mr. Tittoni had frequently assured him that if the Italian Government ordered its land or sea forces to move against d'Annunzio they would refuse to obey. He challenged Mr. Tittoni to deny this. Italy's allies were now being asked to sit still and contemplate d'Annunzio as the King of Fiume and to postpone all attempts to settle the problem.'

'Mr. de Martino protested that this was not at all Mr. Tittoni's intention. A general election was about to take place in Italy, and until it was over, it was very inconvenient for any member of the Italian Government to be absent from the country. All that Mr. Tittoni wished was that the discussion of the three questions alluded to should be postponed until the elections were over and he was consequently able to return to Paris.'

'I observed that His Majesty's Government contemplated recalling the British delegation for good not later than the 1st December. There was reason to hope that the treaty with Hungary might by then have been handed to a Hungarian Government with which the Allies could treat, while it surely was to be hoped that the Adriatic problem might be solved within a short time. As regards the treaty with Turkey, I understood that it might anyhow have to be discussed later and separately. In any event the conference would, it seemed to me, have to see the German treaty through, and it now looked as if the exchange of ratifications could not well be expected before the end of November.'

'I did not therefore see how the conference could be adjourned at this moment, or why work on the Hungarian treaty and the Adriatic question should be postponed.'

'Mr. Polk also intimated that he would be unable to remain at Paris beyond the 1st December.'

'No definite conclusion was reached as result of the discussion.'

The official minute of this discussion is printed in Volume II, No. 18, minute 1.

to meet her reasonable aspirations. He thought we might give way as regards the cession of the extra island, and perhaps as regards other matters. In any case, however, he would insist, as an essential condition of any arrangement, that Italy, that is d'Annunzio, cleared out of Fiume.

M. Clemenceau then explained he had told Mr. Polk that he could not altogether accept President Wilson's view that France and England must, on pain of forfeiting American participation in the settlement, join America in definitely refusing all further discussion, and insisting on the acceptance by Italy of what the President had on his part consented to.

M. Clemenceau asked me how my Government viewed the situation. I said I had no precise instructions, but from a recent exchange of telegrams between Signor Nitti and Mr. Lloyd George, to which he had no doubt seen references in the newspapers, I gathered that the Prime Minister was feeling the same anxiety to find some compromise to save the face of the Italian Government.

I then gave him the substance of those telegrams as well as of Mr. Lloyd George's message to President Wilson, adding that, so far as I knew, no further reply from the President had been received; and I eventually left with him the memorandum, recording what had passed, of which a copy is attached hereto.

M. Clemenceau remarked that he found it difficult to agree that to declare Fiume altogether independent and to connect it territorially with Italy did not raise an important question of principle. He thought we must take into account our commitments to the Jugo-Slavs and their vital interests. The Italians always dwelt on the hostility of the Croats as justifying the Allies in not treating them with too much indulgence, but were apt to forget the Serbs, who formed an integral, if not the most important, part of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and we could not neglect the just claims and aspirations of the Serb nation.

M. Clemenceau did not think President Wilson would give way on this point, nor on the complete independence of Fiume as demanded by the Italians. He still hoped to find a solution, but having no definite plan to offer, he was evidently anxious to learn whether I could put forward an acceptable suggestion.

I explained the difficulty in which we all were placed by the indefinite character of the Italian proposals. The only authoritative shape in which I had seen them was the version communicated to your Lordship by Marquis Imperiali.<sup>4</sup> That version lacked precision in some important points. On others it claimed American acceptance, whilst Mr. Polk assured me that United States had not pronounced themselves on them at all. I therefore suggested that we should in the first instance obtain—

- (a) From Signor Tittoni a precise statement in writing (with maps) of what Italy claimed altogether; and
- (b) From Mr. Polk an equally precise statement of what President Wilson had in fact agreed to accept.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 91.

With these two statements before us, we should be better able to understand the real nature and extent of the divergence between the two parties, and to see whether a bridge could be built to cover the intervening distance.

M. Clemenceau welcomed this suggestion, and begged me to obtain the two statements myself as rapidly as possible. This I agreed to do. I went at once to the Italian Delegation and got Signor de Martino to promise that he would furnish the desired detailed statement and maps by to-morrow. I have also since obtained a statement from Mr. Polk in the shape of a memorandum, which he communicated to Signor Tittoni on the 27th October, and which appears to give all the desired information. The American memorandum is too long to allow of it being copied in time for to-night's messenger, but I will send a copy to-morrow.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 119

*Memorandum*

On the 27th October Signor Nitti telegraphed to Mr. Lloyd George, addressing to him a pressing appeal to consider the serious internal situation in Italy, due, in his opinion, to the attitude of the Allies in the Fiume question. This was destroying the control of the Italian Government over the army and navy. Signor Nitti appealed to Mr. Lloyd George to attest the moderation of his (Signor Nitti's) views, and the fact that he had always opposed any demand which he did not consider just. He insisted on the fact that the Fiume question had now become a sentimental one for Italy, and that Italians were humiliated to think that the Allies did not understand this. Italian demands were based on this, not on economic considerations. Signor Nitti asked Mr. Lloyd George to take into account the heavy sacrifices borne by Italy in the war, and, appealing to his friendship for Italy, begged him to take action at Washington to impress on the American Government the seriousness of the situation. Signor Nitti concluded by saying that to his mind the modest character of Signor Tittoni's demands made it difficult for him to understand why they were not accepted.

On the 31st October Mr. Lloyd George telegraphed in reply to Signor Nitti, through the British Ambassador in Rome, returning his cordial assurances of friendship. Mr. Lloyd George stated that it was impossible to ignore such an appeal, and that he felt bound to help in the settlement of the Adriatic question without any further delay. For this reason he was sending an urgent personal telegram to President Wilson, reminding him of the great sacrifices borne by Italy in the war and the moderate character of the present Italian Government's demands as compared with those of their predecessors. In view of this, he was pressing on the American Government that they should try to meet the last Italian proposals.

On the same day Mr. Lloyd George telegraphed to Lord Grey at Washington, asking him to press very strongly on the President the importance of not insisting on points which did not affect the principles at stake. Mr. Lloyd George called attention to the moderation of the present Italian Govern-

ment, and the necessity for responding to that moderation in order to avoid the danger of a revolution in Italy. The points on which the Italians were now insisting might seem small, but they had become points of honour. On the other hand, they did not seem matters of vital importance to the Jugo-Slavs, who would be satisfied by the control of the Port of Fiume by the League of Nations. For this reason Mr. Lloyd George urged that the President should accept the idea (1) of a statute for Fiume, excluding port; (2) of the annexation to Italy of a small strip of coast, so as to bring Italian territory up to the borders of the independent State of Fiume; (3) that the diplomatic representation of the free town of Zara and the island of Lagosta should be assigned to Italy.

No. 120

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 7480 [149362/123/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1919

Sir,

I have to inform you that the Italian Ambassador has on two occasions suggested to His Majesty's Government that it might be possible for pressure to be put on the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to come to terms with the Italian Government on the basis of the compromise proposed by Signor Tittoni in regard to the Adriatic.

The present position as regards this aspect of the question is best explained by the enclosed copies of correspondence with the Prime Minister's private Secretary on this subject.

I am, &c.

[For the Secretary of State)

GERALD SPICER]<sup>1</sup>

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 120

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. Campbell<sup>2</sup>*

10 DOWNING STREET, November 6, 1919

Dear Campbell,

The Italian Ambassador called to-day to thank the Prime Minister for sending a telegram to Signor Nitti in reply to the latter's personal telegram. During the course of an interview the Marquis Imperiali said that Signor Nitti had suggested that it might be possible for the British Government to urge the Jugo-Slav Government to come to terms with Italy on the basis of the compromise now put forward by Signor Tittoni. I said that I would pass the suggestion on to Lord Curzon and the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,  
P. H. KERR

<sup>1</sup> Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>2</sup> Private Secretary to Lord Curzon.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 120

*Mr. Campbell to Mr. Kerr*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1919

Dear Kerr,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th instant informing me of the Italian Ambassador's suggestion that it might be possible for His Majesty's Government to urge the Yugo-Slavs to come to terms with Italy on the basis of the compromise now proposed by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Lord Curzon hardly thinks it practicable to act on the Marquis Imperiali's suggestion to the Prime Minister. The Ambassador was told a few days ago that His Majesty's Government had already put pressure on the Yugo-Slavs to keep them quiet, and that a solution of the Fiume question was dependent upon the will of the Great Powers rather than on that of the Yugo-Slavs.

Yours sincerely,

R. H. CAMPBELL

No. 121

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)*

No. 2142 [152284/123/3]

My Lord,

PARIS, November 13, 1919

With reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 7349<sup>1</sup> of the 3rd instant, enclosing copies of a memorandum handed by the Italian Ambassador to Lord Hardinge with a statement of Italian claims, I have the honour to submit the following observations on the statement therein contained. These observations are based on a careful examination of the more precise statement of the Italian demands which I have now obtained from Signor de Martino, as foreshadowed in my telegram No. 1545<sup>2</sup> of the 10th November, and a comparison of its contents with Mr. Polk's memorandum of the 27th October. Copies of these several documents form enclosures in the present despatch.

2. In the memorandum handed to Lord Hardinge by the Marquis Imperiali various Italian claims are enumerated as having been accepted by President Wilson. In this statement certain points call for correction. In the first place the geographical description given of the frontiers of the free State of Fiume, as accepted by the President of the United States, appears quite incorrect. There is no evidence at all for the assumption that President Wilson had accepted 'the line of Monte Maggiore' as that of the frontier between Italy and the buffer State of Fiume. A reference to map No. 1 enclosed herein<sup>3</sup> will show that the line runs considerably west of the mountain in question, and, in conversation with Mr. Polk yesterday, the latter categorically asserted that President Wilson had never accepted the line of Monte Maggiore as the frontier.

Signor de Martino has admitted as much to me, although when I spoke to him he was inclined to waive the matter airily aside, on the assumption

<sup>1</sup> See No. 91, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> No. 119.

<sup>3</sup> See map opposite.

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that, if the new Italian demands were accepted, Monte Maggiore would in any case be definitely included in Italy.

3. Again, in the statement handed to Lord Hardinge by the Marquis Imperiali, reference is made to a seventh point, by which 'all the economical Italian interests already existing in Dalmatia are to be safeguarded.' I must confess that I was greatly surprised to hear that President Wilson had agreed to any such demand, which would leave the door open to every form of Italian economic aggression in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. For this reason I questioned Signor de Martino, and subsequently Mr. Polk on the subject. It now transpires that no such condition has ever been accepted by the President, and that this is merely an Italian demand which, in the absence of any statement by the President to the contrary, the Italian Government have assumed they might regard as accepted. M. de Martino has handed to me a detailed statement of these economic demands (Enclosure 3) with the suggestion that it might with advantage be referred for examination and report to a committee of the Conference, thus clearly admitting that it does not in any way represent conditions already accepted.

4. I venture to call your Lordship's attention to the peculiar manner in which the Italian Government have attempted to mislead His Majesty's Government on these two important points.

5. Of the three points mentioned in Marquis Imperiali's note of the 27th October, on which the Italian Government now lay the greatest stress, the third may be dismissed as of minor importance, since it appears from your Lordship's despatch No. 700<sup>4</sup> of the 7th instant to Sir George Buchanan that the Italian Government are not prepared to insist that the diplomatic representation of the free city of Zara should be entrusted directly to Italy, and as I gather from Mr. Polk that the American Government may not, if otherwise satisfied, maintain their resistance to the annexation of the island of Lagosta to Italy. Point No. 1 concerning the special statute for the city State of Fiume, which would safeguard its absolute independence, is so vaguely phrased that at present it is difficult to offer any definite opinion on it, especially as all my enquiries from Signor de Martino have elicited no specific information, and I find that Mr. Polk confesses himself equally vague as to what is or can be thereby intended. It is difficult to understand the relations that are to be established between a 'completely independent town of Fiume' on the one hand, and the 'independent free State of Fiume under the League of Nations' on the other, particularly if, as proposed, the town will not contain the Jugo-Slav quarter of it, Sushak, the streets of which are divided from those of Fiume proper by nothing more than a narrow and shallow ditch, and if the port and railway are to be assigned to the 'independent free State under the League of Nations,' and not to the 'independent free State of the town.' Unless the Italian Government are able to give a clearer idea of what they really propose, it will remain extremely difficult to consider this extraordinary proposal seriously.

6. The chief discussion at present revolves round point No. 2 relating to

<sup>4</sup> No. 115.

the contiguity of the territory of Italy and of Fiume. Your Lordship will observe in the map annexed,<sup>5</sup> showing the Italian claims, that this demand involves the assignment to Italy, not only of the south-east corner of Istria, but also of a minute strip of territory running south-east along the sea-shore up to the boundaries of the city State of Fiume between the sea and the important Fiume-St. Peter railway. From every geographical point of view such a claim is so ridiculous that Signor de Martino, when pressed by me for his reasons for putting it forward, merely replied that they were wholly sentimental, and that he could and need advance no other reason for the demand. Moreover, in conversation with him this morning, when I frankly asked him whether what Italy really desired was not simply the complete annexation of the whole of the Jugo-Slav portion of Istria, Signor de Martino admitted that this was the case, and gave me to understand that the demand for the further thin strip of territory joining Istria to Fiume was not seriously meant. In other words, the territorial connection is not really an important matter. Mr. Polk tells me that Signor de Martino had given him to understand exactly the same thing. Your Lordship will observe that this somewhat naïve admission on the part of Signor de Martino disposes outright of the sole reason hitherto urged by the Italian Government for the annexation of the territory in question, namely, the moral and sentimental reasons, which swayed the Italian Government and people to demand territorial contiguity with Fiume. Once this reason falls to the ground we are confronted simply with a merely material demand for the annexation of a further strip of territory in Istria, entirely inhabited by a Slav population.

7. A conversation is to take place this evening with members of the American Delegation, who have been authorised by Mr. Polk to put freely at my disposal all such information and views as the American Delegation possess in this connection. I will not fail immediately to inform your Lordship of the result. In the meantime I venture to think that the new light shed on the Italian proposals by the admissions of Signor de Martino must be seriously taken into account in determining the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the proposals in question.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 121


*Memorandum handed to the Italian Delegation, and subsequently communicated to M. Clemenceau and Sir E. Crowe*

PARIS, October 27, 1919

Following is a statement of the position of the American Government, which has just been received by cable from Washington, in relation to the Adriatic question:—

1. From a point on the Arsa river, west of Fianona, the eastern frontier of Italy northward to the Karawanken Mountains shall be the so-called

<sup>5</sup> See map facing p. 172.



Italian map to explain latest Italian proposals (Annex II)

### CROQUIS No. 1

Annexe au memorandum de l'11 novembre 1919

Frontière de l'Etat libre de Fiume  
Zone à démilitariser et à neutraliser



American line modified in such a way as to give Italy the city of Albona. The coastal belt thus added to Italy extending between the Canale del' Arsa and the border of the free State of Fiume is to be completely demilitarised, in addition to a similar belt as far south as Cape Promontore.

2. There is to be created within the limits fixed by President Wilson the independent State of Fiume, consisting of the town and its immediate hinterland. The south-western boundary of this free State shall be modified as described in paragraph 1 above. The League of Nations shall have complete control of the free State of Fiume, and shall provide for its administration under a commission form of government. The control of the port and railways shall be vested in the League of Nations. They shall be managed in the interest of the city, as well as those countries which depend upon it as a natural outlet. All facilities for the development of the railways and the port of Fiume shall likewise be under the control of the League of Nations. Within five years, voting as a whole and not by parts, and with the understanding that there is to be no special status for Fiume, there is to be held a plebiscite; but if a plebiscite be unacceptable to Italy the free State shall be left to the League of Nations on the distinct understanding that the League is to determine the whole future of the State. Should the last-named solution be adopted a special statute may be provided, which shall give to the so-called *corpus separatum* of Fiume a degree of autonomy precisely the same as it had under Hungary, but Italian sovereignty shall not be exercised in any form.

3. The Serb-Croat-Slovene or Jugo-Slav State shall have undisputed control of all Dalmatia, but the city of Zara shall enjoy a special régime. In order to safeguard and recognise the Italian character of the town it shall be made an autonomous city, the form and functions of whose government shall be determined by the city authorities themselves in negotiation with the Jugo-Slav State. The League of Nations shall permanently guarantee the government of the town of Zara, and in case of disagreement between the city and the Jugo-Slav kingdom, the League of Nations shall settle the questions at issue. The diplomatic representation of the autonomous city of Zara shall be determined by the government of the city itself.

4. Italy shall have possession of the following islands:—

- (a) The Pelagosa Group.
- (b) Lissa and the small islets west of it.
- (c) Lussin and Unie.

In the case of the Lissa Group there is to be complete local autonomy under Italian sovereignty of the Slav portions of the islands.

5. Albania shall be placed under an Italian mandate, whose terms shall be drawn so as to prevent Italian exploitation of the country and likewise Italian militarisation and colonisation. The territory outside of Valona is to be completely demilitarised and the Jugo-Slavs shall have the right to construct and operate railways through Northern Albania.

north of parallel  $41^{\circ} 15'$ , and otherwise to enjoy full privileges of international transport across Northern Albania, as recognised in the new conventions between the Allied and Associated Powers; and, on condition that Montenegro joins the Jugo-Slav State, the Jugo-Slavs shall have the right to develop and improve the Boyana River.

6. The city of Valona, together with a very small hinterland, only enough for the absolute economic needs of the town and its security, shall be granted in full sovereignty to Italy.

7. Italy shall enjoy, under appropriate guarantees, unrestricted transit over the Assling Railway, though that railway runs through the territory of the Jugo-Slavs.

8. East of the American line in Istria there is to be defined a band of territory which shall be placed under a régime of permanent demilitarisation under the guarantee of the League of Nations. This territory shall include, in addition to the free State of Fiume, a belt of land to extend northward to the Karawanken mountain region, and within it the Assling triangle is to be included. The eastern border of the demilitarised zone shall be a north-south line 6 kilometres east of the town of Assling and extending from the northern boundary of Jugo-Slavia, as hereafter determined by the Klagenfurt plebiscite, southward to Eisnern and thence to Pölland, Lutschana, Podlipa, leaving these towns on the eastern boundary of the free State of Fiume where it is intersected by the railway from Laibach to Trieste. The coast and all the islands of the Dalmatian coast, in addition to their adjacent waters up to the mainland, shall be likewise demilitarised. The southern end of the demilitarised zone of islands shall be Porto di Malfi and the Island of Calametta. This will give a band of neutral water, of islands, and mainland between Jugo-Slavia and Italy from the edge of the Ragusa region northward to the Karawanken mountain region. The three Italian island groups described in paragraph 4 shall be included within the scope of the demilitarised zone.

In the opinion of the American Government, no reason whatsoever has arisen for a modification of the foregoing views, which have been so often and so strongly affirmed by President Wilson. The American Government deeply regrets that the Italian Government does not appear to realise that the acceptance of a settlement on these terms, which are generous and equitable, would be in its own best interest. Too great stress cannot be laid on the fact, and the Italian Government should fully realise that these are absolutely the final conditions which the American Government will accept, and that the concessions of Albona, Lussin, Unie, and the mandate for Albania which they involve, are to be made only on condition that the Italian Government accepts without further modifications the terms above set forth as a complete and final settlement.

The suggestion that Fiume should have its own statute with alterations suggested by Italy, that Italy should have the diplomatic representation of the city of Zara, and be given the island of Lagosta, as well as the recent

proposition for the concession to Italy of a strip of land to connect Fiume to Italian territory, are entirely inadmissible, and their addition to the proposed settlement by the Italian representatives has made a most painful impression on the American Government.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 121

*Memorandum communicated by Signor de Martino to Sir Eyre Crowe as Statement of the present Demands of the Italian Government*

11. IX. 1919<sup>6</sup>

La ville libre de Fiume jouira d'une complète indépendance dont les termes seront fixés par un statut spécial qui sera rédigé par la Conférence sur un rapport de la Commission compétente;

2. L'État libre de Fiume jouira d'une complète indépendance;
3. L'État libre de Fiume sera placé sous la garantie de la Société des Nations;

4. Le port et le chemin de fer de Fiume seront administrés par la Ligue des Nations;

5. Les frontières de l'État libre de Fiume seront les suivantes: au sud, la mer et une ligne qui en partant du littoral entre le district de Fiume et Volosca (voir croquis No. 1 ci-annexé)<sup>5</sup> rejoindra l' 'Alpe Grande' et de là continuera vers le nord en suivant la ligne du Président Wilson; à l'est, la ligne du Président Wilson;

6. Les îles de Veglia et de Cherso et les îlots adjacents seront attribués à l'État libre de Fiume; les îles d'Unie, de Lussin, de Lissa, de Pelagosa et de Lagosta avec les îlots adjacents, à l'Italie. Toutes les autres îles seront attribuées à la Yougo-Slavie;

7. La Dalmatie sera attribuée à la Yougo-Slavie, à l'exception de Zara, qui sera ville libre indépendante avec un statut spécial et pourra choisir sa représentation diplomatique à l'étranger;

8. Une clause spéciale assurera la garantie des intérêts économiques italiens déjà existant en Dalmatie et la protection des minorités;

9. Une autre clause garantira la 'démilitarisation' et la neutralisation: (a) de l'État libre de Fiume; (b) de toutes les îles; (c) de la côte istrienne, croate et dalmate à partir de l'embouchure de la rivière Arsa jusqu'aux Bocche di Cattaro incluses;

10. La Conférence établira les termes précis de la 'démilitarisation' avec le concours d'une Commission d'experts militaires et navals;

11. Le mandat sur l'Albanie sera attribué à l'Italie. La Conférence précisera la nature et l'étendue du mandat sur la base d'un rapport de la Commission compétente;

12. Les frontières de l'Albanie seront au nord et à l'est celles fixées par la Conférence de Londres en 1913. La Conférence de la Paix fixera la frontière au sud;

<sup>6</sup> This date was copied incorrectly. The original dating was: 11. XI. 1919.

13. La possession de Valona et de son hinterland, dans les limites strictement nécessaires à son développement économique et à sa défense, sera reconnue à l'Italie;

14. Des règles identiques garantiront l'absolue liberté du trafic dans l'intérêt de la Yougo-Slavie sur le chemin de fer à construire en Albanie le long de la vallée du Drin, et dans l'intérêt de l'Italie sur la ligne du chemin de fer Trieste-Vienne, de la frontière italo-yougo-slave, et celle austro-yougo-slave, à travers le territoire yougo-slave.

#### ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 121

*Italian economic demands: memorandum communicated to Sir Eyre Crowe by Signor de Martino on November 11, 1919*

*Clauses économiques et concernant la Protection des Minorités entre l'Italie et le Royaume des Serbes-Croates-Slovènes*

#### Art.

Les concessions faites par les États auxquels a succédé le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, ou par d'autres autorités, ou corps ou établissements publics à des ressortissants italiens, ou qui deviendront tels en vertu du Traité de Paix, ou aux sujets de colonies italiennes, ainsi qu'aux Italiens devenus sujets serbes-croates-slovènes, ou qui les possèdent en vertu de cession, sont pleinement respectées par le Gouvernement serbe-croate-slovène, y compris celles qui sont aptes à faciliter le développement industriel des entreprises.

Les sociétés auxquelles les citoyens italiens sont intéressés pour au moins un tiers au moment de l'entrée en vigueur de ce traité jouiront des droits assurés aux Italiens par cette disposition, même si elles n'ont pas leur siège en Italie ni sur le territoire serbe-croate-slovène.

Lesdits citoyens et sociétés pourront transformer et compléter leurs installations industrielles, et l'État serbe-croate-slovène s'engage à accorder les concessions complémentaires nécessaires à la pleine utilisation de celles en cours.

#### Art.

(Conforme à l'art. 223 du traité avec l'Autriche)

L'État serbe-croate-slovène s'engage:

- (a) A ne pas imposer aux ressortissants italiens, ou à ceux qui deviendront tels en vertu du Traité de Paix, en ce qui regarde l'exercice de leurs métiers, professions, commerces ou industries, aucune exclusion qui ne soit pas également applicable à tous les étrangers sans exception;
- (b) A ne pas assujettir les ressortissants italiens, en ce qui regarde les droits visés au paragraphe précédent, à aucune discipline ou restriction qui puisse directement ou indirectement infirmer les dispositions dudit paragraphe, ou qui diffère ou soit moins avantageuse que celles qui seront appliquées aux étrangers ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée;

- (c) A ne pas assujettir les ressortissants italiens, leurs biens, droits et intérêts, les sociétés ou associations auxquelles ils sont intéressés à des droits ou impôts, soit directs, soit indirects, qui diffèrent ou soient plus élevés que ceux auxquels sont ou pourront être assujettis leurs propres ressortissants ou leurs biens et intérêts;
- (d) A ne pas imposer aux ressortissants italiens aucune restriction qui n'était applicable à ces mêmes ressortissants au 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1914, à moins que la même restriction ne soit également imposée à leurs propres ressortissants.

Art.

Le Gouvernement du Royaume serbe-croate-slovène donne son consentement à ce que les Italiens nés ou établis sur le territoire de l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise transférés audit royaume aient faculté d'acquérir la nationalité italienne, dans le délai d'une année à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, et les exempte de l'obligation de transporter leur domicile hors du territoire serbe-croate-slovène.

Art.

Les ressortissants italiens qui ont gardé leur domicile dans le Royaume des S.H.S. et les ressortissants serbes-croates-slovènes appartenant à la minorité ethnique italienne auront un droit égal à créer, diriger et contrôler à leurs frais des institutions charitables, religieuses ou sociales, des écoles et autres établissements d'éducation, avec le droit d'y faire libre usage de leurs propres langues et d'y exercer librement leurs religions.

Art.

Les licences ou autres titres universitaires octroyés aux Italiens, sujets du Royaume des Serbes-Croates-Slovènes, par les universités ou autres écoles de haute étude italienne, seront reconnus par le Gouvernement serbe-croate-slovène comme titres valables sur son territoire et donnant les mêmes facultés professionnelles que ceux des universités ou hautes écoles de l'État serbe-croate-slovène.

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 121

*Mr. Lansing to Signor Tittoni*

*Copy of telegram.*

Washington No. 827 (no date). Arrived [in Paris] November 12, 1919, at 10.

In acknowledging your message from Paris received in Washington on the 23rd October,<sup>7</sup> allow me first to add to your words of deep distress at the death of the Italian Ambassador, Count Cellere,<sup>8</sup> the expression of my own sincere regret at his untimely loss, after so many years of cordial association.

Your proposals which he communicated to me on the 15th October, to

<sup>7</sup> Not found in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>8</sup> Count Di Cellere, Italian Ambassador at Washington, had died at his post on October 20, 1919.

which you refer in your message, and the reasons for which you set forth in detail, have received my most earnest and careful consideration. I regret to be obliged to express my disappointment that, after the repeated evidences of the desire of this Government to meet Italy's claims in a generous spirit, our concessions seem to be used as a point of departure for new and unexpected demands.

I find myself unable to agree with your Excellency that your new proposals are 'secondary questions'. In their consequences they seem to us to touch at the very foundations of a settlement which must 'be square with the principles elsewhere applied', as the President stated to Signor Nitti in his telegram of which you make mention in your message.

The decision reached must determine whether or not the terms of the settlement are to be such as America can honourably support, or are terms so manifestly without a just basis and so dangerous to future peace that America must necessarily withdraw from any compact designed to enforce and maintain them. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, no reason has arisen for a modification of the views affirmed by the President, and there is deep regret that the Italian Government does not seem to realise that its adherence to a settlement on these terms, which are so generous to Italy, would be in her own best interest. Your Excellency cannot fail to recognise that the attitude of the American Government throughout the negotiations has been one of sincere sympathy for Italy, and of an earnest desire to meet her demands. Italy claimed frontier on the Brenner Pass, and the demand was granted in order to assure to Italy the greatest possible protection on her northern front, although it involved annexing to Italy a considerable region populated by alien inhabitants. Italy demanded further a strong geographic eastern frontier, and this likewise was granted in order to assure her abundant protection, although it involved incorporation within Italian boundaries of further territory populated by alien inhabitants. Italy demanded the redemption of her brothers under foreign sovereignty, and every effort was made to meet this wish even in certain cases where by so doing much greater numbers of foreign races were brought within Italian sovereignty. Italy demanded complete naval control of the Adriatic, and this was granted by according her the three keys of the Adriatic: Pola, Vallona, and a central island base. When all this failed to satisfy Italian claims, there was added concession to concession at Sexten Valley, at Tarvis, at Albona, in the Lussin Islands, in the terms of the Fiume free State, and elsewhere. In our desire to deal generously, even more than generously, we yielded to Italy's demand for an Italian mandate over Albania, always hoping to meet from Italy's statesmen a generous response to our efforts at conciliation. The conditions which Mr. Polk has communicated to the Italian plenipotentiaries at Paris are the extreme conditions which the American Government feels it can honourably approve. If American assistance is desired in supporting the terms of the European settlement, those terms must be such as America can honourably endorse. Your Excellency will readily appreciate that America cannot, even if she desired, subscribe

to a settlement which would obligate her to support terms which she believes to be in principle unjust and in practice sure to endanger the peace of Europe.  
—ROBERT LANSING, *Secretary of State.*

No. 122

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 17)*

No. 2147 [152626/123/3]

My Lord,

PARIS, November 14, 1919

With reference to my despatch No. 2142<sup>1</sup> of yesterday, relative to Italian claims in the Adriatic and to the attitude of the United States Government thereto, I have the honour to enclose the accompanying memorandum reporting a conversation between Dr. Bowman of the American Delegation and Mr. Leeper. The facts recorded in this memorandum represent the latest information I have obtained regarding the attitude of President Wilson towards the question.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 122

*Memorandum*

Late yesterday afternoon Dr. Bowman of the United States Delegation came to see me here, at the express wish of Mr. Polk, in order to communicate all such latest information as was at his disposal with regard to the American attitude on the Adriatic question. Dr. Bowman informed me that the American Delegation had received that afternoon from Washington a communication which had been seen and approved by President Wilson,<sup>2</sup> and authorised by him to be sent to the American Delegation as the 'last word' of the United States Government on the Adriatic question. Dr. Bowman prefaced his conversation by saying that there were one or two small points in the communication on which some latitude would still be allowed to the American Delegation for purposes of negotiation (these points he subsequently enumerated), but on all the chief points he assured me most categorically that his statement of the position to me is the final definite position of the American Government on the matter.

For purposes of convenience I asked Dr. Bowman first of all to run through with me the agreement so far reached between the American and Italian Governments, so that no room should be left for doubt as to what Italian demands President Wilson had definitely accepted. We accordingly ran through these demands, and Dr. Bowman made it perfectly clear that President Wilson's line did not pass over Monte Maggiore, as was asserted in Marquis Imperiali's memorandum to Lord Hardinge, and that no engagement had been given by the United States Government to safeguard 'all the economic Italian interests already existing in Dalmatia'. Further, in

<sup>1</sup> No. 121.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 129, annex II.

agreeing to safeguards for the city of Fiume, President Wilson had not bound himself to accord to this city the 'privileges granted by Maria Theresa', as to which privileges both the United States Delegation and this Delegation are ignorant, but had simply agreed to 'a special statute which shall give to the so-called *corpus separatum* of Fiume a degree of autonomy precisely the same as it had under Hungary, while Italian sovereignty should not be exercised in any form'.

Dr. Bowman then went on to discuss with me the new Italian demands. We began with point No. 2 of Marquis Imperiali's memorandum, providing for the contiguity of the territories of Italy and Fiume. Dr. Bowman informed me that in no circumstances whatsoever would President Wilson accept this proposal, either in whole or part, and that he had categorically instructed the American Delegation to refuse to move the frontier in Istria any further east. In reply to my question whether the latest version of the Italian proposal put before us unofficially by Signor di Martino,<sup>3</sup> by which Italy contented herself with pushing these frontiers just east of Volosca and abandoned the small coastal strip between that town and Fiume, might possibly find any acceptance on the part of the American Government, Dr. Bowman replied that that was quite out of the question, and that the matter was definitely as he had stated, namely, that President Wilson's line could not in any circumstances be placed further east.

With regard to the status of Fiume, Dr. Bowman informed me that there could be no question in the eyes of the United States Government of acceding to the new Italian demand for the complete independence of the city of Fiume, as apart from the buffer State now known as the 'Free State of Fiume'. The whole object of the creation of this buffer State, whether the idea be good or bad, was precisely to provide sufficient strategic and economic security for the city of Fiume, which, *ex hypothesi*, must be its capital. In no circumstances could the city of Fiume be excluded from the buffer State and accorded complete independence. Not only would this entirely ruin all possibilities of existence for the buffer State, but it would open the door to every sort of Italian intrigue, open or disguised, for the annexation of Fiume to Italy. I considered with Dr. Bowman whether something possibly might not be done to meet the Italian point of view. I discussed with him whether, in the event of this American point of view being adopted by the British and French Delegations—as to which I could of course give him no assurance or information whatsoever—anything could be devised, whether of a real or illusory character, to sweeten the pill for the Italian Government and nation. He promised to think out the matter and discuss it once again with Mr. Polk. The only suggestion which I ventured to offer, of course purely as a personal suggestion, was that it might be possible to allow the city of Fiume a representation in any such Diet or representative body as might be set up for the buffer State, in excess of its numerical proportion. Possibly, for instance, the inhabitants of Fiume and Italy herself might be less reluctant to accept a solution so unwelcome to them if the city of Fiume were permanently

<sup>3</sup> See No. 121, enclosure 2.

under international guarantee accorded a 20 or 30 per cent. of members on the representative body of the buffer State. Dr. Bowman appeared to be much attracted by this proposal, which, as I again explained to him, I merely put forward personally in connection with our discussion of the position of Fiume in the buffer State.

With regard to the third of the new Italian demands, Dr. Bowman did not seem to anticipate much difficulty as to the settlement of the question of Zara. All the President was prepared to insist on here was that Zara should be a completely independent city, except for the condition that it should be part of the Jugo-Slav Customs Union. Apart from this, it should possess the full right to negotiate with the League of Nations, and through the League of Nations with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, as to what its constitution and international position should be. In this President Wilson was of opinion that he had gone a long way to meet the Italian demand. With regard, however, to the question of the island of Lagosta, the President found it quite impossible to accept the idea of the annexation of a further island to Italy. It was not so much that Lagosta itself was important as that he was unprepared, after the constant series of concessions he had made in the Adriatic question, to agree to this further detail, which was totally unjustified. I urged on Dr. Bowman that this point was really not of so much importance as to be allowed to prevent a final settlement being reached between the two Powers. He admitted this, and declared that personally he thought that, if nothing else stood in the way of an agreement, the American Government might, at the very last moment, make this concession. He made it quite clear, however, that this was merely a personal opinion of his, and that his official instructions were quite categorical against any such concession.

President Wilson was willing to agree to an Italian mandate for Albania. With regard, however, to Valona, Dr. Bowman had received instructions to specify exactly the area which might be allowed to be included within the territory annexed to Italy. This area must be very small, and merely enough for the absolute economic needs of the town and its security.

Dr. Bowman is preparing, with Mr. Polk, a memorandum setting forth with extreme minuteness what he describes as the 'last word' of the American Government on the Adriatic question.<sup>2</sup> He told me that Mr. Polk had not yet made up his mind as to whether he would at once communicate it to the Italian, French, and British Governments, or whether he would communicate it first to the two latter. Without venturing an opinion as to what it might be better for the American Delegation to do, I asked him to allow me to call his attention to the very serious situation which might arise were this document to be handed forthwith to the Italian Government. The Italian Government are strongly under the impression that the British and French Governments do not agree entirely with President Wilson's views. They would also probably not believe that what is called President Wilson's 'last word' is really his last word, and for that reason they might well refuse to accept these conditions, trusting to the British and French Governments to help them to secure better. I asked him to consider and to suggest to

Mr. Polk whether it would not be possible for Mr. Polk to communicate first of all with the British and French Governments, with a view to finding out whether they supported President Wilson's proposals or not. In the first case, future negotiations would be perfectly straightforward, and the Italian Government would be confronted with proposals which represented the united opinion of the three great Powers. In the second case, if such unanimity could not be achieved, at least the French and British Governments would know how they stood, and the same would be true of the Italian Government. Dr. Bowman promised to ask Mr. Polk immediately to consider this question very seriously before he took any action in the matter.

A. W. A. LEEPER

November 14, 1919

No. 123

*Letter from Mr. Kerr to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*Unnumbered [Confidential/General/236]*

10 DOWNING STREET, November 14, 1919

My dear Crowe,

I write you this private letter because I am not sure that you fully understand the Prime Minister's attitude on the Adriatic question. His view is that the dispute has dragged on quite long enough and that if it is prolonged much longer, it may precipitate a very serious state of affairs. He feels that both sides, owing to the length and intricacy of the negotiations, have now been driven to take their stand on what are in themselves points of minor importance. He feels that to allow a crisis to be precipitated over the points still outstanding, between the Italians and the Americans, would imply a grave lack of statesmanship. He is, therefore, willing to use his influence to try and bring about an immediate settlement of the question. On the other hand, I don't think he would agree entirely with the view expressed in your despatch of November 3rd<sup>1</sup> in which you say 'the British and American Delegations have consistently stood together in resisting these Italian manœuvres'. The British attitude has always been that it has considered itself bound by Treaty to Italy. It did its best to persuade Italy to abandon its claim, but it had always admitted that it was bound by these obligations and could not, therefore, definitely side with the United States. Its position, therefore, was that of a mediator bound to one side but whose sympathies were engaged with the other.

The Prime Minister, I think purposely, did not enquire into the detailed merits of the latest Italian proposal. He merely felt that if the three points in question were all that really separated the Americans and the Italians, he was justified in asking President Wilson not to quarrel over such small points for the reasons defined in his telegram to Lord Grey. From your despatch and telegrams it would appear that there is much more in the strip uniting the Free Town of Fiume with Italy than would meet the eye.

<sup>1</sup> No. 113.

In that event, I am pretty sure, though I have not consulted him on the point, that if the Americans were prepared to come back and say they would concede the other points, but would propose a modification of the strip proposal which would remove those objectionable features, while still leaving something to enable Nitti to make a further climb down, he would put the same kind of pressure on Nitti to settle as he is now putting on the Americans. I think his fundamental view is, though here again I am only expressing my own personal opinion, that Britain and France ought to be able to make America and Italy settle, now that there is so little between them.

Finally, the Prime Minister, of course, has no intention whatever of siding with the Italians as against the Americans. He is simply continuing the attitude he has taken up throughout of acting as a go-between, putting pressure where he thinks it desirable on both sides in order to try and produce a settlement. If the Italians try and make out that he is going in for what you might call 'European policy', they are entirely wrong. His action involves no kind of estrangement or separation from America. It is simply that of a mediator. The very fact that feelings are so high and yet the differences between the parties are so small, is just the opportunity for a mediator to grapple with the situation.

Yours sincerely,  
P. H. KERR

P.S. You seem to be having a pretty strenuous time in Paris. Hope you are fit.

#### No. 124

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)*

*No. 695 Telegraphic [152408/123/3]*

*ROME, November 14, 1919*

My telegram No. 687.<sup>1</sup>

*Secret.*

United States Chargé d'Affaires has informed Embassy most confidentially that President Wilson has intimated to Italian Government that he cannot in any way consider Italian proposal regarding Fiume. He was unable to enlarge on terms of refusal which was however categorical.

Signor Tittoni and King of Italy have returned to Rome and Council of Ministers are seriously considering situation.

It is to be hoped that President's reply will not be made public before November 16th when general elections take place.

United States Chargé d'Affaires expressed purely personal and confidential opinion that it now remained to England and France to take what measures they thought necessary to meet situation. He gave impression that President's message may contain some threat of coercive action on the part of United States Government.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 112.

No. 125

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 16)*  
*No. 696 Telegraphic [152462/123/3]*

ROME, November 15, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

French Ambassador tells me that Signor Nitti whom he saw this morning had confirmed reports current here that d'Annunzio had left Fiume with two Italian ships of war and gone to Zara. French Ambassador fears he may extend his operations to other Dalmatian ports such as Sebenico and that in that case he will meet resistance on the part of Yugo-Slavs.

Signor Nitti, French Ambassador said, was very optimistic as regards results of tomorrow's elections. He hopes that majority in new Chamber will be Conservative and opposed to any policy of adventures. When once secured by such a majority he will endeavour to exercise a moderating influence on public opinion. On my asking how he would do this French Ambassador said that it was possible that he might reduce extent of territory claimed, in order to make two frontiers coterminous, to some 80 square kilometres. French Ambassador also expressed opinion that the Fiumani if they had Italy for a neighbour instead of being surrounded by Slavs would prefer to retain their status of an entity rather than to be incorporated in Italian kingdom.

French Ambassador and I are both of opinion that only hope of a solution of Fiume question is to be found in direct negotiations between Italians and Jugo-Slavs. Signor Nitti is I know in favour of such a course and if Allies would lend their good offices it might be possible to bring about some satisfactory settlement by these means.

United States Chargé d'Affaires informs me that American Admiral at Venice had received a wireless to the effect that perfect order reigns at Zara and that no further action will be taken outside zone allotted to Zara by Treaty of London.<sup>2</sup>

Addressed to Foreign Office. Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 124.

<sup>2</sup> In Rome telegram No. 698 of November 16, 1919 (received November 17), Sir G. Buchanan corrected this paragraph as follows: 'I gather that United States Chargé d'Affaires was mistaken in speaking of zone allotted to Zara by treaty of London and that he meant to refer to zone of territory which Zara would acquire on being made a free town.'

No. 126

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 21)*  
*No. 489 [154056/4998/22]*

ROME, November 15, 1919

My Lord,

I had the honour of being received in audience by the King of Italy this morning to present my credentials as His Majesty's Ambassador at the Quirinal.

On my assuring him of the friendly feelings with which both the King

and His Majesty's Government were animated towards Italy, His Majesty enquired whether these feelings were shared by the British public. I replied that His Majesty might rest assured that this was the case and that the services which Italy had rendered us in the war were fully appreciated. His Majesty then proceeded to say that these services had not received the recognition to which they were entitled at the Paris Conference, and that Italy had come very badly out of the war. All the questions in which she was most directly interested had been left over to the last, with the result that she was still unable to complete the demobilisation of the army, the maintenance of which entailed such a heavy charge on the exhausted Exchequer. In spite of all her sacrifices, Italy had not even received the compensation promised her before her entry into the war, whereas Great Britain had got everything that she wanted—Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, German colonies, &c. Great Britain had, in fact, become the greatest Power in the world. I replied that it had been neither our desire nor our aim to add to the burden of Empire, which was heavy enough as it was, and that many of the gains which His Majesty had enumerated had been imposed on us by force of circumstances. On the other hand, if, owing to all that had happened during the last four years, it had been found impossible to give full effect to the treaty of 1915, it was none the less a fact that Italy had won by the war frontiers which would ensure her against invasion either from the north or from the east. In order to give her the natural frontiers which she claimed, the Allies had consented to incorporate in her territories several hundred thousands of Slavs and Germans. The King took exception to what I had said about the eastern frontier, and maintained that the line proposed by President Wilson would not secure Trieste against attack. His Majesty further contended that the line which Signor Tittoni had proposed—making the frontiers of Italy and the new State of Fiume coterminous—was the minimum that would safeguard Italy's interests and satisfy her national aspirations.

I assured His Majesty that no one could have represented Italy's claims in a more favourable light than the Prime Minister had done in his telegram to Washington, but that it was because they infringed the principle of nationality that President Wilson had rejected them. The Paris Conference, as His Majesty was aware, had to act as a High Court of Justice—to weigh and sift the conflicting claims of the various States concerned and to pronounce an impartial judgment. I perfectly understood the sentimental attraction which Fiume must have for Italy, but, if I was correctly informed, it was only of comparatively recent years that the Italian population in that town had attained its present dimensions. So far as I understood the situation both at Fiume and along the Dalmatian coast, such Italian settlements as existed were surrounded by a Slav population. It would no doubt be very hard for the Italian people to renounce a sentimental claim that was dear to them, but they would gain so much materially were the Fiume question to be disposed of that I would ask whether the sound common sense which was one of their characteristics might not in the end reconcile them to such

a renunciation. The King replied that this was out of the question—that there was ample evidence to show that Fiume was to all intents and purposes an Italian town, while in many parts of Dalmatia the people spoke an Italian dialect.

I failed to induce His Majesty to give any indication of the course which his Government would pursue now that President Wilson had vetoed their latest proposals, or to express any opinion with regard to d'Annunzio's descent on Zara. I therefore expressed the personal opinion that direct negotiations with the Jugo-Slavs offered the one hope of escape from the present *impasse*. His Majesty, however, feared that the latter were not likely to go further than President Wilson had gone to meet Italy's wishes.

At the close of my audience I observed that the uncertainty which prevailed with regard to the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the United States rendered it the more necessary for France, Great Britain, and Italy to draw closer to each other and to work loyally together for the maintenance of the world's peace. His Majesty cordially concurred, and added that Germany would recover from the war sooner than was generally anticipated, and that we must therefore be on our guard against her. Italy, His Majesty continued, had now a larger population than France, and, owing to her geographical position, her army would be able to afford assistance to the latter, in the event of attack, sooner than that of any other country.

I do not know whether in saying this His Majesty wished me to understand that Italy was ready to associate herself with us in the treaty, by which we and the United States engaged to go to France's assistance in the event of any future German aggression. Nor am I aware of the reason why Italy was not invited to be a party to that treaty; but the fact that she was left out of it has undoubtedly created the impression here that Italy is regarded by her Allies as not being on a par with them. It might therefore be worth considering, more especially should the United States Senate persist in its present attitude, whether Italy might not be given to understand that no obstacle would be placed in her way should she desire to join in the guarantee which we have given to France.

In spite of his outspoken criticism of what he evidently regarded as the unfair treatment meted out to Italy at the Conference, His Majesty's attitude was throughout most friendly, and as I was taking leave of him he said that nothing that had happened must interfere with the friendship that had so long existed between Italy and Great Britain.

As regards what I said to the King respecting direct negotiations with the Jugo-Slavs, I would only add that, from conversations which I subsequently had with the French Ambassador and with Count Sforza, I have every reason to believe that Signor Nitti is strongly in favour of such a course. I cannot help thinking that, if this proves to be the case, and if France and Great Britain were then to offer their good offices and to exercise a moderating influence at Rome and Belgrade, it might be possible to bring about a settlement of the Adriatic question.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

No. 127

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)*

*No. 699 Telegraphic [153368/123/3]*

*ROME, November 17, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Government have so far kept Zara incident a profound secret but now that elections are over they will probably publish it to-morrow. I have been unable to obtain any authentic information as to what is actually taking place at Zara but according to a report which I believe to be well founded D'Annunzio himself has returned to Fiume.

It also appears to be a fact that Admiral Millo went over to D'Annunzio with five naval units. The Admiral's defection has, I am informed, been a severe blow to Government by whom he was regarded as a strict disciplinarian.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 125, note 2.

No. 128

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)*

*No. 367 Telegraphic [153455/123/3]*

*BELGRADE, November 17, 1919*

S.H.S. Government have received telegram from their agent at Spalato reporting arrival at Zara of D'Annunzio with (? seven) torpedo boats and other vessels.

They have also heard that there are indications in Rome that Italian Government may proclaim annexation of Fiume.

Repeated to Peace Conference and Rome.

No. 129

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 20)*

*No. 2168 [153632/123/3]*

My Lord,

*PARIS, November 18, 1919*

I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship accompanying copies of two documents which have to-day been communicated confidentially to me by Mr. Polk containing respectively:—

- (1) A detailed American commentary on the Italian statement set forth in the memorandum handed to Lord Hardinge by the Italian Ambassador and embodied in your Lordship's despatch No. 7349<sup>1</sup> of the 7th [sic] November; and
  - (2) A memorandum setting forth with great precision a final statement of the position of the American Government on the Adriatic question.
2. By comparing the American commentary and the Marquis Imperiali's statement with the original document, your Lordship will observe that there

<sup>1</sup> See No. 91, note 1.

are in fact very serious discrepancies between the authoritative statement of the American position, which I have now the honour to transmit, and the statement furnished by the Marquis Imperiali to Lord Hardinge, which purported to be an accurate account of the Italian demands already accepted by President Wilson. I have in my despatch No. 2142<sup>2</sup> of the 13th instant called your Lordship's attention to such statements in the Marquis Imperiali's memorandum as appeared to me improbable. In the memorandum which I now forward, not only these two points but several others are shown to have been misunderstood or misstated by the Italian Ambassador. This series of discrepancies in regard to so important a question appears to me so serious that the American Government appear to me to be justified in wishing to remove immediately the misapprehension which has been created. I would therefore ask that your Lordship will authorise me to allow the American Delegation, in accordance with a request which they have made to me privately, confidentially to supply to the United States Ambassadors in London and Rome and to M. Clemenceau a copy of the Marquis Imperiali's memorandum, together with the Italian commentary<sup>3</sup> thereon.

3. I had already in my despatch No. 2147<sup>4</sup> of the 14th instant forwarded to your Lordship a memorandum regarding a conversation between Dr. Bowman, of the American Delegation, and Mr. Leeper, in the course of which Dr. Bowman gave the gist of a telegram just received from President Wilson setting forth the final statement of the American position with regard to the Adriatic question. I have now obtained confidentially from Mr. Polk the precise details of the American statement. This document is also being communicated simultaneously to the French Government,<sup>5</sup> but the American Delegation have, for the reasons recorded in Mr. Leeper's memorandum of the 14th November, wisely thought fit to refrain from immediately communicating it also to the Italian Government. By this act of courtesy His Majesty's Government and the French Government have been given the advantage of being put immediately in possession of the latest information with regard to the final decision of President Wilson on the Adriatic question, and of being able to take this into full consideration before proceeding to further negotiations with the Italian Government.

4. Throughout the discussion of this subject I have deliberately refrained from taking any initiative with any of the Delegations concerned in the matter, as I felt unable to do so without definite instructions from your Lordship. I have confined my efforts entirely to elucidating the situation and obtaining all such information as was necessary for our complete

<sup>2</sup> No. 121.

<sup>3</sup> On November 19, 1919, Sir Eyre Crowe telegraphed correcting this phrase to 'American commentary'.  
<sup>4</sup> No. 122.

<sup>5</sup> In the unnumbered telegram to Lord Hardinge of November 19, 1919 (received November 20), containing the correction indicated in note 3 above, Sir Eyre Crowe reported that the American Delegation now informed him that in fact neither of the two annexes below 'has yet been given to the French Government pending your authority to communicate Marquis Imperiali's statement. The American Delegation therefore beg for this authorisation at earliest possible date.' See No. 141.

information with regard to the attitude of the United States, French, and Italian Governments. I venture to think that this information is now completely at your Lordship's disposal. I therefore have the honour to ask that if it be desired that I should take any further steps in the matter your Lordship will instruct me as to what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the question. I should also be glad if I might be informed whether His Majesty's Government have received any reply from the United States Government to the communication addressed by the Prime Minister to President Wilson through His Majesty's Government's Ambassador at Washington. I am assured most categorically by the American Delegation that the statement which I transmit herewith to your Lordship is definitely the last word of President Wilson on the Adriatic question, having received his personal attention and approval.

5. The American Delegation have promised to supply me to-morrow with a copy of the map referred to in their memorandum, which I shall at once forward to your Lordship by bag.

I have, &c.  
EYRE A. CROWE

#### ANNEX I to No. 129

#### American Commission to Negotiate Peace

##### *Comment on the Italian Statement of the American Position*

(Nothing in this statement should be taken as modifying the full and final statement of the American position which accompanies this memorandum.)

The American Government has never mentioned 'the privileges of Maria Teresa.' Its position is that the *corpus separatum* of Fiume shall have a degree of autonomy precisely the same as it enjoyed under Austria-Hungary.

To remove the phrase 'the harbour and railways being administered by the League of Nations' from its context is to convey a wrong impression. The entire control of the free state and city of Fiume, *including the port and railway*, is to be vested in the League of Nations.

2. The Italians are given a choice between a plebiscite and the determination, without a plebiscite, of the whole future of the free state and city of Fiume by the League of Nations without Italian sovereignty in any form. The western border of the free state of Fiume is not properly described in the Italian note. It is correctly drawn on the accompanying map.<sup>6</sup>

3. Zara shall be left to the League of Nations as to government and international relations, but it shall be in the Jugo-Slav customs union.

4. These islands to be assigned to Italy but *demilitarised*.

5. Mandate for Albania to be given to Italy, *but there is to be no Italian exploitation, colonisation, or militarisation*.

6. Never at any time has it been either proposed or accepted by the American Government that the islands and waters of the eastern Adriatic coast shall be demilitarised 'up to Cattaro.' It was stated that demilitarisation should include 'the islands and adjacent waters to the mainland.' This

<sup>6</sup> See paragraph 5 of the covering despatch above.

would require the demilitarised zone to terminate at the northern border of the Ragusa region.

7. No mention has been made hitherto of 'Italian economical interests already existing in Dalmatia.' It is not proposed to give the Italian economic interests any other status than that commonly enjoyed by nations in the territory of another nation. So far as the protection of Italian minorities is concerned, that matter is fully covered by the Minorities Treaty with Jugo-Slavia.

It should be emphasised that the above corrections are of the greatest importance, since practically every one relates to a fundamental principle.

The following comments should be read with the above, since they refer to Signor Tittoni's proposed additions to the eight points in the American memorandum:—

1. The American Government cannot assent to the proposal that the town of Fiume should receive a special statute 'safeguarding its absolute independence.' It was never asserted, agreed or intended that the town should be independent of the so-called free state of Fiume. The sole distinction between the town and the rest of the free state shall be that its degree of autonomy shall be precisely the same as that which it enjoyed under Austro-Hungarian rule.

2. Under no circumstances would the American Government consent to the transfer to Italy of the small strip of territory extending from Fianona to Volosca.

3. The American Government does not consent to entrust the diplomatic representation of the free city of Zara to Italy; nor can it agree that the island of Lagosta should be assigned to Italy. Since it is specifically pointed out by the Italian representatives that 'these two clauses were already included in the proposal which President Wilson submitted to Signor Orlando on the 7th June last,' the American Government desires to point out categorically, and with the utmost emphasis, that it has informed the Italian Delegation that President Wilson did not submit a proposal on the 7th of June to Signor Orlando. The document to which Signor Tittoni refers, and to which he has repeatedly and erroneously referred as the 'settlement proposed by President Wilson on the 7th June,' was merely a suggestion for a basis of discussion between experts. It was not prepared by President Wilson, nor approved by him, nor submitted by him as a proposed settlement.

PARIS, November 17, 1919

ANNEX II TO NO. 129  
American Commission to Negotiate Peace  
*Memorandum*

Following is a statement of the position of the American Government, which has been received by cable from Washington, in relation to the Adriatic question:—

1. From a point on the Arsa River, west of Fianona, the eastern frontier of Italy northward to the Karawanken Mountains shall be the so-called American line modified in such a way as to give Italy the city of Albona. The modification of the American line thus proposed carries with it the condition that the whole of Albona thus given to Italy shall be demilitarised. It extends from the Canal del' Arsa to a point south of the Bay of Fianona and westward to the Arsa River. The coastal belt between the Canal del' Arsa and Cape Promontore shall be included in the demilitarised zone. The whole of the free State of Fiume, including the coastal border and the islands of Cherso and Veglia, is also to be completely demilitarised.

2. There is to be created within the limits fixed by President Wilson the independent state of Fiume, consisting of the town and its immediate hinterland. The south-western corner of the mainland portion of this free State shall be at a point on the coast midway between the Bay of Albona and the Bay of Fianona. The League of Nations shall have complete control of the free state and city of Fiume, including the control of the port and railways, and shall provide for their administration under a commission form of government. The port and railways shall be managed in the interest of the city as well as those countries which depend upon them as a natural outlet. All facilities for the development of the railways and the port of Fiume shall likewise be under the control of the League of Nations. Within five years, voting as a whole and not by parts, and with the understanding that there is to be no special status for Fiume, there is to be held a plebiscite; but if a plebiscite be unacceptable to Italy the free state shall be left to the League of Nations on the distinct understanding that the League is to determine the whole future of the state. Should the last-named solution be adopted, a special statute may be provided, which shall give to the so-called *corpus separatum* of Fiume a degree of autonomy precisely the same as it had under Hungary, but Italian sovereignty shall not be exercised in any form.

3. The Serb-Croat-Slovene or Jugo-Slav State shall have undisputed control of all Dalmatia, but the city of Zara shall enjoy a special régime. In order to safeguard and recognise the Italian character of the town it shall be made an autonomous city. The form and functions of its government and its international relations shall be under control of the League of Nations, unless, or until, the city itself demands that foreign relations be transferred to Jugo-Slav control. The town shall be included within the Jugo-Slav customs union.

4. Italy shall have possession of the following islands:—

- (a) The Pelagosa group.
- (b) Lissa and the small islets west of it.
- (c) Lussin and Unie.

In the case of the Lissa group there is to be complete local autonomy under Italian sovereignty of the Slav portions of the islands.

5. Albania shall be placed under an Italian mandate, whose terms shall be drawn so as to prevent Italian exploitation of the country and likewise Italian militarisation and colonisation. The territory outside of Valona is

to be completely demilitarised, and the Jugo-Slavs shall have the right to construct and operate railways through northern Albania, north of parallel  $41^{\circ} 15'$ , and otherwise to enjoy full privileges of international transport across northern Albania as recognised in the new conventions between the Allied and Associated Powers. The right to control the development of the Boyana River is to be vested in the League of Nations, with power to delegate the work to either Italy or Jugo-Slavia under proper restrictions.

6. The city of Valona, together with a small hinterland, only enough for the economic needs of the town and its security, shall be granted in full sovereignty to Italy.

7. Italy shall enjoy, under appropriate guarantees, unrestricted transit over the Assling Railway, though that railway runs through the territory of the Jugo-Slavs.

8. East of the American line in Istria there is to be defined a band of territory which shall be placed under a régime of permanent demilitarisation under the guarantee of the League of Nations. This territory shall include, in addition to the free state of Fiume, a belt of land extending northward to the Karawanken mountain region within which the Assling triangle is to be included. The eastern border of the demilitarised zone shall be a north-south line 6 kilom. east of the town of Assling and extending from the northern boundary of Jugo-Slavia, as hereafter determined by the Klagenfurt plebiscite, southward to Eisnern, and thence to Polland, Lutschana, Podlipa, leaving these towns on the eastern side of the line, thence south by east to a point on the eastern boundary of the free state of Fiume, where it is intersected by the railway from Laibach to Trieste. All the islands of the Dalmatian coast in addition to their adjacent waters up to the mainland, shall be likewise demilitarised. The southern end of the demilitarised zone of islands shall be the island of Calamotta. The demilitarised belt of water shall terminate at Porto di Malfi. This will give a band of neutral water and of islands between Jugo-Slavia and Italy from the northern edge of the Ragusa region northward to the Karawanken mountain region. The three Italian island groups described in paragraph 4 shall be included within the scope of the demilitarised zone.

In the opinion of the American Government no reason whatsoever has arisen for a modification of the foregoing views which have been so often and so strongly affirmed by President Wilson. The American Government deeply regrets that the Italian Government does not appear to realise that the acceptance of a settlement on these terms, which are generous and equitable, would be in its own best interest. Too great stress cannot be laid on the fact, and the Italian Government should fully realise that these are absolutely the final conditions which the American Government will accept and that the concessions of Albona, Lussin, Unie, and the mandate for Albania which they involve, are to be made only on condition that the Italian Government accepts without further modifications the terms above set forth as a complete and final settlement.

The suggestion that Fiume should have its own statute, with alterations suggested by Italy, that Italy should have the diplomatic representation of the city of Zara, and be given the island of Lagosta, as well as the recent proposition for the concession to Italy of a strip of land to connect Fiume to Italian territory, are entirely inadmissible, and their addition to the proposed settlement by the Italian representatives has made a most painful impression on the American Government.

PARIS, November 18, 1919

No. 130

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Mr. Kerr<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Confidential/General/236]*

My dear Kerr,

PARIS, November 18, 1919

Please forgive me for not writing before to-day in answer to your letter of the 14th about the Adriatic.<sup>2</sup> I have concentrated my efforts during the last few days on collecting all relevant and authentic material on which a considered line of action can be decided upon. This has presented much difficulty but I have been able to-day to complete the story of the Fiume negotiations by sending home a detailed statement by the Americans of what they have accepted and what they will not accept.<sup>3</sup>

The object of my several reports to Lord Curzon was to call attention to the danger of committing ourselves to a certain course without complete knowledge of what that course involved. When you see—as I presume you will see—the Italian and American documents which I have sent to the Foreign Office, you will, I think, agree that the Italian demands do indeed go beyond ‘small points’ that could readily be conceded without trouble to anybody, and also that the Italians have not been, shall I say, very careful to state their case accurately. I thought I did not exceed my duty in calling attention to these important facts, because in that light our ultimate decision will be judged.

Having now placed all the facts before Lord Curzon, I shall of course await his instructions before making any move in the matter.

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain. The file copy of this letter, which is in Sir Eyre Crowe's handwriting, is headed 'Draft'. This corrected draft was evidently retained by Sir Eyre Crowe as his copy of the letter sent to Mr. Kerr (cf. No. 131).

<sup>2</sup> No. 123.

<sup>3</sup> No. 129.

No. 131

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Confidential/General/236]*

Dear Lord Curzon,

PARIS, November 18, 1919

I am sending to you by this bag a copy of an important statement on the

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not indicated, but was probably the same as for No. 129, received on November 20.

Fiume negotiations which I have just received from the American delegation.<sup>2</sup> It completes the information I have collected and forwarded to you on the subject, and will, I hope, enable you and the Prime Minister at least to get a correct view of the situation as it now stands. I do not venture to offer any suggestion as to the next move, supposing it be desired that we should move.

I have received a letter from Philip Kerr<sup>3</sup> which I presume he will have shown to you—but of which I enclose a copy in case you have not seen it—from which I infer that the Prime Minister is not pleased with what I have said in my reports on the subject of Fiume. I also send a copy of my reply.<sup>4</sup> I need hardly say that my whole object has been to present a clear statement of the facts and issues at stake, and by so doing to avoid an impression gaining ground that the matters involved were inconsiderable trifles.

You may very well think that the discussions had preferably be continued at Washington and Rome until a stage shall have been reached when a more or less accepted plan of settlement can be brought before the conference. In any case I do not propose to take any further action unless you wish me to do so and on such lines as you may direct.

Yours sincerely,  
EYRE A. CROWE

<sup>2</sup> No. 129.

<sup>3</sup> No. 123.

<sup>4</sup> No. 130.

### No. 132

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 20)  
No. 701 Telegraphic [153752/123/3]*

ROME, November 19, 1919

Information contained in my telegram No. 699<sup>1</sup> though given me by colleague who had been told it by President of the Council would appear to be incorrect.

Ministry of Marine told Naval Attaché this morning that Admiral Millo had not gone over to d'Annunzio with five ships and that zone question about which official statement would shortly be sent to Embassy was not causing Government any anxiety.

On the other hand His Excellency told Naval Attaché for my private information that success of Socialists<sup>2</sup> had so incensed military party and adherents of d'Annunzio that Government seriously feared descent by him on some part of Italian coast with a view to provoking military pronunciamiento and upsetting Government. Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 127.

<sup>2</sup> In the Italian elections held on November 16, 1919, the official Socialist candidates had gained 156 seats out of a total of approximately five hundred.

No. 133

*Colonel Peck (Abbazia) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received November 20)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. S.201 Telegraphic [97/1/22/20476]*

*ABBAZIA, November 19, 1919*

Further to my No. S.200<sup>2</sup> newspaper *Era Nuova* states Admiral Millo welcomed D'Annunzio at Zara. Millo wired Rome as follows (message begins) 'D'Annunzio has arrived Zara with 1000 men. I gave him a solemn oath that no Italian soldiers would have ever abandoned the territory assented by Treaty of London'. (Message ends.) D'Annunzio appointed Millo first Governor of Dalmatia Italiana. D'Annunzio returned Fiume November 15 and in speech said 'we will settle question of Italian Adriatic from today onwards with increased force of will and discipline. Serious game now begins. We have now the sword in hand and the sword will cut to the bone'.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to Paris and Rome.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This short telegram of November 15, 1919 (received by the British Delegation in Paris on November 16), transmitted a report that Signor D'Annunzio had sailed with five ships and an expeditionary force, and had landed at Zara on November 14.

No. 134

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received November 20)*

*No. 369 Telegraphic [153822/123/3]*

*BELGRADE, November 19, 1919*

It is stated at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that this Government have reason to believe d'Annunzio will make an attempt on November 22nd on Spalato where, as you are aware, there are Yugo-Slav troops.

No. 135

*Note from the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires in London (Received November 21)*

*No. 1590 [153959/123/3]*

*LONDRES, le 20 novembre 1919*

Le Chargé d'Affaires du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes présente ses compliments à Son Excellence Earl Curzon of Kedleston et a l'honneur de Lui communiquer, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, ce qui suit:

D'après les informations reçues par le Gouvernement Royal des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, la question de Fiume et de l'Adriatique menace d'emporter les cercles politiques d'Italie, poussés surtout par les agitations des militaires sur le terrain des décisions désastreuses. Cet état d'esprit qui doit prévaloir de plus en plus dans les milieux gouvernementaux d'Italie, impressionne gravement le Gouvernement Royal des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et l'oblige d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur la menace croissante d'annexer la ville de Fiume à l'Italie et de mettre ainsi les Puissances Alliées et la Conférence de la Paix devant un fait accompli.

En supposant, non sans fondement, l'éventualité d'un acte d'annexion de la ville de Fiume à l'Italie, le Gouvernement Royal tient de son urgent devoir de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique qu'un tel acte serait un coup terrible à l'unité nationale et à l'avenir du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, et que le Gouvernement Royal ne pourrait prendre aucune responsabilité pour les graves conséquences et complications inévitables qui peuvent en résulter.

Dans l'espoir que la réponse du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sera de nature à rassurer le Gouvernement Royal des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes dans ses préoccupations pour le maintien de la paix, le Chargé d'Affaires prie Son Excellence Earl Curzon of Kedleston d'agréer les assurances de sa très haute considération.

### No. 136

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received November 27)*

*No. 241 [155966/123/3]*

My Lord,

BELGRADE, November 22, 1919

During the short period which has passed since my arrival here I have not elicited from the members of the S.H.S. Government any observations of particular interest in regard to the European political situation. The one subject of paramount import to the new State is the Adriatic question, and that is a subject one hesitates to open in the consciousness that the Allied Powers seem to be failing the expectations of this country that they will make good their authority over their sister Power, Italy, and restrain the ambitions which are threatening the integrity and commercial vitality of the new State they have helped into existence. When in conformity with your instructions I have preached patience and forbearance, I am met with the reproach that had the Serbs, contrary to the advice of the Powers, attempted to eject d'Annunzio when he first landed at Fiume, they could have done so without entailing the grave consequences which they are now warned against. The Serbians are never tired of recalling that in October 1915 we advised them not to take the action which would have forestalled the Bulgarian attack on Serbia.<sup>1</sup>

It is surprising the calm with which this people appear to receive the news of d'Annunzio's exploits, but there is, I believe, an unshakeable resolution to fight sooner or later, according to the period necessary to reorganise their war material, if Italy is kept in the occupation of Fiume or in a position to exercise dominant influence over it. The General Staff have no desire to precipitate hostilities now when their lack of resources would be sure to lead to defeat, but they do mean to resist even now by force any transgression over the line of demarcation into the territory definitely allotted to Jugoslavia. The Serbs are tired of war, and do strongly desire peace, and they were proceeding with the disbandment of the army. The second Ban, con-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Viscount Grey, *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916* (London, 1925), vol. ii, chaps. xxvii-xxviii *passim*.

sisting of men between 31 and 37, were released a few days ago, and it was estimated that the numbers of troops would be reduced to about 150,000 men; but the news of d'Annunzio's action at Zara and his reported intention of landing at Spalato is arresting the work of demobilisation. I had the honour of informing you in my telegram No. 372<sup>2</sup> of the 20th November that the Chief of the General Staff had told General Plunkett that the troops within reach of Spalato were being reinforced. There were already at Spalato two infantry regiments, two batteries, and nearly 3,000 armed volunteers; two other regiments were in the neighbourhood, and orders were issued to oppose with all available force any Italian regulars or irregulars who crossed the line of demarcation.

The telegrams from Spalato published by the semi-official agency describing the proceedings of d'Annunzio and his adherents, and the provocative language used by them as regards their intentions towards Spalato and the rest of Dalmatia, including the 'deliverance' of Montenegro, might have been expected greatly to excite the people here. One sees, however, no outward signs of such excitement, nor is the press permitted to write unrestrainedly. I enclose herewith the French translation of an article appearing in the *Epoche*. Another article from the commercial journal of Belgrade attacks Mr. Lloyd George's allusion to the Adriatic question as being infinitely small is [sic] also annexed.<sup>3</sup>

I am assured that the Serbs, who as a race seem to resemble the 'strong silent man' of the stage, feel the deepest resentment at the conduct of the Italians. It does not excite them in the way in which an insult to their race would do, but the indignation awoken is that inspired by the narration of Nathan's parables. It is known that Fiume is an essential as the port of Croatia, that it is the only port connected with the interior by a serviceable railway line, that the Italians have ports to spare and no use for Fiume in particular. For the Jugo-Slavs to depend on the moods of another and hostilely disposed Power for untrammelled intercourse with the outside world is to rob the State of its independence in political action. Nothing so irritates the Serb as the argument that though there is no valid reason for subjecting Fiume to Italian domination, and there is very good reason for not doing so, yet the fact that an effervescence of Italian sentiment has been whipped up

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received November 21) also reported a statement by the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff 'that S. H. S. authorities had requested American Admiral to safeguard coastline of Jugo Slav zone against Italian attack'.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. Speaking at the Guildhall on November 9, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George had alluded to 'the question of the Adriatic, small in itself, infinitesimally small compared with the tremendous issues which we have so satisfactorily settled, but gathered round it and raised in connection with it, deep passions have created an atmosphere which makes it more difficult to arrive at a calm settlement by common consent.' The article, annexed in original, from the *Trgovinski Glasnik* of November 22, 1919, argued that 'la question adriatique n'est pas aussi "infiniment petite" que Lloyd George l'a dit. Permettre à l'Italie d'occuper quoi que ce soit sur le littoral balkanique occidental, ce serait jeter le germe empoisonné de troubles nouveaux, de complications nouvelles, de conflits et même de guerres dans les Balkans et en Europe.' The general theme of the article was that 'la tolérance indécise des grandes puissances alliées et associées a encouragé les équipées italiennes'.

by an ephemeral juncture of circumstances, makes it necessary to settle a point of the first practical importance to the Jugo-Slavs in a manner not in conformity with the principles of right and justice on which the new distribution of Europe was to be based.

Such a concession to what is considered to be either the wanton caprice or a considered political ambition on the part of a spoilt people whose military prowess is despised by the soldier Serb will infallibly make this nation intent on preparing a new war. For the moment, the Italian menace is binding together the rather discordant elements composing the new Jugo-Slavia, and if Italy desires to prevent the growth of a strong and united Slav kingdom in the Balkans, she would be well advised to allow Fiume a *bonâ fide* independence and wait for the culture and civilisation of Croatia and Slovenia to react against the centralisation schemes of the militarist peasant State to which they are now yoked.

I have, &c.

ALBAN YOUNG

ENCLOSURE IN No. 136

*Extract from the 'Epocha' of November 19, 1919*

Le Coup de main contre Zadar<sup>4</sup>

Le coup de théâtre de Rieka<sup>5</sup> se reproduit. Si c'est, d'une part, une folie ridicule, c'est aussi, d'autre part, un calcul politique. C'est un calcul par lequel continue la série des attaques contre la conscience du monde, tendant à impressionner, par une fausse émotion, les spectateurs et à créer une idée inexacte de l'italianité de la côte orientale de l'Adriatique. Ce calcul rend 'impuissants' le Gouvernement italien et l'Amiral Milo, qui ne peuvent résister à la volonté du peuple.

Mais à côté de ce premier calcul, il y en a un autre; il s'agit de prolonger, aussi longtemps que possible, le désordre et le chaos sur l'Adriatique. Il s'agit de maintenir, même au prix de quelques sacrifices — comme c'est le cas pour Rieka — la Yougo-Slavie fermée, de lui rendre l'exportation et l'importation aussi difficiles que possible, d'empêcher son rétablissement et de la laisser sombrer dans le chaos et dans le mécontentement. L'Italie pourra alors avoir ce qu'elle désire.

Il est vrai qu'en ce moment, il nous est impossible de répondre, ainsi qu'il conviendrait, à de pareils agissements. Mais il nous reste autre chose; nous pouvons nous souvenir. Et nous, qui savons ne pas oublier le bien qu'on nous fait, nous savons également nous souvenir du mal. Et vraiment, si vous voulez, Italiens, nous n'oublierons pas que c'est vous qui nous avez laissés mourir à San-Giovanni, à Durazzo et à Valone en 1915 et 1916; nous n'oublierons pas que c'est vous qui nous avez arraché l'Istrie, la Goriza; que c'est vous qui avez semé le grain bolcheviste dans notre pays; que c'est vous qui avez déporté, maltraité et torturé notre population des côtes de l'Adriatique; que c'est vous qui avez pris la flotte yougo-slave; que c'est vous qui

<sup>4</sup> i.e. Zara.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. Fiume.

avez fait souffrir notre Rieka, qui avez ensanglanté notre Zadar, fermé nos portes sur l'Adriatique; que c'est vous qui avez ri de tous nos maux. Nous n'oublierons pas et nous vous le rappellerons sûrement un jour, puisque vous ne voulez pas que nous l'oublions.

No. 137

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received November 23)*

*No. 379 Telegraphic [154722/123/3]*

BELGRADE, November 23, 1919

Crown Prince and Chief of General Staff told Military Attaché last night that in the event of Italian regulars or irregulars crossing the line of demarcation at any one place Yugo-Slav[s] would as best defensive policy take offensive at most suitable point. This might be anywhere between Fiume and Sebenico. Orders had been given in conformity with this policy not restricting their action to passive defence.

Immediately after learning above I went round to Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup> I told him as regards local defence I could only remind him of instructions contained in your telegram 316<sup>2</sup> but as regards taking offensive at another point I said that such action might entail gravest consequences and upset all efforts which I knew were being now energetically made by Allies at Paris to settle Adriatic question. I spoke very seriously and begged him to communicate my representations at once to President of the Council . . .<sup>3</sup> he said would do so but he (? was ignorant)<sup>3</sup> that any such orders had been issued by Military Authorities.<sup>4</sup>

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> A full stop is probably here omitted.

<sup>2</sup> No. 108.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> In Belgrade despatch No. 244 of November 28, 1919 (received December 4: not printed), Sir A. Young further reported that the Yugoslav authorities had communicated to the French Military Attaché at Belgrade information similar to that given to General Plunkett. Sir A. Young commented: 'As the army authorities had taken such pains to warn the military attachés of their warlike intentions, they were doubtless desirous of exploiting the alarm they would cause us for the purpose of impressing on our Governments the danger of allowing d'Annunzio to continue his provocative proceedings. My American colleague also spoke to M. Davidovitch, the President of the Council, on the same subject. Mr. Dodge tells me that he finds the Jugo-Slavs are inclined to think that England and France have grown very cold towards them.'

No. 138

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 23)*

*No. 707 Telegraphic [154709/123/3]*

ROME, November 23, 1919

Belgrade telegram No. 855.<sup>1</sup>

President of Council, whom I questioned yesterday with regard to Admiral

<sup>1</sup> The reference is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the reference should have been to Belgrade telegram 372, for which see No. 136, note 2.

Millo's conduct at Zara, referred me to official communiqué of which summary will be sent in my telegram immediately following. Admiral had, he said, shown complete disregard for stringent orders sent to him, and would have to be recalled.

On my asking whether His Excellency apprehended any future action on the part of d'Annunzio, President of the Council said that necessary measures had been taken to guard against a possible descent upon Italian coast, and that if d'Annunzio attempted to land he would be shot. Emissaries, whom latter had sent to Ancona, and other ports, for purpose of making revolutionary propaganda, would be arrested, but it was more likely that he would organize another expedition to some other Dalmatian town like Spalato.

I said that I had reason to believe that Jugo-Slavs would oppose any such attempt by force, and I asked what would be Army's attitude in the event of armed conflict.

He replied that, though some hot-heads amongst officers might join him, he did not know (?) whether these men would follow him were d'Annunzio to be aggressive. Latter's vanity had (?) gone to his head. (?) He was in correspondence with German admirers who were encouraging him and sooner than see his enterprise finish like some foolish comedy, he would . . .<sup>2</sup> set world ablaze and end it in some great tragedy.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 139

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)*

*No. 708 Telegraphic [154710/123/3]*

ROME, November 23, 1919

Following is summary of official communiqué issued in press evening of 22nd November. (Begins.)

The occupation of Fiume by volunteers and by those troops who have proceeded there since 12th September still continues, but activity of these irregulars has recently shown itself in new directions and in operations in Dalmatia; a minority even persists in attempting seditious action in Italy, with assistance of agents at home. The latest developments have been as follows:—

In early days of November two officers went from Fiume to Zara; they were received by Vice-Admiral Millo, and assured him that they had no present intention of making an expedition to Dalmatia. The Vice-Admiral in his despatches to the Italian Government had always shown his objections to any irregular action. On 12th November entrance into and exit from town of Fiume was prohibitive [*sic*], apparently with view to conceal from public preparations for expedition to Zara. Italian Government, who had, however, received information of this in advance, warned Admiral Millo of what was going on, and also of what was happening at Fiume and of expedition to Zara at 8 A.M. on 14th November. Semaphore of Puntadura signalled

a convoy *en route* for Zara. Destroyer *Indomito*, which went out to meet these vessels, reported the arrival of d'Annunzio and the Fiume irregulars. About 9.40 the destroyer *Nulla*, followed by the torpedo-boats *86 P.N.* and *M.A.S. 22*, entered the harbour of Zara, while the transport *Cortellazzo* stopped at Derna at the entry of the harbour canal. Above-mentioned vessels had been for some time at Fiume. A motor sent by Admiral Millo awaited d'Annunzio's disembarkation and took him to Governor's residence. After a conversation of half-an-hour Admiral informed officers that he had given his word that no part of Dalmatia indicated in Pact of London would ever be evacuated. Admiral and d'Annunzio then addressed crowd and together with officers reviewed troops. There were further demonstrations in afternoon, and in evening at reception at the Casino, at which Admiral took part. There were some 800 Fiume volunteers on board *Cortellazzo*. A naval lieutenant addressed crowd to effect that soldiers and sailors of Fiume, and not Italian Governments and diplomats, were real exponents of will of Italian people. On morning of 15th November Admiral called on d'Annunzio on board the *Nulla*; latter departed at 10 o'clock, and on leaving all four vessels hoisted down [sic] Dalmatian flag. Behaviour of troops was, in general, calm; only one body of Arditii visited bishop's palace in the evening and insisted on Italian flag being displayed. Similar action was taken in respect of Croat Society of Sokol. On 16th November Vice-Admiral Millo put vessel *Zeffiro* at disposal of commission of citizens of Zara, who, headed by the mayor, Higlotto, proceeded to Fiume. Most deplorable result has been that many soldiers, even officers, have been given to understand (evidently with intention to deceive) that Government is a consenting party to what has happened and that its disclaimers are only make-believe. Another effect has been that officers who have not explicitly announced their adhesion have been placed under control. There are signs that further expeditions are contemplated for Sebenico and Spalato, and other districts of Dalmatia. Admiral Millo has explained his conduct and has declared that he acted in good faith in order to avoid disturbances. Government has expressed its disapproval of and has disclaimed responsibility for every declaration of a political nature of the Admiral's, such declarations being entirely outside his powers, which are exclusively administrative, and military political administration of international question rests in the most absolute manner with Parliament and the Government alone. Since further expeditions had been announced Government will do all it can to prevent them, and it now warns country of danger of such proceedings. From enquiries recently instituted at Ancona, Turin, and Milan, it appears that certain hare-brained persons hoped to avail themselves of situation at Fiume to promote acts of sedition in Italy. Government has taken all necessary measures, and will treat as a crime every act tending to disturb internal peace. Public order is perfect throughout the kingdom. Vice-Admiral Millo remains at his post awaiting Government's decisions.

No. 140

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 23)*

*No. 709 Telegraphic [154711/151922/22]*

*ROME, November 23, 1919*

In conversation reported in my telegram No. 706<sup>1</sup> President of the Council spoke with his usual calm confidence of political situation. He counted on having a majority in new chamber as Catholics would support him, while, though Socialists (? maliciously) attack him on principle, they would not try to overthrow him. Some twenty of them were no doubt dangerous but many others had been elected by conservative peasantry of mountainous districts of North who were tired of war and who returned Socialists as best guarantee against its renewal.

I observed that if people were so averse to policy of adventure which might involve Italy in new war, Government ought to make them understand this danger could be best averted by renunciation of their claims to Fiume.

President of the Council replied this was not possible, that people desired peace but they wanted Fiume as well. Government had moreover to take into account feelings of Army and Navy.

His Excellency then, once more, insisted on necessity for early solution of Fiume question and urged that now as United States were about, as it seemed, to disinterest themselves in European questions, it would be easier for France and Great Britain to promote its solution by bringing pressure to bear on Jugo-Slavs. He appealed to me to help.

I said that it was useless for me to excite hopes that might not be realised and that I doubted whether the two Governments could do this. It might, I thought, be different were his Government to enter into direct (? negotiations with) Government at Belgrade and to invite our good offices, but, in the event of our endeavouring to exercise moderating influence at Belgrade, it would be necessary for us to do same at Rome. Would he, I enquired, be prepared to reduce latest Italian claims? He replied that in view of (? fact that) Italy was giving up all that had been promised to her in Dalmatia, that claim was minimum that would satisfy her.

On my asking whether French Government are prepared to (? support) that claim, His Excellency assured me that they had already done so at Washington. This does not tally with language held to (? Sir E. Crowe) by

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of November 22, 1919 (received November 23) Sir G. Buchanan reported that he had that evening asked Signor Nitti 'whether there was any truth in report of Signor Tittoni's approaching retirement. He replied that though it was not yet accomplished fact Signor Tittoni had asked to be relieved of his present post on account of heart trouble which prevented him taking active part in debates in Chamber. He would probably be succeeded by M. Scialoja and be eventually appointed President of Senate. President of Council begged me to treat above as confidential for the present. Scialoja's record as regards war is a far better one than Signor Tittoni's and though he has not reputation of being a brilliant man he is I believe moderate in his views and well disposed towards Allies.'

M. Clemenceau, as reported in latter's telegram No. 1545<sup>2</sup> but it is, no doubt, what French Press has been persistently impressing on Italian public.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>2</sup> No. 119.

No. 141

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 7621 [153632/123/3]

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 24, 1919

I have received your despatch No. 2168<sup>1</sup> of the 18th instant, in which you enclose a detailed commentary by the United States Delegation on Signor Tittoni's proposals as set forth in the memorandum communicated to Lord Hardinge by the Italian Ambassador on the 27th October, together with a memorandum by that Delegation containing a final statement of the position of the United States Government on the question of the Adriatic.

2. I have observed from your despatch under reply, as well as from the two earlier despatches to which you refer, that there are indeed a series of important discrepancies which justify the United States Government in desiring immediately to remove the misapprehension created by the communication made by the Italian Ambassador on the 27th October. As you are aware, it was on this statement of the Italian proposals that the Prime Minister based his appeal to the President of the United States to regard them as a moderate statement of the position of the Italian Government which President Wilson had in substance accepted. It now appears that the President had not accepted the solution of many important aspects of the problem summarised in the Marquis Imperiali's memorandum.

3. In these circumstances I cannot but accede to your request to be authorised to allow the American Delegation, in accordance with their wishes, confidentially to supply to the United States Ambassadors in London and Rome, and to M. Clemenceau, a copy of the Marquis Imperiali's memorandum, together with the American commentary thereon.

4. His Majesty's Government have received no further reply to the communication addressed by the Prime Minister to President Wilson through His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, beyond the confidential communications made to yourself by Mr. Polk, which clearly reflect the considered policy of the President in regard to this Adriatic question.

5. You are therefore authorised to discuss with the United States, French, and Italian Delegates, in whatever way appears to you best, the communications made to you by the United States and Italian Delegations on this subject, in order to arrive at the earliest possible date, at a just solution of the problem, compatible with the obligations of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>1</sup> No. 129.

No. 142

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 26)*

*No. 1613 Telegraphic: by bag [155749/123/3]*

PARIS, November 25, 1919

Sir A. Young's unnumbered telegram of the 23rd November:<sup>1</sup> Possible Italian invasion of the Jugo-Slav zone.

Accompanying communication from the Jugo-Slav Peace Delegation in Paris calls the attention of the Peace Conference to the serious danger that threatens from the possible attempts of d'Annunzio's forces on points within the Jugo-Slav zone on the Adriatic coast. M. Trumbić has been to see me, and emphasised once again the gravity of the situation. He said there could be no question that if d'Annunzio and his forces landed at any point in the Jugo-Slav zone on the Adriatic coast there would be fighting between these forces and the Jugo-Slav troops. The Jugo-Slav people were determined to resist further attempts of d'Annunzio to occupy Jugo-Slav towns. I impressed on M. Trumbić the serious consequences that would almost certainly follow upon an armed conflict between Jugo-Slavs and Italians, however provoked. He replied that he quite understood this, but that the patience of his people in face of these continual unprovoked aggressions was exhausted. M. Trumbić suggested that the only sure method of maintaining order in the Adriatic was for the despatch of one or two British men-of-war to places like Cattaro and Spalato, and he was certain that in face of them there would be no more trouble from d'Annunzio, and that this would also greatly strengthen the position of the Italian Government. In view of the decision of His Majesty's Government to withdraw the British naval forces from the Adriatic<sup>2</sup> and in no case to allow them to intervene in any armed conflict between Italians and Jugo-Slavs,<sup>3</sup> I was unable to give any encouragement to M. Trumbić's suggestion. I do not therefore venture to suggest to your Lordship any measures on the part of His Majesty's Government, though I cannot refrain from once again expressing my opinion that the situation, if left to itself, will develop in very dangerous directions, and may quite well lead to war between Italy and Jugo-Slavia. Such an eventuality, it seems to me, can only be averted by resolute action on the part of the Allied Governments.

ANNEX TO NO. 142

*Document 1*

*M. Pachitch to M. Clemenceau*

M. le Président,

PARIS, le 23 novembre 1919

Vu les nouvelles d'un nouveau coup de main de d'Annunzio, j'ai l'honneur d'appeler, par ordre du Gouvernement du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to Paris of No. 137.

<sup>2</sup> On October 25, 1919, Lord Curzon had concurred in a proposal by the Admiralty to withdraw H.M.S. *Cardiff* (cf. No. 31) from the Adriatic.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Nos. 41 and 59.

Slovènes, l'attention du Conseil suprême sur ces incidents, qui représentent un grand danger pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité sur les côtes de l'Adriatique et qui menacent nos intérêts les plus vitaux.

Dans ce but, il me semble de toute nécessité de faire mention des faits suivants:

Au commencement de juillet dernier, des rixes sanglantes entre des soldats italiens et français ont eu lieu à Fiume. D'après ce qui est connu, le Conseil suprême avait pris des décisions et des mesures pour rétablir l'ordre à Fiume et y sauvegarder la paix et la tranquillité.<sup>4</sup>

Cette décision, d'après ce qui est connu à l'égard de l'opinion publique, a calmé, jusqu'à un certain point, notre population, qui, par suite des nombreux incidents survenus à Fiume, se trouvait dans un état d'agitation et d'amertume croissantes.

Ladite décision de la Conférence n'a pu être réalisée par suite d'un coup de force d'Annunzio, qui, le jour même où l'administration de la ville devait passer aux mains des troupes interalliées, s'est emparé de Fiume à l'aide de troupes révoltées.

En dépit de cette provocation inouïe, notre peuple a gardé son calme, dans la conviction que la Conférence saura elle-même sauvegarder son prestige et imposer le respect de ses décisions. Il s'est aussi soumis à la décision du Conseil suprême, par laquelle le règlement de l'incident mentionné ci-dessus, regardé comme une affaire touchant la politique intérieure de l'Italie, fut confié à celle-ci.

Les mesures prises à cet égard par le Gouvernement italien n'étaient pas efficaces, ce qui a évidemment encouragé d'Annunzio et ses partisans jusqu'à un tel point que, dans la nuit du 22 septembre dernier, des détachements italiens révoltés ont attaqué Trogir (Traù) en Dalmatie, situé en dehors de la zone d'occupation — un coup de main qu'il n'a pas réussi et qui, heureusement, est resté sans graves conséquences. Le Gouvernement italien, non seulement n'a pris aucunes mesures efficaces contre les provocations de d'Annunzio, mais il vient même de lever le blocus et de permettre le libre trafic commercial avec l'Italie.

Enhardi par cela, d'Annunzio, le 14 novembre, exécuta un nouveau coup de force et pénétra, protégé par quelques vaisseaux de guerre italiens, à la tête de ses 'arditi' dans Zara, ne trouvant aucune résistance de la part des troupes régulières qui étaient sous les ordres de l'Amiral Millo.

Cette nouvelle provocation n'a pas manqué d'exciter la plus vive indignation dans tout notre peuple. Le long de la côte adriatique, l'effervescence de notre population a tellement grandi que les conséquences les plus graves sont à redouter. Cette population, qui, jusqu'à présent, a gardé son sang-froid, malgré toutes les provocations et toutes les souffrances endurées, commence à perdre sa foi en une solution équitable de toutes ces difficultés, voyant qu'une bande d'aventuriers politiques peut s'opposer aux ordres les plus strictes des grandes Puissances, qu'elle peut impunément commettre toutes espèces d'actes de violence et de déloyauté, et s'ériger en maître absolu sur

<sup>4</sup> See Volume I, No. 42, minute 1, and No. 43, minute 2.

un territoire occupé au nom des principales Puissances alliées et associées et dont le sort est encore *sub judice*.

D'après les télégrammes ci-joints et comme le prouve le communiqué du Gouvernement italien publié par l'Agence Stefani<sup>5</sup> (Agence Havas du 22 courant, 20 h., et 23 courant, 6 h.), d'Annunzio menace ouvertement d'occuper encore d'autres villes du littoral dalmate. Vu la discipline ébranlée des troupes italiennes d'occupation, le danger est imminent, comme le cas de Fiume, de Trogir et de Zara le démontre, que ces troupes par-dessus tout, provoqueront des incidents aussi sur la ligne de démarcation laquelle ils se préparent à franchir selon toute vraisemblance. Le commandement suprême de notre armée a pris, par conséquent, et prendra encore des mesures énergiques contre toute éventualité de ce genre, et il repoussera, les armes à la main, toute violation de la ligne de démarcation, ce qui aura comme suite des conflits sanglants.

Exécutant l'ordre qui m'a été donné par mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier, M. le Président, de bien vouloir communiquer ce que je viens d'exposer au Conseil suprême, afin qu'il prenne des mesures efficaces et mette fin à l'état de choses insupportable et extrêmement dangereux qui existe sur la côte orientale adriatique.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

NIK. P. PACHITCH

*Document 2*

*Press Bureau, Belgrade, to M. Trumbitch*

(Télégraphique.)

Belgrade 2350 18 201140.

Mande de Split. Apprenons source très digne confiance que Annunzio prépare nouveau coup de main, cette fois contre Split. Ce coup devrait être primitivement exécuté simultanément avec celui de Zadar, mais dernier moment ajourné. D'Annunzio, qui retourna dans Fiume 15 novembre avec navire guerre, retournera d'après propre déclaration dans Zadar 22 novembre. Arrivé Zadar, continuera de cette ville exécution son programme. De Italie arrivèrent Zadar 15,000 soldats et un détachement marine. But partie armée et marine est Split. Autre partie marine et autre partie armée doivent aller Monténégro. Plan déjà organisé attaque Monténégro, soit par bouches Cattaro, soit côté terre. Zadar se trouvent quantités colossales armes, munitions. Toute route surtout tous ponts situés près frontière minés. Amiral Millo se soumit complètement devant d'Annunzio et tous deux travaillent d'accord. Dans voyage Zadar d'Annunzio était accompagné croiseur guerre *Cottelazzo*, grand destroyer *Nullo*, torpilleur 66, et vedette type 'Mas.'— Bureau Presse.

*Document 3*

*Press Bureau, Belgrade, to M. Trumbitch*

(Télégraphique.)

SSS Belgrad 2801 791 21 21.

Mande de Zadar, soldats Annunzio font régner terreur dans rues. Parti-

<sup>5</sup> See No. 139.

sans d'Annunzio portent tous brassard couleurs italiennes avec inscription : 'Italie ou la Mort.' Personnes qui portent pas brassard exposées, même si italianisants, aux attaques, injures, crachats. Yougo-Slaves, absolument sans protection, vivent enfermés dans maisons. Seules servantes peuvent sortir acheter provisions.

Haine contre Yougo-Slaves dépasse toutes bornes. Officiers italiens déclarent à certains Yougo-Slaves : Voulons plus entendre parler de Rome. Gouvernerons maintenant au nom d'Annunzio et exécuterons ses ordres. Attendrez pas longtemps avant que franchissions ligne démarcation. D'Annunzio arrivera Sibenik 23 novembre. Alors connaîtrons décisions libérateur de Dalmatie et protecteur du Monténégro gémissant dans le plus barbare esclavage.<sup>6</sup> Amiral Millo offrit au Gouvernement Rome démission de Gouverneur. Président Conseil refuse et maintint amiral dans fonctions, adoptant sans réserves entente établie par amiral avec d'Annunzio. Mande de Split et proclament leur projet publiquement. Officiers italiens disent d'Annunzio compte occuper toute Dalmatie jusqu'à Narenta, délivrer Monténégro baie Cattaro qui sera fortifiée pour Monténégro. Déclarent exécution plus bref délai possible de ce projet être volonté ferme d'Annunzio. Selon eux cette opération sera soutenue par bonne partie de flotte et importants effectifs troupes terre. Selon eux levée blocus serait due à pression exercée à Rome parmi leurs militaires. Troupes seraient réunies en Italie et embarquées dans buts aux guerres sous yeux Italie officielle. Dalmatie attend du Gouvernement Belgrade décision rapide et mesures énergiques pour empêcher attaques rebelles Italiens contre partie encore libre de patrie. Peuple surexcité. Dans leurs réunions habitants italianisants Split célèbrent venue prochaine d'Annunzio, déclarent Gouvernement que jour approche où prendront pouvoir. Maintenant compréhensible vaste propagande des italianisants pendant deux derniers mois qui distribuèrent dans région non occupée argent et vivres provenant navire guerre italien *Pudalia*. Dalmatie compte que pays se joindra à elle pour demander que soit tout prix empêché nouvel attentat contre justice et équité.

Commentaires presse Belgrade. *Epoca*, journal indépendant, écrit : 'Coup théâtre Fiume se reproduit.'<sup>7</sup>—*Bureau Presse*.

<sup>6</sup> It would appear that the preceding passage, beginning 'Voulons plus', should be in inverted commas.

<sup>7</sup> See enclosure in No. 136.

### No. 143

*General Delme-Radcliffe<sup>1</sup> (Klagenfurt) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received November 27)*

*No. 11265 Telegraphic [97/1/22/20768]*

*KLAGENFURT, November 25, 1919*

At 8th Army Headquarters I was informed today that there is possibility of a change in the situation at Fiume and that D'Annunzio may be induced

<sup>1</sup> Chief of the British Military Mission at Klagenfurt.

to leave and that Italian troops with him may return to their duty. Badoglio has been at Trieste for two days and is negotiating with D'Annunzio. Latter's latest exploit at Zara has given occasion for the greater part of the press to show more impatience of these adventures and if they are continued widespread irritation against D'Annunzio. Am informed that D'Annunzio himself is getting tired of situation and the troops with him also, especially as they are receiving no pay and the so-called national subscriptions amount to a relatively small total insufficient for their needs for long. The townspeople are suffering from the closing of the port and the stoppage of all business.

No. 144

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received December 5)*

*No. 497 [158743/4998/22]*

*ROME, November 26, 1919*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 486<sup>1</sup> of the 13th instant, I have the honour to draw Your Lordship's attention to the more recent activities of Captain Giulietti, Secretary of the Italian Federation of Maritime Workers. In August last a despatch was received from Mr. Vice-Consul Wray of Genoa and forwarded to the Department of Overseas Trade under Overseas Trade despatch No. 309<sup>2</sup> of 11th August. Reference has also been made to this subject in the memoranda covered by Mr. Kennard's despatches Nos. 433<sup>2</sup> of October 5th and 475<sup>2</sup> of November 1st, and No. 343<sup>2</sup> Overseas Trade of 29th August. The two despatches in the Overseas Trade series are especially important in throwing some light on the activities of the Federation of Maritime Workers in the past and of Giulietti in particular.

As will be observed this individual's activities had, up to four months ago, been almost exclusively directed towards the internal organisation of the Federation and to strengthening its position *vis-à-vis* the country. To a certain extent this is still in progress but during the two months preceding the general elections Giulietti's interests as far as can be judged were more and more turned towards politics.

His attitude was undoubtedly that of a Socialist of the more extremist school, so much so that his opponents called him a Bolshevik. The incident of the *Fedora* being held up because she was carrying arms to Novorossisk (see Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 390<sup>2</sup> of 3rd June and Foreign Office telegram No. 561<sup>2</sup> of 7th June) openly showed his sympathy with the extremist party in Russia.

By his personal influence he had succeeded in obtaining complete control

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This despatch (received November 18) stated, *inter alia*: 'Should the Fiume question not receive a solution favourable to Italian interests, there is always the possibility that the nationalists and the undisciplined elements in the army and navy may attempt a *coup d'état*, with all the disastrous results which such a step must entail.'

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of the Federation which became supreme in the ports of Genoa and Naples. When, however, he tried to extend his zone of influence to the Adriatic he met with a rebuff, largely on account of the tactless attitude of his envoy in Trieste, Captain Biffi.

The interesting development in Giulietti's career however began soon after d'Annunzio's entry into Fiume, when the former was observed to be taking an unduly favourable view of the proceedings and one which appeared incompatible with his previous attitude of an extremist socialist. That his view was disapproved of by the Official Socialist Party and by the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro was soon apparent and led to a campaign in the press between the *Avanti* and the *Lavoro* and other papers. Giulietti, on behalf of the Federation of Maritime Workers, next proceeded to send 50,000 lire to a subscription which Mussolini was raising for d'Annunzio in Fiume. The ill-feeling between the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro and the Federation reached a crisis in September and on the 20th of that month (see Mr. Kennard's despatch No. 433<sup>2</sup> of October 5th last) Giulietti broke with the former body, giving as his grounds that certain of his statements had been deliberately misrepresented in the *Avanti*. The Federation joined forces with the Unione Sindacale Italiana which had already been appealing for publicity to Mussolini's *Popolo d'Italia* during the metallurgic strike<sup>3</sup> owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the support received in the *Avanti* which supported the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro. This was followed by an exchange of letters in the press between Giulietti and d'Annunzio mutually supporting one another.

Lastly occurred the incident of the *Persia* (see Mr. Kennard's despatch No. 456<sup>4</sup> of 20th October) which, after being held up at Spezia on the grounds that she was carrying arms destined to fight the Bolsheviks, was finally allowed to sail with four of Giulietti's emissaries captained by one Poggi on board, and was by the latter diverted on the high seas to Fiume when she was placed at d'Annunzio's disposal. She is reported, with what truth I do not know, to have been carrying a large sum in gold in addition to the arms, etc. and ammunition.

The reasons for this intimacy between Giulietti, the self-confessed Bolshevik, on the one hand, and Mussolini and d'Annunzio, the most violent imperialistic nationalists, on the other, has popularly been attributed to the former's desire to create a situation of such trouble and disturbance in Italy as will eventually enable him to attain his revolutionary objects. That Giulietti is ambitious in the extreme and primarily bent on making for himself a position of paramount importance in the country, is undeniable. At the same time the popular explanation I have had the honour to report to Your Lordship appears to be insufficient and furthermore to be so much discussed as to make one believe that Giulietti deliberately had it put about. I should be very much inclined to seek for some deeper explanation, but as

<sup>2</sup> A protracted metallurgic strike in northern Italy had been terminated on September 26, 1919, after governmental intervention.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 102, note 1.

I have been unable to obtain more than rather superficial reports, I can only suggest that he has joined forces with d'Annunzio in the hopes that, should a military *coup d'état* ever take place, he, Giulietti, will acquire sufficient power to have made the gamble profitable. In the Official Socialist Party and the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro Giulietti probably saw little chance of reaching a dominant position in the near future. In the new situation which would be created by a *coup d'état* he would immediately rise to the position of one of the first men in the country.

This, however, I cannot but emphasize, is at present only a deduction from the course of recent events and I am not in a position to say whether, as at first sight appears to be the case, the trio are really engaged in what might be termed a conspiracy or are merely in *bona fide* collaboration to no greater depth than they would be prepared to admit publicly and on the surface.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

No. 145

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received November 27)*

*No. 381 Telegraphic [155972/123/3]*

BELGRADE, November 26, 1919

My telegram No. 379.<sup>1</sup>

French Minister having acquainted this Government with pacific assurances given by Italian President of the Council a semi-official communication has appeared to the effect that there is no longer cause for the same disquietude.

Chief of General Staff to whom Military Attaché repeated what I had said to Minister for Foreign Affairs (?) also spoke in milder tones.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> No. 137.

No. 146

*Note to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires in London*

*No. 153959/W/3 [153959/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 26, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. 1590<sup>1</sup> of the 20th instant relative to the situation in the Adriatic.

2. His Majesty's Government fully recognise the great importance of this question for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and while using every endeavour at the Peace Conference at Paris to secure a just and equitable solution of it, they do not anticipate any action being taken by the Italian Government of the nature which your Government appear to fear.

<sup>1</sup> No. 135.

3. I would add that His Majesty's Government are confident that the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will take all measures in their power to ensure that any incidents tending to strain the friendly relations at present existing between them and the Government of Italy will be avoided.

I have, &c.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy of original.

No. 147

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)*

*No. 716 Telegraphic [156374/151922/22]*

ROME, November 27, 1919

Signor Tittoni called on me yesterday evening to take leave on his retirement from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He used much the same language about elections as that which Signor Nitti had held to me as reported in my telegram 709<sup>1</sup> and said that unrest caused by fear of a renewal of hostilities was playing into hands of Socialists and that an early solution of Fiume question was only remedy. Though country was opposed to a policy of adventure it felt very strongly that if Italy had to renounce all that she had promised in Dalmatia she could not after all her sacrifices and services forego her claims with regard to Fiume. He feared that it would be useless to attempt direct negotiations with Jugo-Slavs so long as latter believed that President Wilson would give them all they wanted; but if refusal of Senate to ratify treaties were to entail withdrawal of United States Government from Conference, France and Great Britain might then be able to induce Jugo-Slavs to adopt in their own interests a more friendly and conciliatory attitude towards Italy. He had heard, he added, from an impartial source, that friction between Jugo-Slavs and Serbs was increasing and that former had no wish to be incorporated into a centralised Serbian kingdom.

He concluded by emphasizing the necessity of closest possible co-operation between France, Great Britain and Italy, now that United States could no longer be counted upon and said that Italy would certainly attend London Conference if it took place.<sup>2</sup> Signor Scialoja in any case proposed to go to Paris and London as soon as possible in order to discuss matters with M. Clemenceau and ? Mr. Lloyd George.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 140.

<sup>2</sup> For the meetings of Allied statesmen held in London, December 11-13, 1919, see Volume II, chap. II.

No. 148

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)*  
No. 720 Telegraphic [156486/123/3]

ROME, November 28, 1919

In conversation reported in my telegram No. 707<sup>1</sup> President of the Council gave me to understand that Admiral Millo would be recalled. Government however has so far taken no action in matter.

French Ambassador tells me that he had spoken seriously to President of the Council on the subject and had pointed out deplorable impression that would be created in Allied countries as well as in Yugo-Slavia were an Admiral who had fraternised with D'Annunzio and been appointed by him Governor of Dalmatia to be allowed to retain his command. President of the Council seems to have acknowledged force of this argument and to have more or less admitted necessity for recalling him but Signor Scialoja whom French Ambassador saw later in the afternoon remarked that Government had to count with feeling in Army and Navy and was obliged to proceed cautiously. Admiral he added might moreover decline to return.

I referred to subject in a conversation which I had with Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening and told him that were Government to condone Admiral's conduct their motives for doing so would be certainly misinterpreted to their disadvantage. His Excellency replied that he believed it was intention of Government to recall Admiral and that reason for delay was to allow new Chief of Staff time to take over his new appointment and to find a suitable successor to Admiral Millo.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 138.

No. 149

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)*  
No. 724 Telegraphic [156879/151922/22]

ROME, November 28, 1919

French Ambassador protested to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this morning on what he considers an unjustifiable attack on Allies in Signor Nitti's message to American people of which a summary will be found in my telegram No. 723.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram of November 28 (received November 29) summarized an account in the Italian press of an interview granted by Signor Nitti to an agent of Associated Press. Signor Nitti was reported to have said, in particular: 'Italian Socialists stand for a great new industrial democracy which is growing up and votes given for them do not entirely indicate desire for Socialism but are expression of discontent and impatience in Italy. Attitude of Allies towards certain questions has not helped to remedy this discontent. Rumours spread abroad and especially in America of Italy being on the brink of revolution are absolutely false. . . . He has often impressed on his American friends that their views are wrong and that their obstinacy in not assisting Italy to solve Adriatic question can only be result of mistaken or even unjust estimate of her efforts and sacrifices. It is useless to mince

In that message His Excellency was explaining cause of Socialist gains at polls among which he gave first place to discontent generated by war. In two or three passages he attributed that discontent in part to attitude of Allies and to the fact that after war Italy's national aspirations were contested hardly and unsympathetically. Italy in fact he declared feels that she has been unjustly treated.

Though it would have been more tactful on Signor Nitti's part to have omitted such references to Allies, it would not [*sic*] have been very difficult for him to have put Italy's case before American people without repeating what vast majority of Italian people are feeling. The King indeed used very similar language to me in audience reported in my despatch No. 489<sup>2</sup> of

matters. Italy feels she is being treated unjustly. Looking at situation dispassionately Italy has proportionately suffered more in respect of her natural wealth resources and population than any other belligerent among Great Powers and she is still suffering as she is now the only country which has to have war bread, which has not sufficient meat, milk or coal and which has to continue the destruction of its forests. Italy is only country which went to war of its own free choice and not out of the sense of duty. It was moral duty for England which had guaranteed Belgian neutrality to go to war but Italy the Ally of Germany went to war out of a sense of idealism to counteract force and to avoid by her own sacrifice outrageous domination, also to reclaim her national territory. During war, Italy, who ought never to have been left to fight alone against Austria-Hungary, was only too often abandoned to her fate. Austria was superior in disposition and numbers of its troops and in munition[s]. After Russian collapse Italy resisted Austria alone and yet managed to win and conquered before any of other Powers. The defeat of Austria was real cause of defeat of Germany. Italy suffered with resignation greater privations during war than other Powers. Since war all her national aspirations have been contested with unsympathetic harshness. The mistakes, if there have been mistakes, of her politicians should not be denied. But what of that fact if everyone else has got more than Italy who has to struggle for months for things which have only spiritual value? Was it worth while making such difficulties about Fiume? The irregular situation at Fiume and in Dalmatia and existing discontent in Army and Navy are result of many mistakes, but especially of attitude of Italy's Allies. M. Nitti hopes that American public opinion will agree to settle Fiume question quickly. His Government's programme is so moderate that it ought to be accepted. In any case his Government cannot agree to less. Americans know that he is friendly to America and that he is accused at home of being most moderate of men in respect of territorial aspiration. He wishes to emphasize that America ought to stand by Italy and help her to get out of present wearisome situation. He has himself appealed personally to President Wilson as to a friend. Fact that great American democracy is opposing something that is righting [? right in] itself creates an odious feeling amongst people of Italy. Adriatic question might moreover be cause of fresh and violent warfare and Italy wishes to settle it quickly. She does not desire fresh war. She wishes for friendly understanding with Jugo-Slavs who ought to be her cordial neighbours and participate in her culture. . . . If America will have confidence in Italy and will help her by supplying raw materials on credit Italy will recover quickly and will make great strides in path of world peace. Government desire peace as condition of life and declare emphatically that it is absurd to accuse Italy of imperialistic aims. They are before all things democrats. Italy is a healthy country but at present is discontented thanks partly to attitude of her Allies. If Adriatic question is not settled soon it may lead to serious situation. Italy only asks for justice. She is bound to win in the end as her cause is just and once she has issued from her present difficulties her position in Europe will continue to grow in importance. She appeals to America to help her and she counts on support of her Latin South American sisters to whom she is united by ties of race, language, culture, liberty and democracy.'

<sup>2</sup> No. 126.

November 15. It must also be remembered that Signor Nitti's remarks were to American people and that though he spoke of Allies he was thinking of President Wilson. From such telegrams as have been despatched to Rome from New York American press seems to understand this.

I do not therefore propose to take any action in the matter unless it is your wish that I should do so.<sup>3</sup>

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Peace Conference.

<sup>3</sup> In Rome telegram No. 730 of November 29, 1919 (received November 30), Sir G. Buchanan further stated that he considered that an 'official protest on our part against his [Signor Nitti's] language about Allies would, I fear, give rise to polemical discussion in Press that might add to his difficulties. In order, however, that President of the Council should not think that he is at liberty to repeat such criticisms of Allies for his own Party purposes I have ventured to anticipate (? your) instructions and to speak unofficially to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This will not, of course, prejudice question of an official protest should you desire me to make one.' In a telegram of December 2 Lord Curzon approved Sir G. Buchanan's representation to Count Sforza.

### No. 150

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 30)*

*No. 1630 Telegraphic: by bag [156915/123/3]*

*November 29, 1919*

Fiume.

Your Lordship's despatch No. 7621<sup>1</sup> of 24th November.

At Mr. Polk's invitation a conversation yesterday took place between him, M. Clemenceau, and myself on the Adriatic question. M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk both considered that the only possibility of advancing matters and of evolving order from the present tangle was that a joint communication should be made by the United States, British, and French delegates to the Italian delegate, explaining clearly to him the situation which has now been reached, and specifying and discussing the points on which the Italian Government is now pressing further claims, and begging for consideration of those demands which, either for want of precision or for inherent difficulties, which we indicate, cannot be met in the manner proposed.

This communication, the basis for which will be President Wilson's last statement and the statement of the Italian claims which I recently transmitted to your Lordship, is to be drafted jointly by the three delegations. This will require three or four days, but work has already been begun on the draft, and I hope to transmit it by Tuesday's<sup>2</sup> bag.

In view of the approaching visit of M. Scialoja to London and the imminent departure of Mr. Polk,<sup>3</sup> the matter is clearly very urgent, and I hope it will be found possible and that I may be authorised, if the draft is approved, to join in the communication towards the end of next week.

As a result of the conversation, I may record that M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk seemed in entire agreement as to the general attitude to be adopted,

<sup>1</sup> No. 141.

<sup>2</sup> December 2, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Polk returned from Paris to the United States on December 9.

and I venture to think that only along these lines can any progress be made with what may otherwise prove an insoluble problem if no such step is taken.

No. 151

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Lord Curzon (Received December 2)*

*No. 1640 Telegraphic [157686/123/3]*

PARIS, December 2, 1919

My telegram No. 1630.<sup>1</sup>

I am sending by bag to-night provisional draft of proposed memorandum to be communicated to Italian Plenipotentiary (?) by Monsieur Clemenceau, Mr. Polk and myself. This draft is forming basis of detailed discussion with Mr. Polk and Monsieur Clemenceau and is, of course, liable to modification both in its general plan and as regards actual wording, but it represents general idea on which we are substantially agreed. I should not, in ordinary circumstances, submit it to United States<sup>2</sup> in its present stage, were it not for fact that Signor Scialoga [*sic*], new Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, is proceeding to London to-morrow<sup>3</sup> for the purpose of discussing with Prime Minister . . .<sup>4</sup> Italian situation. Such discussion will, no doubt, embrace the Fiume question among others and I venture to hope that, if general outline of our draft of memorandum meets with Prime Minister's and United States approval, its substance may be borne in mind in the course of conversation with Signor Scialoga.

It may be assumed that one of principal points which Italian Government will desire to treat with will be question of finance, credits and raw materials including coal. If in regard to these matters His Majesty's Government are able and ready to accommodate Italian Government this may, perhaps, afford opportunity for urging upon them necessity for settling Adriatic problem on reasonable lines.

<sup>1</sup> No. 150.

<sup>2</sup> The text as transmitted from Paris here read ' . . . submit it to Your Lordship . . . , &c. (In transmission the abbreviation Y.L. was apparently mistaken for U.S.)

<sup>3</sup> On December 3, 1919, Sir E. Crowe telegraphed that Signor Scialoja had deferred his departure for London until December 7.

<sup>4</sup> The text as received in the Foreign Office is here defective. The text as transmitted from Paris here read ' . . . discussing with the Prime Minister the whole Italian situation.'

No. 152

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 4)*

*No. 2236 [158033/123/3]*

PARIS, December 2, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 1640<sup>1</sup> of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith to Your Lordship the preliminary draft for a communication to be made to the Italian delegate at the peace conference by the

<sup>1</sup> No. 151.

representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France. This draft will form the basis of a further conversation tomorrow afternoon between Monsieur Tardieu, Mr. Polk and myself.

I have etc.

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 152

Document I

*Draft Memorandum for communication to Signor Scialoja over the signatures of M. Clemenceau, Mr. Polk, and Sir Eyre Crowe*

At the moment when the peace conference is entering what it is hoped may be the last stage of its labours for the conclusion of peace with Germany, Austria and Hungary, the territorial settlement still remains incomplete in respect of regions where the continuance of uncertainty is calculated to affect gravely the vital interests of the countries directly involved, and might easily endanger the peace of Europe and of the world.

Being persuaded that this danger could only grow in intensity if the peace conference were to terminate before an agreement had been reached among the principal Allied and Associated Powers concerning the Adriatic question, the representatives at the conference of America, Great Britain and France desire to call the attention of their Italian colleague to the urgent necessity of finding a solution. They realize fully the difficulties with which the Italian government is confronted in dealing with this problem, but it is precisely for this reason that they feel it would be unjust to all the parties concerned, and in the first place to Italy herself, were they any longer to delay putting frankly before the Italian government a statement of the position such as they see it after many months of examination and reflection. The friends of Italy therefore feel impelled to make a further effort to reach a settlement which would reconcile the fulfilment of her legitimate aims and aspirations with the equitable claims of the neighbouring States as well as with the supreme interests of the peace of the world.

The three representatives accordingly venture to invite the Italian government to proceed to a fresh survey of the field in the light of the statement which they have now the honour to make.

The British and French representatives have followed with earnest and sympathetic attention the negotiations which have passed between the Italian Government and the President of the United States. If they have hitherto refrained from tendering their direct advice to the Italian Government in the matter, it was because they had hoped the Italian Government would be able to reach an agreement with President Wilson to which the British and French Governments could readily subscribe. Though a complete agreement has not so far been arrived at, the points of difference still outstanding have been so much reduced as to justify an expectation that by continuing to pursue a line of generous moderation, it may yet be possible to reach common ground on all remaining issues.

It may be well, with this view, to place on record, in the first place, the

chief points on which agreement has been reached. This is all the more desirable as it would appear from recent official Italian statements that some misapprehension may exist in regard to matters which can readily be cleared up, such for instance as the exact description of what is generally referred to as President Wilson's line. The points of agreement are, in the main, embodied in the American memorandum communicated to the Italian delegation in Paris on October 27.<sup>2</sup>

(1) With regard to Istria, President Wilson has from the first agreed to a frontier running from the Arsa river to the Karawanken mountains, which widely overstepped the recognised ethnical line between Italy and Yugo-Slavia, and which would have as a result to incorporate in Italy more than 300,000 Yugo-Slavs. Italy's geographical position, as well as her economic requirements, was held to justify this serious infringement of the ethnic principle, and President Wilson, anxious to give the fullest value to these important considerations, went still further in agreeing to an extension eastward in such a way as to give to Italy the region of Albona, in spite of the considerable additional number of Yugo-Slavs thereby incorporated.

Moreover, to strengthen the strategic security of Italy, President Wilson, in agreement with the Italian Government, has endorsed the creation of a buffer State between the Italian territory in Istria and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in which some 200,000 Yugo-Slavs, as against less than 40,000 Italians, will be placed under the control of the League of Nations. Anxious to remove any conceivable strategic menace that Italy might fear from the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, President Wilson has agreed, and the British and French Governments are glad to associate themselves with this agreement, that the so-called Assling region shall be permanently demilitarised. The three representatives would be happy to learn from the Italian Government whether slight modifications of the demilitarised zone between the Arsa river and Cape Promontore are deemed necessary to safeguard the security of the defences in Italian territory.

(2) There is complete agreement concerning the creation in the interest of Italy of the buffer State to be known as the 'Free State of Fiume', and its control by the League of Nations. Ethnic considerations would demand that this State, containing 200,000 Yugo-Slavs, should be afforded an opportunity, by plebiscite, to decide its own fate. In deference to Italy's objection that the incorporation of this region in the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, by free act of the inhabitants, might create a real menace, it is now agreed that the determination of the whole future of the State shall be left to the League of Nations, which, in conformity with Italian requirements, shall not fail to provide the full measure of autonomy which the city of Fiume enjoyed under Austro-Hungarian rule.

(3) The three Representatives are glad to record their appreciation of the wisdom and moderation which have marked the attitude of the Italian Government towards the difficult question of Dalmatia. They feel that the Italian Government have acted on an enlightened view of their higher

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 1 in No. 121.

interests in officially withdrawing territorial claims to an area where to enforce them would have meant permanent discord with the inhabitants of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and prevented all possibility of friendly relations with them. In order, however, to safeguard every Italian racial and sentimental interest it has been agreed that the city of Zara shall enjoy a special régime. Its geographical position indicates Zara as a part of the Yugo-Slav State, but provided the town is left within the Yugo-Slav Customs Union, it is to be given complete sovereignty under the League of Nations and freedom to control its own affairs.

(4) The same wisdom and moderation as that which has marked the attitude of the Italian Government towards the Dalmatian question have characterised their attitude as regards the islands in the Adriatic. The Italian Government appear to be one with President Wilson in realising the necessary racial, geographic and political connection of the Dalmatian coastal islands with the Yugo-Slav State. On the other hand, the possession of certain outlying islands, though ethnically Yugo-Slav and economically connected with Yugo-Slavia, are considered by the Italian Government necessary to Italy's strategic control of the Adriatic, and the reasonableness of this claim has been accepted, the following islands being accorded to Italy, on a demilitarised status, namely:—

- (a) The Pelagosa group.
- (b) Lissa, and the small islands west of it.
- (c) Lussin and Unie.

These islands are to pass in full sovereignty to Italy who on her part is to make an agreement with the Slav population of Lissa providing for their complete local autonomy.

(5) Italy is to receive a mandate for the administration of the independent State of Albania, under the League of Nations. Attached to the present memorandum is an outline of the form which, in the opinion of the three representatives, such a mandate should take. The frontiers of Albania, on the North and East, at present, will be those fixed by the London Conference of 1913. The southern frontier is still a matter for negotiation. In order, however, not to delay a general settlement by such negotiations, the following provisional arrangement could be adopted:—

Greece shall occupy the territory west and south of a demarcation line which shall run as follows (ref. 1,200,000 Austrian Staff maps):

From Mount Tumba on the northern boundary of Greece north-westward along the crest of the Nemercha ridge to the Vojusa river, thence down that river to Tepeleni, Mirica, to Point 98; thence south passing between the villages of Lopsi-Martoluzit and Zemblan; thence through Points 1840 and 1225 to a point about two miles south by east of 1225; thence westward passing just north of Poljana; thence south-east [? south-west], to Point 1669;

thence west and north-west to Point 2025;  
thence south-westward to the coast just south of Aspri Ruga.

The triangle of territory from Point 98 on the Vojusa River (between Baba and Sinanaj) north-eastward to Lake Malik, and southward to the Greek frontier and the demarcation line mentioned above should be the subject of later negotiation between the three Allied representatives on the one hand and Italy and Greece on the other, the three Allied representatives acting for Albania.

(6) The city of Valona, together with such hinterland as may be strictly necessary to its defence and economic development, is to be granted to Italy in full sovereignty.

The above six points in their general aspects are those on which, after many months negotiation, the Italian Government have happily reached an agreement with the President of the United States. They appear to afford to Italy full satisfaction of her historic national aspirations, based on the desire to unite the Italian race; they give her the absolute strategic control of the Adriatic; they offer her complete guarantees against whatever aggression she might fear in the future from her Yugo-Slav neighbours—an aggression which the three Representatives on their part consider as most improbable if the lines of a just and lasting settlement are reached. The three Representatives, therefore, venture very earnestly to urge on the Italian Government that they should reflect on the great advantages which the above settlement would bring to Italy and the great moral and material triumph with which its successful conclusion would now provide the Italian Government.

Anxious, however, to give the most sympathetic consideration to every Italian interest or sentiment, the three representatives have carefully examined in all their bearings certain further demands which the Italian Government have presented under the following four heads:—

- A. Control by Italy of the diplomatic relations of Zara.
- B. An arrangement by which the city of Fiume, the so-called *corpus separatum*, should be dissociated from the Free State of Fiume and made completely independent, though its port and railway should be left to the Free State.
- C. Direct connection of the City of Fiume with the Italian Province of Istria by the annexation to Italy of a long narrow strip of territory running along the coast from Fiume to Volosca between the railway and the sea, the Italian frontier in Istria being pushed eastwards so as to include the whole peninsula within Italy.
- D. Annexation to Italy of the island of Lagosta.

With regard to the first point, the representation of Zara, there ought to be no difficulty in satisfying the national Italian demand that this small historic Italian town shall preserve its Italian character, both in its internal administration and in its representation abroad. It is already conceded,

beyond such connection with Yugo-Slavia as Zara shall have by its incorporation in the Serb-Croat-Slovene Customs Union, the city shall be completely independent, under the League of Nations. The city will therefore be entirely free to decide, subject to the approval of the League of Nations, how it shall be diplomatically represented abroad. If, as is contended, the city is completely Italian, her choice will naturally be made in accordance with the Italian claim, and it is hoped that in this way entire satisfaction will be given to the desire of the Italian Government.

The Italian proposal to withdraw the City of Fiume, except its port, from the Free State is one which has been found seriously perplexing. The main object of the creation of a buffer State between Italy and Yugo-Slavia was precisely to guarantee on the one hand Italian strategic security, and on the other the prosperity and development of Fiume. It is not understood how it would be possible for the so-called buffer State to exist without Fiume, and still less how it would be possible for Fiume to exist except within the buffer State. Fiume and the buffer State are absolutely dependent one on the other, and any arrangement which removed Fiume from the buffer State, would put an end to the prosperity alike of the city and of its hinterland. Mindful of the sentimental feeling aroused in Italy by the question of Fiume, the three representatives have always believed that a practicable plan, which [*sic*] should be provided whereby the City of Fiume, within the buffer State, should enjoy a privileged position, and with this object in view, they propose for Fiume precisely the same degree of autonomy as the city had under Austro-Hungarian rule. It is believed that this provision and the watchful and sympathetic interest of the League of Nations will guarantee to Italy full protection for the Italian ethnic and cultural elements at Fiume. With absolute sovereignty vested in the League of Nations and with Italy represented in the Council of the League every Italian interest will be fully guarded.

With respect to the new Italian proposal for the annexation to Italy of the long narrow strip of coast from Fianona to the gate of the city of Fiume there are difficulties of a practical nature. The reason for which the Italian Government have made this demand is stated to be a purely sentimental one, namely, the desire that the city of Fiume should not be separated from Italy by any intervening foreign country. No doubt such a sentimental reason may be of great importance in the eyes of the Italian Government, but it would appear to rest on a misapprehension of the real position of Fiume. The creation of the buffer State, which is to be completely independent of Yugo-Slavia, was among other reasons precisely intended to safeguard the position of Fiume; and the Free State of which Fiume must, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, form an essential part is already in direct contact with the Kingdom of Italy, not only by sea but by a long land frontier of approximately 100 miles. Full effect, therefore, is already given to the sentimental considerations to which the Italian Government attach so much value. In fact the new Italian plan would not achieve this object so well, as in practice it is to be feared that it would be quite unworkable.

The Italian Government do not propose to interfere with the railway con-

necting Fiume with the north, which they admit is to remain within the Free State. This railway runs for a considerable distance along the coast, and the Italian proposal amounts, so far as this region is concerned, to cutting off from the Free State and incorporating with Italy the line of sandy and barren beach intervening between the railway and the sea. Whilst the injury to the Free State, which would in this eccentric way be entirely cut off from its only seaboard, is obvious and unmeasurable, it is not easy to understand what would be the benefit to Italy, unless it be considered a benefit to her that the Free State should be so crippled. Nor does it seem necessary to dwell on the extraordinary complexities that would arise as regards customs control, coastguard services and cognate matters in a territory of such unusual configuration. The plan appears to run counter to every known consideration of geography, economics and territorial convenience, and it may perhaps be assumed that if these considerations were overlooked by the Italian Government, this was due to their having connected it in their mind with the question of annexing to Italy all that remains of the Yugo-Slav portion of the peninsula of Istria.

This question of further annexation of Yugo-Slav territory is raised quite unambiguously both by the demand for the whole of Istria and by the proposal to annex the island of Lagosta. In neither case do even considerations of strategy arise. For the strategical command of the whole Adriatic is already completely assured to Italy by the possession of Trieste, Pola, the islands facing Fiume, Pelagosa and Valona. Additional security is afforded by the proposed demilitarisation of the whole Free State of Fiume, together with a large zone lying to the north of it and of the small portion of Istria remaining to the Free State of Fiume.

Economic considerations being equally excluded, there remains nothing but a desire for further territory. Now the territories coveted are admittedly inhabited by Yugo-Slavs, they contain practically no Italian elements. This being so, it is necessary to refer to the way in which President Wilson with the cordial approval of Great Britain and France has met every successive Italian demand for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited by peoples not Italian and not in favour of being so absorbed. On this point the following passage may be quoted from a telegram addressed to Signor Tittoni by the Secretary of State at Washington on November 12th. . . .<sup>3</sup>

To the considerations thus urged by Mr. Lansing, the three Representatives desire to add another argument. In doing so they trust the Italian Government will not credit them with any desire to give advice on questions of Italian high policy on which the Italian Government will rightly claim to be the best judge. But an appeal to an historical argument may be permitted to the representatives of three countries to whom the liberation of Italian territories from foreign domination has been a matter of unwavering concern and sympathy through generations of noble and often terrible

<sup>3</sup> There followed an extract from the last paragraph of enclosure 4 in No. 121, beginning 'Your Excellency cannot fail to recognise . . .', and ending '. . . generous response to our efforts at conciliation.'

struggles. Modern Italy won the place in the hearts of all liberty-loving peoples which she has never since lost, by the pure spirit of her patriotism which set before her people the generous aim of uniting under the Italian flag those extensive provinces formerly within the ancient Italian boundaries which were and have remained essentially Italian territories in virtue of their compact Italian population. The sympathies of the world have accompanied Italy's advance to the outer borders of Italia Irredenta, in pursuit of the sacred principle of the self-determination of the peoples. This principle is now invoked by other nations. Not invariably is it possible owing to the complicated interaction of racial, geographical, economic and strategical factors, to do complete justice to the ethnic principle. Small isolated communities surrounded and out-numbered by populations of different race cannot in most cases be attached to the territory of their own nation from which they are effectively separated. But the broad principle remains that it is neither just nor expedient to annex, as the spoils of war, territories inhabited by an alien race, anxious and capable to maintain a separate national State.

From this point of view the inclusion in Italy of purely Yugo-Slav territories where neither security nor geographical or economical considerations compel annexation, is not in itself a commendable policy. It would be bound to create within the Italian borders a compact body of irredentism [*sic*] exactly analogous in kind to that which justified the demand of Italia Irredenta for union with the Italian State.

The three representatives venture with all deference to express the opinion that in hesitating to commit their Governments to the acceptance of the last Italian demands for the incorporation of more Yugo-Slav territory, they are acting in the highest interest of the Italian nation itself.

The three representatives would make an earnest appeal to the Italian Government to seize the present most favourable of opportunities for arriving at a friendly agreement with them for the immediate conclusion and permanent guarantee of a definite settlement on lines which they venture to think fully realise all the legitimate national aspirations of Italy, and fully safeguard her pre-eminent position in the Adriatic. A settlement based on the foundations which Italy, in conjunction with her Allies, could thereby lay, would serve as a means of reconciling interests at present divergent, and of offering Italy an opportunity for rendering more cordial and solid her relations with the new nations who are her neighbours, and to whom she could furnish such valuable assistance and economic support as her resources and experience entitle her to offer.

The spirit of moderation which has characterised the recent attitude of the Italian Government leads the three representatives to hope that this appeal from Italy's American, British and French Allies will not pass unheeded, and that the Italian Government will by assuring definite agreement with their Allies place on firm foundations the great moral and material triumphs to which Italy's efforts and sacrifices throughout the war have so justly entitled her.

*Document 2*

*Draft Memorandum as to the Form of the Albanian Mandate*

The United States, British and French Governments desire to recognise the independence of the Albanian State. They consider that the State of Albania will require, to the extent indicated in paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 'the administrative advice and assistance' of one of the Great Powers. For this task Italy, by her geographical situation and economic capacity, is primarily indicated.

The United States, British and French Governments are anxious, therefore, to entrust to Italy a Mandate over the State of Albania under the conditions implied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. They consider that these conditions could form the basis of Italy's acceptance of this Mandate and should be embodied in a Convention to be concluded between the Italian Government and the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The headings of such a Convention would be the following:—

(1) Albania is recognised as an independent State within the frontiers indicated in the body of the covering memorandum.

Nothing in these stipulations shall, however, prevent the Albanian State from negotiating with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State such regional rectifications as may be in accord with local ethnographic and economic requirements.

(2) The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government shall have the right to construct and operate railways through Northern Albania north of parallel  $41^{\circ} 15'$ , and otherwise to enjoy full privileges of international transport across Northern Albania.

(3) The right to control the development of the Boyana River is to be vested in the Council of the League of Nations with power to delegate the work to either Italy or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State under proper restrictions. It is assumed for this purpose that Montenegro will form part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

(4) A Commission shall forthwith be established consisting of a representative of the Italian Government, a representative of the League of Nations and a representative of the Albanian State who shall be designated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of elaborating (a) the terms of the Mandate to be entrusted to Italy over Albania, and (b) the organic law of the future State of Albania. This Commission shall terminate its labours within five months of the signature of this Convention and will address a report thereon with the necessary recommendations to the Council of the League of Nations. The final decision as to the terms of the Mandate and the organic law shall be made by the Council of the League acting by a majority vote.

(5) The Commission foreshadowed in the above paragraph shall base its deliberations not only on the considerations above outlined but also on the following principles:—

(a) The freedom of conscience and the free and outward exercise of all

forms of worship, the complete liberty in education and linguistic matters of all the inhabitants of the State of Albania.

(b) The organisation, in so far as may be compatible with the traditions of the country and the exercise of efficient administration, of legislative and administrative bodies representing all sections of the population.

(c) Prevention of the exploitation of the country or its colonisation in a manner liable to militate against the interests of the native inhabitants. Under this heading would be included any recommendations which the Commission might make as to improvements in the existing system of land tenure.

(d) The eventual creation of a local gendarmerie, the senior officers of which may be nationals of the Mandatory Power. The Mandatory Power shall have the right for a period of two years from the date on which the Mandate is conferred, and pending the organisation of the native gendarmerie, to maintain armed forces in the country. After that period the State of Albania shall be permanently demilitarised, and no Power shall be allowed to maintain regular forces in the country without the sanction of the Council of the League of Nations.

### No. 153

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 7760 [76/1/1/21003]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 2, 1919

Earl Curzon of Kedleston presents his compliments to Sir E. Crowe and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper:

Name and Date

The Admiralty, Dec. 1.

Subject

D'Annunzio's attitude in the Adriatic.

### ENCLOSURE IN No. 153

*Admiralty to Foreign Office*

M. 04927

December 1, 1919

Sir,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 28th November No. 155749/W/3,<sup>1</sup> on the dangers threatening from the possible attempts of Signor D'Annunzio's forces on points within the Yugo-Slav zone on the Adriatic coast.

<sup>1</sup> This letter transmitted to the Admiralty a copy of No. 142. With reference to the last two sentences of No. 142, the letter stated: 'Lord Curzon is disposed to concur in the opinion expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe, but His Lordship feels that it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government alone to take action in the sense suggested. I am, however, to invite the observations of Their Lordships upon the question generally, and to enquire whether they would concur in Lord Curzon's proposal to represent the serious nature of the position to the French Government and to suggest that a squadron consisting of British and French warships should now be sent to the Adriatic. The actual instructions which would be issued to this Allied Squadron would, of course, need careful elaboration.'

2. The present position in the Adriatic is one which affects international policy, and is not therefore the immediate concern of the Board of Admiralty, but My Lords recognise that it has an important naval aspect, since a demonstration of sea power in the critical area would probably go far towards putting an end to an intolerable state of affairs which otherwise seems likely to drift from bad to worse, if the following may be taken as a correct appreciation of the position :—

D'Annunzio's activities

- (1) Delay the day of a general settlement.
- (2) Encourage the forces making for revolution and disorder.
- (3) Challenge the authority of the Paris Conference.
- (4) Are contrary to the ideas and principles with which we have identified ourselves at the Conference.
- (5) Set a most dangerous precedent, and, if not checked, encourage those Governments which are dissatisfied with the territorial adjustments resulting from the Conference to act similarly. (Roumania's recalcitrant attitude is no doubt largely due to the example of Fiume; similarly that of Yugo-Slavia in relation to the Klagenfurt basin.)

My Lords are led to believe that very little can be expected from Italy by way of settling the matter.

3. As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is aware, the policy of His Majesty's Government has been to withdraw Naval Forces from the Adriatic and to abstain rigorously from any intervention. This policy was adopted at a time when it appeared that the incident would be localised and was capable of settlement by diplomatic means. These hopes have not been realised, the trouble has spread and there seems no prospect of any solution being arrived at through diplomatic channels or by the Italian Government. Meanwhile D'Annunzio seems determined to provoke the Yugo-Slavs into active hostilities and is even stated to be contemplating a raid on the Italian coast—an action aimed at the constitutional Government of Italy and likely to lead to internal chaos and revolution, which in the present state of Europe would hardly be confined to Italy.

4. My Lords therefore recognise that events now justify a reversal of policy, and consider that the despatch of a Naval Force to the Adriatic and the display of a firm hand afford the only means of putting an end to an intolerable state of affairs. My Lords are prepared to make the necessary arrangements so far as the British Navy is concerned. They further consider that the French Government should be asked to cooperate, and they concur in Lord Curzon's proposals to represent the position to the French Government, and to suggest that a Squadron consisting of British and French warships should proceed to the Adriatic.

I am, &c.,  
W. F. NICHOLSON

No. 154

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 4)*  
No. 1648 Telegraphic [158016/123/3]

My telegram No. 1640.<sup>1</sup>

PARIS, December 3, 1919

Draft of memorandum for communication to Italian plenipotentiary was approved to-day by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk. Text adopted is substantially that transmitted in my despatch No. 2236.<sup>2</sup> Only a few minor alterations were made none of which affect the substance. A copy of revised draft of memorandum<sup>3</sup> showing these modifications is going to you by bag tonight.

M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk consider (?) it important, and I have expressed agreement, that memorandum should if possible be communicated to Signor Scialoja before his departure for London on December 7th. I therefore beg that I may receive instructions not later than December 5th authorising me to sign together with Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr. Polk. Memorandum could then be handed to Signor Scialoja on Saturday<sup>4</sup> morning.

<sup>1</sup> No. 151.

<sup>2</sup> No. 152.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. For the final text of this note cf. No. 169, note 2.

<sup>4</sup> December 6, 1919.

No. 155

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received December 4)*  
No. 388 Telegraphic [158064/123/3]

(? Rome) telegram No. 716.<sup>1</sup>

BELGRADE, December 3, 1919

My French Colleague learns that Serbian Minister in Rome has within last few days telegraphed to his Government that in his opinion favourable moment has arrived for Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Government to enter into direct negotiations with Italy for settlement of Adriatic question.

<sup>1</sup> No. 147.

No. 156

*Memorandum from the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires in London<sup>1</sup>*  
[158584/123/3]

LÉGATION DU ROYAUME DES SERBES, CROATES ET SLOVÈNES

Les changements et spécialement les nominations des personnes nouvelles politiques et militaires survenues dans le dernier temps en Italie ne peuvent

<sup>1</sup> Sir J. Tilley noted on this undated memorandum: 'The annexed memo. was left with me today by the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires. The meaning seemed to me somewhat obscure in places and he was not able to make it much clearer. He explained (but his French is very imperfect) that the first sentence meant that the Italian Government had recently given posts to officers with militarist tendencies.'

J. A. C. TILLEY.

'4.12.

'I wd. add that the Serbian Govt. expect the attack on Spalato on Sunday next.'

J. A. C. TILLEY.

'5 Dec.'

pas être considérés comme la victoire des tendances [sic] pacifiques pour la solution de la question adriatique. Au contraire de nouveaux signes des intentions agressives des [sic] certains milieux influents italiens augmentent et montrent presque ouvertement [sic] leur solidarité avec D'Annunzio [sic]. Tout cela et d'autres indications font preuves [sic] qu'une solution pacifique de cette question n'est possible qu'avec une action énergique et directe des Alliés et de la Conférence de la paix.

Quoique le Gouvernement du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes sépare D'Annunzio et les autres rebelles de l'Italie officielle — on pourrait supposer que la passivité du Gouvernement italien pourrait être utilisée par les rebelles au profit d'une action nouvelle, ou même peut-être que le Gouvernement italien cède devant la pression du parti militaire qui a dans ses mains toute la flotte dans la mer adriatique et une grande partie de l'armée. Une action énergique de la part des Alliés, action qui rétablira *status quo* à Fiume et en Dalmatie en même temps que l'autorité de la Conférence de la paix et rendra à ses décisions toute autorité donc [sic] en est le seul moyen; de cette manière la paix serait assurée et un conflit armé serait évité, conflit qui [sic] le Gouvernement du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes aussi bien que le Gouvernement italien ne désire aucunement. Si, par l'action directe des Alliés on n'arrive pas à rétablir la foi à la Conférence de la paix les Serbes, Croates et Slovènes n'accept[e]ront jamais [sic] un fait accompli ourdi par violence [sic] et sans la décision de la Conférence de la paix et ils ne pourront pas rester passifs devant l'atteinte flagrante de leur[s] intérêts vitaux et de la dignité nationale.

Le Gouvernement des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes espère que les tendances [sic] impérialistes ne peuvent pas mettre en cause la paix si difficilement gagné[e], la paix qui lui est sinon plus au moins[s] aussi chère qu'aux autres Alliés.

Une solution prompte et définitive de la question adriatique précédée des mesures énergiques immédiates et préventives de la flotte allié[e] contre les nouvelles tentatives D'Annuzio [sic] dans la mer adriatique, [? est] suivant d'opinion [sic] du Gouvernement Royal le meilleur moyen de prévenir le conflit inévitable et de conserver la paix actuelle.<sup>2</sup> Et le Gouvernement du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes ne peut qu'insiste[r] auprès du Gouvernement britan[n]ique pour en donner d'accord avec les autres alliés la suite immédiate et nécessaire.

D'après les derniers [sic] information[s] digne[s] de foi D'Annunzio avec ses troupes prépare un[e] at[t]aque sur Spalato, Boka du Cattaro et Monténégro.

<sup>2</sup> In a note dated at Paris, December 3, 1919, to M. Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference (copy received by the British Delegation on December 8), M. Pachitch had drawn attention to Signor D'Annunzio's recent descent on Zara, to Admiral Millo's conduct there, and to Signor D'Annunzio's alleged intention of extending his activities in Dalmatia. M. Pachitch requested the Peace Conference to take the necessary steps to terminate Signor D'Annunzio's activities, and stated in conclusion that the Yugoslav Delegation 'croit devoir suggérer que le meilleur moyen d'obtenir ce but serait peut-être d'envoyer dans les eaux dalmates des vaisseaux de guerre alliés, surtout des unités britanniques'.

No. 157

*Colonel Peck (Abbazia) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received December 5)<sup>1</sup>*  
*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [97/1/22/21261]*

No. S 205<sup>2</sup> December 4, 1919.

**ABBAZIA, December 5, 1919**

Following message from D'Annunzio was placarded as well as dropped by aeroplanes into Abbazia this morning. Begins. In reply to the proposal made by General Badoglio, Military Commissioner Extraordinary for Venezia-Giulia, Commandant D'Annunzio has sent to the General his own counter-proposals which can be reduced to following form, 'Give us serious guarantees that Italy will neither renounce Fiume nor territories occupied since the armistice and we are ready to cooperate so that Fiume situation may re-enter normal conditions both from a military and a disciplinary point of view'.

Thus those rumours are shown to be without foundation which have been intentionally circulated and are contained in recent official communications according to which Commandant D'Annunzio is charged with revolutionary designs, with the intention of provoking new wars by means of expeditions in zones not stipulated in the terms of Armistice. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and the British Military Attaché at Rome.

<sup>2</sup> Note on original: 'Not yet received.'

No. 158

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*  
*No. 1444 Telegraphic: by bag [157329/123/3]*

**FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919**

Your telegram No. 1613<sup>1</sup> of 26th [sic] November and my despatch No. 7760<sup>2</sup> of 2nd December: Adriatic.

It was decided yesterday that return of fleet to Corfu at the present juncture would be inadvisable.

<sup>1</sup> No. 142.

<sup>2</sup> No. 153.

No. 159

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)*  
*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [159877/123/3]*

**FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919**

In connexion with the present endeavours to find a way out of Fiume difficulty it has been suggested that the visit of a British Fleet to Corfu and the display of armed force in the Adriatic, with the assistance preferably of some French vessels, might help to bring about an early solution and facilitate task of Italian Government.

We are rather distrustful of this proposal, which has been negatived for the moment, but I should be glad to learn from you what effect you consider it would have on Italian public opinion.

No. 160

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 1445 Telegraphic [158735/123/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 1648<sup>1</sup> (of December 3rd. Adriatic).

Without<sup>2</sup> expressing final opinion on draft memorandum, with which on whole we are in agreement, we think that it would hardly be fair on Signor Scialoja to present him with an ultimatum immediately upon his acceptance of office and on eve of his visit to England to discuss matters with His Majesty's Government. We would therefore prefer presentation of Memorandum by Supreme Council to be deferred for moment. I should like to show Scialoja unofficially a copy when I meet him on Monday<sup>3</sup> and to say that Prime Minister and I will talk it over with him on Tuesday, telling him that we regard it as a fair settlement, which we see no reason why Italian Government should not accept. I think this procedure may be conducive to satisfactory result.

<sup>1</sup> No. 154.

<sup>2</sup> The word 'without' was omitted from the decipher of this telegram made by the British Delegation in Paris.

<sup>3</sup> December 8, 1919.

No. 161

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6)*

No. 1665 Telegraphic [159353/123/3]

PARIS, December 6, 1919

Fiume.

Your telegram 1445,<sup>1</sup> December 5th.

I informed M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk of your decision. They are disappointed because it was felt that what was mainly desired at this moment was to present the Italians with a statement signed jointly by their three principal Allies, and to put an end to all Italian efforts to negotiate separately with each of us and play off one against other. So long as note is not signed this possibility remains open. There cannot of course be any objection to separate discussions with Signor Scialoja so long as arrangements contemplated in note are maintained and he is not allowed to take advantage of such conversation in order to drive separate bargain or arrive at separate understanding with one or other of the Allies.

M. Clemenceau tells me that he has himself spoken to Signor Scialoja in the sense of draft note and had gained impression that latter would welcome such a joint statement and was generally satisfied at conciliatory character of our views and language.

The difficulty now arises of how to get document signed and presented. For Mr. Polk is leaving on Tuesday December 9th, before Signor Scialoja

<sup>1</sup> No. 160.

will be back from London. Mr. Polk thinks, and M. Clemenceau and I agree, that whole effect of note would be spoilt (?) if it did not bear his name. The only possible solution would in the circumstances consist in Mr. Polk's signing on Monday but this is only possible if by then your Lordship definitely authorises me to accept text on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I venture to urge that in view of Signor Scialoja's evident readiness to receive note in friendliest spirit, His Majesty's Government will accordingly approve it (?) without waiting for result of proposed conversation with him, which might well be conducted on basis of note as representing definitely the views of (?) the three Allies, although note itself could not reach Signor Scialoja's hands until after his return to Paris. I should be grateful for early reply.

## No. 162

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received December 7)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [159901/123/3]*

*ROME, December 6, 1919*

Your private and secret telegram of December 5th.<sup>1</sup> Private and Secret.

Despatch of British ships to police Adriatic would create a deplorable impression in this country and encourage belief of which Mr. Harmsworth spoke to me when he was in Rome,<sup>2</sup> that we were giving material as well as moral support to Jugo-Slavs as against Italians.

Recent raid on Zara which was generally condemned tended to discredit d'Annunzio in the eyes of Italian people who are opposed to any action that might provoke hostilities with Jugo-Slavs. Victory of Socialists and opening of new Parliament has moreover distracted for the moment public attention from Fiume. Despatch of a naval force to Adriatic which would be interpreted as covering an intention on our part to enforce claims of Jugo-Slavs, would on the other hand arouse all dormant Nationalist sentiments of country. It is also by no means certain that it would have effect of overawing d'Annunzio for his love of . . .<sup>3</sup> in display might make him sally forth and brave British fleet to do its worst. Were we in that case to attack him we should completely alienate Italian sympathies and at the same time make a martyr of him.

I fail to see why we should incur (?) expenses of (?) scheme which French

<sup>1</sup> No. 159.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Harmsworth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, had visited Rome for the thirty-first session of the Supreme Economic Council, held there on November 21-3, 1919. After Mr. Harmsworth's return to England the Italian Ambassador in London had called at the Foreign Office on December 3 and had represented to Mr. Harmsworth 'that the United States Government, having regard to the present uncertainty of their attitude in relation to European affairs, should be asked to leave the settlement of Fiume to the British, French and Italian Governments. His Excellency dwelt on the grave anxiety of a situation in which there was nothing more than a most indefinite prospect of settlement.' (Foreign Office despatch No. 807 of December 11, 1919, to Sir G. Buchanan at Rome.)

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

and others will be certain to exploit to our disadvantage here. It is better in my opinion to leave d'Annunzio alone in the hope that Signor Nitti who I have reason to believe is in negotiations with him may succeed in inducing him to leave Fiume. To act otherwise will but enhance his popularity. It will also add greatly to difficulties of Government and introduce a new and disturbing element into an already complicated situation. Maintenance of law and order in this country is in great measure dependent on an early solution of Fiume question, but to despatch a British fleet to Corfu will be to invite trouble and will certainly not (? expedite) that solution.

### No. 163

*General Delme-Radcliffe (Klagenfurt) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris.  
Received December 8)*

No. 11267 Telegraphic [97/1/22/20768]

KLAGENFURT, December 7, 1919

Badoglio told me today that he hoped to settle Fiume difficulty shortly and will then go to Rome to assume functions of Chief of the Staff. He thinks D'Annunzio is really anxious to get away though he has not yet accepted the offer of Italian Government. He is partly the prisoner of circumstances of his own creation. There have been no further incidents since expedition to Zara.

There are some revolutionary elements even amongst the officers at Fiume who are exercising a bad influence.

### No. 164

*M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received December 10)*

[76/1/1/21117]

PARIS, le 8 décembre, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat Général de la Délégation Britannique copie d'une lettre en date du 3/12 adressée à M. le Président de la Conférence de la Paix par M. Pachitch au sujet de la situation au Monténégro.

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 164

No. 4787

PARIS, le 3 décembre, 1919

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que la Délégation Royale a appris que le Ministère de la Guerre italien a donné l'ordre verbal à d'Annunzio, à l'insu du Gouvernement italien :

1. De débarquer, le 6 courant, 10,000 hommes dans les bouches du Cattaro et d'envahir le Monténégro; et
2. D'exécuter, le 7 courant, une attaque sur notre front du Nord-Ouest ainsi que par Castelli sur Spalato.

J'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien prendre note de la susdite communication.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

NIK. P. PACHITCH

No. 165

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)*

No. 806 [160423/123/3]

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 8, 1919

My telegram to Sir Eyre Crowe of this afternoon<sup>1</sup> has given in a condensed form the results of a conversation, lasting more than a hour and a-half, which I had to-day at my house with the Italian Ambassador and Signor Scialoja, who had come to London for the purpose of confidential consultation with His Majesty's Government. It may, however, be desirable that I should set down at greater length what passed in the course of our conversation.

I began by pleading the urgent necessity of a prompt solution of the Adriatic difficulty and the desirability of arriving at a settlement which should have some finality. Signor Tittoni had, some little time ago, put forward a series of proposals which had been under examination in Paris during the past few weeks. They had not been altogether free from obscurity, and were in some cases still undefined, but they had been sufficiently precise to enable the Allied Powers to consider and reply to them. The Allied representatives had accordingly been engaged in drawing up a reply, which had taken the form of a note, to be handed to the Italian representative in Paris after it had been signed by the representatives of France, America, and Great Britain. I had urged on behalf of His Majesty's Government that, as Signor Scialoja had just taken office and was about to visit us in London, it would be an act of courtesy to him to present him, on his way through Paris, with what he might conceivably regard as an ultimatum; and I had requested that the presentation of the note should be deferred until I had had the opportunity of a conversation with him. I was not, of course, in a position to communicate the note to the Foreign Minister; that could be done only in Paris; but I thought it might facilitate matters if I gave him a general *aperçu* of its contents.

The agreement proposed by the note was one with which His Majesty's Government were in general sympathy, and they cordially commended it to the consideration and acceptance of the Italian Minister. I gathered from something that had reached me from Paris that Signor Scialoja had had an interview with M. Clemenceau, who had indicated to him the general character of the note, and that Signor Scialoja had been not unfavourably impressed with its contents.

This, interposed the Italian Minister, was not quite the case. It was true that he had had a conversation with M. Clemenceau, but it had been on

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram, No. 1453 to Paris, is printed as document 2 in Cmd. 586 of 1920, *Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question*.

general lines, and no indication had been given to him that the Allied Powers were about to sign a note or to present one.

In treating the subject, I said that I proposed to divide it into two parts, the first containing the proposals of the Powers, to which President Wilson had been brought to agree, and the second consisting of the reply of the Powers to the more recent proposals put forward by the Italian Government.

Setting aside the very considerable Italian gains in the Trentino and the Rhaetian Alps, by which Italy had obtained a large access of territory and a strategical frontier—in defiance, I feared, of all the laws of self-determination—I invited the Minister to consider the position which was about to be assigned to her in the Adriatic. Istria, with its population of 300,000 Jugo-Slavs, was to be handed over to her. This included Albona, also containing a considerable Slav population. The Powers proposed the creation of a substantial buffer State between Istria and the territories of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State, which would contain 200,000 Jugo-Slavs as against 40,000 Italians, and which would be placed under the League of Nations. North of this in the triangle of Assling, and south of it on the eastern coast of Istria, were two zones which were to be demilitarised. This free State, with the larger islands opposite Fiume, had been created solely as a buffer between Italy and the neighbour whom she distrusted. No one else desired this State. The Jugo-Slavs certainly did not. Its creation was a concession at once to the scruples and to the fears of Italy. In any other circumstances and at any other time, the territory in question would certainly have been handed over to the Jugo-Slav State.

Further down the coast Italy had withdrawn her claim to Dalmatia; but Zara, which, though it was geographically a port of the Jugo-Slav State, yet had an Italian history, an Italian population, and Italian traditions, was to be given a separate existence of its own under the League of Nations.

As regards the islands in the Adriatic, the Italian claims would, under the contemplated agreement, be confined to the Pelagosa group, to Lissa and the little islands to the west of it, and to Lussin and Unie, lying immediately off the mouth of the Gulf of Fiume.

As for Albania, Italy was to receive a mandate for that country under the League of Nations, and she was to have the port of Vallona in full sovereignty.

Up to this point, I believed that agreement had been reached between Italy and the United States. The proposed arrangement gave to Italy the absolute strategical control of the Adriatic, and complete guarantees against the Jugo-Slavs. Italy, in possession of Trieste and Pola, of all the islands I had named, separated from the Serb-Croat-Slovene State by the solid barrier of the free State of Fiume, and further with Albania and Vallona at the southern end of the Adriatic, seemed to me to be in a position of commanding superiority in that sea.

I then turned to the more recent Italian demands and the manner in which it was proposed to meet them.

The first of these was the demand for the diplomatic control of Zara. The Powers, I said, could see no particular reason for this demand. Zara was to

be an independent State under the League of Nations, and if its population and sentiments were as Italian as they were claimed, and as I believed them to be, the people of Zara could safely be left to decide their own diplomatic representation under the League of Nations, and there could be not a shadow of doubt that it would be Italian.

I passed on to criticise somewhat severely the proposal made by Italy with regard to Fiume. As I understood it, Italy desired to separate from, and cut out of the new free State of Fiume the town, or a portion of the town, bearing that name. This portion of the town had a majority, but not, I believed, a greatly preponderating majority, of Italian inhabitants. It was separated from the Jugo-Slav suburb of Suzac, not by a river or any other obvious line of demarcation, but only by a narrow ditch. Nevertheless, it was proposed to create a separate and independent city of Fiume under a statute of its own, not only to be divorced from its suburb, but even to be cut off from its port and its railway, which were to be left to the free State. Such an arrangement, I frankly confessed, appeared to me to be fantastic. Was it really possible for the free State of Fiume to exist without the city, and could the isolated city live except inside the free State? The Allied Powers were quite prepared to give a substantial form of autonomy to the city of Fiume, but the city should be a part of the buffer State.

I then took the recent Italian demand for a strip of coastal territory, a sort of corridor, in fact, connecting the city of Fiume with the Italian territory of Istria. The Italian case for this concession was purely sentimental. It was not required for the strategic defence of Italy. It appeared to be open to two insuperable objections: in the first place, owing to the difficulties arising out of the administration of the railways, customs, and coastguards, it would be quite unworkable, and, secondly, as long as it existed it would be a constant incitement to the people of Fiume to work for their union with the Italian State, with which they would be connected by this carefully fabricated artificial tie. I had endeavoured to understand the Italian case on this point, but it really did not seem to me capable of defence.

This, I said, was in substance the line which the Allied Powers were disposed to take up, and which would be found embodied in the note which they were about to present.

The Italian Minister proceeded to criticise with some asperity the proposals as I had explained them.

He did not contest that the measures adopted at the head of the Adriatic had sufficiently provided for the strategical security of his country; but, as for the buffer State of Fiume, he said that the Italians did not desire it. They were quite willing to let the Jugo-Slav portions of that territory go to the Jugo-Slav State. They were quite willing to have a common boundary with their rivals in that quarter, and they did not regard the military danger as worthy of consideration. The thing to which they did attach importance, and indeed the only thing to which they attached importance in that area, was the town of Fiume itself. As for the islands in the Gulf of Fiume, the only considerable ones which would have fallen to Italy under the Treaty of

London were to be handed over to the free State, and Italy was to be put off with the little islands of Lussin and Unie at the mouth of the Gulf.

The Minister pointed out that, on passing away from the head of the Adriatic to its middle and lower parts, the strategic insecurity in which Italy would be left was at once apparent. The islands which it was proposed to give to her were of little or no value. The Dalmatian coast was to belong exclusively to the new Jugo-Slav State, and there, at Sebenico and still more in the Gulf of Cattaro, the two most considerable ports in the Adriatic, the new State would have the opportunity of creating naval bases which would be an eternal menace to the Italian shores. As Italy had given up her claim to Dalmatia, at least she might expect that these ports would be demilitarised. She did not ask for them herself, but if they were to be given to others, at any rate let them not be a menace to Italy on her most vulnerable side. Let both of them, if possible, but at least let Sebenico, be demilitarised, so that Italy might feel some security.

What, after all, said the Minister, were the proposals put forward by the Allies but a re-hash of the Wilsonian propositions? If it was said that they constituted a great departure, in the interests of Italy, from the original Wilsonian points, these had already been torn into such tatters in other parts of Europe that no favour to Italy could be claimed in this respect. But, so far as the Minister could see, no advance whatever had been made from the second Wilsonian position in deference to the urgent needs, and the almost insurmountable difficulties, with which Italy was confronted. The Italian proposals with regard to Fiume might be impracticable, but Fiume was an Italian town. It was the Italian voice of Fiume that was crying out to be joined to the motherland. Nothing would or could silence that voice. D'Annunzio was there and had on his side the sentiments not only of the army and the navy, but of the nation. If the situation thus created was to be entirely ignored, the Italian Government saw no prospect of a solution for their difficulties; which would probably lead to a revolution in the structure of the Italian State.

Passing to the occasion and form of the note, the Minister entered a strong plea that it should be either not presented or withdrawn. Its presentation would only render more critical the situation already sufficiently difficult. It would be regarded as an ultimatum. If its contents, as I had sketched them, were divulged, there would be a storm of hostility in Italy. If they were not divulged, and it was known that the note had been presented, all sorts of doubts and suspicions would be raised as to its contents. Some people would say that at last the desires of Italy had been met; and, when the truth came out, the disappointment might amount to a disaster. Others would say that the Italian claims had been rejected, and a grave reaction might ensue. In either case, there would be an almost irresistible demand for publication, which could not permanently be refused.

To this I replied that, in one respect, I thought the Minister was not quite fair. Surely, if Signor Tittoni had presented his latest proposals to the Supreme Council in Paris, it was an obligation of courtesy and duty to

consider the proposals and to reply to them. Were the Italian Government to decline to receive or to consider the reply when it was tendered? What was the alternative to withdrawing the proposed note altogether? What course had the Minister in view? Did he propose to submit to the Council a new set of proposals, and, if so, would it not be necessary to reply to them at some stage? Did he propose to come to London and endeavour to gain our assent to one set of proposals, and then to go to Paris to find the same set or another set either rejected or modified by the French Government? One thing seemed certain, that any attempt to play off one of the Powers against the others could not be successful, and that it was only by combined agreement and common action that any real solution could be found.

As to the presentation of the note, therefore, I thought there could be no doubt that it was both a legitimate and necessary stage in the proceedings; and I thought that it would be a mistake for Italy to lose the opportunity of hearing the views of the Allies in the only way possible. I realised, however, the difficulties of the Italian Government, and I understood their objection to anything which might seem to be of a peremptory character or to wear the form of an ultimatum. I was not aware of anything in the note that prevented the Italian Government from replying to it; and the concluding paragraphs of the note, which I had especially in mind, so far from containing anything in the nature of a threat, were an appeal to the discretion, the good feeling, and the patriotism of the Italian Government. I would, I said, endeavour to satisfy myself that the note, when presented, should not be exposed to the misunderstandings and dangers which the Minister feared. Many such notes had been issued week by week by the Paris Conference, to the Roumanian and other Governments. I did not recall that their texts had been published, or even that the fact of their delivery had in every case been made public. I could not see, therefore, why any publicity should naturally attach to the note at this stage. I would, I said, communicate my views on this point to Paris, and I would do my best to secure their acceptance.

In the course of our conversation, when the Italian Ambassador asked his colleague whether, if Signor Tittoni's proposals were to be rejected, and if the Allied proposals were so entirely unacceptable to the Italian Government, the latter had prepared or charged him with any alternative, I noticed that Signor Scialoja evaded the question, and made no reply. In fact, I inferred from his attitude that either he had come with no new suggestion in his pocket, because he anticipated that the Allies would give way, or, if he had a suggestion, he did not care to produce it at the moment.

When I mentioned that M. Clemenceau was coming to London a few days hence, the Minister asked eagerly whether he might be admitted to the meeting, in order to discuss this question; and it may be that, when the gathering takes place, the Italian Foreign Minister may have been instructed or may be in a position to carry matters to a further stage.

This concluded our conversation about the Adriatic, and we then turned to other subjects.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 166

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [160069/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 8, 1919

My telegram about Italian Note.<sup>1</sup> It would be well for you to see Monsieur Clemenceau and impress upon him great danger of divulgation of contents of note in Press or otherwise at Paris—a danger that has on previous occasions been attended with very unfortunate results. His approaching visit here may provide occasion for confidential discussion of situation between us.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram was No. 1453 to Paris, for which see No. 165, note 1.

No. 167

*Letter from Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali*

*Unnumbered [160334/123/3]*

December 8, 1919

My dear Ambassador,

At our meeting this afternoon you or Signor Scialoja suggested that the approaching visit of M. Clemenceau to London might be made an occasion for the confidential discussion of the matters in dispute.

This seemed a good idea. But, if it is to be attended with advantage, I think a further step might be taken.

On the lines of the Allied Note, I criticised severely the Italian proposal about the free town of Fiume and the couloir, and I pointed out, when the Minister spoke of the Italian difficulties, that we had no alternative proposal on the part of the Italian Government and had no idea as to what their conception of a compromise might be.

I do not know if Signor Scialoja has any such in his mind.

May I suggest to you that it would be a very good thing if you were to telegraph to Signor Nitti and ask him whether he has anything to put forward in the event of such a discussion as I have contemplated taking place.

Yours sincerely,  
CURZON

M. Clemenceau comes, I believe, on Wednesday.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> December 10, 1919.

No. 168

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10)*

*No. 747 Telegraphic [160366/123/3]*

My telegram No. 734.<sup>1</sup>

ROME, December 9, 1919

French Ambassador informs me that in conversation with Signor Nitti this morning he had once more referred to fact that Admiral Millo has not

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

yet been recalled and had told him according to information which he had received Government at Belgrade was well disposed to idea of direct negotiations with Italy but were not likely to enter on them so long as Admiral Millo retained his command.

Signor Nitti had reaffirmed his desire to begin such negotiations as well as his wish to recall Admiral Millo. So long, however, as d'Annunzio was at Fiume the Admiral would probably refuse to comply with an (?) order and lay down his command. He was therefore endeavouring to induce d'Annunzio to leave and he hoped that within the next week negotiations which he was conducting with latter would be crowned with success. On my French colleague's enquiring what were d'Annunzio's (?) conditions) Signor Nitti replied that he was stipulating that on his departure Fiume would be occupied by Italian troops and that Government should engage to adhere to Tittoni's proposed solution of question. I asked French Ambassador whether such an engagement might not cause us embarrassment in our future negotiations with Italian Government but His Excellency expressed opinion that Signor Nitti was not so scrupulous as to feel himself bound by any engagement that did not suit him.

### No. 169

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 9)*

*No. 1674 Telegraphic [160074/123/3]*

PARIS, December 9, 1919

Fiume.

Your telegram 1453,<sup>1</sup> December 8th.

M. Clemenceau and Mr. Polk had no hesitation in agreeing to Signor Scialoja's three conditions. Note was accordingly signed and is dated to-day.<sup>2</sup> It will be handed to Signor Scialoja as soon as he returns to Paris.

I impressed upon M. Clemenceau importance of preventing any divulgation through Press or otherwise. He at once gave strict instructions under this head to M. Dutasta and Monsieur Berthelot.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 165, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> The final text of this note is printed as document 1 in Cmd. 586 of 1920.

### No. 170

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received December 12)*

*No. 748 Telegraphic [161186/123/3]*

ROME, December 12, 1919

Following for (?) Director of Military Intelligence) from Military Attaché.

General Delme-Radcliffe asked Ambassador to telegraph to Chief of General Staff as follows: Begins:

Private communications from Fiume state that d'Annunzio has arrested his Chief of Staff, Major Reina, as a traitor for advocating acceptance of Italian Government's proposals and for advising that present situation in

Fiume be brought to an end. This I believe to be true though contrary statements in Press. Ends.

Following from Military Attaché. Begins:

At an interview with Minister of War, December 11th, following information was obtained:—

1. Some difference of opinion known to exist between d'Annunzio and some of his staff who hold more moderate views but story of Reina's arrest not believed.

2. Army as a whole sick of war, only Fiume situation necessitated maintenance of army at present strength. It would be impossible to get men back once demobilised.

3. Minister of War optimistic of agreement being reached between Italian Government and d'Annunzio provided Government's position not compromised by threat of Allied force to settle question.

4. General Caviglia has left to take over from General Badoglio who succeeds Diaz as Chief of General Staff. Ends.

### No. 171

*Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received December 18)*

*No. 266 [162848/123/3]*

BELGRADE, December 12, 1919

My Lord,

The Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me today what I thought of the prospects of a solution of the Adriatic question. Fresh from the reading of the telegram sections<sup>1</sup> which arrived with the King's Messenger this morning, I felt at liberty to tell him that the long protracted and hitherto disjointed discussions seemed now to be narrowing into a straight run home and that on the close of Signor Scialoja's visits to Paris and London a solution might possibly be in sight.

M. Miloyevitch again drew attention to the exemplary patience with which the S.H.S. State had maintained their sorely tried faith in the justice of the Allies, and I again paid tribute to the virtue undoubtedly displayed. I made some allusion to the recent feelers with regard to direct negotiations between Italy and the Jugo-Slavs. His Excellency admitted that some sort of approach had been perceived [*sic*] by his Government to the effect that they should take the first step in that direction. His private opinion very vaguely expressed was that it was preferable that the Conference should be the arbiters in this question. I should certainly think that this view would reflect the considered opinion of the S.H.S. Government and that neither the subject matter nor the characteristics of the two contestants would be appropriate for a settlement out of court.

I have, &c.,  
ALBAN YOUNG

<sup>1</sup> Copies circulated to H.M. Missions abroad of a selection of telegrams recently exchanged between the Foreign Office and H.M. Representatives abroad.

No. 172

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)*

*No. 900 Telegraphic [161186/123/3]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 15, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 747<sup>1</sup> (of December 9th) and 748<sup>2</sup> (of December 12th: negotiations between Italian Government and d'Annunzio).

At Conference in Downing Street note prepared in Paris and signed by Monsieur Clemenceau, Mr. Polk and Sir E. Crowe was formally presented to Signor Scialoja.<sup>3</sup> Signor Nitti was invited to attend a Conference between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, France and Italy in Paris or elsewhere as soon as Signor Nitti could leave Italy, which it is believed would be in about twelve days' time. To this Conference he would bring the reply of his Government and in the meantime he was strongly urged to desist from any negotiations which by presenting the Powers with a *fait accompli* negotiated with d'Annunzio behind their backs would gravely imperil the chance of an amicable solution.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 168.

<sup>2</sup> No. 170.

<sup>3</sup> On December 12, 1919: see Volume II, No. 56.

<sup>4</sup> For subsequent negotiations concerning the question of the Adriatic see Volume II, Chap. II, and Cmd. 586 of 1920.

## CHAPTER II

# Policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Syria and Palestine before the First Conference of London

May 30, 1919–February 12, 1920

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

THE background to British policy in regard to Syria and Palestine in 1919 was as set forth in Part II of Mr. Balfour's memorandum of August 11, 1919, respecting Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, printed as document No. 242. British policy was, in particular, conditioned by four main wartime undertakings: first, the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, H.M. High Commissioner in Egypt, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca in 1915–16; secondly the so-called Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916; thirdly the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, concerning the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine; fourthly the Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918. Certain additional statements relative to this question were made on behalf of His Majesty's Government to Arab representatives in 1918, namely the so-called Hogarth Message, the Declaration to the Seven, and the assurances given by General Allenby to the Emir Feisal in October that year. These three statements are printed in Cmd. 5964 of 1939.

Of the four main undertakings, the Hussein–McMahon Correspondence is printed in Cmd. 5957 of 1939; the Balfour Declaration is printed by H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, p. 170, and an English translation of the French text of the Anglo-French declaration is given in *Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, House of Commons*, vol. 145, col. 36. The correspondence embodying the so-called Sykes–Picot Agreement was as follows:

(i) *M. Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in Petrograd*

'M. l'Ambassadeur,

'PÉTROGRAD, le 13/26 avril, 1916

'En me référant aux aide-mémoire adressés par le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères à l'Ambassade de France en date des 4/17 et 8/21 mars, année courante, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence qu'à la suite des entretiens que j'ai eus avec M. Georges Picot, délégué spécial du Gouvernement français, relativement à la reconnaissance de l'accord qui serait établi entre la France et l'Angleterre pour la constitution d'un État ou d'une fédération d'États arabes et à l'attribution des territoires de la

Syrie, de la Cilicie et de la Mésopotamie, le Gouvernement Impérial est prêt à sanctionner l'arrangement établi sur les bases qui lui ont été indiquées aux conditions suivantes :

'1. La Russie annexerait les régions d'Erzeroum, de Trébizonde, de Van et de Bitlis, jusqu'à un point à déterminer sur le littoral de la mer Noire à l'ouest de Trébizonde;

'2. La région du Kourdistan située au sud de Van et de Bitlis entre Mush, Sert, le cours du Tigre, Djezireh-ben-Omar, la ligne de faîtes des montagnes qui dominent Amadia, et la région de Merga Var serait cédée à la Russie, qui, en revanche, reconnaîtrait à la France la propriété du territoire compris entre l'Ala Dagh, Césaréh, l'Ak Dagh, l'Yildiz Dagh, Zara, Eghin et Khar-pout. En outre, à partir de la région de Mergavar, la frontière de l'Arabie suivrait la ligne de faîtes des montagnes qui limitent actuellement les territoires ottoman et persan. Ces limites sont indiquées d'une manière générale et sous réserve des modifications de détail à proposer par la Commission de Délimitation qui se réunira ultérieurement sur les lieux.

'Le Gouvernement Impérial consent, en outre, à admettre que dans toutes les parties du territoire ottoman ainsi cédées à la Russie les concessions de chemins de fer et autres accordées à des Français par le Gouvernement ottoman seront maintenues. Si le Gouvernement Impérial exprime le désir qu'elles soient modifiées ultérieurement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec les lois de l'Empire, cette modification aura lieu d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la République.

'En ce qui concerne les institutions, administrations, établissements religieux, scolaires, hospitaliers, &c., relevant des deux nations, ils continueront à jouir des priviléges qui leur étaient accordés jusqu'ici par les traités, accords et contrats conclus avec le Gouvernement ottoman. Il demeure, toutefois, entendu qu'en stipulant une telle réserve les deux Gouvernements n'ont pas voulu exiger pour l'avenir le maintien des droits de juridiction, du protectorat religieux et des Capitulations dans les régions qui seraient ainsi annexées à la Russie et à la France, mais seulement assurer la survie des institutions et établissements actuellement existant et ouvrir la voie, après la conclusion de la paix, à une négociation entre les deux Puissances.

'Enfin, les deux Gouvernements admettent en principe que chacun des États qui annexerait des territoires turcs devrait participer au service de la Dette ottomane.

'Veuillez, &c.  
SAZONOF'

*(2) M. Paléologue to M. Sazonov*

'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN RUSSIE, PÉTROGRAD, le 13/26 avril, 1916.

'M. le Ministre,

'J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de la communication que votre Excellence m'a adressée à la date de ce jour, relativement à la reconnaissance par le Gouvernement Impérial, aux conditions suivantes, de l'accord qui serait

établi entre la France et l'Angleterre pour constituer un État ou une fédération d'États arabes et assurer l'attribution des territoires de la Syrie, de la Cilicie et de la Mésopotamie sur les bases qui lui ont été indiquées par le délégué spécial du Gouvernement français. De son côté, le Gouvernement de la République m'a chargé de vous faire connaître qu'il a décidé de sanctionner l'arrangement dont il s'agit:

'1. La Russie annexerait les régions d'Erzeroum, de Trébizonde, de Van et de Bitlis, jusqu'à un point à déterminer sur le littoral de la mer Noire à l'ouest de Trébizonde;

'2. La région du Kourdistan située au sud de Van et de Bitlis entre Mush, Sert, le cours du Tigre, Djezireh-ibn-Omar, la ligne de faîtes des montagnes qui dominent Amadia et la région de Merga Var serait cédée à la Russie, qui, en revanche, attribuerait à la France les territoires compris entre l'Ala Dagh, Césarée, l'Ak Dagh, l'Yildiz Dagh, Zara, Eghin et Kharpout. En outre, à partir de la région de Merga Var, la frontière de l'Arabie suivrait la ligne de faîtes des montagnes qui limitent actuellement les territoires ottoman et persan. Ces limites sont indiquées d'une manière générale et sous réserve des modifications de détail à proposer par la Commission de Délimitation qui se réunira ultérieurement sur les lieux.

'Le Gouvernement de la République prend acte avec satisfaction de ce que le Gouvernement Impérial consent, en outre, à admettre que dans toutes les parties du territoire ottoman ainsi cédées à la Russie les concessions de chemins de fer et autres accordés à des Français par le Gouvernement ottoman seront maintenues. Si le Gouvernement Impérial exprime le désir qu'elles soient modifiées ultérieurement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec les lois de l'Empire, cette modification aurait lieu d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la République.

'En ce qui concerne les institutions, administrations, établissements religieux, scolaires, hospitaliers, &c., relevant des deux nations, ils continueront à jouir des priviléges qui leur étaient accordés jusqu'ici par les traités, accords et contrats conclus avec le Gouvernement ottoman. Il demeure, toutefois, entendu qu'en stipulant une telle réserve les deux Gouvernements n'ont pas voulu exiger pour l'avenir le maintien des droits de juridiction, du protectorat religieux et des Capitulations dans les régions qui seraient ainsi annexées à la Russie et à la France, mais seulement assurer la survivance des institutions et établissements actuellement existant et ouvrir la voie, après la conclusion de la paix, à une négociation dont l'amitié des deux pays ne permet pas de mettre en doute l'heureuse solution.

'Enfin, les deux Gouvernements admettent en principe que chacun des États qui annexerait des territoires turcs devrait participer au service de la Dette ottomane.

'Veuillez, &c.  
PALÉOLOGUE'

(3) *M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey (Received May 10)*

'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, le 9 mai, 1916

'M. le Secrétaire d'État,

'Désireux d'entrer dans les vues du Gouvernement du Roi et de chercher à détacher les Arabes des Turcs en facilitant la création d'un État ou d'une confédération d'États arabes, le Gouvernement de la République avait accepté l'invitation qui lui avait été adressée par le Cabinet britannique en vue de fixer les limites de cet État et des régions syriennes où les intérêts français sont prédominants.

'A la suite des conférences qui ont eu lieu à ce sujet à Londres et des pourparlers qui se sont poursuivis à Pétrograd un accord s'est établi. J'ai été chargé de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français accepte les limites telles qu'elles ont été fixées sur les cartes signées par Sir Mark Sykes et M. Georges Picot, ainsi que les conditions diverses formulées au cours de ces discussions. . . .

[Follows the French text of the agreement, as printed in the *Dictionnaire Diplomatique* (Paris, 1933), vol. ii, pp. 892-3 (Annex I to article, 'Syrie', by M. Picot).]

'Je serais obligé à votre Excellence, au cas où ces conditions auraient l'agrément du Gouvernement du Roi, de vouloir bien me le faire connaître.

'Veuillez, &c.

PAUL CAMBON'

(4) *Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon*

'(Secret.)

'Your Excellency,

'FOREIGN OFFICE, May 15, 1916

'I shall have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, relative to the creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your Excellency could assure me that in those regions which, under the conditions recorded in that communication, become entirely French, or in which French interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British concessions, rights of navigation or development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions will be maintained.

'His Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in regard to the British area.

'I have, &c.

E. GREY'

(5) *M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey (Received May 16)*

'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, le 15 mai, 1916

'M. le Secrétaire d'État,

'Par sa communication de ce jour votre Excellence m'a exprimé le désir, avant de répondre à ma lettre en date du 9 de ce mois relative à la création d'un État arabe, de recevoir l'assurance que dans les régions qui deviendront françaises ou dans celles où les intérêts français seraient prédominants, les

concessions et droits de navigation, ainsi que les droits et priviléges de tous les établissements religieux, scolaires et médicaux britanniques, seraient maintenus. Il serait entendu, par contre, que les mêmes droits seraient reconnus à la France par le Gouvernement du Roi dans la sphère dévolue à l'Angleterre.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à sanctionner les diverses concessions britanniques ayant date certaine antérieure à la guerre dans les régions qui lui seraient attribuées ou qui relèveraient de son action. Quant aux établissement médicaux, scolaires ou religieux, ils continueraient à fonctionner comme par le passé, étant entendu toutefois, qu'une telle réserve ne comporte pas le maintien des droits de juridiction et des capitulations dans ces territoires.

'Veuillez, &c.

PAUL CAMBON'

(Secret.)

(6) *Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon*

Your Excellency,

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 16, 1916

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached thereto, such as they result from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments—

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map,<sup>1</sup> under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as

<sup>1</sup> Not here reproduced. The delimitations of the areas indicated in the map accompanying the present agreement were subsequently included in the map accompanying the Agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne, for which see the Introductory Note to Chapter III below.

they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

'3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

'4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

'5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

'That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area (B), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

'6. That in area (A) the Bagdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Bagdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.

'7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

'It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion of Bagdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French Government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhad Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (B).

'8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversion from *ad valorem* to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers.

'There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

'9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.

'10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.

'11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.

'12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two Governments.

'I have further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His Majesty's Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as exchanged.

'I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies.

'His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded.

'I have, &c.  
E. GREY'

(7) *Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London*

'Your Excellency,

'FOREIGN OFFICE, May 23, 1916

'I have received from the French Ambassador in London copies of the notes exchanged between the Russian and French Governments on the 26th ultimo, by which your Excellency's Government recognise, subject to certain conditions, the arrangement made between Great Britain and France, relative to the constitution of an Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of the territories of Syria, Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured.

'His Majesty's Government take act with satisfaction that your Excellency's Government concur in the limits set forth in that arrangement, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, on their part, in order to make the arrangement complete, are also prepared to recognise the conditions formulated by the Russian Government and accepted by the French Government in the notes exchanged at Petrograd on the 26th ultimo.

'In so far, then, as these arrangements directly affect the relations of Russia and Great Britain, I have the honour to invite the acquiescence of your Excellency's Government in an agreement on the following terms:—

'1. That Russia shall annex the regions of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, up to a point subsequently to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond.

'2. That the region of Kurdistan to the south of Van and of Bitlis between Mush, Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezireh-ben-Omar, the crest-line of the mountains which dominate Amadia, and the region of Merga Var, shall be ceded to Russia; and that starting from the region of Merga Var, the frontier of the Arab State shall follow the crest-line of the mountains which at present divide the Ottoman and Persian Dominions. These boundaries are indicated in a general manner and are subject to modifications of detail to be proposed later by the Delimitation Commission which shall meet on the spot.

'3. That the Russian Government undertake that, in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, any concessions accorded to British subjects by the Ottoman Government shall be maintained. If the Russian Government express the desire that such concessions should later be modified in order to bring them into harmony with the laws of the Russian Empire, this modification shall only take place in agreement with the British Government.

'4. That in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, existing British rights of navigation and development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions shall be maintained. His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that similar Russian rights and privileges shall be maintained in those regions which, under the conditions of this agreement, become entirely British, or in which British interests are recognised as predominant.

'5. The two Governments admit in principle that every State which annexes any part of the Ottoman Empire is called upon to participate in the service of the Ottoman Debt.

'I have, &c.  
E. GREY'

(8) *M. Cambon to Viscount Grey. (Received August 26)*

'M. le Vicomte,

'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, le 25 août, 1916

'Les termes "protéger un État arabe indépendant" et "protect an independent Arab State" employés dans les lettres que nous avons échangées, les 9

et 16 mai dernier, relativement à la question de Syrie, ayant semblé à votre Seigneurie devoir prêter à des erreurs d'interprétation, en pouvant laisser croire qu'il s'agit d'une sorte de protectorat, alors que nous avons seulement entendu garantir la pleine indépendance du nouvel État, je ne vois, en ce qui me concerne, aucun inconvénient à modifier ces expressions, suivant le désir que vous m'en avez exprimé.

Il me semble que les mots "soutenir" et "uphold" rendraient plus exactement notre pensée. Si votre Seigneurie partage ce sentiment, la substitution pourrait en être faite dans les documents originaux.

'Veuillez, &c.

PAUL CAMBON'

(9) *The Marquess of Crewe to M. Cambon*

'FOREIGN OFFICE, August 30, 1916

'Your Excellency,

'I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 25th instant, suggesting that for the words "protect ('protéger') an independent Arab State," which occur in the notes exchanged on the 9th and 16th May last, on the subject of Asiatic Turkey, the words "uphold ('soutenir') an independent Arab State" should be read.

'In reply, I have the honour to state that I see no objection to the adoption of the word suggested by your Excellency, and I have accordingly caused the necessary alteration to be made in the original text of your note of the 9th May.

'I have, &c.

CREWE'

(The words 'as the protectors of the Arab State' were also correspondingly deleted in article 10 of the agreement.)

(10) *Count Benckendorff to Viscount Grey. (Received September 1)*

'AMBASSADE IMPÉRIALE DE RUSSIE, le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre, 1916

'M. le Vicomte,

'Par une note en date du 23 mai, année courante, votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'informer qu'elle avait reçu de l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres une copie des notes échangées, le 26 avril, année courante, entre les Gouvernements français et russe, par lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial accepte, à certaines conditions, l'arrangement conclu entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France relativement à la création d'un État ou d'une confédération d'États arabes, ainsi qu'au partage des territoires de la Syrie, la Cilicie et la Mésopotamie, pourvu que la coopération des Arabes soit assurée.

'En outre, votre Seigneurie a bien voulu ajouter que le Gouvernement Royal est disposé, en vue de rendre l'arrangement complet, à reconnaître les conditions formulées par le Gouvernement Impérial et acceptées par le Gouvernement français dans les notes échangées à Pétrograd le 26 avril, 1916.

'J'ai, en conséquence, l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Seigneurie que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement Impérial sont tombés d'accord sur les points suivants:

‘1. La Russie annexera les régions d’Erzeroum, Trébizonde, Van et Bitlis jusqu’à un point sur le littoral de la mer Noire à l’ouest de Trébizonde à déterminer ultérieurement.

‘2. La région du Kurdistan au sud de Van et Bitlis comprise entre Much, Sert, le cours du Tigre, Jesireh-ben-Omar, la ligne des montagnes dominant Amadia et la région de Merga Var, sera cédée à la Russie. A partir de la région de Merga Var, la frontière de l’État arabe suivra la ligne des montagnes divisant actuellement les territoires ottomans et persans. Les frontières susmentionnées sont indiquées d’une manière générale et sont sujettes à des modifications de détail devant être proposées ultérieurement par la Commission de Délimitation qui se réunira sur les lieux.

‘3. Le Gouvernement Impérial consent de maintenir dans toutes les parties du territoire ottoman ainsi cédées à la Russie toutes concessions accordées par le Gouvernement ottoman aux sujets britanniques. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial exprimerait le désir que ces concessions soient modifiées ultérieurement dans le but de les faire concorder avec les exigences des lois russes, cette modification aura lieu d’accord avec le Gouvernement britannique.

‘4. Dans toutes les parties des territoires ottomans ainsi cédées à la Russie, les droits existants de navigation et les concessions diverses consenties au Gouvernement britannique, ainsi que les droits et priviléges des institutions religieuses, scolaires et médicales britanniques, devront être maintenus. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique reconnaît, de son côté, que les droits et priviléges similaires reconnus à la Russie dans les territoires attribués en toute souveraineté à la Grande-Bretagne ou dans lesquels les intérêts britanniques sont reconnus comme prédominants par le présent arrangement devront être maintenus.

‘Toutefois, je suis chargé de formuler la réserve suivante: Les avantages consentis par cet article, affectant la législation de l’Empire en matière de cabotage, législation qui a déjà donné lieu à des réserves spéciales dans plusieurs traités internationaux conclus entre la Russie et diverses autres Puissances, cette question ne saurait, dans l’opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, être préjugée dès maintenant, mais elle pourra être soumise ultérieurement à l’amical examen des deux Puissances en vue d’arriver à une solution satisfaisante pour l’une et pour l’autre.

‘5. Les deux Gouvernements admettent le principe que chaque État annexant une partie quelconque de l’Empire ottoman sera tenu de participer au service de la Dette ottomane.

‘C'est avec la plus haute considération, &c.

BENCKENDORFF'

(II) Viscount Grey to Count Benckendorff

‘Your Excellency,

‘FOREIGN OFFICE, October 23, 1916

‘In reply to Your Excellency’s note of the 1st ultimo, regarding the arrangement between Great Britain, Russia, and France, relative to the creation of an Arab State, or of a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of

the territories of Syria, Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government take note of the reservation formulated by the Imperial Russian Government at the end of article 4 of the arrangement respecting the rights of the Imperial Government to *grand cabotage* in the Black Sea, and of the desire manifested by that Government that this question should be submitted later to a friendly examination by the Governments of the parties interested.

'I have, &c.

GREY OF FALLODON'

After the end of the First World War the wartime undertakings were modified and supplemented in certain respects.

The terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were modified in two particulars during a visit which M. Clemenceau paid to London for a meeting of the Allied Supreme Council at the beginning of December 1918. Mr. Lloyd George then secured M. Clemenceau's verbal agreement, first, to the transfer of Mosul from the French to the British sphere of influence, and secondly to the proposal that Palestine should come under British, instead of international, administration.

In January 1919 the Emir Feisal, son of the Sherif Hussein, and Dr. Weizmann, representing the Zionist Organisation, concluded the so-called Feisal-Weizmann Agreement concerning Palestine. This agreement is printed by George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), pp. 437-9.

On March 20, 1919, there was an important discussion on Near Eastern affairs in the Allied Supreme Council at Paris. At the end of this discussion President Wilson undertook to draft terms of reference for an Allied commission of enquiry to the Near East. A minute of this discussion is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. v, pp. 1-14.

Shortly before the departure of the Emir Feisal from Paris in April 1919 an exchange of letters between him and M. Clemenceau was drawn up. Copies of these letters were communicated by Mr. Balfour to Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office in the following despatch:

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon. (Received May 1)*

'No. 628

'PARIS, April 30, 1919

'Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of correspondence between M. Clemenceau and Emir Feisal before latter's departure for the East.'

ENCLOSURE I

*Mr. Kerr to Sir L. Mallet*

'Sir Louis Mallet,

'PARIS, April 28, 1919

'I enclose for your information copies of correspondence which passed between M. Clemenceau and the Emir Feisal before the latter's departure for the East.

P. H. KERR'

ENCLOSURE 2

*M. Clemenceau to the Emir Feisal*

'PARIS, le 17 avril 1919

'Altesse,

'Je suis heureux, au moment de votre retour en Orient, de confirmer ce que je vous ai dit dans la conversation que j'ai eue avec vous le dimanche, 13 avril.

'Le Gouvernement français, désireux d'assurer à la Syrie comme à l'Arménie, à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays d'Orient délivrés par la victoire de l'Entente, le régime de liberté et de progrès conforme aux principes dont il s'est toujours inspiré et qui sont la base des délibérations de la Conférence de la Paix, déclare reconnaître le droit de la Syrie à l'indépendance sous la forme d'une fédération d'autonomies locales répondant aux traditions et aux vœux des populations.

'La France est toute prête à donner son aide matérielle et morale à cette émancipation de la Syrie.

'C'est en référant aux besoins de ce pays, à l'intérêt de ses populations comme au rôle séculaire joué par la France, que votre Altesse a reconnu que la France est la Puissance qualifiée pour donner à la Syrie l'assistance des conseillers divers nécessaires pour instaurer l'ordre et réaliser les progrès que réclament les populations syriennes.

'Lorsque l'heure sera venue d'élaborer des arrangements plus détaillés pour assurer la collaboration de la France avec la Syrie, ils devront être conformes à l'esprit de nos entretiens. J'ai grand plaisir, au moment de me séparer de votre Altesse, à vous le confirmer par écrit et à constater une harmonie dont ne manqueront pas de s'inspirer les représentants de la France en Syrie.

'Je prie votre Altesse d'agréer, &c.

G. CLEMENCEAU'

ENCLOSURE 3

*The Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau*

'I am happy to have an opportunity, as I leave Paris for the East, to thank you for the great kindness you showed me in our conversation of Sunday last. As I told you I am a warm friend of France and of your administration.

'The deep sympathy that exists between the people of France and the people of Syria is founded on a tradition which you may rest assured I will do my best to confirm.

'I was deeply impressed by the disinterested friendliness of your statements to me while I was in Paris, and must thank you for having been the first to suggest the despatch of the Inter-allied Commission, which is to leave shortly for the East to ascertain the wishes of the local peoples as to the future organisation of their country. I am sure that the people of Syria will know how to show you their gratitude.

'Our conversations, to which I have referred, have convinced me of the need there is for us to come to a complete understanding on the points that interest us. As, however, it is impossible for me to put off longer my return

home, I must ask you to accredit someone to continue the arrangements we have begun. Their completion will foster the good relations of the two countries.

'Finally, let me assure you that on my arrival in Syria, I will do my best to assure my people of your kindly feelings towards us and will work to increase the friendly bonds between the French and the Arabs.

'FEISAL

'(Letter sent on 20th April to M. Clemenceau. The previous draft, a frank statement of what the Syrians wanted from the Powers and were willing to offer France, was rejected by M. Robert de Caix (acting for M. Clemenceau) and, therefore, never transmitted.

'Feisal saw Colonel House and M. Clemenceau for a few minutes on the 21st April, to say good-bye.): appended passage in parentheses as in the original enclosure.

Lord Curzon replied to this despatch as follows:

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 3475  
Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 26, 1919

'With reference to your despatch No. 628 of the 30th ultimo, the French Ambassador, who has just returned from Paris, alluded to-day to the letters said to have been exchanged between the Emir Faisal and M. Clemenceau.

'M. Cambon said that he had noticed that when he had cast doubt, some ten days ago, on the existence of any such correspondence, his statement had been received with polite incredulity. He had taken the opportunity of his visit to Paris to clear the matter up. It appeared that there had been a proposal to make an exchange of letters between M. Clemenceau and Faisal, but the former was only willing to write on the clear understanding that Faisal's reply to his letter would be of a satisfactory character. A draft letter from M. Clemenceau was communicated to Faisal on the 17th April with a request to communicate the answer which it was proposed to return. When Faisal's draft reply was received its terms were not considered to be satisfactory, and therefore M. Clemenceau's letter was never sent to him.

'It would therefore appear that the note from Faisal transmitted to me in your despatch No. 628 as well as the earlier letter, referred to in a footnote, both proved unacceptable to M. Clemenceau.

'I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON'

(Cf. in this connexion *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. v, p. 112.)

There was a further important but inconclusive discussion on Near Eastern affairs in the Council of Four on May 21-22, 1919. In this discussion

M. Clemenceau had indicated that France would not be represented immediately on the proposed Allied commission to the Near East, and the possibility that the American representatives might in the first instance proceed independently had been raised. Minutes of this discussion are printed *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 756–66 and 807–12.

No. 173

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 842 [82836/2117/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 30, 1919

My Lord,

M. Cambon paid me his weekly call to-day.<sup>1</sup> He had just returned from a visit to Paris, which indeed we had taken in common at the same time. But his confabulations with his Government and their accounts of what was passing at Paris had not inspired him with any different view from that which he had frequently expressed to me, of the degree of wisdom with which the future fortunes of the world are being determined, or of the nature of the solutions, particularly in the Eastern world, which seem to find favour among the arbiters of Europe. I found some difficulty in reconciling his account of what had happened at Paris in the preceding week with what I knew of the facts; but I record his statements as made to me.

He represented that on a Monday the British representative had practically offered to France the undisputed mandate for Constantinople, the whole of Anatolia, Armenia (if it were not given to the Americans), and Syria; and two days later had submitted the rival proposition that America should receive the mandate for the whole of Turkey, both in Europe and Asia, *including Syria*, but excluding Mesopotamia and Palestine. This suggestion, the Ambassador told me, had excited the vehement wrath of M. Clemenceau, who had been inclined to attribute it to my pernicious influence in Paris. M. Cambon had assured him, from his numerous conversations with me, that this could not be the case, since I had never favoured any arrangement by which the French claims to Syria were thus arbitrarily extinguished; and I confirmed his recollection by the further assurance that, in the conversations in which I had taken part in Paris, the question of Syria had not even been mentioned.

The incident, which probably rested upon some misunderstanding or misreport of what had actually happened, is only of value as indicating the passionate intensity with which France, while disinteresting herself, for reasons of expediency, from Constantinople and Asia Minor, means to adhere to her Syrian pretensions.

M. Cambon then recapitulated the heads of the agreement or understanding which he had already proposed at the Foreign Office, of the two disputed subjects of: (a) The division of civil and military control at Constantinople

<sup>1</sup> For M. Cambon's present conversation with Lord Curzon, cf. Paul Cambon, *Correspondance 1870–1924* (Paris, 1940 f.), vol. iii, pp. 337–8.

during the military occupation; and (b) the division of military commands between Turkey-in-Europe and Turkey-in-Asia. As regards (b), Turkey-in-Europe was to be the sphere of the French, Turkey-in-Asia of the British commander-in-chief. But the French military control was to extend over the city, really a portion of Constantinople itself, separated by a broad channel, on the southern or Asiatic side of the straits, excluding however Haidar Pasha which, as the starting-point of the railway, was to remain in British military hands. Such was the agreement which he had proposed, which we had accepted, and which had equally been accepted by his Government. He now sought to obtain one further concession, viz., that the French should be allowed to retain military control over the coal-mines and small port of Heraclée on the Black Sea, which had been developed and were worked by a French company, though in consequence of the war but little had lately been done.

I failed to ascertain from his Excellency for exactly what reason, whether *amour-propre* or the intention of making a future claim, the French were anxious for the concession: which indeed the Ambassador said that he only sought as a favour and would not press if we felt any strong disinclination to grant it. I promised to look into the matter, which was new to me.

The Ambassador then raised once more the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, now in British military occupation, and urged that, immediately upon the signature of peace, the French company which owned it should be indemnified for the seizure. His Excellency also pressed most strongly that M. Pavie, the director of the company now in Palestine, should be accorded an interview, which had hitherto been refused to him, either with General Allenby<sup>2</sup> or with the Governor of Jerusalem, Colonel Storr[s].

In conclusion, the Ambassador reported to me a very frank conversation which he appeared to have had with M. Sazonof,<sup>3</sup> in which, in reply to the appeals and petitions of that statesman, he had vigorously rejoined that Russia had only to thank herself for her misfortunes; while, as regards the Allies, she had 'let them down' so badly that the war had been prolonged for two years.

A little later, M. Sazonof himself, when calling upon me,<sup>4</sup> presented the reverse side of the same picture, by actually contending that, had it not been for the valiant efforts of the Russian armies in the opening stages of the war Paris would have fallen, the Channel ports been taken, and the war ended in less than six months.

If these are the rival angles of vision of contemporaneous authorities, what will not be the perplexities of the historian of the future?

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>2</sup> Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

<sup>3</sup> Former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-16.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume III, No. 254, note 3.

*General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received May 30)  
No. E.A. 2484 Telegraphic [349/1/3/11352]*

CAIRO, May 30, 1919

I have received following telegrams from Feisal.

(A) (Begins). A rumour in Beirut says that it has been decided that the international commission<sup>1</sup> will not come and that a big French army is coming under the command of General Garron. Apart from the fact that this will wound the national feeling it will cause agitation all over the country, therefore I see myself justified if I beg your Excellency's permission as to considering myself *irresponsible* for what may occur if the French force is increased even by one soldier. I beg your Excellency's reply about this and accept my best respects. (Ends).

(B) (Begins). I have received following telegram from Hedjaz member in Paris—'The Allies are now considering the future of Turkey. The British Government will withdraw her troops from Syria, the mission has been stopped'.—If this is true and the people of the country hear it there will be a great upheaval in all Arabian countries and my position before you and before the British Army will be very critical. As I cannot conceive this news I request an answer and authentic news within 24 hours. We cannot accept to be divided like cattle. We cannot accept any decision except that of the liberty of nations and parties<sup>2</sup> by sending the commission. If this news is true the responsibility of shedding innocent blood by your armies will rest on the Peace Conference. (Ends).

In forwarding this second telegram political officer at Damascus adds—(Begins.) If Feisal's information is correct the situation here becomes most dangerous as his interpretation is to mean<sup>3</sup> our withdrawal from Syria in favour of France and without consulting the wishes of the country about its future. Considering that he is in deadly earnest and in this Joyce<sup>4</sup> concurs and that he will be unable even if willing to prevent bloodshed on a large scale unless news is contradicted and will probably even identify himself with any rising, urge immediate reply to his wire.

If matter has to be referred to England please inform me. (Ends).

I look on the situation as extremely grave. Unless you can at once enable me to reassure Feisal and tell him that the Commission is coming out and will decide the future of the country it is certain he will raise the Arabs against the French and ourselves. This will jeopardise position of my troops in Syria and will seriously endanger the whole situation in Syria and Palestine. A word from Feisal will bring against us all the warlike Bedouins from

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the Allied Commission to the Middle East: see Introductory Note.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain. In the text of this telegram as received in the Foreign Office this passage read '... liberty of nations and that this ? be brought about by sending the commission'.

<sup>3</sup> The text as received in the Foreign Office here read '... most dangerous as he interprets this to mean . . .' &c.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel P. C. Joyce was attached to the staff of the Emir Feisal.

the East of Jordan, on whose friendly attitude depends the safety of Palestine and the security of my long lines of communication.

A rising of the Bedouins would bring against us also the tribes of the Sinai peninsula and serious trouble would certainly break out in Egypt and the Sudan. In such a case I shall be totally unable to handle the situation with the troops at my disposal.

Addressed Troopers,<sup>5</sup> repeated to Foreign Office.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. addressed to the War Office, as well as to Mr. Balfour.

### No. 175

*General Clayton<sup>1</sup> (Cairo) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received May 30)*

*No. Pol. 508 Telegraphic [349/1/3/11351]*

CAIRO, May 30, 1919

Your telegram number 15<sup>2</sup> of May 28.

Am I to understand that American section of Inter-Allied Commission to Near East is coming separately to Syria and Palestine? I think it of prime importance that Inter-Allied Commission should come as one body.

In this connection please see wire E.A. 2484<sup>3</sup> from General Allenby of to-day's date.<sup>4</sup>

Addressed to Mr. Balfour, Paris. Repeated Mr. Balfour Marcellles.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram reported that the American section, under Dr. King and Mr. Crane, of the Inter-Allied Commission was leaving that day for Syria and Palestine.

<sup>3</sup> No. 174.

<sup>4</sup> In reply to the present telegram Mr. Balfour telegraphed on June 3, 1919, referring General Clayton to Nos. 177 and 178.

<sup>5</sup> The reference is uncertain. Cf. No. 194, note 2.

### No. 176

*Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room at the  
Quai d'Orsay, Paris<sup>1</sup>*

*C.F. 43 [Secret/General/162]*

*Saturday, May 31, 1919, at 5.30 p.m.*

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

*British Empire*: Mr. Lloyd George.

*France*: M. Clemenceau.

*Italy*: M. Orlando.

*Secretaries*: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

*Interpreter*: Professor Mantoux.<sup>2</sup>

... 8.<sup>3</sup> *Turkey. The proposed Commission to Syria, Mesopotamia, &c. Mr. LLOYD*

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 130 f.

<sup>2</sup> M. Tardieu was also present for item 8.

<sup>3</sup> The remainder of these minutes related to other matters.

GEORGE read a telegram he had received from General Allenby, indicating that the situation in Syria would be extremely grave unless the Commission of the Peace Conference should come to Syria. (Appendix III.)<sup>4</sup> He said that General Wilson<sup>5</sup> had also received a private letter from General Allenby, dated the 17th May, 1919, which fully confirmed the message in the telegram. Hence, he felt that the moment had come to decide whether the Commission should proceed at once. The United States Commissioners had already left for Syria. He himself did not wish to send out British Commissioners unless the French also sent Commissioners, but in this case, he must inform General Allenby. The situation was so serious that he could not postpone action.

M. CLEMENCEAU said his position was as he had stated a few days before, namely, that he was willing to send French Commissioners as soon as the relief of British troops by French troops was begun. As long as Syria remained entirely in British military occupation, and Mr. Lloyd George's latest proposals<sup>6</sup> held the field, it was useless to send French Commissioners. Nevertheless, he would undertake not to send any more French troops against the wishes of the British Government. He was sending some troops to Silesia [? Cilicia], although there was not much object in this from the French point of view, if Silesia [? Cilicia] was to go to the United States. As soon as General Allenby would let him know that the replacement of British troops by French could commence, so that the people of Syria knew that they were not exclusively under British force, he would send Commissioners.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had thought it right before taking action, to let his colleagues know exactly what he proposed to do. He would not send Commissioners if the French did not. General Allenby showed clearly that if French troops went to Syria now, there would be very serious trouble. He himself was not in a position to judge of the matter, but General Allenby was a very reliable man, and was the British representative on the spot, and he could not afford to neglect his advice. Mr. Lloyd George then read a copy of the telegram he proposed to send to General Allenby. At M. Clemenceau's request he agreed to alter one passage in order to make it clear that the French were not willing to send Commissioners until the relief of British troops by French troops had been arranged.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would make no comment beyond asking for the above alteration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE promised to send M. Clemenceau a copy of General Allenby's despatch.

M. ORLANDO said he would not send Commissioners until the British and French Governments sent them. . . .<sup>3</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained a paraphrased summary of No. 174.

<sup>5</sup> British Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

<sup>6</sup> The reference was to proposals made in the discussion of the Council of Four on May 21-22, 1919: cf. Introductory Note.

No. 177

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 48 Telegraphic [349/1/3/11352]*

PARIS, May 31, 1919

With reference to your telegram E.A. 2484,<sup>1</sup> you may announce that the Commission which is to investigate the problems connected with the political future of the people of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia will arrive in the East almost immediately. The American representatives have already started. We have long been prepared and anxious to send ours. The French, however, have decided not to send their Commissioners until the relief of British troops in Syria by the French has been arranged. As an arrangement to do this cannot be agreed, French Commissioners will not go out. Under these circumstances we think it for obvious reasons inexpedient to send ours. We therefore authorise you to state when Americans arrive that the British Government will give the fullest weight to the advice which the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will receive from the American Commissioners. His Majesty's Government rely upon you to see that the Commissioners are given every facility in prosecuting their enquiries. We have informed French, United States and Italian Governments of this decision.

<sup>1</sup> No. 174.

No. 178

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 49 Telegraphic [349/1/3/11352]*

PARIS, May 31, 1919

With further reference to your telegram E.A. 2484<sup>1</sup> you appear to think that the Commission will decide the future of the various ex-Turkish territories. That is not correct. They will have no power to decide, but after examining all the facts of the case will tender their advice to the Council of the Principal Allied Powers, who will have to take the final decision.

<sup>1</sup> No. 174.

No. 179

*General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received June 1)*

*No. E.A. 2487 Telegraphic [349/1/3/11529]*

CAIRO, May 31, 1919

In continuation of my E.A. 2479<sup>1</sup> of May 30 I at once sent following telegram to Feisal. Begins: Your C. 721 and 722.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It was suggested on the original that this reference should be E.A. 2484, i.e. No. 174.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the two telegrams from the Emir Feisal transmitted in No. 174.

As follows for Feisal from C.-in-C., begins:

With reference to information cabled to you by memoir<sup>3</sup> in Paris. I have no knowledge whatever of such a decision.

Your telegrams Nos. C. 721 and C. 722 of May 29 have been repeated to War Office and Foreign Office and I have requested an early reply. I count upon you in the meantime to maintain order and discipline, and to restrain any action that might endanger future of your country. Any hasty action that would bring you into conflict with my troops would put an end to all your national aspirations at once.

Addressed Troopers,<sup>4</sup> repeated Foreign Office.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that this should read 'by member'.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. addressed to the War Office, as well as to Mr. Balfour.

### No. 180

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 2)*

*No. 861 [82739/1051/44]*

PARIS, May 31, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon and transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned papers:

Name and Date	Subject
Correspondence communicated by Mr. Frankfurter, <sup>1</sup> May 21.	Establishment of Palestine as Jewish National Home.

### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 180

*Mr. Frankfurter to President Wilson*

My dear Mr. President,

ORGANISATION SIONISTE, PARIS, May 8, 1919

Conscious of the duty of every American not to take from your time and energy, I am nevertheless compelled to bring to your attention the conditions that now confront Jewry, above all Eastern Jewry.

You are familiar with the problems and have stated their solution. The controlling Jewish hope has been—and is—your approval of the Balfour Declaration and your sponsorship of the establishment of Palestine as the Jewish National Home. The appointment of the Interallied Syrian Commission and the assumed postponement for months, but particularly beyond the time of your stay here, of the disposition of Near Eastern questions, have brought the deepest disquietude to the representatives of the Jewry of the world. As a passionate American I am, of course, most eager that the Jew should be a reconstructive and not a disruptive force in the new world order. I have reassured their leaders, with the conviction born of knowledge of your purposes. They have faith; I venture to think no people in Paris have more faith, the faith of 2,000 years. But they also have the knowledge of the suffering of millions of Jews; and the hopes of Jews the world over, which nothing

<sup>1</sup> Member of the American Zionist Delegation at Paris.

will assuage except the rededication, at last, of Palestine as a Jewish Homeland.

Moreover it is not merely a Jewish question. An extended delay in the Near Eastern settlement is bound to intensify the existing unrest by giving dangerous opportunities to Young Turk intrigue and to the stimulation of religious animosities.

The English authorities are eager to have Dr. Weizmann<sup>2</sup> and me go to Palestine to assure moderation in the Jewish population. We are doing all that can be done and I am confident the Jewish population will maintain restraint. But I dare not leave here while the Turkish issues are undetermined and while you are still in Paris to decide them.

You will forgive me for writing, but circumstances have made me the trustee of a situation that affects the hopes and the very life of a whole people. Therefore I cannot forbear to say that not a little of the peace of the world depends upon the disposal before your return to America of the destiny of the people released from Turkish rule.

Faithfully yours,<sup>3</sup>

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 180

*President Wilson to Mr. Frankfurter*

PARIS, May 13, 1919

My dear Mr. Frankfurter,

Just a line to acknowledge your important letter of May 8th,<sup>4</sup> and to say how deeply I appreciate the importance and significance of the whole matter.

Cordially and sincerely yours,  
WOODROW WILSON

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 180

*Mr. Frankfurter to President Wilson*

May 14, 1919

My dear Mr. President,

You know how profoundly words, even familiar words, move people today—how their hopes and their faith are sustained or saddened, by what you say or fail to say. Therefore I know you will want me to inform you, in all candour, that your note of acknowledgement to my letter of May 8th has occasioned almost despair to the Jewish representatives now assembled in Paris, who speak not only for the Jews of Europe but also for the American Jewish Congress, the democratic voice of three million American Jews. I do not fail to appreciate the forces which confront you here, and the circumspection which conditions impose upon you. On our side the task is to keep literally millions of Jews in check. Uncertainty, indefinite delay, seeming change of policy, bring a feeling of hopelessness which only those in intimate

<sup>2</sup> President of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking in original copy.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 1 above.

contact with the people whose fate is at stake can fully gauge. We are bending every energy to prevent the slow attrition of the spirit of such a people.

Therefore, you will forgive me for submitting to you the wisdom and justice of a reassuring word, written or spoken, even though it be repetitive—that you are purposing to have the Balfour Declaration written into the Treaty of Peace, and that you are aiming to see that declaration translated into action before you leave Paris.

Faithfully yours,<sup>3</sup>

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 180

*President Wilson to Mr. Frankfurter*

My dear Mr. Frankfurter,

PARIS, May 16, 1919

I have your letter of May 14.<sup>5</sup> I never dreamed that it was necessary to give you any renewed assurance of my adhesion to the Balfour Declaration, and so far I have found no one who is seriously opposing the purpose which it embodies. I was very much taken by surprise that you should deem anything I wrote you discouraging. I see no ground for discouragement and every reason to hope that satisfactory guarantees can be secured.

In haste,

Sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

ENCLOSURE 5 IN No. 180

*Mr. Frankfurter to President Wilson*

My dear Mr. President,

May 20, 1919

I wish I could convey to you the feeling of relief and contentment that your letter of generous reassurance that the Balfour Declaration will eventuate into effective guarantees, has aroused. We are very grateful indeed.

May I ask you to have word sent me that I may show the letter to all those who are interested—not to be published of course—and that I may cable its contents to Mr. Justice Brandeis?<sup>6</sup>

Faithfully yours,<sup>3</sup>

ENCLOSURE 6 IN No. 180

*Mr. Close to Mr. Frankfurter*

My dear Mr. Frankfurter,

PARIS, 21 May, 1919

The President asks me to say in reply to your note of May 20<sup>7</sup> that he is entirely willing that you should show his letter to those who are interested and use it in the way that you suggest.

Sincerely yours,

GILBERT F. CLOSE

Confidential Secretary to the President

<sup>5</sup> Enclosure 3 above.

<sup>6</sup> In 1914 Mr. Brandeis had been appointed Chairman of the American Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> Enclosure 5 above.

No. 181

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 2)*

*No. E.A. 2491 Telegraphic [82973/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 1, 1919

Have seen Picot<sup>1</sup> to-day. He tells me Syria is being divided without reference to Feisal and that American Commission is only coming out to keep Feisal in the dark while partition of Syria is being arranged. This Picot professes to know for certain from French official sources. He and I agree that if true, this is a dangerous game to play. If Feisal finds that the fate of Syria has been decided without his knowledge and before Commission has made its report he will undoubtedly take hostile action.

M. Picot also tells me while he was in Paris it was decided not to send an international Commission to Syria and Palestine.

If this is true I would suggest that I ought to have been so informed by you.

<sup>1</sup> M. Picot was then head of the civil administration of Occupied Enemy Territory (West).

No. 182

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 17)*

*No. CPO. 93/2 [89850/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 5, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward copies of reports rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis, Deputy Chief Political Officer at Damascus.

These reports give a clear appreciation of the political situation and they may be taken to be accurate, as Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis enjoys to an exceptional degree the confidence of Emir Feisal and of the Arabs in general.

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON,  
Chief Political Officer,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 182

*Report by British Liaison Officer on Political Situation in Arabia*

No. 24

DAMASCUS, May 16, 1919

The visit of the Commander-in-chief on the 12th instant was given a political significance, and every effort was made to render it a success.

Organised bands of school-children and patriots wandered about the town during the day demanding independence, and a large crowd gathered round the Emir's house after lunch to honour the Commander-in-chief. Sheikh Abdel Kader-el-Muzghar started to make a speech but had to be stopped in mid-career. The demonstrations were all arranged by the police, no doubt under the orders of the Emir.

2. During the week there have been many political meetings and gatherings. Deputations have come in from all parts of the country to welcome Feisal and are being entertained at Government expense. The most important meeting was held on Wednesday<sup>1</sup> afternoon. The official account of this is attached (Appendix A). By it, Feisal stands pledged to the independence programme and has received full powers from the notables. This gives him no new official standing since the notables had no mandates from their communities, but it is another proof that he stands very high in popular favour at present. The Pan-Syrian Conference, to which he refers in his speech, was to have been held with the object of bringing about a *coup d'état* by the immediate declaration of complete independence without reference to the Peace Conference, and of discussing the form of Government to be set up. The Commander-in-chief, however, disapproved the idea which has been abandoned.

3. The 'Nadi-el-Arab' has affixed a notice to its club-room stating that as the club is scientific and social, politics must not be discussed inside the building, and no more political meetings will be held. This is a 'camouflage.' Feisal realises that the club has fallen into political disrepute and can be of no further use to him, and he has, therefore, dissolved both the 'Hizb-el-Istiklal' and the 'Ittihad-es-Suri,' and stated that there will be no more political societies in O.E.T.<sup>2</sup> East. He knows, however, that it would be easier to dam the Falls of Niagara than to stop the Syrians from talking politics, and he will, therefore, allow discussions to continue in the houses of members. His policy is to bring the Extremists into line and to prevent the creation of an opposition party, and he claims to know everything which is going on. There is no doubt that he does, and he certainly has been very successful so far. The politicians are said to be bickering a good deal amongst themselves.

Feisal has taken the whole of the political campaign into his own hands, and has already sent instructions to all parts of the country. These instructions will be communicated to the people by Government officials, who, no doubt, will be used for political purposes much more openly than before. The people have been told to ask for complete independence for Syria, and, at the same time, to express a hope that it will be granted to other Arab countries. By this compromise Feisal has reconciled the 'Ittihad-es-Suri,' which thinks only of Syria, with the pan-Arab empire enthusiasts represented in the 'Istikhāl[sic]-el-Arabi.'

Since the dissemination of these instructions he and the local politicians have been greatly perturbed by a letter received from Rustum Bey Haidar, the Arab representative in Paris, saying that it will be fatal to ask for complete independence, as the Powers have decided that there must be a mandate. People have been flocking round to ask whether Great Britain will accept the mandate if one is insisted on, and have taken no comfort either from evasive answers or advice to be honest and ask for what they really want. Several proposals are under discussion—to ask alternatively for British,

<sup>1</sup> May 14, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Occupied Enemy Territory.

American, or joint Allied control (Great Britain, France, and America)—but they vary from day to day.

The politicians have only two convictions; firstly, that they want independence, and secondly that they do not want France. Anti-French feeling is surprisingly strong amongst the people who count, and it is very doubtful whether Feisal would be permitted to bring about a 'rapprochement' even if he wanted to. Unless he is exceptionally untruthful, this is far from being his intention, but he will find it hard to keep up the deceitful game he is playing, especially as M. Picot has returned and may reasonably expect to see some visible results of the Clemenceau-Feisal agreement.<sup>3</sup> In any case, he cannot keep up the farce after the arrival of the Commission, since he intends to say quite frankly that fear of the French has forced him into his complete independence campaign, and that he would be willing to accept a British mandate at any time. Both he and his followers realise their weaknesses, and are frightened at what may happen if they are left alone. They are at present in a state of complete indecision, fearful lest the course they have taken is the wrong one, doubtful whether they can or should draw back, distrustful of our intention to help though recognising our general sympathy.

4. Feisal is beginning to realise the difficulties which he will have in reconciling the Palestinians and Zionists, and no longer treats the question as a minor one. He has abandoned his idea of having a conference here, but intends to ask various notables to visit him separately and endeavour to convert them. He will also try to induce the Zionist Commission to moderate its demands, and will probably propose a conference to the Peace Commission.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. the Clemenceau-Feisal negotiations in Paris: cf. Introductory Note. In this connexion the following report by General Clayton had been transmitted to the Foreign Office in telegram No. E.A. 2457 of May 21, 1919, from G.H.Q., Cairo (received May 24): 'I had interview with Feisal yesterday and today. He raised the question of his policy towards the French.'

'He informed me that on the advice of Lawrence he had agreed verbally with Clemenceau to use his efforts with the people to secure a French mandate for Syria on the understanding that France recognised Syrian independence. Feisal stated frankly that he had never any intention of carrying out this arrangement and that Syria was bitterly opposed to French penetration in any form whatever. He said that Great Britain would be welcomed as mandatory Power but that he was unable to ask for a British mandate as he could not ascertain whether or not Great Britain would accept a mandate if offered.'

'He had asked the Prime Minister this question but had received no direct reply. Feisal was obviously nervous as to the result of such an underhand policy towards the French and asked for my advice. I told him that in my opinion a policy of intrigue and deception would only recoil upon himself and might easily endanger Franco-British relations and as a consequence the relations between Great Britain and the Arabs.'

'Feisal has now decided to await the arrival of the Peace Conference Commission and to ask definitely for the following:

'1. The independence [? of Syria] as the ruling principle of any mandate which the Peace Conference may decide to give.'

'2. Advice and assistance to the Syrian State to be given by Great Britain; should they refuse by America; if America refuses, by Great Britain, America and France; in no case by France alone (?). This is in accordance with the impressions I have gained when (?) in Damascus on) May 12.'

Meanwhile Palestinians here are as vehement as before, and Mohamed-es-Saleh-el-Husseini, of Nablus, has been advocating the defence of Arab independence in Palestine by the sword. Abdel Kader-el-Muzghar, also, does not allow his opinions to mellow with time. There was a meeting yesterday in honour of Feisal, at which the speeches aimed at independence and inclusion in the Syrian State. They were censored beforehand, and contained nothing very objectionable.

5. M. Kasbani, a Syrian cotton merchant from Manchester, and recently secretary-general of the Hejaz Delegation at the Peace Conference, has just arrived. He will act as liaison officer between Feisal and the Peace Commission. He has brought with him notes for a draft Syrian constitution.

6. Feisal has given his different heads of departments much greater freedom, and told them to refer direct to him on all important matters. This reduces the Chief Administrator to a position of complete inferiority, and Feisal hopes that Ali Riza will resign. He realises Ali Riza's incapacity, but, always inclined to take the line of least resistance in personal matters, does not wish to offend him by dismissal.

Sherif Jemil, the first cousin of Feisal, is being sent to the Hauran as Mutessarif.<sup>4</sup> In this connection, Feisal is sending instructions to all Governors, telling them to rely on the advice of political officers, and to consult them more freely than they have hitherto done. He has summoned the chief Sheikhs of the Hauran—settled and Bedu—and is going to try and come to a workable understanding in conference.

The Druses are also discussing their future Government with him.

7. Feisal asked the Commander-in-chief for approval and equipment for an army of 14,000, and was told to submit a case. His real object is undoubtedly to form a nucleus with which to fight the French if the necessity arises. He has already begun a spirited recruiting campaign in the press and elsewhere, and was the first to enrol himself as a private soldier in the new national army. The proposal will fall thoroughly flat amongst the people, who only want to be left in peace and quiet. He has been told that he cannot conscript, but he intends to bring to bear what he calls 'moral suasion.' It will be wise not to enquire into the details of this.

His immediate task is to bring to efficiency the brigade which was approved some time ago, and to ensure this he will probably ask the Commander-in-Chief for the loan of British officers for the cavalry, French for the artillery, and American for the infantry.

8. An emissary has come in from Ibn Rashid<sup>5</sup> with a letter addressed to the British Military Governor and Sherif Feisal, proposing a reconciliation, and professing a readiness to obey orders. The emissary is an ordinary Bedouin and has little news of importance.

H. CORNWALLIS,  
Lieutenant-Colonel, D.C.P.O.

<sup>4</sup> Governor of a Sanjak.

<sup>5</sup> Arab ruler of Hayil.

*Note.—M. Picot has expressed his approval of Said Pasha Shoucair<sup>6</sup> coming here to take over the finance. I have therefore wired to him to report at once.*

**ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 182**

**APPENDIX A**

*Emir Feisal's Address to the Notables of Syria in the Town Hall of Damascus,  
the 9 May, 1919, at 3 p.m.*

The direct cause of the war against the Turks was to save the Arabs from the results of a war in which the Turks and their Allies were not expected to succeed.

Then after he had spoken about the war, the preliminary treaties made by his father, King Hussein, with some European nations, and of the good effects of the war, he spoke about his experiences in Europe. He said that people in Europe were ignorant of the present condition of the Arabs, and thought them to be still those savage ignorant nomadic tribes about whom they read in old books of history and legend. This gave me great difficulty in convincing them that the Arabs were one single nation, living in one country bounded by three seas from the south, east, and west, and by the Taurus range from the north.

When the Allies were better enlightened on the present conditions of the Arabs and understood their national hopes and wishes, and appreciated the great service they rendered to the Allies in this war, they agreed in principle to give them their independence. They also decided to send an international commission to make a thorough study of the character and condition of the Arabs.

In the Conference I spoke on two points:—

1. The indivisibility of the Arab country and that the Arab nation demands its absolute independence.

2. Owing to the difference in habits and in the degree of education and civilisation of the different parts of the countries, and to the difficulties in the lines of communication amongst them, I asked that El-Hedjaz, Syria, and El-Irak, should each have an independent Government by itself, but all united within the great union of Arab countries. Moreover, Nejd and the smaller parts of Arabia will be attached to the Hedjaz.

I spoke and I asked that the independence of El-Irak and of Syria should not be sold for the little help she needs from the outside, but Syria should be allowed to buy that help for what it is worth.

The little opposition that I experienced at first was caused partly by misunderstanding and partly by ignorance of what the Arabs wanted. The Europeans thought that the troubles that commonly took place in the country were the fault of the Arabs, and expressed their apprehension of our renewing such troubles, but when it was explained to them that the Turks

<sup>6</sup> An official of Syrian origin temporarily seconded from the Financial Department of the Sudan Government.

were the cause of all the troubles in Syria, they agreed in principle to all that you asked, and the Inter-Allied Commission will soon arrive and will ask you to express freely your wishes with regard to the future of your country. In the League of Nations, which was formed to guarantee the peace of the world, the Arab nation will have one delegate. After its return to Europe, the Inter-Allied Commission will give a report of the demands of each of the nations liberated from the Turks, and it is according to these reports that the Peace Conference will decide the future of these countries. Thanks to our Allies, our foreign duty has already been accomplished, and it now remains to you to choose to be either slaves or masters of your destiny.

Before I tell you what we ought to do, I will say that so far we have done all without taking the opinion of the nation to see if they approve of our work or not. This was not done, because we had no time or chance of doing it; but now I take the opportunity of your presence here to ask you some questions, Gentlemen; though you are not elected to represent your people, your place in society and moral standing with regard to your people make you worthy of making an effective representation. Now please hear the questions, and give your answers to them:

'Do you approve of all that we have done?'

'Yes, good.' (Great applause.)

'Are these deeds satisfactory to the people?'

'Quite satisfactory.' (Great acclamations.)

'Is what we have done in conformity with the wishes of the nation?'

'Quite so; exactly.' (Great applause.)

'Now these are our past deeds, and as you are present I have to ask your personal opinion whether you want us to go on with our work or not?'

'We shall go on, we shall go on.' (Strong applause.)

'Does the nation depend upon the one that is pleading her cause?'

'With all good-will and confidence.'

'Now listen to what I have to say: Does the nation permit me to handle her internal and foreign affairs, or not?'

'Yes, yes.' ('Long live Feisal.')

'I thank you, Gentlemen, for your confidence in me and for your satisfaction with my deeds. You know that a lawyer cannot defend the rights of people unless he has official documents which he can present to the authorities, proving him to be a true representative of the defendant; so it is with politicians. They have to be appointed by those they say that they represent, and should be given power in all the matters whose discussion may take place. Now I have to ask the nation this question: Does the nation back me in speech and in action in all that I do in the country and outside; and does the nation give me all that I ask for without objection or discussion?'

'Yes, yes; yours is the command.'

'That is what I want, and these are the essential points that are needed by the man or men who are authorised to deal with the political problems till the time when the Syrian Congress is held. To be able to work I wanted to have this authorisation; I asked it from you and you gave it to me, so now I ask

God to lend His helping hand to me in my struggle for the welfare of this country.

'Gentlemen, be wise and cautious, and do not say that the nations have given you your independence thus sitting still and neglecting your duty towards your country. Gentlemen, it is you who decide the future of your homeland by saying in one voice that you want it, and proving to the nation that you are fit for it.'

'I say that because of the great welcome of the nation for me, which will make me expect from her very strong backing in action whenever I ask that from her.'

'What I asked from you to-day is short and summarised, simply because I do not know what I need in the future; but after I have got the approval of this honourable assembly, I shall ask the nation to back me physically and morally.'

Sad-ed-Din El-Khalil, one of the representatives of the Hauran, said: 'The Hauran offers to his Highness all that he asks.'

A delegate from Palestine said: 'The blood and the property of the Palestinians are yours.'

A delegate of the Amiriyan (Arabs) said: 'We are equipped for war; we and all the Arabs are under your orders. The one who is killed let him die.'

Emir Feisal: 'Please stop and let the delegates of each district choose one to speak for them.'

Then the delegates of the different districts began to rise in turn and show their approval of his work, and give him the authorisation to work as he sees fit for the welfare of Syria.

Their exact words were as follows:—

The Hauran delegate said: 'The Hauran offers to his Highness all that he asks.'

Nouri Pasha Shalan (head of the Rowala Arabs) said: 'We, the Arabs, our families, and our hair-tents are under your orders, and the one who does not obey leaves the Moslem Faith.'

Nasib Bey Atrash (Druze chief from the Hauran): 'All the tribes in Syria, whether Arabs or Druzes, sacrifice their lives in your service and the service of the Arab nation, and the one who does not do this has no honour, and is a traitor to the Arabs.'

Sheikh Abd-el-Hussein Sadik (Jebel Amil): 'In the name of the inhabitants of Jebel Amil, I consider you my sovereign, even to death' (this is the translation of one Arabic word which people said to the Khalifs on their becoming Khalifs. It is a sort of appointment of the Khalif and a vow of allegiance to him).

Emir Feisal: 'It is not time for it yet; we are now in Damascus and I want to ask the people of Damascus, and then the other districts of Syria.'

Mohammed Fauzi Pasha-el-Azm, Mohammed Abdul Kheir Effendi Abdeen and Sheikh Asad-el-Salib of Damascus, said: 'Ready to accomplish your orders, we sacrifice ourselves for you and lay all confidence in you as our representative.'

Catholic Patriarch: 'Just as your Highness orders—so please order what you want.'

Then his Highness asked the Greek Orthodox Patriarch who answered: 'We came to an agreement in this very room under conditions that your Highness still has in memory, and I stick to that.'

The Catholic Patriarch again: 'I say just as my colleague, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, has just intimated.'

This was also repeated by the Mutran<sup>7</sup> of Syrian Catholic Church.

Said Pasha Suleiman of Baalbek: 'All the inhabitants of the Kaza Baalbek are at your service: hundreds and thousands awaiting your orders.'

Omar Bey-el-Atasi of Homs: 'I only said farewell to the people of Homs after they had entrusted me with the power to represent them. They hand to you their blood and lives.'

Ibrahim Effendi-el-Khateeb (Southern Lebanon): 'We choose you as our Sultan.' (Emir Feisal, smiling: 'Leave that aside now'.) 'Mount Lebanon is at part [sic] to complete Syria and would not be separated from it.'

Abd-el-Kadar Effendi Kilani of Hama: 'We agree with you with our lives and property, and lay all confidence in you.'

Sheikh Riza Rifaii of Aleppo: 'All the inhabitants of Aleppo, citizens, and nomads, lay confidence in your Highness.'

Shawkal Effendi-el-Hirabi of Ma'ama: '60,000 of the district of Ma'ama lay confidence in you.'

Sheikh Abu-el-Medj El-Mograbi of Tripoli: 'The nation sacrifices her life and possessions for you.'

Riza Bey Suh of Beirut: 'The Arabic nation lays confidence in your Highness.'

Riaz [sic] Bey Suh of Sidon: 'The hopes of the nation are attached to your Highness; the nation sacrifices her blood and soul for you, and from this minute I volunteer as a simple soldier.'

A Jarkas young man from Amman: 'We sacrifice our children and possessions for the good of the Arab nation.'

Mauh Effendi, Haroun of Sathikiya: 'A friend of mine and myself were sent from Sathikiya with documents in our hands that enable us to speak for their loyalty and to lay confidence in your Highness to do what you think good for the country.'

Adib Effendi, Wibbeh of Salt: 'The inhabitants of Es Salt are the servants of your Highness. They sacrifice their lives and blood for you.'

Emir Asad-el-Ayoubi of Lebanon: 'We give your Highness full authority to work for absolute independence.'

Mustapha Bey Awad, on behalf of the Druzes of Lebanon: 'Everything that you see good is good and we give you our full confidence.'

Abd-el-Razala Effendi, El-Daudashly of Husn-el-Akrad: 'The inhabitants of Husn-el-Akrad, who form one-fifth of the inhabitants of El-Eutasarrifa of Tripoli, authorise your Highness to represent them, and they pour their blood for you.'

<sup>7</sup> Bishop of the Syrian Catholic Church.

The Religious Head of the Jews: 'Our possessions and souls are in your hands.'

Emir Feisal: 'I have got what I wanted.'

Then the Mutran of the Armenian refugees spoke in Turkish thanking the Arabs for their good treatment to the Armenian refugees during the four years of war, and said that in their history the name of the Arabs shall be written in letters of gold, so now I thank and congratulate you [*sic*].

After hearing what the delegates said Emir Feisal continued his speech, saying:—

'There is no doubt that after I have received this authorisation from this honourable assembly I shall continue my work as before till the meeting of the Syrian Congress, which will formulate the laws for all Syria.'

'I shall tell you now my personal opinion as regards the Government of this country, aiming by this at an explanation of the situation to the people, and a tranquillization of their minds without regard to religion or creed. I think that more attention should be paid to the votes of the minority, thus to efface the hatred and religious faction created by the Turks, and to sow in its place the seeds of love and of fraternity amongst the members of the different religions. I also think of dividing the country into parts according to its geographical location and to its attainments and habits, so that the southern part of Syria will not be governed like the northern part, and the Hauran and Jebel Druse will have special laws, which will be in conformity with the wishes of the people. So also we shall have for the coast and for the interior of the country. This, as I have said, is my personal opinion, but without doubt it will effect [? affect] the public, and we will do according to it.'

'For the attainment of the cherished independence please depend on God first and then on my humble person, and be sure that I will have no difference between the members of the different religious sects.'

'I have no distinction between the members of the different sects, and I only look to degrees of education and promote the one who is fit only, never asking whose son he is or to what religious sect he belongs. In private affairs we should respect people of noted families, but we should not give them responsible posts unless they are fit for them, and then it is their education and character that gives them the post. We should not play with the Government posts because they are not ours but the nation's property, and the holders thereof are the trustees of the rights of the nation.'

'I beseech you, sons of the nation, to depend and trust in our Allies who helped us, and who wish us good success and have no ambitions but to help us to progress. So we ought to prove to them that we are an energetic nation that wants her independence.'

'Show them that we protect our neighbours and refugees, that we help our old and young, and that we respect those of their number who come to us and work for us in this dear country of ours.'

'I beg this especially from you because this is the only foundation on which we can build our future work, and I also beg from you to unite for the common cause, a thing which it is as much your duty as it is mine and to work towards

it. I tell you that you will have no independence unless you keep the peace and do exactly as I tell you.'

A few words as an excuse for the long speech and the faults made therein ended his address.

(For Lieutenant-Colonel, D.C.P.O.),

G. R. HUNTER

May 12, 1919.

Captain.

### No. 183

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 20)*

*No. C.P.O. 107/5 [91480/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 8, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour, in continuation of my telegram No. C. 155<sup>1</sup> of the

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (received May 5) General Clayton had reported:

'With reference to pending visit of a Commission to Palestine Chief Administrator reports as follows:

'Begins: In the present state of political feeling there is no doubt that if Zionist's programme is a necessary adjunct to a mandatory the people of Palestine will select in preference the United States or France as the mandatory Power or as the protecting Power of an Arab administration.

'By Zionist programme I do not mean the interpretation of certain extreme Zionists but the comparatively moderate programme presented to the Peace Conference.

'The Palestinians desire their country for themselves and will resist any general immigration of Jews, however gradual, by every means in their power including active hostilities.

'The people of Palestine think Great Britain is more systematically committed to the Zionist programme than either the United States or France, and both Arab and (? French) propaganda have been actively engaged during last few months in fostering this view.

'India and Egypt are quoted as example of the tenacity of Great Britain's hold on countries on which she once lays her hand. More speedy autonomy is expected from United States. Moreover recent events in Egypt have greatly impressed the people of Palestine.

'Nevertheless fear of Zionism by Moslems and Christians is the main issue, and if this were removed a large majority would vote for a British mandate. As long as this fear exists it will be impossible for the Commission to gauge the real wishes of the people which will appear to be against the British mandate.

'If a clear and unbiased expression of wishes is required and if a mandate for Great Britain is desired by His Majesty's Government it will be necessary to make an authoritative announcement that the Zionist programme will not be enforced in opposition to the wishes of the majority. In conclusion, the idea that Great Britain is the main upholder of the Zionist programme will preclude any local request for a British mandate and no mandatory Power can carry through Zionist programme except by force and in expressing [? opposition to] the wishes of the large majority of the people of Palestine. Ends.

'I consider above a true appreciation of the situation. Fear and distrust of Zionist aims grow daily and no amount of persuasion or propaganda will dispel it.

'There was recently danger of serious disturbance in which Arabs from east of Jordan were to take part. At present the situation has been calmed by news of impending Commission.

'Political officer east of Jordan reports violent anti-Jewish sentiment and open threats of active hostility.

'A British mandate for Palestine on the lines of the Zionist programme will mean the indefinite retention in the country of a military force considerably greater than that now in Palestine.'

2nd May 1919 to forward herewith a copy of a memorandum received from the Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory (South), reiterating the importance which is attached by the whole population of Palestine to the Peace Conference Commission which is now about to arrive in this country.<sup>2</sup>

I have recently returned from a tour throughout Syria and I am able to assert that the feeling in Syria is equally strong to that which the Chief Administrator finds universal in Palestine.

The fact that the Commission is now only composed of American Delegates may not of itself have any bad effect. On the contrary, it is conceivable that the leaders of the people may feel themselves more free to express their real feelings, being unembarrassed by any fear of offending either Great Britain or France, both of whom they consider to be interested parties.

On the other hand, if any idea gets abroad that the Commission is not an authoritative one whose recommendations will be considered seriously by the Peace Conference,<sup>3</sup> or that the decision has already been reached in principle and that the arrival of the Commission is merely a matter of form, there is little doubt that a grave situation will arise.

Public opinion throughout Syria and Palestine is united in opposition to any arbitrary division of what they hold to be Arab Territories, and if the issues are decided before they have had an opportunity of stating their case they will regard it as a complete negation of—

- (A) Principles initiated in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- (B) The principle of the self-determination of peoples so often upheld by the leading Statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers.
- (C) The specific declaration made by Great Britain and France in November 1918.<sup>4</sup>

The present unsettled and anxious state of Moslem opinion throughout the world, owing to the approaching dissolution of Turkey and the consequent collapse of the temporal power of the Caliphate, is already being exploited by interested agitators and intriguers throughout the Middle East. Although

<sup>2</sup> The above-mentioned memorandum from General A. W. Money, dated at Jerusalem, May 31, 1919, was as here indicated and is not printed. The memorandum referred to 'rumours that are prevalent that the proposal to send the Commission is being opposed both by the French and the Zionists, as being inimical to their respective interests'. After referring to the considerable quantity of arms retained by the population of Occupied Enemy Territories South and East, General Money observed: 'Trouble in Palestine, which has by no means an excessive garrison of troops, would have the effect of again delaying the demobilization of the army, and putting back for a considerable number of years the progress which has been gained under British occupation.'

<sup>3</sup> In this connexion General Clayton had in his telegram No. E.A. 2504 of June 7 to the War Office and to the Foreign Office (received June 7) referred to No. 177, and requested that he might announce 'that the Peace Conference and not only His Majesty's Government will attach fullest weight to their [the American commissioners'] advice to the Council of Allied and Associated Powers. Unless I can give this assurance I consider it inadvisable to make any announcement at all.'

<sup>4</sup> See Introductory Note. (General Clayton had transmitted the substance of the above three-point consideration in his telegram No. E.A. 2508 of June 7 to the War Office and to the Foreign Office, received June 8.)

local political problems occupy the most prominent position at present in the minds of the inhabitants of the various areas, disappointment and disillusionment will render them still more accessible to enemy propaganda and violent local disturbances may combine into a general Anti-Christian and Anti-Foreign Movement.

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON.

## No. 184

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 876 [88743/2117/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 11, 1919

My Lord,

After an absence of a fortnight, the French Ambassador, who had again been to Paris in the interval, resumed his conversations with me this afternoon.

On the occasion of our last interview he had expatiated upon the differences that had arisen in the Council of Three or Four in Paris concerning the future of Syria, which had produced such strong feeling between the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> He now came to explain to me that an even more regrettable situation had arisen out of the proposal of the British representatives to modify at the eleventh hour the terms of the peace proposals to Germany. . . .<sup>2</sup>

If there was any region, I said, in which France had good cause to be grateful for our support, it was in Syria itself. Not only had Mr. Lloyd George in the Councils of Paris openly declared that Great Britain neither desired nor would accept, if it were offered to her, a mandate for Syria, but we had actually telegraphed an intimation to the same effect to the Emir Feisal.<sup>3</sup> Our policy, therefore, was aboveboard and known. If difficulties remained, they were not so much between the French and ourselves as between the French and the Arabs, who, according to my information, appeared exceedingly reluctant to accept France as a mandatory. Of all the French representatives in those regions, the one who had received most encouragement and assistance from us was M. Picot, the joint author of the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. This gentleman had on many occasions turned to us for aid. He had been taken, under the protection of the late Sir Mark Sykes, to Aleppo and Damascus. Every effort had been made by our representatives to secure him a good reception and a friendly hearing from the Arab and Syrian population. M. Picot indeed owed his entire position to ourselves. I was therefore very much surprised when I read that

<sup>1</sup> See No. 173.

<sup>2</sup> The conversation turned to other matters (not printed). For the British proposal referred to by M. Cambon, cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 139 f.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 206.

he had, on the 13th May, in a speech to the school teachers of Beirut, expressed himself as follows:—

'A people once asked the French to help them to gain their independence. The French responded and within a year the desired end was achieved. These people were the Americans and the country from which they were freed was Great Britain. Having appreciated the help given, the Americans asked what reward they could give. "Have your independence, that is the only reward we seek," said the French. The same attitude is now held towards Syria. To see you independent is what we long for. You have my assurance that France will help you to this end.'

Having read this extract to the Ambassador, I said that I thought the Syrians would be greatly surprised to learn that it was to the French that they must look for their independence. But, putting that aside, the suggestion that it was from Great Britain that this independence was in danger, and that the French were appearing upon the scene as the emancipators of Syria from the British yoke, appeared to me to be an astonishing travesty of the facts.

The Ambassador sought to make little of the American analogy, and enlarged upon the French desire to secure and protect the independence of Syria. But neither in this case nor in those that I had mentioned previously did he seriously contest my proposition that these incidents were much to be regretted, and, in concluding our conversation, he promised to take an early opportunity of bringing them to the attention of the French Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

### No. 185

*General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 20)*

*No. E.A. 2529 Telegraphic [91666/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 12, 1919

I have received the following from Feisal from Aleppo. Begins:—

Will Your Excellency very kindly find out from Commission or elsewhere whether League of Nations is prepared to put into force recommendations made by Commission and whether Commission is authorized to recommend the giving of Mandate to any power wanted by great majority of population. Unless this be known the people of Syria will be severely handicapped in approaching Commission. If they ask for Britain and Great Britain is unable to take mandate they will run grave risks of getting power which is only desired by very small minority as it will be only (?) other competing. If they knew Britain is not to be available they can inform Commission accordingly that is to say the vast majority of Syrians want Great Britain. Failing that they wish for complete independence although they well know difficulties and dangers of latter course but they prefer them to France. If they knew England was not going to accept a mandate and League would not allow complete independence Syria would ask for America in preference to France.

Your Excellency can well understand although these are real sentiments of people it is quite impossible for all these alternatives to be appointed [*sic*] and sufficiently clearly expressed by people for Commission to be justified in afterwards making really confident recommendations to League. It is only fair to Syria that it should know what is possible and what is impossible. The only result of keeping Syria in the dark will be a (? mixed) opinion, some asking for England, some for America, some for France and some for complete independence, and Commission might then report that opinion is so divided that France will be as acceptable as any other Power. This Your Excellency well knows will be a complete misunderstanding of situation. I beg you in fairness to the country you have liberated to help it to obtain what it now wants for its future peace and development. I have been told that Commission is only a show and that fate of country has been already decided. I feel sure this is incorrect but at this crisis in history of Syria a clear pronouncement (on) that point is of greatest importance.

Besides communicating them to me will Your Excellency be pleased to issue answers to these questions in as public a manner as possible to enable Syria to state its mind to commission with freedom and confidence.

If you approve I should like to meet Commission myself at earliest date possible. Can this very kindly be arranged? I await Your Excellency's answer by telegraph at Aleppo.

Please accept my humblest apologies for giving Your Excellency this trouble. Ends.

I have replied as follows. Begins: Following for Feisal from Commander-in-Chief. The Commission will advise Council of Allied and Associated Powers as to wishes of people with regard to future form of Government or mandate.

His Majesty's Government have expressed unwillingness to accept a mandate for Syria but will give fullest weight to advice of Commission in the Council of Allied and Associated Powers.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has not yet seen Commission which landed in Jaffa on 10th but Clayton is with Commission in Palestine. He returns probably tomorrow and will then be able to report programme and itinerary of Commission. You will be informed when Commission visits Syria and when and where you will be able to meet it. Ends.

#### No. 186

*Earl Curzon to General Clayton (Cairo)*

*No. 194 Telegraphic [82090/801/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 13, 1919

Zionist Organization have asked assistance of Treasury to enable large funds locked up in Eastern Europe and Siberia to be made available for use in Palestine.

Do you think projects for this purpose should be encouraged in present circumstances?

No. 187

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 23)*

*No. E.A. 2536 Telegraphic [92879/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 15, 1919

Addressed to War Office, repeated to Foreign Office.

Reference my E 2529<sup>1</sup> of June 12.

I have received following from Feisal in reply.

Begins: June 14. *Confidential*.

Telegram received. I have noted Great Britain's expression of unwillingness to take mandate for Syria. Its intention to give the fullest weight to advice of Peace Commission however is cheerfully understood by us all. The Syrians will be unanimous in expressing to Commission their wish to have Britain and no other, for reasons I am going to set before a Conference to be held shortly at Damascus, comprised of Delegations from every part of Syria strongly backed by Syrian public opinion. I wish to inform Your Excellency of all this, hoping that this national feeling of mutual love and esteem and confidence will last for ever, profoundly trusting British honour will never permit those who pray for its assistance to be thrown away into strange arms. (Ends.)

<sup>1</sup> No. 185.

No. 188

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 17)*

*No. 1053 Telegraphic [89531/2117/44]*

PARIS, June 16, 1919

Referring to telegram from Chief of Egyptian Force E.A. 2504<sup>1</sup> of June 7 repeated to me in your telegram No. 829<sup>2</sup> the French would presumably not agree to any such announcement. The most that His Majesty's Government can do is to inform French, Italian and United States Governments that it is intention of British Government to give fullest weight to the views of American commission and this has already been done, see last sentence of my telegram No. 48<sup>3</sup> to Cairo.

Repeated to Cairo.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 183, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> No. 177.

No. 189

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Clayton (Cairo)*

*No. 22 Telegraphic [371/5/5/12888]*

PARIS, June 16, 1919

Zionist Organisation of America are sending out Messrs. Julius Fohs, late assistant State Geologist of Kentucky, and William Foster to conduct investigations in Palestine with reference to oil and minerals. Organisation

state their investigations will be strictly confidential and exclusively for use of Zionist Organisation, and ask that necessary facilities may be given to them. They leave June 17.

No. 190

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Lord Hardinge (Received June 25)*

*No. 605 Telegraphic [89806/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 17, 1919

Your telegram 20014<sup>1</sup> of June 14.

Captain Yale is now working with Commission.<sup>2</sup> His connection with Standard Oil Company is known to us and will not be lost sight of.

<sup>1</sup> This was probably a private telegram and is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> The American King-Crane Mission.

No. 191

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 58 Telegraphic [375/2/7/13144]*

PARIS, June 18, 1919

Dr. Weizmann has asked that following message may be delivered to Friedenwald, Zionist Commission, Jaffa, through General Clayton.

'Present our case before American Commissioners with firmness, moderation and dignity on lines submitted by us to Peace Conference. Inform them our co-operation with Feysal and our desire to work harmoniously with Arab population for good of Palestine. Draw their attention to achievements Jewish Colonisation under difficult circumstances and great possibilities now when greatest majority Jewish people all over world resolutely supports Zionist aims and considerable numbers waiting first opportunity settle Palestine. Wire position. Weizmann.'

No. 192

*Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis (Cairo)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 52/129/6781 [98096/2117/44]*

CAIRO

M. Picot had a long conversation with Sherif Feisal on the 18th inst.<sup>2</sup> of which the latter gave me the following account.

M. Picot began by complaining of the propagandist activities of Anti-French Damascenes in O.E.T. West and in particular cited the instance of Iskander Bey Ammun. Feisal was delighted at the opening and after making the point that such men were patriots and working for what they considered

<sup>1</sup> This undated memorandum of June 1919 was communicated to the Foreign Office by General Clayton on his return to England, and was received on July 4, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> June 1919.

the best interests of their country countered with a long recital of French misbehaviours both in O.E.T.A. West and East. He referred to the activities of Col. Cousse and said that he could produce written proofs that this officer had been intriguing against him amongst the Druzes and others.

Perhaps feeling that he had begun badly M. Picot changed the subject, and said that he had come to talk about the future Syrian State. He stated that he had done his best to create a national government in O.E.T. West, but that the proposal had been disapproved by the Commander in Chief. He claimed, however, that France had fulfilled her part of the bargain in this, and also her having accepted the principle of independence for Syria.

Feisal refused to place the responsibility on the Commander in Chief, saying that he could only judge results, and, as regards the recognition of independence, thanked M. Picot for nothing, since a similar recognition had also been made by Great Britain, America and Italy. What he had asked for and failed to get was a recognition of complete and uncontrolled independence.

He then asked M. Picot why France had failed to fulfil her promise of sending out a Commission. M. Picot replied that she had not done so because conversations were taking place in Paris which rendered its despatch unnecessary. He said that Great Britain was claiming Palestine and a Northern line, which included the Hauran and Jebel Druze, and thence ran East to Mesopotamia, but that France was resisting such a proposal since Feisal was not in Paris to discuss it. He personally had pressed for a Greater Syria which would include Diarbekr and Mosul.

He added that he had been much surprised to hear that the American Mission had issued a statement that it represented the Peace Conference. The fact was that it had been sent out privately by President Wilson, and that its findings would carry no weight at all with the Conference. He intended to correct the error publicly.

Feisal refused to accept this view of the case<sup>3</sup> and said that since France had failed to fulfil her promise to him, and since he had noticed a great change in the feelings of the population since his departure to Paris, he intended to leave the verdict as to their future entirely in their hands, and could therefore not discuss the matter further until after the American Mission had come and gone.

<sup>3</sup> In this connexion the Emir Feisal sent a message to President Wilson in which he reported that M. Picot had informed him that 'he was going to write French Government asking them to deny what the Commission has issued in its circular namely that it is American portion of a Commission sent by Peace Conference. He said also that Commission is sent by Doctor Wilson only. I and all my nation are convinced you are the outstanding figure in world and that you will not allow the Syrian nation to voice its opinion and then see them punished for it revengefully if it is true the future of this country is already settled as the spreaders of these rumours wish. I find it my duty to my country and nation and to you to state facts to you relying on principles of the great American nation. Thus we may all know true state of our situation. I and my nation await a speedy reply.' This message was transmitted in Cairo telegram No. Pol. 646 of June 22 from General Allenby to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

The above is Feisal's version. He is very pleased with himself and considers he has got out of a difficult situation very adroitly.

M. Picot, whom I visited, was very friendly. He still appears to have confidence in Feisal's honesty, but admitted his weakness and powerlessness to carry the country with him. He realised that O.E.T. East would vote almost solidly against France, but considered that there would be no fighting when France came in and that two or three brigades would be sufficient, providing that he was given the authority to act with severity and promptness. He insisted, however, on the necessity of recalling Feisal to Paris before any final decision was made public.

H. CORNWALLIS.

No. 193

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 26)*

*No. 347 Telegraphic [94298/801/44]*

CAIRO, June 19, 1919

Your telegram No. 194<sup>1</sup> June 13. I am not in a position to judge financial desirability of this proposal but until future status of Palestine is decided by Peace Conference there is no opening for investment of large funds in Palestine which is still under a purely military administration.

<sup>1</sup> No. 186.

No. 194

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 26)*

*No. 350 Telegraphic [94307/94307/44]*

CAIRO, June 19, 1919

Telegram No. 22<sup>1</sup> of June 16 from Balfour, Marseilles.<sup>2</sup>

No objection to Messrs. Fohs and Foster visiting Palestine provided they come in private capacity and render copies of any reports they may make to military administration. They will be given the usual (? facilities).

<sup>1</sup> No. 189.

<sup>2</sup> The file copy of this telegram was entered as from Paris. Cf. No. 175, note 5.

No. 195

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27)*

*No. 348 Telegraphic [94476/1051/44]*

CAIRO, June 19, 1919

Your telegram No. 188<sup>1</sup> of June 7.

A draft Ordinance now under consideration provides for re-opening of land transactions on limited scale under official control. The approval of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This brief telegram requested information in connexion with a report by the Zionist Commission 'that land registers for ordinary land transactions are to be reopened shortly under control of administration'.

Military Governors will be necessary in regard to minor transactions and of Chief Administrator in more important cases. The removal or destruction of land records has prevented any land transactions being permitted up to present and this has a serious effect on economic conditions of country. The land records have now been recovered for the most part. No change is proposed in Ottoman law and land tenure and no guarantee of title will be given. Transactions in state domain will not be affected as Ordinance will only affect privately owned land. Zionist interests will be fully safeguarded and the land registry is controlled by the Acting Senior Judicial Officer Colonel Bentwich who is himself a prominent Zionist.

No. 196

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 4)*

*No. C.P.O. 190 [98124/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 19, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 99<sup>1</sup> of the 31 May, transmitting copies of letters from the Marquis Imperiali and Monsieur Pichon to Doctor Sokolow<sup>2</sup> and from President Wilson, to Dr. Wise,<sup>3</sup> together with a copy of a despatch No. 760<sup>4</sup> from Mr. Balfour.

<sup>1</sup> This covering despatch is not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Chairman of the Political Committee of the Zionist Organisation.

<sup>3</sup> Founder and secretary of the U.S. Zionist Federation.

<sup>4</sup> In this despatch of May 19, 1919, from Paris to Lord Curzon (received May 20), Mr. Balfour had referred to General Clayton's Cairo telegram No. C. 155 (see No. 183, note 1) and commented:

'There can of course be no question of making any such announcement as that suggested in paragraph 8 of General Clayton's telegram, and in this connection it might be well to recall to General Clayton that both the French, United States and Italian Governments have approved the policy set forth in my letter to Lord Rothschild of November 2nd, 1917. I would refer in this connection to M. Jules Cambon's letter to M. Sokolov of June 4th, 1914 [1918], and M. Pichon's letter to M. Sokolov of February 14th, 1918, the Marquis Imperiali's letter to M. Sokolov of the 9th May, 1918, enclosed in M. Sokolov's letter of 15th May, 1918, to the Foreign Office, the correspondence with Sir William Wiseman in October 1917 and the President's letter to Rabbi Wise of August 13th, 1918 [not here printed].

'General Clayton will doubtless have opportunities of emphasising the general unity of opinion among the Allies on this matter in responsible quarters in Palestine. In this connection a suggestion has also been made to me by the Director of Military Intelligence here that it might be advisable at this stage to send out to Palestine a further adviser on Zionist matters to assist General Clayton and preferably some representative who has been in Paris during the last few months and understands the different currents of opinion here. Major General Thwaites proposed in this connection Colonel Meinertzhagen, D.S.O., as the most suitable person. I am not quite clear, however, as to the position and functions of Major Waley who has recently been sent to Palestine, as I understand, with the joint concurrence of the Foreign Office and the War Office, but Your Lordship will doubtless take Major General Thwaites' suggestion into consideration, if necessary, consulting General Allenby and General Clayton on the matter.

'In conclusion I venture to suggest that it might be well to show to Major Ormsby Gore and to Mr. Samuel, as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Economic Development in

I am glad to receive copies of these documents which had not hitherto been communicated to me.

I was aware when I despatched my telegrams regarding the situation in Palestine and Syria that both the French, United States and Italian Governments had approved the policy set forth in Mr. Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild of November 2nd 1917 and that there was general unity of opinion among the Allies on this question. This unity of opinion has been emphasized in responsible quarters in Palestine, although I am not sure that local French and Italian representatives have always acted entirely in accordance with the spirit of the declarations made by their respective Governments.

Unity of opinion among the Allied Governments on the subject of Palestine, however, is not a factor which tends to alleviate the dislike of non-Jewish Palestinians to the Zionist Policy. Indeed, it rather leads to still further anxiety on their part to express clearly to the world their own point of view, in the fear that a decision will be forced upon them by the Peace Conference before they have had an opportunity of expressing their aspirations.

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON.

Palestine, a copy of General Clayton's above mentioned telegram with a view to ascertaining whether they have any further proposals to offer as to how the present hostility to Zionism in Palestine can best be allayed by the administrative authorities on the spot.'

### No. 197

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 4010 [86424/2117/44]*

Sir:

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 19, 1919

With reference to your despatch No. 760<sup>1</sup> of 19th May, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of my letter of 31st of May to Mr. Herbert Samuel and of his reply, forwarded by Doctor Weizmann.

I should be glad of Your Excellency's instructions as to what effect, if any, is to be given to Mr. Samuel's suggestions.

I have, &c.

[for Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

W. TYRRELL].<sup>2</sup>

### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 197

*Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. Samuel<sup>3</sup>*

*No. 242 M.E./44*

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 31, 1919

I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that a report<sup>4</sup> has been

<sup>1</sup> See No. 196, note 4. <sup>2</sup> Signature supplied from files of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>3</sup> The text of this letter is supplied from the archives of the British Peace Delegation, file 375/2/7/13393.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 183, note 1 and No. 196, note 4.

received from the Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the effect that if Great Britain holds that the Zionist Programme is a necessary adjunct to the Mandate for Palestine, the people of that country will select, in preference, the United States or France as the mandatory power, or as the protecting power of an Arab administration. The Palestinians, General Clayton continues, desire their country for themselves and will resist any general immigration of Jews, however gradual, by every means in their power, not excluding armed resistance. They apparently consider that Great Britain is more systematically committed to the Zionist Programme than either the United States or France and both Arab and French propaganda are actively fostering this view.

In view of the above report Mr. Balfour has suggested that you should be consulted, as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Economic Development of Palestine with a view to ascertaining whether you have any proposals to offer as to how the present hostility to Zionism in Palestine can best be allayed by the administrative authorities on the spot.

I am, &c.

WILLIAM TYRELL.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 197

*Letter from Dr. Weizmann to Sir W. Tyrrell*

DÉLÉGATION SIONISTE, PARIS, June 6, 1919

Sir:

Mr. Herbert Samuel has asked me to forward to you a copy of the enclosed letter. Mr. Samuel had to leave<sup>5</sup> in a hurry yesterday and he had no time to sign this letter himself. I have forwarded to him the same letter for signature and you will receive it in due course.<sup>6</sup> In the meantime I am sending on this copy to you.

I beg to remain,

Yours faithfully,

CH. WEIZMANN.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 197

*Letter from Mr. Samuel to Sir W. Tyrrell*

PARIS, June 5, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 31st in which you refer to a report received from the Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, on the attitude of the people of Palestine towards the Zionist programme, and in which you ask whether, as Chairman

<sup>5</sup> For Brussels.

<sup>6</sup> This signed copy of the letter was sent to Sir W. Tyrrell by Mr. Samuel under a covering note of June 11, 1919 (received June 20). In this note Mr. Samuel drew attention to 'a few small typing errors which I have corrected in ink' and asked that these corrections might be made in the previous copy of the letter, here printed. Mr. Samuel's corrections to the original text are printed in square brackets.

of the Advisory Committee on the Economic Development of Palestine, I have any proposals to offer as to how the present hostility to Zionism in Palestine can best be allayed by the administrative authorities on the spot.

I have consulted the members of that Committee on the subject and have also come to Paris in order to ascertain the views of Dr. Weizmann and [M.] Sokolow.

The attitude of the administrative authorities in Palestine does not appear to be fully in harmony with that of H.M. Government. It is now a year and a half since Mr. Balfour's declaration was made. No public pronouncement on the subject of Palestine has recently been issued and, from the reports which reach us [me] from various quarters, it would seem that the British administrators in Palestine do not always conduct their relations with the Arabs on the basis that the declaration of November 2nd 1917 embodies the settled lines of British policy.

As a consequence, there would naturally arise among the Arabs a feeling of doubt whether the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine is really a decided issue, and a tendency to believe that if an agitation were set on foot and a threatening attitude adopted on their part, the British Government might well be ready to abandon the intentions it has [had] at first announced. At the same time, distorted views of the nature of the Zionist programme are disseminated among the population by interested persons and have undoubtedly become widespread in Palestine. They give rise to a not unnatural alarm among the people.

I would venture to suggest that H.M. Government should send definite instructions to the local administration to the effect that their policy contemplates the concession to Great Britain of the Mandate for Palestine; that the terms of the Mandate will certainly embody the substance of the Declaration of November 2nd 1917; that in no circumstances with [?will]<sup>7</sup> the Arabs be despoiled of their land or required to leave the country; that there can be no question of the majority being subjected to the rule of the minority and that the Zionist programme does not include any such ideas; that complete religious liberty will be guaranteed to all denominations and that the Christian and Mohammedan Holy Places will remain in the custody of the adherents of these religions. It might be repeated that the American and French Governments are also pledged to favour the establishment in Palestine of the Jewish National Home. The local administrators might be instructed to bring these facts to the attention of the Arab leaders at any convenient opportunity, and to impress upon them that the matter is a *chose jugée* and that continued agitation could only be to the detriment of the country and would certainly be without result. It would probably have a useful effect if any suitable occasion could be taken to add that it is expected that under the new régime very large sums of money will be brought into Palestine for its development and that all classes and races would benefit by the expenditure.

It is of obvious importance that such instructions, if they are issued, should

<sup>7</sup> Editorial insertion.

be executed not only by the heads of the administration but also by their local representatives; the Governor of Jerusalem and of Nablus may be mentioned in particular.

I would submit the further suggestion that an officer, whether civil or military, who has been in close touch with the British Delegation in Paris or with the Foreign Office in London, who is well acquainted with the policy of H.M. Government in relation to Palestine and is personally in sympathy with it, could be sent to Palestine with the special mission of conveying to the local administration, more fully than can be done by correspondence, the views of the Government, and also of endeavouring to influence Arab opinion.

These suggestions have the general concurrence of all those whom I have consulted.

Perhaps I may be allowed to take this opportunity of drawing the attention of the Foreign Office to the vital importance of adding [sic]<sup>7</sup> to the boundaries proposed for Palestine by H.M. Government, which are now the subject of discussion with the French Government. This [The] success of the whole plan for the future of Palestine depends upon the extent to which the country can absorb Jewish immigrants, and this depends upon the development of industry as well as of agriculture. For industrial development motive power is the essential preliminary as is immigration for a full agricultural development. Both of these are conditioned by access to water power and water supply and for this access the northern boundary now proposed is indispensable. Further, for the maintenance of a population in Palestine numerous enough to support the structure of a modern state the fertile territory east of the Jordan proposed to be included within the boundaries, is also essential. I would venture to express the hope, therefore, that no alteration will be admitted in any circumstances, that would prejudice these two vital needs.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) HERBERT SAMUEL.

#### No. 198

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received June 29)*

*No. 351 Telegraphic [95458/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 20, 1919

American Commissioners to Palestine and Syria arrived at Jaffa by sea from Constantinople on June 10. They remained 3 days at Jaffa and then proceeded to Jerusalem. Their proposed programme is as follows:—

Remain Jerusalem and the neighbourhood till June 23rd. Arrive Haifa 24th visiting Nablus on the way. Leave Haifa on the 26th and proceed via Nazareth to Damascus. Arrive there evening of 27th. They will remain four or five days in Damascus and then proceed to Beirut. Further movements not yet decided upon but they expect to complete their Mission and return to Constantinople by July 15th.

General Clayton visited Commissioners at Jaffa. He confined himself to a

general outline of the situation and a description of the method of military administration in Occupied Enemy Territory, avoiding all political questions. British Officers in Administrative and Political Service have been instructed to act on similar lines while affording all possible courtesy and assistance to Commissioners.

Commissioners appear to realise that all sections of population have been awaiting their arrival with eagerness and that the people attach great importance to Commission as only means by which they can make their aspirations known to Peace Conference. Commissioners are therefore making very careful and considered enquiries. Commissioners have signified their wish that no public demonstrations should take place and are wisely making their stay as short as possible consistent with adequate investigation of the problems before them.

Commissioners have issued statement of which following is a paraphrase. Begins.

American people are not anxious to become entangled in Europe or Near East where they have no political ambitions but they recognise that they have responsibilities for just settlements under the League of Nations with a view to securing permanent peace and they are approaching problems before them in this spirit.

Conference had proposed an International Commission to study question of mandates in Turkish Empire. American section is now arrived with a view to ascertaining the desires of all peoples and sections in order that full knowledge may be at the disposal of President Wilson and American people when they are called upon to act in the Peace Conference or subsequently in the League of Nations. (Ends.)

No British officers have been attached to the Commission but Lieutenant Colonel Watson has been charged with all arrangements for their transport and accommodation.

#### No. 199

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 4)*

*No. C.P.O. 311 [98129/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 23, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward a summary of the situation up to date in Syria.

In spite of the impression which appears to prevail in French Government circles that some sort of agreement was arrived at in Paris between M. Clemenceau and Emir Feisal, there seems little doubt that the Emir has in no way changed his attitude of uncompromising opposition to any form of French intervention in Syria.

At a meeting between himself and the Commander-in-Chief in the middle of May<sup>1</sup> he outlined the situation in France at the time of his departure; and,

<sup>1</sup> On the occasion of General Allenby's visit to Damascus on May 12. See No. 182.

even at that time, so little was he affected by any discussions which may have taken place between himself and M. Clemenceau, that he put forward a proposition to assemble selected Syrian representatives with a view to bringing about a *coup d'état* by the immediate declaration of the complete independence of Syria. The Commander-in-Chief forbade any such action, and the idea was therefore dropped.

Emir Feisal then observed that he was unable to ask for Great Britain alone as Mandatory Power, and at the same time forgo the demand for independence, for reasons that:—

- (a) He feared that the French would hear of it and take steps to defeat his plans;
- (b) He was uncertain whether or not Great Britain would accept a mandate, even if offered it by the Peace Conference; and
- (c) He had gone so far in his campaign for independence that it was difficult to make any change at short notice.

He had therefore decided to instruct his people to ask for complete independence for Syria, at the same time expressing the hope that it would be granted to other Arab countries. By this means he would be able to reconcile those who were thinking only of Syria and those who favoured the idea of a great Pan-Arab State. At the same time he proposed to tell the Commission sent out by the Peace Conference that he had been forced into this course for fear of the French, and that he would at any time accept a British mandate.

Emir Feisal added that the French could only enter Syria by force of arms and that he himself felt so strongly on the subject that he would identify himself with active opposition.

As regards Mesopotamia, the Emir felt that an agreement should be made between Great Britain and the Arabs without recourse to the Peace Conference. He hoped that the Arabs would have a semblance of independence in that area, but realised that they must have some sort of control the details of which should be worked out between the two parties concerned. He was anxious that British officials in the Iraq should be answerable, not to India, but to London or, preferably, Egypt.

Towards the end of May Emir Feisal received a telegram from his delegate in Paris<sup>2</sup> stating that the Commission appointed by the Peace Conference was not coming out to Syria. He was greatly distressed at this news, and the result of lengthy interviews between him and the political officers in Damascus are given in the attached Appendix (A). On receiving a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief stating that the American portion of the Commission had already left he was reassured, and the crisis passed off.

There was still some uncertainty in the minds of Emir Feisal and his followers as to the best course to take up before the impending Commission, and Emir Feisal continued to endeavour to obtain a mandate from as many of the local notables as possible, giving him a free hand in his dealings with the Commission. He has approached all communities in this sense, including

<sup>2</sup> See No. 174.

the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the leading chiefs of the Druses in the Hauran.

Some indication of a tendency to look to America was given during the visit of two American journalists to Damascus. The Arab Club took the opportunity of giving a reception in honour of these representatives of the American press, and of expressing appreciation for all that President Wilson and his country had done for the cause of Arab independence.

Lately some rumours seem to have spread abroad that Emir Feisal came to an agreement with the French during his visit to Europe, and there are reports of feeling against him owing to a suspicion that he has been entering into agreements without the knowledge of the people. He is aware of this, and has now decided to ask the Peace Commission openly for a British mandate. This may be due to his realising that there is little chance of complete independence being granted.

The investigations of Said Pasha Shoucair and his trenchant criticisms of Arab financial arrangements have probably shown the necessity for European advice and control. Said Pasha has suggested certain immediate reforms, including the cutting down of the army and gendarmerie, and the reduction of Feisal's own Civil List. A committee has now been formed, consisting of Said Pasha himself and certain other Arab officials, to examine the various departmental budgets and see whether further retrenchments can be effected.

The defeat of Emir Abdullah's army in the Hedjaz has greatly disturbed Emir Feisal, and he and his chief advisers are anxious that a Mohammedan force should be sent to the Hedjaz to assist King Hussein.<sup>3</sup> All agree, however, that it is not possible to send any large reinforcements from Syria, and assistance is being confined to the despatch of a few guns and machine-guns, together with a small detachment of selected officers and other ranks.

In the middle of June Emir Feisal paid a visit to Aleppo district and was received with considerable enthusiasm throughout his tour of inspection. He had a long interview with the General Officer Commanding and the Political Officer at Aleppo, at which he gave a full statement of his views on the general situation. A detailed report of this interview is attached as Appendix (B).

There is no doubt that political questions are occupying the entire attention of all Arab leaders in Syria to the detriment of administrative reform, which is urgently needed. Until a decision is arrived at it is hopeless to endeavour to interest either Emir Feisal or his immediate advisers in questions of local administration. As a consequence the Government is not progressing to any marked degree and many urgent reforms are being postponed. Old feuds are beginning to revive, especially in the Deraa district, where the

<sup>3</sup> The Emir Ibn Saud, a protagonist of the Wahhabi movement, had in May 1919 defeated the army of the Emir Abdulla, brother of the Emir Feisal, at the battle of Turabah in the course of the intermittent local hostilities between the Emir Ibn Saud and King Hussein. A focal point of these hostilities was the oasis of Khurmah. Cf. A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925* (London, 1927), vol. i, p. 288 *passim*.

Arabs of the Hauran are indulging in desultory quarrels with Beni Sakhr and other tribes with whom they have long-standing enmities.

In the Lebanon there are two main parties, one in favour of an independent Lebanon and the other desirous of forming part of an Arab State with central government at Damascus.

The independence party have recently been active and indulged in a demonstration at Baabda, the headquarters of the Lebanon Government, at which the Lebanese flag was hoisted and the independence of the Lebanon declared. The incident did not cause any particular disturbance and was brought to an end by the Military Governor, who ordered the flag to be pulled down and dispersed the assembly.

The independence party, of which the Maronite Patriarch is a leading member, are showing signs of nervousness in view of the reports that the French have come to an arrangement with Feisal which they think may lead to the inclusion of the Lebanon in a Syrian State, in opposition to the programme of independence which they are pressing.

On the other hand, the counter party are not idle. Meetings take place every day and Moslems are working harmoniously with some of the prominent Christians. Their programme is an autonomous Lebanon comprised in the more extended boundaries which they consider essential to economical prosperity, on condition that this autonomous Lebanon will recognise in principle the suzerainty of the future government of all Syria at Damascus. A considerable number of Greek Orthodox Christians and of Druses have joined this party and are engaged in canvassing in opposition to the programme of the Lebanon Administrative Council, which is in favour of the complete and absolute independence of the Lebanon.

It is not easy to appreciate the lines which the policy of French officials in this area are now following in this complicated situation. They are faced with the difficulty of having to conciliate Emir Feisal and the Arabs at Damascus without alienating the traditional support of the Maronite Christians, the majority of whom are members of the party which desires an independent Lebanon. Attached to this despatch, as Appendix (C), is a report rendered by the Chief Administrator (Colonel Copin).

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON.

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 199

At one o'clock on Thursday, the 29th of May, Colonel Cornwallis and Colonel Joyce were sent for urgently by Emir Feisal. Arrived there they found him in a state of almost [? utmost] distress. He proceeded to read out a telegram which he had received from Rustum Haidar, the Hedjaz delegate at the Peace Conference. The gist of the telegram was that the Conference was now engaged in Turkish questions, that all British troops in Syria were going to be withdrawn, and that the Commission to Palestine and Syria had been stopped. This Feisal interpreted as meaning that we were going to abandon the country to the French without any attempt being made to

ascertain the wishes of the people. This he said would inevitably cause bloodshed. It would mean war between the French and the Arabs. The Arabs would attack the French, and since in that case the British might be expected to come to the assistance of the French in the country, it would mean war with us as well. He made it fairly evident what part he himself would play in such a contingency. He did not even hint at trying to prevent trouble, and it is clear that he meant that he would identify himself with the movement, and place himself at the head of it. He stated that if our troops were withdrawn, and any French troops left, even if only in the coastal sector, he would regard it as a hostile act. On being asked if he wanted all troops, British and French, to be withdrawn, he hedged, and hinted that he would consider it an unfriendly act if the British troops were withdrawn under any circumstances. His point of view in this is rather hard to follow, as it is surely what would happen if he attained the objects of his programme and was granted complete independence without any mandatory Power. He finally wrote a telegram for the Commander-in-Chief, requesting an answer in twenty-four hours, and demanding:—

1. That no British troops should be withdrawn unless all French troops were withdrawn.
2. That the Commission should come out.

He was very insistent about the Commission coming out, and scouts the idea that any arrangements acceptable to him might possibly have been arrived at in Paris. He is still unwilling to accept any compromise as regards an independent Syria. Although at one time he said he did not mind about the Lebanon being French, he afterwards hedged, and said that by the Lebanon he meant the mountains only without any portion of the coast, not even Beirut. He also showed himself very mistrustful of our Zionist aims, although he declared that he was only presenting the point of view of the people of the country to us. On Friday morning he was not quite so excited, but announced his intention unless he received a satisfactory answer to his telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of executing a *coup d'état* by proclaiming the independence of Syria, including the coastal sector, and sending his troops to occupy the latter.

He asked what would be our attitude, having in view the fact that the Arabs in Palestine would probably rise. He was informed that such an act would finally and irreparably destroy all friendship between us, as it would probably entail the loss of British lives. He agreed that this would be the probable result, but asked what could he do.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 199

The G.O.C. and Political Officer at Aleppo have had several long interviews with Emir Feisal. His attitude and policy seem very reasonable, and with his personality it should be very easy to form a National Government even in Syria. His great difficulty now is what he considers the extraordinary attitude of Britain; after liberating the Arabic-speaking countries at an

immense cost in blood and treasure, and after four years' unbroken friendship with the Emir and the Arabs, England has suddenly cooled, refuses to say whether she is going to help any more, and is now giving the impression that she has sold the Arabs to suit the exigencies of politics in Europe. As for Syria, England did not conquer Syria—she defeated the Turkish forces in Syria, and thereby liberated the country, and Syria is no more a chattel to be used for political bargaining than is liberated Belgium. All the more is the Emir surprised at our attitude because of the obvious importance to England of the firm friendship of the Moslem Arabs. By breaking up the Turkish Empire and delivering the Hedjaz, Mesopotamian and Syrian Moslems, England has caused alarm among all the Moslems who look to the Sultan as Caliph, and now she is deliberately throwing away the friendship of the very people she has risked so much to save. Besides, these Arab countries command all the roads leading to the East, and every consideration demands that England should not surrender this enormous advantage, political, commercial, and religious, to even her closest ally. With these countries under her control and in her firm friendship the way to the East is safe, and the rest of the Moslem world will soon be reconciled. With these countries in anyone else's hands England becomes the humble suitor of that country. France, to all appearances, relies solely on England and America for her future existence; this the Emir knows full well, and he cannot understand why England should be so afraid of doing anything to offend the country which should logically be prepared to make almost any sacrifice to avoid alienating England. The result is a lurking suspicion in the Emir's mind that the Arabs are being sold. He regards Syria as the crux of the whole problem. Syria is full of promise, the gem in the Arab crown, and will be the natural leader of the Arab race. If that goes to other hands the Arabic-speaking countries will suffer a loss that will cripple them for ever. The Emir is confident that he can unite the Syrians in a common nationality. After all, the Christians and Moslems are of the same race and language—in physique the Moslem is superior owing to the sedentary occupations long followed by the Christians, while in intellect there is nothing to choose. In education alone the Christian is superior, and this is not due to the money and efforts of the Christians themselves, but to continuous effort and expenditure by outside Christians. Put the two religions on equal terms for purposes of education and eliminate foreign influence, except under the control of the mandatory Power, and in a few years the Syrians will be one race again.

The Emir is very uncertain whether England really means to accept the mandate if it is offered her. The natural inference that otherwise the sending of the Commission was waste of time is discounted by the story said to come from French sources that the Commission is pure camouflage, and the fate of Syria has already been settled. If England is not going to accept the mandate, the sooner this is widely known the better. If England will accept Syria the cry for complete independence and the immediate recruiting of troops will be at once dropped. If England is determined to avoid further

responsibilities in Syria—although she must well know that the undertaking of a Syrian mandate would make many of her other responsibilities infinitely lighter—then Syria wants complete independence; she knows well enough that it means Capitulations, foreign protection of Syrian Christians, foreign concessions, and corruptions and intrigues innumerable, but the Moslems deliberately accept this as better than a French Protectorate. A French mandate is regarded as a national death. It will bring French colonists and French citizenship and Christian hegemony. The Emir and his Arabs did not make their revolution to see the fairest part of their country handed to France, whom they regard as nothing less than an enemy, and whom they fully intend to resist by force of arms should she attempt to exercise a protectorate over Syria.

The Arabs would, in a few years more, have thrown off the Turkish yoke by themselves. They did not join the Allies to be put under the infinitely stronger yoke of France, and until England shows her hand it is exceedingly hard for Syria to show hers. Those who prefer England, but will not actually fight France, do not want to ask for England and then find France in charge—they fear the very natural resentment of France; their own countrymen who spoke for France will naturally be preferred until they have lived down the mistake of asking for England.

The worst of the whole situation is that the people who will oppose France most bitterly are the very best and most enlightened of the Moslems, the pick of Syria. It will not be the scum but the true Syrian Arab who will 'go out' and wage war if France comes to Syria—of course the Bedouins will join the outlaws. Failing England, and failing complete independence, America is the only hope. Anything, in fact, but France.

These are the Emir's views and the views of all the best Moslem Arabs as well.

The actual details of the interests of England in Syria were, of course, not discussed with the Emir, but they were obviously present in his mind, as he insisted on the fact that our interests were identical with those of the Arabs.

It is easy, of course, to say that the Emir is actuated by personal ambition, &c. That may be true enough, but he undoubtedly has the Moslems of this part of the country with him, and also all the Bagdad Arabs now here.

The Christians are sitting on the hedge, and are hopelessly intractable and fanatical. Their only platform is anti-Moslem and self-interest, and they will fawn upon whatever Power receives the mandate. A statement that England will accept the mandate would be received with unbounded enthusiasm by every Moslem from the sea to the desert, and there is no question but that the stimulus of England's acceptance of the Protectorate would go far to tide over the difficult days of forming a Government and getting the country going on modern lines.

With an English Protectorate the French will at once become not only tolerated but actually popular, as their language and civilisation are undoubtedly intensely admired. In the present political situation they are unpopular, and their language tabooed.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 199

*Report by Colonel Copin (French Army), Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory (West).*

No civil administration or government exist in the Lebanon besides the Military Administration. On the arrival of the Allies and in accordance with the instructions contained in G.H.Q. telegram No. O.A.M. 98 of October 22, 1918, the Administrative Council of the Lebanon continued to function, the only modification being that the Senior Military Administrator of the Lebanon was entrusted with the presidency of the Council.

Under this senior officer there are three deputy administrative officers, one at Batroun (northern Lebanon), one at Beiteddin (southern Lebanon), and one at Zahleh (eastern Lebanon).

The Kaimakams<sup>4</sup> and the Mudirs<sup>5</sup> are the only people who have been retained as civilian officials of the Administration.

I beg to furnish hereinafter the information required regarding the political situation of the Lebanon:—

The Lebanon has at all times been constituted in Syria as a small island, partly isolated, sheltered by its mountains, and has remained always, whoever was the dominator of the country, a feudal people, very attached to its beliefs, its traditions, and its family customs. In 1860 the European Powers guaranteed to it a separate statute [? status] in Turkey in Asia, with special privileges, of which it has always shown itself excessively jealous, and to which it holds with the greatest possible energy. The arrival of the Allied troops in the country last October had been enthusiastically welcomed, because it marked the end of the Turkish régime. The Lebanese have only seen in those alterations the absolute certainty henceforth of the maintenance of the privileges previously conceded. Confident in this hope, and of the Allied nations, they have awaited the decisions of the Peace Conference with the greatest tranquillity.

Towards the end of April, after the arrival of Emir Feisal at Beirut, the Sherifian Party stirred themselves, organised manifestations, and started carrying out an active and an undisguised propaganda. The Moslems proclaimed that Syria, including the Lebanon, must return to El Emir. The Lebanese, surprised, deceived, and uneasy, saw in these exaggerated manifestations a menace of Sherifian attempts at inclusion. The consequence of this fear was a calm, pacific, and orderly, but firm and decided reaction. The great majority of the Lebanese, the municipalities, and the clergy undertook a campaign for independence.

At present the situation is clear. On one side, and these represent the great majority, the partisans for the autonomy of the Lebanon claim a Lebanon more or less large, but are entirely firm and unanimous on the principle of the independence of the country, under the French Protectorate. On the other side, the partisans of Feisal, most of them are Druses, demand the attachment of the Lebanon to Syria.

<sup>4</sup> Local government officials.

<sup>5</sup> Subordinate officials.

The Sherifians, and more particularly those of Zahleh, show themselves very active, trying to gather signatures in favour of El Emir, distributing money, and promising posts and employment in the future government. This propaganda is carried out in full daylight.

As a proof, I beg to draw your attention to the attached tract,<sup>6</sup> of which I am sending the original and a translation, which has been distributed at Zahleh by Michel Bey Loutfallah, member of the Committee of 'Société des Secours pour la famine'. The latter has been authorised to circulate in Syria so as to control the distribution of relief, on the express condition that he should not interfere in policy during his journey, it being well understood that the permit for travelling could be withdrawn from him on the 18th February, 1919 [sic]. I cite also Iskandar Bey Ammoun, Inspector-General of Justice, Damascus, who has held numerous meetings in the Lebanon, and who has endeavoured to recruit adherents to the Sherifian cause, thus breaking the neutrality which his official functions impose on him.

Such is, at present, the political situation: on one side an active propaganda; on the other a very clear and a very calm reaction.

It is quite evident that it would be advisable to regulate, as soon as possible, the political status of Syria in order to avoid the uneasiness which is developing from day to day, and which is provoking manifestations and enervation, and which may, in accentuating itself, cause trouble against public order.

For the moment, the disorder does not offer any cause for anxiety. The general attitude of the population remains satisfactory.

Beirut, June 4, 1919.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This tract was headed '*Les Lois fondamentales. Parti de l'Union syrienne centrale — Égypte*', and began: '1. La Syrie tout entière doit être une, depuis les monts Taurus jusqu'au Khabour et l'Euphrate à l'est, le désert arabe jusqu'aux villes de Saleh au sud, la mer Rouge jusqu'à la ligne El-Acaba, Rafqa et la mer Méditerranée à l'ouest.

**2.** La Syrie doit être parfaitement indépendante; son indépendance doit être garantie par la Ligue des Nations, aussi bien que ses lois fondamentales. Cette garantie doit conserver les droits de l'indépendance.

**'3. Le Gouvernement du pays doit être aidé par la Ligue des Nations, en choisissant au début des hommes expérimentés aux hautes fonctions de conseillers nécessaires.'**

After proposals regarding methods of government and administration, the tract concluded: 'Si la nation arabe formait une nation séparée, la Syrie s'unirait à elle, à condition que cela ne change rien de sa propre unité ni de la forme de son Gouvernement.'

No. 200

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 24)*

No. 1049 [93118/1051/44]

PARIS, June 23, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon and transmits three copies of the undermentioned paper.

*Name and Date* *Subject*  
Mr. Balfour to General Clayton, Visit of Dr. Weizmann and Justice  
June 19, 1919. Brandeis to Palestine.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 200

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Clayton (Cairo)*

(13137)

*June 19, 1919*

*Jewish Question in Palestine*

I am giving this letter to Dr. Weizmann and Justice Brandeis who are going to Palestine. You know the desire of the Jewish leaders, both in Europe and America, at the present moment to do something to meet the pressure of Jewish opinion in regard to the idea of a national home. This pressure is of course intensified by disturbances in Europe, which re-act very seriously upon the Jewish populations. From this point of view they are anxious to ascertain whether there are any immediate questions which could be quietly taken up and pushed forward a little with the British authorities on the spot. They are, however, fully aware of the difficulties which confront us in Syria, and are fully impressed with the necessity of not adding to those difficulties. I hope that you will be able to discuss these matters with them in detail, and do anything you properly can to assist them. Dr. Weizmann you already know, and he needs no introduction to you. Justice Brandeis who is visiting the East for the first time, is, as you know, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the highest legal position in the United States. I can warmly recommend him to you, not only as a man whose position in his own country commands universal respect, but as one of whose sentiments and wisdom I have had many opportunities of judging personally. I am sure that his influence, like that of Dr. Weizmann, will be of service to you with Jewish opinion in Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

A. J. BALFOUR.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Balfour further stated in Paris telegram No. 61 of June 30, 1919, to General Allenby (Cairo): 'Mr. Justice Brandeis, accompanied by Mr. A. E. Zimmern, a prominent British Zionist, left Paris early last week for Palestine. I understand the Foreign Office had already telegraphed to General Clayton warning him of Mr. Brandeis' visit. In view, however, of Mr. Brandeis' important position in America and the influence which he possesses in wide circles there, both Jewish and non-Jewish, I should be glad if special facilities could be afforded him on his visit and instructions given to all concerned to show him all possible courtesy.'

No. 201

*General Clayton (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 1)*

*No. E.A. 2555 Telegraphic [96247/2117/44]*

*CAIRO, June 24, 1919*

In view of the importance attached by the people of Syria and Palestine to the Mission of the American Commissioners I consider it important that no decision regarding the future status of Syria and Palestine should be published until Commission has made its report.

No. 202

*General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 1)*

*No. 1028 Telegraphic [96488/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 24, 1919

Following is a paraphrase of message sent by Hussein to Feisal on June 20.  
Begins:—

May God enlarge your mind. Briefly I find it best not to say much about asking for protective French force for this is quite contrary to your telegram because it is Great Britain's (?) business alone to supply our needs as she is responsible to her conscience for all (?) [that] may<sup>1</sup> befall us.

If you ponder on how you went to Europe and opposition there was in accepting you, it will appear to you that we know only Great Britain and nobody knows us except through her. Except for her request I should (?) not have communicated with any other Government, because we are in no need of them. In everything stick to this vital line of policy.

I order you to do so as your father and chief, and this is outcome of his care for you and your happiness. I believe you will respect my advice and after my (?) death you will follow it even more closely than during my life-time. God is last witness and guide. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 203

*Earl Curzon to General Clayton (Cairo)*

*No. 205 Telegraphic [89590/2530/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 24, 1919

Civil Commissioner Baghdad suggests that as the Arab Army is still financed entirely from His Majesty's Treasury, pressure should be brought to bear upon Sharif Faisal to restrict his activities and those of his staff to Syria. He adds that these activities are rapidly assuming an anti-British and anti-foreign tendency. What are your views?

No. 204

*Earl Curzon to General Clayton (Cairo)*

*No. 207 Telegraphic [91372/2117/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 24, 1919

(Feisal's propaganda in Mesopotamia).

The spread into Mesopotamia of Feisal's propaganda for the complete independence of Arabia is causing considerable apprehension here and at Baghdad. India Office<sup>1</sup> fear that agitation may be deriving encouragement from British officers in Syria acting under the mistaken belief that aspirations for the immediate establishment of an uncontrolled Arab Government in Mesopotamia enjoy the support of His Majesty's Government.

<sup>1</sup> The India Office at that time controlled the administration of Mesopotamia.

You should instruct all responsible British officers to discourage the movement by all means in their power.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> On June 24, 1919, the Delegation of the Hejaz in Paris transmitted to Mr. Lloyd George a memorandum of June 23 by General Nuri Said, Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emir Feisal. This memorandum was designed 'to prove the necessity of forming one united government of the liberated Arab provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia. . . . The commercial relations between Mesopotamia and Europe have always been, and will always be, by way of the Mediterranean and through Syria, this being the nearest practicable route. The commercial relations between Southern Mesopotamia and India are not of vital importance to the whole country of Mesopotamia. . . . The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Syria and Mesopotamia looks forward to the formation of one single government composed of a group of united states. . . . The desire to separate Syria and Mesopotamia is based in part on the imperialistic policy of certain parties in Europe. It is neither just, nor wise, to sacrifice the vital interests of any country or any nation merely for the sake of imperialistic ideas and colonizing policies. These imperialists have raised lately the question of the danger of forming an Arab State which might develop the ambition of extending beyond Syria, Mesopotamia and Peninsular Arabia. This idea has never occurred to the inhabitants of Syria and Mesopotamia, and their only hope for the future is the development of their own country in which there is enough wealth to keep them occupied for centuries. They also hope to revive Arab civilization and Arab literature and to be an important factor in modern civilization. The desire is also based in part on the supposed danger which may arise from the formation of a large Moslem state with a head which will hold both the religious and temporal power. The fear has been expressed that such a state will carry out a policy of Moslem fanaticism which will be anti-Christian in character. This feeling has no foundation, as is proved by the fact that in the recent war thousands of Arab officers and men, both Christians and Mohammedans, took up arms against the Sultan and Caliph and fought side by side with their European allies. The composite character of this body of men, consisting of Mesopotamians, Syrians and Lebanese, is an indication of the extent to which the spirit of liberalism has spread and an assurance that this liberalism will be characteristic of the new Arab State. . . . The best solution for the Arab question, and it is the only solution which will meet with the approval of the majority, is to form one government composed of federal states on the same lines as the United States of America; each state of which should have some sort of self-government compatible with the traditions, habits and degree of development of its inhabitants.'

## No. 205

### *Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris.*

*C.F. 92<sup>1</sup> [Secret/General/162]*

*Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson

*British Empire*: Mr. Lloyd George

*France*: M. Clemenceau

*Italy*: M. Sonnino

*Japan*: Baron Makino

*Secretaries*: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and Mr. Portier

*Interpreter*: Professor Mantoux.

(M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, was introduced.)

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 669 f.

. . . 17.<sup>2</sup> Syria. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received a telegram from Feisal<sup>3</sup> in regard to the United States Mission complaining of a breach of faith that the Commission was not an Allied Commission. Feisal had interpreted a telegram that General Allenby had sent him<sup>4</sup> as suggesting that Great Britain would take a mandate for Syria if no other Power would do so. At his request, Mr. Balfour had drafted a telegram to General Allenby<sup>5</sup> stating in the most specific terms that in no circumstances would Great Britain take this mandate, and calling his attention to Mr. Lloyd George's statement on this subject made at an earlier Meeting in General Allenby's presence. . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of these minutes related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 185.

<sup>5</sup> No. 206.

## No. 206

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 59 Telegraphic [349/1/3/13968]*

PARIS, June 26, 1919

General Clayton's telegram No. 2536.<sup>1</sup>

Feisal has based his message on a misunderstanding of your reply quoted in No. E.A. 2529.<sup>2</sup> Feisal's view apparently is that while H.M.G. are reluctant to be mandatory for Syria, they would accept position if American Commission advised that this was in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned.

This however is a mistake. H.M.G. have not departed from view expressed orally by Prime Minister, I think in your presence, to M. Clemenceau in the presence of President Wilson, Signor Orlando and myself that in no circumstances would Great Britain become mandatory for Syria; and this has been repeated explicitly in telegram No. 16<sup>3</sup> to General Clayton which runs as follows:—

'You can only reply to Feisal that His Majesty's Government are determined not to take a mandate for Syria.'

I feel confident that Feisal was told the same thing when he was here though I can find no record of this having been done.

It is evident he is unwilling to accept even the most direct statement as conclusive, but it is all important that he should be made to understand that whatever else happens Great Britain must refuse to take any leading part in guidance or control of Syrian affairs, and that he is quite without justification in thinking that this refusal constitutes an abandonment either of himself or of the Arab cause. We earnestly desire to support both, but for reasons with

<sup>1</sup> No. 187.

<sup>2</sup> No. 185.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This telegram of May 29, 1919, was as cited below. It was sent in reply to General Clayton's Cairo telegram No. EA 2440 of May 15 in which he had reported: 'Feisal asks that he may be given indication whether Britain would accept mandate for Syria if asked by Peace Conference on recommendation of Commission', i.e. the subsequent King-Crane Mission.

which he is perfectly well acquainted we cannot add to the other responsibilities which we have undertaken on behalf of the Arab race, the position of Mandatory of Syria.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 1092.

No. 207

*Colonel French<sup>1</sup> (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 1)*

*No. 362 Telegraphic [96246/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 26, 1919

Your telegram No. 205<sup>2</sup> of June 24.

Feisal has been cautioned repeatedly against political propaganda but fear of a French mandate and knowledge of French propaganda has led him to adopt a programme for complete Arab independence. (There is no) anti-British feeling in Syria at present time. Commander-in-Chief is proceeding to Damascus shortly and will again impress on Feisal importance of restraining activities of his (? agents).

<sup>1</sup> Acting Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in the absence of General Clayton who was returning to England.

<sup>2</sup> No. 203.

No. 208

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 1)*

*No. 363 Telegraphic [96459/2117/44]*

CAIRO, June 26, 1919

Your telegram No. 207<sup>1</sup> June 24. This agitation derives no support from British officers in Syria who limit themselves to assisting and (advis)ing Arab Administrators in occupied enemy territory of the East.

<sup>1</sup> No. 204.

No. 209

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 4330 [375/2/14/13896]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 26, 1919

Earl Curzon of Kedleston presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith for Mr. Balfour's consideration copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Name and Date

War Office, June 19.

Subject

Proposed increase of Zionist troops  
in Palestine.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 209

*War Office to Foreign Office*

No. 0152/5091 (M.O. 2)

WAR OFFICE, June 19, 1919

Sir,

With reference to the proposed increase of Zionist troops in Palestine,<sup>1</sup> and in continuation of my letter No. 0152/5091 (M.O. 2) of 3rd June,<sup>2</sup> I am commanded by the Army Council to forward the enclosed copy of a telegram received from General Allenby on the subject.

The Army Council agree with General Allenby that any increase of Jewish troops in Palestine is most undesirable and should not be undertaken.

I am, &c.,

B. B. CUBITT.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 209

*Telegram from General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egypt*

No. E.A. 2501 of June 6, 1919, to War Office

Your 78549 M.O. 2.<sup>3</sup>

I am strongly opposed to any increase of Jewish troops in Palestine. The measure would be interpreted as a preparation to enforce the claim of the Jewish minority on rest of population. The present distrust of Zionist aims among non-Jewish population would be greatly increased. There have been already incidents between Jewish soldiers and non-Jewish inhabitants especially Moslems and an increase in number of Jewish troops would certainly lead to riots and widespread trouble with the Arabs.

<sup>1</sup> On May 8, 1919, the Foreign Office had asked for the views of the Army Council upon a Zionist proposal for an increase of Zionist troops in Palestine.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This letter, in reply to the Foreign Office letter of May 8, 1919 (see note 1 above), stated that 'any increase in Zionist troops would presumably be in addition to, and not in substitution of, the British units in the interim Army of Occupation and the post-war garrison of Palestine. The Army Council do not consider the fighting value of Jewish units such as to warrant their use to replace British troops. In any case the Army Council are of opinion that the views of General Allenby should be obtained before any decision is arrived at, and they are arranging accordingly.'

<sup>3</sup> Cf. note 2 above.

No. 210

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 2)*

No. 1132 [96834/2117/44]

PARIS, July 1, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 4010<sup>1</sup> of June 19 enclosing a copy of a correspondence with Mr. Herbert Samuel regarding the situation in Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> No. 197.

I am of opinion that effect might with advantage be given to Mr. Samuel's suggestions by sending instructions by telegraph to General Allenby in the sense of paragraphs 5 and 4 [6] of Mr. Samuel's letter beginning with the words 'I would venture to suggest' down to the words 'also by their local representatives.'<sup>2</sup>

The further suggestion contained in paragraph 7 of Mr. Samuel's letter regarding the despatch of a further officer to Palestine might in the first instance be discussed with General Clayton on his forthcoming visit to England on leave.

I am, &c.  
(for Mr. Balfour)  
ESME HOWARD.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 236.

### No. 211

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 4)*

*No. 1158 [97958/2117/44]*

PARIS, July 2, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits here-with copies of the under-mentioned paper.

<i>Name and Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
Mr. Balfour to Mr. Lloyd George, June 26.	Disposal of Turkish Territories.

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 211

By A. J. B. for Mr. Lloyd George.

#### Memorandum

June 26, 1919

I understand that the President means shortly to return to America, that the Prime Minister means shortly to return to England and that Italy is to be represented by a Minister little acquainted with what has been passing at Paris in the last five months.

I earnestly hope that the departure of the two most important members of the Supreme Council will not take place until the outlines of the Turkish settlement are more or less agreed to. My own personal view of what the new arrangement ought to be has been more than once expressed:—I venture briefly to recapitulate it.

(1) All Arab speaking parts of the Ottoman Empire should be permanently severed from it, and should be put under Mandatories. The precise power of these Mandatories has still to be determined.

(2) The French should be the Mandatory for Syria, the British for Mesopotamia, the American[s] or English for Palestine, the Americans for Armenia and the Straits (Constantinople), Italy perhaps for the Caucasus.

(3) I am aware that there are some unsettled frontier questions with

regard to the first three. I would only ask that these be determined, so far at least as the Great Powers are concerned, with little consideration for questions of strategy and much consideration for questions of economics. To give an example, I believe the soldiers talk about the Northern frontiers of Palestine from the point of view of Egyptian defence. I hope arguments like these will not have much weight. In determining the Palestinian frontiers, the main thing to keep in mind is to make a Zionist policy possible by giving the fullest scope to economic development in Palestine. Thus the Northern frontier should give to Palestine a full command of the water power which geographically belongs to Palestine and not to Syria; while the Eastern frontier should be so drawn as to give the widest scope to agricultural development on the left bank of the Jordan, consistent with leaving the Hedjaz railway completely in Arab possession.

(4) The French Mandatory should include Alexandretta, though historically this can hardly be said to belong to Syria. I should however be sorry to see any important extension of the French Mandatory westwards along the Anatolian coast, not because I grudge this to the French, but because everything that the French gain in the Eastern Mediterranean is made the basis of a fresh claim by Italy.

(5) The great bulk of Anatolia, including most of the Black Sea littoral in the North and the Mediterranean littoral in the South should constitute the new Turkish State. Its frontiers on the East will be bounded by Armenia, on the West by the Aegean Sea, subject to the Greeks obtaining either as Mandatories, or in full sovereignty, possession of the Sanjak of Smyrna, the majority of whose population is Greek. No part of Europe should be left within the Turkish State, nor should the latter be allowed to own territories sufficiently near the water-ways of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles to embarrass the Mandatory responsible for the guardianship of Constantinople and the Straits. Whether to this Mandatory there should be assigned a strip of territory along the Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmora, is a matter for discussion.

(6) My own inclination would be not to appoint a Mandatory for Turkey. It is quite true that the new Turkey will certainly require financial advisers and probably Allied assistance in other forms, but I cannot help thinking that it would add to the dignity of the Turkish State, which, subject to more important consideration I am anxious as far as possible to maintain, if it were treated like a European enemy state, say Hungary or Bulgaria, rather than as a fragment of the late Ottoman Empire or a conquered German Colony.

(7) The Italians in this, as in other cases, are the difficulty. They have appropriated the Dodecanese, including Rhodes, where there are no Italians. They have claims under the Treaty of London to equal treatment with the other Allies in the Eastern Mediterranean, and there is no region bordering on that sea where they can be constituted a Mandatory Power consistently with the broad scheme I am endeavouring to outline. The question therefore is, will less content them?

(8) My hope is that it will. If, in our Treaty of Peace, with the Turks or

in some similar Treaty between Italy and the Turks, they could be promised priority in respect of concessions in Southern Anatolia, I think they might perhaps be satisfied. The responsibilities of a Mandatory are likely to be inconvenient and not likely to be lucrative, especially when the population over which the Mandate is to be exercised is Turkish and the Government which is to exercise it is Italian. Of the value of concessions, on the other hand, the Italians have a most exaggerated estimate, and although I would give them no right except to the first offer of railway or mining privileges, I think they would value this right at a high level.

This in roughest outline is the territorial arrangement of the Turkish Empire outside Europe, which I should be disposed to recommend. If that could be combined with a settlement of all the small but irritating questions which are perpetually raising points of difference between French, Italians and British in Africa and the East, and if by such an arrangement all petty jealousies and intrigues between these Allied Nations could be finally put an end to, not merely those three Allied countries, but all the world would greatly gain. I cannot think that such a consummation is wholly beyond our reach, but if it is to be attained, we should set to work to do it at once.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was minuted as follows by Lord Curzon:

'The memo is generally, as it appears to me, on sound lines. I greatly deprecate the Greeks being given Smyrna. But this I suppose is the inevitable consequence of the grave mistake made in admitting them.'

'Much turns on whether the American Congress will allow President Wilson to accept a mandate for anything.'

'I rather doubt it.'

'Better not circulate at present.'

C. 5/7.'

## No. 212

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 4)*

*No. 1148 [97957/2117/44]*

PARIS, July 2, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Earl Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of two documents on the subject of the proposed Zionist activities in Palestine.

### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 212

*Dr. Weizmann to Sir L. Mallet*

DÉLÉGATION SIONISTE, PARIS, June 18, 1919

Dear Sir Louis Mallet,

I have been thinking a great deal over the valuable suggestion you made when I last saw you a few days ago regarding the desirability of entering on practical work in Palestine as soon as possible. Since seeing you I have discussed the same subject with Lord Eustace Percy<sup>1</sup> who, I understand, has

<sup>1</sup> At that time private secretary to Mr. Balfour.

mentioned it to Mr. Balfour. These two gentlemen, as well as others, seem to share your views in the matter, and after a further conversation with Mr. Vansittart<sup>2</sup> I have decided to approach your department formally and submit a programme of work in Palestine, which, to my mind, is already both desirable and possible. Before doing so, however, I venture to submit to you one or two general considerations.

In the first place, any encouragement which may be given to us by His Majesty's Government would, in the present state of extreme pressure on Jewry, be received by the whole of the Jewish world with deep relief and gratitude. Secondly, the development of certain of the undermentioned lines of action would introduce into the country both additional men of character and of brains, and also capital, and would thereby improve the economic condition of the country, and thus contribute more than anything else towards establishing good relations between the Jews and the Arabs. If the Arabs see that practical work, remunerative to them as to the other elements in the population, is beginning in earnest, and that this work, far from affecting their conditions unfavourably, improves them, any artificial agitation that may still be prevalent will be checkmated, and wild and unfounded rumours that may be circulating will be stopped.

I should also like to point out for the information of His Majesty's Government that we have not been unmindful of the great financial responsibilities which will probably fall on the Zionist Organisation immediately after the signature of peace, and to meet these responsibilities we have been endeavouring to create the necessary instruments. This work has been rendered even more complicated than would otherwise have been the case by the difficulties encountered in communicating with the greater number of our supporters in the east of Europe. However, in addition to balancing the Zionist budget for the current year at £500,000 we have established a company with a capital of 10,000,000 roubles for the erection of dwellings in Palestine, this company to be registered in England, and we are moreover establishing a development company with a capital of £4,000,000. The status of this latter company is being considered now in London by the committee of our Organisation, of which Mr. Herbert Samuel is chairman, and it is hoped that it will be possible to register it in the near future. In the meanwhile negotiations are in progress on behalf of this company for the purchase of a number of transportable houses, and the erection on its behalf of hotels in Palestine has already commenced.

The activities in Palestine which seem to us of an urgent character are as follows:—

1. The acquisition of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.
2. The acquisition of the German colonies and town settlements in Palestine.
3. The acquisition of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospice on the Mount of Olives, which is German State property. We are specially anxious

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation.

to effect this as the hospice adjourns the university site, and if we acquired it we could fit it out as a temporary university building, library, &c. I need not point out the immense importance of such a step, equally from the moral, intellectual, and political points of view. The erection of buildings for the University<sup>3</sup> is very difficult at present on account of lack of building material, which is itself a consequence of the scarcity of transport. The acquisition of the hospice building would relieve us of this responsibility.

4. Permission for Jews to enter and settle in the country. These would be guaranteed by the Zionist Organisation as economically sound and anxious to invest their capital in Palestine. There is a large number of Jews who are ready to proceed to Palestine to found small industries there, to open commercial undertakings, and to acquire and work land. Their entry into Palestine is at present rendered very difficult. The Zionist Organisation would be quite prepared to guarantee the *bona fides* financial position and suitability for the purpose of such immigrants. We are ourselves most anxious to stop all unsuitable immigration and have published warnings to that effect throughout the Jewish world. On the other hand, we are also anxious to introduce into the country in limited numbers people willing and capable of assisting the development of the country on sound lines.
5. The transfer to the Zionist Organisation or other body to be constituted specially for the purpose of the waste or unoccupied lands that could be put under the plough almost immediately. We are particularly anxious to settle the demobilised Jewish soldiers in Palestine as an encouragement not to leave the country. Means are available to do this, and, if only we had the land, we could set to work immediately.
6. The establishment of a shipping line principally for the transport of material from the Mediterranean ports and Palestine, but also possibly from England. This would enable us to import building material, of which the need is greatest at present and the meeting of which need is an inevitable preliminary to further activities.
7. The acquisition by the Zionist Organisation or other public body of certain small concessions to be developed for the purposes of public utility, e.g., telephone, radio-telegraph, and water-power of the Jordan.

I should like to point out to you that all these concessions, with the single exception of that of the waste lands, would not effect the present agrarian policy of the administration and should not interfere with the susceptibilities of the Arabs. For us, however, they would mean a very important beginning. If, as I hope, the Secretary of State considers the immediate carrying out of the programme outlined above desirable, I would be ready to proceed to Palestine in the near future, and in the company of Justice Brandeis and other friends discuss with the administration on the spot the best ways and

<sup>3</sup> The Hebrew University of Jerusalem had been founded in the previous year.

means of putting the programme into effect. I would also propose to visit Feisul in Damascus, and, in co-operation with him, elaborate a conciliatory policy so far as the Arab population is concerned. For this purpose I shall be grateful to receive the necessary recommendation from His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

CH. WEIZMANN.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 212

*Sir L. Mallet to Dr. Weizmann*

July 1, 1919

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

I have read and shown to Mr. Balfour your letter of the 18th ultimo,<sup>4</sup> submitting a programme of work in Palestine which you would like his authority immediately to carry out.

I understand that you have already received a letter from him for presentation to General Allenby asking him to discuss with you in detail whether there are any immediate questions which could be quietly taken up and 'pushed forward a little' without waiting for further developments.

You will no doubt raise with him the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, but, as you are aware, this railway is French property and the French Government have already addressed His Majesty's Government several times with regard to its immediate return to French control, so that it is not possible for the British authorities to dispose of it.

Mr. Balfour doubts therefore whether it would serve any useful purpose to open a discussion of this question with the French Government at the present stage, and thinks that it might possibly provoke inconvenient opposition if broached before the mandate is given to the British.

As regards the acquisition of the German colonies and town settlements, so long as the country is only in the military occupation of the British, they are not in a legal position to expropriate the German possessions, so that we fear that little can be done in this direction for the present.

The same argument applies to the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospice, but it occurs to me that possibly an arrangement might be made for its provisional use by the Zionists as a temporary university building. This, however, is a matter on which General Clayton's advice would be valuable, as there may be practical reasons against its adoption.

No. 4 is also a matter for discussion with the local authorities. I, personally, think that it is the most useful suggestion in your letter. If a few of the best sort of Jewish immigrants were allowed to enter Palestine and to purchase land at good prices from Arabs who were willing to sell, the effect might be good, but, in view of the accounts which we have been receiving of the hostility felt by the inhabitants for the Jews, the greatest care and tact would have to be exercised and the immigrants carefully chosen. If there were any waste lands available on which settlement of demobilised soldiers could be unostentatiously begun, it would be very desirable.

\* Enclosure 1 above.

The establishment of a shipping line for the transport of materials to Palestine is not one upon which the views of His Majesty's Government or of the Palestine authorities is presumably required.

As regards your seventh suggestion, I fear the military authorities would not have legal power to grant permanent concessions to the Zionist Organisation.

Meanwhile, as you are aware, precautions have been adopted that no step shall be taken which will enable commercial interests, whether British or foreign, to establish themselves in Palestine or obtain control over land or industries until the decision of the conference enables His Majesty's Government to work out the full implication of their acceptance of a mandate for Palestine and of the policy of a national home for the Jews.

I have just heard that General Clayton is shortly due in London, so that you will have an opportunity of discussing these matters with him before going out.

Please understand that I am not raising these difficulties with a view to discourage you from trying to make some small beginnings.

When I enquired of you the other day whether some small practical work could not be begun, it was with a view to make your own position rather easier with your fellow Zionists, and I was really thinking more of the necessary preparation in the way of providing houses or at any rate provisional shelter for the first arrivals, of settling beforehand in what regions the early immigrants would be placed, and of the necessary organisation for the distribution of food than of concessions, but it is useful that these questions should all be discussed and I much hope that there will be some good result.

Believe me, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

### No. 213

*Note by Sir R. Graham of conversations with Mr. Samuel and Dr. Weizmann*

[98082/2117/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 2, 1919

Mr. Herbert Samuel called this afternoon and referred to the situation in Palestine which he described as most disquieting from the Zionist point of view.

He complained of the attitude of the British Military Authorities who were administering the country and declared that they took every opportunity of injuring Zionist interests. He made special reference to Colonel Storrs in this respect.

Mr. Samuel said that he understood the difficulties with which His Majesty's Government were confronted in the question but that he was convinced that the local Authorities were not acting in the spirit of the assurances given by Mr. Balfour to the Zionist organisation.

He earnestly hoped that in the forthcoming changes which were to be made in the administration of Palestine new officers would be appointed who would possess a better understanding of the intentions of His Majesty's Government. He added that of all the British officers who had a knowledge

of the Palestine question General Deedes would be the one inspiring most confidence in Zionist circles.

This afternoon I had a visit from Dr. Weizmann who referred in far more violent terms to the present situation in Palestine. He declared that the British Authorities were showing a marked hostility to the Jews and lost no opportunity of not only injuring their interests but of humiliating them. These Authorities were spreading the idea that His Majesty's Government had no intention of fulfilling the obligations which they had incurred towards the Jews in view of the declarations made.

Every encouragement was given to the Arabs as against the Jews, and Jewish interests were now in a far worse position than they had been under the Turkish régime.

He said that General Allenby was too much occupied with the Egyptian and Syrian questions to take interest in Palestine; General Clayton showed no strength in handling the situation and he denounced Colonel Storrs with great bitterness.

He concluded by saying that when the true facts of the situation in Palestine came to be generally known there would be a violent outburst of feeling in Jewish circles and Jewish gratitude and friendship towards His Majesty's Government would be turned into bitterness and hostility. Judge Brandeis was now on his way to Palestine and could scarcely fail to discover the true facts. The effect on Jewish-American opinion which was now strongly inclined towards Great Britain would be deplorable.

He earnestly begged that the question should be taken in hand and that a new spirit should animate the direction of affairs in Palestine.

I said that His Majesty's Government had no thought of going back on their declaration with regard to the Jewish national home but that they must be the best judge as to how and when the policy should be carried into effect. Precipitate action in the sense of fulfilling all Zionist aspirations at once presented grave danger. General Clayton was just arriving in England on leave and an early opportunity would be taken of discussing matters with him and of learning the views of General Allenby and of the British Authorities on the spot.<sup>1</sup>

R. G.

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon commented in a minute on this note: 'To a large extent the Zionists are reaping the harvest which they themselves sowed.'

C. 3/7.'

#### No. 214

*General Sir E. Allenby (Ramleh)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received July 8)*

*No. 1071 Telegraphic [99704/142/44]*

My telegram No. 940.<sup>2</sup>

RAMLEH, July 6, 1919

In the course of conversation at Beyrouth on July 4 M. Picot gave me to

<sup>1</sup> The summer capital of Egypt.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram of June 9 (received that day) reported that a French

understand that King Hussein had suggested to him that French troops should be sent to Hedjaz. In view of King's message to Feisal given in my telegram No. 957<sup>3</sup> and King's general attitude towards French I doubt accuracy of M. Picot's intimation.

M. Picot asked me if I thought it advisable to send troops to Hedjaz.

I replied that I thought it inadvisable to send any troops there.

Liaison officer had asked General Allenby what the British attitude would be if King Hussein or the Emir Feisal requested the assistance of French Mohammedan troops for the defence of Mecca. General Allenby telegraphed that he presumed that in that case Lord Curzon would desire British troops to co-operate, but that none were available from Egypt.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This Cairo telegram of June 11, 1919, reported that King Hussein had that day sent the following message to the Emir Feisal: 'As to your plans in Syria, be very careful not to do anything detrimental. Do not ask for any French or other force, as probably aeroplanes will be sufficient to settle this case; and if not or if it is not solved by political measures which are being adopted in accordance with original plan I consider resignation to be better.' (The reference to aeroplanes was probably to aircraft supplied by the British authorities to assist King Hussein in local Arab hostilities in the Hedjaz: cf. No. 199, note 3, also No. 202.)

### No. 215

*General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 8)*

*No. 1074 Telegraphic [99706/142/44]*

*CAIRO, July 6, 1919*

My telegram No. 1071.<sup>1</sup>

M. Picot further informed me that Emir Feisal had suggested to him that French should interest themselves in Mesopotamia [*sic*]. This also I do not believe.

<sup>1</sup> No. 214.

### No. 216

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 8)*

*No. 858 Telegraphic: by bag [99834/2117/44A]*

*PARIS, July 7, 1919*

Recent fighting between Turks and Greeks in Asia Minor<sup>1</sup> has furnished 'Pertinax'<sup>2</sup> with occasion to revert, in *Echo de Paris* this morning, to question of French interests in former Turkish Empire. He insists of [? on] necessity of France, in order to save what can be preserved of her traditional influence, to concentrate her efforts on Syria and Cilicia where French rights were recognised by Treaty of 1916 with England. He expresses satisfaction at recent despatch of French reinforcements to Cilicia, and remarks that affairs of King of Hedjaz are in bad way on account of opposition of Wahabites and of fact that British assistance is not forthcoming owing to hostility of Indian Mussulmans who have not forgiven Sovereign of Mecca for having abandoned the Sultan of Constantinople. Thus, he concludes that Arab

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. III.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudonym of an influential French political journalist.

power, which induced Great Britain to annul her previous engagement with France, is now in danger of complete collapse, and hour has come for definite conclusion with Messrs. Lloyd George and Balfour of those negotiations which have already lasted too long.

No. 217

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 8)*

*No. 512578 [sic] Telegraphic [99833/2117/44]*

CAIRO, July 7, 1919

I visited Damascus on June 30 and saw American Commissioners.

They are making good progress. They are now at Beyrouth and thence go to Tripoli, Homs and Aleppo and then return to Constantinople. They hope to complete their work in Syria and Palestine by about third week in July. I was favourably impressed by their earnestness, ability and impartiality.

I also saw Feisal who enquired about the advisability of his returning to Paris. I advised him to go there in three or four weeks' time when Commission had finished its tour. He was anxious for an assurance that no decision as regards future of Palestine and Syria would be taken until Commission had rendered its report. I told him I thought he had no cause for fear but could give him no definite assurance. He (? understand)s that Great Britain will not accept a mandate for Syria.

On July 1 I motored from Homs to Tadmor and remained there two nights. Landing ground at Tadmor was used by several aeroplanes during my tour. A depot of petrol and oil will be established shortly there and hangars erected. There will be a permanent gendarmerie post there. Natives appear quiet and content but parties of Shammar Arabs from Mesopotamia had been raiding in neighbourhood. On day of my arrival there was a fight some 20 miles west of Tadmor and I was met by Bedouins of Roalla tribe bringing in (? prisoner)s and camels of raiders whom they had defeated, killing or capturing whole band.

General Barrow who has lately (? visited) Jerablus, Urfa and Cilicia is quite satisfied with situation there.

Addressed to War Office, repeated to Foreign Office.

No. 218

*Earl Curzon to Colonel French (Cairo)*

*No. 218 Telegraphic [98705/1051/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 348<sup>1</sup> (June 19).

You should bear in mind limitations and general policy regarding land transactions laid down in my despatch No. 84<sup>2</sup> of 14 May.

<sup>1</sup> No. 195. Lord Curzon had transmitted a copy of this telegram to Mr. Balfour under cover of Foreign Office despatch No. 4391 of July 1, 1919, to Paris. Lord Curzon stated therein: 'I feel some doubt whether the course of action which General Clayton proposes in

<sup>2</sup> See note opposite.

[cont. opposite

As I attach considerable importance to the question I should be glad if you would forward land ordinance for approval here before issue.

the enclosed telegram is consistent with the policy indicated in your despatch No. 678 of May 7th.' (See note 2 below.) Mr. Balfour had replied in his telegram No. 1124 of July 5 from Paris (received that day): 'We see no great objection provided that opening of registers is done on a limited scale, and no large blocks of private land are transferred; and provided that, as far as possible, preferential consideration is given to Zionist interests. As a copy of my despatch No. 678 of May 7 has been sent to Cairo, it might be well first to ascertain Colonel French's views as to effect of proposed opening of land registers in relation to policy indicated in that despatch, or General Clayton might be consulted in London.'

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch was a repetition to Cairo of Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 678 of May 7, 1919, from Paris to Lord Curzon. This despatch stated, in particular:

'His Majesty's Government, if and when they obtain a mandate from the Conference for Palestine, are pledged to carry out the policy of a national home for the Jews. In the adoption of this policy there can be no question of religious privileges for the Jews, and in the face of the present hostility of the majority of the population (both Moslem and Christian) in Palestine His Majesty's Government can hardly fulfil their pledges of any form of political preference. An increase in the numbers and economic influence of the Jews and steady colonisation must precede political favours. By this means the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine who fear the Jew primarily as a political and religious force may gradually come to welcome his presence, as they see the full advantages from the influx of Jewish money and the Jewish methods of developing the country.'

'This line of policy is reinforced by the following considerations: Palestine is a rich and undeveloped country and a particularly good field therefore for the foreign concession hunter who may expect to obtain high profits quickly. Every care must therefore be taken to watch the commercial interests which establish themselves in the country and ensure that the development of its natural resources does not take place at the expense of the inhabitants or primarily for the benefit of foreign capitalists. It is here that His Majesty's Government's adoption of the Zionist policy may be found to offer the best method of insurance. As your Lordship knows, it is the intention of the Zionists, if His Majesty's Government feel able to adopt their plans, to institute some form of public utility company under the control of the Zionist organisation who could perhaps be given preferential consideration for immigration and land development generally. The company would take, say, 5 per cent. of the profits. The remainder would go to relieve the taxpayer (Jew and non-Jew) in Palestine.'

'In the uncertainty of the present situation these possibilities can only be indicated, but enough has been said to show how essential it is that as long as His Majesty's Government are in military occupation of the country, no policy should be adopted or step taken which would enable commercial interests, however reputable, and whether British or foreign, to establish themselves in Palestine or obtain control over the land or the principal industries until the decision of the Conference enables His Majesty's Government to work out the full implication of their acceptance of a mandate for Palestine and of the policy of the national home for the Jews.'

### No. 219

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 13)*

*No. 378 Telegraphic [102567/2117/44]*

CAIRO, July 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 312 [212]<sup>1</sup> of June 27.

Emir Feisal had an interview with American Commissioner on July 3. Commissioner first asked if there had been any anti-French propaganda in Syria. Feisal replied that any such propaganda was primarily due to the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

extensive French propaganda and French methods. He attributed this feeling against French to fear of their Colonial methods of policy as evidenced in Algiers and Tunis, to fear that French mandate meant the exploitation of Syrian markets and man power in French interests, and to bad impression produced by French methods and administration in Western Zone when he went to France.

As regards propaganda he stated to Commissioner that Great Britain had carried out no propaganda of any sort, but if they had given so much as a sign, even unofficially, that they were prepared to accept the mandate, there would have been an overwhelming majority who would have asked for a British mandate. Questioned on the subject of unity of Arab countries and especially of Syria, he said that sense of Arab native was very strong and that to satisfy that feeling it was most desirable that all Arab countries including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Asir and Yemen should be under influence of same Power.

With regard to Syria no partition of Syria from Palestine would be acceptable, as they were nationally one.

The Commissioner asked if Unionist and Independence movement had not threatened to become Islamic in character. This Feisal denied. He states that the movement was entirely racial and not religious in character.

Zionism he stated some months ago he was prepared to accept in its limited sense of a certain amount of immigration and extension of existing Jewish colony. The wider Zionist aspirations had however frightened the people and he now finds them determined not to have any form of it. He apparently did not say a great deal on this point or express himself very strongly.

With regard to present conditions in Mesopotamia Feisal said there was undoubtedly a certain amount of feeling against English and English methods there. The disappointment was rendered more acute by the fact that in Syria a very large measure of freedom had been given to Government.

Questioned on choice of a mandatory Power, he said that he realized that considerable assistance was needed and that such assistance would involve some sort of mandate. As regards choice of the Mandatory Powers he could only speak for people. They desired to ask for America first, Great Britain second, definitely refusing blandishment of France. The reasons for America being put in the first instance was (1) the fear that Great Britain would refuse the mandate if offered to them, (2) the 'unknown quantity' in America. He . . . (?stated)<sup>2</sup> once again the fact that Great Britain would have been asked for if they had given the least sign of willingness to accept.

The portion of people who asked for complete independence without any mandate did (? so omitted) more as a protest against a too complete control, than with any idea that they could stand on their own.

N.B. This statement of the Emir's though true in certain cases, hardly tallies with the facts in the case of extreme independence party who are perfectly prepared to try complete independence and quite indifferent as to

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

the result of their experiments on the country. Provided that they can become a Power in politics and have a reasonable chance of success in their (?) country) . . . (they are content).<sup>2</sup>

Feisal claimed that the form of mandate to be imposed should be a matter of discussion between himself, aided by a few chosen delegates and Peace Conference. He seemed distinctly pleased with result of his interview and with . . . [? visit]<sup>2</sup> of commissioner in general.

During the interview he handed over a long written statement of which a translation is being sent to you by despatch. The salient points are that Syrians who fear . . .<sup>2</sup> and division claim liberty and independence for their country.

And they claim extensive . . .<sup>2</sup>s from Taurus Mountains to the Sinai desert. They dislike Article 22 of League of Nations but will not reject assistance.

They desire for Syria a democratic Government (?) willing to) safeguard the rights of minorities. They want similar system of government and education in Syria and (?) Ira)q and no economic restrictions between two areas while against a separate Lebanon they agree to a continuance of the special privileges of that area.

The Syrians dislike the idea of the French as mandatory because of their commercial exclusiveness and their disregard of national feelings and because they would prevent (?) all) progress and development of people.

The action of French officials in O.E.T.A. West where their political opponents are persecuted and their supporters favoured have caused local troubles and have distressed Syrians and strengthened their dislike to idea of French mandate. Finally they believe that presence of British in Iraq and French in Syria would lead to friction and . . .<sup>2</sup> of which Arabs would be the chief sufferers.

#### No. 220

*Mr. Gosling<sup>1</sup> (Prague) to Earl Curzon (Received July 14)*

*No. 100 [102514/801/44]*

My Lord,

PRAGUE, July 11, 1919

I have the honour to enclose herewith a paper<sup>2</sup> which has been addressed to me by Mr. David Trietsch, a prominent Jewish Zionist, who makes proposals regarding the Jewish colonization of Cyprus,<sup>3</sup> and the frontiers of Palestine, which, he states that [sic] his co-religionists are anxious should include the town of Saida.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Chargé d'Affaires on special mission at Prague.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This paper was as indicated below.

<sup>3</sup> In this connexion M. Trietsch argued that 'many people in England used to regard Cyprus as a doubtful asset. If, however, by means of Jewish immigration and colonisation the country could soon be made to flourish again it would become a most valuable possession, and by the same course the Jewish and the Moslem populations combined could in a short time outnumber the so-called Greeks and bring the anti-British propaganda to a standstill.'

Palestine proper, Mr. Trietsch maintains, is too limited a territory to hold the large numbers of the Jewish Race, which will be forced to emigrate from Eastern Europe, and he gives figures in support of his contention.

As regards the Jews and the revolutionary movement in Europe, he states that although there are prominent Bolsheviks of Jewish extraction, these are neither orthodox or nationalist Jews, for the genius of their race is constructive and not destructive, but men of Jewish extraction whose revolutionary tendencies are the product of 'despair bred by the abnormal and to a great extent horrible conditions forced upon the Jewry of Eastern Europe'.

Since my arrival in Prague, I have been in touch with the Jews resident here, amongst whom are a number of Zionists who wish to make their permanent homes in Palestine.

Of late, signs of unrest are noticeable among them, especially since the signature of Peace with Germany, and they manifest a strong desire that the Zionist restoration may become effective.

The bulk of the educated Jews in Central Europe are, I believe, loyal to Great Britain, and confident of their just treatment by her. It is, I submit, desirable to afford the genuine Zionists among them facilities for return to Palestine.

Should a belief become prevalent among them that the Jews of Central Europe are to be permanently, or for any considerable length of time, debarred from a restoration to the Jewish Commonwealth, discontent and possibly disorder might well ensue.

I have &c.

CECIL GOSLING

### No. 221

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 66 Telegraphic [384/1/1/14444]*

Following from Lawrence<sup>2</sup> for Feisal:

The settlement of Arab affairs is not being considered at present in Paris. Nothing will be done till about September. I recommend that you do not come here till then.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this telegram was sent to the Foreign Office on July 18 (received July 21).

<sup>2</sup> Colonel T. E. Lawrence: cf. No. 223, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> In Cairo telegram No. 384 of July 14 (received in Paris, July 16) Colonel French had reported that the Emir Feisal intended to leave for Paris about the end of the month, and had asked that the necessary arrangements might be made.

### No. 222

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 17)*

*No. 385 Telegraphic [103235/103235/44]*

Reference my telegram 384<sup>1</sup> Cipher July 14.

CAIRO, July 17, 1919

Following has been received from Political Officer at Damascus. Begins:—  
Feisal was handed to-day a cable from M. Picot stating that as Peace Con-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 221, note 3.

ference will not discuss affairs of Syria for some time the French Government are of opinion that he should postpone his departure. He takes this as (? showing) opposition to his going at all and should we take the same line as the French will I think consider that we are also trying to prevent his going. If his departure was prevented or even unduly postponed he said he would feel bound to take defensive measures against a possible adverse decision by decreeing mobilization. To this threat I do not attach much importance but it would certainly be as well to let him go as soon as possible.

### No. 223

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 994 Telegraphic [105018/103235/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 17, 1919

I understand that Colonel Lawrence is here, and proposes to return to Paris in order to be with Feisal, who is expected towards the end of the month. I consider that further co-operation between these two in Paris is likely to cause us serious embarrassment with the French.

I am very doubtful as to the advisability of Feisal's visit at all in present circumstances and it seems possible that if Lawrence were not available he might be induced to renounce his journey. Do you regard Lawrence as a member of your Delegation and subject to your orders and if so would it not be advisable to refuse permission to him to proceed to Paris?<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile War Office are making enquiries as to his military status in order to determine whether he is still amenable to military orders. It seems that he claims to have been demobilized but no trace of this can be found.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Balfour replied in Paris despatch No. 1605 of August 13, 1919 (received August 14), that 'Colonel Lawrence was and is attached to the British Delegation to the Peace Conference as a technical adviser. . . . For the present Mr. Balfour would be glad if Colonel Lawrence could still be regarded as technical adviser to this Delegation as his services here are likely to be required when the question of Syria comes to be discussed with the French and possibly with Feisal on the latter's return to Paris.'

### No. 224

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received August 6)*

No. C.P.O. 311 [112576/2117/44A]

CAIRO, July 19, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform you that I have now received various accounts of the ideas formed and the conclusions reached by the American commissioners who are examining the conditions in Palestine and Syria.

The most important of these ideas and conclusions are as follows:—

1. That Syria as represented by occupied enemy territory (East) will not accept France peaceably as mandatory Power.

2. That the Zionist programme for Palestine can only be carried through against the wishes of the people and by force. The opposition of the non-Jewish portion of the population was not at all realised by the members of the Commission before they reached the country.
3. That Arab national aspirations to semi-independence under an Anglo-Saxon ægis are worthy of encouragement.
4. That the general wish of the people is for a United Syria.

The commissioners have formed a high opinion of British officials in occupied enemy territory and of British systems of administration.

I have, &c.

C. FRENCH

### No. 225

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 1001 Telegraphic [103235/103235/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 21, 1919

(Feisal's proposed visit to Paris.)

Colonel French's telegrams Nos. 384<sup>1</sup> (of July 14) and 385<sup>2</sup> (of July 17).

General Clayton considers that no useful purpose would be served by Feisal's visiting Paris until American Commission has submitted its report and Turkish Peace Terms been finally decided. He thinks that when a decision has been reached Feisal should be called to Paris and the final terms communicated to him. If Feisal comes to Paris now he will probably create more difficulties and he is better in Syria unless General Allenby has reasons from the local point of view for letting him come.

Colonel Cornwallis is also strongly of opinion that Feisal's absence from Syria in present circumstances would be inadvisable.

Unless therefore General Allenby particularly wishes us to support Feisal's request in opposition to the French I would suggest that we should if possible leave the matter alone and throw the onus of refusal upon them.<sup>3</sup>

Repeated to Colonel French No. 230.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 221, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> No. 222.

<sup>3</sup> In Paris telegram No. 1190 of July 23 (received July 24) Mr. Balfour concurred with this suggestion.

### No. 226

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received July 24)*

*No. 388 Telegraphic [107362/103235/444]*

CAIRO, July 24, 1919

Your cypher telegram No. 230<sup>1</sup> July 21. Feisal has been informed by Lawrence (Mr. Balfour's telegram July 14 [15])<sup>2</sup> that Syrian question will not come up for discussion till September and will probably be content to remain in Syria till about the middle or end of August. Presume this arrangement

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to Cairo of No. 225.

<sup>2</sup> No. 221.

will suit you. If so suggest Feisal be informed that His Majesty's Government do not consider his presence in Paris necessary till September or whatever date you decide. It is not possible to leave question (entirely) alone as Feisal is exceedingly annoyed because Picot advised him not to start at once and if French and Arabs are to work together in future nothing should be done that would increase the present tension between them. Please reply by telegraph.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 238 of July 30 to Cairo replied that 'general Turkish settlement . . . stands postponed pending United States decision' as to the assumption of a mandate for any part of Turkish territory. (See Chap. III.) Colonel French was instructed to inform the Emir Feisal accordingly, 'as an obvious reason for not fixing at present any date for a return to Paris'.

No. 227

*Letter from Mr. Baker<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Forbes Adam<sup>2</sup> (Paris)*

*Unnumbered [385/3/3/16195]*

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LONDON,<sup>3</sup> July 24, 1919

Dear Eric,

Since I wrote to you about the next meeting of the Commission on Mandates, I have received instructions from Lord Milner to summon the next meeting for August 5. This date may possibly be altered if any of the members object, but I do not much believe they will do so.

In the meantime, there has been a startling new development—Weizmann has had a conference with Lord Robert<sup>4</sup> in which they decided between them, and apparently with the approval of General Storrs and other authorities here, that the best thing that could happen would be for this Commission to draw up a draft Palestinian mandate, and to publish it at once. With this in view Weizmann has telegraphed to Frankfurter to come back from Poland and to begin discussing with me the draft which is to be laid before the Commission.

As I know nothing about it, Frankfurter will have all his own way with me, and I think it most desirable that if possible, you should come here in the last days of July to discuss things generally with Frankfurter, Storrs, Lord Robert and anybody else who may be concerned. It would really be very useful if you could be here for the meetings of the Commission if Lord Robert's proposal comes to anything.

I will let you know the next development that occurs. In the meantime I hope that you will try and arrange to come over for a day or two at least. Alternatively, I may possibly be going to Paris next week and if I have

<sup>1</sup> Mr. P. J. [Noel] Baker was British Secretary to the Commission on Mandates constituted by the Peace Conference.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>3</sup> The temporary office of the preparatory organization of the League of Nations was then at Sunderland House in London.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Robert Cecil was a member, for League of Nations affairs, of the British Peace Delegation.

Frankfurter's drafts by then we could discuss them there. I may know this in the course of a day or two and will let you know at once if I am coming.

Love to Agatha. If I come over, & you can't come here, may I travel home with her?

Yours ever,

P. J. BAKER.

P.S. I have suddenly remembered that you are making a Palestine Draft. If it is approximately ready, could you let me have a copy for Ld R's guidance. I know he would be most anxious to have it.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> This letter (received July 25) was minuted as follows in the British Peace Delegation by Sir E. Crowe, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Forbes Adam:

'I cannot believe that it is proper or politic that the mandate commission, which I understand is a body responsible to the Council of Five, should draw up—still less publish—a mandate for Palestine before the question has been decided whether there is to be a separate mandate for Palestine or not, and who is to be the mandatory.'

'But I express an opinion with much diffidence, since I am in total ignorance of either the powers or the proceedings of this curious commission which seems to migrate between Paris and London on no fixed principles.'

E. A. C.

July 28

'I think there must be some mistake. Have any of the other mandates been yet published?

'Apart from the question of publication I presume nothing on the form & substance of the mandate will be decided without my first seeing it.'

A. J. B.

'Mr. Forbes Adam

'Put this in answer to the present letter.'

E. A. C.

July 29

'I have sent Mr. Baker a copy of Sir E. Crowe's & Mr. Balfour's minutes with a request [not filed] to show them to Lord R. Cecil.'

E. G. F. Adam

July 29.'

(In a minute of July 28 Mr. Forbes Adam had stated: 'I am going to London on July 31st until August 5th and might stay on a few days, if this could be authorized.' See No. 299.)

## No. 228

Sir G. Grahame<sup>1</sup> (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 905 Telegraphic: by bag [108817/2117/44A]

PARIS, July 26, 1919

The *Bulletin de l'Asie Française* for July contains an article by a well-known publicist, Monsieur Robert de Caix, violently attacking British propaganda against France in the Levant.

According to Monsieur de Caix, the object of this propaganda is to eliminate French influence in Syria. It was for this purpose, he says, that British occupation encouraged pan-Arabism in Syria, and despatched the Emir Feisal to Paris with an exaggerated programme. England, he says, justified

<sup>1</sup> Minister in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

her attitude towards the King of the Hedjaz by promises made to him at the end of 1915. These promises were contradictory to engagements taken by England towards France in 1916, and he complains that promises made to 'the King of the Arabs' should have prevailed over those made to France, and attributes this to British self-interest.

Monsieur de Caix then proceeds to enumerate certain of the methods employed by the Sherifian régime, installed by British occupation and subsidised by British funds, to destroy French influence in Syria:—

Sherifian censorship, he says, and Press foster a xenophobia, particularly aimed at France. The Sherifian Police ill-treats French partisans. Anti-French petitions are circulated by the Gendarmerie itself. Francophil manifestations are severely dealt with and persons suspected of having francophil tendencies are prevented from travelling and their passports refused them. Mussulman fanaticism is antagonised by representing France as the guardian of the Christians, more especially of the Maronites to whom, it is alleged, she intends to hand over the government of the country. At the same time, among the Christians, stress is laid on the irreligion of the French Government which, it is stated, intends to institute schools without religion. Monsieur de Caix explains the apparent inconsistency of the last two examples quoted by stating that it is not a question of being logical but of ruining French influence.

It would be easier, he continues, for France to resist this propaganda if French merchants and engineers who formerly exercised influence in Syria were at their posts. But, he adds, by skilful manipulation of passports and other formalities they are kept away as long as possible. While they are kicking their heels in Egypt, a number of British Civil Servants are admitted to Syria to organise competition against them. When Frenchmen are enabled to return, they find their establishments requisitioned for some of the innumerable needs of the British Army of Occupation. British ships often at the last moment find they have no room on board for French Officers sent to Syria, who are consequently delayed at the port of embarkation. Commerce via Egypt or Haifa is favoured in opposition to that via Beyrouth, the traditional basis of French economic influence in Syria. French traders cannot obtain trucks owing to British military requirements. If the French administration buys wheat at Damascus to relieve famine in Lebanon, the Anglo-Sherifian administration prohibits its export. French Administration being thus rendered impossible is then blamed for incapacity.

Not even the most petty forms of propaganda are ignored, and it is, he says, difficult to draw a distinction between the acts of Sherifian agents whose finances are supplied by England and those of British agents themselves.

As an example of direct anti-French propaganda by British agents Monsieur de Caix quotes the prohibition by the British Occupation to allow French to be taught in schools at Mardine in the middle of the French zone as defined by agreement of 1916. He concludes by observing that it would be naive not to recognise influence of British advisers and British subsidies behind the native Government.

Monsieur de Caix states that while some of the above examples may not be absolutely exact, the whole account is undoubtedly true and confirmed by a quantity of concordant reports. He declares that the object of his article is not to publish a number of irritating details, but to ensure that an Allied Government, which has not the right to ignore the acts of its subordinates, render that justice which is due to France.

*Temps* of to-day's date publishes most of Monsieur de Caix's article and practically endorses his view adding that it is in interest of two countries so closely allied as France and Great Britain to be loyally frank with one another. It observes there is no doubt that policy of British agents in Levant has aroused deep uneasiness in France. No one, it remarks, wishes to accuse His Majesty's Government and no one doubts Mr. Lloyd George's assertion that England has no desire for Syrian mandate, but brutal fact remains that, outside the Government, British agents endeavour to apply in Levant a policy which aims at the exclusion of France.

*Temps* then refers to work of American Mission in Syria and expresses belief that result of its report is unfavourable as regards France's mandate. If, it adds, this is so, this view is due to the skilful propaganda during past six months aimed exclusively against France.

*Temps* article concludes by an appeal to well-known British sense of 'fair-play'.

Text of articles will be forwarded by despatch.<sup>2</sup>  
Communicated to Peace Delegation.

<sup>2</sup> No. 229.

#### No. 229

Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 30)

No. 738 [109680/2117/44]

PARIS, July 27, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 905<sup>1</sup> of to-day's [sic] date, to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies<sup>2</sup> of the two articles therein summarised, the one written in the *Bulletin de l'Asie Française* by Monsieur Robert de Caix, the main portions of which were reproduced by the *Temps*, and the other, an article on the first page of the *Temps*, commenting on Monsieur de Caix's accusations and views. I have marked in the margin of the extract<sup>2</sup> from the *Bulletin de l'Asie Française* the portion of Monsieur de Caix's article which was reproduced in the *Temps*.

There have been from time to time during the last month or two anti-British articles in the French Press with regard to the question of Syria which have been reported to Your Lordship. I fear, however, that Monsieur de Caix's article and the prominence unfortunately given to it by the *Temps* mark a further step in the aggravation of this controversy.

Monsieur de Caix is a well-known writer and journalist who has travelled

<sup>1</sup> No. 228.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

much in the East. He was a good many years ago Foreign Editor of the *Journal des Débats*, and is connected with various committees, such as the 'Comité de l'Asie Française', which occupy themselves with French interests outside Europe. His article will make a very considerable impression here, and will be read and believed by large numbers of Frenchmen in and outside administrative circles, who form and direct public opinion in France as regards foreign affairs.

Your Lordship is accustomed to hear from Monsieur Paul Cambon complaints of and charges against British action in the Near East, but what was formerly only said in the Secretary of State's room is now set forth for all the world to read in the columns of so influential a paper as the *Temps*.

This article in itself will do harm to the good feelings existing between the two countries; and if the campaign continues on these lines, it may arouse public opinion to such an extent that, in a comparatively short time, some change may be observable in the cordial sentiments of this country towards Great Britain. The old picture of 'perfide Albion' has never quite faded from the French mind, and though new and strong ties between the two countries have been forged during the common struggle just terminated, it has not yet been proved what powers of resistance these ties would have should a sharp strain be put upon them. The trouble is that French public opinion will believe what it is told from the French side and pay little attention to the counter-statements rebutting the charges from the English side.

An experienced French diplomatist, now retired, who evidently knew something of the Sykes-Picot agreement, observed to me a year or two ago about the situation which was coming into being in the Near East that he feared that there were cases when the hard facts of a situation were stronger than the 'bonne volonté' of Governments, and that the proposed arrangements by which France and England found themselves in the Near East in an equivocal position with an Arab State or States between them were calculated to set France and England by the ears for the next fifty years.

I have &c.

GEORGE GRAHAME

### No. 230

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)*

*No. 1208 Telegraphic: by bag [109238/2117/44A]*

PARIS, July 28, 1919

Following is the text of a note handed to me by M. Pichon to-day:—

'Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, en présence d'une série d'informations reçues de Syrie, croit devoir appeler l'attention de Monsieur Balfour, et le prier d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur des faits qui lui paraissent peu conforme[s] à l'esprit des accords intervenus entre les Gouvernements français et anglais et des déclarations répétées de M. Lloyd George.

'Les autorités anglaises du Hedjaz se proposeraient de donner au contrôle

sanitaire du prochain pélerinage de la Mecque un caractère purement britannique, sans tenir compte des efforts communs pour la création de l'état du Hedjaz, des traditions et des intérêts français à l'égard des sujets musulmans français de l'Afrique du Nord.

'Sur quatre régiments de cavalerie anglais envoyés d'Angleterre, débarqués récemment à El Kantara, deux régiments seraient envoyés en Syrie, mesure difficilement conciliable, après la demande de relève des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises en Cilicie, après les difficultés opposées à la relève des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises en Syrie, avec la situation présente en Syrie et le désintéressement proclamé dans cette région par le Gouvernement britannique.

'Le Commandement anglais, s'appuyant sur une convention anglo-arabe de décembre dernier qui ne nous a pas été communiquée, aurait commencé à équiper et armer 6,000 gendarmes chérifiens et une brigade chérifienne, la livraison des armes devant commencer à Caïffa. Si une telle opération devait être exécutée, elle représenterait l'organisation par le Gouvernement anglais d'une force chérifienne hostile au mandat français au moment même où la question est posée internationalement.

'Enfin, à la suite de la visite des commissaires américains à Alep et des déclarations favorables au mandat français faites par la majorité des divers éléments de la population, les officiers anglais ont arrêté à Homs Moudjhem-Bey et les principaux chefs des Aneizés, accompagnés d'un officier français, qui se rendaient à Beyrouth pour s'entretenir avec le Haut-Commissaire français.

'Le Gouvernement Français ne saurait concevoir comment de pareils faits et spécialement les deux derniers pourraient se concilier avec les relations confiantes existant entre les deux pays, la répudiation déclarée par le premier ministre anglais de toute demande de mandat en Syrie, et l'impartialité loyale qui doit être gardée par les autorités militaires britanniques qui en fait conservent le commandement en Syrie.

'M. Pichon est convaincu que l'arrestation, du jour qu'ils se disent favorables au mandat français, de chefs arabes, (objets jusque là des faveurs et des cadeaux des services politiques anglais) est la manifestation d'un état d'esprit local et qu'il suffira de signaler ces faits divers, dont la répétition produit une impression pénible, pour que des ordres formels soient donnés par le Gouvernement anglais afin qu'il y soit remédié, qu'ils ne puissent se renouveler, et que l'équivoque maintenue sur la situation en Syrie soit dissipée.'

The tone of this note makes it desirable that it should receive an immediate answer and a stiff one, if as I imagine we are in a position to give it. It would seem better that the [sic] answer should be given by the Foreign Office to M. Cambon in the same way as the previous correspondence that has passed between you and M. Cambon on the subject of the earlier French charges in regard to our conduct in Syria. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would telegraph to General Allenby the substance or the text of this note for his immediate observations and report, that is if you are not already in a position to answer it categorically. If the result of the inquiry is as I anticipate to

show that these charges are ill-founded the reply should be of a nature to discourage repetitions of them.

I should mention, however, that I have learned in conversation with a British officer who passed through Paris on his way from Syria that it is only quite recently that our local officials have been informed of the Prime Minister's categorical statement that 'H.M.G. are determined not to take a mandate for Syria'. (See my telegram to General Clayton No. 16,<sup>1</sup> of May 29, forwarded to you in my despatch No. 870<sup>2</sup> of June 2.)

This seems most unfortunate. If British officers on the spot have been in ignorance of so vital a point in our policy in Syria this may well have caused suspicion in the French mind as to the genuine intentions of H.M.G., and may possibly even have given rise to action in individual cases of a nature to lend some colour to these repeated French complaints. General Allenby's serious attention ought to be called to this, and steps taken to ensure that our policy of *désintéressement* in regard to Syria is made as widely known as possible.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 206, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> This formal covering despatch is not printed.

### No. 231

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 31)*

*No. 1457 [110404/2117/444]*

PARIS, July 30, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and with reference to His Lordship's despatch No. 4330<sup>1</sup> (91359/ME/44) of June 26 begs to transmit the accompanying copy of a letter addressed by Dr. Weizmann to Mr. Forbes Adam regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine.

Mr. Balfour would propose to reply that if and when the questions of a mandate and the mandatory are settled and the time has come to begin Jewish immigration into Palestine, the selection of suitable immigrants will doubtless be left largely to appropriate Jewish control agencies working in consultation with the mandatory, and that *prima facie* young immigrants suitable for pioneer work, particularly of an agricultural nature, would be the most desirable, but that the questions of the constitution of a militia for Palestine and whether and, if so, in what numbers Jewish immigrants should be enrolled, cannot be settled even in principle at present and must eventually be a matter for the decision of the military authorities of the mandatory.

Mr. Balfour would be glad to learn whether His Lordship concurs.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 209.

<sup>2</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 5218 of August 6 to Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon stated that he agreed 'entirely' with the proposed reply. It was made to Dr. Weizmann in a letter from Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris) of August 9.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 231

*Dr. Weizmann to Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris)*

DÉLÉGATION SIONISTE, PARIS, July 23, 1919

Dear Forbes-Adams [sic],

I realise quite well that nothing much can be done until the mandate for Palestine has been granted. Moreover it is not our desire to increase the Jewish population of Palestine by means of an undue proportion of soldiers or ex-soldiers, but it is obvious that a strong militia will be needed in Palestine for some years at least after the political settlement has been effected and, as it is, I presume, generally agreed that the number of British troops in the Near East should be reduced as much as possible some substitute for a relatively large British army should be welcomed. There are to-day thousands of Jewish young men who have served in the Russian army, mountain Jews of the Caucasus, Galician prisoners of war in Russia who would, in the ordinary course, be drafted into the Polish army, Polish prisoners of war in Italy, Roumanian Jewish ex-soldiers, and others, young, healthy, well trained men, at present wasting their lives waiting in camps and elsewhere who have no desire to return either to Poland or Roumania and are begging to be admitted to Palestine to take part in the building up of that country. They are an excellent type of immigrant, both for pioneer work in Palestine and at the same time as material for a militia. For the latter reason, if admitted to Palestine, they would serve as a relief to a portion of the British garrison; for the former they would be ideal instruments for preparing for a larger immigration. I am able to say that the Adjutant-General looks on this suggestion with favour but he thinks that it is primarily a matter to be considered by the political authorities. If approval in principle of the policy which I have outlined could be obtained we could immediately give much needed encouragement to some of those who are appealing so insistently for opportunities to settle in Palestine.

I am,  
Yours very sincerely,  
CH. WEIZMANN

No. 232

*General Sir E. Allenby (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received July 31)*

*No. 1177 Telegraphic [109994/2117/44A]*

RAMLEH, July 30, 1919

Following from Policy<sup>1</sup> Egypt Expeditionary Force. Begins.

An article has been submitted to a Jewish paper in Palestine by Zionist organization . . .<sup>2</sup> purporting to come from London *Daily Telegraph* correspondent Percival Landon, to the effect that Zionists in Paris have won 'Tremendous victory at Peace Conference', that they are to be given great powers in Administration of Palestine and that they are busy with plans for re-population and intensive cultivation. Unrestricted immigration is implied.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the political office.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

If such articles find their way to Palestine they will inflame an already excited population. I urge that Zionists in London and Paris should be told to restrain the exuberance of their press supporters and to be moderate and cautious in their views.<sup>3</sup> Ends.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office despatch No. 421 of August 19, 1919, to Cairo that he had 'ascertained that the article referred to is apparently identical with a statement which appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* some months ago.'

'The statement was made by Dr. Weizmann to Mr. Landon in Paris on April 7th shortly after Dr. Weizmann's appearance before the Council of Ten, and it is probably to this that the article referred to as a Zionist Triumph. Dr. Weizmann denies that he said anything more to Mr. Landon at this interview than what he had already stated in public: viz., that Palestine should eventually be able to receive 58,000 immigrants yearly.'

'It would seem therefore that some local Jewish correspondent must have resuscitated Mr. Landon's article and applied it to a situation which had altered in the interval since its first publication.'

'I have impressed on the Zionist Organisations, both here and in Paris, the vital importance of restraining and moderating their press supporters.'

### No. 233

*Earl Curzon to Colonel French (Cairo)*

No. 240 Telegraphic [105333/73497/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1919

Zionist Organisation are pressing for facilities for entry into Palestine of Commissions of experts to examine political schemes for irrigation, water power, etc., and for individuals proceeding on behalf of important economic groups.<sup>1</sup>

Peace Delegation have informed Dr. Weizmann that there is no objection from their point of view. This would seem to exclude any objection that the despatch of such missions should await the final decisions of the Peace Conference.

We propose therefore with General Clayton's concurrence to grant facilities provided that these commissions partake of no official character.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In a letter of July 23, 1919, to Mr. Balfour, requesting these facilities, Dr. Weizmann had stated: 'I may say that we are most anxious to prevent any immigration on a large scale at present, but, on the other hand we wish to make all possible preparations so that this larger immigration may commence as soon as the country is ready to receive it. The granting of the favour for which I am asking now would I believe hasten the day on which this larger immigration can commence.'

<sup>2</sup> With reference to this proposal Lord Curzon asked Colonel French in Foreign Office telegram No. 254 of August 18 to Cairo whether he saw any objection to it in view of the policy laid down in Foreign Office telegram 245: see document No. 236. Colonel French replied in Cairo telegram No. 408 of August 21 (received August 22): 'It was assumed that these Commissioners were coming in any case. No objection provided that numbers are limited.' Dr. Weizmann was informed accordingly in a Foreign Office letter of August 27, 1919.

No. 234

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 2)*

No. 1485 [111235/111235/44A]

PARIS, August 1, 1919

My Lord,

I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me by Dr. Weizmann in regard to appointments in Palestine. I trust that Your Lordship and the War Office will endeavour to meet Dr. Weizmann's wishes in the matter of these new appointments.

I am, &c.

(for Mr. Balfour)

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE IN No. 234

*Dr. Weizmann to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

(16465)

DÉLÉGATION SIONISTE, PARIS, July 23, 1919

Dear Mr. Balfour,

Referring to the conversation I had the pleasure of having with you yesterday I venture to submit that, in view of the regretted impending resignation by General Money of his office of Chief Military Administrator in Palestine and also by General Clayton of that of Chief Political Officer, which is equally regretted, it is most desirable in the interests of the future of Palestine and also for the furtherance of the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government in the communication made by you to Lord Rothschild in November 1917, that these two very important offices should be filled by men who are in complete sympathy with that policy. It is, I am sure, unnecessary to point out that in the present unsettled state of the country and nervous condition of its population any false step, no matter how apparently insignificant, that may be taken may have incalculable consequences and it is on this account essential that those to whom the administration of the country is entrusted shall be thoroughly conversant with and in sympathy with the policy that His Majesty's Government has adopted.

I understand that the Foreign Office has already suggested as successor to General Clayton the name of an officer<sup>1</sup> who, I know, possesses a thorough understanding of the problems with which he would have to deal and who would, I am sure, be rigidly just to all sections of the population as well as to all others who are concerned in the welfare of the country. He would have, I can assure you, the full confidence of the Zionist Organisation and of the Jews of Palestine and I know of no reason why he should not also obtain the confidence of all the other elements in the population. When this and the other impending vacancy have been filled steps will no doubt be taken to replace officers, some of them filling positions inferior only to those already mentioned, who, according to all the information we have received, have shown them-

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Meinertzhagen.

selves not only unsympathetic but even hostile to the Jewish population of the country. Changes in these offices are, I feel, almost as essential as the filling of the higher appointments with the right type of men.

I am,  
Yours very truly,  
CH. WEIZMANN

No. 235

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 5148 [109412/2117/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1919

The Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to Mr. Balfour and with reference to Astoria telegram No. 1208<sup>1</sup> of the 28th ultimo communicating the text of a Note from the French Government complaining against the actions and policy of His Majesty's Government in Syria and the Hedjaz, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a Note on the same subject from Monsieur Cambon.

Mr. Balfour will observe that this note is couched in stronger terms than that which formed the subject of the telegram above-referred to.

The War Office have been asked to instruct General Allenby to submit by telegraph his observations on the French complaints and in the meantime the question is being examined and a detailed reply is being prepared in this Department.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 235

*Note from the French Ambassador in London<sup>2</sup>*

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, 28 juillet, 1919

L'Ambassadeur de France est chargé d'appeler l'attention du Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères sur les renseignements récemment reçus du Haut Commissaire de France à Beyrouth :

1<sup>o</sup>. Les Autorités Anglaises du Hedjaz veulent imposer au Malek, pendant le prochain pèlerinage, un contrôle sanitaire exclusivement britannique. Le Gouvernement Français ne peut consentir à une action exclusive dans cet Etat du Hedjaz, à la création duquel il a coopéré avec ses alliés britanniques et animé du même désir qu'eux de ménager les susceptibilités du monde musulman en assurant au Souverain qui règnera sur les deux villes saintes de la Mecque et de Médine une entière indépendance.

On ne saurait nier que les mesures sanitaires doivent être surveillées pour être efficaces par les puissances européennes intéressées; même dans la Mer Rouge au temps des Turcs le service sanitaire était nettement international. Il serait inadmissible pour le Gouvernement Français que ses sujets musulmans, se rendant au pèlerinage cette année, constatent que le premier

<sup>1</sup> No. 230.

<sup>2</sup> This note was communicated to the Foreign Office by M. Cambon on July 29, 1919.

résultat de la Victoire des Alliés ait été de diminuer la situation de la France dans la Mer Rouge et auprès du Souverain des villes saintes.

2°. L'Officier britannique en mission au Hedjaz doit armer et équiper une brigade de troupes et 6,000 gendarmes chérifiens; la brigade comportera 3,666 hommes, 12 canons et 40 mitrailleuses. Cette organisation, qui aurait déjà commencé, serait effectuée en vertu d'une Convention anglo-arabe du mois de décembre 1918. M. Pichon doit constater que des accords sont passés avec les Autorités chérifiennes par les Autorités Britanniques sans que celles-ci jugent à propos ni de le prévenir, ni même de les lui communiquer.

Il est en outre important pour le Gouvernement Français de savoir à quoi seront employées ces troupes chérifiennes et dans quelle région elles doivent opérer. Il serait à tout le moins singulier que l'autorité britannique, sachant les efforts qui sont faits dans une partie du monde musulman de Syrie pour l'exciter contre tout mandat ou toute intervention étrangère, prenne sur elle de fournir à ce parti des troupes et des armes.

3°. Tandis que le Général Allenby continue à s'opposer à l'envoi de nouvelles troupes françaises en Syrie, 4 régiments de cavalerie anglaise venant d'Angleterre débarquent à El-Kantara, deux de ces régiments étant destinés à la Syrie.

Il est certain qu'à moins d'explications que Monsieur Pichon serait heureux de recevoir, l'envoi de deux régiments de cavalerie anglaise en Syrie dans les conditions actuelles, peut être interprété, après les difficultés opposées à la relève des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises, comme la marque de l'intention du War Office de ne pas tenir compte des accords franco-anglais de 1916 et de combattre par tous les moyens le mandat français en Syrie.

4°. Les officiers britanniques résidant en Syrie ont employé, ces temps derniers, des procédés d'intimidation vis-à-vis des personnes appelées à déposer devant la Commission Américaine. Huit chefs anzaries qui venaient de déposer à Alep devant ladite commission et qui rentraient à Beyrouth, où Monsieur Picot les attendait, ont été arrêtés à Homs pour 'vol avec violence' malgré la présence d'officiers français qui les accompagnaient. L'accusation de 'vol avec violence' ne reposait sur rien et n'a pas été poursuivie. Mais les officiers britanniques ont voulu discréditer les chefs anzaries et les agents français vis-à-vis du public local et des Américains.

Ces procédés prennent un caractère singulier quand on les rapproche des déclarations réitérées de M. Lloyd George qui ne veut absolument pas de mandat syrien pour l'Angleterre et qui ne dispute pas à la France ce mandat.

Et il faut bien constater que ces actes répétés ne sont pas en harmonie avec les relations que les deux pays, unis dans une commune lutte et dans une commune victoire, doivent entretenir et qu'ils sont contraires aux déclarations publiques des deux Gouvernements sur leur politique en Syrie. Monsieur Pichon veut croire qu'il ne s'agit que de manœuvres d'officiers et fonctionnaires auxquels une trop grande liberté a été laissée jusqu'ici.

No. 236

*Earl Curzon to Colonel French (Cairo)*

*No. 245 Telegraphic [96834/2117/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1919

Following is for your information and guidance and for that of all heads of administration and their local representatives:

His Majesty's Government's policy contemplates concession to Great Britain of Mandate for Palestine. Terms of Mandate will embody substance of declaration of November 2, 1917.<sup>1</sup> Arabs will not be despoiled of their land nor required to leave the country. There is no question of majority being subjected to the rule of minority, nor does Zionist programme contemplate this.

All denominations will enjoy religious liberty and Holy Places of Christian and Mohammedans will remain in custody of adherents of those religions. American and French Governments are equally pledged to support establishment in Palestine of Jewish national home. This should be emphasised to Arab leaders at every opportunity and it should be impressed on them that the matter is a '*chose jugée*' and continued agitation would be useless and detrimental. Development of Palestine under new régime may be expected to involve large influx of money and all classes and races will benefit by its expenditure.

<sup>1</sup> The Balfour Declaration.

No. 237

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic: by bag [105999/73497/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 5, 1919

Your despatch No. 715<sup>1</sup> May 13.

I am very doubtful about giving preference either to Samuel's Committee or to Zionist Organisation in respect of privileged information concerning the commercial and economic development of Palestine before mandate for that country has been given. Information asked for in this case consists of:

(1) Report drawn up by Sir W. Willcocks<sup>2</sup> for the Ottoman Government on the Sania Lands in the Jordan Valley with special reference to water-power.

(2) British official report on hydro-electric power on the Upper Jordan.

(3) Suggestions by Major Tulloch on the same subject,  
and will no doubt be followed by similar requests as time goes on.

If however this is your policy it shall be done.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this short despatch Mr. Balfour stated that he would be glad if the War Office could be approached with a view to satisfying a request from Mr. Samuel that it should make available to the Advisory Committee on the Economic Development of Palestine non-confidential official information on the subjects indicated.

<sup>2</sup> British irrigation expert.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was minuted as follows in the British Peace Delegation by Mr. Vansittart, Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Balfour:

'Not only has the mandate not been given: is it *certain* that we shd accept it if offered? Considerations are beginning to emerge which might conceivably make it wiser for us, while supporting Zionism to the extent of our power, not to be the mandated power. (See however 17239 [a copy of No. 236].)

'Perhaps it wd be well not to proceed with this for the moment. Mr. Samuel may not return to the charge for some time & by then the situation will be clearer. I doubt if, until it is, the communication of this information wd be of any real utility to the Zionists.

'Robert Vansittart

'I agree.

'Aug. 6

'We had better hold our hand and so reply to Lord Curzon.

'E. A. C.

'Aug. 6

'(1) I am an ardent Zionist—but I agree with Mr. Vansittart that if only our own convenience is to be consulted I should personally like some one else to take the mandate. I do not however think this will happen.

'(2) The question put by Lord Curzon is not easy to answer: and the considerations on both sides are too complicated to discuss in this minute. Please speak to me.

'A. J. B.

'Wait  
'E.A.C.'

### No. 238

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 5282 [375/2/13/17547]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 8, 1919

Earl Curzon of Kedleston presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith for Mr. Balfour's consideration copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Name and Date	Subject
2 copies of Minutes on meeting between Gen. Clayton and the Zionist Organisation on July 9. (Transm <sup>t</sup> to F.O. by Mr. Landmann, Aug. 4.)	Zionist Questions.

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 238

*Minutes of Meeting with General Clayton at the Offices of the Zionist Organisation, 76/7, Great Russell St., London, W.C. 1 on Wednesday July 9, 1919.*

Present. Dr. Weizmann, in the Chair, General Clayton, Lord Rothschild, Sir Alfred Mond, Mr. James de Rothschild, Dr. Levin, Messrs. Berligne, Dizengoff, B. Goldberg, Landman, Naiditch, Sacher, J. Simon,<sup>1</sup> Slatopolsky, Ussishkin, Wilkansky.

DR. WEIZMANN, after welcoming General Clayton in the name of the Zionists present, proceeded to deal with the following questions:—

#### *Immigration*

He said that certain measures were required to enable the Zionists to begin

<sup>1</sup> Probably Mr. Julius Simon.

work in Palestine without loss of time. The first was immigration. By this he did not mean mass immigration. As General Clayton was aware, the Zionist Organisation had sent out a strongly worded notice to Jews in every part of the world, warning them not to leave their homes for Palestine until the Central Office of the Zionist Organisation gave the signal. What they did require, however, was facilities to enable small groups of immigrants to proceed to Palestine, in order to prepare the way for future immigration. For instance, arrangements had been made to enable a Company to commence building operations on a large scale as soon as possible. This Company required to send out architects and experts to advise on the kind of houses required, the numbers required, and all kindred subjects. It was a great hardship if such representatives were not allowed to enter the country. He hoped that the recommendation of the Zionist Organisation would be accepted by the authorities in the future, as in the past. The recommendation had been given with the greatest care, and with full knowledge of the circumstances in each individual case. He (Dr. Weizmann) thought that the Zionist Organisation could be safely relied upon to discriminate between desirable and undesirable immigrants.

#### *2. Land already in Jewish Possession*

Wherever land was already owned by Jews, the Zionist Organisation asked for the possibility to begin to settle colonists and build houses without waiting for the general land question to be solved.

#### *3. The Embargo on Land*

There had been a good deal of talk and rumour as to the imminent raising of the embargo. The Zionist Organisation felt that this would work most unfavourably and desired the maintenance of the embargo until the future status of the land was settled and the land policy was decided upon.

#### *4. Concessions*

They were aware that concessions were being asked for from all sides, and desired that no concessions should be granted until the policy of the authorities regarding public works was declared. In the meantime, the Zionist Organisation should be permitted to send out experts to commence preliminary investigations.

#### *5. Hebrew Language*

DR. WEIZMANN, knowing that General Allenby and General Clayton were both agreed on the right of Hebrew to be on a par with Arabic in all official publications, expressed his surprise that in several instances Hebrew had been omitted from such publications. It was a question of prestige, and General Clayton would appreciate how valuable this factor was in the East. He, therefore, urged that instructions be given that Hebrew should not be omitted in future official publications.

## *6. Government Scheme for Agricultural Loans*

He had received information regarding a scheme to grant loans to Fellahen, to promote agriculture. These loans were to be provided, he understood, from private sources. If the report was true, it appeared to be in contradiction to the policy of the Government to maintain the *status quo*. He urged that enquiry be made into the matter, and if the report were correct, instructions should be given to prevent anything being done in this direction before the mandate was settled.

## *7. Specific Cases*

There were specific cases of discrimination against Jews on the part of the Administration. He referred to the case of Nablous, which was already sufficiently familiar to General Clayton. In Nablous, at the present time, it was impossible for a Jew to spend a night. He thought that this was very detrimental, not only to the Jews, but also to the prestige of the British power in the country. It should not be possible, under a British Government, for any place to be unsafe for any citizen. He would not refer to the other cases in any detail. He would just mention the cases of Hotel Hardegg and the Wagner Factory, and the removal of the Jewish Battalions from Haifa and Raffa. These cases appeared to him to proceed from a lack of good will on the part of the authorities and there were many other less important cases. These cases were much to be deplored, and they prejudiced the future position of the Jews in Palestine very considerably. He would like to say in conclusion, that some trouble might come after the policy of the British Government was declared, but he was sure it would not go to any considerable extent. On the other hand, the more the present policy of the Administration was persisted in, the more the Arabs would be encouraged in their views, and the greater the difficulty in making them accept the policy when it was declared. He urged that the motto of the Administration should be 'Good Will and Clear Vision'. He had said what he had said, not with any intention of making complaints, but from a desire to save trouble for the authorities in future.

GENERAL CLAYTON said he was indebted to Dr. Weizmann for the clear explanation of the difficulties which the Zionists were meeting with at the present time. He wished to point out, in fairness to the authorities, that, in the first place, they were not placed there in order to carry out any particular policy, but to maintain security in the country. They were in the position of a trustee awaiting a decision regarding the fate of the country. In the second place, in the absence of definite instructions from the Home Government, the Administration was, in his opinion, not justified in doing anything which could be construed as in some way forestalling the mandate.

Individual administrators may have appeared to show lack of good will. That was probably due to the fact that the staff of administrators was collected under great difficulties, and from the material available at the time. Most of the best men were already serving elsewhere.

The delay in the settlement was undoubtedly a misfortune, and greatly

increased the difficulties of the administration. Therefore, the real solution was to get a quick settlement. The document shown to him by Dr. Weizmann that day (General Clayton referred to the draft treaty between the Allies and the Turkish Government)<sup>2</sup> certainly indicated that the decision was already come to, and he thought that, if this was really the case, instructions might be given almost at once. The present unsettled position strengthened the position of the Arabs. He thought that a clear statement of policy and the declaration of the *fait accompli* would probably be accepted peaceably by at least 75 per cent. of the Arab population. At the present time, some of them still thought that there was a hope of reversing the policy, perhaps by violence. It was advisable, therefore, to remove any ground for hopes which could not be fulfilled. Until his visit to Europe, he had been of the opinion that it was better not to forestall the mandate, but he thought now that if the decision had really been reached in principle and if a delay of four or five months must elapse before it was announced, definite instructions should be given, and certain lines of action should be indicated to the Administration in Palestine, along which they could proceed in preparing to carry the decision into effect.

#### *Immigration*

He saw no objection whatever to the immigration of groups such as Dr. Weizmann had mentioned. With regard to the official commission he thought that it was not advisable to make the commission official. Individual members, who would probably not exceed forty or fifty, could do their work, for which all facilities would be given them, and report to the Organisation. He could not speak for General Allenby's views on the subject, but he himself was of opinion that no person who could be of assistance to the country should be excluded.

LORD ROTHSCHILD said that the sting of the restriction of immigration was that it could be construed as proving that the administration was less favourable to the Jews than to the other elements of the population.

GENERAL CLAYTON replied that he had been attacked by the Arabs for being the very opposite, but unfortunately this was a position in which he often found himself. He had no authority in actual matters of administration, and many matters were decided upon without his being informed or consulted.

#### *Embargo on Land.*

A draft ordinance dealing with the subject had been sent when he was already in Egypt. He submitted it to Egyptian experts, and advised that it should be sent on to the Home Government for consideration. It was not yet issued. Speaking from memory, he could say that it did not contemplate any large transfers, but was intended to help very small landowners to realise their assets, and thus relieve themselves of their financial difficulties.

LORD ROTHSCHILD feared that such an ordinance would be a loop-hole

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 299, notes 2 and 7.

for speculators on the look out for speculations in Palestine. There were two persons especially whom he had in mind, of whom the home authorities could not be too careful.

MAJOR JAMES DE ROTHSCHILD thought that the Zionist Organisation should have been consulted in such a question. They would be quite ready to co-operate with the authorities on the lines of the draft treaty. If a land purchase authority were to be established Zionists would be quite ready and willing to provide some of the capital.

#### *Concessions*

GENERAL CLAYTON said, on this point, that there were no concessions granted or contemplated. The military authorities had no power to grant concessions.

#### *Schools*

With regard to the schools, MR. BERLIGNE explained that there was an old Turkish rule which provided that funds from the general taxation levied on Jews and Arabs went to the support of Arab schools. The Zionists hoped that, if this were the case, the Jewish schools, too, would receive similar support. The schools cost the Zionists about £100,000 a year.

GENERAL CLAYTON said that he was not aware of any such rule at present prevailing in Palestine.

#### *Hebrew*

With regard to Hebrew, he quite agreed that the principle was settled. Instructions had been given that it should be put into practice at once. He would write to Egypt again on the subject to remind them.

#### *Nablous*

In this case the Governor had been removed from Jaffa to Nablous with the best intentions. As he did not get on very well with the Jewish population, he was sent to a town where there were no Jews. The events which occurred could scarcely have been foreseen.

#### *Jewish Battalions*

GENERAL CLAYTON said that the removal of the Jewish Battalions was not due to representations by the Arab inhabitants of Haifa but to some other cause. It was intended to bring them back again, though not necessarily to Haifa.

LORD ROTHSCHILD said that he had heard that the 38th and 39th Battalions were near Jerusalem, and that the 40th was at Raffa. An understanding had been given that the men should be treated as British subjects, and they felt very sore that they had not been treated as such.

MAJOR J. DE ROTHSCHILD pointed out that as most of the recruits in the 40th Battalion were Palestinians, their removal from Palestine was interpreted as being tantamount to their being sent into exile, and a grave stigma upon their good name.

GENERAL CLAYTON said that he would take up the matter, with General Bols.<sup>3</sup> He could not accept Lord Rothschild's view that they wished to be treated as British subjects pure and simple. He thought that, being Jews, they wished to be treated as such and to be stationed in Jewish centres.

DR. WEIZMANN said that it was generally believed that the Egyptian Labour Corps was at the bottom of the removal. This Corps was notoriously anti-British. If they had triumphed in getting the Jewish battalions removed, it was a grave reflection on the prestige of the military authorities.

*Loans to Fullaheen*

DR. WEIZMANN pointed out that this was done over the head of the Political Officer, and the Zionist Organisation.

GENERAL CLAYTON said that he had only seen it as a *fait accompli*, and therefore had no knowledge of the preliminary negotiations.

DR. WEIZMANN thanked General Clayton for the way he had dealt with the points raised. The points had accumulated for a considerable time, and he had preferred to wait until a favourable opportunity presented itself, to submit such cases to the Authority, rather than trouble them with each particular case. Nearly all the complaints originated from the same cause, namely, that the administration had not been given clear instructions. The remedy was, therefore, to give the British administration in Palestine a clear hint that they should not run counter to the policy of the Home Government, and this would certainly bring about the good will which they are all so anxiously desired [sic] to find in Palestine.

GENERAL CLAYTON thanked Dr. Weizmann for the opportunity of having matters brought so clearly to his notice. The document deciding the policy with regard to Palestine had not yet been communicated, so far as he was aware, to General Allenby or the administration. He thought that General Allenby was in full sympathy with their aspirations. He concluded by repeating that the remedy which he favoured was a speedy decision, and the publication of such decision. The meeting then terminated.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of Staff to General Allenby.

No. 239

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

No. 1041 [109680/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 8, 1919

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 738<sup>1</sup> of the 27th ultimo, enclosing a copy of an article by M. Robert de Caix, which appeared in a recent issue of the *Bulletin de l'Asie française*, attacking the British administration and policy in Syria, and your subsequent telegrams<sup>2</sup> reporting similar attacks on the part of other French newspapers.

The recrudescence, after some weeks of silence, of these quite unjustifiable

<sup>1</sup> No. 229.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

attacks upon His Majesty's Government in the French press causes me serious concern.

In the absence of M. Cambon I accordingly sent for M. de Fleuriau,<sup>3</sup> who was received by Sir Ronald Graham.

Sir Ronald Graham spoke very strongly, and pointed out that what amounted to an organised campaign against our attitude appeared to be in progress. It had started in the *Bulletin de l'Asie française*, and had been continued in the *Temps*, the *Journal*, the *Démocratie nouvelle*, and the *Pays*. The accusations against His Majesty's Government were some of them a reiteration of complaints already received from the French Government. They were generally extravagant, and many of them had already been disproved. It was unnecessary to dwell on the true facts with regard to Franco-British relations on the Syrian question, as they had already been indicated in conversations with M. Cambon. It was perhaps possible that subordinate British agents in Syria had shown an anti-French bias, although this had not been proved.

Sir R. Graham went on to say that certain fresh allegations had been made officially by the French Embassy,<sup>4</sup> such as the unwarranted arrest of eight Arab chiefs at Homs, and Field Marshal Allenby<sup>5</sup> had at once been called upon for a report, but it should be pointed out that previous allegations of a similar nature which had formed the subject of enquiry had been proved to be of the flimsiest nature. The French Government could not pretend to have any cause of complaint against Field-Marshal Allenby or against His Majesty's Government. Their whole position in Syria was dependent upon our support. Our attitude both in Paris and in the Middle East had been perfectly correct. We had categorically, repeatedly, and publicly disclaimed any intention of accepting a mandate for Syria, and had, in so far as was possible, supported French claims. If the French position in Syria was bad they owed it to their extreme unpopularity and the want of confidence which they inspired. Field-Marshal Allenby had to act with great discretion in order to avoid an explosion, and when he expressed fears that the decrease of British or increase of French troops in those regions would produce a collision with the Arabs his fears were genuine. It was true that M. Cambon affected to disbelieve the possibility of any such danger, but the responsible officer on the spot was presumably the better judge.

His Majesty's Government were now faced with what might be described as an anti-British campaign in the French press. Its systematic continuance in a series of French newspapers made it appear that, if not organised, it must at least be encouraged by the French Government, although His Majesty's Government would be most reluctant to believe that anything of the kind was possible.

Sir Ronald Graham reminded M. de Fleuriau that a campaign of a somewhat similar nature had been conducted in the Italian press with the connivance of the Italian Government. It was directed against the allies of Italy,

<sup>3</sup> Minister in the French Embassy in London.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 235.

<sup>5</sup> General Allenby had recently been promoted field-marshal and raised to the peerage.

and had ended not only in exciting public feeling in that country to a dangerous extent, but had finally passed out of the control of the Italian Government, and had overwhelmed them. There was a danger of these French attacks embittering French feeling against this country, and they would certainly lead to replies in the British press and to polemics extremely detrimental to our good relations with France. Moreover, so serious a view on the subject was taken by His Majesty's Government that unless the propaganda was discontinued they would feel compelled to take steps, either by a public statement or otherwise, to bring the true facts of the situation to the public knowledge.

M. de Fleuriau accepted all that was said in extremely good part. He declared that he had no wish to discuss the rights or wrongs of the British attitude on the question of Syria or the grievances which the French Government entertained on the subject. He entirely agreed that press articles of the nature indicated were most undesirable. They could serve no useful purpose, and must lead to mutual bad feeling. He took careful note of the names of the papers in which the articles had appeared, and promised to call the immediate attention of the French Government to the matter, and to repeat Sir Ronald Graham's observations to them.

M. de Fleuriau said that he felt certain that neither M. Pichon nor the French Government were in any way responsible for the articles in question, and had given no encouragement to the campaign.

M. de Fleuriau added that there might be subordinate British agents in Syria who did not carry out the wishes and intentions of His Majesty's Government, and there were certainly subordinate French agents in Paris who wrote in the press and could not be trusted to follow the lines which the French Government recommended. He enquired whether a representation on the same lines as that addressed to him by Sir Ronald Graham would be made to the French Government through His Majesty's Embassy in Paris and was informed in reply that this was the case.

You should, therefore, take the earliest opportunity to make representations to the French Government in accordance with the terms of Sir Ronald Graham's statement.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to Mr. Balfour.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 240

*Earl Curzon to Colonel French (Cairo)*

*No. 250 Telegraphic [111916/87018/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 9, 1919

Please send by despatch as soon as possible for information of Peace Delegation all available information regarding

- (a) Concessions in either Syria or Palestine in which British interests participate.
- (b) Concessions of any kind in Palestine.

No. 241

Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received August 23)

No. C.P.O. 31/1 [119995/1051/44A]

CAIRO, August 11, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith for your information copy of a letter from the Commander-in-chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary, War Office, London, in regard to Mr. Justice Brandeis and Zionism.

I have, &c.

(For Acting Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force)

E. WALEY, Major, G.S.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 241

Field-Marshal Allenby to Mr. Churchill

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, August 6, 1919

Sir,

Mr. Justice Brandeis, who sailed for Europe on the 26th July, will no doubt discuss at some length with you the impressions he has gained and the conclusions he has come to as the result of his visit to Palestine.

On his arrival in Egypt I pointed out to the Judge, in a lengthy interview between us, the peculiar local difficulties besetting the Zionist programme in Palestine, the opposition to it on the part of the non-Jewish elements of the population—which at present constitute a large majority—and the fact that my administration, being a purely military one, can only act in strict adherence to the laws and usages of war. I laid stress on the fact that scrupulous fairness characterised the dealings of my administration with all classes and creeds, and I pointed out that His Majesty's Government's policy, contained in the Balfour Declaration, though fully appreciated by myself and my subordinates, did not entitle me as a military administrator to grant to the Zionists privileges and opportunities denied to other members of occupied enemy territory. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who appears to me to consider the future of Zionism in a statesmanlike and broad-minded manner, at first gained the impression, I believe, that I was unduly apprehensive, and consequently rigorous in my control of the actions of the Zionist Commission. On his return from his tour, however, he admitted that my review of the position was in no wise exaggerated, and that he found the difficulties more numerous and serious than he had anticipated. At the same time his visits, which included twenty-two colonies and all the towns where important Jewish influence exists, confirmed and strengthened his opinion as to the wisdom and practicability of the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. He agrees with me that the only policy to be followed at present is one of great patience and moderation, and that every care should be taken to avoid exciting, by threats of expropriation and subjection to Jewish dominion, the enmity and fear of the non-Jewish elements.

It is a matter for regret that the same sane spirit and sound vision does not characterise the leading articles of Zionist publications in Europe, most of which find their way into the chief centres of Palestine and are the primary cause of the bitter antagonism at present shown to the Zionist programme.

Mr. Justice Brandeis was accompanied by the Zionist Commission during his tour, but Major Waley also travelled with him and ensured his coming into close contact with such sections of his community as cause a bad impression and represent the unsatisfactory aspect of Zionism. His demeanour towards local leaders was exceptionally dignified, and on several occasions he administered rebuke to those who had caused trouble by immoderate conduct and self-advertisement, thus giving proof to Palestinian Jewry that the real leaders of the movement appreciate the pettiness and undesirability of local disputes and intrigues. The Zionist Commission, on the other hand, has not always been firm enough with the unruly spirits of the community, and has made promises of concessions impossible to be carried out. This has resulted in a loss of authority and prestige.

During his tour various grievances against my administration were laid before Mr. Justice Brandeis. It was alleged that there had been unfair restrictions on Jewish development, amounting to contravention of His Majesty's Government's policy, and that this was due to anti-Semitic prejudice on the part of Government officials.

I have enquired fully into the alleged anti-Semitic attitude of the administration, and am satisfied that any such complaints are without foundation. I understand that Mr. Justice Brandeis on the conclusion of his visit held the same opinion. There have certainly been some misunderstandings between the administrators and the Jewish leaders, and it has been and will continue to be necessary for questions of public security or military exigency to take precedence, a necessity which the Zionists are naturally sometimes unable to appreciate. The chief administrator has, however, invariably been ready to receive the representatives of the Zionist Commission at any time, and if those grievances had always been brought before him they would have been carefully considered. The Zionist Commission has, however, not always adopted this policy, and has referred complaints direct to its organisation in Europe. Such procedure makes difficult the relations between the Chief Administrator and the Zionist Commission.

Mr. Justice Brandeis fully appreciated this and has explained to the present leaders of the Commission his views as to the correct method of procedure.

On his departure the Judge expressed his gratitude for his sympathetic reception by the authorities and for all the facilities afforded him during his stay.

I have, &c.  
E. H. H. ALLENBY

No. 242

*Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia<sup>1</sup>*

[132187/2117/44A]

August 11, 1919

I

The effect which the Syrian question is producing on Anglo-French relations is causing me considerable anxiety—an anxiety not diminished by the fact that very little is openly said about it, though much is hinted. The silence which the French press maintains about the Prime Minister's declaration that under no circumstances will Britain accept a Syrian mandate, is itself ominous. All know it, none refer to it; and it has done little or nothing to modify the settled conviction of the French Government and the French Colonial Party that British officers throughout Syria and Palestine are intriguing to make a French mandate in these regions impossible.

These misunderstandings are no doubt in part due to the same cause as most misunderstandings—namely, a very clear comprehension by each party of the strength of his own case, combined with a very imperfect knowledge of, or sympathy with, the case of his opponent. In this particular instance, for example, I have never been able to understand on what historic basis the French claim to Syria really rests. Frenchmen's share in the Crusades of the Middle Ages, Mazarin's arrangements with the Turk in the seventeenth century, and the blustering expedition of 1861, lend in my opinion very little support to their far-reaching ambitions. I could make as good a case for Great Britain by recalling the repulse inflicted by Sir Sydney Smith on Napoleon at Acre, and a much better case by asking where French claims to Syria or any other part of the Turkish Empire would be, but for the recent defeat of the Turks by British forces, at an enormous cost of British lives and British treasure.

If, however, we start from the French assumption, that they have ancient claims in Syria and the Middle East, admitted as it has been in all the recent negotiations, then we must in fairness concede that they have something to say for themselves; and it is well to understand exactly what that something is.

Suppose, then, we were to ask M. Clemenceau to speak his full mind in defence of the attitude of resentful suspicion adopted almost universally by his countrymen, I think he would reply somewhat in this fashion:—

‘In Downing Street last December I tried to arrive at an understanding with England about Syria. I was deeply conscious of the need of friendly relations between the two countries, and was most anxious to prevent any collision of interests in the Middle East. I therefore asked the Prime Minister what modification in the Sykes-Picot Agreement England desired. He replied, “Mosul.” I said, “You shall have it. Anything else?” He replied, “Palestine.” Again, I said, “You shall have it.” I left London

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum was sent to the Foreign Office on September 19, 1919 (received September 22).

somewhat doubtful as to the reception this arrangement would have in France, but well assured that to Great Britain at least it would prove satisfactory.

'What, then, was my surprise when I found that what I had given with so generous a hand was made the occasion for demanding more. Mosul, it seems, was useless unless Palmyra was given also. Palestine was no sufficient home for the Jews unless its frontiers were pushed northward into Syria. And, as if this was not enough, it was discovered that Mesopotamia required a direct all-British outlet on the Mediterranean; that this involved, or was supposed to involve, the possession by England of Palmyra; so that Palmyra must follow Mosul and be transferred from the French sphere to the British.'

'All this was bad; but worse remains to be told. In the early days of the Peace Conference it was agreed that, speaking generally, conquered territory outside Europe should be held by the conquerors under mandate from the League of Nations. Who under this plan was to be the mandatory for Syria? This, perhaps, could only be finally settled when other Turkish problems were dealt with. But who was not to be mandatory could be settled, so far as England was concerned, at once. Accordingly, the Prime Minister took occasion formally to announce that under no circumstances would England either demand the mandate or take it; she valued too highly the friendship of France. Nothing could be more explicit. Yet at the very moment when the declaration was made, and ever since, officers of the British army were occupied in carrying on an active propaganda in favour of England. Rumours were spread broadcast regarding France's unpopularity with the Arabs, and though the rumours were false everything was done to make them true. There could be but one object in these manœuvres, namely, to make the British mandate, which had been so solemnly, and doubtless so sincerely, repudiated in Paris, a practical necessity in the East. England's pledged word would be broken, because England had so contrived matters that it could not in fact be fulfilled. Syria would thus go the way of Egypt, and an incurable injury would be inflicted on Anglo-French relations.'

This, or something very like it, represents, I am convinced, the present frame of mind of M. Clemenceau. The French Foreign Office, the French Colonial Party, the shipping interests of Marseilles, the silk interests of Lyons, the Jesuits and the French Clericals, combine to embitter the controversy by playing on French historical aspirations with the aid of mendacious reports from French officials in Syria. Relations between the two countries on this subject are getting more and more strained, so that it does most seriously behove us to consider the method by which this cloud of suspicion can best be dissipated, and an arrangement reached which shall be fair to both countries and of benefit to the Eastern world.

It must be admitted, in the first place, that we have not 'staged' our plan—so far as we have a plan—with any notable success. We have made a dramatic

renunciation, but it has fallen flat. We have made a *beau geste*, and none have applauded. This is, of course, in part due to the fact that we are not proposing to give the French anything which they do not believe to be already theirs, and that what it is proposed to give them now is less than what they would have obtained under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. But it is also due in part to the fact that, if I am rightly informed, the British officers in Syria have not always played up to the British Ministers in Paris. This is vehemently and most sincerely denied by General Clayton. But friends of mine from Syria confirm the view, and I know personally of one case in which a British officer, though well acquainted with the Prime Minister's pledge, thought himself precluded by his instructions from giving an Arab deputation, which came to ask for British protection, the clear and decisive answer which, by destroying all hopes, would have effectually removed all misunderstandings. It is easy to guess what interpretation the French would put on an incident which must certainly have come to their ears, and is doubtless only one of many.

How came such things to happen? In the main, I have no doubt, owing to the loudly-advertised policy of self-determination preceded by a Commission of Enquiry—a Commission that began by being international, and ended by being American. This Commission, by the very term of its reference, was to find out what the Arabs of Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia desired, and to advise the Powers accordingly. We gave it our blessing, and directed our officers to supply it with every assistance. But this obviously involved, as an inevitable corollary, that the whole future of these regions was still in the balance, and that their destiny depended chiefly on the wishes of their inhabitants. No British officer could possibly think otherwise; yet, if he thus spoke and acted, there is not a Frenchman in Syria—or elsewhere—who would not regard him as anti-French in feeling, and as an intriguer against France in practice.

## II

This brings into clear relief what I fear is the unhappy truth, namely, that France, England, and America have got themselves into a position over the Syrian problem so inextricably confused that no really neat and satisfactory issue is now possible for any of them.

The situation is affected by five documents, beginning with our promise to the ruler of the Hedjaz in 1915;<sup>2</sup> going on to the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France of September 1916;<sup>3</sup> followed by the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918;<sup>4</sup> and concluding with the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919; and the directions given to the Commission sent out to examine the Arab problem on the spot<sup>5</sup>—directions which, it must be observed, were accepted by France, Britain, and America, though the Com-

<sup>2</sup> See Cmd. 5957 of 1939, *Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca.*

<sup>3</sup> See Introductory Note.

<sup>4</sup> See Parl. Deb. 5th Series, House of Commons, vol. 145, col. 36.

<sup>5</sup> The instructions are printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. xii, pp. 745–7.

mission itself was, in the end, purely American in composition. These documents are not consistent with each other; they represent no clear-cut policy; the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is not really the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers; and yet, so far as I can see, none of them have wholly lost their validity or can be treated in all respects as of merely historic interest. Each can be quoted by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, and Arabs when it happens to suit their purpose. Doubtless each will be so quoted before we come to a final arrangement about the Middle East.

These difficulties are well illustrated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. What its authors aimed at was the creation of two clearly-defined areas, one carved out of Syria and the other out of Mesopotamia—the first which should be French, as Tunis is French, the other English, as Egypt is English. Between them was to lie a huge tract occupied in part by nomad Bedouins, in part by a sedentary Arab-speaking population, urban and agricultural, who should be independent in the sense that they would live their own life in their own way, but who would be under the patronage, and for certain purposes under the control, either of France or of England, according as they belonged to what in the agreement was described as area A or area B. The scheme was not thought out, it had obvious imperfections; but if honestly and sympathetically worked by the superintending Powers it might easily have proved a success. For, as I read history, such an overlordship is not alien to the immemorial customs and traditions of this portion of the Eastern world.

On the other hand, the scheme does seem to me quite alien to those modern notions of nationality which are enshrined in the Covenant and proclaimed in the declaration. These documents proceed on the assumption that, if we supply an aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of advice, if we protect them from external aggression and discourage internal violence, they will speedily and spontaneously organise themselves into a democratic state on modern lines. They will, in language borrowed from the declaration, establish 'a national government', and enjoy 'an administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population'.

If by this is meant, as I think it is, that when the Turkish tyranny is wholly past the Arabs will desire to use their new-found freedom to set up representative institutions, with secret voting, responsible government, and national frontiers, I fear we are in error. They will certainly do nothing of the sort. The language of the Covenant may suit the longitude of Washington, Paris, or Prague. But in the longitude of Damascus it will probably get us into trouble, unless, indeed, we can agree to treat it with a very wide latitude of interpretation.

How, indeed, when dealing with this series of documents, is latitude of interpretation to be avoided? Consider the following analysis:—

In 1915 we promised the Arabs independence; and the promise was unqualified, except in respect of certain territorial reservations. In 1918 the promise was by implication repeated; for no other interpretation can, I think, be placed by any unbiased reader on the phrases in the declaration

about a 'National Government', and 'an Administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population'.

But in 1916 (Sykes-Picot) the independence even of the most independent portion of the new Arab State (*i.e.*, areas A and B) was qualified by the obligatory presence of foreign advisers; as, indeed, it is under the mandatory system of 1919. Now, by an 'adviser' these documents undoubtedly mean—though they do not say so—an adviser whose advice must be followed; and assuredly no State can be described as really independent which has habitually and normally to follow foreign advice supported, if the worst comes to the worst, by troops, aeroplanes, and tanks.

In our promises with regard to the frontiers of the new Arab States we do not seem to have been more fortunate than in our promises about their independence. In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been confided, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter, except certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Cilicia.

In 1916 all this seems to have been forgotten. The Sykes-Picot Agreement made no reference to the Sherif of Mecca, and, so far as our five documents are concerned, he has never been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes-Picot Agreement the rough and ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have so far neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced.

By implication, indeed, they have rejected them. The language of the Covenant assumes or asserts that in the regions we are discussing, as in other portions of the Turkish Empire, there are in the advanced chrysalis state 'independent nations' sufficiently 'developed' to demand 'provisional recognition', each of which is to be supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is able to stand alone. Where and what are these 'independent nations'? Are they by chance identical with Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with the Sykes-Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the minds of those who framed it. They started from the view that France had ancient interests and aspirations in Western Syria; that Britain had obvious claims in Bagdad and Southern Mesopotamia; that Palestine had a unique historic position; and that if these three areas were to be separately controlled, it was obviously expedient that none of the vast and vague territory lying between them, which had no national organisation, should be under any other foreign influence. In other words, when they made the tripartite arrangement they never supposed themselves to be dealing with three nations already in existence, ready for 'provisional recognition', only requiring the removal of the Turk, the advice of a mandatory, and a little time to enable them to 'stand alone.' It never occurred to them that they had to deal at all with nations in the modern and Western sense of the term. With the Arab race, Arab culture, and Arab social and religious organisation (to say nothing of Jews, Maronites, Druses, and Kurds) they knew they had to deal. But this is a very different thing.

Now where the covenant of 1919 is in contradiction with the Agreement of 1916 it is presumably the Covenant which must be held to represent our policy. We are seemingly committed, therefore, to the view that the whole area we are considering already consists of an independent nation or nations; and that all we have to do, after having got rid of the Turk, is to supply every independent nation with one, but not more than one, suitable mandatory.

Without further considering whether the political picture drawn by the Covenant corresponds with anything to be found in the realms of fact, let us ask on what principle these mandatories are to be selected by the Allied and Associated Powers.

On this point the Covenant speaks as follows:—

'The wishes of these communities (*i.e.*, the independent nations) must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory.'

The sentiment is unimpeachable; but how is it to be carried into effect? To simplify the argument, let us assume that two of the 'independent nations' for which mandatories have to be provided are Syria and Palestine? Take Syria first. Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind. According to the universally accepted view there are only three possible mandatories—England, America, and France. Are we going 'chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants' in deciding which of these is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind. England has refused. America will refuse. So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They may freely choose; but it is Hobson's choice after all.

The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the 'independent nation' of Palestine than in that of the 'independent nation' of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.

In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonised with the declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry.

I do not think that Zionism will hurt the Arabs; but they will never say they want it. Whatever be the future of Palestine it is not now an 'independent nation,' nor is it yet on the way to become one. Whatever deference should be paid to the views of those who live there, the Powers in their selection of a mandatory do not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them. In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate.

### III

Since the literal fulfilment of all our declarations is impossible, partly because they are incompatible with each other and partly because they are incompatible with facts, we ought, I presume, to do the next best thing. And the next best thing may, perhaps, be attained if we can frame a scheme which shall, as far as possible, further not merely the material interests but the hopes and habits of the native population; which shall take into account the legitimate aspirations of other peoples and races, in particular, of the French, the British, and the Jews; and which shall embody, as completely as may be, the essential spirit of the various international pronouncements, whose literal provisions it seems impossible in all cases to fulfil.

To this end I venture to lay down the following propositions:—

1. The fundamental conception underlying the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be maintained—namely, a French sphere centring round Syria, a British sphere centring round the Euphrates and the Tigris, and a home for the Jews in the valley of the Jordan.
2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement should, however, be brought into closer harmony with the Covenant by the abandonment of the special privileges in the 'blue' and 'red' territories where France and England were given rights not easily distinguishable from complete sovereignty. These should be absorbed in the general body of areas A and B, as ultimately defined.
3. Moreover, the economic monopoly assigned by the Sykes-Picot Agreement to France and Britain respectively shall be abandoned, France and Britain will become mandataries, and the fundamental principles laid down by the Covenant for the Government under mandate of territories outside the Turkish Empire shall, as far as possible, be maintained.
4. The French zone of Syria shall extend in the direction of Anatolia at least sufficiently far to include Alexandretta and its hinterland. Whether France obtains more of Cilicia than this must depend on the arrangement of Armenian mandates and the claims of Italy under the Treaty of London.
5. The British zone in Mesopotamia shall extend at least as far as Mosul. Even if this general scheme be provisionally adopted as a basis of discussion, there evidently remains a large number of difficult questions of delimitation which still await solution. In solving them I think the following principles should be borne in mind.

In the first place I would lay it down that frontiers should be determined by economic and ethnographic considerations rather than strategic.

If other things are equal, by all means choose a good military frontier rather than a bad one. But do not let us further impede the already slow and difficult movements of diplomacy by providing needless safeguards against so remote a possibility as a war with France. It will probably never take place; if it does take place, it will probably be waged with weapons whose

character and use we cannot foresee: in any case it will not be decided in Syria. Let us therefore for the moment forget these local views of strategy and take a more practical view of the position.

We have three coterminous areas to consider—Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Their frontiers may be doubtful, but the great central core of each is disputed by no one. Syria includes Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, and the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean north of Palestine. Palestine is essentially the valley of the Jordan, with the adjacent coast and plains. Mesopotamia is essentially the region watered by the Tigris and Euphrates. What we have got to do is to make such international arrangements, economic and territorial, as will enable each region to develop itself to the best advantage without giving occasion for jealousies or disputes. The task ought not to be impossible, but it will require to be worked at by experts who have far more knowledge than I possess or can obtain. What follow are casual notes on such points as occur to me.

#### *Palestine*

If Zionism is to influence the Jewish problem throughout the world Palestine must be made available for the largest number of Jewish immigrants. It is therefore eminently desirable that it should obtain the command of the water-power which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north, or by treaty with the mandatory of Syria, to whom the southward flowing waters of Hamon could not in any event be of much value.

For the same reason Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan. It should not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz Railway, which is too distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests.

#### *Mesopotamia*

So far as I know the only two economic needs of Mesopotamia which are likely to cause trouble with the mandatories of Syria are rights of water and rights of access. On both subjects I am ignorant, and on neither is there much expert knowledge available in Paris. Nevertheless, I venture the following observations:—

In this part of the world fertility is in proportion to irrigation. If, therefore, for other reasons, a river is anywhere taken as a frontier, elaborate provisions will have to be made by treaty for dividing the water between the cultivators on its two banks, who (by supposition) are under different mandatories. Such a scheme might be difficult to devise and yet more difficult to enforce. It would therefore be best, where possible, to avoid using rivers as frontiers.

The question of access to Mesopotamia is a more complicated affair. By sea the only obstacles are: (1) the distance from European markets; (2) the unhealthiness of the Persian Gulf; (3) the dues of the Suez Canal.

Nothing can change the first; we are not likely to modify greatly the second and third. And for these reasons engineers are much preoccupied with

schemes for giving to Mesopotamia direct access by pipe and railways to a Mediterranean port.

So far as I can learn, the subject as a whole has so far been very imperfectly studied. I am not sure that, as regards pipe lines, it has been studied at all. A great deal, indeed, is known and much has been done with the Bagdad Railway; and its eastern section—if it were connected with Alexandretta, and the port of Alexandretta were improved and modernised—would provide the natural outlet to the commerce of Northern Mesopotamia.

But, it will be objected, Alexandretta is going to be French; and we know enough of French methods to be aware how successfully the most ‘open door’ can be half-closed by the ingenious zeal of local officials.

I do not deny that this is an argument of some substance; and if the sea route is too costly to protect us from this species of blackmail, we must consider the possibility of finding an alternative land route wholly within our own control. On this point I shall say something in a moment.

In the meanwhile, however, let me observe that the force of this criticism is easily exaggerated. The pinch of French methods is felt not in the case of through traffic, but in such cases as Morocco, where the local officials control the whole machinery of railway distribution. There, no doubt, French traders have a strong interest in hampering their foreign rivals, and their malpractices, aided by official methods, are extremely difficult to check.

But the case is quite otherwise when we are dealing with through traffic and with a port which, like Alexandretta, must largely depend on through traffic. Here the interests of those who own the port and railways are identical with those of the importers and exporters in the foreign country which they serve. There is no opening for differential treatment; and, if the familiar expedients by which through traffic to such places as Switzerland and Bohemia is protected in transit are insufficient in the case of Mesopotamia (and I cannot conceive why they should be), it would always be possible to retaliate at the Bagdad end, a fact which would probably render retaliation unnecessary.

I think the people who shrink from the idea of allowing a British protectorate to depend in part on a foreign-owned railway are in the main moved by arguments which are either sentimental or military. With the sentimental argument I sympathise, but I would not let it control our policy. I would neither allow it drive us into wasting millions on unprofitable projects, nor into an interminable series of petty squabbles with our neighbours. But this does not mean that we shall refuse to consider alternative methods of connecting Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean by rail and pipe-line through all-British protectorates. On the contrary, it is of the first importance that we should know without delay whether any such prospects are physically possible and economically sound. The mere fact that we were considering them would keep the appetites of French concessionnaires at Alexandretta within reasonable limits. At the same time, such conversation as I have had with experts has not raised my hopes. The route by Palmyra is circuitous. It could be tapped by a short French line to Tripoli. Palmyra itself belongs

naturally to the sphere of Damascus, if it belongs anywhere; and the French will take more trouble to prevent our having it than it will ever be worth, either to them or to us. Such, at least, are my first impressions.

On the other hand, a direct line south of Palmyra and wholly in the British sphere (B) would have a longer continuous stretch of desert to cross before reaching Palestine; and in Palestine itself the succession of mountain ridges running parallel to the coast render the construction of a transverse railway line difficult and costly.

On these subjects, however, I speak without any sort of authority. I doubt whether they have ever been adequately examined.

No. 243

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)*

*No. 791 [116079/2117/444]*

*PARIS, August 12, 1919*

My Lord,

On receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 1041<sup>1</sup> of the 8th instant (109680/ME/44A) on the subject of the anti-British campaign here in connection with Syria, I requested the Minister for Foreign Affairs to receive me. His Excellency fixed this morning for my visit.

I began my conversation by saying that, as he was aware, the attacks in the French press had caused His Majesty's Government serious concern. In the absence of M. Paul Cambon, Sir Ronald Graham had seen M. de Fleuriau, and I was instructed to repeat to his Excellency what Sir Ronald Graham had said to him. M. Pichon showed unusual warmth directly I informed him of the subject of my visit, and said, before I could begin: 'I will answer you!' I then communicated to him the tenor of what had been said to M. de Fleuriau, a report of which had apparently already reached him. M. Pichon, speaking at first heatedly, declared that his *dossiers* were full of reports of anti-French propaganda carried on by Anglo-Syrian agents. He received them almost daily, and they formed a formidable mass of evidence. These reports were so detailed and concordant that it was absolutely impossible for the French Government not to believe that they were well-founded. He did not for a moment wish to insinuate that His Majesty's Government were at the back of these proceedings. He knew Field-Marshal Allenby personally, and believed in his good faith, but at the same time he must tell me that he felt sure that neither Field-Marshal Allenby nor the British Government could be aware of what was being done. I interrupted his Excellency at this point to tell him that British officers, personal friends of mine, who had come back from the Near East and who had talked to me on the subject, had spontaneously assured me that the French were entirely mistaken in thinking that we were working against them there; that the sole idea of the British authorities was, pending a settlement of the destinies of the regions in question, to prevent any parties from carrying on premature

<sup>1</sup> No. 239.

propaganda calculated to stir up trouble. M. Pichon listened to me, but maintained his view that contrary information was reaching him from many quarters, which he could not possibly disregard.

His Excellency said that I must know that the press here could not be controlled by the French Government. In fact, the latter were attacked in many of these articles for not properly defending the French cause. Needless to say, M. Robert de Caix had acted entirely independently of the French Government. I said to him at this point that these articles against England were of daily occurrence, and I showed him two: one in the *Figaro* (reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 783<sup>2</sup> of yesterday's date), and another written by M. Gauvain in the *Journal des Débats* (please see my despatch No. 789<sup>3</sup> of to-day's date), of which, I pointed out, His Majesty's Government were not cognisant when sending to me the instructions on which I was acting. In M. Gauvain's article the British Government were directly accused.<sup>4</sup> M. Pichon had not seen them, but he observed that in the *Figaro* article the French Government were accused of *mutisme*. As regards M. Gauvain, he attacked the Government frequently, and paid no attention to their wishes. The same was true of the authors of the other articles brought to his notice.

M. Pichon said there was another aspect of the question which he would like to emphasise. He was convinced that His Majesty's Government were not fully aware of the intense feeling about Syria in this country. It was not a thing of yesterday, but a traditional sentiment which was continually increasing. It would be the greatest mistake to underestimate the almost passionate interest which the French took in this question. If the Government laid themselves open to the charge of not properly defending French interests, they would be swept away. They would not get ten votes in the Chamber if they tried to thwart this sentiment, and he told me that a strong attack was coming when Parliament met towards the end of the month about the manner in which the French Government were neglecting the proper defence of the French position in the Near East. M. Franklin-Bouillon<sup>5</sup> and others would certainly go into the Tribune and deliver it. M. Pichon's tone in mentioning this prospect suggested that it was not one which he relished.

I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. See note 4 below.

<sup>4</sup> In his despatch No. 789 Sir G. Grahame had reported that M. Gauvain had stated: 'The British Government with a singular imprudence has created a Panarabism and a new Panislamism of which England will be the first victim. England has been endeavouring, with an acrimonious zeal (*épreuve*) which has often been of an unpleasant character, to eject friendly states which a false political conception has induced her to regard simply as rivals.' Sir G. Grahame commented: 'This direct accusation against His Majesty's Government has some importance from the fact of Monsieur Gauvain's reputation in France as a writer on foreign affairs. In some of the recent articles on this subject, which I have had the honour to bring to Your Lordship's notice, the blame was put on subordinate British agents and not on His Majesty's Government themselves.'

<sup>5</sup> Member of the French Chamber of Deputies.

at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated. I knew that he would be the first to regret any diminution in the cordial feelings between the two countries. To this M. Pichon replied: 'I have always been Anglophil, and I shall be so till the day of my death.' I begged him earnestly to take some steps which would have the effect at least of putting the soft pedal down upon this loud anti-British campaign. M. Pichon said that he saw no means of succeeding in so doing unless he were helped by us; both sides must do something, and not only the French Government. His Majesty's Government should send instructions to their agents in Syria to abstain from the attitude of which the French complained.

In one part of our conversation M. Pichon mentioned the fact that Mr. Lloyd George had at an earlier date made an attempt with M. Clemenceau to find some settlement, but that it had been abandoned, and now M. Clemenceau would not take the initiative.

In spite of my attempts to shake his belief in the anti-French action of British agents in Syria, I came away from my interview feeling that he was firmly persuaded that the reports which had reached him represented in the main a true picture of what was happening. He seemed to be honestly convinced of this, and there does not appear to me to be any prospect of eradicating this belief from his mind. I gathered that M. Paul Cambon was quite as convinced as he was himself that the French have the most serious and well-founded reasons for complaint.

As regards public opinion here, one cannot but feel that, if such difficulty is found in disabusing the minds of the French Government of these suspicions, there would be still greater difficulty in obtaining a favourable hearing of our case from the public in general. A detailed statement rebutting the charges brought against us would be disregarded as an *ex parte* one, but it is just possible that a conciliatory statement of a somewhat general character as to the desire of His Majesty's Government to give fair and favourable consideration to the French point of view might have some emollient effect on the public mind and help to tide over the period until some real progress towards a settlement of the various outstanding questions in the Near East can be effected. It is not believed here that Great Britain is seeking a mandate over Syria for herself, but it is believed that British agents are endeavouring to prevent France from obtaining one and are insidiously combating French influence in the Near East, especially in Syria.<sup>6</sup>

(Communicated to Peace Delegation and Mr. Balfour.)

I have, &c.

GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>6</sup> Lord Curzon, in the course of a general conversation with M. de Fleuriau on August 13, 1919, again referred to Anglo-French relations with regard to Syria: see No. 717.

No. 244

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)*

*No. 405 Telegraphic [115952/17115/44A]*

CAIRO, August 13, 1919

Reference to telegram 69<sup>1</sup> of March 9.

The Standard Oil Company have applied for permission to (? resume) operations Palestine and have satisfied administration that there is no doubt as to the rights which they obtained from the late Ottoman Government.

I have seen Mr. Gunkel of Company who informs me company are interested in operations which are in 3 categories, viz.

(1) Operations finally approved by late Government of Turkey and on which certain work has actually commenced i.e. the building of roads etc. but no boring.

(2) Operations approved by the council of state of late Government of Turkey, but on which no work had been undertaken.

(3) Operations approved by Government of Turkey Departments not submitted to Council of State.

It is work on operations under number (1) which company wish to continue. They have full documentary evidence of their rights in Jerusalem. This can b[e] submitted to (? local) administration.

Your decision is requested as to whether co[mpany] may commence work. Chief administrator recomme[n]ds per]mission being given.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

No. 245

*Letter from Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Sir R. Graham<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [140475/2117/44A]*

PARIS, August 14, 1919

My dear Graham,

The French, as you know, are very wily diplomats. I think it just possible that there may come a moment—but when that moment may be it is impossible to foretell—when the French Government may give us to understand that if we will be amenable about the question of Tangier,<sup>2</sup> they will abate some of their pretensions about Syria.

It seems to me that if, as I understand they do, His Majesty's Government feel the importance to us of preventing a French '*main mise*' on Tangier, we should be in a better diplomatic position were we to forestall the French by giving them to understand that if they want our continued support in Syria, the price will be an abatement of their pretensions about Tangier and a strict application to that town of plain Treaty rights.

GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>1</sup> The original date of receipt is uncertain. The filed copy of this letter is a copy of the original. This copy was supplied by H.M. Embassy in Paris on October 11, 1919, and was received in the Foreign Office on October 13.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 55, note 10; also in the present volume, Nos. 324 and 338.

No. 246

Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 15)

No. 954 Telegraphic: by bag [116244/2117/444]

PARIS, August 14, 1919

Syria.

*Intransigeant* of last night under heading of 'Our Allies show conciliation' publishes statement to effect that Your Lordship in private conversation stated that British Government has always denied any pretensions to Syria and has constantly supported French claims at Peace Conference.

No. 247

Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)

No. 805 [118285/2117/444]

PARIS, August 18, 1919

My Lord,

The *Journal des Débats* of to-day's date publishes an article initialled 'R. C.' (Monsieur Robert de Caix, the author of the recent article in the *Bulletin de l'Asie Française*), commenting on the denial recently given by Your Lordship in regard to alleged British pretensions in Syria.<sup>1</sup>

The writer states that without wishing to doubt the good faith of that declaration, it resembles somewhat the maxim of de La Rochefoucauld to the effect that one can always support with philosophy the ills of others, and adds that while France is happy to receive such an assurance in regard to the good intentions of England towards France in Syria, she would have been more pleased to see a reflection of those good intentions in the attitude of the British agents in the East. He observes that it is a somewhat strange manner of supporting French claims and of executing the treaty engagements of 1916 to permit these agents to allow the local Government to prosecute unchecked its anti-French propaganda, and to imprison French partisans, who are some times even arrested by the British authorities themselves. Even if England, he continues, has no pretensions to Syria, the British agents appear to have no other object except to render the position of France there impossible, and thereby to create a vacancy which would eventually be filled by the nearest Power. Nor, he remarks, does England show any inclination to allow the British troops in Syria to be replaced by French contingents, nor to delegate to France the care of directing the local Government which has been established through British partiality at Damascus.

Under these circumstances, the writer is not astonished that French public

<sup>1</sup> See No. 246. In this connexion Sir G. Grahame had stated in Paris despatch No. 799 of August 16 (received August 18, not printed): 'Your Lordship will observe from my reports that a variety of newspapers have now reproduced the sense of the declaration reported to have been made by you in a private conversation. The most cordial of the comments on this declaration is that in the *Petit Journal*, of which M. Pichon was the chief Editor before entering M. Clemenceau's Cabinet, and it must be supposed that he is still in touch with it.'

opinion is agitated at seeing the loyal execution of the 1916 agreement applied in such a strange fashion, and draws unfavourable comparisons between the situation created for France in the East and that which is being made for herself by England, who not only abandons none of the advantages secured to her in 1916 but adds to them, in fact if not in theory, the protectorate of Persia.<sup>2</sup>

He then proceeds to reverse the rôles and enquires what the feelings of the British public would have been if the war had resulted in a French occupation of Mesopotamia and if such occupation had been prolonged and accompanied by a policy tending to render a British mandate over that country impossible. Would, he asks, the British have been satisfied with a declaration of the good intentions of France and with verbal assurances? He considers such a comparison all the more legitimate since the agreement of 1916 established an absolute parallel between the situation of France in Syria and that of Great Britain in Mesopotamia, and he concludes as follows:—‘French public opinion can only see a promise in the words which Lord Curzon has thought fit to address to it: words by themselves have not the effect of acts and it is not by calling a rabbit a carp that the taste of the meal that is being served to France in Syria will be changed’.

I have, &c.,  
GEORGE GRAHAME

\* Cf. Chap. V.

#### No. 248

*Letter from Mr. Clark-Kerr<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Vansittart (Paris)*

No. 116059/ME. 44A [116059/103235/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1919

Your despatch No. 1605<sup>2</sup> (10-371/3/2/17751) of August 13 causes us considerable concern.

While fully appreciating the value of Lawrence as a technical adviser on Arab affairs, we regard the prospect of his return to Paris in any capacity with grave misgivings. We and the War Office feel strongly that he is to a large extent responsible for our troubles with the French over Syria and you know well enough what their present temper is.

Hirtzel<sup>3</sup> goes as far as to say that the India Office hope that Lawrence will never be employed in the Middle East again in any capacity.

If Feisal comes to Paris later on in the autumn and Lawrence is allowed to bear lead him there is sure to be a recrudescence of all the past bitterness.

I understand that Lawrence has already been in Paris since he came back from Egypt,<sup>4</sup> but neither we nor the War Office ever know where he is.

In any case we think that he should be definitely under the orders either of

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 223, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Arthur Hirtzel was Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Lawrence had recently paid a brief visit to Egypt.

the War Office or of the Peace Delegation. Hardinge says that Lawrence used to come and go quite irrespectively of any authority from himself or the Political Section of the Delegation.

Will you bring the matter up again privately and let me know what happens?

No. 249

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 5575 [117034/73499/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from Dr. Weizmann<sup>1</sup> requesting permission to publish a statement embodying the substance of telegram No. 245<sup>2</sup> of the 4th instant to Colonel French, copy of which was forwarded to Peace Delegation with my despatch No. 5205<sup>3</sup> on the 5th instant.

I would venture to point out that if this statement is once published, it will doubtless be taken to represent not only the views of His Majesty's Government, but also the considered view of the Peace Conference.

I would also suggest that the question of publication is one on which Field-Marshal Allenby might with advantage be consulted.

I have, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

[GERALD SPICER]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This short letter of August 13, 1919, was as here indicated.

<sup>2</sup> No. 236.

<sup>3</sup> This formal covering despatch is not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Signature supplied from files of the British Peace Delegation.

No. 250

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 5636 [118115/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 25, 1919

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 5148<sup>1</sup> of the 1st instant, and to your telegram No. 1283<sup>2</sup> of August 19. I have the honour to transmit herewith, for Your Excellency's information, copy of correspondence with the War Office arising out of the French Notes presented in Paris and London referred to in my despatch under reference.

<sup>1</sup> No. 235.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received August 20) stated that 'the continuing acrimony of the press campaign here respecting alleged British action in Syria makes it most desirable that we should with the least possible further delay receive General Allenby's comments on the charges contained in M. Pichon's note', and requested that the matter might be expedited.

Your Excellency will observe that the War Office letter of the 19th instant does not provide the material for a satisfactory reply to the 2nd and 4th of the charges advanced by the French regarding respectively the arming of Arab troops and the alleged maltreatment of French partisans in Syria.

As regards the former of these points, the correspondence submitted by the War Office is prior in date to Your Excellency's despatch No. 363<sup>3</sup> of April 1, in which you conveyed your decision that the equipment of the Arab Forces should be decided between Field-Marshal Allenby and the Emir Feisal direct. In any event it is obvious that the French are not likely to accept a statement of instructions sent to Field-Marshal Allenby without any information as to the extent to which he has acted on them.

I have accordingly requested the War Office to obtain Field-Marshal Allenby's views on these points without further delay. Meanwhile I have addressed to M. Cambon an interim reply to cover points 1 and 3 of his Note—the alleged monopoly of pilgrimage arrangements and the despatch of British reinforcements to Syria—of which a copy is enclosed.<sup>4</sup>

I have &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

[J. A. C. TILLEY]<sup>5</sup>

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 250

*War Office to Foreign Office*

0144/5508 (M.I. 2)

WAR OFFICE, August 19, 1919

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge your communication No. 109412/M.E/44A<sup>3</sup> addressed to the Director of Military Intelligence, covering a note from the French Ambassador and a telegram from Mr. Balfour, with relation to complaints against the action and policy of His Majesty's Government in Syria and the Hejaz.

I am to say that the Army Council presume that Lord Curzon will prefer to deal with the complaint regarding the Hejaz Pilgrimage, which appears to concern British administration solely.

As regards the second complaint raised in M. Cambon's note, the Army Council wish to observe that so far from having armed and equipped Arab troops with the object of encouraging them to resist a foreign mandate, as Lord Curzon will notice from their letter No. 121/3/1279 (M.I. 2)<sup>6</sup> dated 10th February, copy attached, they have been careful to postpone the issue of all the equipment asked for by Feisul, pending the decision of the Peace Conference regarding the future of Syria. Telegram No. 76290 (M.I. 2)<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 5 below.

<sup>5</sup> Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>6</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

<sup>7</sup> Enclosure 3 below.

which was sent to Field Marshal Allenby on 18th March, and of which a copy is also attached for convenience of reference, shows clearly that this particular accusation on the part of the French is quite unfounded.

As regards the third complaint that British reinforcements have been sent to Kantara while Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby opposed the sending of French reinforcements to Syria: the facts are that four British Cavalry regiments have been sent to the Suez Canal, of which two have been ordered to proceed to Syria and that these regiments are in replacement of Yeomanry regiments which are being demobilized and hence there will be no increase of British Forces.

On the other hand, Field Marshal Allenby only accepted the 412th French regiment under his command on condition that it replaced the 19th British Brigade in Cilicia, so this accusation is also unfounded.

As regards the fourth complaint, the Army Council propose to send the attached telegram<sup>8</sup> to Field Marshal Allenby as no satisfactory answer can be made from here.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 250

Copy.

121/3/1279 (M.I. 2)

February 10, 1919

Sir,

In continuation of my letter number as above of the 10th February, 1919, I am commanded by the Army Council to say that in view of the fact that the Peace Conference is still deliberating as to the ultimate fate of Syria, the Council are of the opinion that the question of arming Emir Feisal's Northern Arab Army should be temporarily suspended.

2. In view of the fall of Medina,<sup>9</sup> and the subsequent transference from Turkish to Arab hands of considerable quantities of guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunition, the Council consider that the Arabs are well situated, as regards munitions of war, to deal with any military operation which it is desirable for them to undertake, and the Council would propose, that in order to gain time the Emir Feisal should be asked, in view of the above, for a revised estimate of his requirements for his Northern Arab Army, and, subject to the concurrence of Lord Curzon of Kedleston, the Council will despatch a telegram to General Sir Edmund Allenby directing him to delay the issue of the equipment sanctioned by War Office telegram No. 74814<sup>3</sup> of the 1st February, a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office with my letter of the 10th February.

3. The provisional estimate of munitions of war which have been handed

<sup>8</sup> Enclosure 4 below.

<sup>9</sup> Medina, the last town in Arabia to be under Turkish occupation, was surrendered to the Arab forces of King Hussein on January 13, 1919.

over after the fall of Medina amounts to roughly 11,000 rifles, 135 (?) machine guns and some 52 guns with considerable quantities of ammunition.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant  
(Initialled) W.T[HWAITES]

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 250

*War Office to G.O.C. Egypt*

121/3/1279

*Despatched 17.30 18.3.19*

76290 cipher M.I. 2. My telegram No. 74814<sup>3</sup> of the 1st Feb. It is undesirable at present to take further steps which French Government might regard as evidence of our intention to combine with Arabs against their interest in view of facts that (a) Peace Conference is still deliberating as to ultimate fate of Syria and (b) increasing suspicion with which every action on our part is view[ed] by French. You should confine the issue of equipment therefore to that required to organize forces necessary for preservation of law and order in area under Arab administration. Whole case of financing Arab Army being referred to Paris where final decision will be arrived at as to future status of Syria and relations between British and French Governments and Arab administration. Foreign Office are being requested in order to gain time to approach Feisal to submit revised estimate for his Northern Army giving as reason the fall of Medina and increase in Arab armament consequent thereon.

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 250

*Draft Telegram to Field Marshal E. Allenby*

0144/5508 (M.I. 2)

M. Cambon has again presented a series of complaints against alleged anti-French attitude of H.M.G. regarding Syrian affairs. These are being dealt with here in the main but they include statement that Ansarie chiefs who had given evidence before the American Commission and who were returning to Beirut where M. Picot awaited them were arrested at Homs for highway robbery despite the presence of French officers who accompanied them. The charge is said not to have been proceeded with. No date is given for the alleged occurrence. Please telegraph after investigation facts of the case.

ENCLOSURE 5 IN NO. 250

*Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador in London*

118115/M.E. 44A

Your Excellency,

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 25, 1919

While certain of the points raised in the Note<sup>1</sup> which Your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 28th ultimo call for an enquiry which

it has not yet been found possible to complete, I nevertheless think it well to offer the following observations on the 1st and 3rd points raised in Your Excellency's Note without awaiting the reports which are required to enable me to make a comprehensive reply.

With regard to the sanitary control in the Red Sea, His Majesty's Government felt it their duty to ensure proper provision being made for this year not only at Jeddah but also at the Island of Camaran, which forms the quarantine station for the large number of pilgrims from India, and on the Hejaz railway in the neighbourhood of Maan. The arrangements at these places are of a purely temporary nature and every possible care has been taken to limit the amount of supervision at Jeddah to the absolute minimum compatible with the protection of the world from infection. I feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with me that in view of the fact that the pilgrimage season has already begun, and that none of the other Powers interested have hitherto shown the least intention of taking any steps, His Majesty's Government were fully justified in initiating action and in doing what they could to obviate the risk of Europe and the rest of the world being exposed to the spread of plague and other epidemics.

As regards the 3rd question raised in Your Excellency's Note, namely the complaint that British reinforcements are being sent to Syria while the despatch of French reinforcements is opposed, I am informed that the two British Cavalry Regiments to which Your Excellency refers as being destined for Syria, are being sent there in replacement of Yeomanry regiments which are being demobilised, so that no increase of the British Forces in Syria will result.

If further evidence of the intentions of His Majesty's Government in this respect is required, it should suffice to remind Your Excellency that Field-Marshal Allenby has accepted the 412th French regiment under his command only on the express condition that it should replace the 19th British Brigade in Cilicia.

The information afforded on the above points will serve to remove the apprehensions of the French Government in regard to them, and I have every reason to believe that the enquiries now in progress will furnish equally satisfactory explanations on the other matters which have given rise to representations from Your Excellency.

I have, &c.,  
(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

#### No. 251

*Note from the French Embassy in London<sup>1</sup>*

[120806/142/44A]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, À LONDRES

Le roi Husseïn a demandé l'envoi de quatre tanks français pour la protection des pèlerins sur la route de Médine. M. Pichon a pensé que ce

<sup>1</sup> This note was left at the Foreign Office by M. de Fleurieu on August 25, 1919.

n'était pas au moment du rembarquement à Djeddah' des avions britanniques<sup>2</sup> qu'il convenait de donner satisfaction à cette requête.

ce 25 août 1919

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 214, note 3.

No. 252

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 27)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic: by bag [121570/73497/44A]*

PARIS, August 26, 1919

Your private telegrams of August 25<sup>1</sup> and August 5.<sup>2</sup> We have decided to take no further action for the present.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram asked for a reply to No. 237.

<sup>2</sup> No. 237.

No. 253

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 6)*

*No. C.P.O. 31/110 [125609/2117/44A]*

My Lord,

CAIRO, August 26, 1919

I have the honour to attach copies of two reports received from the Assistant Political Officer at Jerusalem dated 12th August 1919 for your information.

There is every reason to believe that the facts as stated therein are accurate and unexaggerated and they may be taken as indicative of the widespread antagonism and organisation against the Zionist programme which is prevalent throughout Palestine at the present juncture.

The Chief Administrator of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South) does not consider it desirable to take any special action with regard to these reports, as it is considered that the men referred to can be better supervised and controlled whilst serving in the Police, than would be possible should they be released without being actually interned. At the same time steps are being taken by the Chief Administrator to frame and issue an order which will make it illegal for any member of the Police Force to belong to any Political Society or Club, and care will be taken to ensure that this order will be generally enforced. If cases occur where this order is contravened there will no doubt be sufficient evidence to justify dismissal and internment of the individuals concerned.

I have, &c.,

C. FRENCH

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 253

*Arab Movement and Zionism*

The Arab movement at Jerusalem is centred in the following four societies:—

(1). *El Muntada el Adabi* (The Literary Club)

This is the leading and most powerful Arab propaganda society in Jerusalem. It is in direct and constant touch with the centre of the propa-

ganda at Damascus. Its aims are Arab independence, prevention of any and every sort of Zionism and Jewish immigration, union of Palestine with Syria, and abolition of foreign capitulations.

Most of its members are young Moslems, the Christian membership being very limited and not at all trusted by the others. The most important members at present are as follows:—

(a) Muhammad Yusef el Khatib, also known as Muhammad Yusef Jumaa el Kenani. Well educated, able writer, capable leader, most likely sincere patriot.

(b) Mahmoud Aziz el Khaldi. Crafty, heavy drinker, skilled intriguer, unscrupulous. A dangerous man. He is also a most active member of 'Black Hand'. Anti-British.

(c) Hasan Sidki Dejjani, also known as Hasan Omar Dahudi. Only about 21 years old. Good education, very clever, unscrupulous, thorough charlatan. Desired permission to establish Arab propaganda newspaper at Jerusalem but was refused. Now wishes to go to Constantinople to get into touch with C.U.P.<sup>1</sup> Is reported by most reliable sources to have received 24 pounds per month from French Commissariat at Jerusalem. Often acts as liaison with Damascus. Anti-British.

(d) Isaaf Neshashibi. Able, well educated, a teacher and writer. Is head-master of Reshidieh school. Very likely good man and sincere.

(e) Omar Zaani Beiruti. Native of Beyrouth, and has been in Beyrouth for about three months, but now on secret visit to Jerusalem. Acts as liaison among Arab societies in various places. Is reported to be leader of 'Black Hand' at Beyrouth. A dangerous man.

(f) Other prominent members are Rushdi Shaath, Fakhri Neshashibi, and various other members of the Neshashibi family. One of the chief unofficial members who does not appear in the meetings of the societies but directs affairs from without is Muhammad Yusef el Alami, who is perhaps the greatest potential danger among Jerusalem agitators. Please see under (3). Aref, who recently arrived from Russia as an escaped Turkish prisoner of war, is also active in Muntada affairs, but may cease to be so on taking up some Government post at Haifa. He was formerly employed at the Turkish Foreign Office, and is a linguist of unusual ability.

#### (2). *El Nadi el Arabi*. (The Arab Club)

Nearly all the important members belong to the Huseini family, many of whom are not on good terms with the leading lights in the Muntada el Adabi. The aim of the Nadi el Arabi is about the same as that of the Muntada, but the members of the Nadi are not so radical. That is, they are not so strong on Arab independence, but are just as much opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration.

At present, the most important members connected with the Nadi are:—

(a) Hajj Emin Huseini. Brother of the Mufti. Is very ardent Arab propa-

<sup>1</sup> The Committee of Union and Progress.

gandist, and has been especially active among the villagers. Most active of Huseini pro-Arabs.

(b) Jemil Bey Huseini. Very active propagandist. Works among villagers.

(c) Sheikh Hasan Abu Sioud. Also member of No. (3). His talk and preaching at Mosque of Omar have at times verged on Holy War (Jehad). Has been reproved by the Mufti.

Other members include Ibrahim Bey Huseini, who is the son of Ismail Bey and was formerly . . .<sup>2</sup> in the Intelligence Corps; Hilmie Huseini, Ahmed Jauna, and, connected unofficially, Sheikh Muhammad Saleh, director of the Raudet el-Maarif School.

### (3). *El Akha w'el Afaf* (Brotherhood and Purity)

The society is composed of the more violent propagandists as leaders of a host of ordinary ruffians and cut-throats. These latter members are expected to do the dirty work for the Muntada and Nadi if and when any needs to be done.

At present the leading spirits are as follows:—

(a) Mahmoud Aziz el Khaldi. Please see (1), (b).

(b) Sheikh Hasan Abu Sioud. Please see (2), (c).

(c) Sheikh Said el Khatib. President of the Society. Meetings sometimes at his house.

(d) Sheikh Muhammad Yusef el Alami. Very anti-British. Very active. A driving power behind the scenes in all the societies. Carries on propaganda among the Bedouin of the trans-Jordan. Most dangerous agitator.

(e) Abdul Raouf Bustami. Assistant Commissioner of Police. Meetings often at his house. Frequently reported by me to the Military Governor for his anti-British utterances and on account of political meetings at his house.

(f) Sheikh Reshid el Khatib. Not a member, but has influence with those who are. Very anti-British, and more than once has attempted to cause disaffection among Indian guards at the Mosque. Not doing so now, but invites Indians to his house.

Many policemen and gendarmes are openly or secretly connected with the Akha w'el Afaf. As complete a list as possible may be found in my . . .<sup>3</sup> of to-day to Headquarters of O.E.T.A. South. The policemen and gendarmes have recently been alarmed by the reduction in their numbers and what they regarded as certain reduction in their pay, and so both those who have been discharged or left and those who have remained have alike had more inclination to continue their connection with the Society.

### (4). *El Fedaiyeh*

It is difficult to translate this word into English; the idea is that of a society of persons who are ready to sacrifice themselves. The society is somewhat

<sup>2</sup> An indication of Ibrahim Bey Huseini's status in the Intelligence Corps is here omitted.

<sup>3</sup> A code reference to the second of the two reports referred to by Colonel French in his covering despatch is here omitted. This report listing police personnel is not printed.

like the Black Hand, so prevalent in Italy and a few years ago in the United States. Its membership is composed of ruffians who swear to do what they are told; that is, to start a revolt or assassinate anybody. The members were originally 38, which comprised eight policemen and gendarmes. The organiser was Mahmud Dabbagh, a gendarme who was interned about two months ago. The resent [recent] leader is Mahmud Aziz el Khaldi referred to in (1) (b). Muhammad Yusef el Alami is also behind the scenes; please see (3) (d). This society, like the Akha 'el Afaf, is subsidiary to the Muntada. Its membership is composed of specially selected ruffians, including some Greek Orthodox Arabs. For the names of policemen and gendarmes, formerly serving or now serving, who were or are members of the Fedaiyeh, please see my . . .<sup>3</sup> of to-day.

(5). In addition there is the recently formed *Muntada el Dejjani* (Dejjani Club), the leading spirit of which is Hasan Sidki Dejjani, referred to in (1). On its political side, this society is similar to the Muntada, but its membership is limited to the Dejjani family.

(6). *The Moslem-Christian society* is composed of older and more representative Moslems and Christians of Jerusalem and the surrounding villages. The Latins in it are pro-French; the Greek Orthodox are nearly all pro-British; the Moslems are out for independence, though if they cannot have it some prefer Britain and others America as Mandatory Power. The Moslems want nothing to do with France. But Latin, Greek Orthodox and Moslem are equally opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration. The Moslem-Christian Society is not so secret nor so violent in its attitude and activities as the five previously mentioned.

The present activities of the first five societies comprise the following:— Arming of members with small arms; preparation of lists of prominent Jews and pro-Zionists among non-Jews, with place of residence of each; propaganda among the Bedouin of the trans-Jordan, the prospect of Jewish women and loot being held out before them; effort to concentrate Palestinian officers at Amman, so as to be ready in case pro-Zionist policy is announced; learning of Hebrew by a few agents so as to follow Hebrew papers and conversation; appointment of agents to watch everything going on; effort to effect agreement with police and gendarmes to hand over arms or at least put no obstacles in the way in case a revolt takes place; teaching of pan-Arab ideals to children, especially those in Reshidieh and Raudte [*sic*] el-Maarif Schools. In other words, every sort of preparation is quietly being made for action in the event of the success of any Zionist policy, however moderate.

In all these preparations, the Muntada is taking the leading role and working through the Akha w'el Afaf and the Fedaiyeh. Not all the persons who have most influence in the societies are members, as some of the most active agitators do not attend any of the meetings but only work through those who do.

According to present information, the following persons are the most dangerous of all and are not only anti-Zionist, but also very anti-British. Many of the others are not anti-British at all, but only anti-Zionist.

1. Muhammad Yusef el Alami.
2. Mahmud Aziz el Khaldi.
3. Hasan Sidki Dejjani.
4. Omar Zaani Beiruti.
5. Sheikh Reshid el Khatib.
6. Jodet el Halabi.

No. 6 is a recently discharged policeman and is the right-hand man of Mahmud Aziz el Khaldi in the Fedaiyeh. Hajj Emin Huseini might be added to the list, but is by no means so violent and dangerous as the others.

It is difficult to say what is the best policy of dealing with the six persons named above. They are preparing their plans for acting in case any sort of Zionist policy is to be carried out in this country, and the announcement of such a policy will likely be their signal for action. If arrested and interned now they will be regarded as martyrs, and others will inevitably arise to take their places. There would also be the question of what to do with them on release from internment, at which time they would surely be more anti-Zionist and anti-British than ever. And in this connection it must be remembered that similar societies exist in almost every place of importance in Palestine, and that almost every town has agitators of the same sort. Consequently, if the six persons mentioned above are to be interned, a similar policy should be followed at Nablus, Jaffa, Gaza, Tul Keram, Haifa, etc.

In brief, practically all Moslems and Christians of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionists, and bitterly so. They openly or secretly support or sympathise with the societies in their anti-Zionist and anti-immigration talk and plans for action. In other words, if we mean to carry out any sort of Zionist policy we must do so with military force and adopt a strong policy against all the agitators in the country. We must also be prepared for the possibility of raids by the Gaza, Beersheba, and trans-Jordan Bedouin. We must also be ready to risk disorders in the Moslem world at large and be prepared for the propaganda that is certain to be made with regard to Jews taking possession of the Holy Places and the Holy Land. The emissaries of other Powers would appear on the scene as champions of Christendom in their propaganda, and perhaps of Islam as well.

In my opinion, Dr. Weizmann's agreement with Emir Feisal is not worth the paper it is written on or the energy wasted in the conversation to make it. On the other hand, if it becomes sufficiently known among the Arabs, it will be somewhat in the nature of a noose about Feisal's neck, for he will be regarded by the Arab population as a traitor. No greater mistake could be made than to regard Feisal as a representative of Palestinian Arabs (Moslem and Christian natives of Palestine who speak Arabic); he is in favour with them so long as he embodies Arab nationalism and represents their views, but would no longer have any power over them if they thought he had made any sort of agreement with Zionists and meant to abide by it. But it seems that he is capable of making contradictory agreements with the French, the Zionists and ourselves, of receiving money from all three, and then en-

deavouring to act as he pleases. This is an additional reason why his agreement with Weizmann is of little or no value.

The information and opinions in this report are based on intelligence agents' reports, conversation with almost every class and nationality in Jerusalem, close study on the spot of political questions since our occupation, and residence in and study of the Moslem world most of the time since 1910.

Open Arab opposition may possibly be averted if the Jews through a policy of peaceful penetration, without the blaring of trumpets and without any special privileges such as Dr. Weizmann and other official Zionists desire, attain by their own work and on their own merits a position of supremacy in the land. That is, Britain would obtain a mandate for Palestine, but not for a Jewish or Zionist Palestine. An immigration policy to be applied to all comers without distinction of race or creed would be adopted; the immigrants would come in such numbers yearly as the land could support, due consideration being given to the present inhabitants and their probable rate of increase. Then if the Jew with an open field and no favours attains a position of supremacy twenty or thirty years hence, the Arab should have no reasonable grounds for objection. On the other hand, as it is now, the Arab feels that the Zionist policy is unjust and that any mandatory power that attempts to carry out a Zionist policy is guilty of favouritism and doing him gross injustice.

J. N. CAMP,  
*Major,*  
*Asst. Political Officer*

Jerusalem, 12.8.19

#### No. 254

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 986 Telegraphic [120806/142/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 29, 1919

Your telegram No. 1071<sup>1</sup> (of 6th July—French troops for the Hejaz).

French Chargé d'Affaires states that Hussein has asked for the despatch of four French tanks for the protection of pilgrims on the Medina road.<sup>2</sup> Have you any confirmation of Hussein having made such a request to the French?

<sup>1</sup> No. 214.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 251.

#### No. 255

*Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received August 31)*

*No. 414 Telegraphic [122999/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, August 29, 1919

The Commander-in-Chief has (?) received omitted from Feisal a letter and memorandum dated August 17 written after he had been informed by Chief of General Staff of gist of your telegram 245<sup>1</sup> which seriously perturbed him.

Memorandum is to following effect.

He was informed in Paris by Pichon that Syrian question was in Feisal's hands.

<sup>1</sup> No. 236.

He believes we sympathise with him and will take great interest in the report of the American Commission which he credits with real power.

He sees that decision of His Majesty's Government to accept a mandate for Palestine involves division of Arab countries and a return to the 'Unjust Agreement of 1916'.

People of Palestine have asked for and obtained a British mandate; why has not the rest of Syria been consulted similarly?

The majority of Arabs have asked that mandate for all Syria and Mesopotamia should be given to one Power.

If there is any possibility of Peace Conference making a decision which is contrary to this desire and which involves a division of country, Feisal cannot remain in his present position which would render him liable to the accusation that he consented to the ruin of his country.

He would be obliged in that case to shed his last drop of blood with his countrymen.

He therefore desires information on above points and begs the Commander-in-Chief to warn His Majesty's Government that if country is divided or a mandate given contrary to the wishes of the people there will be a general rising by all Arabs.

He has asked for a personal interview with Commander-in-Chief which in circumstances is impossible.

The original of this memorandum has been lost in post and up to the present it has proved impossible to trace it.

It is conceivable that it may have fallen into hands of the French and I am therefore repeating this telegram to Mr. Balfour.

A telegram from Damascus dated 7th states that Feisal believes His Majesty's Government have come to an Agreement with French.

He threatened to issue in a few days a call to his people to fight but has been persuaded to withdraw it.

He insists however that he must either send some one to England or go himself to present his case.

Commander-in-Chief has acknowledged this memorandum and informed Feisal that he is taking it with him to England on September 3 and that gist of it had been telegraphed to His Majesty's Government.

## No. 256

*Earl Curzon to Colonel French (Cairo)*

*No. 271 Telegraphic [121883/17115/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 30, 1919

Your telegram No. 405<sup>1</sup> (of the 13th August. Standard Oil Company's application for permission to resume operations in Palestine).

Permission cannot be granted until the question of the mandate has been settled.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 244.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Balfour had previously concurred in this reply.

No. 257

Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 17)

No. C.P.O. 311 [130392/2117/44A]

CAIRO, August 30, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Brig. General Clayton's despatch No. C.P.O. 311 of the 23rd June,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to forward herewith a summary of the situation in Syria and Palestine as it appears to me at present.

The visit of the American Commission, regarding which I have reported to Your Lordship in my despatch No. C.P.O. 311 of the 19th July<sup>2</sup> and my telegram No. 378<sup>3</sup> of the 10th July, came to a conclusion on the 24th of July, when the Commissioners embarked at Mersina for Constantinople. While it is impossible to tell what may have been the conclusions they reached, there is good reason to believe that their report<sup>4</sup> will be a document of considerable interest and material assistance, in that it was drawn up by men with keen and unprejudiced minds who had opportunities of discussing the political situation and future of Syria with representative and intelligent men of every section of the community. They were accompanied by Colonel J. K. Watson, C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., who was specially selected by the Commander-in-Chief on account of his linguistic qualifications and also because he had not previously been in Syria and was therefore entirely without bias. His duties with the Commission were to make all the necessary arrangements as regards transport, &c. He had no political duties.

There is no doubt that a considerable proportion of the population hope and believe that the report of the Commissioners may avert the granting of a mandate for Northern Syria to the French, against whom the opinion of most of the influential men of almost all classes is hardening as time goes on. The aversion to the French has been strengthened by the ill-timed and injudicious action of some of their officers, which gave the impression that they were anxious to prevent any Francophobe natives from meeting the American Commissioners. I do not believe that any such actions were encouraged by the heads of the administration; they were for the most part mere exhibitions of misplaced zeal on the part of indiscreet subordinates; but such indiscretions have unfortunately been encouraged by a propaganda campaign countenanced by some senior French officials and which has been almost as harmful to French prestige and popularity as these indiscretions.

There were similar instances of political pressure and propaganda in O.E.T. (East), where the administrators are Arabs, but from the evidence available they were not as numerous as in O.E.T. (West).

The whole country is now quiet from a political point of view, but it is the quiet resulting partly from exhaustion which followed the political orgy during the visit of the Commission, and partly from the tension caused by the belief that the decision of the Conference will be known shortly.

<sup>1</sup> No. 199.

<sup>2</sup> No. 224.

<sup>3</sup> No. 219.

<sup>4</sup> This report is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. xii, pp. 751-863.

The Emir Feisal was seriously perturbed during the time immediately following the visit of the Commission and sent two of his most trusted officers to interview the Commander-in-Chief and to inform him that in his opinion the political persecution practised by the French was with the deliberate intention of creating an incident which would compel armed intervention. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that it was almost impossible to prevent propaganda, that it usually recoiled on the heads of those who carried it out and that the French had made somewhat similar accusations against the Arabs, and satisfied the Emir by promising to make enquiries into the alleged cases of injustice.

The situation is exceedingly difficult for the Emir Feisal whom I believe to have made honest attempts to hold the balance between the moderate and extreme sections of the Arabs and who desires to fulfil his promises both to His Majesty's Government and to the Zionists; and this very honesty has to a certain extent undermined his influence which for the moment is probably decreasing rather than increasing.

On the other hand, if there were a crisis and he took the lead, as I believe he would, it is probable not only that the Arabs would join him in large numbers, but that he might be joined by considerable numbers of Turks and Kurds who would be prepared to serve with him as a leader not only of prestige, but of great ideals, under whom it might be possible to win the independence of large areas of the Ottoman Empire.

A long-standing feud between the Ansariah and Ismailien in the neighbourhood of Khadmis led to the despatch of a small French column which appears to have been ambushed and suffered a certain number of casualties. A joint Anglo-French political mission is now visiting the chiefs of the disturbed area and the latest information is that the tribe concerned has accepted the conditions imposed by the Commander-in-Chief, and made submission.

The situation in Palestine has not changed. A report on the visit of Mr. Justice Brandeis has been sent to you vide my C.P.O. 31/1<sup>s</sup> of the 11th August. This visit has undoubtedly done a certain amount of good, especially among the more extreme Zionists, and it is to be hoped that Mr. Brandeis will be able to impress on the Zionist leaders in Europe the need for caution and moderation both in deed and in word in face of the genuine and deep-seated dislike of the non-Jewish population of Palestine not only for Zionists but to a certain extent for all Jews.

The relations between the administration and the Zionist Commission have not been entirely satisfactory, mainly in consequence of the fact that the personnel of the Commission has not been strengthened by the presence of men of outstanding ability since its original formation. These relations must to a large extent depend on good personal relations and perfect frankness on the part of both parties. Recently there have been instances where questions have either been referred direct to the Zionist Organisation in Europe without previous discussion with the administration, or where the organisation has approached your Lordship on information received from Jewish sources

<sup>s</sup> No. 241.

other than the Zionist Commission. Either procedure is likely to lead to inexact information, waste of time and friction on the spot between the administration and the Commission.

There are other signs that the Zionists in Europe are not kept fully informed regarding the situation in Palestine.

Dr. Weizmann in a letter to Sir L. Mallet<sup>6</sup> which was forwarded under your letter No. 5<sup>7</sup> of the 2nd July, wrote of 'artificial agitation' in Palestine. It is the considered opinion of British officers who know Palestine well that the opposition to Zionism, which is based to a certain extent on the national sentiment of the inhabitants, has grown stronger during the past months, and it is believed that this is well known to the Commission, which has an efficient 'intelligence' service. It may be an oversight on his part, but Dr. Weizmann invariably refers in his letter to the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine as 'Arabs'. He no doubt realises that these 'Arabs' consider themselves primarily as 'Syrians' and form the greater part of the population, and that it is among the Moslem and Christian Syrians that the idea of nationalism is strongest.

The proposed acquisition by the Zionists of the Kaiserin Victoria Augusta Hospice as a university presents certain practical difficulties which no doubt might be overcome; but it should be pointed out that ever since its construction it has been regarded as a Christian institution with a Christian chapel, while since the beginning of the war it has always been used as a headquarters. To relinquish it as the seat of government, and to hand it over as a Zionist university would, in my opinion, earn for the Mandatory Power the contempt of all classes of the community, none of whom even now quite understand our religious toleration, and I think it will be admitted that the prestige of the Mandatory Power is worthy of some consideration, most of all perhaps by the Zionists.

Finally, I will venture to suggest that there would appear to be a tendency among some of the leading Zionists to complain of what the administration have not done for them and to ignore both what has been done and the practical difficulties of the present and the future. These difficulties are going to be very great, and will demand sympathy, tact, caution and absolute fairness to all sections of the population on the part of both administration and Zionists. Great ideals and enthusiasm are not enough to ensure success, and any ill-considered haste is likely to delay rather than expedite the realisation of a Jewish National Home.

I have, &c.  
C. FRENCH

<sup>6</sup> Enclosure 1 in No. 212.

<sup>7</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 258

*Colonel Meinertzhangen<sup>1</sup> (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 6)*

*No. 418 Telegraphic [125910/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 3, 1919

My Political Officer at Damascus reports volunteers are being voluntarily enrolled and swearing to defend the country against partition without special reference to any Power. Feisal gives assurance there will be no trouble at present. Feisal intends the movement to strengthen his case before His Majesty's Government. Commander-in-Chief has wired to Feisal disapproving of movement as creating unfavourable impression in Europe and doing harm to (? Allied) cause, at the same time hoping Feisal will not lend support to it but use his influence against it. Feisal also wishes to repudiate his agreement with Weizmann for fear it may be construed as acquiescence in partition of Syria. I am visiting Feisal on September 10 in company with Picot's successor Lafourcade to try and bring about a more conciliatory state of affairs than already exists between French, Arabs and ourselves.

Addressed to London. Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in succession to General Clayton.

No. 259

*Letter from Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Mr. Clark-Kerr (Received September 5)*

*Unnumbered [125340/125340/44A]*

PARIS, September 3, 1919

My dear Archie,

I have received your letter No. 116059/ME44a<sup>1</sup> of August 21st about Colonel Lawrence and have consulted the authorities here.

The reply is that Colonel Lawrence should be considered to be under the Foreign Office, and that we do not share the apprehensions as to the effect of his presence in Paris at the proper time. It is considered, on the contrary, that there is little hope of a settlement except in an agreement between Feisal and the French, and that such an agreement would hardly be possible except with Colonel Lawrence's assistance. If he is properly handled, he may be able to get Feisal into a reasonable frame of mind, and if he cannot or will not, probably no one else can. If Feisal comes here for the ultimate settlement and then found that we were preventing him from having the advice of Lawrence, it would only make him more suspicious of an Anglo-French plot against him and all the less likely to be accommodating.

Yours ever,

VAN.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 248.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Kidston minuted as follows on this letter: 'The trouble is that it is always Col.

Lawrence who does the "handling". He has told me quite frankly that he has no belief in an Anglo-French understanding in the East, that he regards France as our natural enemy in those parts & that he has always shaped his action accordingly.

'Reply to W.O. as suggested.

'G. Kidston

Sept. 9/19.'

### No. 260

*Sir M. Cheetham<sup>1</sup> (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 7)*

*No. 1332 Telegraphic [126069/142/44A]*

Your telegram No. 986.<sup>2</sup>

CAIRO, September 5, 1919

British agent at Jeddah has been unable to obtain any confirmation of such a request.

<sup>1</sup> Counsellor in H.M. Residency at Cairo.

<sup>2</sup> No. 254.

### No. 261

*Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador in London*

*No. 121038/M.E. 44A [121038/2117/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 6, 1919

Your Excellency,

In pursuance of the Note which I had the honour to address to you on the 25th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> I am now in a position to communicate to Your Excellency the report of the responsible Military Authorities on the 2nd and 4th points raised in the Note which you were so good as to address to me on July 28th<sup>2</sup> with regard to the position in Syria.

Ever since the successful advance of the Arab forces last year and the disappearance of the Turkish power it has been in contemplation to raise and equip a suitable force of gendarmerie for the maintenance of law and order in the various regions that now acknowledge Arab authority. The organisation and equipment of this force has been steadily proceeded with ever since, and the plans of the Commander in Chief contemplate the arming of one Arab mixed brigade and six thousand gendarmes. It is however his intention to secure the exchange of a modern rifle, machine gun or gun for every similar weapon of British pattern furnished to the Arab forces. The effect of the step therefore will not be to increase Arab armaments but solely to ensure uniformity between the different sections comprising Field-Marshal Allenby's command.

In point of fact no rifles, machine guns or guns have hitherto been transferred to the Arabs under this scheme.

Field-Marshal Allenby contradicts categorically the statement which appeared in *Le Temps* of August 18 to the effect that arms and ammunition have been landed at Beirut by British ships and delivered to the Arabs. I should be grateful if the French Government could see their way to publish a *démenti* of this statement.

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure 5 in No. 250.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 235.

With reference to the 4th point in Your Excellency's Note of the 28th July. Field-Marshal Allenby has reported that in point of fact several Arabs headed by one Mujhim, who was wanted by the Authorities on seventeen different charges, were arrested at Homs en route from Aleppo to Beirut, at the instance of the Arab Military Governor of Aleppo. I am asking the War Office to obtain a further report showing the nature of the charges against these persons, whether their prosecution was actually carried out and if so with what result. I shall not fail to communicate to Your Excellency further information on these points so soon as it is received.

As Your Excellency is aware, the arrest of a person known as the Emir Said has recently aroused some criticism in the French Press. Field-Marshal Allenby reports that this man was arrested and removed from Beirut for reasons of public security with the full concurrence of the French Chief Administrator at that place. I shall be glad if in this case too the facts can be communicated without delay to the French Press.

I have, &c.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy of original.

## No. 262

*The French Chargé d'Affaires in London to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 10)*

[127178/17115/44A]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES

Un groupe anglais, présidé par Lord Inchcape et un groupe français, ayant à sa tête la Banque Demachy, se sont récemment mis d'accord en vue de l'étude et de la concession de gisements pétrolifères en Palestine et dans la région d'Akaba.

Le Gouvernement Français est disposé à prêter son appui, le moment venu, à ce groupement franco-anglais.

Toutefois la délivrance de ces concessions ne saurait être envisagée pour le moment et aucune autorité n'est actuellement qualifiée pour accorder des concessions dans les territoires occupés du Levant, puisque la situation internationale de ces territoires n'est pas encore réglée.

Sans doute s'agit-il uniquement d'études relatives aux conditions possibles pour la constitution de cette Société. Au cas où l'envoi d'une mission sur les lieux serait envisagé, en vue d'y préparer des travaux préliminaires d'étude, tels que des sondages, le Gouvernement Français serait heureux d'être tenu au courant à ce sujet par le Gouvernement Britannique. Il souhaiterait notamment savoir si la prospection peut s'effectuer sans entraves dans les territoires du Levant occupés par les troupes anglaises.

M. de Fleuriau en portant des vues du Gouvernement Français à la connaissance de Sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'État, saisit cette occasion pour Lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.

ALBERT GATE HOUSE, 8 septembre 1919

No. 263

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 8)*

*No. 422 Telegraphic [126509/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 8, 1919

If statement in Reuter telegram that Prime Minister is proceeding to Paris to confer on Syrian question is correct it is urged that Emir Feisal be allowed to go there also without delay.

No. 264

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 1140 Telegraphic [126509/2117/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 9, 1919

Colonel Meinertzhagen's telegram No. 422<sup>1</sup> (of 8th September Feisal's visit to Paris).

Prime Minister intimates through his Private Secretary that he thinks this suggestion an excellent one. I have pointed out that even if Feisal can arrive in time the assent of the French Government should be obtained before arrangements are made. I understand that Mr. Davis<sup>2</sup> is in communication with Mr. Kerr on the subject and presume that instructions will be sent to Colonel Meinertzhagen direct from Paris.

Repeated to Colonel Meinertzhagen Cairo No. 281.

<sup>1</sup> No. 263.

<sup>2</sup> A private secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

No. 265

*Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*[384/1/1/18777]*

September 9, 1919

*Some difficulties to be borne in mind in any Syrian negotiations.*

(1) On whatever basis the arrangement with the French is arrived at—whether Sykes-Picot or League of Nations or any other—it will be difficult to shew reason why Feisal should have a larger measure of independence in Damascus and Eastern Syria than we are prepared to accord to him or other Arab rulers in Mesopotamia.

(2) The distinction between the Blue and Red areas on the one hand and the A. and B. areas on the other created by the Sykes-Picot agreement, is not recognised by the Covenant, and cannot well be embodied in an A. Mandate, which recognises no distinctions of authority within any mandated area. Therefore the French can hardly claim more in Western Syria (Lebanon) than they give in Eastern Syria (Damascus, Aleppo, &c.) and the English cannot claim more in the red area (Bosrah [*sic*] and lower Mesopotamia) than they give in upper Mesopotamia (Mosul &c.).

But to me this seems difficult to reconcile with our quasi-territorial ambitions, and quite impossible to reconcile with the ambitions of the French.

Neither of us wants much less than supreme economic and political control, to be exercised no doubt (at least in our case) in friendly and unostentatious co-operation with the Arabs—but nevertheless, in the last resort, to be exercised.

(3) In all the ordinary talk I hear on the subject of Mesopotamian oil, it is assumed that if this is found in the British sphere it belongs, to all intents and purposes, to Britain. But this is quite inconsistent with the assumption underlying the whole Covenant and expressly embodied in its clauses. For in all mandated territory the 'open door' is to be completely maintained and all nations are to enjoy equal opportunities.

(4) This will prove an inconvenient argument when we are urging our inherent rights to an all-British Railway and an all-British pipe-line to carry all-British oil to the British Navy and the British Mercantile Marine!

(5) Quite apart from this consideration I do not think the French will be much impressed by our claim to a right of direct access to Mosul based on the ground that, as they have given us Mosul, they must clearly give us that, without which Mosul would be useless. They will reply with perfect truth (a) that the gift of a great oil-bearing and wheat-growing district is one of extraordinary value, even if its whole produce has to go round by the Suez Canal—and (b) that they see no great hardship in sending it under international guarantees over a partly French railway and through a neutralised and internationalised French port. Nor in fact (in ordinary times) is there.

It is of course quite true that the Sykes-Picot agreement ought never to have given Mosul to France. But it *did*; and that through no fault of the French, but in consequence of a miscalculation of Lord Kitchener<sup>1</sup> who was unwilling to have territories in which Britain was interested coterminous with a military Monarchy such as Russia then was. I remember agreeing with him.

(6) I think these are considerations which must not merely be kept in mind during our negotiations with the French—but should be brought to Lord Milner's attention in framing a scheme for Mandate A. I am inclined to go further and say that he ought to read carefully the survey of the situation contained in my long paper on 'Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine'.<sup>2</sup>

A. J. B.

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of State for War, 1914-16.

<sup>2</sup> No. 242.

## No. 266

*Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 9)*

*No. 1341 Telegraphic [126873/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 9, 1919

Following telegram has been received from King Hussein for transmission to His Majesty (?) Begins:—

Feisal has wired to me of agitation which is taking place in consequence of statements made in certain papers concerning the existence of a secret agreement made with object of dividing country.

Though I have no doubt that I and Arab people will obtain fulfilment of pledges given as a basis of revolt, I desire to issue an official proclamation immediately in accordance with your views, in order to reassure the public otherwise all our moral and material efforts will have been vain.

The importance of question is evident.

In conclusion please accept my profound respects. Ends.

I have received a similar telegram from Emir Abdulla in which he associates himself with Hussein. If you approve (?) I propose to inform (?) latter that pending decision of Peace Conference premature action by him would be undesirable.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 1036 of September 13, 1919, to Cairo Lord Curzon approved this proposal.

### No. 267

*The Delegation of the Hejaz to Mr. Norman (Paris)*

*(Received September 12)*

[384/1/1/18830]

PARIS, le 10 septembre 1919

La Délégation Héjazienne a l'honneur de communiquer à M. le Secrétaire Général de la Délégation Britannique à la Conférence de la Paix l'exposé ci-joint concernant la question syrienne.

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 267

PARIS, le 10 septembre 1919

Le Paragraphe 4 de l'Article 22 du Pacte de la Ligue des Nations ainsi conçu règle le sort des provinces libérées de la Turquie.

'Certaines Communautés qui appartenaient autrefois à l'Empire Ottoman ont atteint un degré de développement tel que leur existence comme Nations indépendantes peut être reconnue provisoirement à la condition que les conseils et l'aide d'un mandataire guident leur administration jusqu'au moment où elles seront capables de se conduire seules. Les voeux de ces Communautés doivent être pris d'abord en considération pour le choix du Mandataire.'

En vertu de ce paragraphe et à l'effet de pratiquer la consultation prévue, le Conseil des Quatre a décidé l'envoi sur les lieux d'une mission d'enquête, représentant les Quatre Grandes Puissances. Les différents membres furent désignés; mais en définitif et après bien des hésitations, la Commission Américaine seule se mit en route. Son enquête se poursuivit pendant deux mois dans toutes les régions de la Syrie et nous estimons que les constatations faites ont dû être déjà soumises à l'appréciation de la Conférence.

Cependant les tergiversations et les hésitations qui ont présidé aux négociations relatives à l'envoi de cette Mission, la campagne menée par la Presse pour diminuer la valeur de la consultation et les protestations qui ont été provoquées à dessein contre l'envoi, et plus tard contre la Commission elle-

même, révèlent un état d'âme et des dispositions qui s'accordent mal avec l'esprit qui a inspiré les promoteurs de la Ligue des Nations.

Tandis que les hommes d'État autorisés déclarent du haut des tribunes que les traités et accords secrets sont nuls et non avenus et ne peuvent être invoqués dans le règlement du sort des peuples, on voit d'autre part une recrudescence d'activité pour concilier les intérêts de telle ou telle puissance, et nous assistons à des marchandages et à des combinaisons sur la base du fameux accord secret de 1916<sup>1</sup> fait aux dépens et au détriment des peuples dont on prétend vouloir assurer l'unité et l'existence.

Aussi les nouvelles qui circulent dans la Grande Presse concernant les déclarations de certains hommes d'État, les négociations en cours entre les Puissances intéressées au sujet de la relève des troupes d'occupation en Syrie et le jeu des compensations qui ne cesse d'être la base de la Diplomatie secrète ont provoqué une très vive émotion parmi ces populations qui ont cru au triomphe du règne de la Justice et du Droit. Cette effervescence a été d'ailleurs signalée par une dépêche de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Faïsal que nous avons déjà communiquée à la Conférence.<sup>2</sup> Les populations en question ne peuvent concevoir que le Pacte de la Ligue des Nations élaboré au prix de tant d'efforts et de tant de sacrifices et qui constitue le couronnement de l'œuvre de la Conférence puisse demeurer lettre morte quand il s'agit des peuples arabes.

Il est inadmissible que les priviléges accordés par la Turquie pour la construction d'un chemin de fer, d'un port, ou la fondation d'une école ou d'un hôpital, puissent constituer une hypothèque sur un patrimoine national et justifier une mainmise incompatible avec le droit sacré de *self determination*.

Cet accord secret de 1916<sup>1</sup> invoqué toutes les fois qu'il s'agit du Levant est un acte nul et non avenu. Il est caduc du fait de sa dénonciation par la Russie, une des parties contractantes. Si la France et l'Angleterre, les deux Puissances intéressées, veulent se considérer liées par cet acte, le peuple à l'insu et au détriment duquel il a été conclu, ce peuple qui a tant souffert pour conquérir son indépendance, ne peut jamais souscrire à un acte qui détruit son existence et son unité nationales. En effet il suffit de jeter un regard sur la carte pour concevoir l'incohérence qui a présidé à l'élaboration de cet accord. Les régions les plus évoluées y sont soumises à un régime d'administration directe de la part d'une Puissance étrangère, tandis que les régions de l'intérieur sont dotées d'un gouvernement indépendant mais par contre condamnées à n'avoir aucun accès libre à la mer. Cet accord multiplie les différentes zones d'influence et compromet la vie économique du pays au point qu'un voyageur partant par chemin de fer d'une ville du littoral

<sup>1</sup> The Sykes-Picot Agreement.

<sup>2</sup> On September 8, 1919, the Delegation of the Hejaz had communicated to the British Delegation the following telegram from the Emir Feisal: 'Les nouvelles qui reviennent avec persistance concernant des négociations secrètes entre gouvernements visant le partage de la Syrie, ont produit une grande effervescence. Le peuple se révolte à l'idée de se voir traité en serf et d'être un objet d'échange. Fort de son unité et de son droit, décidé à lutter pour son existence, il décline toute responsabilité présente et à venir quant aux conséquences possibles, si une décision était prise au mépris de ses justes revendications.'

comme Saint Jean d'Acre pour une ville de l'intérieur comme Alep est condamné à traverser plus de douze frontières dans un petit pays comme la Syrie. Ce découpage qui ne répond à aucun besoin est tellement paradoxal qu'il n'y a aucune considération qui peut le justifier.

La Conférence qui a pris sur elle le rétablissement de la Paix et la reconstitution du monde sur les bases de la Justice et du Droit afin d'assurer le libre développement des peuples ne peut pas permettre la consommation d'un pareil acte.

Le Pacte de la Ligue des Nations a reconnu aux provinces arabes de l'Ancienne Turquie leur indépendance et le droit de *self determination*. Il y est prévue une consultation, cette consultation a été faite par les soins de la Commission Américaine. Le résultat de cette enquête doit donc constituer la base du règlement des statut[s] de ces provinces.

Les Délégués du Hedjaz inspirés par le seul souci des intérêts et des droits de leurs frères de race estiment de leur devoir d'attirer l'attention des membres de la Conférence sur la situation fâcheuse que pourrait créer en Syrie tout arrangement provisoire tendant à mettre la Conférence devant un fait accompli et éluder des décision[s] futures. Les négociations en cours dont l'écho nous parvient ne peuvent avoir d'autre but que d'écartier les conséquences de l'enquête pratiquée avec tant d'impartialité par la Commission Américaine et dont les conclusions peuvent seules offrir une base juste et équitable pour le statut définitif de la Syrie et des autres provinces libérées, visées par le Paragraphe 4 de l'Article en question.

### No. 268

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 12)*

*No. 888 [128223/53817/17]*

PARIS, September 10, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that Monsieur Alfred Capus has written an article in to-day's *Figaro*, of which he is the Editor, under the heading 'La Cordialité Franco-Anglaise'. The following is a résumé of the article: 'One must say frankly that any movement of opinion either in France or in England calculated to harm Franco-British friendship would have been for both countries in the nature of a severe wound inflicted on our victory. In France such a movement has not even been outlined (*esquisse*) and the legitimate observations of practically the whole Press about the affairs of Syria have simply drawn public attention to that question. In England we have only noticed an increase of sympathy towards us and this has been emphasised by what Field Marshal Allenby said on arrival at Marseilles.<sup>1</sup> The tone of his remarks was just that which loyal Allies should

<sup>1</sup> Sir G. Grahame, in his telegram No. 1003 of September 9, 1919 (received September 10: not printed), had reported on accounts given in the French press of interviews with Field-Marshal Allenby on his arrival at Marseilles from Egypt. He was 'quoted as saying that there is entire agreement between French Authorities in Syria and himself on the larger

use towards one another, realising as they must what influence their union has upon their own and the world's destinies. If public opinion wishes to find a guide in any matter touching our relations with England, it has only to notice that any suggestions which have a tendency to throw a shadow over Franco-British friendship are accompanied by the approval of the German thesis which is that the Treaty of Peace is a violation of the liberty of peoples and of the principles which the Allies themselves proclaim. The apostle of a "rapprochement" with Germany and of a hostile attitude towards England was the very man whom Monsieur Clemenceau has brought to justice and who is to be tried by the High Court.<sup>2</sup> Who[m] do we see coming to the rescue of this man? That fraction of the Socialist Party which leans on Russian Bolshevism on the one hand, and on the German Maximalists, on the other, in order to combat the Peace Treaty. The Anglo-French alliance is one of the key-stones of the system created by our common victory. Its adversaries are naturally those whose interest it is to disparage and diminish the effect of that victory.'

Such sentiments as those uttered by Monsieur Capus can only be hailed with satisfaction as a corrective to what has of late been only too noticeable in all the chief French newspapers. I regret to say, however, that it does not appear to me an accurate representation of the facts when Monsieur Capus declares that there has been no movement in France in a sense unfavourable to England. For many weeks Great Britain has been persistently, and in many instances, virulently attacked almost daily by just those newspapers which have the power to influence public opinion, and these attacks have, in my opinion, produced the suspicion of British policy which is now prevalent. It is to be hoped, in the interests of the relations between the two countries, that this unfavourable impression has not gone very deep and may soon be effaced. In any case, the chief blame for this state of things must be laid at the door of the French leader-writers. While this campaign was in progress, there was no sign that the French Government took steps to moderate it, in spite of the representations which were made through the French Embassy in London and by myself to Monsieur Pichon, and in private conversation to various French officials and others. One is, therefore, forced to the conclusion that it suited the purposes of the French Government that the French Press should inveigh against British action in Syria and thus bring the matter into prominence, both here and in England, in the expectation that this campaign would make His Majesty's Government anxious to come to some speedy settlement of the Syrian question in the sense of French desires, and induce on their part a more amenable frame of mind than might have been the case if public opinion had not been aroused on the subject.

I have, &c.,  
GEORGE GRAHAME

questions and generally as having spoken in a conciliatory manner with regard to French claims.'

<sup>2</sup> The reference was apparently to M. Joseph Caillaux.

No. 269

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [128191/2117/44A]*

*PARIS, September 11, 1919*

Please send following message from Prime Minister to Emir Feisal.

Begins.

Lord Allenby has handed me your letter.<sup>2</sup> As question of Syria is likely to arise at an early date we think it advisable you should come to Paris at once. I shall have to leave Paris on Tuesday next<sup>3</sup> and if you cannot reach Paris by then I should be glad to see you in London.

M. Clemenceau and other members of Conference have been informed.<sup>4</sup> Arrangements for your transport are being made.<sup>5</sup>

Addressed Arbour,<sup>6</sup> Cairo. Repeated London.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to the Arab Bureau in Cairo (see note 6 below) and repeated to the Foreign Office (see below). The original copy to Cairo in the files of the British Peace Delegation is untraced.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 278.

<sup>3</sup> September 16, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 270.

<sup>5</sup> Colonel Meinertzhagen replied in Cairo telegram No. 430 of September 12, 1919 that 'Feisal is coming to Paris as quickly as possible.' Colonel Meinertzhagen suggested that Colonel Cornwallis should meet the Emir Feisal in Paris. (For the Emir Feisal's journey, cf. Volume I, No. 57, minute 1.)

<sup>6</sup> Telegraphic designation of the Arab Bureau in Cairo. This bureau for Arab affairs had been constituted under the Egyptian Expeditionary Force during the First World War.

No. 270

*Message from Mr. Lloyd George (Deauville)<sup>1</sup> to M. Clemenceau<sup>2</sup>*

*[144535/2117/44A]*

*September 11, 1919*

It looks to me as if the question of mandates for Turkey would take longer to settle than we had anticipated, in view of the delay in American decision. The British Government, however, cannot any longer undertake to maintain an army of over 400,000 men to garrison the Turkish Empire. This involves the question of what will happen in the parts of the Turkish Empire we withdraw from. When the Syrian question is discussed, the British Government wish to lay certain proposals before the Supreme Council in regard to it. With this object, I propose to come to Paris on Friday next<sup>3</sup> to discuss this and the Armenian question<sup>4</sup> and could see you at any time on Saturday or Sunday, but I shall have to leave on Tuesday in order to keep an engagement in London on Wednesday. As the British and French Governments are both pledged to the Emir Feisal that he shall be present when the settlement of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 21, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of this message and of No. 271 were communicated to the Foreign Office by Mr. Kerr on October 21 (received October 23).

<sup>3</sup> September 12, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 271.

the Syrian question is reached, I have taken the responsibility of inviting him to Paris. As he may not be able to reach Paris before next Tuesday, I hope that you will see no objection to his paying me a visit in London.

No. 271

*Message from M. Clemenceau to Mr. Lloyd George (Deauville)<sup>1</sup>*

[144535/2117/44A]

*September 11, 1919*

I agree with you that the settlement of the mandates in Turkey by the Allied and Associated Powers must be delayed until the American Government is in a position to acquaint us with its views on this subject. We have decided to wait until the Conference examines in its entirety and with full knowledge the settlement of the Eastern question.

The general difficulties which can result from the final settlement of the Ottoman questions, and, as regards the maintenance of order, from the retreat of the British troops from the territories of the Turkish Empire, are assuredly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council. It is not possible to isolate the question of Syria from the other questions connected with the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, and to submit it to the Supreme Council independently from those connected with Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia. The Supreme Council is only actually informed (and that by the Americans themselves) that imminent danger threatens the Armenians, in addition to the fact of the retreat of the English troops from the Caucasus and of the Turkish nationalist movement in Asia Minor.<sup>2</sup> The American, British, and Italian Delegations have declared that they are not in a position to send troops to protect the Armenians. The French Government has, therefore, offered to send 12,000 men as from the 10th September through Cilicia to effect this purpose.<sup>2</sup> The reply to our proposal awaits the British opinion. Mr. Balfour, who told me that he had consulted you and who is favourable to the proposal, has told me, that you also had given your assent in principle. He added that Marshal Sir Henry Wilson<sup>3</sup> was sick in London and could not come to Paris to settle this question, and further asked me to send him an officer. I accordingly sent Colonel Fagalde, our second military attaché in London. As to the question of the relief of the British troops in Syria, this really only concerns the French and British Governments, because of their agreements in 1916, and ought to be settled directly between them without any intermediary. This question, which is a purely military question, does not prejudge the final settlement of the Syrian question, which will be determined at the same time as the general settlement of the Eastern question by the Allied and Associated Powers. In these circumstances the journey of the Emir Feisal at this moment, and before a previous understanding between ourselves, would not appear to have any definite object in view.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 270, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. III.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

No. 272

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 429 Telegraphic [128333/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 11, 1919

At meeting between Laforcade, Feisal and myself at Damascus on September 9 effort was made to improve relations between French and Arabs by frank exchange of views. The conciliatory attitude of Laforcade and establishment of personal friendship with Feisal has removed immediate danger of Arab aggressive action. The four points on which I based discussion were (1) British refusal of Syrian mandate, (2) establishment of Zionism in Palestine, (3) the Anglo-French 1918 agreement, (4) the nature of present administration of occupied territory whereby any breach of the peace would bring Feisal into direct conflict with Allies to the (? detriment, omitted) of his cause. Feisal told Laforcade that unity of Syria was vital issue defining the area as from Gaza to Taurus Mountains. He accepted Zionism. Laforcade asked whether unity of Syria embracing French Mandate would be acceptable to Feisal asking at the same time what were the objections to French mandate. Feisal (?) replied that French Mandate entailed slavery quoting local instances of French oppression; and that definite reply to Syrian question of French mandate would be given if His Majesty's Government and French Government would give assurance that 1918 agreement is basic principle of Syrian solution. The interpretation of Feisal of this document is that it implies compliance with Syrian wishes regarding unity of Syria and choice of Mandatory power. Feisal agrees to stop all propaganda and give no further trouble in the event of favourable reply from both Governments.

Part 2 following later.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A repetition of this telegram was received on the same day by the British Delegation in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 276.

No. 273

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)*

*No. 1797 [128728/73497/44A]*

PARIS, September 11, 1919

My Lord,

I have received Your Lordship's despatch No. 5575<sup>1</sup> (117034/M.E. 44a) of August 21.

2. I consider that there are considerable and obvious objections to the publication at the present moment of such a statement as that desired by Dr. Weizmann. The telegram in question<sup>2</sup> was intended rather for the guidance of British representatives than for publication and such a publication, appearing, as it inevitably must, to prejudge the question of the

<sup>1</sup> No. 249.

<sup>2</sup> No. 236.

mandate would be likely, especially in view of the present frame of mind in this country, to raise antagonism.<sup>3</sup>

I am, &c.,  
[for Mr. Balfour]  
CHARLES TUFTON

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Weizmann was informed accordingly in a Foreign Office letter of September 16, 1919.

No. 274

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo)*

No. 283 Telegraphic [126114/801/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 11, 1919

Zionist organisation in Odessa desire to repatriate to Palestine 350 Jewish refugees who were expelled by Turks in 1915. I have received strong representations from Dr. Weizmann regarding our present attitude in refusing to allow Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine from Russia.

Can anything be done?

No. 275

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)*

No. 431 Telegraphic [128913/17115/44A]

CAIRO, September 12, 1919

Your 271.<sup>1</sup> Is geographical survey included in refusal resume operations?

<sup>1</sup> No. 256.

No. 276

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)*

No. 443 Telegraphic [129319/2117/44A]

CAIRO, September 12, 1919

In continuation of my 429<sup>1</sup> 11th of September following is part two. With me personally Feisal freely discussed situation reaffirming his policy of a united Syria to absolute exclusion of France and everything French. He and his people would fight on these points. His faith in His Majesty's Government is absolute and his loyalty to us unquestionable, but he fears fate of Syria may be decided on lines of Sykes-Picot agreement and without consulting wishes of people, in which case his faith and loyalty would give place to realization of national ideals. My considered opinion is that movement, which is now national, may drift into religious fanaticism and massacres though (?) at present our political influence is sufficiently strong to insist on moderation (?) and patience. Feisal has regained support of his people. At first sign of Peace Conference handing Syria over to France our political influence over Arabs and Feisal will disappear. Recent Arab military preparations need not be taken too seriously. Feisal's ultimate aim is an Arab

<sup>1</sup> No. 272.

Federation embracing Mesopotamia and a Jewish Palestine all under a British mandate. He is inclined to (? ignore) British refusal of Syrian Mandate and intends to force hand of His Majesty's Government in this respect.

General situation becomes increasingly serious though it is not yet acute. French and Arab propaganda which neither party agreed to limit is an aggravating fact. Both Feisal and Syrian leaders regard French administration as corrupt and oppressive which opinion has unfortunately been confirmed at their very doors.

French local attitude is that a French Syrian Mandate is essential to maintenance of Entente. Their Syrian policy is based on Sykes-Picot agreement. They foster a contempt for Arabs, distribute active propaganda against Zionism and Arab movement, mistrust (? British) refusal (? of) Syrian mandate . . .<sup>2</sup> general desire for immediate replacement of French for British troops in Syria, (? convinced) that British have created present situation and are carrying on anti-French propaganda. I endeavoured to convince Laforcade on last three points, but found suspicions too deep(? ly) rooted. He on the other hand was unable to produce any evidence in support of his suspicions and I am convinced no such proof exists.

Finally I strongly urge His Majesty's Government to give clear assurance to Feisal that they still adhere to 1918 agreement and that no Syrian settlement will be made contrary to wishes of people. Laforcade is asking his Government for similar assurance. Ends.

Repeated to Astoria, No. 1155. September 13, 8 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 277

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received September 17)*

*No. 1362 Telegraphic [130451/2117/44A]*

**RAMLEH, September 13, 1919**

....<sup>1</sup>A telegram sent by King Hussein to Emir Feisal to-day, begins: The fate of the Kings of tribes in Andalousia and Mesopotamia<sup>2</sup> impels me to charge you to convey to Peace Conference my previous (declarations relative to) partition of country so that it may be aware of my resignation before it decides in favour of rights of the case or reverse. Ends.

Original telegram being sent in cypher to Astoria for Feisal in my telegram No. 1050 M. addressed to Astoria.

Repeated to Astoria.

<sup>1</sup> A confidential reference is here omitted.

<sup>2</sup> Major Young, a member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, minuted on this: "Andaloos" is a generic term used by the Arabs for Spain. It also conveys the idea of the old Moorish Empire. Hussein's meaning is, I think, that the fate of Arab kings when they come in contact with European civilization—as exemplified in Spain, Algiers, Morocco, and (rather ominously) Mesopotamia—conflicts with the aspirations of Arab nationalists. He repeats his threat to resign if the Arab countries are divided up between Western Powers.

'H. W. Young  
18/g.'

*Summary of the Proceedings in Paris in regard to the Military Occupation in  
Syria, Cilicia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, September 1919<sup>1</sup>*

No. 18/Q/252 [130943/2117/44A]

2 WHITEHALL GARDENS, September 17, 1919

(Prepared by the Secretary of the War Cabinet)

It is thought that a summary of the recent negotiations in regard to Syria, Cilicia, Palestine and Mesopotamia would be useful to those concerned.

On September 9, Field Marshal Lord Allenby accompanied by Major-General Sir John Shea arrived at Deauville on a visit to the Prime Minister. Between September 9 and September 11 the Prime Minister had four conferences with Lord Allenby. In their latter stages he was joined by Mr. Bonar Law,<sup>2</sup> and Colonel W. A. Gribbon of the General Staff, Colonel A. M. Henniker, Railway Expert, and Sir Frederick Black, K.C.B., the Managing Director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company nominated by the Government were in attendance.

At his first interview with the Prime Minister Lord Allenby handed to him a letter from the Emir Feisal (undated) (Appendix I) and an interview which Lord Allenby's Chief of the Staff had had with the Emir Feisal (Appendix II).

In the case of the earlier Conferences it became clear that it would be desirable to make a declaration to the French on the subject of the withdrawal of British Forces from Syria and Cilicia. Field Marshal Lord Allenby gave his view that it was of the first importance that corresponding declarations should be made to the Emir Feisal in person. Accordingly on September 10 a telegram<sup>3</sup> was sent by the Prime Minister to the Emir Feisal acknowledging the receipt of his letter and stating that as the question of Syria was likely to arise at an early date it was deemed advisable that he should come to Paris at once.

M. Clemenceau, M. Tittoni and Mr. Polk were notified.

As the result of the discussions at Deauville an *aide-mémoire* was drawn up for the Prime Minister to hand to M. Clemenceau.

On the evening of Friday September 12, that is to say, immediately after his arrival in Paris the Prime Minister showed the semi-final draft of this Memorandum to Mr. Polk. It should be observed that Mr. Polk made no adverse comment.

On Saturday September 13 the Prime Minister handed to M. Clemenceau the attached *Aide-Mémoire*. (Appendix III.)<sup>4</sup>

On Monday September 15 the Prime Minister raised the question at the Supreme Council and communicated formally to the Council copies of the

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum was sent to Lord Curzon on September 18, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.

<sup>3</sup> No. 269.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This *aide-mémoire* is printed in Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

*Aide Mémoire.*<sup>5</sup> The result was that the following conclusions which have already been circulated were reached.

'1. M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the French Government, accepted Mr. Lloyd George's proposal for the evacuation by the British Army of Syria and Cilicia and their replacement by French troops in Cilicia and in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line, on the distinct understanding that, in accepting this proposal, the French Government was not committed to acceptance of any other part of the arrangements proposed in Mr. Lloyd George's *Aide Mémoire*, dated September 13, 1919, "in regard to the occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia pending the decision in regard to Mandates."

'2. The Conference took note of the above agreement as a purely temporary provisional arrangement for military occupation without prejudice to the final settlement of mandates or boundaries, which would have to be considered as part of the general question of peace with Turkey.'

On Saturday, September 13, Lord Allenby had a preliminary conversation with General Weygand, Marshal Foch's Chief of the Staff, on the subject of the Relief of the British by French Troops in Cilicia and on the afternoon of Monday September 15, that is to say after the above resolutions had been taken by the Supreme Council, he had an interview with M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch, on the general subject of the Relief of British by French Troops in Syria and Cilicia.

One of the difficulties which arises in carrying out this policy is that there are actually some French Troops in Damascus and Aleppo and the French will regard it as a blow to their prestige if these are withdrawn. M. Clemenceau is very anxious that Lord Allenby should use his good offices with Emir Feisal on this question.

On the morning of September 16, M. Clemenceau paid a final visit to Mr. Lloyd George and at this interview the question was discussed as to the possibility of the French undertaking responsibility for half Emir Feisal's subsidy. M. Clemenceau was anxious to do this if it could be arranged with the Emir Feisal.

M. P. A. HANKEY

#### APPENDIX I TO NO. 278 *The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George*

Sir,

Two very grave factors prompt me to write you this urgent message.

First, my well known sincerity towards the British nation, since the time when I swore allegiance to her, in spite of varied opposition.

Secondly: The state critical of suspension [*sic*] in which the Arab Provinces find themselves situated, from one end to another.

As I have already explained this position to the British Officers here, I feel

<sup>5</sup> The official minute of this discussion is printed in Volume I, No. 57, minute 5.

it my bounden duty to send this to Your Excellency, so that I may be innocent in the future before you, and History, and in the eyes of my People.

Your August Excellency,

Affairs have reached a most dangerous climax. This is an indubitable fact, and God forbid that I should exaggerate or give you a false impression. I know to whom I am addressing my message—it is before Great Britain, crowned with victory and glory: but it is my personal duty both to her and to my Country which compels me to be unhesitatingly and fearlessly frank, so that, if it becomes our fate that the expected danger is not avoided, this letter will remain in Your esteemed hands, a silent testimony from me of the facts contained therein, and a certificate of the plain unvarnished truth. I will now proceed to present the facts as follows:—

1. It had been my intention to proceed to Europe a long time ago; but I remained here in accordance with a suggestion that I should delay; and now, after the lapse of much time, I find myself torn asunder by different National Parties, which have now united through alarm at this delay and through the assurance of an evil augury. They are all agreed to perish utterly, rather than witness the division and mutilation of this Country, and put no further assurance in promises, which are now becoming obscured by clouds coming from every direction.

2. I am not now asking for the fulfilment of the first promise made to my Father and myself, nor am I reminding you of what the Arabs regard as official statements published in their case, but I am asking you in the name of the Honour of Great Britain and Human Justice, that the reward of the Arabs for their sincerity to and struggles in the cause of the Allies, in doubtful hours and times of fear, should not be the division of their country, which division is predicted by these introductory signs, and indicated by other symptoms. I stand up and ask that it be prevented not only as touching my personal honour and the dignity of my family, and the protection of my people, who would prefer annihilation in the cause of their unity; but I also do this in the interests of Great Britain herself, who has been in greatest contact with the East throughout this War, and the Power most implicated with the Moslem World.

3. One of the objects of the Rising which I have undertaken, and of which I have assumed the responsibility, depending on and confiding in you, is to persuade the Moslem World of the false principles which the 'Committee of Union and Progress' proclaimed, viz: the necessity for Panislamism and nothing else. Mecca was upheld against Constantinople and the Turks in order to maintain the 'national principle' and to prostrate any other. Does not Your Excellency therefore see that the placing of the Arab Provinces under Mandates of different Powers will be counted by the Moslems as a complete failure of the straightforward and righteous national policy which ought to be supported with all possible power and all firmness, and does Your Excellency not know that the losing of hope for unity of the Country will lead up to a very strong reaction, which will carry Ruin and Disaster in its steps not only in this Country, but elsewhere, as well, as a result

of Despair? Whatever may happen cannot be more horrible than such a division.

4. The future Government of the Arab provinces will be the last lesson to be given by Europe to the East. If it does not turn out to be in accordance with the wishes of the people, confidence will be lost in every future official treatment, and a wide channel opened for intrigues and troubles: the crime will then be duplicated, politically, against the country and morally, against the people themselves. This is probably the point which caused the two Great Powers to refer the question of the future Government of the Country to the People, when they made their celebrated Declaration of November last, and which was subsequently confirmed by the rules laid down by the 'League of Nations'. The first visible proof of this was the arrival of the Committee<sup>6</sup> a short time ago, whose duty was to ascertain the wishes of the people. If there are certain people who think that Syria, which is the brain of the Arab Provinces, is too small to be recognised, let him remember this very delicate subject in connection with other important subsidiary facts.

5. In the past I have been, and am still worried by the everchanging situations, which the people have been called upon to face, following the natural course of such unrestful circumstances. God only and a few of those who were in close touch with the position, know the extent of my anxiety. I have now reached a stage which requires great alacrity and thought, because I am placed between two contradictory situations, either I should have a guarantee, to reassure the people of the unity of their country, which would extricate me from a position of suspicion, touching my honour and my moral status, or I should wash my hands of the whole business and leave the country in anarchy, of which the consequences are obscure and the term of that anarchy unknown. If I do this, my conscience will be Hell and torment to me, and only men of conscience will understand to what extent.

6. Does the British policy which is paramount, since it is governed by principles of Right and not of Wrong, does it stand with hands tied in the face of the threatened (schism) of our Arab Provinces and their partitioning under different Mandates or their being placed under the Power which is resented by all the people?

7. Does not Your Excellency perceive that the Moslem World, which is looking for the reward promised to the Arabs for their loyalty to the Allies and sacrifices in their cause, will all rise in a general revolt when it realises that that reward is nothing but the disintegration of the Arab People and the dismemberment of its country? Will there be any means left wherewith to convince the Moslems of other countries after their brethren here have received such severe punishment, that they have not been the object of a special scheme aimed against them, because their sincerity and loyalty protected them insufficiently against such punishment? I am certain that the men who represent the 'brain' of Great Britain will not misconstrue the facts and thus cause the rise of millions of their subjects for no other reason than to meet the views of an extremist Commercial party in some other countries,

<sup>6</sup> The King-Crane Commission.

which party has no right to gamble with the souls and destinies of other peoples when Nature and public interest and justice refuse that such a loyal nation should be so condemned to death.

8. The arrival of the American Commission in Syria and the open declaration of the nation's hopes have subjected the Syrians of the coast to severe vengeance and painful torment and has increased their emigration to the Damascus district, which has become over-excited and in sympathy with them. This excitement is a warning of imminent danger—bad news has already been disseminated throughout the neighbouring countries, and among the dwellers of the desert, aggravating the present situation to such an extent that I am forced to make a direct exposition of the facts before you directly and personally, without a medium and without a veil.

In conclusion, I insist with all my strength on my immediate departure for London to meet you and expose the minutest details to the British Government, before any decision is taken in London or disaster overtakes us both here and there. I am convinced, without the slightest doubt, that this excitement of the Arab population will only cease when I depart in the hope that I may get definite news for them, either by returning personally in case of a further delay in the final solution, or by sending assurances to assuage their troubles. Otherwise, I shall be as one arraigned on a charge of lack of patriotism or negligence of the powers delegated to me in the Administration of their general interests and the settlement of their future—the public will then plunge into dangerous paths, sacrificing their whole position, ignoring the consequences and paying no heed to promises or threats.

I do believe that those who understand the temper of this people as much as I do and have entered the recesses of their hearts will decide that I am telling the truth and that any delay or hesitation in my departure will simply add fuel to the fire.

This is a brief summary of what I want to say, pending a further meeting with you in the immediate future in the hope that you will kindly give me a quick answer and accept my high respects and beg you to believe that I remain,

Your Excellency's old, sincere  
and intimate friend,

FEISAL

(Undated)

May God grant us success.

## APPENDIX II TO NO. 278

*Statement made by the Emir Feisal to the Chief of the General Staff, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and the Political Officer, Damascus on August 31, 1919.*

It is my intention to state to you my views on the latest events.

The British, at the commencement of the recent war, announced that they were not fighting the Arabs or Islam, but only that section of the Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress, who had brought the Germans, our common enemy, to their country.

My father, King Hussein, received a message from the High Commissioner, Egypt, Sir Henry MacMahon [*sic*], through a certain agent, in which promises were made by the High Commissioner that Great Britain would assist the Arabs, if the latter threw in their lot with her.<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, my father, relying on this promise, took up arms against the Turks, who had at that time proclaimed a Holy War against the Allies and against Great Britain in particular, and accepted willingly the responsibility of war.

Now, at this moment, when the final settlement is about to be reached, and when the voice of Great Britain is the one most listened to in the world, the eyes of all Mohammedans are fixed on the British and the Arabs to see what will be the reward of the Arabs, who were the principal instrument in ruining the Turkish Mohammedan Empire.

My father has not asked Great Britain for the fulfilment of her promises, and neither my father nor myself wish to remind her that there are certain understandings and obligations between us. We have determined to wait, because, to our mind, the honour of Great Britain is sufficient.

The Mohammedans are well known to be strongly attached to their religion. Every Mohammedan believes that his Holy Places should be under the protection of a Caliph or an independent ruler, otherwise a vital necessity of his religion will be deficient. Any Mohammedan feeling that the Shrines are in danger or insufficiently protected by an independent Mohammedan ruler, considers himself bound to attempt the establishment of such an independent State. If the course of events is shown to be opposed to this vital need, religious feeling will be stirred in him and forced to seek a remedy.

We now come to the following points. Mohammedans will strive to form a government on the lines mentioned and naturally they will encounter opposition on the part of the powers. This will begin the fighting and it will continue. Further, since the overwhelming majority of Moslems in the world are under the rule of Great Britain, the latter power will be the chief object and focus of the hatred of Moslems.

We, the Arabs, were formerly with the Turks and fought against them, not with the intention of dividing our country by giving a share to the French and a portion to the British. We cannot possibly brook that insult in the pages of history and in the eyes of the Mohammedan world. Our family, in particular, cannot tolerate that stain on its history, and will withdraw.

I myself shall not do so, but will take part in the defence of our principle, knowing that this is certain by any way or means and in its right time. When such defensive action commences in a country which is known all over the world to be sincere and loyal, there is no doubt that the Mohammedan world outside will be of opinion that the Arabs have been betrayed.

I have no wish to threaten you with these words, but to prove to you that I am sincere and loyal to you and to my country, and that on this point I have only done my duty as a perfect friend and true patriot. I only beg that

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Cmd. 5957 of 1939.

these words be remembered and written in your records and that they may be referred to should anything occur.

My greatest fear, and what I am trying to avoid, is that the national feeling against the division of our country should be transformed into a religious one, an event which will have the worst results for both sides.

Let me speak still more freely and talk of some recent events. I tell you that no official and definite reports have been received by me, yet as a Mohammedan, I can see what is going on by instinct. The troubles in Afghanistan, India, and to some extent in Egypt,<sup>8</sup> are but a sign of the fear and doubt in the Mohammedan world with regard to the future. It is, at the bottom, on account of the questions of the Holy Places and the Caliphate. By Almighty God, it is not for the sake of the Turks, but for the symbol for which the Turks stand that these things have taken place. Now there is a man before the Mohammedan world named El Hussein Bin Ali (The King of the Hejaz). He declares openly that he is with the British, and that he is certain to obtain from them true assistance for the Mohammedan world and the safeguarding of the shrines. Imagine, then, what a bad impression will be created if any trouble is started between this very man and Great Britain, who were Allies in a time of the greatest danger. I swear by Almighty God, that in this case never more will be found a single man to have confidence in anything British.

You must not say that I am an Arab and you are British, and that we look at things from different points of view. By my father, by my honour, I say this to you because I love you as well as I love my own country.

An Englishman will never be able to feel in this way, and particularly an Englishman living in England. He may realise that there is feeling, but its nature and depth he will never be able to gauge as I do myself.

I have said what I believe to be strictly true and exact, and whether you accept it or not does not concern me. What I get from these declarations, is the feeling that I have done my duty as a friend and obtained quiet for my conscience.

Fighting will start first against the French, and naturally you will interfere, and the Commander-in-Chief will crush us, but I assure you by God, we will open our breasts to him and his troops, and no shot will be fired by an Arab against any British, though this I cannot guarantee in countries outside Arabia.

There are certain papers in which we see that they try to mislead the British Government in England by saying that our excitement and unrest is due to British officers. I here openly declare upon my word of honour, that nothing of the sort has happened, and one of the causes which impels me to go to London, is that I wish this to be understood by the authorities there and by the whole world, and I will give proof of it. On the contrary, we are somewhat disappointed with those officers in that they remain as silent as ever.

<sup>8</sup> The Third Afghan War had broken out in May 1919 and ended in August; local revolts had recently occurred in Waziristan; in view of recent nationalist unrest in Egypt it was decided to dispatch thither the Milner Mission of Inquiry.

No. 279

*Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador in London*

[127178/17115/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 17, 1919

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 8th inst<sup>1</sup> relative to an agreement recently come to between a British group under the Chairmanship of Lord Inchcape and a French group having the Banque Demachy at its head, for carrying out researches for petroleum in Palestine and in the Akaba district, with the ultimate view of applying for and obtaining concessions.

2. In the same communication Your Excellency was good enough to state that the French Government were inclined to give their support, at the appropriate time, to this Anglo-French combine, and also to inform me of the views held by the French Govt. with regard to the present possibilities and nature of the researches which this combine wish to undertake.

3. In reply, I have the honour to state that in view of the present Administration of Syria and Palestine being necessarily of a temporary character, H.M.G. have thought it advisable consistently to refuse all requests which have been made for permission to carry out geological and other surveys in either of those countries, preferring to leave the consideration and grant of such permission to the mandatory Power to be designated by the Peace Conference.

4. In these circumstances Your Excellency will no doubt recognise that it will not for the present be possible to make an exception in favour of the groups represented by Lord Inchcape and the Banque Demachy respectively.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 262.

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy of original.

No. 280

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 17)*

No. 440 Telegraphic [130455/801/44A]

CAIRO, September 17, 1919

Following from Meinertzhangen for Weizmann begins:—

It is considered that your presence as head of Zionist Commission to Palestine accompanied by Professor Frankfurter would be of material advantage to Administration. Can you arrange to come as soon as possible? Ends.

No. 281

Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 19)

No. 444 Telegraphic [131415/801/44A]

CAIRO, September 18, 1919

Your telegram No. 283.<sup>1</sup>

There is no objection to return of genuine refugees<sup>2</sup> from Russia provided Weizmann guarantees that they are not Bolshevik and on the understanding that administration is not put to any expense. The immigrants not required at present are newcomers.

<sup>1</sup> No. 274.

<sup>2</sup> It was noted on the original that 'by "refugees" is to be understood persons driven out of Palestine and wishing to return and not refugees from anywhere'.

No. 282

Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)

No. 909 [131691/2117/44A]

PARIS, September 18, 1919

My Lord,

As I had the honour to inform Your Lordship in my despatch No. 907<sup>1</sup> of yesterday's date the recently announced provisional agreement for the relief of the British by French troops in Syria was received with—to say the least of it—little enthusiasm by a number of the more important Paris newspapers, Monsieur Jacques Bainville in the *Action Française* even going so far as to describe it as 'an imperfect, provisional solution and perhaps the worst that could have been imagined'.

Monsieur Robert de Caix, in the *Journal des Débats* of yesterday evening begins his article on the subject by describing the notice published in the *Temps*, the text of which was forwarded to Your Lordship in my despatch No. 906<sup>2</sup> of yesterday's date, as a 'British communication', and insinuates that the explanation thus supplied by the British negotiators carries but little weight without the actual text of the letters exchanged or the *procès-verbaux* of the meetings in 1915. He considers, in fact, that French public opinion is justified in awaiting a more detailed and less unilateral publication before it makes up its mind that it has not in this question met with an exception to the usual British method of 'fairplay'. At present, he observes, one is tempted to endorse Monsieur Bainville's view of the new agreement.

Monsieur de Caix then enumerates various points on which the French

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch reported that the *Temps* of September 17 had published a notice indicating the terms of the Anglo-French agreement of September 15, 1919 (see No. 278) and evidently referring to a document communicated on the same date by Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau on the question of whether the French Government had been notified of the engagements made by His Majesty's Government with King Hussein (see Volume I, No. 57, minute 5. This document is untraced in Foreign Office archives. For the British exposition of this question, however, see No. 334).

rights under the 1916 agreement have been 'distorted' since the British occupation of Syria. He asserts that since the victories of Field Marshal Allenby, England has apparently taken it for granted that Mosul, which under that agreement was in the zone marked A, should belong to the British sphere, and that Palestine, which was to be internationalised, should be placed under a British mandate. Similarly the region of the four towns (Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hamah), instead of forming a native State under French influence has become a state in which England 'exercises a sort of protectorate against French enterprises'. In fact thanks to the spirit which has been breathed into, or at least tolerated, in the organism thus created, this State has all the appearance of an instrument forged to close the interior of Syria to French influence.

According to Monsieur de Caix, the present agreement does not alter the situation complained of, but seems rather to perpetuate the lines of the policy which France had had to endure in Syria. Palestine and Mosul are left in the British occupation. The Sherifian forces, created without French assistance, are left to maintain order in the region of the four towns and to ensure the rights of the various religious minorities there.

For these reasons among others, Monsieur de Caix disapproves of the 'Clemenceau–Allenby arrangement'. France, he continues, might not object to limit her occupation to the coast line if she were sure of finding in the interior a friendly Power accessible to her influence, but, he adds, 'We persist in being unable to believe that our Allies have acted in a manner to render this the case, and the way in which even to-day they are limiting the relief of their troops gives them an air of protectors of a Government which should be guided and advised by us; and thereby they continue to act in contradiction to the spirit of the agreement of 1916.'

On the other hand the *Temps* which made known yesterday evening further details (forwarded to Your Lordship in my despatch No. 908<sup>1</sup> of yesterday), in respect of the Anglo-Arab negotiations during the war<sup>3</sup> tending to prove that no engagements contrary to the Franco-British agreement were taken by the British Government towards the Sherif of Mecca, publishes a leading article describing the situation in more reasonable language. It declares that it adopts its present attitude, not, as certain French journals appear to believe, in defence of British interests, but, because it recognises the evidence before it, in defence both of the truth, without which there is no safety for alliances or nations, and of French interests which alone it is its habit to serve. There is no use, it continues, in cavilling at what is past or in boasting of what could have been done. These interests are best served by utilising what actually exists.

In a closely reasoned article *Temps* then proceeds to demonstrate firstly, that the distinction drawn in the present agreement, whereby French troops are to replace the British forces in Cilicia, part of Kurdistan and on the Syrian coast, that is to say the Blue Zone, and whereby the district of the four towns, Damascus, Homs, Hamah and Aleppo, in zone A is to be evacuated by the British troops, but not necessarily occupied by French troops, is not

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence: cf. Cmd. 5957 of 1939.

a new departure but dates from the Anglo-French agreement of 1916. Secondly, that though the actual text of the Anglo-Arab engagement in 1915 was not communicated to Monsieur Picot—a fact which it regrets as all misunderstanding might have thereby been removed—the general sense of that rather vague engagement was known to the French Government, who were aware of the ultimate connection between the region of the four towns and the Hedjaz, and that that engagement contained nothing contrary to the principles of France, the friend of Mussulmans and the emancipator of peoples. Thirdly, that the present agreement, though exclusively military, may be taken as *ipso facto* abrogating the arrangement of September 30, 1918, whereby the French civil authority in both the Blue Zone and Zone A was subordinated to the British Commander-in-Chief. Henceforward, it says, France will enjoy in the Blue Zone all the rights guaranteed to her under the 1916 agreement, while in Zone A, whether French troops are in occupation or not, the 'Arab Governments' can in future only have recourse for assistance or subsidies to the French authorities or to a French General.

The *Temps* takes particular exception to one point, namely that the British troops are not to evacuate the Mosul region in spite of the fact that it was included in the 1916 agreement in Zone A. The *Temps* regrets this proviso even though it be but temporary, and it adds that, if it be intended to compromise the future, French public opinion would have just cause to protest. As regards the application of the new agreement, it sums the matter up by declaring that in the Blue and Red Zones and in Zones A and B, the powers of the French authorities should be exactly the same in each Zone as the powers of the British authorities in the corresponding zone.

The Paris newspapers this morning make no further unfavourable comments on the new agreement. Monsieur Hervé, indeed, in a leading article in the *Victoire* on the subject remarks that the diplomatic documents recently made public proved conclusively that England in the Syrian question has acted towards France since 1915 with irreproachable loyalty and correctness. 'As it is not', he says, 'for her own pleasure that she has been maintaining garrisons in the French Syrian zone, she has decided to evacuate them in order to pacify the susceptibilities of certain French colonials. Before clamouring about England's long teeth', he concludes, 'we would do better in France to reflect seriously about the new territories we have acquired in Asia and Africa, and by which we are enlarging a colonial empire already out of all proportion to our wretched birthrate.'

It remains to be seen whether the anti-British campaign about Syria will be discontinued as a result of the announced agreement. The manner in which it has been received by the Paris Press in general scarcely warrants such a hope, and it is to be feared that the leader-writers who have been for many weeks rousing public opinion on the subject will find fresh material for their attacks on British policy on the score that the new arrangement is not fully in harmony with the Anglo-French agreement of 1916.

I have, &c.,  
GEORGE GRAHAME

No. 283

*Letter from Sir M. Hankey to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [384/1/1/1919]*

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET, September 19, 1919

My dear Crowe,

The Prime Minister asked me to send you the enclosed Notes which I took of a Meeting he had this afternoon with the Emir Feisal.<sup>2</sup> I enclose two copies as the Prime Minister wishes you to communicate one of them to M. Clemenceau next time you see him in order that he may be fully conversant of what is going on here in this matter.

The Prime Minister suggests that you should tell M. Clemenceau that the Emir Feisal's attitude was at times distinctly menacing when he spoke of what would happen if French troops came to Syria.

The difficulty is a real one and it is hard to see how the Emir Feisal is to be brought into accord with the French.

Yours sincerely,

M. P. A. HANKEY

P.S. I send this at once because the P.M. regarded it as a matter of urgency. I should be glad however if you would suspended [*sic*] handing it to M. Clemenceau until you receive a telephone message from me on Monday.<sup>3</sup> I have some personal doubts as to the expediency of giving it to Clemenceau & want to raise the question again.

M. P. A. H.<sup>4</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN No. 283

*Notes of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W., on Friday,  
September 19, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

Present:

The Prime Minister.

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,  
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the  
House of Commons.

The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of  
Kedleston, K.G., Acting Secretary of  
State for Foreign Affairs.

Field Marshal Lord Allenby, G.C.B.,  
G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief,  
Egypt.

Colonel Cornwallis, Assistant Chief  
Political Officer, Egyptian Expedi-  
tionary Force.

His Highness The Emir Feisal.

\*Brigadier-General Haddad Pasha,  
Director-General of Public Security,  
O.E.T.A. East.

Sheikh Fuad el Khatib, Political Ad-  
viser to H.H. King Hussein and to  
H.H. the Emir Feisal.

\* Acted as Interpreter.

<sup>1</sup> Received September 23, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> The Emir Feisal had arrived in London the night before.

<sup>3</sup> September 22, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> This postscript was a manuscript addition to the typed letter. In this connexion it was noted on the file in the British Delegation on September 24 that Sir M. Hankey had telephoned to say 'that the Prime Minister does *not* wish a copy to be communicated to M. Clemenceau'.

Lt.-Colonel Stirling, Deputy Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.  
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary, War Cabinet.  
Lt.-Col. L. Storr, C.B., Assistant Secretary, War Cabinet.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was anxious to see H.H. the Emir Feisal because the present situation could not be permitted to continue any longer. The British Government had already informed the Emir Feisal, as well as M. Clemenceau, that Great Britain could not accept a mandate for Syria, on the ground that they would create unpleasantness with their neighbours if they did so. Hitherto, we had been keeping our army in Syria and Cilicia in the hope that the Treaty would be concluded with Turkey during the present month, and, therefore, we had expected to clear up the whole Treaty at once. This could not be done, however, until we knew whether the United States of America was prepared herself to take up a mandate in Turkey. It had been hoped that President Wilson would give a decision by September, but now it seemed certain that we might have to wait some time longer for his decision, and there was some doubt as to whether the American Senate would agree to accept any mandate. In the meanwhile, the British Government had had to maintain very large forces in the Caucasus, in Syria, in Cilicia, that is to say, in territories which they had no intention of occupying themselves on the conclusion of peace, and the British people were complaining of the burden of expense. The British Government had, therefore, decided to withdraw their troops from all these territories, except Mesopotamia and Palestine. The question arose, therefore, for decision as to whom Field Marshal Allenby should hand over the garrisons of the territories evacuated, and that was the question on which he wished to consult with the Emir Feisal. Great Britain had entered into obligations with the King of the Hejaz, and with the President of the French Republic—they had entered into two distinct sets of engagements, and they were bound to respect both equally. What he was now saying to the Emir Feisal he had already said to M. Clemenceau, and he had told M. Clemenceau that it was his intention to say the same to the Emir Feisal. The British Government considered their engagement with the King of the Hejaz to be of the same value as their engagement to the President of the French Republic, and they considered their engagement to the President of the French Republic to be of the same value as their engagement to the King of the Hejaz. Both engagements would be treated as of equal value. Both these sets of engagements had been entered into by his own predecessors. They were recorded in writing, and he was bound by the engagements entered into by his predecessors in this Chair. He then proceeded to read the engagement entered into with King Hussein, a copy of which he handed to the Emir Feisal:—

'The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot

be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and make the following reply to your letter:—

"Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basrah, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.<sup>5</sup>

The point about this engagement was that Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, were recognised as being within the Arab State. King Hussein had been told that the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of that line could not be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries of the Arab territory. The agreement entered into with the French in 1916 also provided that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be Arab, but that the area to the west of those towns should be subject to such direct or indirect administration or control as the French desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. The ultimate settlement of these territories the British Government were not now attempting to determine. All that they now proposed was to evacuate these territories and hand over their garrisons in accordance with the agreement entered into with King Hussein. The eventual settlement would be determined by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. At present, only the arrangements for military occupation were under discussion. Consequently, Field Marshal Allenby, in conjunction with whom this document<sup>6</sup> had been prepared, and he himself, had both seen M. Clemenceau, and had informed him distinctly that they could not hand over Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo to French troops, and that when the Field Marshal ordered his troops out of those places he would hand over the towns to the Emir Feisal to hold until the Peace Treaty finally decided their disposition. West of that line the Field Marshal would retire in favour of French troops, who would occupy the country until the Peace Treaty decided on its eventual disposal. The evacuation would begin on November 1, 1919. He wanted the Emir Feisal to arrange with the Field

<sup>5</sup> This engagement, contained in Sir H. McMahon's letter of October 24, 1915, to King Hussein, is printed in Cmd. 5957 of 1939, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Apparently the British *aide-mémoire* of September 13, 1919: see Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

Marshal as to how he would occupy these places. This was a matter not for the British Government but for Field Marshal Allenby. The same applied in the case of the handing over to the French, and the Field Marshal had already seen M. Clemenceau. The British troops, after their withdrawal from Syria and Cilicia, would hold the line of Palestine and Mesopotamia (including Mosul) until the Peace Conference decided what the future of these territories was to be. His intention was to hand to the Emir Feisal the same *aide mmoire* which he had handed to M. Clemenceau, and this contained certain subsidiary questions which he wished to discuss, e.g., he would ask for the right to make a railway and oil pipe line through the Arab State from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. This was a question which could be discussed with His Highness whenever convenient. He would only say one further word before handing him this document, namely, that whatever views the Emir Feisal might hold about the final dispositions, he hoped that he would fall in with these temporary arrangements. Later he could put any further points he wished to raise, such as the question of access to the sea, to M. Clemenceau, when the Treaty with Turkey was discussed. This, however, would not be until it was known whether President Wilson could accept a mandate, and this would probably not be before November.

THE EMIR FEISAL asked that he might be permitted to ask certain questions in order to make everything clear.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE EMIR FEISAL expressed the gratitude of His Majesty his Father and his own feelings of gratitude, as well as those of the Arab nation to the Prime Minister himself, to the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, and to the British nations for all that they had done. This being a question on which the whole future of the Arab nation depended, he wished to make certain observations. When the present rising against the Turks had originally taken place, the Arabs had known of only one great Power, namely, Great Britain, whose representative had acted for Mr. Asquith,<sup>7</sup> whom the Emir did not know personally. There had been no question of France, or the United States of America, or of any other Power connected with the engagement which his Father had entered into. Consequently, he had made a certain agreement with Great Britain, as the result of which the Arabs had taken up arms against Turkey, basing themselves on the pledge of Great Britain. The Arabs were a very small nation, but they had done their very best in this matter. (THE PRIME MINISTER interjected 'Quite true'.) They had full hopes that Great Britain would help them to realise their aspirations. He now wished to put this question:—

'Did Great Britain, France, and the United States of America, that is to say, the Great Powers, still maintain the words they had uttered to small nations, and, more especially, the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9, 1918?'

He wished to know whether this Declaration still held good.

<sup>7</sup> British Prime Minister, 1908-16.

He wished to say that his Father had nothing to do with the Peace Conference, but he had certain engagements with Great Britain. With regard to the new arrangements proposed he wished to ask two questions:—

- (1) Will the subsidy continue to be paid from the British territory or not?
- (2) Will the British Commander-in-Chief continue to exercise his command over the districts from which the troops were withdrawn?

He asked this because, when the Syrians had hoisted the Arab flag and actually proclaimed the Arab Government in the Coasts, the Commander-in-Chief had divided the country into districts and had insisted on the withdrawal of the Arabs into certain districts as a temporary arrangement. It was important to know, therefore, whether his command was to continue or not.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had better answer these questions at once. The first question was as to whether Great Britain stood by her engagements to His Majesty King Hussein—the answer was that Great Britain stood by every one of them. The Arab forces had redeemed the pledges they gave to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges. For this Great Britain had been attacked somewhat fiercely in the French Press. It was because Great Britain was redeeming these pledges that he had been so anxious to see the Emir Feisal, and he was most grateful to him for coming to this country. He had wished to explain to him that the arrangements for military occupation were being made in accordance with the pledges given.

THE EMIR FEISAL said he had something to say about these engagements. First, a Treaty had been made with the King of the Hejaz, and then there had been a preliminary letter. Then came the letter of October 24, 1915,<sup>8</sup> in which the interests of France had been referred to. There was on record an official letter from the King of the Hejaz that he did not accept any change in the original agreement, and that if any change in it were made he would withdraw. He promised to forward a copy of this correspondence.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this was the first time that he had heard of any definite Treaty with King Hussein, other than the correspondence that he had already referred to. Colonel Cornwallis informed him, however, that he knew of the letter which His Majesty the King of the Hejaz had written to Sir Henry McMahon, and he reported that Sir Henry McMahon had replied that he also stood by his letter of October 24, 1915. The King of the Hejaz reiterated his claims but it was considered unnecessary to reply.

(MR. BONAR LAW entered at this point and the PRIME MINISTER explained to him how matters stood.)

THE EMIR FEISAL said that the whole correspondence would be submitted to the Prime Minister officially. He felt sure that this further letter had been sent by his Father, who had said that he would not consent to any alteration in the original agreement.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would await the receipt of the correspondence from the Emir Feisal. He would now answer the other questions

<sup>8</sup> See note 5 above.

which the Emir had asked. After he had done so, he would give the Emir time to consider before the next meeting the reply he would make to the proposals that had been laid before him. He would also like the Field Marshal to have a discussion with the Emir Feisal about the military arrangements.

THE EMIR FEISAL, reverting to the question he had just raised, said that the first agreement had been entered into by his Father alone, and His Majesty had never shown it to anyone. He had always said that if there were any difference of opinion in regard to it, he would settle it with Great Britain. He did not mind alterations being made as long as they were made by Great Britain alone. The Emir Feisal had himself never seen the full agreement, and had only seen certain articles of it about ten days before leaving Damascus. His Father had never wanted to make the agreement public. Later on, his Father had heard of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, and he had then wired to his representative at Cairo who then communicated with the High Commissioner of Great Britain, protesting against it and saying that he would never recognise any agreement with France.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would be advisable to have copies of all the documents before continuing the discussion. He then handed to the Emir Feisal the *aide mémoire* which he had handed to M. Clemenceau on September 13, 1919,<sup>9</sup> and stated that he had handed it to the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Polk, on September 15.

Replying to the Emir Feisal's questions, he said that as regards the subsidy, the suggestion had been made that the French Government should take responsibility for half. The French Government were prepared to do so, the other half continuing to be paid by Great Britain.

The other question the Emir had asked was in regard to the command. After the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia, Field Marshal Allenby would cease to command in that area. The Emir Feisal would command in Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and the whole of that area, and the French would command in the rest of Syria. Field Marshal Allenby would continue to command in Palestine and Egypt and General Marshall would continue to command in Mesopotamia, including Mosul.

GENERAL HADDAD said that the Emir Feisal's question had referred rather to the question of administration. At the present time, the administrators took their orders from the Commander-in-Chief. If complaints were made, these went eventually to the Commander-in-Chief. He wished to know whether this arrangement would continue.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that his interpretation was that in districts occupied by the Emir Feisal he would be responsible until the Peace Conference had decided the future of these regions. In the districts occupied by the French, the French would be responsible.

GENERAL HADDAD asked if the Emir Feisal would have the right to ask for assistance where he wished. He had lately been asking for certain assistance, for example, rifles, arms, ammunition, the loan of officers and officials, including officers to organise gendarmerie for the maintenance of order.

<sup>9</sup> See Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

**FIELD MARSHAL ALLENBY** said that, of course, he could not nominate advisers outside the British sphere. The Emir Feisal wanted a financial adviser, a political adviser, and one for gendarmerie.<sup>10</sup> If he were asked to supply these in the zone occupied by the Emir's troops he would have to refuse.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** said it appeared that in the areas opposite the zone, temporarily and provisionally occupied by the French, the Emir Feisal would have to ask for French advisers. In the area temporarily and provisionally occupied by the British, he would have to ask for British advisers.

**GENERAL HADDAD** said that the district would, therefore, have to be divided into two parts as regards requests for assistance.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** said this was the case. It must be understood, however, that this was only a provisional arrangement, pending the final settlement by the Peace Conference. The Emir would have to refer to the British in the district opposite the zone occupied by the British armies and to the French in the districts opposite the zone occupied by the French armies.

**GENERAL HADDAD** asked if it would be necessary to refer to the French for any assistance in the zone opposite the French?

**THE PRIME MINISTER** said if assistance were required in the district opposite the zone provisionally and temporarily occupied by the French, application could be made to the French.

**THE EMIR FEISAL** remarked that this was the agreement of 1916 between Great Britain and France.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** replied that, under this agreement, the Emir Feisal was not bound to ask for assistance unless he wished it.

**THE EMIR FEISAL** said that up to now the maintenance of public order in the Near East, or, he should rather say, in that special province of Syria, was first with the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Army. Field Marshal Allenby would be able to tell the Prime Minister what was the state of mind of the population towards the French in certain districts, even though these were occupied by British troops and under an administration supervised by the Commander-in-Chief. What he himself thought was that, on the evacuation of the western zone by the British troops and their replacement by French troops, there would be great trouble and a rising if there was no British administration to appeal to. Then the French Catholics on the frontier of Lebanon would make great trouble in his own districts, and there would be a general rising against the French occupation of the coast. In his view Great Britain would be responsible for any bloodshed that might ensue.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** said he would be greatly distressed but he was in the position of a man who had inherited two sets of engagements made by his predecessors. He was bound to keep both sets of engagements, those to King Hussein and those to the French. He regarded the King of the Hejaz just as much as an ally as he did the President of the French Republic. He did not distinguish between the two as allies. He was trying loyally to interpret his

<sup>10</sup> Note in original: 'The Emir Feisal wishes it to be recorded that he himself never contemplated an "adviser" for the gendarmerie.'

engagements to both. Although he deplored bloodshed, he could only do his best to keep the engagements which had been signed under the authority of the Sovereign.

THE EMIR FEISAL said it was true that the Prime Minister had two sets of engagements. He believed, however, that the first was that to King Hussein, and this must be properly interpreted. In this connection he would [p]roduce certain documents. One of these sets of engagements had been based on the principles on which the war with Germany had been based, namely, justice and the freedom of peoples. The other set concluded with the French Government had been on the basis of colonisation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had a hard decision to make. But the British Government had passed its word both to the French Government and to King Hussein. They could not depart from their word. The Peace Conference might make other arrangements. But as between King Hussein and the French Government, he was bound to stand by his engagements to both. The Emir Feisal could plead his case as an ally before the Peace Conference. He had a perfect right to state his case there. He might receive satisfaction from the Peace Conference. But as a provisional arrangement, with the knowledge of the Supreme Council, he was bound to report his engagement to King Hussein and his engagement to the French Government.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that the Prime Minister could not decide what his engagements were until he had seen the documents which he would produce. This gave as the boundaries for the Arab Provinces the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and did not exclude any province at all right up to the Taurus Mountains. As regards the west coast, it included everything.

COLONEL STIRLING said that the Emir Feisal claimed that it included, as its western boundary, the Red Sea, the boundaries of Egypt and the Mediterranean.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this question had better be deferred until the documents were available. In the meanwhile, he hoped that the Emir Feisal would examine the documents that he had presented. The Field Marshal might also discuss with him the question of the provisional boundaries before they met again.

(LORD CURZON entered at this point.)

THE PRIME MINISTER explained to Lord Curzon the questions that had been put. First, in regard to the subsidy he had replied that M. Clemenceau was offering to pay half. As regards the nation to whom the Emir Feisal should look for assistance, he had stated his view that he should apply to the French Government in the district opposite the zone temporarily and provisionally occupied by French troops, and to the British Government in the district opposite the zone temporarily and provisionally occupied by British troops. As regards the temporary and provisional boundaries, he had informed him that a Cabinet Committee, composed of Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, and Field Marshal Allenby was examining the question, and he had suggested that he should meet Field Marshal Allenby on Monday<sup>11</sup> after-

<sup>11</sup> September 22, 1919.

noon. He described the correspondence which the Emir Feisal stated had passed between King Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon.

LORD CURZON said that he believed the Foreign Office had all the documents. Speaking from memory, he thought that King Hussein had made certain claims which we had been unable to accept. To avoid further difficulty the matter had been left as shown in the correspondence, that is to say, King Hussein had stated his claim and we had stated our claim.

GENERAL HADDAD promised to forward the correspondence by the following afternoon. He said that the Emir Feisal protested vehemently about the agreement.<sup>12</sup> The other questions were all subsidiary to this. In 1916 there had been an agreement between the British and French Governments which the Emir had always repudiated. There had been an official telegram from the British Government to King Hussein stating that the settlement must depend on the wishes of the people. He inquired whether the people had been asked whether they wanted the French? The American Commission had visited Syria and the people had made it clear to the Commission that they did not want the French. Now the British Government wanted to impose the French. This was the main point and everything else was secondary to it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was now only asking the Emir Feisal to assent to a provisional agreement. M. Clemenceau did not accept the whole of the *aide mémoire* which he had presented, and had stated that he would not accept the part of it relating to occupation if he was to be bound by the whole of the conditions. But he was ready to accept the occupation on the understanding that the remainder of the proposals stood over until the final settlement of this question.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that he did not think that M. Clemenceau used to say this when the Germans were very near to Paris. He considered that he himself and the Arab nation were being very badly treated in having a Power thrown on them when it had been promised that they should select for themselves, and he was certain that every Arab would shed his last drop of blood before he admitted the French. He himself had drawn the sword basing himself on the promise of Great Britain. He had had no interview with any other Power. He was a descendant of one of the oldest Arab families which traced its descent to the Prophet. He had taken up arms against the Kaliph on behalf of the Allies and with full confidence in Great Britain, and he felt sure that Great Britain would not allow a Power to step in that was not wanted. The aspirations of all the Arabs were for unity. In order to keep his honour he must be prepared to die for this unity, and not to allow any division to be made. King Hussein had never wanted to show the Treaty to anyone else. He was sure that he would receive fair treatment. He did not object to any interim arrangement so long as it did not prejudice the final settlement.

(The Interpreter mentioned at this point that the Emir Feisal had been greatly worried about this and had not been sleeping for some nights.) He could not stand before the Moslem world and say that he had been asked to wage a war against the Kaliph of the Moslems and now see the European

<sup>12</sup> Apparently the Sykes-Picot Agreement: see below.

Powers divide the Arab country. If the French could take the responsibility for Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia up to the Red Sea, and Mediterranean, they would accept this, for they had no special hatred to the French. But there must be one Power only, and in his view that Power should be Great Britain. There had been a definite agreement, though it was true that Sir Henry McMahon had made certain objections and had quoted something about the French rights in Syria, but King Hussein had refused to make any alteration in the agreement. When Sir Henry McMahon had written and asked to exclude Syria, King Hussein had not accepted and did not consider himself bound.

THE PRIME MINISTER, after conferring with Lord Curzon and Field Marshal Allenby, observed that he did not think there was any definite sealed agreement as the Emir Feisal had stated.

GENERAL HADDAD said that Sir Henry McMahon had sealed it. He had a copy of it, but the Emir Feisal had never seen it before.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if it was among the documents to be handed in.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that in the Middle Ages a boat slave had had the right to demand to be sold to another master. He hoped that in the 20th century at least that right would be preserved.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the documents had better be first communicated, after which a further meeting could take place.

THE EMIR FEISAL said he was sure that there was great agitation throughout the Near East on this question, and a word was awaited from him. What should he say?

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this was only the first conference, and it was not possible to settle the question in one meeting. Consequently, he thought he had better say nothing.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> It appears that the present copy of this record, as sent to Sir E. Crowe, did not include the immediately following last page. This page read as follows (copy supplied from file 132929/131660/44A):

'The Emir Feisal said that this was the first time he had been informed of the proposed arrangement. He wished to lay a formal protest against the arrangement now proposed. In his view it would be very difficult to carry out and he wished to lay his protest officially. When the first Frenchman landed there would be a general mobilisation and every man would take up arms against them.'

The Prime Minister said he greatly regretted to hear this statement, but he had given his word and he must stand by it. Great Britain had given her word both to King Hussein and to the French Republic, and they must stand by it in both cases.

'The following arrangements were made:—

- '(1) The Cabinet Committee should meet on Monday at 11.30 a.m. at the Foreign Office.
- '(2) Field Marshal Lord Allenby should see the Emir Feisal at 4 p.m. on Monday at the Foreign Office.

<sup>12</sup> WHITEHALL GARDENS, S.W.  
*September 20, 1919.*

No. 284

*Translation of a letter from the Emir Zeid to King Hussein, dated September 20, sent from Damascus<sup>1</sup>*

*Copy*

[143803/2117/44A]

Sire, (Compliments),

I wired to you about my brother Faisal's journey to Paris undertaken at the invitation of the British Government, to confer with Lloyd George, Marshall [sic] Allenby and Clemenceau on the Syrian question in particular and the Arab question in general, and to bring to an end this understand policy which the Allies have been pursuing. This invitation was made in consequence of Faisal's recent report to the British and French Governments, as it came to be known that they were negotiating secretly on Arab Questions and giving the mandate to one of these two Powers. This produced consternation in all parts of the country. The people joined together and organized great demonstrations before my brother in his capacity as delegate elect, before representatives of the Powers, and also in the towns and villages—demanding the enforcement of their demands (which only confirmed the principles of the Allies and President Wilson) and the application of the principle of complete independence to the country in accordance with the aspirations of the people and the object for which their blood was shed. The result is, in view of the *volte-face* of the Allies, and the government set up in contradiction to the desire of the Nation for complete independence, expressed before the Commission, and for the sake of which it shed its blood, that the people have decided to volunteer in the Army irrespective of creed, and shortly upwards of 20,000 men will have assembled without any invitation from the local government.

The situation being thus uncertain, and the Imperialist party intriguing amongst us, a great rising with dire consequences involving the shedding of the innocent blood of true patriots, is inevitable. This has forced my brother to emphasize before the British Government the necessity of his proceeding to Europe to confer with Lloyd George and to ascertain what has been, and what is going to be, decided—whether the Allies will hold to their honourable principles or do violence to the wishes of the Nation.

The situation is extremely grave. At any moment some regrettable incident may occur, for the people are in a state of great anxiety as to the future of their country. Revolutionary movements have begun in the French zone in the Northern part, with killed and wounded, with highway robbery and attacks on public security. We see the Government which claims justice and liberty regarding these conditions with indifference, in fact even longing for religious strife and internal disorders to arise so as to have the satisfaction of seeing the disruption of the Arab Cause for which so much blood was shed, so that they may be able to say they have the right to take the country on the

<sup>1</sup> Heading as in filed copy. A copy of this letter was communicated to the Foreign Office in Sir M. Cheetham's covering despatch No. 491 of October 8, 1919, from Cairo (received October 21).

ground that the nation does not deserve independence, and that it is a savage nation incapable of governing itself. But for my fear of alarming you, Sire, I could fill many pages with the description of these deplorable circumstances.

The people of the country will live in the hope of the fulfilment of the principles of the Allies and of the satisfaction of their aspirations in spite of all, but when they find that they have been given the cold shoulder, the great fight will come. Indeed the people of the country will defend the principles of the Allies at the point of the spear and the sword, and the responsibility of the blood that shall be shed in this cause will fall upon *those who have been the cause* of the colonisation of the free Arab countries which have freed themselves by the blood of their heroic martyrs who have fought in the battlefield beneath the victorious Arab flag.

Sire, the heart of every noble Arab applauds the sacrifice of his brothers, even though it be in vain, and they will defend the noble cause of right and justice until he dies as the martyrs died before him, or they will win their country as they won it of old from the race of Genkiz Khan by the help of God.

If any change occurs I will inform you by telegraph and by letter. I, as an Arab, beg you, as a duty incumbent upon you, to defend this nation, which you were instrumental in bringing to life after many centuries of death, and not to leave it to be divided up amongst colonising nations. The nation has none other to succour it after God than yourself. I beg you to defend its lawful rights in every sense of the word, for justice is supreme and cannot have aught set above it. I venture boldly to remind you, Sire, that the great responsibility moral and material, falls upon him who has given this noble command, and I assure you that every patriotic Arab will shed his blood at your behest for this sacred cause, and 'the way of the ungodly shall be turned upside down'.

May you live for ever and evermore.

ZEID

### No. 285

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo)*

*No. 297 Telegraphic [128913/17115/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 431<sup>1</sup> (of the 12th September. Resumption of operations by Standard Oil Company).

Refusal equally applies to all surveys.

<sup>1</sup> No. 275.

### No. 286

*The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George<sup>1</sup>*

*[132930/2117/44A]*

LONDON, September 21, 1919

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency my reply to the Aide-

<sup>1</sup> Communicated on September 22, 1919.

*Mémoire*<sup>2</sup> of which you kindly gave me a copy on Friday, September 19, 1919, and of which you said a copy was given to M. Clemenceau on the 13th instant, and another to Mr. Polk on the 15th.

1. This proposed arrangement is detrimental to the rights of the Arabs and in direct opposition to what they expected from the British and French Governments in particular, and from the civilised world in general. After having taken part in this war against the Caliphate itself, and after exposing the Holy Land to the ravages of war in support of the principles avowed by the Allies more than once in speeches and proclamations, the Arabs at least expect that their rights should be taken into consideration.

2. The Arabs, at whose expense the agreement had been concluded without their knowledge, can never recognize such an engagement or take the responsibility of accepting what would be detrimental to their rights and what would lead to the dismemberment of their country for no fault or crime on their part.

3. The 1916 Treaty, which has been made the basis of this agreement, is not officially known to the Arabs. It could never be the basis of any agreement after the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to cancel all secret treaties. Furthermore, my father having learnt for the first time from the Paris Arabic paper *El-Mustakbal* of the existence of this secret treaty which was divulged by Jamal Pasha<sup>3</sup> in Damascus for propaganda purposes, he protested vehemently to His Majesty's Government. He received the following reply:—

'Bolsheviks found in Petrograd Foreign Office record of old conversations and provisional understanding (not formal treaty) between Britain, France and Russia made early in war to prevent difficulties between Powers in prosecuting war with Turkey. Jamal either from ignorance or malice has distorted its original purpose, has omitted its stipulations regarding consent of native populations and safeguarding their interest, and has ignored fact that subsequent outbreak and success of Arab revolt and withdrawal of Russia had for long time past created wholly different situation'.<sup>4</sup>

This has also been confirmed as far as the consent of the population is concerned by the joint proclamation of Great Britain and France of November 1918, also by the Covenant of the League of Nations of which the ink is not yet dry, and by the last communication of Colonel Meinertzhagen in the presence of M. Lafourcade<sup>5</sup> the purport of which is that Great Britain will not force a mandate on any nation.

4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Syria notified us officially and also more than once through the Political Officers in Syria orally and by written statements that he was responsible for the administration of the whole country to the Allies and to the Peace Conference through

<sup>2</sup> See Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

<sup>3</sup> Formerly Turkish military governor of Syria.

<sup>4</sup> For this communication see G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 257, also pp. 431-2.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 272.

the British War Office. This fact was confirmed by Colonel Meinertzhangen, Chief British Political Officer, at a meeting in Damascus on Tuesday, September 9 1919<sup>5</sup> in the presence of the French High Commissioner M. Lafourcade. The occupation has existed for the past year and there seems to be no sufficient cause to now alter the arrangement for the short period which you say will now only elapse until the Peace Treaty with Turkey is signed.

5. The Arabs decline to recognise an agreement concluded without their knowledge at a meeting at which they were not represented. They also decline to recognize a decision they did not take part in at a time when all concerned were equally held responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces.

6. It is officially and unofficially understood that the present measures of administration in Syria are temporary. It is also understood from the attached *Aide Mémoire*<sup>2</sup> that this new agreement is also temporary 'pending the decision in regard to mandates'. What is the meaning then of exchanging a temporary arrangement with another of the same temporary character, and what is the difference between the two that one should replace the other and be carried out at a very inopportune time when it is much easier to keep the *status quo* unchanged until the final decision? I should like to give a caution to the responsible statesmen who manage the affairs of nations that the execution of this policy will undoubtedly lead to untoward events in the Arab provinces and this must be a great responsibility on those who have concluded this unjust and hated agreement.

7. The third clause of the attached *Aide Mémoire* says: 'In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.'

As I have no copies of these engagements and declarations, particularly between the French Government and the Arabs—engagements which tend to dismember the country, I should be greatly obliged if you would kindly furnish me with authorized copies. I am only aware of engagements between Great Britain and the Arabs which are not, however, in exact harmony with this last agreement, and of declarations by both Governments giving self-determination to the nations (Nov. 1918).

8. Although this agreement is said to be of a temporary nature, I strongly protest against what the *Aide Mémoire* says with reference to the boundaries and their limitations. The mention of the boundaries and the fact that Great Britain is prepared to discuss their limitations is an absolute proof of the intention to dismember the Arab provinces and is an unjustified interference to thus determine the future of the country before the final decision by the Peace Conference.

9. I would like to ask His Britannic Majesty's Government who have declared that Great Britain will not accept a mandate over Syria, what would Great Britain say to her previous engagements to the Arabs and her

promise 'to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs'? Would Great Britain say to the Arabs that she has nothing to do with them now and that her interests are not the same as they were? Would Great Britain, who has always declared that she would defend the rights of nations and who has often fought in defending weak nations, leave the Arabs at mercy of greedy imperialistic ideas? I leave the decision in this question to Your Excellency's conscience and to the public opinion of the generous British nation.

10. Should it be found necessary to withdraw the British forces from Syria why not withdraw all European troops and leave the responsibility to the Arab Government who are prepared to be responsible to the Allied and Associated Powers for the interior security of the country until such time as the Peace Conference shall decide the future of Syria?

11. These are the preliminary observations I wish to bring to Your Excellency's notice. In conclusion I ask that this proposed engagement between the French and British Governments shall be entirely cancelled as it is contrary to the ideals of the League of Nations and is also contrary to our other engagements which were based on national honour. It is, moreover, an unjust return to the policy of ambitious imperialism which after this war should be swept away for ever. The Arabs will consequently be obliged to defend their unity and existence with their utmost available power and zeal. They will not fail to find the means to publish to the whole world how engagements have been thrown to the wind and how different lines of policy have been taken although it may be said in defence of this change that it is of a temporary character. The condition of mind of the inhabitants of the country will undoubtedly lead them to believe that this arrangement is a preliminary to the actual dismemberment of the country. They will not accept any argument or excuse. I cannot understand how the Commander-in-Chief, who is aware of all these facts, could consent to expose the country he liberated to internal disorder. It would surely be much more advisable to leave the *status quo* as it is or withdraw all European troops until the final decision. I have submitted these observations to Your Excellency to relieve myself of all responsibility to you and to the whole civilised world.

I have &c.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

### No. 287

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 23)*

*No. 450 Telegraphic [132902/2117/444]*

CAIRO, September 22, 1919

Immediately following Feisal's departure for Paris and unofficial announcement in Press of Syrian settlement an unauthorized Arab Committee of National Defence issued proclamations with a view to partial compulsory mobilization.

Consequently Yasin Pasha<sup>1</sup> was sent for and Commander-in-Chief has

<sup>1</sup> Chief of the General Staff of the Arab forces.

made him responsible for confining strength of Army to limits defined by Commander-in-Chief whilst Chief Administrator has been ordered to break up the Committee of National Defence and cancel proclamation. M. de La Forcade [sic] has taken exaggerated view of affair and has demanded internment of Yasin and removal of Ali Riza. I have replied pointing out steps we have taken as outlined above but that his request cannot be granted even though we recognized faults of the two Arab officers in question. That it is necessary to keep some responsible heads in Administration of O.E.T.A. East and that their removal during the absence of Feisal would be inadvisable—we would however consider names of any likely successors whom Lafocade might suggest. The incident has passed quietly but it is important as being indicative of Arab determination to oppose French. Both Yasin and Nuri Pasha have confided to me that if recently reported Paris settlement of Syria be true they will not tolerate French control nor will they stand by and witness oppression of Arabs in French (? coastal) administration. They will not join with Mustafa Kemal as he will attempt to occupy Aleppo on our withdrawal which will entail collision with Arabs. It is my opinion that we need anticipate no trouble so long as British troops remain: that extreme Arab party with Army at their back will force conflict with France either during or immediately following our withdrawal, and that Feisal will be forced to conform or abandon his position. In order to avoid accusation by French of fomenting Arabs and handing over country in state of revolt I suggest you make situation quite clear to French and warn them of immediate trouble following our evacuation.<sup>2</sup> I wish again to point out that my inability either to refute or to confirm the unofficial report of Syrian Agreement published in Paris on September 17<sup>3</sup> is giving rise to increasing distrust of British and is immediate cause of present restlessness.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon replied in telegram No. 306 of September 27 to Colonel Meinertzhagen: 'I do not propose to warn the French of impending trouble unless and until we have failed to make Feisal see reason'.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 282. Foreign Office telegram No. 296 of September 19, 1919, to Cairo (not printed) had given Colonel Meinertzhagen a brief summary of the Anglo-French Agreement of September 15 regarding Syria, and had concluded: 'Until matter has been discussed with Feisal no public announcement should be made as to terms of agreement.'

## No. 288

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)  
No. 452 Telegraphic [134580/2117/44]*

CAIRO, September 23, 1919

Following for Feisal from Zeid begins:—

It is decided to withdraw British troops from this zone we have heard. If so grave disturbances will arise and dangers will threaten from N. where forces of Ajeimi el Saadun and the Kurds have assembled. These are in agreement with Mustafa Kemal<sup>1</sup>. The danger from coast will be greater. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> For the activities at that time of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Chap. III.

You should see telegram E.A. 2703<sup>2</sup> from Egyptian Force to War Office of today's date in this connection.

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram British General Headquarters, Egypt, stated that its opinion as to the above Arab communication was 'as follows':—

'1. Following the withdrawal of British troops disorders will arise in the area north and east of Aleppo, but would probably only take the form of raids by the local Arabs and Kurds. No organised movement of aggression is probable, the Turkish ?troops which have joined Mustapha Kemal are not moveable and it seems unlikely that the Kurds will join Mustapha Kemal wholeheartedly.

'Amongst the population there is no general enthusiasm for Mustapha Kemal.

'2. The Arabs authorities will undoubtedly use the plea of possible attacks by Mustapha Kemal's party to ask for an increase in the strength of the Arab Army and arms and ammunition for it.

'Final sentence of Zeid telegram shows however what their real concern is. It seems quite probable that the extreme Arab Nationalists will eventually make common cause with Mustapha Kemal and try to unite Arabs, Kurds and Turkish to keep foreigners out of their country.'

### No. 289

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received September 24)*

*No. 1385 Telegraphic [135438/2117/44A]*

*RAMLEH, September 23, 1919*

Following is paraphrase of message to Hussein from Feisal contained in your telegram 1066.<sup>1</sup> Begins.

83. Yesterday I reached London and met the British Cabinet where an earnest and excellent discussion took place. Inform me of date of Treaty which you sent to us on July 17 because it arrived without indispensable date, it being the latest official document which contains signature of Sir H. MacMahon [*sic*]: or is there any other? They feign ignorance of its existence. I shall ask for other documents in detail.<sup>2</sup> Ends.

Decyphers of three other telegrams will follow as soon as decyphered.

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 290.

### No. 290

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received September 24)*

*No. 1386 Telegraphic [135438/2117/44A]*

*RAMLEH, September 23, 1919*

Following is paraphrase of second telegram from Feisal to King Hussein contained in your No. 1066.<sup>1</sup> Begins:

84. Please send me all the correspondence (literally) which took place between you and High Commissioner, Sir H. MacMahon [*sic*] and British agent at Jeddah and (men of England) from earliest negotiations and beginning of revolt until present day viséed by Your Majesty and by British Agent at Jeddah. Situation renders them urgently necessary. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

I have instructed Colonel Vickery<sup>2</sup> to scrutinise most carefully (? any) documents presented for his counter signature, to insist on seeing originals and to take copies.

<sup>2</sup> British Agent at Jeddah.

No. 291

*Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 24)*

*No. 1387 Telegraphic [135438/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 23, 1919

Following is paraphrase of third telegram from Feisal to the King contained in your telegram No. 1066.<sup>1</sup> Begins:

No. 86. Continuation to my 84.<sup>2</sup> The dates and numbers are required on account of a difference which has arisen on question of Syrian coasts. They say that there is no agreement containing an acknowledgement by England that this zone is to be given to Arabs. Copy of treaty which you sent me contains such an acknowledgement. An immediate answer is required. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 290.

No. 292

*The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George*

*[133506/2117/44A]*

LONDON, September 23, 1919

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency the following additional note to my reply submitted yesterday and dated September 21 1919.<sup>1</sup>

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Syria asked me yesterday to discuss with him the question of carrying out the evacuation of the country by the British Forces.<sup>2</sup> I brought to the notice of His Excellency that I would decline to discuss the subject and gave my reasons for it.

I beg now to remind Your Excellency that when the British General in Command at Beyrouth obliged the Arab troops to evacuate the sea-coast, he wrote to Shukri Pasha, the Arab General, that this change was simply of a military and temporary character until the future of the country was settled at the Peace Conference.

It was the British Forces that lowered the Arab flags. Our confidence in the honour of the British Army, and the statement of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in a telegram he sent to me in which he assured me of the nature of this arrangement, and the fact that it was understood that the whole country was to remain under the Commander-in-Chief until the final settlement, induced me to agree to the evacuation of the sea-coast by our troops and the removal of the Arab flags hoisted on government buildings and elsewhere by the inhabitants.

<sup>1</sup> No. 286.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 283, note 13.

For these reasons, I asked one of two things:—either the return of the Arab Forces to the places they occupied on the sea-coast, in which case I take the whole responsibility of keeping public security and peace until the final decision, or the maintenance of the *status quo* until the final settlement.

I have &c.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

### No. 293

*Notes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W., on Tuesday,  
September 23, 1919, at 12 noon*

[384/1/1/19202]

#### Present:

The Prime Minister.

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,  
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the  
House of Commons.

The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of  
Kedleston, K.G., Acting Secretary of  
State for Foreign Affairs.

Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, G.C.B.,  
G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief,  
Egypt.

Colonel Cornwallis, Assistant Chief  
Political Officer, Egyptian Expedi-  
tionary Force.

Lt.-Colonel Stirling, Deputy Chief  
Political Officer, Egyptian Expedi-  
tionary Force.

Lt.-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey,  
G.C.B., Secretary, War Cabinet.

Lt.-Colonel L. Storr, C.B., Assistant  
Secretary, War Cabinet.

His Highness The Emir Feisal.

\*Brigadier-General Haddad Pasha,  
Director-General of Public Security,  
O.E.I[T].A. East.

Sheikh Fuad el Khatib, Political Ad-  
viser to H.H. King Hussein and to  
H.H. the Emir Feisal.

\* Acted as Interpreter.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that since the last Meeting he and his Ministers had carefully examined various papers, in particular a translation of Arabic excerpts sent by King Hussein to the Emir Feisal on [?] of the alleged treaty of His Majesty's Government and himself, which His Highness had been good enough to send (Appendix). These extracts came upon them all with a great measure of surprise, and he had at once communicated with Lord Curzon, the present Foreign Secretary, though he had no connection with the Foreign Office at the time the Treaty was alleged to have been agreed upon. He would say at once that he and his advisers knew nothing at all about the alleged Treaty, and he proposed to invite Lord Curzon to explain to the Meeting the results of the researches he had made into the Foreign Office records.

LORD CURZON stated that the first thing the Foreign Office did when they saw the translation of the excerpts of the alleged Treaty was to ask Sir Henry McMahon, who had been High Commissioner in Egypt when the negotiations were first conducted with the Sheriff of Mecca, if the Treaty was in any way authentic. Sir Henry wrote in reply, 'I have read alleged Treaty with amazement; it bears no resemblance to the original document.' This statement of Sir Henry McMahon led him to look exhaustively into the whole correspondence between the Foreign Office and King Hussein. He found that the alleged Treaty was almost identical with an enclosure sent in a letter from King Hussein to the High Commissioner in August 1918, which was King Hussein's own version of various agreements concluded between himself and H.M. Government. The High Commissioner, on receiving the said communication, realizing that he was not in a position to deal with the matter, referred it to London. H.M. Government had not considered it necessary to put forward any considered reply to King Hussein for the following reasons:—(a) The whole draft was erroneous in almost every respect, and (b) the declaration made in November 1918 by the French and ourselves, which followed almost immediately upon the receipt of the letter, and which was familiar to His Highness, was regarded as a real and effective reply to the contentions put forward in the alleged Treaty. He proposed to point out *seriatim* how erroneous the whole document presented by His Highness was:—

Para. 1. From the words in the 9th line<sup>1</sup> 'the Arab Government' to the words 'or an individual' at the end of the paragraph; this was quite new, and appeared in no agreement concluded with King Hussein.

Para. 2. There was no truth in this at all, and it appeared in no arrangement or agreement that had been made with King Hussein. H.M. Government had never at any stage presumed to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.

Para. 3. Sub-Para. 1. No time was ever set by H.M. Government in regard to the occupation of Basra.

Para. 3. Second Sub-Para. This was the interpretation put by King Hussein on the grants of money and it was never accepted by us.

Para. 4. Arms were not given by H.M. Government to the Arab Government but to the Sheriff of Mecca, as spokesman of the Arab people.

Para. 5. This was quite untrue. King Hussein on April 18th, 1916, wrote to us saying that he thought it necessary that we should land troops and occupy the railway connecting Syria with Anatolia. The High Commissioner on the 19th July, 1916, replied that the military situation was such as to render any such step unnecessary.

It was therefore clear, in respect of the document under discussion, that there had been a serious mistake. The document in question represented what the Arabs had been pressing, and not what H.M. Government had accepted.

THE EMIR FEISAL stated that before he got to Europe, he had never referred to any agreement with Great Britain with anybody. He had regarded

<sup>1</sup> Lines 7–8 in Appendix below.

the agreement with Great Britain as a 'moral' agreement, and he had depended on the word of British officials. His expectation had been that the Arabs were entitled to be rewarded for all they had done in the war, and he left the issue to British justice. Just before leaving Damascus to come on his present mission, as he had never seen the text of the agreement, he had applied to his father for a copy of it. The excerpts which he had submitted to the Prime Minister had been sent to him by his father. On his arrival at Marseilles he found a communication in the French press which contained a reference to a previous document referring to the agreement. He had at once telegraphed to his father to send him two copies of the agreement and the correspondence exchanged with the High Commissioner to be certified, before despatch, by the British official at Jeddah. Until he had received these copies he did not feel that he was in a position to discuss the matter further.

LORD CURZON said that there never had been any signed agreement between H.M. Government and King Hussein. The discussions between the two parties had been carried on by means of correspondence. This correspondence he had himself examined most carefully; and, if necessary, it could all be printed and laid.<sup>2</sup> It was no use to ask King Hussein for copies of the agreement, as it did not exist. The 'understanding' between H.M. Government and the King arose from a series of letters, copies of which H.M. Government would gladly produce for His Highness's perusal.

THE EMIR FEISAL asked whether the Prime Minister had a copy of a certain letter from King Hussein to the High Commissioner, bearing the date about thirteen months previously.

LORD CURZON pointed out that this was the letter of August 1918 which had already been referred to in the discussion.

(At this point, 12.30 p.m., the discussion was adjourned, while the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Curzon and Lord Allenby, with Sir Maurice Hankey, withdrew for a private conversation.)

(The Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Lord Allenby, and Sir Maurice Hankey rejoined the Meeting at 12.50 p.m. when the discussion was resumed.)

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he and his advisers had again considered carefully the documents relating to the question under discussion, and also the statements which had been made that morning at the meeting. A satisfactory solution of the question was of the greatest importance to the relations of the Arab people and the people of this country. The British Government were most anxious to be on the best of terms with the Arab race whom they admired so much, and who in the last struggle had been so exceedingly helpful to the Allies. With a view to reaching a satisfactory solution, the British Government proposed to give a written answer to the document submitted to them by His Highness. In the meantime he would like to make one or two observations. His Highness had referred to the *Aide-Mémoire* which he (Mr. Lloyd George) had submitted to His Highness and to Mons. Clemenceau,

<sup>2</sup> Laid before parliament. (This was done in 1939—Cmd. 5957.)

as an 'agreement'. The document was in no sense an agreement. He had not submitted it to Mons. Clemenceau as such, but merely as an indication of the views of His Majesty's Government in respect of the occupation of Cilicia, Syria and Palestine, after a long consultation with Field Marshal Lord Allenby. Mons. Clemenceau had told him in Paris that he could not accept the *Aide-Mémoire* as a final settlement of the questions which affected the future administration of territories concerned. When the time came, Mons. Clemenceau would put the case from the French point of view before the Peace Conference. He himself thought that the French view was that Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo ought to be in the French sphere and occupied by French troops. This, however, the British Government had refused to accept, and he had pointed out to M. Clemenceau that we had entered into definite engagements with King Hussein that these towns were to be under the Arab Government and that we proposed to hand them over to be garrisoned by Arab troops. He only wished to point out that this was not the result of negotiations between Mons. Clemenceau on behalf of the French Government and himself on behalf of His Majesty's Government, but merely an indication of our intentions regarding future temporary arrangements. The *Aide-Mémoire* had been prepared by Field Marshal Lord Allenby, Mr. Bonar Law, and himself before he ever saw Mons. Clemenceau in Paris. There was no alteration of a single word in the document he had prepared for presentation in Paris, and the document he had handed to the Emir Feisal. He wished the Emir to understand thoroughly that it was not the result of negotiations with the French Government behind the back of the Arab representatives.

A second observation he desired to make was that His Majesty's Government were bringing home troops from every country where we did not intend permanently to remain, e.g.—Archangel,<sup>3</sup> the Caucasus,<sup>3</sup> France, etc. as rapidly as they could on account of the great expense entailed in their maintenance. As the British Government saw no prospect of peace being signed with Turkey until February or March of next year, and as they did not wish to maintain big garrisons in the middle East until then, the proposals contained in the *Aide-Mémoire* had been submitted to Mons. Clemenceau. Both in the Caucasus and in North Russia strong appeals had been made to us not to evacuate,<sup>3</sup> as we were assured that if we went there was bound to be trouble. To stop in all these places, however, would involve so gigantic a burden on the British taxpayer, that this country would never tolerate it. When we decided to evacuate Cilicia and Syria we arranged to do it in such a way as would conform with the agreements made by us with King Hussein, as set forth in the correspondence with His Majesty. When the peace treaty with Turkey came to be discussed, the French would put forward their claims before the Inter-Allied Council, and it was open to the Arabs to do the same; and it would be for the Council to decide upon those respective claims. In the meantime the British Government could only make provisional arrangements in conformity with the Agreements by which they were bound. Further, he would like to say that, had it not been for the

<sup>3</sup> See Volume III, Chap. II.

gigantic sacrifices made by France as well as by Great Britain in fighting Germany as well as Turkey and Austria, Aleppo, Damascus, and Arabia itself, would not to-day be free. They were free because Great Britain with all her might fought Turkey, and also fought Germany lest she should come to Turkey's assistance. The French nation alone had lost 1,400,000 dead in the great struggle, and the British Empire had lost nearly 1,000,000. Moreover, the loss to both countries in treasure was incalculable. It was this that had enabled the Emir Feisal to win freedom for his race. It was this great effort of the Western races that had enabled the gifted race, of which the Emir was so distinguished a representative, to free itself from Turkish thralldom. He hoped the Emir would bear this in mind, both in dealing with us and also with France which had suffered even more than the British Empire.

In conclusion he would say that the written reply to the Emir's document which he had promised would be submitted shortly, would be in His Highness's hands by Thursday or Friday of this week<sup>4</sup> if that would be convenient to His Highness, and would fully explain the position.

THE EMIR FEISAL said there was only one thing that he would like to submit to the meeting before it adjourned. To begin with, had it not been for the British, perhaps no Arab power would exist to-day. The Arab nation was most grateful for all the assistance that Great Britain had given them, and they fully recognised what they owed to the British nation. He personally owed everything to Great Britain, but he was now speaking, not for himself only, but for the whole Arab nation, and he hoped that Syria would not be considered in the same way as North Russia. On the solution of the Syrian question depended the whole Moslem movement throughout the world. Arabia had fought with Great Britain and not with the other powers. He himself had fought under the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief. The Field Marshal had occupied all the places referred to and he had made a declaration that the present occupation of Syria should continue, until the Peace Conference should make a final settlement, and also that the British troops should not be withdrawn. He felt much with France and her sacrifice *for her existence*. The Arabs had also been fighting for their existence; but he was astonished that a great nation fighting for its existence should now try to encroach upon a small nation. It was not right that Frenchmen should live and that the Arabs should die. He left the issue to the British nation. The Field Marshal was there present at the meeting, and he had occupied the country and had made the declaration to which he (the Emir Feisal) had referred. He himself was very much afraid that, if the British troops were withdrawn, anarchy and a general rising would ensue. He left it to the British nation to judge his cause. He was so much attached to that great friendly nation that he did not wish to hear from Great Britain the sentence of death. If it was to be pronounced, let it be by an international Council and not by his friends.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the final decision must be made by some international Council. The Field Marshal equally with them all, had thought

<sup>4</sup> September 25 or 26, 1919.

that peace with Turkey would be signed by August or September of this year. He desired again to impress upon the Emir that public opinion in this country would not permit, now that war was over, H.M.G. to maintain British troops all over the world. The delay in obtaining peace was due to no fault of the British but to the United States, who have not yet made up their minds to the acceptance of mandates. The circumstances, therefore, had changed since the Field Marshal had made his declaration. As soon as the Emir had received the written answer to his declaration, he and his advisers would be very pleased to renew the discussion.

THE EMIR FEISAL said he would await the British Government's written reply and then be very glad to confer again with them. The proposed evacuation of troops seemed to him to be based on the 1916 agreement between the British and the French, which to the Arab nation was a sentence of death. That sentence he hoped would never be pronounced by his friends.

LORD CURZON, in reply to a request by General Haddad Pasha, undertook to send to the Emir Feisal copies of all the correspondence which had taken place between the High Commissioner and King Hussein, as well as a copy of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.<sup>5</sup>

(The Meeting adjourned at 1.35 p.m.)

#### APPENDIX TO NO. 293

##### *Translation of Arabic Excerpts sent by King Hussein to Emir Feisal from alleged Treaty between His Majesty's Government and Himself*

1. Great Britain undertakes to form an Arab Government—*independent in every sense both as to interior and exterior affairs with its boundaries on the East—the Persian Gulf; on the West the Red Sea, the Egyptian frontiers and the Mediterranean; on the North the Province of Aleppo and Northern Mosul up to the Euphrates and its junction with the Tigris down to the Persian Gulf (sic?)*.

The colony of Aden shall be considered outside these boundaries. The Arab Government shall respect the agreements and Treaties which Great Britain may have already concluded with any Arab within these boundaries and shall consider herself in the place of the British Government in guarding such agreements whether they are with an Emir or an individual.

2. Great Britain undertakes to safeguard this Government from any interference whatsoever in its interior affairs and to protect its land and sea

<sup>5</sup> In accordance with this undertaking the Foreign Office on September 29, 1919, remitted to Colonel Cornwallis, for communication to the Emir Feisal, documents 1-8 of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence printed in Cmd. 5957 of 1939. On October 2, 1919, the Foreign Office further remitted to Colonel Cornwallis, for the same purpose, four additional documents: (i) the Sykes-Picot Agreement as printed in the Introductory Note, items (6) and (3)—French text—as modified by item (9); (ii) the Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918, for which cf. the Introductory Note; (iii) King Hussein's letter of February 18, 1916, to Sir H. McMahon, printed as document 9 in Cmd. 5957; (iv) Sir H. McMahon's letter of March 10, 1916, to King Hussein, printed as document 10 in Cmd. 5957.

frontiers from encroachment of any sort. In the case of any internal revolt caused by enemy intrigues or the jealousy of any Emir, Great Britain shall render assistance to the Arab Government both materially and morally to crush such revolts.

3. The Province of Basra shall be occupied by Great Britain until the final establishment of the new Government.

Great Britain undertakes to supply such sums as may be required by the Arab Government—which is in the position of award.<sup>6</sup> These grants to be considered as compensation for the occupation of Basra.

4. Great Britain undertakes to supply the Arab Government with arms, equipment, ammunition and money as may be required during the war.

5. Great Britain undertakes to cut the line at Mersina or any other suitable point in that region, in order to lessen the pressure of war on the country which is not yet prepared.

<sup>6</sup> Another text of this document here read, probably correctly, ‘... the position of a ward’.

#### No. 294

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 6206 [132737/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 24, 1919

Sir,

The French Ambassador called on Lord Hardinge on the 22nd instant.

In the course of conversation he alluded to Syria and the conflict of public opinion on the subject of the action of British officers in that country. Lord Hardinge therefore seized upon this opportunity of putting to him very clearly the views which I had already expressed to his Excellency. He told him that no country could have acted more loyally towards the French Government in regard to Syria than we had, that every complaint which had been shown to have any justification had been at once set right, but that, nevertheless, in spite of the *bona fides* of the British Government, a campaign of calumny had been organised in the French press, and apparently the French Government did nothing whatsoever to check it. This, Lord Hardinge pointed out to him, was making a very bad impression upon me and His Majesty's Government at a moment when we were trying to induce the Emir Feisal to recognise our engagements towards France by which we considered ourselves bound, and which were in reality not in conflict with our engagements with King Hussein. For this action on our part we were incurring the mistrust of Feisal and of the Arab community, and it would be as well that the French Government should realise the disinterestedness of our action and take some steps to put an end to the press campaign against Great Britain.

M. Cambon said in reply that it was a great mistake to imagine that the French Government could take control of such papers as the *Débats* and the *Écho de Paris*, two very independent journals. He maintained that the complaints of the press were justified, and he related certain facts, such as the

taking over of the railways constructed by French capital in Syria, the elimination of all French *employés*, and the refusal to allow repairs to be carried out on these lines. Another instance he gave was the seizure of the customs sheds at Beirut, which had put an end to all activities in the port, but he admitted that this had now been arranged. Lord Hardinge pointed out to M. Cambon that this was ancient history, and that what he was saying only served to confirm what he, Lord Hardinge, had already said, that if any complaint of the French authorities was justified it was immediately put right by the military authorities on the spot, and that being the case, surely the French Government could have passed the word round to the press to cease their attacks on British policy in Syria in view of an arrangement being practically settled. But, Lord Hardinge added, this was not the only quarter in which a campaign of hostile propaganda was being carried on against Great Britain, for the same thing was being done in Tehran, where an active campaign was in progress, headed by the French and American Ministers, against the Anglo-Persian Agreement.<sup>1</sup> Lord Hardinge reminded M. Cambon that on two occasions his Excellency had declared to me the complete political disinterestedness of the French Government in Persia, and that I had taken note of these declarations. Consequently it was all the more astonishing to me that the French Minister should be assuming a hostile rôle towards His Majesty's Government in the Persian capital at this moment. Lord Hardinge added that he trusted that M. Cambon would bring these facts to the notice of his Government, and that M. Bonin would receive a severe reprimand.

M. Cambon admitted that my statement, that he had twice declared the disinterestedness of France in Persia, was absolutely correct and that the position remained precisely the same in that respect.

As for the remarks made in the French press against the agreement, he said that there was a certain feeling of surprise that no warning had been given to the French Government that such an agreement was in prospect, and that the absence of such a warning to an Ally had been wounding to their susceptibilities, but that he could not believe that there was any serious opposition in the French press to the agreement. As for M. Bonin, he knew nothing at all about him or what he was doing, but he would not fail to bring his activities to the notice of his Government in the hope that a stop might immediately be put to them. He added that he had been promoted from the Consular Service and was apparently suffering from *Morbus consularis*.<sup>2</sup>

I am, &c.

(for Earl Curzon of Kedleston)  
[HUBERT MONTGOMERY]<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Chap. V.

<sup>2</sup> Consular disease.

<sup>3</sup> Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

No. 295

*Note by Colonel Cornwallis of conversations with the Emir Feisal<sup>1</sup>*

[134093/2117/44A]

LONDON, September 25, 1919

1. The Emir Feisal has talked to me freely during the last few days. His general attitude towards the points at issue is already known to H.M.G. and has undergone no substantial change but certain subjects have arisen in the course of conversation which may be of interest.

2. In the absence of any instructions and in ignorance of the policy which H.M.G. intends to adopt in replying to the two letters of the Emir,<sup>2</sup> I have only spoken to the Emir in general terms and have been chiefly concerned in learning his views and in impressing on him the importance of taking no hasty action.

He has agreed to this and is now awaiting the reply from H.M.G. If he considers it unsatisfactory he intends to make a further appeal to the Prime Minister and to place before him certain alternative counter proposals. These are

- (i) that Field Marshal Lord Allenby should remain in supreme control of the evacuated areas with, if possible, a very few troops in the important towns as an outward sign to the people that the changes are only of a temporary character. He thinks that the French might accept this in preference to the risk of an immediate conflict and would undertake to keep his own people in order *vis à vis* the French if the proposal were approved.
- (ii) that an international Commission should be appointed to consider what temporary arrangements should be made pending the final decision of the Peace Conference.
- (iii) that the Peace Conference should consider without delay the future of the Arab countries on the grounds that there is no reason to await the conclusion of the Treaty with Turkey since it has already been decided to separate the Arab provinces from the old Turkish empire and that the present period of suspense if prolonged is likely to lead to disaster.

These proposals are merely given as indications of the Emir's frame of mind and are of course subject to modification and change.

3. If he fails to obtain what he considers favourable terms the Emir intends to state his case in the press of the world. He is very anxious to send a commission to America in order to interest the people there, but is at present debarred by his inability to find suitable representatives. He talks of going there himself.

4. Dr. Weizmann has approached him and two long discussions have already taken place. I understand that Dr. Weizmann, in return for the

<sup>1</sup> This note was received in the Foreign Office on September 26, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Nos. 286 and 292.

Emir's help in Palestine towards the realization of Zionist aspirations, proposes to give money and advisers, if required, to the Arab Government and claims that the Zionists can persuade the French Government to waive their claims of influence in the interior. The Emir is strongly inclined to come to an agreement but matters are at present at a deadlock since the Emir asks the Zionists to throw in their lot definitely with the Arabs against the French while Dr. Weizmann is in favour of allowing the French to occupy the coastal districts saying that they can be squeezed out later.

H. CORNWALLIS.

No. 296

*Letter from Colonel Lawrence to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [129405/129405/444]*

*September 25, 1919<sup>2</sup>*

Dear Lord Curzon,

I am putting this note into the form of a private letter, in order that you may feel free to deal with it as you please.

If I am asked to make Feisal accept the Paris arrangement of last week reasonably, I would point out to him that though it was strictly provisional, yet its provisions might be so established by him in Syria, that it would become the basis of the permanent settlement.

A. I would tell him that for it to be wholly satisfactory to him, he required some interpretations and additions of special points, and would suggest his asking H.M.G. for an assurance that our pledges with regard to the Arab character of the Government of Mesopotamia hold good, and that to relieve the local situation now (pending the Peace Conference decision) Sir P. Z. Cox [should] again take charge there,<sup>3</sup> and his present deputy be employed outside the province.

Feisal would not expect Sir Percy Cox to make any particular change. What is needed is not a change of fact but of spirit. At the same time one consequence of the Milner commission will probably be an altered relation of Egypt to the Home Government, and another will be a demand for a 'Milner commission' to bring Mesopotamia into line with the new constitution of Egypt.

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain. Lord Curzon noted on October 2, 1919, that this letter was sent him 'after an interview' with Colonel Lawrence. No record of this interview has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this letter, dated in error September 27, 1919, is printed by David Garnett, *The Letters of T. E. Lawrence* (London 1938), pp. 291–3. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 288–91, for a memorandum by Colonel Lawrence on Middle Eastern affairs, communicated by him to Mr. Harmsworth and noted as having been received in the Foreign Office on September 15. (Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 282–7, for the unofficial so-called Yale Plan for a settlement in the Middle East. No reference to this plan has been traced in Foreign Office archives, nor does it appear that it was approved or considered by the British Cabinet: cf. loc. cit., also Harry N. Howard, *An American Experiment in Peace-Making: the King-Crane Commission*, New York, 1942, p. 17.)

<sup>3</sup> Sir P. Cox, then H.M. Minister at Tehran, was formerly Chief Political Officer of the Indian Expeditionary Force.

My own ambition is that the Arabs should be our first brown dominion, and not our last brown colony. Arabs react against you if you try to drive them, and they are as tenacious as Jews: but you can lead them without force anywhere, if nominally arm in arm. The future of Mesopotamia is so immense that if it is cordially ours we can swing the whole Middle East with it.

B. I would suggest to Feisal that he ask the offices of H.M.G. in persuading the French to accept, jointly with us, as regards Syria:—

(i) That on the evacuation the present Arab administration become civil, and that an elected assembly from areas A and B ratify this agreement, and Feisal's position.

(Of course this new agreement will be written down in Paris, and signed by us, by the French and by Feisal.)

(ii) That this new local government be then recognised: as promised in the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918.

(Poland and Slovakia are parallels for a war recognition.)

(iii) That H.M.G. concede the Arab administration a free port in Haifa, and the French concede a free port either at Tripoli or Alexandretta. (By offering Haifa we force the French hand. Tripoli and Alexandretta are the future ports of Mesopotamia.)

(iv) The necessary railway convention be drawn up, to give proper effect to the free-ports concession.

(v) That the evacuations of Areas A and B be both complete.

(Neither British nor French wish this. We want to garrison Deraa, and the French want to keep their detachment in Damascus: but I think the French should pay for the privilege: see Section vi. below.)

(vi) The half-subsidy be paid by the British, and Feisal accepts a British adviser on his staff to deal with area B. The other half-subsidy be paid by the French and Feisal accepts a French adviser on his staff to deal with area A.

(The point is to keep Colonel Cornwallis in Damascus, where his influence will probably ensure peace. The French may see a condominium in this. We might then concede their point of the 200 troops in Damascus (Section v.) in return.

If they still refused to allow Cornwallis in Damascus, as adviser for area B, I would go out to Syria, and transfer Feisal, and the whole Syrian Government to Deraa in the British area, and H.M.G. would of course forbid the residence of a Frenchman in area B. They will soon become reasonable.)

I think Feisal will accept these terms, if I explain them to him. He has the Zionist proposals behind him,<sup>4</sup> though I suggest that H.M.G. remain ignorant of them!

C. We might take the present conversations as an opportunity of regulating the Hejaz subsidy. I would like to lift it off the Imperial Exchequer and

\* Cf. No. 295.

make it first a charge on the surplus of the local Arab Governments of Syria and Mesopotamia, divided according to taste, and estimated, for size, on the former 'Hejaz' budget.

As Syria and Mesopotamia are not yet solvent the Great Powers overseeing them would guarantee the payment of the Hejaz subsidy by them, for the present. In Syria this obligation would be shared equally by the British and French Governments, who would pay the amount annually to the Government of Syria for transmission to the Hejaz.

The Government of Bagdad would remit direct to Mecca.

It seems to me inevitable that the next stage of the Arab Movement will be the transfer of the Hejaz towns to Damascus, in the same relation as they formerly stood to Turkey. (Just as the third stage will be the transfer of both Mecca and Damascus to Bagdad, when the density of population in Mesopotamia rises to an Egyptian standard.) This second stage risks great French influence in Mecca: but if we pay half the Hejaz expenses direct to Mecca, and another share direct to the Government of Syria, we seem reasonably à cheval upon all possible contingencies.

D. With regard to the French coastal area of Syria they have accepted the formula 'French in Syria as British in Mesopotamia'. Therefore so long as we are the more liberal ('left' in the Parliamentary sense) we call the tune. The relation of French, Arab and British administrations sandwiched across 'Arabia' will be a very peculiar one: and I have no doubt that the middleman (Damascus) will always be urging on each of us the good features of the other. Our remedy and safeguard will be to trend continually 'left'.

I think the parallel of our constructive work in Persia may help us materially in Mesopotamia.

T. E. LAWRENCE.

### No. 297

*Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 28)*

*No. 1400 Telegraphic [135439/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 25, 1919

Your telegram 1066.<sup>1</sup>

Following is . . .<sup>2</sup> King Hussein's telegraphic reply to Feisal forwarded today.

Begins.

No. 1245 with reference to your telegrams Nos. 83, 84 and 86.<sup>3</sup> Great Britain is too noble and great not to admit the truth after seeing Treaty which she made and registered in her books. I am by help of God one of those who say but the truth, and although my loyalty forces me not to oppose her but to shew my innocence before her I am obliged to say 'let them refer to the registers in office of High Commissioner in Egypt'. They will find his letter of March 10, 1916, in which he says 'I am pleased to inform you that

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. See No. 289.

<sup>2</sup> A confidential reference is here omitted.

<sup>3</sup> Nos. 289, 290, and 291.

His Britannic Majesty's Government has accepted all your demands<sup>4</sup>. Depending on this assurance we began the preparations for revolt about end of following month.

Our claims are clearly known and it is advisable to appoint somebody else for this country lest I shall be forced to withdraw and country will be left in anarchy.

Ends.

Copy of Sir H. MacMahon's [sic] letter to King Hussein, dated March 10, 1916, was sent with said [sic] Despatch to you No. 54<sup>5</sup> of March 13, 1916.

A further telegram on this subject follows.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the text printed in Cmd. 5957 of 1939, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

### No. 298

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)*

*No. C.P.O. 31/1 [141037/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 26, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit some observations on the state of Zionism as I find it at present in Palestine.

As the value of any opinion on controversial matter is enhanced by a knowledge of the personal leanings of the informant, I wish to make my own position *vis-à-vis* Zionism perfectly clear.

My inclination towards Jews in general is governed by an anti-semitic instinct which is invariably modified by personal contact. My views on Zionism are those of an ardent Zionist. The reasons which induced in me a fascination for Zionism are many and complex, but in the main were governed by the unsatisfactory state of the Jews of the world, the great sentimental attraction of re-establishing a race after a banishment of 2000 years, which is not without its scientific interest, and the conviction that Jewish brains and money could, when backed by such a potent idea as Zionism, give to Palestine that impetus in industrial development which it so sorely needs after lying fallow since the beginning of the world. Neither could my mind, educated in military thought for the last 20 years, totally ignore the great strategic value to the British Empire of a strong, healthy and contented Palestine under British guidance, and the resultant gratitude of the bulk of Jewry throughout the world.

My first introduction to Zionism was in 1917 when I met the Aaronsohn family and visited the Zionist colonies of South Palestine. My close relation with Zionism since that date and an established friendship with many of the Zionist Leaders in Paris and London, have only increased my respect and admiration for Zionism and all that it means. I do not therefore approach Zionism in Palestine with an open mind, but as one strongly prejudiced in its favour.

It has been well known in Paris and London for some months past that there is strong local opposition to Zionism in Syria and Palestine, which is

frequently being voiced by nearly all communities and classes. Neither is such opposition entirely confined to non-official elements. The reasons underlying such opposition are varied and spring from many sources, but they are mainly traceable to a deliberate misunderstanding of the Jew and everything Jewish—this in its turn is based on contact with the local Jew, the least representative of Jewry or Zionism. Local contact with real Jewish culture and the better class of Zionist is not yet established in Palestine and cannot well materialise until Zionism commences its growth under a mandate.

All non-Zionist feeling in Palestine also views with alarm the question of immigration, which is regarded as the unlimited dumping of undesirable Jews from Eastern Europe.

The acknowledged superiority of Jewish brains and money forces land-owners and business men to realise their impotence to withstand eventual eviction, and they look on Zionism as synonymous with complete Jewish control and possession of land and industrial development in Palestine. The Jew is regarded as a parasite among Nations, indigestible to his host, and therefore scarcely able to assimilate himself to Nationhood.

The Moslem element in Palestine is also inclined to direct its antagonism to Zionism along fanatical channels—cries out against the minority ruling the majority, and strongly resents a policy being imposed on Palestine against the wishes of the majority.

It is not therefore difficult to understand that in Palestine every man's hand is against Zionism. This state of affairs is aggravated by the activities of French and Arab propaganda in Palestine, by the utterances and publication of the Moslem Christian Society whose original economic role has given place to political propaganda, by a local press which never fails to discredit Zionism and republish in badly translated form many immoderate articles from an over-zealous Zionist Press and by a host of smaller organisations and societies whose activities are encouraged by delay in the Peace settlement and which in some instances are contemplating a campaign of threat and terror against the Zionist leaders.

To reconcile this mass of opposition to the policy of H.M.G. has been no easy task for our administration and the work of our officials has been rendered doubly difficult as their personal views, no matter how anxious they are to conceal them, incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine. The determination of H.M.G. to establish Zionism in Palestine was also imperfectly realised until the arrival of your telegram No. 245<sup>1</sup> of August 4, 1919.

The contents of this have now been made known to the British Administration and to the Arab Leaders, but is still withheld from the general public.

There has in the past been certain mutual accusations between the administration and the local Zionists, which have not helped either the Zionist cause or the smooth working of the administrative machine, but in nearly every case the trouble has been of a trivial nature. This unfortunate friction has been caused by Zionist criticism of our officials in Palestine, by the weak

<sup>1</sup> No. 236.

constitution of the Zionist Commission, by a steady and constant pressure on our Administration to inaugurate the Zionist programme before the mandate is established, by a lack of patience among the local Zionists, and by some isolated cases where our officials have shown partiality towards the Arab or made use of some unfortunate language directed against Zionism. But on the whole our administration has exhibited laudable tolerance towards a subject they dislike and towards a community which is often unreasonable and by nature exacting.

In order to relieve our administration of minor worries connected with Zionism and to smooth down and consolidate local Zionist activity, I have arranged that Dr. Weizmann takes over charge of the Zionist Commission early next month.

It is hoped that Dr. Weizmann's influence will also check the petty jealousies and recriminations among Palestinian Jewry. Such unfortunate conduct among an organisation already saturated with trouble and opposition of all descriptions, is gradually discrediting Zionism and should it continue will serve to wreck the whole idea on the rocks of an exasperated Administration.

But in spite of all local opposition and all the many and real objections to establishing Zionism in Palestine, its eventual success is assured provided the growth is slow and methodical. In its incipient stages Zionism can only be artificial and unpopular and though it is realised that eventual success must depend on its own merits, it is only by careful nursing that it will develop a healthy growth. The great difficulty which the Mandatory Power will experience, is in giving Zionism just sufficient impetus and encouragement to prevent a stunted and disappointed growth, whilst not allowing it to outgrow itself and become strangled by its own impulsive effort.

The people of Palestine are not at present in a fit state to be told openly that the establishment of Zionism in Palestine is the policy to which H.M.G., America and France are committed. They certainly do not realise this fact. It has therefore been found advisable to withhold for the present your telegram No. 245<sup>1</sup> of 4th August, 1919, from general publication. So soon as Dr. Weizmann arrives I intend to draw up with him and the Chief Administrator a statement giving in the most moderate language what Zionism means, the gradual manner of its introduction, its freedom from religious or industrial intolerance, its eventual benefits to Palestine and a denial that immigration spells the flooding of Palestine with the dregs of Eastern Europe.

This has never been explained to the people of Palestine and it is the opinion of many officers of the present Administration that if moderately yet frankly put, such a declaration will go far to allay local apprehension and induce the bulk of the more reasonable element to accept the policy of H.M.G. It will not be without effect on others of the more educated classes who have so far prejudiced Zionism in their refusal to understand a distasteful subject.

Any such declaration will be submitted to you before publication.

The lack of such a declaration and my unwillingness to advise the publication of the bare facts as outlined in your telegram No. 245<sup>1</sup> of August 4, 1919, in face of local advice, is responsible for a certain amount of dangerous intrigue. It is only by a gradual education in Zionism, by a closer acquaintanceship with Zionists of the more tolerant and moderate school and by a clear definition of H.M.G.'s determination to prevent unfairness towards other creeds and races, that Zionism can be imposed on Palestine without violent opposition.

At the same time I am losing no opportunity to impress on Zionists the necessity of patience and the certainty of eventual success. Whilst on the other hand I am insisting on official recognition of Zionism as the established Policy of H.M.G. and on its being the main factor in considering the many Palestinian questions always arising, subject always, until the Treaty with Turkey is signed, to the administration being conducted according to the Laws and Usages of War.

I have &c.

R. MEINERTZHAGEN.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 236.

<sup>2</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 245 of October 20, 1919, to Colonel Meinertzhagen at Cairo, Lord Curzon acknowledged receipt of the present despatch and expressed himself as 'grateful for the frank exposition of your personal views which it contains'.

### No. 299

*Memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris)*

[385/3/3/19140]

September 26, 1919

In July last we were authorised<sup>1</sup> to discuss with Dr. Weizmann, Mr. Frankfurter and Mr. Ganz as representing the Zionist Organisation a possible draft for a Palestine mandate on the supposition that Great Britain were to obtain the mandate for Palestine and were to carry out the policy of a National Home for the Jews there. 16385<sup>2</sup> shows the result of that discussion.

Subsequently in August there seemed a possibility that the Mandatory Commission appointed by the Supreme Council and who were then sitting at Sunderland House might draft model mandates for the mandatory areas in Turkey including Palestine<sup>3</sup> and the documents in 16385<sup>2</sup> were sent to Mr. Baker, British Secretary of the Commission, and at the instance of Lord Robert Cecil further discussions between Mr. Frankfurter and Mr. Cohen, another member of the Zionist Organisation and Mr. Baker took place in London regarding our draft.

Mr. Cohen called here on September 24 and brought with him a draft prepared by the Zionist Organisation based on our draft, but with certain amendments in and additions to that draft. For convenience of reference the two drafts typed in parallel columns are attached herewith.<sup>4</sup> The amend-

<sup>1</sup> By Mr. Balfour.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This paper comprised earlier versions of the drafts for the Palestinian mandate in the appendix below.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 227.

<sup>4</sup> See appendix below.

ments and additions to our draft in the Zionist draft are underlined in ink.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Cohen explained that the fresh Zionist draft went, he thought, a long way to meet various suggestions put forward by this Section, although it included certain points to which we had not agreed. He added that the draft had been drawn up in close co-operation with Justice Brandeis after the latter's recent visit to Palestine and that it was chiefly Justice Brandeis's influence which led them to modify the rather extreme demands which they had put forward during our discussions in July which will be found in document 'B' in paper 16385.<sup>2</sup>

We then went through the draft in detail together and he explained the precise reasons which had led the Zionists to amend and add to our draft in the way they had done. I said that personally I thought several of these amendments and additions were acceptable, but explained that I was not of course in a position to agree to any of them on behalf of the higher British authorities: that in any case the original draft which we had discussed in July was only the work of this Section of the British Delegation and that as I explained in writing to Mr. Frankfurter at the time could not be held to bind His Majesty's Government or Mr. Balfour in any way. I said, however, that I thought we might usefully discuss this draft again when Mr. Malkin,<sup>6</sup> who had assisted in the July discussions, returned to Paris. I added that of course it was impossible to foresee when or by what body the Palestine mandate would be drafted or when it would be formally decided who was to be the Mandatory for Palestine.

Mr. Cohen said he quite understood the position, but the Zionist Organisation felt that if and when Palestine came to be discussed by the Peace Conference and a mandate prepared, it would be useful if some draft more or less agreed upon by the Zionist Organisation and the British Delegation could be ready. He would gladly come over from London to Paris again when Mr. Malkin returned or at any time if we wished to discuss matters with him.

E. G. F. ADAM.

#### APPENDIX TO No. 299

##### *Chapter V.<sup>7</sup> Palestine Mandate*

###### *'Political Section's draft'*

The High Contracting Parties:

Recognising the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to find a national home in that country:

Associating themselves accordingly with the declaration originally made by

###### *Zionist Organisation's draft*

The High Contracting Parties:

Recognising the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine (*Erez Israel*) and the claim which this gives them to reconstitute Palestine as their national home:

Associating themselves accordingly with the Declaration originally made by

<sup>5</sup> Here italicized.

<sup>6</sup> Assistant Legal Adviser on the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>7</sup> Of the draft treaty of peace with Turkey.

the British Government, and assented to by the other Allied and Associated Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country;

Considering that this object can best be secured by the administration, for as long as may be necessary, of Palestine by a State member of the League of Nations;

Have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. (The boundaries of Palestine are defined in Annex 1<sup>8</sup> to this chapter. A Commission representing the Governments of . . .<sup>9</sup> shall be appointed at once to trace these boundaries on the spot.)

2. The High Contracting Parties, recognising that it would be in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned that . . .<sup>9</sup> should be the Power selected to conduct the administration of Palestine and to secure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, hereby confer upon . . .<sup>9</sup> a mandate to that end, including the right to exercise as such mandatory all the powers inherent in the Government of a sovereign State, in so far as such powers shall be consistent with the control of the League of Nations and save as they shall be limited by the terms of this chapter. . . .<sup>9</sup> hereby accepts the mandate thus conferred upon it.

3. . . .<sup>9</sup> will be responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish national home; but nothing shall

<sup>8</sup> Not annexed to filed original.

the British Government, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country;

Considering that this object can best be secured by the administration, for as long as may be necessary, of Palestine, by a State member of the League of Nations;

Have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. The boundaries of Palestine are defined in Annex 1<sup>8</sup> to this *Convention*. A Commission representing the Governments of . . .<sup>9</sup> shall be appointed at once to trace these boundaries on the spot.

2. The High Contracting Parties, recognising that it would be in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned that *Great Britain* should be the Power selected to conduct the administration of Palestine and to secure the observance of the provisions of this *convention*, hereby confer upon *Great Britain* a mandate to that end, including the right to exercise as such mandatory all the powers inherent in the Government of a sovereign state, in so far as such powers shall be consistent with the control of the League of Nations and save as they shall be limited by the terms of this *convention*. *Great Britain* hereby accepts the mandate thus conferred upon it.

3. *Great Britain* shall be responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the

<sup>9</sup> Punctuation as in original.

be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The administration of the country shall be conducted with the aim of the ultimate creation in Palestine of a self-governing commonwealth..

4. . . .<sup>9</sup> will encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities consistent with the local conditions.

5. The Mandatory will promote the establishment of a Provisional Council representing Jewish opinion both in Palestine and in the world generally. The Mandatory will have the right to nominate a percentage of the members of the Council. The Provisional Council shall have its headquarters in . . . .<sup>9</sup> Its functions will be to advise the Government on such administrative, educational and economic questions as effect the interests of the Jewish population, and, subject always to the control of the Government, to assist and take part in the development of the country. The Government may grant to the Provisional Council, or to bodies organised or approved by the Provisional Council, concessions for public works or similar undertakings, provided that any dividends distributed by the Provisional Council or such bodies shall not exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital employed, and any further profits shall be utilised under trust for the benefit of the country. In the grant of such concessions preferential consideration shall be given to the Provisional Council or to the bodies organised or approved by it.

The Provisional Council will enter upon its functions as soon as the Government of Palestine is constituted. It will eventually be superseded by, and its functions transferred to, a permanent Council, of which the Mandatory shall

*development of a self-governing Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.*

4. *Great Britain will encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities consistent with the local conditions.*

5. *An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognised as a public body with power to advise and co-operate with the Government in all administrative, economic, social and other matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Government, to assist and take part in the development of the country. It shall have a pre-emptive right, upon fair and equitable terms, to construct and operate public works and utilities and develop the natural resources of the country. No private profits distributed by such agency shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it under trust for the benefit of the country. Concessions for the construction and operation of such public works and utilities and the development of such natural resources as are not undertaken by such agency, shall be granted by the Government only after consultation with it.*

*The Zionist Organisation shall forthwith be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home.*

retain the right to nominate a percentage of the members.

6. The control and administration of Moslem Wakf property<sup>10</sup> in Palestine shall be undertaken by the Government, who will respect Moslem law and the wishes of the founders.

7. The Mandatory will take steps to promote Jewish immigration and settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded; provided, however, that no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious beliefs.

8. Jews who within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty take up their permanent abode in Palestine will lose their existing nationality and become citizens of Palestine. The Government of Palestine will also enact a nationality law so framed as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who may take up their permanent abode in Palestine after the expiry of the said period of two years.

9. The immunities and privileges of foreigners, as well as the rights of consular jurisdiction and protection formerly established in the Ottoman dominions by the Capitulations and by usage, are abolished in Palestine. In all cases touching the person, status, or property of a subject or citizen of one of the States members of the League of Nations (other than cases which under Article 10 fall within the competence of a special religious court) the judge, or a majority of the judges if more than one, shall be persons with a Western legal training nominated by the Government to hear such cases.

6. The control and administration of Moslem Wakuf property<sup>10</sup> in Palestine shall be undertaken by the Government, who shall respect Moslem law and the wishes of the founders, *so far as may be consistent with the public interests of the country as a whole.*

7. The *British Government in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 5 shall promote Jewish immigration and close settlement by Jews on the land, and shall open for such settlement all public lands and all other lands that can be made available,* the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.

8. Jews who within *five* years from the coming into force of the present convention, take up their permanent abode in Palestine, *shall be entitled to abandon their existing nationality and become citizens of Palestine.* The Government of Palestine *shall* also enact a nationality law so framed as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who may take up their permanent abode in Palestine after the expiry of the period of *five* years.

9. The immunities and privileges of foreigners as well as the rights of consular jurisdiction and protection formerly established in the Ottoman dominions by the capitulations and by usage are abolished in Palestine.

<sup>10</sup> Property held in trust for religious or charitable uses.

10. All matters relating to Moslem Wakf, and all such matters relating to personal status as exclusively concern Moslems and fall within the jurisdiction of existing Moslem courts, shall be dealt with by exclusively Moslem courts. All matters relating to personal status or inheritance shall, in so far as they exclusively concern the members of non-Moslem communities invested with a recognised jurisdiction on such matters, be dealt with exclusively by the jurisdictional authorities of such communities. All other matters shall be dealt with by courts and under codes of universal jurisdiction.

11. The Government of Palestine shall have full power to reserve the development of the country for local interests, including the Councils referred to in Article 5 and such other Jewish bodies as may be organised to facilitate the development of the Jewish national home and are officially recognised by the Government. It will be the duty of the Government to introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, which shall provide, in order to avoid the evils of land speculation, that no person except a citizen of Palestine, and no company or other corporation except Jewish organisations officially recognised by the Government, shall own or occupy more than twenty dunam<sup>11</sup> of land without the special permission of the Government in each case.

10. *In the general legal system of Palestine, the Jews, Moslem and other communities shall have the right to maintain and develop their own judicial institutions in all civil matters exclusively concerning the members of their respective communities.*

11. The Government of Palestine shall have full power to reserve the development of the country for local interests, including the *Jewish agency* referred to in Article 5, and such other Jewish bodies *approved by it* as may be organised to facilitate the development of the Jewish National Home, and are officially recognised by the Government.

*In the construction and operation of public works and utilities and in the development of the natural resources of the country, the establishment of the Jewish National Home shall be a guiding principle.*

*The Government shall provide for public ownership or effective public control of the natural resources of the country and of the public works and utilities established and to be established therein; shall safeguard the interests of the community against their exploitation, and shall limit private profit from their development to a reasonable return on the capital employed therein, taking into account the extent and character of the risks assumed.*

*The Government shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, and adequate to prevent the evils of land speculation, which shall, among other things, further the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land and dis-*

<sup>11</sup> A dunam approximately equals a quarter of an acre.

*courage its uneconomic use or non-use, and limit the maximum areas of holdings.*

12. The foreign relations of Palestine will be conducted by . . .<sup>9</sup> and citizens of Palestine will be entitled to the protection of . . .<sup>9</sup> when outside the limits of Palestine. All States members of the League of Nations will have the right to station consular officers in Palestine.

13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites of Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights therein, of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship therein, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by . . .<sup>9</sup> who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected therewith.

14. The Mandatory will be responsible for providing that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are transferred to the permanent possession and control of suitable bodies selected or appointed by it and representing the adherents of the religion concerned. The selection of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites to be so transferred will be made by the Mandatory.

The Mandatory will also be responsible for deciding, after investigation by a Commission appointed by it and containing representatives of the denominations concerned, questions arising in connection with any Holy Places, religious buildings or sites which, in the opinion of the Mandatory, should be dealt with under this Article, but whose ownership or control may be disputed by two or more denominations.

In all cases of transference, however,

12. The foreign relations of Palestine shall be conducted by Great Britain, and citizens of Palestine shall be entitled to the protection of Great Britain when outside the limits of Palestine. All States members of the League of Nations shall have the right to station consular officers in Palestine.

13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites of Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights therein, of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship therein, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the British Government, who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected therewith.

14. The British Government will be responsible for providing that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are transferred to the permanent possession and control of suitable bodies selected or appointed by it and representing the adherents of the religion concerned. The selection of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites to be so transferred will be made by the British Government.

The British Government will also be responsible for deciding, after investigation by a Commission appointed by it and containing representatives of the denominations concerned, questions arising in connection with any Holy Places, religious buildings or sites which, in the opinion of the British Government should be dealt with under this article, but whose ownership or control may be disputed by two or more denominations.

In all cases of transference, however,

the right and duty of the Mandatory to maintain order and decorum in the places transferred, shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted by the Government of Palestine.

The rights of possession and control conferred upon [sic] this Article are guaranteed by the League of Nations, and shall never be subject to any diminution or modification whatsoever, unless by the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

15. The responsibility for the protection of all religious interests being thus exercised on behalf of the League of Nations by . . .<sup>9</sup> all such protectorates previously exercised by any foreign States will cease to operate in Palestine.

16. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 13 and 14, religious organisations shall enjoy with regard to their property the same rights, privileges and immunities as shall be accorded to citizens of Palestine.

17. Freedom of conscience and religious toleration shall be allowed to all inhabitants of Palestine, including the exercise of all forms of worship, and no discrimination of any kind shall be made between any citizens of Palestine on the grounds of race or religion. No civil or political right of any citizen of Palestine shall be conditional upon, nor shall its exercise be affected by any consideration of race or faith or a change of faith, provided that this shall not prevent the selection of official representatives of races or faiths, or forbid the definition of the franchise for their selection on the basis of race or faith. No hindrance shall be offered in spiritual matters either to the organisation of the different communities or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. The

the right and duty of the *British Government* to maintain order and decorum in the places transferred shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted by the Government of Palestine.

The rights of possession and control conferred under this Article are guaranteed by the League of Nations, and shall never be subject to any diminution or modification whatsoever, unless by the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

15. The responsibility for the protection of all religious interests being thus exercised on behalf of the League of Nations by the *British Government*, all such protectorates previously exercised by any foreign states shall cease to operate in Palestine.

16. (Omit.)

17. *No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.* Freedom of conscience and religious toleration shall be allowed to all inhabitants of Palestine, including the exercise of all forms of worship, and no discrimination of any kind shall be made between any citizens of Palestine on the ground of race, sex or religion. No civil or political right of any citizen of Palestine shall be conditional upon, nor shall its exercise be affected by, any consideration of race, sex or faith or a change of faith, provided that this shall not prevent the selection of official representatives of races or faiths or forbid the definition of the franchise for their selection on the basis of race or faith. No hindrance shall be offered in spiritual matters either to the organisa-

right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements as the Government may impose) will not be denied or impaired.

18. The organisation of religious communities as millets,<sup>12</sup> where it exists already, shall be maintained by the Government of Palestine as long as the Government considers it desirable.

The administration of all schools provided or maintained by the Jewish agency referred to in Article V, or by subsidising bodies approved by it, shall, subject to compliance with such requirements of a general nature as the Government of Palestine may impose, be vested in the said agency or such bodies controlled by it as it may designate for the purpose.<sup>13</sup>

19. Missionaries of all denominations shall be allowed freely to prosecute their calling and to maintain their schools, subject only to the requirements of public order and there shall be no discrimination against such schools and institutions as compared with other establishments providing similar standards of education. Missionary bodies will be allowed, on a footing of equality with citizens of Palestine and subject to local laws, to acquire and hold property of every description and to erect buildings for missionary purposes; but so long as the maintenance of public order renders such a measure necessary, missionaries who are subjects or citizens of any Power which at any time since the 1st August, 1914, has been at war with . . .<sup>9</sup> may be excluded from Palestine unless they have applied for and obtained a permit from the Governor.

20. The Government of Palestine

<sup>12</sup> Settlements of separate religious denominations.

<sup>13</sup> This paragraph was inserted thus in the original as a manuscript addition to the typescript. (Cf. No. 397, paragraph 14.)

tion of the different communities or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language shall not be denied or impaired. *The control of the educational system in so far as Jews are concerned shall be vested in the Jewish agency referred to in Article V.*

18. The organisation of religious communities as millets<sup>12</sup> where it exists already shall be maintained by the Government of Palestine as long as the Government considers it desirable.

19. Missionaries of all denominations shall be allowed freely to prosecute their calling and to maintain their schools, subject only to the requirements of public order, and there shall be no discrimination against such schools and institutions as compared with other establishments providing similar standards of education, *it being understood that such schools and institutions shall not be assisted from the public funds.*

Missionary bodies will be allowed, *subject to local laws, to erect such buildings and to acquire and hold such property as may be necessary for the conduct of their religious and educational work.* So long, however, as the maintenance of public order renders such a measure necessary, missionaries who are subjects or citizens of any power which at any time since 1st August, 1914, has been at war with Great Britain may be excluded from Palestine unless they have applied for and obtained a permit from the Government.

20. The Government of Palestine

may organise a local gendarmerie for the preservation of peace and order, but with this exception, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by Palestine, nor shall any fortifications be erected or bases established therein. Such forces as shall be raised shall be on a voluntary basis. Such forces of the Mandatory as may be stationed in Palestine shall be confined to such numbers as may be necessary for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the frontiers against raids. No Palestinian territory shall be ceded, leased, or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power for the establishment of a naval, military, or aerial base.

21. Subject to the provisions of Articles 5 and 11, the commerce and navigation of all States members of the League of Nations while engaged in lawful enterprises will enjoy equal treatment in Palestine. No attempt will be made by the Mandatory to obtain in Palestine for the commerce or navigation of its own subjects treatment more favourable than that which is accorded to the commerce and navigation of other nations.

22. The Mandatory will secure the observance, so far as local conditions permit, of all international conventions dealing with matters referred to in Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

23. English, Hebrew and Arabic shall be the official languages of Palestine, and shall be employed on the stamps and coinage of Palestine.

24. (Whatever clause regarding

may organise a local gendarmerie for the preservation of peace and order, but with this exception, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by Palestine, nor shall any fortification be *created* or bases established therein. Such forces as shall be raised shall be on a voluntary basis. *Such British forces* as may be stationed in Palestine shall be confined to such numbers as may be necessary for the maintenance of the internal order and protection of the frontiers against raids. No Palestinian territory shall be ceded, leased, or in any way placed under the control of any foreign power for the establishment of a naval, military or aerial base.

21. Subject to the provisions of Articles 5, 7 and 11 the commerce and navigation of all States members of the League of Nations while engaged in lawful enterprises shall enjoy equal treatment in Palestine. No attempt shall be made by *Great Britain* to obtain in Palestine for the commerce or navigation of its own subjects treatment more favourable than that which is accorded to the commerce and navigation of other nations.

22. *The British Government shall* secure the observance, so far as local conditions permit, of all international conventions dealing with matters referred to in Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

23. English, Hebrew and Arabic, shall be the official languages of Palestine, and shall be employed *inter alia* on the stamps and *money* of Palestine.

23 (a). *The Government shall recognise the Jewish Sabbath and the Jewish holidays as legal days of rest without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of non-Jews and shall permit to all inhabitants the pursuit of their ordinary vocation on all days other than their respective days of rest and holidays.*

24. (Whatever clause regarding

annual report is agreed upon by Mandatory Commission for 'A' mandates.)

annual report is agreed upon by Mandatory Commission for 'A' Mandates with due regard to the special character of the Mandate for Palestine.)

25. The Government of Palestine will co-operate, so far as religious and other local conditions permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

26. The Government of Palestine will take steps within twelve months from the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty to enact and thereafter to execute a Law of Antiquities based on the instructions contained in Annex II<sup>8</sup> to this Treaty which shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities. No attempt will be made by the Mandatory to obtain for the archaeological research of its own citizens treatment more favourable than that which is accorded to the archaeological research of other nations.

27. The Mandatory Power recognises the obligations accepted by it under this Convention to be matters of international concern of which the League of Nations has jurisdiction.

28. Changes in the present Convention may be made with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and it shall be the duty of the Council to advise the reconsideration of the present Convention should the terms in its opinion have become inapplicable to existing conditions.

29. If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the present Convention which cannot be settled by friendly negotiations, this dispute shall be submitted to the Per-

25. The Government of Palestine will co-operate, so far as religious and other local conditions permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

26. The Government of Palestine shall take steps within twelve months from the exchange of ratifications of this convention to enact and thereafter to execute a Law of Antiquities based on the instructions contained in Annex 2<sup>8</sup> of this convention, which shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities. No attempt shall be made by Great Britain to obtain for the Archaeological research of its own citizens treatment more favourable than that which is accorded to the archaeological research of other nations.

27. The Mandatory Power recognises the obligations accepted by it under this convention to be matters of international concern of which the League of Nations has jurisdiction.

28. Without prejudice to the principles embodied in the Preamble to this convention, changes in its provisions may be made with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and it shall be the duty of the Council to advise the reconsideration of the present Convention, should the terms in its opinion have become inapplicable to existing conditions.

29. If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the present convention which cannot be settled by friendly negotiations, such dispute shall be submitted to the per-

manent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

manent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

*It shall be the friendly right of the Jewish agency referred to in Article 5, to bring to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations any matter relating to the interpretation or application of the present convention.*

No. 300

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 2)*

*No. 1879 [136086/2117/44A]*

PARIS, September 29, 1919

Mr. Balfour [Sir E. Crowe]<sup>1</sup> presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of the undermentioned paper.

Name and Date	Subject
Minute by Mr. Forbes Adam	Claims of the Lebanese.
Sept. 26	

ENCLOSURE IN No. 300

*Minute by Mr. Forbes-Adam*

The Maronite Patriarch of Antioch, Mgr. Hoyek, accompanied by the Archbishop of Beirut and the Bishop of Baalbek called to-day.

They began by stating that they had wished particularly to see the Prime Minister and Sir Eyre Crowe, but fully appreciated the reasons which, as I had already explained in writing, made it impossible for Sir Eyre Crowe to see them.

After expressing their gratitude to Great Britain and to General Allenby for freeing Lebanon from Turkish rule they went on to explain that the special object of their visit was to make it quite clear to the British Government that the Christian population of the Lebanon, whom they claim to represent and who according to their estimates form a majority of the Lebanon, while quite willing that their country should be placed under a French (or I gathered British or American) mandate were most anxious that it should not be placed in any way under an Arab and Moslem Government. By 'the Lebanon' they meant not the provinces constituting it in 1861, but the greater Lebanon which the Lebanese representatives had at that time claimed from the Powers—bounded on the west by the Mediterranean, on the north by a line drawn from and including Tripoli to the Eastern slopes of the anti-Lebanon, on the East by the Eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon

<sup>1</sup> The printed formula of this standard covering despatch had inadvertently not been altered to take account of Mr. Balfour's departure from Paris.

including the Valley of the Bekaa and the towns of Hasbeya and Rasheya and on the south by the River Litany. They were afraid that there were indications that some form of united Syria, including or excluding Palestine, would probably be formed and placed under one mandate and that though the form of Government might be a decentralised federalism, there would be a central and predominantly Arab and Moslem Government at Damascus which would rule the whole country including the Lebanon, though assisted by the Mandatory Government. This they did not want. The French or some other Mandatory might have a Mandate over the Lebanon and over the rest of Syria, but the two mandates should be separate. They added that they explained these views to the American Commissioners on their recent visit to Syria.

I listened to what they had to say and promised to pass it on to the higher authorities, but speaking quite personally I thought it right to point our [out] that it seemed more important that they should put these views forward to the French Government rather than to His Majesty's Government, as we regarded French interests as predominant *vis-à-vis* British interests, in the districts in question. They said they realised this and were taking pains to emphasise their point of view to the French Government.

E. G. F. ADAM  
26th September.

### No. 301

*Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received September 30)*

*No. 1414 Telegraphic [135440/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, September 29, 1919

Following is paraphrase of Emir Feisal's telegram No. 88 to Emir Abdullah Mecca contained in your telegram No. 1077.<sup>1</sup> (Begins.)

To which decision before revolt do you refer? They pretend here that there was no convention. They showed me a document signed by (? Mc)-mahon and dated October 24 1920 (*sic*) which stipulates separation of Iraq and Syrian coast.

I wired to His Majesty to send me date of the Treaty by wire. (Ends.)

Foregoing is probably a reply to King's telegram No. 1245<sup>2</sup> as we have seen no telegrams from Emir Abdullah to Feisal. Date quoted is a cyphering error and Feisal no doubt refers to Sir H. Macmahon's [*sic*] letter to King Hussein translation of which was enclosed in his despatch No. 131<sup>3</sup> secret October 26, 1915.

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 297.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The letter in question, of October 24, 1915, is printed as document 4 in Cmd. 5957.

No. 302

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo)*

No. 527 [134164/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 1, 1919

Sir,

According to the report contained in the letter of the Director of Military Intelligence, of which copy<sup>1</sup> is forwarded herewith, the Syrian Congress at Damascus protested against the number of Jews who had recently come to Palestine.

I should therefore be glad to learn the approximate number of Jews who have entered Palestine since the beginning of the British occupation.

I am, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

<sup>1</sup> This formal covering letter of September 25, 1919, is not printed. The enclosed, undated 'Protestation of the Syrian Congress in Damascus against Jewish immigration to Palestine, presented to Emir Feisal, to be forwarded by him to the Allies and to all those whom it may concern' was as indicated and is not printed. This protest stated in part that 'it is acknowledged that during the last months about 5000 Jews (Roumanian, Polonian and Russian) came to Palestine. Some were quartered in Tiberius, others in Jaffa and Haifa. This immigration still continues, which action assures the danger of our social life. Therefore we again raise our voices, in the name of humanity and Justice, demanding through the necessary channels, the prevention of the immigrating Tidal Wave, and the immediate return of all comers, and the information of those concerned in the verification of our future, that we refuse separation of Syria and allowance of a foreign Jewish hand to predominate in the country.'

No. 303

*Sir M. Cheetham (Alexandria) to Earl Curzon (Received October 5)*

No. 1428 Telegraphic [137693/2117/44A]

ALEXANDRIA, October 2, 1919

Following is paraphrase of Feisal's telegram No. 89 to King Hussein contained in your telegram No. 1089.<sup>1</sup>

Begins.

Great Britain is no doubt acting as usual with regard to keeping her word; but non-existence of any registration in Foreign Office led to these arguments. Please inform me whether MacMahon's [*sic*] letter of March 10, 1916,<sup>2</sup> was a reply to a letter sent to him in which you made political demands. Also saying what those demands were and giving date and number of your letter in question.

Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as document 10 in Cmd. 5957 of 1939.

**No. 304**

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received October 8)*

*No. 1438 Telegraphic [138266/2117/44A]*

**RAMLEH, October 4, 1919**

Following is paraphrase of King Hussein's telegram No. 7, sent to Feisal to-day in reply to latter's (? telegram No.) 89.<sup>1</sup> (Begins.)

A copy of our demands was sent you when you were in Damascus and you acknowledged receipt.

Our communications are with High Commissioner and naturally they are not registered in London Foreign Office. This is long and short of matter. Please hurry up decision. (Ends.)

<sup>1</sup> See No. 303.

**No. 305**

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received October 8)*

*No. 1439 Telegraphic [138238/2117/44A]*

**RAMLEH, October 4, 1919**

A telegram has been received by post from British agent at Jeddah addressed by Emir Abdullah to Mr. Lloyd George.

Purport is as follows:—Begins.

Arab nation is much disturbed by statements in European Press regarding future of Arab countries.

King Hussein and Arabs only joined Allies to secure their independence relying on *bona fides* of Allied nations and their rulers.

They therefore await announcement of what was decided between Hashimite Government and His Majesty's Government before Arab revolt. We trust you will assist Emir Feisal now in London in securing fulfilment of our hopes. Ends.

**No. 306**

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)*

*No. 466 Telegraphic [137984/801/44A]*

**CAIRO, October 7, 1919**

Acting Commander-in-Chief has given orders that Weizmann be refused admittance to Palestine<sup>1</sup> unless Lord Allenby approves. As any attempt to hold up Weizmann will have very bad (? effect) and denotes complete lack of confidence in Zionist leader hope General Allenby's approval may be wired out with least delay.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Weizmann was arranging to proceed to Palestine: cf. No. 280.

No. 307

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)*

*No. 467 Telegraphic [139168/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, October 7, 1919

Following from absolutely reliable source which must not be compromised. Vatican concurs in deprecating<sup>1</sup> Zionism which they regard as blow to Christian conscience.

<sup>1</sup> It was suggested on the original that this should read: 'Vatican circles deprecate. . . .'

No. 308

*The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George<sup>1</sup>*

*[139326/2117/44A]*

LONDON, October 9, 1919

Your Excellency,

You were kind enough to tell me when I saw you at the Guildhall two days ago that the delay in replying to my note of the 21st September, 1919,<sup>2</sup> had been due to the recent crisis,<sup>3</sup> and that you hoped to send your answer shortly.

I appreciate your Excellency's kindness in telling me this, but since a very serious crisis is upon us I venture to anticipate your letter and to lay before you certain proposals.

I have already explained my views about the arrangement which was made recently in Paris, and I do not propose to do more than repeat that they have not altered.

Whatever the merits or demerits of the arrangement, the fact remains that it is regarded by the bulk of the inhabitants with the utmost dismay, and the withdrawal of British troops from Syria is likely to lead to a catastrophe to the whole Arab world and to the common cause which the Allies are defending.

I am extremely anxious to avoid the creation of any serious situation that may cause a strain in the friendly relations existing between the Allies and the Arabs, and perhaps render a permanent settlement on a friendly basis impossible, and I wish to do all in my power to maintain that bond which was written with the blood shed by all for the triumph of right and justice.

In order to prevent any unfortunate event which may but aggravate the situation, I beg to submit to your Excellency the following proposals:—

1. That the arrangement arrived at in Paris should be cancelled, or at least its execution suspended.
2. That the whole question be placed before the Peace Conference for final settlement without delay and be considered by the Peace Conference itself, or by a Conference appointed by it (consisting of British, French, and Arab representatives under the presidency of an

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note was communicated to the Foreign Office on October 10, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> No. 286.

<sup>3</sup> The reference was to a widespread British railway strike.

American chairman), which will discuss the serious question at issue, and render its report to the Peace Conference.

I consider the cancellation or suspension of the Paris arrangement as a vital preliminary to a successful solution. Unless this is done the crisis in Syria may be precipitated and events happen which will render friendly discussion most difficult. I trust, therefore, that these demands, which are essential to the interests of all, will meet with your approval, and that I may rely on the help of the British Government to bring them about.

I beg that your Excellency will be kind enough to let me have your reply at the earliest possible moment.

I have, &c.

FEISAL

No. 309

*Earl Curzon to the Emir Feisal*

[132930/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 9, 1919

Your Highness,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the preliminary observations<sup>1</sup> which you have been so good as to offer on the *aide-mémoire* presented by the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau<sup>2</sup> and yourself on the subject of the military occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, pending the decision of the Peace Conference in regard to mandates, copies of which have also been communicated to Mr. Polk, representing the United States of America, and Signor Tittoni, representing the Kingdom of Italy.

As your Highness would appear to be under a misapprehension as to the character of the *aide-mémoire*, I should like at the outset to make it clear that the said document in no sense represents an agreement between the French and British Governments. It contains proposals put forward by the British Government on its own initiative for the military occupation of the ex-Turkish territories pending a final settlement as to their future by the Peace Conference. These proposals—to which they adhere—were worked out by the British Government as soon as they had decided that it was impossible for them to continue the occupation of Syria by British troops. They invited you to come to Europe, and made instant arrangements for your transportation before ever they were communicated to the French Government or the Conference, and they were placed in your hands for your consideration directly you arrived.

Your Highness would appear to regard the proposed arrangement for the relief of British troops by French and Arab forces as being in some way contrary to the obligations entered into by His Majesty's Government with your illustrious father, his Highness Sherif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz. In order that there may be no misunderstanding on this point, I append the correspondence between your illustrious father, King of the Hedjaz, and His

<sup>1</sup> See No. 286.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo,<sup>3</sup> which contains the conditions upon which the Arabs entered the war against Turkey. The series contains the whole correspondence on the subject in the possession of His Majesty's Government. The document which your Highness handed to the Prime Minister at our conference a few days ago<sup>4</sup> is only a summary of conditions at one time desired by King Hussein, but never at any time entertained, and still less accepted by them. It has therefore no bearing on the question under discussion.

From the annexed correspondence it will be apparent to your Highness that His Majesty's Government made it clear from the outset that, in their opinion, 'the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries within which they were prepared to recognise the independence of the Arabs, and in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France.' These quotations are from a letter dated the 25th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon to his Highness Sherif Hussein. On the 5th November his Highness Sherif Hussein replied to this letter, stating that he renounced his insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab kingdom, but declared that the provinces of Aleppo and Beyrut and their sea coasts were purely Arab provinces. To this letter His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo replied on the 14th December welcoming his Highness's agreement to exclude the vilayets of Mersina and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab territories. He went on, however, to say that:—

'.... with regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beyrut, the Government of Great Britain had taken careful notice of your observations, but as the interests of our Ally, France, are involved, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.'

The necessity for this further communication, however, was obviated by a reply from his Highness Sherif Hussein, dated the 1st January, 1916, in which His Highness wrote as follows:—

'As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment was desired by the will of the blessed and supreme God. It was this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what might possibly injure the Alliance between Great Britain and France, and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet, we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished we should ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beyrut and its coasts.'

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The appended correspondence is printed as documents 1-8 in Cmd. 5957 of 1939. (Cf. also No. 293, note 5.)

<sup>4</sup> Appendix to No. 293.

His Highness went on to express the opinion that:—

‘The people of Beyrut would decidedly never accept such isolations [sic], and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which might exercise Great Britain certainly not less than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which was the only cause that caused us never to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation which gives France or any other Power a span of land in those regions.’

On the 25th of January, His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo replied that:—

‘... as regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the Alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who had died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty.’

This was the last communication which passed on this subject before the combined operations began, which terminated in November 1918 in the total defeat of the Turkish forces.

From this correspondence two things are clear. First, that the British Government are bound by their undertakings to King Hussein to recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders the four towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo; and second, that they made it absolutely clear to your illustrious father before the entry of the Arabs into the war that they regarded France as having special rights in the area west of these four towns. His Majesty’s Government would further point out that in 1916 when, for the purposes of the common campaign, it became necessary to arrive at an agreement with France and Russia as to the occupation of Turkish territories in the event of the downfall of Turkey, His Majesty’s Government insisted on reserving the independence of the Arabs in the districts which they had promised to reserve to them in their correspondence with King Hussein.<sup>5</sup> They did not communicate this agreement to King Hussein, because it was in complete conformity with the undertakings they had already entered into with him.

The attitude of His Majesty’s Government, therefore, throughout these negotiations has been entirely consistent and clear. They have entered into obligations to both their Allies, to the French and to the Arabs. These obligations do not conflict but are complementary to one another. His Majesty’s Government attach the greatest importance to the friendship and co-operation of both their Allies, and it is their intention to live up to their undertakings to each.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the Sykes–Picot Agreement printed in the Introductory Note.

I come now to your Highness's query as to why it is necessary for the British occupation of Syria to be brought to an end immediately instead of being prolonged till the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The reason is to be found in the tremendous effort put forward by the British Empire in the war against Turkey and its allies. His Majesty's Government recognise gladly and fully the indispensable assistance rendered to the Allied cause by King Hussein and yourself, and by the valiant Arab troops under your command. The courage and activity of your Highness's troops were an essential element in the campaign which led to the overthrow of Turkish despotism. But His Majesty's Government cannot forget that infinitely the larger share of the burden of the defeat of Turkey was carried by the British Empire. From first to last they sent to the Eastern theatre of war a total of over 1,400,000 troops, at a cost exceeding £750,000,000. These burdens were additional to the far greater sacrifices which they were compelled to make in Europe in order to secure the overthrow of the German power which lay behind the Turkish Empire. The peoples of the British Empire have lost over 950,000 lives, and they have incurred a debt of £9,000,000,000 in securing the freedom of the nations of Europe and of the peoples who formerly languished under the Turkish yoke. It was at this cost that the peoples of the British Empire assisted the Arab peoples, and the oppressed nationalities of Europe, to throw off the yoke of the oppressor and to make a start on the highroad to prosperity, independence, and influence in the world.

In addition, however, to its efforts made during the war the British Empire has maintained garrisons throughout the occupied territories for a year from the signature of the Armistice. It has sustained the onerous and expensive burden of maintaining law and order in countries just liberated from alien rule in the hopes that the Peace Conference would come to a rapid and peaceful solution of the difficult problems connected with the future of the Middle East. But it is unfair to the British taxpayer to ask him to bear any longer the burden of occupying provinces for which the Empire does not propose to accept permanent responsibility. As long ago as March last His Majesty's Government made a formal declaration to the Peace Conference and to yourself that in no circumstances would it undertake a mandate for Syria.<sup>6</sup> There is now, owing to the delay of the United States of America in deciding whether or not it is prepared to take a hand in safeguarding the well-being and progress of the peoples of the Middle East, no prospect of any final peace being made with Turkey until well on into next year. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided that it is impossible for them to maintain their troops any longer in Syria, and they have notified the Conference accordingly that they propose to withdraw them on the 1st November, 1919.

In an additional note dated 23rd September,<sup>7</sup> your Highness raises the question of the conditions upon which the coast towns were evacuated by the

<sup>6</sup> The reference was to the discussion in the Council of Four on March 20, 1919: cf. Introductory Note, also No. 206.

<sup>7</sup> No. 292.

Arab forces during the advance. His Majesty's Government is loth to think that your Highness considers that you complied with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief under whose command you were—orders which he had ample strength to enforce—as the result of a bargain. That your Highness understood that the British occupation would last until the final conclusion of peace I can readily understand, since that view was shared by His Majesty's Government at that time. His Majesty's Government have prolonged the British occupation far longer than they or anyone else ever contemplated as probable, but in view of the overwhelming burden which rests upon them it is certainly within their rights to insist that that occupation must be brought to an end.

In making the aforementioned notification to the Peace Conference of their intention to withdraw their troops forthwith, His Majesty's Government also submitted the proposal for the interim occupation of the ex-Turkish territories contained in the *aide-mémoire*. They do not see that any other proposal is practicable for the interim period. There is no authority of weight who believes that the people of Syria can stand alone at the present time. To attempt this solution, which you suggest, would simply be to prejudge the free and rapid progress and ultimately the independence of the Syrian and Arab peoples. Further, it is essential that until the peace is made with Turkey some first-class European Power should hold the territory to the south-east of Anatolia. In submitting their proposal as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* His Majesty's Government have scrupulously regarded the obligations they have incurred to both their Allies, to the Arabs and to the French, obligations which, as already explained, were made clear to King Hussein before ever he entered the war. They have, not without difficulty, secured to your Highness the establishment of an independent Arab State in that part of Syria, including Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, promised to the Arabs in the correspondence with King Hussein.

In so far as the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned, they would ask your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large measure to the supreme sacrifices made by the French people in the late war. It is true that the French contribution in Syria itself was not great, for France was deeply preoccupied in the war on other fronts. But on these greater and vital battlefields of Europe they lost 1,400,000 in dead, and incurred a debt not far short of that incurred by Great Britain in overthrowing the power which sustained the Turkish tyranny, and without whose support the Turkish military power could not have continued the war more than a few weeks.

His Majesty's Government therefore earnestly trust that you will agree to the proposals for the occupation of Syria made in the *aide-mémoire* for the interim period up to the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The considerations you raise as to the future of the Syrian and Arab people will properly be urged at the Peace Conference itself, of which you are yourself a distinguished member, and which will have complete power to deal with the whole Arab question, and which will have to take into account not only your own

views and those of the Arab people, but the various undertakings and declarations of the Great Powers.

His Majesty's Government have not the slightest doubt that the best course for the Arab people is to accept the temporary arrangement proposed, and to enter into friendly working arrangements for its execution with their Allies, Great Britain and France. As previously suggested, they strongly urge that your Highness should discuss these arrangements at once with the French Government. His Majesty's Government will be only too glad to do all in their power to promote a cordial and satisfactory understanding between their two Allies in regard to the occupation during the interim period. They would, however, be failing in their duty to their Arab Ally if they did not declare in the most earnest as well as in the most friendly manner that they can conceive of no policy more fatal to Arab aspirations and prosperity, both at the forthcoming Peace Conference and afterwards, than the method of military resistance hinted at in your Highness's letter. As the sincere friend and well-wisher of the Arab people, Great Britain invites them to accept the arrangement proposed. I further trust that this letter will help to render profitable the further conversations with your Highness to which I look forward with pleasure and in which I trust a means will be found to effect a complete reconciliation of the relations between this country and its French and Arab Allies.

I beg your Highness to believe that the British Government are actuated by the same sympathy with and admiration for the Arab nation which prompted them to support his Highness Sherif Hussein in his revolt against the Turks, and which characterised the entire course of their relations with your Highness in the glorious and triumphant struggle in which, with the co-operation of your Highness, they have so long been engaged.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

### No. 310

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 13)*

No. 977 [140470/2117/44]

PARIS, October 9, 1919

My Lord:—

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship with reference to my telegram No. 1071<sup>1</sup> of yesterday, that the appointment of General Gouraud, as High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and Commander in Chief of the Army of the Levant, appears in the *Journal Officiel* this morning. The French Government could probably not have made, from the point of view of French interests, a more felicitous choice. The prestige of General Gouraud, not only in the French Army, but abroad, stands very high. He has been described as the Bayard of the French Army, and his popularity with his own soldiers was unbounded. Before the great war he had long and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

distinguished service to his credit in Mauritania and Morocco, which has given him an intimate knowledge of the Moslem character. Commander in Chief during the recent war at the Dardanelles, where he was severely wounded and lost an arm, he afterwards commanded the 4th Army, and is famous for the sanguinary defeat he inflicted on the Germans east of Rheims on July 18 on the occasion of the last German offensive at the most critical phase of the war.

In French Roman Catholic circles, where so keen an interest is displayed about Syrian matters, the appointment will be extremely well received, for General Gouraud is known for his devotion to the Church.

I have &c.  
DERBY.

### No. 311

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*

*No. 469 Telegraphic [140173/2117/44]*

*CAIRO, October 10, 1919*

Following for King from Lebanese civil defence committee through Emir Zeid begins:—

Druses of Lebanon who enjoy traditional British patronage and follow pro-British policy like their brethren in Hauran, Palestine and other parts of Syria are now under French and Maronite pressure in most critical position. Maronites entertaining hope of dislodging Druses from prominent position are trying to carry out imaginary scheme thinking French will help them. Maronites are getting arms but Druses are strictly watched, unable to do so with result that public security is very unsatisfactory and things assuming revolutionary aspects.

While matters so unfavourable pro-French press published report that British troops will evacuate Syria in October. Withdrawal of British Army now placing Druses, Moslems, Protestants, Greek orthodox in real danger. Pray stop withdrawal and give us protection.

Country full of disturbances, murderous attacks of very frequent occurrence. It has become dangerous for individuals to travel in districts and almost impossible for local French authorities to pacify country owing to political disputes. Non-Maronites absolutely refused French intervention. Ends.

(Signed) (1) Selim-el-Yaoussef  
(2) Amin Khadre  
(3) Mahoud Eskieddini  
(4) A. Musfy.

Comment follows.

No. 312

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Alexandria) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)*  
No. 470 Telegraphic [140174/2117/44A]

ALEXANDRIA, October 10, 1919

With reference to immediately preceding telegram No. 469.<sup>1</sup> There is little doubt that the French policy has favoured Maronites at the expense of Druzes in Lebanon and that armed conflicts are inevitable on the withdrawal of British troops.

This will react on Druzes but there is no evidence of such alarming situation as outlined in above quoted telegram.

The immediate effect of Maronite-Druzes conflict in Lebanon will be adoption by Druzes of Gebel Druzes of Feisal's anti-French policy.

<sup>1</sup> No. 311.

No. 313

*Mr. Lloyd George to the Emir Feisal<sup>1</sup>*

[139326/2117/44A]

10, DOWNING STREET, October 10, 1919

Your Highness,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 9th October,<sup>2</sup> in which you suggest that the proposals for the occupation of Syria after the British withdrawal should be cancelled or at least suspended, and that the whole question should be placed before the Peace Conference, or before a Sub-Conference appointed by it, for final settlement without delay.

I do not think it is necessary for me to discuss again the reasons which have prompted His Majesty's Government in putting forward the proposals contained in the *aide-mémoire*, as these have been fully set forth in the letter already communicated to you by the Foreign Secretary.<sup>3</sup> For the reasons therein set forth it does not seem to me that the proposal you now make is practicable. His Majesty's Government have made up their mind that it is impossible for them to continue the occupation of Syria by British troops. Six months ago they announced to the Peace Conference and to yourself that under no circumstances would they accept a mandate for Syria. Their occupation of the country, which involves them in a heavy burden of expense, has been prolonged far beyond their own expectation, in the hopes that the Peace Conference would deal with the question without delay. There is now no prospect of the Peace Conference being able to undertake the discussion of the Turkish problem for some months, and the regrettable illness of President Wilson, without whose participation no final decisions can be arrived at, is likely to delay rather than to hasten the settlement of the problem. It is therefore impossible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw the proposals which they have made for dealing with the Syrian problem in the interim period until the Peace Conference can settle it.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note was communicated to the Foreign Office on October 10, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> No. 308.

<sup>3</sup> No. 309.

They would, however, be very glad to arrange an immediate meeting between yourself, a French, an American, and a British representative to adjust, in a most amicable and satisfactory manner to all concerned, the problems involved in the impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria on the 1st November.

As already announced, I am looking forward to hearing your Highness's remarks in person at a further interview on this question on Monday next,<sup>4</sup> at 4 o'clock, at 10, Downing Street.

I have, &c.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

♦ October 13, 1919.

No. 314

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 13)*

No. 1931 [140423/2117/44A]

PARIS, October 10, 1919

Mr. Balfour [Sir E. Crowe]<sup>1</sup> presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of the undermentioned paper.

<i>Name and Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
Communicated by Monsieur Cle-	Military Occupation of Syria and
menceau, October 10.	Mesopotamia.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 314

*Reply to English Memorandum of September 13, 1919, respecting Syria<sup>2</sup>*

Entre les Français et les Anglais en Asie Mineure la seule base d'entente est l'accord de 1916, application des déclarations de Sir Édouard Grey de 1912.<sup>3</sup> Les conversations de décembre 1918 entre M. Lloyd George et M. Clemenceau sont restées sans effet, puisqu'il ne pourrait être fait état de concessions éventuelles sur Mossoul et la Palestine que si des contre-parties étaient accordées, au lieu des nouvelles concessions qui sont demandées.

La situation de la France en Syrie et ses rapports avec les Arabes dans sa zone ne peuvent qu'être identiques à la situation de l'Angleterre en Mésopotamie et à ses rapports avec les Arabes dans sa zone. Ce parallélisme parfait résulte de l'accord au bas duquel les deux pays ont mis leur signature. Le fait que l'Angleterre a occupé au cours de la guerre, au nom des Alliés, la zone anglaise et la zone française constitue une situation de fait qui ne peut pas plus modifier le droit en Asie que cela ne serait possible en Europe.

2. Entre les Alliés, les questions de Syrie et de Mésopotamie seront réglées définitivement en même temps que le sort des territoires de l'Empire ott-

<sup>1</sup> The printed formula of this standard covering despatch had inadvertently not been altered to take account of Mr. Balfour's departure from Paris.

<sup>2</sup> This undated note was evidently of October 9, 1919 (see enclosure in No. 326).

<sup>3</sup> See G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the origins of the War 1898-1914* (London 1926 f.), vol. ix, part ii, p. 250.

man, de Constantinople, de l'Asie Mineure et de l'Arménie. Les droits traditionnels et les intérêts de l'Angleterre et de la France dans leurs zones respectives ne sauraient recevoir aucune atteinte.

3. La décision du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre 1919<sup>4</sup> n'a sanctionné que l'acceptation par le Président du Conseil français des propositions du Premier Ministre anglais quant à la relève des troupes britanniques par des troupes françaises à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> novembre en Cilicie et dans la Syrie côtière.

Il a été expressément spécifié que cette décision ne comportait aucun engagement français sur aucun point de l'aide-mémoire anglais: cela sans préjuger de la solution définitive des mandats ou des frontières des zones anglaise ou française, qui seront examinés comme parties du problème général oriental.

4. La position de la France et de l'Angleterre par rapport aux régions arabes est définie essentiellement:

(1) Par l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de l'accord de 1916, qui déclare que la France et l'Angleterre sont disposées 'à reconnaître et à protéger un État arabe indépendant ou une Confédération d'États arabes dans les zones A et B';

(2) Par la nécessité reconnue par la Conférence de confier à une Puissance européenne 'un mandat sur les Arabes', jugés encore incapables de se gouverner eux-mêmes aussi bien en Syrie qu'en Mésopotamie.

Les accords spéciaux entre Anglais et Arabes ne lient pas la France, à laquelle les textes des accords de Sir Henry MacMahon [*sic*] avec le Roi Husséin en juillet et octobre 1915 n'ont été communiqués qu'en février 1919, ainsi qu'il résulte des extraits des procès-verbaux eux-mêmes (d'ailleurs vagues, incomplets et non signés par notre représentant) communiqués par M. Lloyd George.<sup>5</sup> Ces accords ne sauraient, d'ailleurs, modifier les termes explicites de l'accord dernier qui est celui de 1916.

5. Les dispositions du Gouvernement français, décidé à appliquer d'une manière libérale les engagements d'assistance à l'égard de l'État arabe inclus dans son mandat, lui permettraient de s'entendre directement avec l'Émir Feysal, si celui-ci ne continuait pas à bénéficier de la protection anglaise, par suite d'une conception qui fausse nos accords. Il appartient à la France de s'entendre elle-même avec les Arabes de sa zone, comme à l'Angleterre dans la sienne, sur les données générales convenues et sans que l'une des Puissances intervienne dans le mandat de l'autre.

6. La relève des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises ne peut s'opérer sans risques et sans désordre que si elle a lieu simultanément.

L'interdiction de la zone intérieure syrienne et des villes d'Alep et Damas aux troupes françaises serait aussi contraire aux accords de 1916 que si l'on exigeait que les troupes arabes occupent les villes de la zone B à l'exclusion des Anglais. Comment la France pourrait-elle substituer sa responsabilité à celle du commandement anglais et avoir même une possibilité d'exercer son mandat, si elle n'avait pas la faculté d'intervenir en cas de troubles? Et comment pourrions-nous traiter avec Feysal si ce sont les Anglais qui en font leur client et se posent vis-à-vis de lui en garants de l'engagement de nous

<sup>4</sup> See No. 278.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 282 note 2.

interdire la zone intérieure? C'est à nous qu'il appartient de nous entendre avec Feysal en acceptant de limiter notre occupation s'il s'engage et réussit à maintenir l'ordre dans les villes de Damas, Homs, Hama et Alep. La protection assurée par l'Angleterre à l'indépendance de Feysal dans la zone française est une intrusion inconciliable avec nos accords dans notre mandat syrien.

7. Les frontières entre la Palestine et la Syrie ont été fixées par l'accord de 1916 après une étude minutieuse tenant compte des intérêts des deux régions. Les faire remonter au-dessus de la latitude de Tyr et presque jusqu'à la banlieue de Damas priverait la Syrie d'un certain nombre de ses régions les plus fertiles et de ses populations les plus courageuses, dans des conditions que n'accepteraient ni les chrétiens ni les Arabes.

Cependant, quelques rectifications pourraient être consenties après un examen sur place par une Commission mixte de Délimitation tenant compte des raisons géographiques et ethniques.

Les autres limites entre le mandat anglais et le mandat français sont aisées à fixer, car elles sont imposées par la nature. Dans le cas où la concession sur Mossoul serait consentie, la France conserverait au sud et au nord les limites de 1916, à l'est le bassin du Kabour et de ses affluents.

8. Le tracé du chemin de fer de Caïffa à la zone B n'oblige nullement à modifier les termes de l'article 7 de l'accord de 1916. Celui-ci répond à la préoccupation anglaise et a prévu que, dans le cas de difficultés techniques de construction, la ligne pourrait traverser un périmètre déterminé de la zone A française.

Si l'on avait la faculté de remonter jusqu'à la latitude de Deir-es-Zor, on pourrait à volonté ôter toute valeur au chemin de fer d'Alexandrette et l'on perdrat de vue le but unique de l'entente faite sur ce point, qui était de relier par une ligne, sous la souveraineté anglaise, Caïffa à Bagdad — le passage sur un point de la zone française n'étant prévu que pour éviter une impossibilité technique. Bien entendu, la partie de la zone du mandat français traversée éventuellement ne passerait pas sous le contrôle anglais, toutes facilités de constructions, exploitations et améliorations restant données au Gouvernement anglais, et le Gouvernement français étant décidé à remplir dans un esprit large les engagements pris en 1916.

9. La question des pétroles et des pipe-lines pour leur transport est liée à la très importante concession de Mossoul; le Gouvernement français a indiqué et confirme que la contre-partie essentielle réclamée par l'industrie et le Parlement français est la stricte égalité dans l'exploitation des pétroles de Mésopotamie et du Kurdistan. Ce point a une importance capitale en raison de la privation absolue et des besoins de la France en pétroles.

Sous cette réserve, l'accord sur l'abandon éventuel de Mossoul et toutes facilités pour la construction de pipe-lines traversant le mandat français pourraient être acquis.

No. 315

*Notes by Colonel Cornwallis<sup>1</sup>*

[140355/2117/44A]

LONDON, October 11, 1919

Colonel de Meru<sup>2</sup> and Colonel Fagalde called on the Emir Feisal this evening and spent about an hour with him.

Colonel de Meru opened the conversation by saying that his visit was entirely unofficial, and that he had come to pay his personal respects, and, if his Highness wished, to have a friendly discussion on the present situation. His Government had the greatest respect and liking for his Highness, and were only too anxious to come to a friendly understanding with himself and his people. He thought that this might be brought about if his Highness visited Paris where he would be sure of a cordial welcome.

The Emir said that he was equally anxious to arrive at an amicable settlement. He had hoped much from the conversations which had taken place between himself and M. Clemenceau during his last visit to Paris, but unfortunately the pledges which he had received had not been fulfilled, and a series of incidents, which he recounted at some length, in Syria itself, had tended to widen the breach between the two peoples. The Paris press, too, had shown itself singularly hostile, and he felt that the estrangement was not due to any action on the part of the Arabs, but rather to the attitude taken up by the French themselves. He did not, however, wish to lay particular stress on this, since doubtless there existed on both sides misunderstandings which were capable of explanation.

He then went on to refer to something which he considered as much more important, namely, the recent arrangement arrived at in Paris. He recapitulated most of the arguments which he had already brought before His Majesty's Government, and complained bitterly of an arrangement which had been made without his being consulted, and which in effect partitioned the country contrary to the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants.

Colonel de Meru emphasised the military and provisional nature of the arrangement, but, when pressed, agreed that the mention of the Sykes-Picot boundary had been unfortunate and likely to lead to a misconception. He asked the Emir whether he intended to fall in with the arrangement, and whether the appointment of General Gouraud in place of M. Picot, who was generally recognised to be unsuitable, would be acceptable.

The Emir replied that he had a personal respect for General Gouraud, who had presented him with the Légion d'honneur, but that the question as a whole was one which affected him not in his private capacity but as the representative of his people. He felt that the arrangement would be fatal to Arab interests, and, as he had already pointed out to the British Govern-

<sup>1</sup> These notes were communicated to the Foreign Office on October 13, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> This French staff officer was visiting London in order to consult with the War Office concerning the relief of British forces in Syria by French forces.

ment, he could not accept it nor could he proceed to the discussion of the final solution until it was cancelled or suspended.

Unless this was done, he must return to Syria at once, and the future alone would show the effect of so high-handed a decision.

As matters had now reached somewhat of an impasse, I intervened unofficially and pointed out that if it could be arranged for the interested parties to meet without delay and discuss the whole question with a view to arriving at a settlement which could be submitted to the Peace Conference for ratification, the question of the relief of troops would lose its political importance and assume a purely military character. As such, it ought to be accepted by the people of Syria, who would keep quiet when they knew that a conference would immediately take place in Europe.

The Emir admitted that there was some truth in this, but maintained his contention that he was not being treated as an Ally, and insisted that the discussion of the Paris arrangement must precede that of the final settlement.

To this Colonel de Meru saw no insuperable objection, and said that he would lay the whole matter before his Government. He earnestly hoped that a solution could be found, and assured the Emir that the French Government was actuated by motives of sympathy and friendship.

The Emir thanked him, and said that he too was only too anxious to approach this question in a spirit of friendliness.

The interview was, I think, a success. It was, of course, entirely unofficial, but the French officers came away considerably impressed with the Emir, and will doubtless pass their impressions on to their Government. Colonel de Meru remarked that Feisal had a considerable amount of right on his side, and that the only way of avoiding a very difficult situation was to meet him half-way. His opinion was that the Emir should be consulted about military measures which affected his own command.

If this can be done, a peaceable solution may be possible.

I would suggest a meeting, preferably in London, between British and French military representatives and Feisal to discuss the question of the withdrawal and relief of troops.

This would not alter the existing policy as regards the withdrawal, but it would mollify Feisal and make him feel that he was being treated with consideration. If a renewed assurance could at the same time be given by both Governments that the change was dictated by military considerations, and a promise made that the future of the country would be discussed without delay in confidence as already proposed, I hope that Feisal would not only agree to the arrangement but would help to ensure that it was carried out without opposition.

The meeting of military experts would in a sense be chiefly useful as a sop to Feisal's *amour-propre*, but it would also facilitate the carrying out of the withdrawal in detail and would materially increase the possibility of discussing the final settlement in a spirit of friendliness.

The two French officers certainly showed themselves fully alive to the dangers of the situation and to the necessity of pacifying Feisal and of acting

in a manner which will avert the immediate crisis. But for their tact and good sense, to-night's meeting might have been a failure.

K. CORNWALLIS<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> At the conclusion of the Emir Feisal's visit to London the following official letter, dated from the Foreign Office, October 23, 1919, was sent to Colonel Cornwallis:

'I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to convey to you an expression of His Lordship's appreciation of the valuable services which you have rendered to His Majesty's Government during the stay of His Highness Emir Feisal in London.

'Lord Curzon fully realises that it is largely due to your untiring efforts that not only His Highness but also the more extreme members of his Staff have come to realise that an attitude of unreasonable hostility to the French would be detrimental both to British and Arab interests.'

### No. 316

*Mr. Vaughan<sup>1</sup> (Santiago) to Earl Curzon (Received October 13)*

*No. 242 Telegraphic [140196/2117/44]*

SANTIAGO, October 11, 1919

Jewish community have invited me to celebration in honour of Great Britain on November 2 anniversary of Mr. Balfour's declaration respecting Palestine.

I am trying to discourage proposal but non-acceptance will cause offence as French Minister attended banquet of Lebanon Syrians this week. Jews say my refusal will be interpreted as casting doubt on Mr. Balfour's declaration.

Jews maintain that mandate for Palestine has been entrusted to Great Britain and that similar celebrations are contemplated in many other countries.

I should be glad of any information as to future status of Palestine which can be telegraphed to me for my guidance.<sup>2</sup>

Matter is urgent.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Santiago de Chile.

<sup>2</sup> In reply Mr. Vaughan was instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 163 of October 16, 1919, to Santiago: 'You should not attend the dinner as it appears to presuppose the acceptance by Great Britain of a mandate which has not yet been granted or even discussed by the Peace Conference. Mr. Balfour's declaration is in course of being carried into effect but it would be undesirable for a representative of the Power that made it to take part in rejoicing over its own conduct.'

### No. 317

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

*No. 1468 Telegraphic [141669/2117/44]*

RAMLEH, October 12, 1919

Following is paraphrase of telegram No. 9 sent by King Hussein to Feisal to-day. Begins:

It is absolutely necessary to settle question in one of two ways<sup>1</sup> and there is no third. This is clear in my letter to High Commissioner dated August 28 1918,<sup>2</sup> receipt of which you acknowledged before your departure.

Thank them very much (ironical). They have my letters and their own are registered in their books. Expedite matter. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> It was presumed in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office that the 'two ways' were, first, that all King Hussein's demands should be met, or alternatively that he would abdicate. <sup>2</sup> The reference was to the letter of August 1918 referred to in No. 293, q.v.

No. 318

*Notes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday,  
October 13, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

[142627/2117/44A]

*Present:*

The Prime Minister.	His Highness The Emir Feisal.
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.	*Brigadier-General Haddad Pasha, Director-General of Public Security, O.E.I.[T.]A. East.
The Rt. Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	Sheikh Fuad el Khatib, Political Ad- viser to H.M. King Hussein and to H.H. The Emir Feisal.
Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.	
Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, Egypt.	* Acted as Interpreter.
Colonel Cornwallis, Assistant Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expedi- tionary Force.	
Lieut.-Colonel Stirling, Deputy Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expedi- tionary Force.	
Lieut.-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary, War Cabinet.	
Lieut.-Colonel L. Storr, C.B., Assistant Secretary, War Cabinet.	

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, since their last meeting, certain documents had been exchanged by both parties, and he asked whether the Emir Feisal wished to make any statement.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that he had received two communications since the previous Conference, one from the Prime Minister (G.T.-8312)<sup>1</sup> and one from the Foreign Office (G.T.-8310).<sup>2</sup> He had prepared a reply (*Appendix A*) to the Prime Minister's letter, which he had brought with him to the meeting to hand over in person. He hoped to have his reply to the Foreign Office communication ready in the course of the next few days. He wished to express his gratitude to the Prime Minister for all the trouble he had taken, and especially for the suggestion contained in the penultimate paragraph of his letter to him, which stated that the British Government would be very glad to arrange an immediate meeting between the Emir, a French, an American and a British representative, to adjust, in the most amicable manner to all concerned, the problems involved in the impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria on November 1st.

<sup>1</sup> No. 313.

<sup>2</sup> No. 309.

*(The Emir Feisal then handed his reply to the Prime Minister.)*

*(The Prime Minister read out the reply to the Meeting.)*

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped the Emir Feisal would excuse them if he and his ministers withdrew to a separate room for a short time, in order to give the Emir's reply their careful consideration.

*(The Prime Minister, Lord Curzon, Lord Allenby, Sir Henry Wilson, Sir Maurice Hankey and Colonel Storr then withdrew for a period of twenty minutes, when the discussion was resumed.)*

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the difficulty about the suggested Conference was that, owing to the unfortunate illness of the President of the United States, which precluded the President from transacting any public business, the United States could not be properly represented, as there was no-one with authority to issue the necessary instructions. He had been conferring with his colleagues during their absence from the meeting, and they had decided that the best thing to do would be to invite General Gouraud, the new French Commander in Syria, to come over to England to confer with the Emir, Lord Allenby and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, either tomorrow or the following day.<sup>3</sup> The most suitable military representative of the United States would be General Bliss, who, however, it was to be regretted, would not be in an authoritative position if he attended the Conference, as he would be without instructions from Washington.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that he accepted Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but he hoped that the Conference would not confine its discussions to military questions only. He would particularly like an American representative to be present to hear the discussions, which might bear upon administrative as well as military questions. Moreover, the Prime Minister had particularly mentioned an American representative in his letter to him.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that, as he had said, owing to the President's illness and the difficulty, in the circumstances, of securing a properly accredited American representative, it would be impossible to settle the whole question of the future of Syria now. The Emir Feisal would, of course, understand that this did not mean that His Majesty's Government had any objection to America being represented. On the contrary, they would welcome an American representative, and, if the Emir approved, they were prepared to ask Mr. Polk to send either General Bliss or some other responsible American officer to attend the Conference.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that he would be most grateful if this could be arranged.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, in that case, a telegram would be sent at once to Paris, asking Mr. Polk if he would very kindly take the necessary action. The result of this communication would be at once communicated

<sup>3</sup> In Paris telegram No. 1090 of October 12 (received that day) Lord Derby had reported that the French authorities were 'very anxious that Gouraud should have talk with Allenby before latter returns to Egypt' and had enquired whether Field-Marshal Allenby 'could arrange to stay in Paris a couple of days on the way through'.

to the Emir. In the meantime, he wished to ask His Highness whether Arab troops were available to relieve the British directly the latter withdrew.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that he hoped that the Conference might assemble with the least possible delay. In regard to the other point raised by Mr. Lloyd George, he said that he had a certain number of troops ready, and that, as the evacuation would start from the North and would only proceed slowly in a southerly direction, he proposed to recruit fresh troops to relieve British garrisons in the South.

LORD ALLENBY, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, stated that orders had been sent to British Headquarters to be ready to start evacuating from the North on November 1. It was improbable that the withdrawal from Aleppo, for instance, could be completed before the end of that month. His intention was to withdraw first from Aleppo and East of the Euphrates, and enquired whether the Emir had sufficient troops there to relieve the British.

THE EMIR FEISAL replied that, in all probability, in six weeks' time he would have sufficient detachments there to take over from the British garrisons. He would, however, require equipment for the new fresh troops that he proposed to recruit. As he had said, his wish was to raise sufficient new troops to garrison in particular the four large towns.

LORD ALLENBY, in reply to the Prime Minister, thought that between 5,000 and 6,000 Arab troops would be sufficient for the purpose, and their duties would really be those of Military Police.

THE EMIR FEISAL thought that this would not be sufficient, and expressed the view that not less than 15,000 would be necessary.

LORD ALLENBY pointed out that he had not more than 7,000 to 8,000 men performing these duties, and he thought that the Emir should be able to do with the same number.

THE EMIR FEISAL said that he wished to put certain conditions, regarding the British evacuation, before the mixed Conference. These conditions he was prepared to discuss now, or they might be left for the consideration of the Conference.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read the draft of a telegram which it was proposed should be sent to M. Clemenceau, suggesting the holding of a Conference (*Appendix B*).<sup>4</sup>

THE EMIR FEISAL expressed his assent to the terms of the telegram, and again said that he had certain views and conditions, regarding the release [? relief], which he was anxious to submit to the Conference as soon as possible. These conditions were framed with a view to maintaining public order until the future of his country was decided by the League of Nations.

(*The Prime Minister then read an additional sentence which he and his colleagues thought it advisable should be added to the proposed telegram to M. Clemenceau.*)  
(*The Emir Feisal having again expressed his assent, the Conference ended at 5 p.m.*)

2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S.W. 1, October 13, 1919.

\* Cf. note 7 below.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 318  
*Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain*

LONDON, October 11, 1919

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the tenth of October.<sup>1</sup> I have also received a communication from the Foreign Office,<sup>2</sup> to which I shall reply in detail.

Allow me to submit a formal protest in the name of the Arab nation against any change which may be desired to introduce into the present form of government in Syria. As I have already stated in my previous correspondence and interviews, I consider that no changes should be allowed before the final decision of the Peace Conference as to the future form of government.

My protest is based on three main points:—

1. I withdrew my agents and troops *without bargain* from the coast, and at the same time the Commander-in-Chief made a declaration through me to the *Syrian people* that he intends occupying their provinces by his troops and forming a provisional administration depending directly on him acting on behalf of the Allies, which administration shall *continue* to exist until a final decision is given by the Peace Conference as to the future government of this country. This pledge must not be thrown aside for reasons which are outside our power and knowledge, and for which we are not responsible in any way. If the Peace Conference has delayed its final decision it is not the fault of the Arabs, and it is not an offence for which they deserve the punishment of repudiating a pledge most solemnly made. If it is absolutely necessary that the British troops should be withdrawn, the Syrians naturally expect that the French troops will be withdrawn at the same time and the coast handed over to the Arabs as it was before the British occupation, thus awaiting the final decision of the Peace Conference. This will also conform to the promise made by Great Britain to the Syrian Committee in Cairo on 11-6-17.<sup>5</sup>

2. I understand that His Majesty's Government, in withdrawing their troops, have regarded the obligations they have incurred to both their Allies, the French and the Arabs.

In addition to the engagement referred to in the preceding paragraph, I beg to again call attention to the telegram addressed by the High Commissioner in Egypt to the King at Mecca, which runs as follows:—

'Bolcheviks found in Petrograd Foreign Office record of all conversations and provisional understanding (not formal treaty) between Britain, France, and Russia, made early in war to prevent difficulties between Powers in prosecuting war with Turkey. Jamal, either from ignorance or malice, has distorted its original purpose, has omitted its *stipulations regarding consent of native populations* and safeguarding their interest, and has ignored fact that subsequent outbreak and success of Arab revolt and withdrawal of Russia had for long time past *created wholly different situation*.'

<sup>5</sup> In error for June 11, 1918. The reference was to the so-called Declaration to the Seven; cf. Introductory Note to this chapter.

This telegram was sent to the King in reply to his protest against the secret treaty between Great Britain and France which Jamal Pasha divulged in Damascus for propaganda purposes. It was quoted in my letter to you dated 21st September, 1919,<sup>6</sup> and has remained unanswered.

Has the different situation affecting your agreement with France, and referred to in the above telegram, been since modified in any way? Has the opinion of the people been taken as to the new proposed occupation?

The stipulation regarding the consent of the people was confirmed in November 1918 by the formal declaration made conjointly by Great Britain and France, whether the occupation is temporary or otherwise.

3. The over-excited feeling now prevailing in the Arab provinces, as well as all Moslem provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, and caused by unwise foreign interference, is no longer a secret. Any person having the slightest knowledge of what has been going on in the Syrian provinces is undoubtedly convinced that there will be trouble, and in different quarters, if the *status quo* of the present administration is changed.

I therefore beg you, in the name of humanity and public peace, in the name of the Arab nation, in the multitudinous interests of Great Britain and France in the Eastern world, as I have already asked previously, that no new doors should be allowed to be opened for further troubles and to leave the present situation as it is.

I beg also that hasty measures be taken to assemble a commission of the interested Allied Powers and brethren-in-arms to consider the interests of each nation, according to the requirements of justice, for the aim of which we have fought together.

If, however, the British Government remains unchanged in her decision to withdraw her troops after due consideration of this exposé of my case, I shall be glad to accept your kind offer for me to meet representatives from Great Britain, America, and France to consider the problem involved in the impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria and to give a final decision regarding the same, so that these problems may be solved in a way which will keep public peace and safeguard the interests of all.

Anticipating that this conference may be assembled with the least possible delay, I have, &c.

[FEISAL.]

APPENDIX B TO NO. 318  
Telegram to Lord Derby (Paris)<sup>7</sup>

October 13, 1919, 6.10 p.m.

In connection with message from the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau,<sup>8</sup> which is being transmitted through you, please ask approval of French

<sup>6</sup> No. 286.

<sup>7</sup> It seems possible that this unnumbered subsidiary telegram, headed 'Appendix "B"' in filed original, may have been inserted in error for the message to M. Clemenceau to which it refers, cited in the above minutes as Appendix B, and here printed as No. 319.

<sup>8</sup> See No. 319.

Government to proposal that an American Officer be invited to attend, and if they agree consult Mr. Polk as to whether he will be willing to depute General Bliss or, if he is not available, another American Officer for the purpose.

No. 319

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1160 Telegraphic [140172/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 13, 1919

Following from Prime Minister for M. Clemenceau:—

(Secret.)

'Now that the strike is over, I have been able to resume negotiations with the Emir Feisal. We are most anxious that the arrangements for the occupation of Syria after the withdrawal of British troops should work smoothly. This is not likely unless the military representatives concerned have previously agreed upon them. Both Emir Feisal and Field-Marshal Lord Allenby are in London, but both are leaving for the Near East in two or three days. I would therefore strongly urge you to send General Gouraud to London to-morrow to discuss with them the military arrangements for the occupation of Syria from 1st November on the lines laid down in the *aide-mémoire* I gave you when I was last in Paris.

'The Emir Feisal is very anxious that an American representative should be present, and we are instructing the British Ambassador, if the French Government has no objection, to communicate with Mr. Polk on this subject.'

No. 320

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Curzon Papers/Iraq]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 13, 1919

Following from the Prime Minister:—

When you present to M. Clemenceau my telegram No. 1160<sup>1</sup> please communicate to him the following private and personal message:

(Begins.) The negotiations with Feisal have been very difficult. It will be much easier to induce him to accept French occupation of Western Syria if Gouraud were to come over and meet him and Allenby at once. I therefore strongly urge you in the interests of peace in Syria to send Gouraud to-morrow as I suggest in my today's telegram. Feisal was further extremely anxious to have an American representative present at the discussion. I promised, if you consented, to ask Polk if Bliss could attend, as this also would in my opinion help matters.

If you agree, perhaps you would speak to Polk on the subject.

<sup>1</sup> No. 319.

No. 321

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)*  
No. 1091 Telegraphic [141298/2117/44A]

Your telegram No. 1160.<sup>1</sup>

PARIS, October 13, 1919

Following for Prime Minister.

I was unable to communicate your telegram to M. Clemenceau to-night. He had left the office and was in bed: orders had been given that he was not to be disturbed. Telegram will be given to him first thing in the morning and I am promised an early reply but I fear that it will not be in time for Gouraud to start to-morrow even if answer is favourable.

I will await answer before seeing Mr. Polk.

<sup>1</sup> No. 319.

No. 322

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)*  
No. 1439 Telegraphic [141197/2117/44A]

PARIS, October 13, 1919

(? Marshal Foch) spoke to me to-day very earnestly about his anxieties as regards important questions which he considered ought to receive immediate attention. One was German aggression in Baltic States,<sup>1</sup> and the other Syria. In both cases problems were involved which might entail heavy military responsibilities rest(? ing) upon him. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Question of Syria was treated by Marshal in a more general way. He urged upon me in friendliest manner importance of not allowing the controversy between the two Governments to continue. He thought that a direct negotiation between us ought to be opened (? without) further delay either in London or here. I assured him that this suggestion was . . . .<sup>3</sup> in accordance with what I knew to be Your Lordship's view, that it ought to be (? easy) to set up such a negotiation on foot [*sic*] and I expressed a general preference for London, without going into reasons or arguments. Our conversation (? was) quite informal.

<sup>1</sup> See Volume III, Chap. I.

<sup>2</sup> The ensuing observations concerning German activities in the Baltic Provinces, not here printed, are printed in Volume III, No. 135.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 323

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 16)*  
No. 993 [141929/2117/44A]

My Lord,

PARIS, October 13, 1919

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith the text, extracted from the *Journal des Débats* of to-day's date, of an interview<sup>1</sup> given to

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this interview General Gouraud was reported as saying that his

the representative of the Havas Agency by General Gouraud in regard to the political and military policy which he proposes to follow in Syria.

The *Journal Officiel* to-day publishes the official announcement of the appointment of Monsieur Robert de Caix, as reported in my telegram No. 1087<sup>2</sup> of October 11 to be Secretary General to the mission of the French High Commissioner in Syria. In commenting on this nomination, the *Temps* last night remarked that Monsieur de Caix had been, since the beginning of the Peace Conference, acting as technical adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on questions relating to the Levant and that in that capacity he had been entrusted with the negotiations with the Emir Feisal last spring before the departure of the latter for Syria.

This admission of his official connection with that Ministry is not without interest in connection with the Press campaign, which Monsieur de Caix waged during that period against the activities of the British agents in those regions.

I have &c.

#### DERBY

mission to Syria 'est avant tout d'ordre militaire. Elle consiste pour moi à relever d'abord les troupes britanniques dans la région prévue par les accords franco-anglais relatifs au statut de la Syrie. Répondant à une question que nous lui posons, le général Gouraud précise que l'occupation française se bornera pour le moment à la région dont nous venons de parler. La juridiction du haut commissaire, commandant l'armée du Levant, ne s'étendra pas aux villes de l'intérieur Alep, Damas et Mossoul. . . . Venant à parler du caractère politique de sa mission, le général Gouraud nous dit: J'estime que notre protectorat en Syrie doit être souple et doux. Il devra tenir compte des modalités spéciales de la situation. J'entends appliquer là-bas une politique de justice, celle-là même par laquelle je me suis fait des amis dans le monde musulman. Vous me demandez par quel miracle un catholique peut se faire aimer des Mahométans? Il n'y a pas de miracle là-dedans; là-bas chacun, à la condition d'être brave et juste, réussira. Pas plus que je ne souffrirais qu'on entre dans une église catholique le chapeau sur la tête, pas plus — et c'est de quoi les Musulmans me sont reconnaissants — je ne tolérerai qu'on moleste ou même qu'on raille les rites étrangers aux nôtres. Je l'ai dit hier, ici-même, aux évêques maronites qui venaient me faire visite: je ne veux être en Syrie l'homme d'aucun parti ni d'aucune confession. Je veux représenter seulement la France juste. . . . Je désire qu'on sache, nous dit-il, que j'entends continuer en Syrie à entretenir avec les Anglais, et particulièrement avec leurs chefs militaires, les relations de cordiale estime que nous eûmes toujours.'

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

#### No. 324

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

*No. 1945 [141423/2117/44A]*

PARIS, October 13, 1919

Mr. Balfour [Sir E. Crowe]<sup>1</sup> presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copy of the undermentioned paper.

##### Name and Date.

##### Subject.

Delegation Minute. (Mr. Forbes Anglo-French relations regarding Adam) October 10. Mosul and Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> The printed formula of this standard covering despatch had inadvertently not been altered to take account of Mr. Balfour's departure from Paris.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 324  
*Minute by Mr. Forbes Adam*

It may be worth recording the following points which M. Philippe Millet of the *Temps* has made on more than one occasion in conversation with me. I do not know whether they are merely his own personal views but he hints that they are held by other responsible Frenchmen, and he in any case claims always to be in close touch with M. Tardieu.

1. M. Clemenceau never agreed with the Prime Minister last December to hand over the Mosul area unconditionally but asked that in return French troops should be allowed to occupy Damascus. M. Millet says that Mr. Lloyd George agreed at the time but found afterwards that our engagements to King Hussein precluded it. The French therefore regard the bargain as off.

2. If we are to take a mandate for Palestine and also to extend our Mesopotamian mandate to the Mosul area, the French will require a *quid pro quo* for such a modification of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in our favour (Palestine was to be an international state under that agreement).

3. Tangier is, he says, the *quid pro quo* they really want (on one occasion he hinted that the French might consider the 'offer' of a mandate for Constantinople and the Straits), and he believes that the French could come to an agreement with Spain about a cession to them of Tangier<sup>2</sup> if only we, without actually supporting the French, would stand aside and tell the Spaniards we would accept any arrangement they might reach with the French. He claims that the Spaniards are in a bad way in the Spanish zone from the point of view of both men and money and that the French Foreign Office believe that a time will soon come when they will 'offer' to cede the zone to France for a sum down. Then the French will be in a stronger position to secure Tangier, i.e. our acquiescence in a Franco-Spanish agreement about Tangier would now be a useful bargaining counter but will soon cease to be.

4. If only we would meet the French about Tangier and throw in a (unspecified) concession as to Gambia and give up the condominium in the New Hebrides in their favour, they would probably be willing to reach a comprehensive agreement with us which would satisfy our desiderata in the matter of (1) Karikal, Mahé, Yanaon, Chandernagore and the French 'Loges' in India (he is doubtful about Pondicherry)<sup>3</sup> (2) Muscat and Sheikh

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 245, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahé, Yanaon, and Chandernagore were French possessions in India. In addition to holding these territories under French sovereignty, the French government further exercised certain rights of jurisdiction over some twelve scattered sites of former French factories, known as Loges. Anglo-French negotiations had been conducted with regard to these French possessions and titles in India in 1857, 1883-5, and April 1914. On the first occasion H.M. Government had sought to secure the cession of all French territory in India except Pondicherry and Karikal; on the second occasion H.M. Government had endeavoured to secure the extinction of French rights in the Loges in return for compensation in the region of Pondicherry; the third of these negotiations, in 1914, related more particularly to the position of Chandernagore. None of these negotiations had resulted in agreement.

Said,<sup>4</sup> (3) Mosul and Palestine. He says that he has urged some such comprehensive settlement of Franco-British 'clashes of interest' more than once on Lord Milner.

I have never entered into a discussion of these points with M. Millet or said that I would pass them on. I should add that Sir Arthur Hirtzel when in Paris always urged that at one time or another during the Conference we should try and reach an agreement with the French about (1) and (2) above, which were put forward in the India Office memorandum of our desiderata before we came out. It is possible, of course, that we could secure our wishes as to (1) in return for a lump sum down but more than probable that we should have to offer a more tangible territorial *quid pro quo*, and there seems something to be said for an attempt at a more comprehensive agreement with the French, if and when an opportunity offers.

E. G. F. ADAM

October 9, 1919.

Send copy of above minute to the Foreign Office.

E. A. C.

October 13th, 1919

\* H.M. Government desired to secure the cancellation of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 guaranteeing the independence of Muscat, and the renunciation of certain French claims, dating from 1869, to Sheikh Said, a promontory in south-west Arabia.

### No. 325

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

No. 1095 Telegraphic [141299/2117/44A]

5.0 p.m.

PARIS, October 14, 1919

My telegram 1091<sup>1</sup> October 13.

In spite of repeated enquiries by telephone at Ministry of War I have not been able to elicit a reply from Monsieur Clemenceau to message of Mr. Lloyd George. General Gouraud left Paris yesterday for Strasburg where he now is.

<sup>1</sup> No. 321.

### No. 326

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

No. 996 [141637/2117/44A]

PARIS, [October 14, 1919]<sup>1</sup>

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the undermentioned paper.

Name and Date.

Subject.

President of the Council to H.M. Syria: General Gouraud.  
Ambassador.

<sup>1</sup> The date was lacking on the original and was supplied in the Foreign Office on the filed copy.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 326

*M. Clemenceau to the Earl of Derby<sup>2</sup>*

*Copie*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

PARIS, le 14 octobre 1919

Vous avez bien voulu me communiquer deux télégrammes de Mr. Lloyd George et Lord Curzon<sup>3</sup> tendant à l'envoi du Général Gouraud à Londres pour participer à une Conférence sur la Syrie qui se tient aujourd'hui, en présence de l'Émir Feysal, qui souhaiterait également y voir assister un représentant américain.

En fait, le Général Gouraud est à Strasbourg, et ne pourrait matériellement se rendre à Londre[s] en temps utile.

Je n'aurais pu, d'ailleurs, l'autoriser à participer à cette réunion; c'est au Gouvernement français qu'il appartient de négocier avec le Gouvernement anglais, et le Général Gouraud n'aurait pu délibérer que sur les modalités d'exécution de décisions prises par le Gouvernement français relatives à la décision prise le 15 septembre par le Conseil suprême,<sup>4</sup> décision limitée à la relève des troupes britanniques par les troupes françaises en Cilicie et Syrie (zone bleue).

Quant à la demande de l'Émir Feysal de voir participer un délégué américain à ses conversations avec le Gouvernement anglais, je ne lui reconnaiss aucun droit de prendre une pareille initiative. Si le Gouvernement américain exprimait de lui-même un désir de cette nature, je n'y ferais pas opposition. Toutefois, il ne pourrait être question de régler la question de Syrie elle-même dans des réunions officieuses de ce genre. C'est à la Conférence seule qu'il appartient de prendre une décision définitive sur la question de Syrie et de Mésopotamie, en même temps que sur le sort de l'Empire ottoman.

Je continue à regretter que l'Émir Feysal ait été appelé par le Gouvernement anglais sans consultation préalable avec le Gouvernement français, car cela ne contribue pas à faciliter les solutions.

Il faut replacer la question sur son véritable terrain.

Ainsi que je l'ai indiqué, le 9 octobre, dans ma réponse<sup>5</sup> au mémoire du 13 septembre de Mr. Lloyd George,<sup>6</sup> la position de la France en Syrie et ses rapports avec les Arabes de sa zone ne peuvent qu'être identiques à la position de l'Angleterre en Mésopotamie et à ses rapports avec les Arabes dans sa zone.

C'est à la France qu'il appartient de s'entendre directement avec l'Émir Feysal. Or, comment une entente sera-t-elle possible avec l'Émir si celui-ci, qui prétend à la souveraineté de toute la Syrie, reste le protégé des Anglais? Cette protection encourage l'ambition de l'Émir et ses résistances, et risque de créer dans la zone arabe, au moment où les troupes françaises remplaceront les troupes britanniques dans la zone bleue, une surexcitation d'autant

<sup>2</sup> A summary translation of this note had been transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris telegram No. 1098 of 11.15 p.m., October 14, 1919 (received 8.50 a.m., October 15).

<sup>3</sup> See Nos. 319 and 320.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 278.

<sup>5</sup> Enclosure in No. 314.

plus dangereuse que les forces arabes recrutées en hâte ont été armées par les Anglais de fusils, de mitrailleuses et d'autos blindées.

La théorie qui consiste à couper la Syrie en deux zones imperméables l'une à l'autre est contraire non seulement à l'accord de 1916, mais à la nature des choses et au simple bon sens. Je comprends fort bien l'embarras où se trouvent les négociateurs anglais, qui, sous le coup des nécessités politiques, ont été amenés à prendre au Hedjaz, au Nedjd et avec la France des engagements, sinon opposés, du moins difficiles à ajuster.

Mais la solution ne peut consister à sacrifier les droits et intérêts français et à nous placer dans une position équivoque vis-à-vis des Arabes, en gauchissant les accords de 1916 au moment où se termine l'occupation de fait anglaise de la Syrie résultant de la guerre, et en nous demandant d'accepter une situation rendue dangereuse par les promesses faites aux Arabes et les moyens militaires qui leur ont été imprudemment prodigues et qui ne peuvent servir que contre nous.

Il n'y a, en réalité, qu'une issue digne du grand pays loyal et allié qui a traité avec nous; c'est de nous remettre la situation sans arrière-pensée. Que le Gouvernement anglais dise nettement à Feysal de s'entendre avec nous, qu'il se conforme à la lettre et à l'esprit de nos accords (dont l'article 1<sup>er</sup> dit que les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à 'reconnaitre et protéger un État arabe ou une confédération d'États arabes dans les zones A et B') et il pourra abandonner sans crainte la responsabilité de la situation à la France, qui saura bien s'entendre avec l'Émir arabe et sortir des difficultés présentes, en s'inspirant à la fois de ses traditions libérales et généreuses envers les musulmans, du respect de ses engagements, et d'une énergie réfléchie.

C'est sur ces données que je suis prêt à m'entretenir avec l'Émir Feysal à son passage à Paris, s'il exprime le désir de me voir et d'arriver à un arrangement.

Veuillez, &c.

G. CLEMENCEAU

### No. 327

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo)*

*No. 321 Telegraphic [140366/801/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 14, 1919

Your telegram 466.<sup>1</sup>

Acting Commander-in-Chief was instructed telegraphically by War Office on October 8th that Dr. Weizmann must be well received and given every assistance.

He has also been referred to my telegram 245<sup>2</sup> August 4th to Colonel French and asked to report what fresh factors, if any, influenced him in his decision.

<sup>1</sup> No. 306.

<sup>2</sup> No. 236.

No. 328

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

*No. C.P.O. 31/1 [146382/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, October 14, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward by the hand of Major E. G. Waley a draft Declaration on Zionism, as proposed in my despatch C.P.O. 31/1 dated 26.9.19.<sup>1</sup>

I would point out that the draft as it stands has been approved by the Chief Administrator of O.E.T.A. (South) and by Doctor Weizmann. It will be submitted to the Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief on his return to Egypt. Meanwhile I would ask that your sanction, with such alterations as you may deem necessary, be wired out, as the publication of such a Declaration is becoming increasingly urgent.

Major Waley can personally explain to you the extreme necessity of immediately publishing such a document and the reasons underlying the various points mentioned therein.<sup>2</sup>

I have purposely refrained from drafting too formal a document and have avoided making any very definite pledges, with the double object of not binding His Majesty's Government too closely and of framing a Declaration which is easily understood by the masses in Palestine.

I have &c.

R. MEINERTZHAGEN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 328

*Draft Declaration of [on] Zionism*

An attitude of hostility towards Zionism has sprung up in Palestine, which is partly traceable to the deliberate fomenting of trouble between races and religions by irresponsible persons, to an ignorance of the meaning of Zionism, and to an erroneous idea that H.M.G. might be induced to abandon its policy of establishing a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, if sufficient

<sup>1</sup> No. 298.

<sup>2</sup> In this connexion Mr. R. H. Campbell, private secretary to Lord Curzon, noted on October 28, 1919:

'Captain [sic] Waley left this with me and explained that, in Colonel Meinertzhagen's view, the publication of some such declaration was of urgent importance:

(a) to allay the growing restlessness in Palestine, which might develop into active revolt in the event of disturbances in Syria when British troops are withdrawn;

(b) in order to define rather more definitely the attitude of the British Government towards Zionism in terms which, whilst showing that the future administration of Palestine, if in the hands of the Jews, will be subject always to the control of the Mandatory Power, have nevertheless been formally accepted by Dr. Weizmann. Colonel Meinertzhagen claims that this draft, if approved, would make public the only conditions to which Dr. Weizmann, for his part, has yet committed himself.'

'Colonel Meinertzhagen is anxious to have a reply one way or the other at the earliest possible moment.'

local agitation was set on foot by anti-Zionist elements and a threatening attitude adopted on their part.

It is also realised that whilst a considerable proportion of anti-Zionist feeling is artificial and the result of propaganda there is also a genuine and sincere desire to crush at its birth the establishment of Zionism in Palestine.

It has therefore been decided to make a clear statement to the People of Palestine regarding the attitude of H.M.G. towards Zionism. On November 2, 1917, Mr. Balfour made known the policy of H.M.G. towards Zionism. The American and French Governments are now pledged to support the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It must therefore be accepted that Zionism is a *choue jugée* and that continued agitation is only to the detriment of the whole community and will certainly be without the result it aims at attaining. Any Societies or Organisations whose professed programme is directed against Zionism can therefore only be looked on with disfavour, as being directed against an established policy. It is however most desirable clearly to state what Zionism means and what it entails, in order to remove some erroneous and exaggerated impressions which exist.

The various points which have hitherto constituted the main objections to Zionism will be taken in detail and explained. The merits and demerits of Zionism are beside the question and will not be discussed, for the Policy having been decided on, no such discussion would serve any useful purpose.

1. *Holy Places.* It is known that the people of Palestine very rightly regard with most jealous eye their historic and unique guardianship of the Holy Places. There is no intention whatsoever to remove the custody of the Holy Places of Christians and Mohammedans from the adherents of those religions. Zionism is essentially tolerant of other religious belief and there is nothing in its programme or ideals which aims at in any way altering the custody or status of the Holy Places of all Religions in Palestine. In return, Zionism hopes for tolerance from other religions towards the Jewish Faith.

All denominations in Palestine will enjoy full religious liberty subject to the maintenance of public order and security and there is nothing in the Zionist policy which aims at less than encouraging such a principle.

## 2. *Jewish Immigration.*

Zionism does not entail the flooding of Palestine with the poorer class of Jew. Its chief aim is the successful and progressive development of Palestine on scientific lines which is a necessary foundation of a National Home for the Jews. Immigration in its initial stages only means the introduction of the necessary capital for development, of skilled labour, and preparatory scientific brain power, in order to build up a healthy and prepared Home, ready to receive those Jews who wish to settle in Palestine. An unlimited and uncontrolled influx of Jews either in the preparatory stages of Zionism, or at any later date, is unthinkable and impossible, such an idea having originated and having only existed in the minds of those who have deliberately

misunderstood Zionism or of those who have allowed their enthusiasm to outrun their reason.

*3. Spoliation or eviction of present landowners in Palestine.*

Great apprehension exists among both Syrians, Arabs and others in Palestine, lest Zionism should mean the wholesale Jewish acquisition by, law<sup>3</sup> or other means, of land with the ultimate result of the eviction of present landowners. No such idea has existed among responsible Zionists. Certain land will have to be taken up by the Zionists, but it is guaranteed that no unfairness will be permitted, and the present landowners will not be despoiled of their land.

Zionism is as tolerant and sympathetic towards the sanctity of ownership of property as it is towards religious questions.

Zionism also realises its impotence to fulfil its ideal should it adopt an intolerant attitude towards the inhabitants of Palestine, whose assistance is essential to a healthy development of industry and agriculture. Zionism does not aim at stifling competitive effort; it welcomes it. It does, however, require and can reasonably demand, in view of the policy of H.M.G. a certain degree of preferential treatment in its initial growth.

But in order to fulfil its obligations towards Zionism, and prevent the establishment of a National Home of the Jews becoming a mere empty phrase, it is contemplated that certain concessions preferential to Zionism must be given and no apprehension need exist that any such concessions will entail hardship or unfairness to any member of the Palestine community. On the contrary, all such concessions will be made to Public Utility Bodies, and not to individuals, and will therefore not fail to benefit the whole community.

*4. The Majority being subjected to the rule of the Minority.*

The Zionist programme does not contemplate that the majority shall be subjected to the rule of the minority, nor has the question ever arisen. Such a principle is entirely opposed to Zionist doctrines of Justice and Freedom, and to the terms of any mandate under which Palestine will be governed. Zionism aims at all parties having equal opportunities to participate in the administration of Palestine.

5. The material benefits which will fall to the lot of the people of Palestine, by the realisation of Zionist ideals, have never been sufficiently appreciated. The introduction of Jewish brains and money can only lead to scientific progress, and development. That this means the death-knell of the stagnant and obsolete methods of agriculture and industry is fully realised, but this need not entail the swamping and absorption of Palestine by Jewish culture. It means solely the uplifting of all classes from poverty, and the removal of the preventive force hitherto exercised over Palestinian development.

None can deny the present backward state of industry and agriculture in Palestine, and the comparatively undeveloped state of the land. It is to remedy this unhappy state that Zionist money and Zionist brains will apply

<sup>3</sup> The comma should evidently be after 'acquisition'.

themselves and not only Zionists, but all classes will benefit by increased prosperity.

All opposition to the accepted Zionist programme, which so materially benefits the people of Palestine, can only be to the detriment of all classes and can only impede the development which Palestine so sorely needs after so many stagnant years.

Finally, it is contemplated that Palestine will be administered under the guidance of a Mandatory Power, and whatever may be the ultimate aims of Zionism, they are always subjected to the restraining influence of a non-Zionist control, whose main consideration is to ensure that no injustice is done to the people of Palestine, and that the country is not given over to the immoral exploitations of capitalists and speculators.

### No. 329

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1167 Telegraphic [141300/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 15, 1919

Following from Prime Minister for Monsieur Clemenceau.

I have received your telegram in regard to Syria<sup>1</sup> with surprise and deep regret. Its tone represents a complete change from the friendly attitude you took up on this subject a month ago in Paris, and is one in which I could not have believed it was possible for one Ally to address another after five years of intimate brotherhood in arms. I profoundly regret your decision because it defeats a sincere and loyal attempt by your Ally to bring about by agreement between all concerned a temporary settlement of the Syrian difficulty which should be in complete accordance with British and French engagements. Had you allowed General Gouraud to take part in a purely military meeting to agree upon the mode of execution, and which was not intended to have any political character, I believe that all difficulties might have been overcome and relations between France and the Emir Feisal established on a friendly basis. As it is your decision has rendered fruitless our endeavour to bring this about. For the consequences the British Government must disclaim all responsibility.

I am leaving immediately for Sheffield, but on my return I will send you a full reply to your two communications<sup>2</sup> together with documents showing now [how] incessantly the British Government has laboured in the face of great difficulties to carry out in complete loyalty to France the agreement which was arrived at on September 15th.<sup>3</sup>

I am communicating to the Emir Feisal your statement that you are ready to meet him on his way through Paris if he desires to see you and come to an arrangement.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 326.

<sup>2</sup> See Nos. 314 and 326.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 278.

*Letter from Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

Unnumbered [142631/2117/44A]

October 16, 1919

My dear Eddie,

I am greatly obliged for the very explicit and useful letters<sup>1</sup> in which you have explained to me the rather heated political atmosphere prevailing in official quarters in Paris as a result of the proceedings of the past few days.

The suggestion to invite Gouraud over here had no 'arrière pensée' behind it whatsoever. In conversation with Feisal we found that, quite apart from his views upon the political aspect of the Syrian case, he was seriously disturbed at the military proposals: less, of course, at what may happen in the coastal areas of Syria and Cilicia than at what may conceivably occur in the larger inland towns of Syria itself. As he understands, and as we understand, the agreement arrived at in Paris, the British troops, on evacuating Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus, are to be replaced, not by French troops, at any rate at the present stage—for that would be prejudging the ultimate decision—but by Arab troops of the Emir.

Clemenceau's attitude, however, leaves us in some doubt whether he understands the agreement in that sense, and the entire point is one of such extreme importance that, looked at from the military standpoint alone, it seemed extremely desirable that it should be discussed by military experts representing all parties. Feisal and Allenby being here, and Gouraud being about, as we understand, to leave for his new post in the East, the suggestion was made in absolute good faith that Gouraud should be invited here to have a military conference, in which the politicians would have taken no part at all.

Clemenceau, no doubt actuated by the motives you have described, scented in this, most unjustifiably, an attempt to place him in a false position: and accordingly he replied in language which was almost insolent.

The Prime Minister was very wrath, and answered in the message which you have read.<sup>2</sup>

As I dictate this letter I am awaiting the arrival of the French Ambassador, with whom I have no doubt that I shall exchange some frank words upon the whole situation.

Now, as regards your suggestion that Clemenceau should be invited to come here with Gouraud to settle the matter with Allenby or myself, or both together, I need hardly say that we should be delighted to see him now or at any time, although I imagine that the Prime Minister would insist either upon presiding at the conference or upon intervening at a crucial stage: which might not altogether suit Clemenceau's book. For the moment, however, I think that the suggestion must be held in abeyance, because, acting upon the suggestion thrown out in the concluding paragraph of Clemenceau's

<sup>1</sup> These private letters are untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> No. 329.

reply to the Prime Minister,<sup>3</sup> Allenby and I saw Feisal here this afternoon, and induced him to accept Clemenceau's invitation to Paris.<sup>4</sup>

I urged Feisal to go to Paris without delay, unaccompanied by any Englishman, and with no evidence of British inspiration or backing, to see Clemenceau personally; to put before him his own position with clearness, cogency, and moderation; to realise that this was in all probability the last opportunity of coming to a friendly agreement with the French; that, in the interests of all parties concerned, Arabs, French, and British, such an agreement was supremely desirable; and that, if the opportunity were lost or sacrificed, great injury, and indeed disaster, might very likely overtake us all.

I declined to discuss with Feisal, or to offer any opinion upon, any hypothetical situation that might arise in the event of his failing to come to terms with Clemenceau. I said that he must decide that on his own responsibility. I think that, if there is such a failure, he has it in his mind to propose some such conference as that which was unavailingly suggested by us two days ago. The reason for his laying stress upon the presence of an American Officer is simply that he would like someone to be present who was quite detached and impartial, and who, at a critical or controversial moment, might intervene with sound advice.

I consider that Clemenceau was ill-judged when he turned down this innocent suggestion in the way in which he did, and indeed that it is Clemenceau's attitude, quite as much as anything else, that has rendered a friendly solution difficult.

If the projected conversation between Clemenceau and Feisal leads to nothing, we shall be quite willing to see Clemenceau here, or, I dare say, to meet him in Paris.

It must be remembered, though, that Allenby, who specially postponed his departure in view of the intended talk with Gouraud, must in any circumstances leave London on Thursday next week,<sup>5</sup> and must sail from Marseilles on the 29th. I believe that he contemplates visiting the French battlefields, in order to see the grave of his son.

Even now, however, I am not quite clear as to what form the discussion with Clemenceau would take, for hitherto he has invariably assumed the position that the Syrian question cannot be decided except as a part of the whole question of the future of the Turkish dominions, and therefore he must decline to consider it in separation therefrom. If he merely has in view a solution of the military difficulties, that may carry us a certain distance, but not very far.

Personally, I think that the whole question of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Cilicia ought to be cleared out of the way as quickly as possible, and I even think that it is capable of being dealt with independently of the larger Turkish issue. The latter may not come on for settlement for some

<sup>3</sup> No. 326.

<sup>4</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 1170 of October 16, 1919, to Paris instructed Lord Derby to inform M. Clemenceau that the Emir Feisal had accepted his invitation and proposed to travel to France on October 20.

<sup>5</sup> October 23, 1919.

time yet, though I also have some proposals to make for accelerating the pace in that quarter.<sup>6</sup>

This, I fear, is as far as I can take the matter to-night, and I close this letter in a hurry, in order that it may go off to you by the post to-morrow morning.

Yours ever

CURZON

Cambon, whom I have seen since writing the above, is going to represent to his Government that they should invite Allenby to Paris to assist in conversations with Clemenceau and Gouraud—in other words, that the military conference which we suggested here should take place next week—but at Paris.

<sup>6</sup> See Chap. III.

### No. 331

*The Emir Feisal to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)*

[143945/2117/44A]

LONDON, October 16, 1919

My Lord,

I had intended addressing a comprehensive reply to your Lordship's letter of 9th October 1919,<sup>1</sup> but my letter to the Prime Minister of the same date<sup>2</sup> and my interview with your Lordship this afternoon<sup>3</sup> are, I feel, sufficient for the purpose.

I rest content with your Lordship's avowal to me that my cause is just, and that the ministry of His Majesty feel and appreciate the same.<sup>4</sup>

I have &c.

FEISAL

<sup>1</sup> No. 309.

<sup>2</sup> No. 308.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 330.

<sup>4</sup> This was minuted as follows by Lord Curzon:

'I must place on record that I did not state that Feisal's cause was just and that H.M.G. felt and appreciated the same.'

'What I did say—in the presence of Lord Allenby—was that I hoped that Feisal would put his case, which was a good one, before M. Clemenceau with the same candour, moderation and force that he had put it before H.M.G. at Downing St.'

'I asked him personally yesterday whether his departure was a final one and he declined to reply. I am afraid that if he fails with M. Clemenceau he will try and come back for further consultation and advice.'

'But I think that this ought to be altogether discouraged.'

'If any further British advice is required Lord Allenby may perhaps be in a position to give it as he goes through Paris.'

C. 19/10.'

### No. 332

*Sir M. Cheetham (Ramleh) to Earl Curzon (Received November 1)*

No. 508 [147731/142/44A]

RAMLEH, October 16, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 1340<sup>1</sup> of the 8th September, 1919, I

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

have the honour to inform you that recent reports from the British agent at Jeddah, as well as the tone of telegrams from King Hussein himself, make it appear possible that the latter may announce his resignation at any time, and perhaps without giving Colonel Vickery notice of his intentions. However this may be it would obviously be advantageous to establish the King's successor with as little delay as possible, in order to avoid an interregnum which might lead to anarchy, or even civil war. Colonel Vickery would therefore be glad of any general instructions which could be issued for his guidance.

Emir Abdullah would be the most suitable successor. He is not fanatical, will listen to advice, is progressive and pro-British in his ideas. He has considerable diplomatic ability, learnt from long intercourse with the Turks, and this, added to his personal popularity both in British and native circles, should enable him to establish himself without difficulty. He would also probably be able to persuade his father to nominate him to the exclusion of his elder brother the Emir Ali, who is childish, incompetent, fanatical, and weak, and therefore not a serious rival.

In the event of King Hussein nominating Emir Abdullah, it may be anticipated that the latter will before accepting responsibility ask the British agent the extent of the support, moral and material, which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to give him.

As regards moral support, he will probably demand the maintenance at Jeddah of a senior British official who will act as his intermediary with His Majesty's Government, and whose views will carry the necessary weight. I understand that the King and the Emir Abdullah would view with apprehension the re-establishment of a simple consulate at Jeddah in place of the present agency. If the agency as such ceases to exist, I suggest that the consulate might be placed in charge of a senior official with experience of Arabian political affairs, who would be appointed temporarily as British consul, and be assisted in his consular duties by a junior official of the Consular Service, but would perform the duties of a British agent.

Emir Abdullah would rely largely on His Majesty's Government for material support to secure his position in the Hedjaz, and is certain to ask for a statement from His Majesty's Government as to the maintenance of the subsidy after December 1919, and he may submit proposals for a loan to the Hedjaz to supplement his reduced subsidy. I do not suppose it is possible to make any definite statement on this subject at the present stage, but should His Majesty's Government's future policy with Arabian rulers favour the continuance of the principle of subsidies and stipends which is the feature of the trucial treaties, and of the arrangements concluded with the chiefs such as the Abdali Sultan and the Sultan of Lahej, we should presumably have to give marked preferential treatment to the ruler of Mecca. Any indication which could be given of our policy in this respect would undoubtedly do much to enable the King's successor to make good.

I have, &c.

M. CHEETHAM

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)*

*No. 478 Telegraphic [142968/2117/44A]*

*CAIRO, October 18, 1919*

My telegram No. 475<sup>1</sup> October 17.

Consider Arab authorities at Aleppo likely to evacuate rather than accept responsibility of maintaining order after our evacuation. I suggest French be advised by you to arrange for General Gouraud's arrival on the spot some days before evacuation begins. Turkish circular found in Aleppo states that 'Mujahid's warriors for holy cause will soon be guests of their brethren the Arabs and will scatter their foes'.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram (received October 17) Colonel Meinertzhagen represented that the French relief of British forces in Syria should be effective since 'any French failure to substitute good French troops for ours will encourage Extremists, and first to suffer will be thousands of defenceless Armenians whom we have collected and distributed in Cilicia and Aleppo.'

'It is thought Mustapha will be on his best behaviour and will do his utmost to control excesses but he has to reckon with an element which is always prepared to take advantage of Christian helplessness.'

'The remedy is to insist on effective relief measures by French before evacuation, relieving troops to be equal in numbers and quality.'

'In zone where Arab Army relieves our troops I have been repeatedly warned that Arab leaders cannot be responsible for results more especially as Syrian settlement is deemed by them to be unfavourable.'

'I consider sooner or later after our evacuation such centre(s) as Aleppo and Damascus will be not far removed from state of anarchy which will inevitably lead to European interference or acknowledgment of our impotence to interfere.'

<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Office subsequently received a full text of this circular, headed: 'Translation of a Proclamation issued by the Mustapha Kemal Party in Aleppo about 9/10/19.' This proclamation read:

'Mustapha Kemal's proclamation to the Syrians.

'Listen to the voice of a sad nation, fallen into the hands of despotism and the evil intentions of the enemies.

'As a co-Religionist I pray you not to heed the strife stirred amongst us and which has separated us; we must remove all misunderstanding and let us all aim our arms against the treacherous parties who want to divide our country. If you do not listen you will regret. Do not rely upon the promises of the faithless enemies of our Religion.'

'They have agreed between themselves. The Rules [principles] of Gladstone are sufficient for you to understand.'

'Let us not be taken unawares. We want to save the Country and Islamism from the hands of the enemies who think that our Country is a "digestible mouthful".'

'At the inspiration of God the Faithful—Unitarians—have decided to fight their enemies. We have cleared Konia and Brussa. We have cut the enemies' lines of communication by occupying Konia. The Mujahids (Fighters for a Religious cause) who trust in the Right will soon be the visitors of their Arab brethren, and will scatter away the enemy.'

'Let us live as brethren in Religion and may our enemies perish.'

No. 334

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1257 [143507/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 18, 1919

My Lord:—

With reference to your Despatch No. 996<sup>1</sup> of Oct. 14, I transmit to Your Excellency herewith the reply of the Prime Minister to Monsieur Clemenceau's letter on the subject of Syria.

I request that you will cause this document to be delivered to Monsieur Clemenceau with the least possible delay.<sup>2</sup> It is desirable that it should reach him before the arrival in Paris of the Emir Feisal, who leaves London for the French capital on Monday, October 20.

I am, &c.<sup>3</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 334

*Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau.<sup>4</sup>*

October 18, 1919

Monsieur le Président du Conseil,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 14th October<sup>1</sup> in reply to my telegrams of the preceding day,<sup>5</sup> and also of the memorandum you have submitted<sup>6</sup> in reply to my *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September<sup>7</sup> which has just reached me. I must state at the outset that the tone of your telegram took me entirely by surprise. It represents, so far as I can judge, a complete change from the friendly tone you adopted in our discussions on this subject in Paris. I must in particular resent your statement that you—

'...thoroughly understand the difficulty in which English negotiators find themselves after being driven by political necessities to enter into engagements both with the King of the Hedjaz and with France which, if not in opposition the one to the other, are at any rate difficult to adjust.'

I can hardly conceive of a more offensive imputation made by one Ally to another, after five years of comradeship in arms, considering that the engagements were entered into with the King of the Hedjaz with the sole object of making possible the revolt of the Arabs against the Turks at a critical stage of the war. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 was not concluded by the present Government but by its predecessor, and was entered into by Sir Edward Grey, whose scrupulous integrity is recognised by the whole world. Your statement implies a charge of duplicity against the man who carried the British Empire into the war against Germany by the side of France, and remained in office the steadfast friend of France during those critical years

<sup>1</sup> No. 326.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lloyd George's letter was communicated to M. Clemenceau at noon on October 20, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy of original.

<sup>4</sup> The main part of this document is printed by David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), vol. ii, pp. 1082-1100.

<sup>5</sup> Nos. 319 and 320.

<sup>6</sup> No. 314.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 278 and Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

before America entered the war. He is the last man against whom a French Prime Minister should bring such a charge. It is all the more singular that you should have made this imputation in view of the fact that, so far from the engagements entered into by the British Government to the Arabs and the French Government being contradictory, the French Government is itself explicitly bound by the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 to accord to the Arabs the very rights guaranteed by the British Government to King Hussein.

2. As the French Government appears to be under a complete misapprehension both as to the facts and as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter, I propose to record the history of the Syrian question. In order that that history may be complete, I append the correspondence in full which passed between the British High Commissioner in Egypt and King Hussein in 1915 and 1916.<sup>8</sup> From this correspondence you will see that, while the authority of the Turks over their whole Empire was still intact, the British Government scrupulously protected the interests of its French Ally in Syria. It was of the utmost importance to encourage the Arab movement of revolt in order to help break down the Turkish wall, which prevented effective communication between the Allies of the West and the Russian armies. The condition upon which alone the Arabs would agree to throw in their lot with the Allies was an agreement that there should be an independent Arab State or Confederation of States including the whole Arab population. As you will see, the Arabs pressed for the inclusion within the area of the independent Arab State of the whole of Syria and Cilicia. His Majesty's Government, however, refused to consider this proposal. They stated, on the 25th October, 1915, that they did not consider that that portion of Syria lying west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo could be said to be purely Arab, and that the interests of France were there involved. This area, therefore, had to be excluded from the zone within which they were prepared to recognise the existence of an independent Arab State. Thus they stated in a letter to King Hussein of the 14th December, 1915, that—

'... with regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have taken careful notice of your observations; but as the interests of our Ally (France) are involved, the question will require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.'

I would call your attention, however, to the reply which the Sherif Hussein made on the 1st January, 1916:—

'As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment was desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It was this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what might possibly injure

<sup>8</sup> Not appended to filed copy. These documents, from which the quotations below were drawn, were documents 1-8 in Cmd. 5957 of 1939.

the alliance between Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished we should ask (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coast.'

His Highness went on to say:—

'The people of Beirut would decidedly never accept such isolation, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which might exercise Great Britain certainly not less than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which was the only cause that caused us never to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently it is impossible to allow any derogation which gives France or any other Power a span of land in those regions.'

In the end King Hussein, yielding to the insistence of His Majesty's Government, and subject to the reservation quoted above, entered the war on the Allied side.

3. I turn now to the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. The negotiations between the British and the Arabs and the British and the French were carried on simultaneously during the autumn of 1915. On October 21st Sir Edward had a discussion with M. Cambon on the subject, and asked that the French Government should appoint a representative to discuss the frontiers of Syria with a representative of the British Government. On the 23rd November M. Picot, who was the representative appointed by the French Government, met Sir Arthur Nicolson,<sup>9</sup> who pointed out to him our attitude towards the Arabs and our dealings with the Sherif. No agreement was arrived at at that meeting, but at a later meeting, on the 21st December, M. Picot informed Sir Arthur Nicolson that, after great difficulties, he had obtained permission from his Government to agree to the towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus being included in the Arab dominions to be administered by the Arabs under French influence. He said, further, that his Government realised the importance of the Arab movement and wished to make any sacrifices possible in order to separate the Arabs from the Turks. You will observe that these negotiations with France were completed some months before the Arabs revolted and before the correspondence between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein on the subject of the Arab boundaries was concluded. These records, a summary of which I handed you before,<sup>10</sup> but which I attach for convenience of reference<sup>11</sup> are purely British records. But that the French Government was aware at that time of the undertakings of Great Britain to King Hussein in regard to the boundaries of the area within which the British Government was prepared to recognise the independence of the Arabs is clear, not merely from these records, but still more from the fact that the limits laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, within which there was to be an independent Arab State or

<sup>9</sup> At that time Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 282, note 2.

<sup>11</sup> Not attached to filed copy of original.

confederation of Arab States, are identical with those laid down in the correspondence with King Hussein, and include the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.

4. I come now to the text of the agreement itself. Article 1 reads as follows:—

'France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A), France, and in area (B), Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A), France, and in area (B), Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or confederation of Arab States.'

I observe that, both in your telegram and in your memorandum, you state that under the Anglo-French Agreement France and Great Britain were to protect ('protéger') an independent Arab State. This is not correct. The word used in the Agreement is 'soutenir' (uphold), which bears an entirely different significance. I would further remind you that the alteration of the word 'protéger' to 'soutenir' was deliberately made in August, 1916. The proposal of alteration was set forth in a letter from M. Cambon to Viscount Grey on the 25th August, in which he says,

'Il me semble que les mots "soutenir" et "uphold" rendraient plus exactement notre pensée',

and was agreed to in a reply of Lord Crewe's of the 30th August, 1916.<sup>12</sup> According to the correct text, therefore, the French Government is bound by its undertakings to Great Britain to uphold (*soutenir*) an independent Arab State in the area which includes the above-mentioned four towns, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and within that area to 'supply advisers and foreign functionaries *at the request of the Arab State or confederation of States*'. Under the mandatory system, of course, the provisions of the 1916 agreement about priority of exploitation would be superseded by the system of the open door.

5. I would further direct your attention to the previous paragraph of Sir Edward Grey's letter of the 16th May, 1916, to M. Cambon, in which, on behalf of the British Government, he accepted the agreement:—

'I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project as it now stands will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, *provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.*'<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See the Introductory Note to this chapter.

You will observe that the acceptance of the agreement by Great Britain was made conditional upon the Arabs obtaining the four towns Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. If that condition is not fulfilled, the whole agreement clearly falls to the ground. There was also the further condition that the Arabs should fulfil their part. In view of the fact that the Arabs remained in the war until the end and played an indispensable part in the overthrow of Turkey, there can be no question that this condition has been fulfilled.

6. Two other declarations or engagements which have bearing on this question are the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The text of the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th November, 1918, runs as follows:— . . .<sup>13</sup>

The clause relating to the Turkish Empire in the Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:—

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.'<sup>14</sup>

7. The only other historical date which I think it necessary to record as affecting the problem under discussion are the understandings arrived at between yourself and myself in December last year in regard to Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the declaration made by the British Government in March of this year in regard to the mandate for Syria. The understanding of last December was that the French Government would agree to the inclusion of the Mosul area in Mesopotamia, would also agree to relinquishing the idea of an international state in Palestine, and that so far as they were concerned, would agree to a British mandate over both. The reasons for this arrangement, as I understand them, were threefold: (a) that Mosul was geographically and economically part of Mesopotamia; (b) that international Government had proverbially proved a failure, and that the sentiments of the inhabitants of Palestine, whether Arab or Zionist, appeared to favour a British mandate; (c) that in view of the fact that the British Empire had practically alone overthrown Turkey, and had employed a total of 1,400,000 troops and incurred an expenditure of £750,000,000 in a campaign which led to the conquest of Syria, the French Government which, owing to the concentration of its forces on the Western front had been unable to participate in the Turkish campaign in more than a small degree and had even opposed its prosecution, was prepared to make these modifications in the 1916 Agreement, to meet British desires without attaching, as has since been alleged, any conditions thereto.

8. The declaration of Great Britain's disinterestedness in Syria was made to the Council of Four at a meeting held in March last.<sup>12</sup> Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-chief in these parts was present at the meeting and went back

<sup>13</sup> There followed the text of the declaration, for which see the Introductory Note.

<sup>14</sup> Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

to Egypt and Syria immediately afterwards to inform his subordinates. Instructions were further sent to him at later dates from Paris and London instructing him to make it clear that under no circumstances could Great Britain accept the mandate for Syria.<sup>15</sup> Similar statements were made to the Emir Feisal at the time of the Paris meeting and later. To these declarations the British Government unreservedly adheres.

9. It was in the light of these facts, declarations, and undertakings, that I brought forward the proposals as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* of September 13th.<sup>7</sup> The British Government had hoped that the Peace Conference would be able to deal quickly with the Turkish problem, and in the earlier half of the year they had thought the best road to a peaceful settlement would be the continuance of the military occupation of Syria by British troops, assisted by French and Arab troops under the supreme command of Lord Allenby until the Turkish peace was made. In the summer a proposal for substituting French for British troops in Western Syria broke down partly through disagreement about boundaries, and partly because of doubt as to the consequences on local peace and order. Despite their strong desire to promote a Franco-Arab understanding it has been brought home to the British Government at every turn that there was strong opposition among the population of Syria to the exercise by France of a mandate over that country—opposition which His Majesty's Government did their best to discourage. The long-standing existence of this opposition is clearly indicated in the correspondence with King Hussein in 1915. The report of the American Commissioners who have recently traversed the country taking evidence, proved that it is still formidable.<sup>16</sup> It has throughout, however, been the desire of the British Government that an amicable working arrangement should be arrived at between the French, British, and the Arabs, the three peoples concerned, and they did all in their power, as you will remember, to promote that understanding as long as the Emir Feisal was in Paris. Unfortunately, though they had entirely disinterested themselves in Syria, and therefore had no interests of their own to serve, their efforts came to nought. In the early autumn, however, of this year it became clear that the decision of the United States as to whether she would assume a mandate for any part of Turkey would be long delayed, and it became necessary for Great Britain, which had borne almost the whole brunt of the war against Turkey, to cease to make itself responsible for the occupation of Syria. It was essential that she should demobilise her troops and limit her responsibilities. Pressure both of public opinion and of financial necessity left no other course open to the British Government. Accordingly they brought forward their proposals for the replacement of British troops in Syria by French and Arab troops in the following terms:—

*Extract from aide-mémoire of September 13th, 1919*

‘3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area regard will be had to the engage-

<sup>15</sup> See No. 206.

<sup>16</sup> See No. 257, note 4.

ments and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.

'4. In pursuance of this policy the garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, will be replaced by an Arab force.'

The British Government further declared its willingness to accept the arbitration of the President of the United States on the question of the boundaries between Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. This last, and certain other proposals in the *aide-mémoire*, I agreed at your request, to adjourn until the Peace Conference could take up the whole question of the future of the Turkish territories. The proposals, however, in so far as they related to the occupation of Syria during the interim period, were reported to the Conference on September 13th and no objections were raised. These proposals were in all respects in complete accord with the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, as modified by the Prime Ministers in 1918. They accord to France full control of the so-called blue area until such time as the Peace Conference determines the future of these territories. They accord to the Arabs the control in the area in which they were promised an independent Arab State both by British engagements and by the French Government under the 1916 Agreement. Further, in area (A) (excluding Mosul) France will alone have the right of supplying advisers at the request of the Arab State.

10. As these proposals vitally affected the Emir Feisal and the Arabs, and could not be carried into effect without his co-operation, I telegraphed as soon as they were formulated inviting him to come to Paris at once to discuss them with the British and French Governments.<sup>17</sup> At the same time I notified you and the other members of the Conference that I had done so.<sup>18</sup> In reply, you stated that you did not see the purpose of the Emir Feisal's journey at that time,<sup>19</sup> and when he arrived you stated that you did not wish to see him. Accordingly, with your consent, I invited him to come straight to London with the object of inducing him to accept the proposal about occupation as assented to in Paris. To these proposals the Emir Feisal raised the strongest objection, partly on the ground that the Arabs objected to the exercise by France of any mandate over Syria, and that these objections had already been made clear by the people themselves to the American Commissioners, who had been sent to ascertain the wishes of the people; and partly on the ground that the Arab people, as represented by him, were bitterly opposed to the partition of Syria and the Arab territory in any shape or form. Despite very great difficulties, the British Government put the strongest pressure on the Emir Feisal to accept the arrangement and to come to terms with the French Government. How strong were the Emir's objections and how loyally the British Government carried out its understandings with the French Government will be apparent from the correspondence which passed between the Emir and the British Government during the last

<sup>17</sup> See No. 269.

<sup>18</sup> See No. 270.

<sup>19</sup> See No. 271.

few weeks, copies of which I append hereto.<sup>20</sup> That the British Government was not forgetful of France's rights and claims is shown from the following extract:—<sup>21</sup>

'In so far as the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned, they would ask your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large measure to the supreme sacrifices made by the French people in the late war. It is true that the French contribution in Syria itself was not great, for France was deeply pre-occupied in the war on other fronts. But on these greater and vital battlefields of Europe they lost 1,400,000 in dead, and incurred a debt not far short of that incurred by Great Britain in overthrowing the power which sustained the Turkish tyranny, and without whose support the Turkish military power could not have continued the war more than a few weeks.'

11. As a result of our representations, I reached the conclusion that if a round table conference of military representatives were held to discuss, not the policy, but the method of carrying out the military arrangements for the replacement of British troops by French and Arab troops in their respective areas, the change in the occupying authority could probably be carried through by friendly agreement between the three parties concerned and with the consent of all. I therefore telegraphed to you asking you to send General Gouraud to London immediately to discuss the military arrangements with the Emir Feisal and Field-Marshal Lord Allenby.<sup>5</sup> You can now understand how surprised I was to receive your refusal and still more the statement of the reasons which led you to adopt this course. After labouring incessantly to bring about a friendly settlement which would secure to France the whole of her rights, which would re-establish friendly relations between herself and her Arab neighbours, and leave her completely free to deal with them under the agreement of 1916, I found my efforts met with an attitude of suspicion and opposition wholly unwarranted by the facts, as the documents attached to this letter will show. I earnestly trust that the destruction of this attempt at settlement by consent will not prejudice the conclusion of an amicable agreement between Arabs and the French.

12. The British Government are so impressed with the importance of bringing about an understanding between the Arabs and the French that they did not communicate your message to the Emir Feisal in the somewhat insulting form in which it reached them. Had they done so, there would, in their opinion, have been but little chance for a peaceable settlement of the Syrian question. They informed him that you had invited him to Paris and pressed upon him in the strongest manner that he should accept your invitation and come to terms with the French Government direct. He has, I am glad to say, decided to act upon this advice.

13. The British Government knows that when the Emir Feisal does come

<sup>20</sup> Not appended to filed copy. The documents communicated were Nos. 286, 292, 308, 309, 313 and appendix A to No. 318.

<sup>21</sup> From No. 309.

to Paris, you will, notwithstanding the tone of your message, treat him with the courtesy and consideration which one of the Allies deserves. They would remind you that he initiated a revolt against Turkish rule at a time when the Allied fortunes were at a very low ebb; that he was loyal to the alliance to the end; and that he and his followers played an indispensable part in overthrowing Turkey, which was the prelude to the collapse of the German combination. The Emir Feisal is the representative of a proud and historic race with whom it is essential that both the British and the French should live in relations of cordial amity. He is further a member of the Peace Conference, of which you are yourself the distinguished president. The British Government is bound to him by solemn engagements, and the area he controls lies opposite both to the French and British spheres. His father is also a great Mohammedan leader. His Majesty's Government cannot conceal the anxiety they have felt at the apparent determination of the French press to deal with the Emir Feisal and the Arab problem with a high hand. If this were indeed the policy of the French Government, the British Government are afraid that it would inevitably lead to serious and long-continued disturbances throughout the Arab territories which might easily spread to the whole Mohammedan world. The Emir Feisal is now anxious to co-operate with the Allies. They earnestly hope that during the course of the negotiations in Paris nothing will occur to drive the Emir Feisal into hostility or induce him to enter into relations with those hostile elements which exist in the Middle East, and are the enemies alike of France and Britain.

14. His Majesty's Government would further state that the Emir Feisal regards himself as entitled by solemn agreement to set up an independent State within the zone laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, and including the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. The French Government is no less bound than the British Government, as the documents I have quoted in this letter will show, to uphold (*soutenir*) this Arab State in these districts, though they alone have the right to supply it with advisers at its request.

15. They must further state that inasmuch as the Emir Feisal is one of Britain's Allies they cannot disinterest themselves in the question of whether or not the obligations which they have undertaken towards him, and which the French Government have also undertaken in the 1916 Anglo-French Agreement, are carried out or not. The British Government is under solemn obligation both to the Arabs and to the French Government. As I have pointed out in this letter, its obligations do not conflict with one another, but are complementary. It is clearly their right, as it is their duty, to concern themselves with the fulfilment of the treaties by which they are bound. As you will have seen, they have insisted to the Emir Feisal that he can expect no support from the British Government for anything more than he is entitled to under his treaty rights, and they have pressed him in the strongest possible manner to come to a friendly agreement with the French Government as soon as possible. They are confident that their French ally will

carry out its obligations in the spirit and in the letter, and come to a friendly settlement with the Emir Feisal.

16. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would call attention to the fact that both the British and the French Governments are bound by the Anglo-French declaration of the 8th November, 1918, and by the covenant of the League of Nations. They have pledged themselves to take into account the wishes of the population in the final settlement of the Turkish problem. The Emir Feisal and the Arab people regard these declarations as binding undertakings, and it is clearly their present intention to plead before the Peace Conference, which will have final authority in the settlement, that the wishes of the people shall be the determining factor in the selection of the mandatory. As it is the desire of the British Government that France shall exercise the mandatory power, it is clearly of the utmost importance that the French Government should spare no pains to establish a friendly understanding with the Emir Feisal and the Arab population of Syria.

17. The British Government, therefore, await with anxiety the result of the negotiations between the French Government and the Emir Feisal in Paris. The arrangement for the withdrawal of the British troops and for the occupation of Syria thereafter, as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September will, of course, stand.

18. There are other matters in your memorandum which call for comment. But inasmuch as they relate to the final settlement of the problem of the Turkish Empire, which are reserved for the Peace Conference, and not to the interim period which is now alone under discussion, I do not propose to consider them now. A separate memorandum from the Foreign Office on certain of these points, however, will follow in a few days.<sup>22</sup>

19. His Majesty's Government trust that this despatch will put an end to the unwarranted suspicion which exists in the mind of the French Government as to the British attitude and intentions. They venture to believe that it will make it clear that they have pursued a policy of loyalty and co-operation from the start. You will observe that in many important particulars the memorandum which you gave me was inaccurate in matters of fact, and unfounded in its insinuations. During the last six months, His Majesty's Government has been subjected to a series of accusations from the French Government in regard to its policy and its actions in Syria, which they believe in every case have been proved to be without substantial foundation. Even in the note under reply the French Government repeat their statement in regard to the supposed British action in arming the Arabs. They<sup>23</sup> believed that in the British despatch of the 6th September,<sup>24</sup> addressed to the French Ambassador in London, they had finally disposed of this charge. As this despatch does not seem to have produced any effect, they can only repeat the essential parts of it:—

'Even [sic] since the successful advance of the Arab forces last year, and

<sup>22</sup> A draft of this memorandum was prepared in the Foreign Office but was subsequently cancelled. No other reply has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>23</sup> His Majesty's Government.

<sup>24</sup> No. 261.

the disappearance of the Turkish Power, it has been in contemplation to raise and equip a suitable force of gendarmerie for the maintenance of law and order in the various regions that now acknowledge Arab authority. The organisation and equipment of this force has been steadily proceeded with ever since, and the plans of the Commander-in-chief contemplate the arming of one Arab mixed brigade and 6,000 gendarmes. It is, however, his intention to secure the exchange of a modern rifle, machine-gun or gun for every similar weapon of British pattern furnished to the Arab forces. The effect of this step, therefore, will not be to increase Arab armaments, but solely to ensure uniformity between the different sections comprising Field-Marshal Allenby's command.

*'In point of fact no rifles, machine-guns, or guns have hitherto been transferred to the Arabs under this scheme.'*

Field-Marshal Allenby contradicts categorically the statement which appeared in *Le Temps* of the 18th August to the effect that arms and ammunition had been landed at Beirut by British ships and delivered to the Arabs. I should be grateful if the French Government could see their way to publish a *démenti* of this statement.'

The British Government would earnestly plead that interested propaganda should not be allowed to estrange Anglo-French relations, and that a hearing should not be given to these unfounded accusations against the British Government and its agents. There is a point at which such accusations, and still more their appearance in the French press, will inevitably provoke a demand for publicity. His Majesty's Government do not think it would conduce to the good relations between Great Britain and France if they were forced to publish the whole series of accusations made against them by the French Government, in no very friendly or conciliatory language, during the past six months, together with the replies which show these accusations to have been unfounded. Certainly nothing would be more calculated to encourage the enemies of that Anglo-French Alliance which was the principal cause of the Allied victory in the war. But they will not shrink from this duty if it is thrust upon them.

I have, &c.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

No. 335

*The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George<sup>1</sup>*

[143928/2117/44A]

LONDON, October 19, 1919

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit to your Excellency that, while I was awaiting the arrival of representatives of the French and United States Governments to discuss with Field-Marshal Allenby and myself the question of the advisability, or otherwise, of the withdrawal of British troops from Syria until such time as the Peace Conference shall have taken a final decision on the

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note was received in the Foreign Office on October 21, 1919.

Syrian question, I was called by his Lordship the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Earl Curzon of Kedleston, who informed me that the French Premier wished to see me before any decision was taken. I accepted the invitation with greater pleasure in that I am desirous of establishing cordial relations between all the Powers concerned in the Near East, and I am proceeding to Paris to-morrow. My endeavour will be to persuade the French Government to maintain the *status quo* and to agree to the meeting of the special conference proposed by your Excellency. My object is to prevent the troubles that will inevitably break out upon the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria, on the lines laid down by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which the Syrians have never acknowledged and against which they will continue to protest. If I succeed I shall be much gratified. On the contrary, if I fail I shall communicate with your Excellency with a view to returning to London and asking for the holding of a conference of representatives of the British, United States and Arab Governments. I believe that America will not hesitate to accept our call to discuss this very important question.

Will your Excellency allow me to urge once more that the Syrian question shall henceforth be separated from the Turkish question and be discussed on its own merits? Indefinite postponement might easily, in my opinion, lead to highly undesirable consequences. President Wilson's illness has assuredly caused us all great regret, but I feel sure that the United States Government, in spite of this unfortunate mischance, will approve of my proposal, because the state of affairs in the Near East is such as to render a speedy settlement imperative.

I have, &c.  
FEISAL

No. 336

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)*

No. 479 Telegraphic [144520/2117/44A]

CAIRO, October 20, 1919

Yasin Pasha has refused to accept responsibility for maintenance of order if British troops are withdrawn.

It is clear that Arab army is inadequate for the purpose.

No. 337

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)*

No. 1018 [144224/2117/44A]

PARIS, October 20, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 981<sup>1</sup> of October 9, I have the honour to report that an interesting article from the pen of Monsieur Maurice Barrès the well-known author, Deputy and member of the French Academy, has appeared in to-day's *Echo de Paris*.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Monsieur Barrès complains of the occupation by British troops of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, who, he declares, though operating in the name of the Allies, appear to act in a manner much less favourable to French interests than is doubtless warranted by the policy of the Authorities in London, and at any rate in complete opposition to the aspirations of France and to the plans of the French Government.

He draws attention to the loss of influence which France has suffered by the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and he calls upon the French Government to take care lest this diminution of influence should develop into a disaster. 'It cannot be possible', writes Monsieur Barrès, 'that after having fought together and having won a common victory, England will now oppose the rights of France in Syria, Armenia, Anatolia and Constantinople.'

The importance of French influence, spiritual and economic, in the Turkish Empire should not, he says, be discussed separately but in conjunction with Egypt and Persia and all the other sides of the whole problem. In return for the freedom given to her elsewhere, England should be prepared to allow to France a similar freedom in those portions of the late Turkish Empire where lie her rights and duties.

'If we consider Syria', writes Monsieur Barrès, 'no one can doubt the right of France to receive a mandate for the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. French public opinion will not for a moment allow us to be driven out. France learns with amazement that General Gouraud is not to occupy these towns. The Feisal comedy has gone far enough. No nation other than France possesses in so high a degree the particular kind of friendship and genius which is required to deal with the Arabs; and Algeria, which has given us gladly such magnificent assistance during the war, bears witness to this fact. Let a comparison be drawn between the manner in which our administration has been received in Algeria, and the present results of the British administration in Egypt. The British theory of installing in Syria an Arab Government of the Hedjaz is untenable. The Emir Feisal has no right to be in Damascus, Homs, Hama or Aleppo. France knows how to give these towns a Syrian Government. What is Feisal to us or to the Syrians? A man of straw set up by England, without a title, without influence...<sup>2</sup> If England wishes to give a kingdom to this Emir, let her set him up in Bagdad.'

Public opinion would be at fault, he continues, if it failed to realise that the present partial substitution of French for British troops is merely a first step. The British forces must be evacuated from all those regions in which France is interested, and the intrigues by which over-zealous British agents are trying to oppose French rights must definitely cease.

Finally, he calls upon his fellow-writers to lift up their voices in defence of the rights of France while the Government is engaged upon the negotiations, lest French interests should be crushed under-foot by the British Government because they are inarticulate.

The publication of the article by such a well-known writer as Monsieur Maurice Barrès on the very day of the arrival of the Emir Feisal in Paris is

<sup>2</sup> Punctuation as in original.

somewhat significant, as is also Monsieur Barrès' appeal, referred to in the last paragraph, to other publicists to force the hand of the French Government at the moment when it is negotiating with the Emir.

I have &c.

DERBY

No. 338

*Letter from Mr. Peterson<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris)*

*No. 141423/M.E. 44a. [384/1/7/19550]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 20, 1919

Dear Eric,

Your despatch No. 1945<sup>2</sup> of October 13 sending a resumé of your conversation with M. Philippe Millet of the *Temps*.

I send you copy of the Minutes on your despatch.

Yrs. ever,

MAURICE PETERSON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 338

Lord Curzon had this paper<sup>3</sup> before him yesterday evening. The marked passage<sup>4</sup> throws a new light on M. Clemenceau's repudiation of the agreement reached between him and the Prime Minister last November.

It is more than likely that M. Clemenceau's intransigent attitude, and his refusal to discuss the Arab countries with Feisal and ourselves are due to the fact that he sees no adequate *quid pro quo* in the Arab areas to compensate for the loss of Mosul. He feels that the French pieces on the Arab board are too valuable to exchange for what we are likely to offer.

Even if it is really the case that Spain will offer to cede the Spanish zone<sup>4</sup> to France later on, it is clear that the French would be glad to know now, that we would acquiesce in a future Franco-Spanish agreement. I do not know how powerful the naval and military arguments for internationalisation of Tangier may be, but I find it difficult to think that they could outweigh the absolute necessity from our point of view of avoiding an outbreak in Syria. A hint to the French that our recent note on the subject of Tangier<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> No. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Enclosure in No. 324.

<sup>4</sup> Of Tangier.

<sup>5</sup> The reference was to a note of October 14, 1919, from Lord Derby to M. Pichon, under cover of which a Foreign Office 'Memorandum regarding Moroccan Questions' was communicated to the French Government. Lord Derby stated in his note that he was directed to inform M. Pichon that the various declarations previously made by the French Government with regard to Tangier during discussion of the Moroccan question at the Peace Conference showed that there was a considerable difference of opinion in the matter between the British and French Governments, wherefore it was considered desirable that the latter should be acquainted with the British views without further delay in order that each government should clearly understand the standpoint of the other when the time should come for a detailed discussion of the question. The memorandum enclosed in Lord Derby's note was divided into three parts, of which the first referred to the earlier history of the question of Tangier before 1918, and concluded: 'In short, His Majesty's Government

was not necessarily our last word might do a great deal towards ensuring a happy conclusion to Feisal's impending conversation with M. Clemenceau.

(Signed) H. W. Young<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Sperling.<sup>6</sup>

cannot but consider that Great Britain, France and Spain at the present moment stand committed *vis-à-vis* each other to the principle of the internationalisation of Tangier'. The second and third parts of the memorandum read as follows:

'II. His Majesty's Government have been given to understand that the French Government have in contemplation the opening of discussions in the near future with the Spanish Government concerning the Spanish zone of Morocco.

'His Majesty's Government need not remind the French Government of their right, in the event of any such discussions taking place, of being consulted in regard to all matters involving possible changes of an international character, as, for instance, customs tariffs, and particularly as to any question of cession of territory. They are confident that the French Government entirely recognise their position as a third party in this respect, based especially upon the formal exchange of notes between the British and Spanish Governments, concerning the territorial *status quo*, of the 16th May, 1907, and the declarations exchanged on the same day between Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon, and upon the share taken by His Majesty's Government in the negotiations which resulted in the Franco-Spanish Convention of the 27th November, 1912.

'III. In regard to the general position in Morocco, His Majesty's Government cannot remain blind to a certain tendency, evinced in the French press and discernible even in some of the French Government's official utterances, to treat Morocco as a country in which France possesses a supreme—not to say exclusive—interest, the rights of other Powers (with the exception of Spain) being referred to in terms suggesting that they derive from no better source than concessions wrung from France by Germany in 1906.

This is a view to which His Majesty's Government can by no means subscribe, having regard to the actual facts as they relate to the British position in Morocco. The commercial interests of Great Britain in that country are of much longer standing than those of any other European Power, and British merchants played the chief part in developing the Moroccan trade in the days when the greatest difficulties and risks accompanied all foreign enterprises in the country. The direct successors of these pioneers of Moroccan trade are in very many cases still established in Morocco carrying on important and reputable business, and their presence alone creates a serious interest for Great Britain in Morocco. It is, perhaps, not out of place to mention that General Lyautey himself has on several occasions expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by these British merchants to the general development of Morocco. The position was recognised in 1904 when Great Britain, while formally admitting France's special political status in Morocco, obtained the acceptance of the principle of equality for British commerce which at that time amounted to about 40 per cent. of the total Moroccan trade.

In the political sphere also Great Britain has established a right to be regarded as closely interested in the affairs of Morocco, both by her participation in every important international agreement concerning the country and by the assistance she has given to France in the establishment of her present position there. Without wishing to magnify British services in this respect, it may be recalled that His Majesty's Government lent effective support to the French Government in the Algeciras negotiations, and it will hardly be denied that several important modifications of German demands on that occasion, as, for instance, in the matter of the police establishment at Casablanca, were secured mainly through British assistance. At the conclusion of the Conference, indeed, the French Government showed their appreciation by thanking His Majesty's Government for their help. On later occasions also when French interests in Morocco were threatened by Germany's actions, His Majesty's Government exerted themselves on behalf of the French Government

[Note 6, see over.]

Ever since the middle of last century the naval and military authorities have consistently held that no strong power must be allowed to establish itself on the strip of Moorish coast between and including Tetuan and Tangier.

In their opinion such a power, particularly if acting in conjunction with Spain, could close the Mediterranean to British shipping and even make it impossible for a British fleet to anchor at Gibraltar or anywhere in the Straits. For these reasons we insist on the internationalisation of Tangier, to which the French know they are committed by written declarations, however much they may bluff and pretend that what they meant was a 'special', not an 'international', regime. There is also a not unimportant commercial objection to the acquisition by France of the Spanish zone. That zone is extremely rich in iron ore, which is greatly needed in this country. If France gets control we know from past experience of French colonial policy that France will get the ore, whatever promises of the open door may be given.

As regards M. Millet's proposals generally, they are obviously inspired, being merely a repetition with some additions of what French officials have been saying for some months past.

Par. 3 is misleading. The Spaniards are now making fair progress in the work of pacification and will certainly not abandon their zone, at any rate as long as they feel they have the support of H.M.G.

Par. 4. Australia would never hear of the cession of the New Hebrides. If there is to be any change in their status they want the group themselves. (I had Mr. Hughes' views on this at Paris.)

As a matter of tactics I venture to suggest that no attention should be paid

as in the case of the guarantees desired by them as a preliminary to the recognition of Mulai Hafiz. It is unnecessary to add that His Majesty's Government did their utmost in the Franco-German negotiations of 1911 to facilitate the realisation by France of her aim to secure a free hand politically in Morocco.

'British rights in Morocco have, however, not always received the recognition due to them at the hands of the authorities in Morocco, and His Majesty's Government have been placed frequently in the necessity of addressing representations to the French Government on the subject. The cases of infringement of treaty rights claimed by Great Britain are too many to enumerate in detail, but mention may be made of the restrictions imposed at different times upon the sale of public lands, by which British subjects have often been excluded from the opportunity of purchase, the "servitudes" imposed on lands in the neighbourhood of certain towns, the lighterage regulations introduced at Casablanca in 1913, the imposition of "gate tax" upon foreign goods entering certain of the ports, and the various cases in which the Moorish Government have ignored their obligation to submit new public works to open adjudication.'

'The not infrequent disregard shown to British rights in these and similar cases renders it more incumbent upon His Majesty's Government at the present moment to reassert the existence of these rights, and the essential interests possessed by Great Britain in the Shereefian Empire.'

*'October 1919.'*

<sup>6</sup> i.e. Mr. Young passed the paper, for minuting, to Mr. Sperling, head of the American Department of the Foreign Office.

<sup>7</sup> Prime Minister of Australia.

to these proposals until they are put forward by a responsible member of the French Government.

(Signed) R. Sperling. 16/10  
,, G. Kidston.<sup>8</sup> Oct. 16/19.

I agree. It seems to me a most immoral bargain that is proposed.

(Signed) J. A. C. Tilley. 16/10.

We cannot afford to conclude it. It would be fatal to our position in the Mediterranean. Mosul is not of such vital importance to us.

(Initialled) H.

I really cannot see why the French whose attitude about Syria is already insufferable should be allowed to aggravate their offence by asking for Tangier, or why we should perpetrate a double folly by conceding it.

(Initialled) C. 17/10.

<sup>8</sup> Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

### No. 339

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 21)*

*No. 480 Telegraphic [144109/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, October 21, 1919

In continuation of my telegram No. 478<sup>1</sup> and my telegram No. 479.<sup>2</sup>

Report from Damascus indicates that all Syrian, Palestinian and Mesopotamian independent parties are now working in conjunction. The whole movement is Pan-Islamic but is Pro-Turk and Anti-Sherifian.<sup>3</sup> Yasin Pasha is believed to be the moving spirit.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Embassy Paris.

<sup>1</sup> No. 333.

<sup>2</sup> No. 336.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. in opposition to the Hashimite dynasty.

### No. 340

*Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 21)*

*No. 670 Telegraphic [143979/801/44A]*

ROME, October 21, 1919

Italian Government enquires whether 207 Russian Jews interned at Asinara can be admitted into Palestine. They wish to go there as they anticipate that they will be massacred if they go to Russia.

### No. 341

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1266 [144897/2117/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 22, 1919

My Lord,

In the course of my conversation with the French Ambassador last week, he mentioned, in tones of pious regret, a very insulting message which M. de

Fleuriau, after an interview of an entirely different character, had been instructed to leave in the Foreign Office with regard to the alleged armament of the Syrian forces of the Emir Feisal.<sup>1</sup> This note I had declined to receive, and it had been returned to M. de Fleuriau. The Ambassador admitted that its tone was of an unusual character, and he expressed no surprise at its rejection; but he informed me incidentally that it had the distinction of having been composed by M. Clemenceau himself.

This afforded me an opportunity of entering at some length into the successive notes of a not dissimilar character which had been handed in by the French Government in the course of the last six months, culminating in the recent exchange of high explosive shells between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

The Ambassador, speaking from the standpoint of the old diplomacy, deeply deplored that these matters should be taken out of the hands of the respective Foreign Offices, and that language should be employed which did not strictly conform to the old traditions. He greatly disliked this form of fusillade, which, he thought, excited tempers and rendered settlement difficult.

I suggested to him that an even greater cause of the friction that had arisen between our two countries in respect of the Middle East was the nature and language of the communications which the French Government had thought fit to make. The French language was a medium, I said, singularly well adapted to innuendo and invective, and the scribes in the French Foreign Office had taken full advantage of the openings thus afforded to them. We, on the other hand, were a stupider people with a less flexible instrument; but I asked the Ambassador to contemplate what would have been his feelings had he received from me during the past six months a series of messages of the character and tone to which I had referred? I could imagine the speed with which he would have come to the Foreign Office and the vigour of the protest he would have made. Throughout this campaign in France, whether it had taken the form of official notes or of articles in the press, issued with the connivance, if not under the direct inspiration, of the French Government, I had never once retaliated. I had never seen a pressman on the subject, I had not even suggested an article. But, I said, if I turned my attention to the matter, even through the doubtful and clumsy medium of the British tongue, I thought I could make myself nearly as disagreeable as the French, and the Ambassador must not be surprised, if this campaign were continued, should he one day find himself the recipient of a note that was a conscious, though feeble, imitation of the French style.

Alluding to the recent interchange of messages and telegrams about the visit of the Emir Feisal to London and Paris, I said that we were quite prepared to challenge the verdict of public opinion, and to publish the entire papers at any moment when they might be called for. It would then be seen how conspicuously loyal we had been throughout in our obligations to the French, how unfounded were the charges of which we had been the victims,

<sup>1</sup> See No. 342.

and how monstrous were the calumnies by which we had been assailed. In the event of the matter being pushed to extremes by the French Government, we should not hesitate to make public the whole of these papers, and to leave the verdict to be pronounced by the public opinion of the world at large.

Once again the Ambassador deplored to me the alleged necessity for delaying the solution of the Turkish problem in deference to the illness of President Wilson and the scruples of the United States. He could not see now—he never had been able to see—why the matter should not be taken in hand and settled. He hoped that this might still be done soon.

It was apparent from our conversation that his Excellency was not kept fully informed by his Government, and was not presented with the text of many of the communications that passed. His point of view, therefore, was not inspired by inside knowledge. It represents, however, an attitude from which I have never known him to waver during the nine months in which I have had the pleasure of conversing with him in the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 342

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 7152 [141893/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 23, 1919

Sir,

I transmit copy of a note left at this Department by the French Chargé d'Affaires on the 14th October relative to the present situation in Syria.

The French Ambassador desired to hand it to me in person, but I was unable to receive him. Monsieur de Fleuriau accordingly left it with Sir John Tilley, at the conclusion of a conversation on other topics. Referring to the Note, he stated that the French Government heard that it was being said in Syria that, in preparing to evacuate the Arab sphere, British officers were leaving the Arabs arms with which to fight the French troops. Sir John Tilley replied that this story was ridiculous. Monsieur de Fleuriau agreed that it certainly was, and stated that the French Government realised its falsity, but he feared that some of the Arabs might believe it. Sir John Tilley observed that if His Majesty's Government had given the Arabs anything at all, it was merely material for them to keep order locally and he repeated that the whole story was absurd. Monsieur de Fleuriau agreed again and said that he thought we were exchanging too many notes where the purpose could be better served by conversations, but insisted on leaving the enclosed note which Sir J. Tilley had no opportunity of reading until after Monsieur de Fleuriau's departure.

It is, as you will observe, couched in a vein very different from anything that Monsieur de Fleuriau suggested in his conversation, and is based upon allegations which the French must know to be unfounded. (In this connection I would invite your attention to previous correspondence ending with my Note to the French Ambassador of 6th September,<sup>1</sup> copies<sup>2</sup> of which are

<sup>1</sup> No. 261.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

attached for convenience of reference.) In view of this, I felt myself unable to discuss the Note and I accordingly instructed Sir John Tilley to hand it back to Monsieur de Fleuriau with a statement to that effect. Monsieur de Fleuriau accepted it, merely remarking that Monsieur Cambon would have preferred to have seen me in person in regard to the matter.

A similar despatch is being addressed to Lord Derby.

I am, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

[V. WELLESLEY]<sup>3</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 342

[Copy]<sup>4</sup>

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES

Les renseignements récemment parvenus à Paris concordent à montrer que l'évacuation des troupes britanniques de Syrie est préparée dans des conditions dangereuses pour le maintien de la paix dans ces régions. Les agents arabes des quatre ville[s], Damas, Homs, Hama and [sic] Alep recrutent et organisent des troupes dans le dessein avoué de les opposer aux troupes françaises; ces troupes arabes sont approvisionnées et armées avec le concours des officiers britanniques qui leur fournissent des armes, des munitions, des mitrailleuses et des automobiles blindées. Et le mouvement anti-français est excité par les messages que l'Emir Feysal envoie de Londres où il paraît entretenir des négociations dont M. Paul Cambon n'est pas informé.

Enfin, les nationalistes arabes de Syrie préparent ouvertement la guerre contre les Français et leur agitation est excitée, sinon par les propos, du moins par la présence et les actes des officiers et agents britanniques dans les quatre villes arabes. Car, sur place en Syrie, on considère l'armement des Arabes comme destiné à combattre les Français, parce qu'en fait cet armement ne peut servir que contre les Français.

Dans quelques semaines, les troupes françaises remplaceront en Syrie les troupes britanniques. Que des soldats français soient tués avec les armes fournies par les Autorités britanniques, cela paraîtrait impossible aux nations qui viennent de combattre côté à côté, et cependant c'est ce qui peut arriver le mois prochain si l'on ne fait cesser le concours et les encouragements si imprudemment donnés aux nationalistes arabes par les actes des agents anglais.

Le Gouvernement français signale cette dangereuse situation au Gouvernement britannique et lui demande d'envoyer sans délai des instructions aux agents britanniques en Syrie afin de supprimer tout concours au recrutement, à l'organisation, à l'armement et au ravitaillement des troupes arabes des quatre villes. Il est indispensable de marquer publiquement et par des actes que l'un des deux Gouvernements alliés n'encourage pas l'agitation dirigée

<sup>3</sup> Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>4</sup> In the following document a number of accents, omitted in the filed copy, have been restored.

contre cet allié et, plus encore, qu'aucune aide matérielle ou morale n'est donnée à des préparatifs de combat contre les troupes d'une nation alliée.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant au Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères de bien vouloir porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Premier Ministre et il saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa haute considération.

ALBERT GATE HOUSE, 14 octobre 1919

No. 343

*Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Curzon Papers/Iraq]*

CAIRO, October 24, 1919

Following is paraphrase of Feisal's telegram No. 96 to King Hussein despatched from London October 22.

'At my request a Committee will be formed to examine matter.<sup>2</sup> Situation is improving. Opinion of most Englishmen is on our side. Result later.'

'At invitation of (?) Prime Minister we leave on Monday for Paris.'

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Nos. 355 and 359.

No. 344

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard (Rome)*

*No. 825 Telegraphic [143979/801/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 25, 1919

Your telegram No. 670<sup>1</sup> (October 21).

Under existing regulations these Jews can only be admitted if they are:

1. Genuine refugees from Palestine.
2. Non-Bolshevik and
3. Self-supporting.

If they fulfil these conditions as to which you may consult representative of Zionist Organisation in Rome you should arrange repatriation direct with Chief Political Officer, E.E.F. Cairo.

<sup>1</sup> No. 340.

No. 345

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29)*

*No. 489 Telegraphic [146767/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, October 27, 1919

Following from Zeid for Feisal, London, begins:—

Major Clayton<sup>1</sup> informs me that Chief of General Staff said that British troops will withdraw from O.E.T.A. East beginning next month with exception of Deraa, Amfres and Es Salt and that our Government is compelled to

<sup>1</sup> Major J. N. Clayton was British Political Officer at Damascus.

accept French Advisers and he informed Military Governor (that?) subsidy may stop from beginning of next month.

The agreement of 1916 will, I understand, be put into execution.

The nations' (*sic*) minds are greatly troubled for future of their country and will be still more troubled when this is actually executed especially these times when the allies are still in a state of war with Turkey who are doing their best to spread their intrigues in Syria through Mustapha Kamal and his assistants. Be sure that revolution will be at doors in event of this agreement taking place and which is against the wishes of population and which (is?) contrary to declarations and decisions of allies which made population believe the future of their country is in their hands especially that intrigues of French in South and West are increasing daily.

In spite of my best efforts to calm the excitement in order to facilitate you I am unable to resist swelling current through which blood will be shed and I shall not in any way hold myself responsible in case of (protest?) under heavy (burden?) which I beg should be taken away from me and from nation in general.

I have reported to General Headquarters about bad results.

I beg you to reply as soon as possible which may put everyone at ease (? so that we may) be able to understand the position.

I beg to draw attention that subsidy should not be (?) stop)ped and am awaiting orders from you.

Ends.

#### No. 346

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

No. 1129 Telegraphic [146334/2117/44]

PARIS, October 28, 1919

Have seen Allenby this morning and it is at his request, and with his knowledge I send you the following telegram.

He learns orders have been sent for evacuation in Syria by our troops to commence on November 1 regardless of fact that it will not be possible for French troops . . .<sup>1</sup> (see my telegram No. 1124<sup>2</sup> October 26).

He is convinced that during time that will elapse between departure of our troops and arrival of French, posts will be occupied by Arabs with probability of massacre of Christians and that Arabs will resist by force French troops when proceeding to occupation of posts. This would lead French to occupy by force Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama which it is now arranged to hand over to Feisul's troops.

Allenby considers as country is occupied enemy territory he is by law of nations bound to continue occupation until his troops (?) are relieved)<sup>1</sup> so as to maintain order. He therefore wishes me to impress upon you how essential he considers it is that British occupation should continue until French are

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

in a position to take over which they should be urged to do at earliest possible moment.

He strongly urges orders be telegraphed at once to Egyptforce, our Garrisons of Syrian and Cilician posts should stand fast till relieved by French.

No. 347

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

No. 681 [147559/147559/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 30, 1919

My Lord,

The United States Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, in order to make representations with regard to a case in which his Government took a keen interest, and concerning which they had received a reply from the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office that did not altogether satisfy them.

The case arose out of the claim of certain American geologists (as they were called by the Ambassador) representing the Standard Oil Company, who, being in possession of a concession from the Turkish Government for the exploitation of certain oil-producing areas in Palestine, had gone to Jerusalem with a view of inspecting their properties, but who had been denied by the British authorities any opportunity of carrying out their task. The defence had been made by the Foreign Office that, pending the grant of a mandate, all such proceedings had been impartially vetoed by H.M. Government, who felt that they had no right to anticipate a decision which might compromise the ultimate mandatory, whoever that might be; and which, further, might be a source of trouble in the country itself while it remained under a military administration.

The Ambassador read to me a long and rather argumentative statement from his Government, which did not seem to carry much conviction to his own mind, but which, he apparently felt, compelled him to reopen the case. He argued as though it would be safe to proceed upon the hypothesis that the mandate, if not already given, would presently be given to Great Britain.

To this I replied that, so far as my recollection extended, though there had been a certain classification of different forms of mandate drawn up by Lord Milner's Commission in Paris,<sup>1</sup> the French had hitherto refused to agree to the grant of any particular form of mandate with regard to any part of the Turkish dominions.

Mr. Davis then sought to establish a distinction between investigation and operation. He contended that it might be possible to allow a concessionaire at least to investigate upon the spot the nature of the concession which he had obtained, without taking any practical steps to carry it into effect.

I said that, though this was a logical, I did not think that, in practice, it would be a very helpful distinction. A permission given in one case would

<sup>1</sup> Lord Milner was chairman of the Commission on Mandates at the Peace Conference.

have to be given in others; there were doubtless scores of concessionaires who held, in differing degrees, concessions from the Turkish Government—with whom, I reminded him, Great Britain was still at war—and I could not imagine anything more unfortunate than to have Palestine overrun by groups of persons of different nationalities, endeavouring to ascertain what their concessions—the legal status of which had not yet been determined—were likely to be worth. I promised, however, to look into the matter myself, and to let him have a reply.

I then took advantage of the presence of Mr. Davis to tell him, not in the form of an official protest, but as a fact of which I thought that in fairness I ought to make him aware, that I had good reason to believe that the United States High Commissioner in Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, was inspired by no very friendly feelings towards Great Britain, and was continually suspecting, and sometimes openly accusing, us of dark and sinister intrigues for which there was not a vestige of foundation. Not only had we evidence that Admiral Bristol had openly spoken to this effect in recent discussions in Smyrna, but I had an abundance of testimony from independent quarters that his whole action was characterised by a similar suspicion. This, I said, seemed to me to be a very unjustifiable attitude for the Admiral to adopt. Amongst the various parties who were figuring upon the international stage in Constantinople and Asia Minor, there was, I said, none less anxious to get any individual advantage out of the situation or more sincerely desirous to be quit of responsibility than the British. Our evacuation of the Caucasus; our retirement from Trebizond and Samsun;<sup>2</sup> our reluctance to let our forces play any compromising part in Asia Minor; our well-known intention not to take a mandate for any of those regions; and the sincerity and consistency with which we had advocated, and were still prepared to support, an American mandate should alone have been sufficient to protect us from the kind of insinuation in which Admiral Bristol appeared constantly to indulge. I should have thought that a satisfactory solution, already very problematical, could only be retarded, and might indeed be eventually prevented, by disagreement between the Americans and ourselves. It was not for me to make any suggestion, still less did I desire to make an official complaint, to the Ambassador, but if he felt disposed to take any informal steps to moderate the attitude of Admiral Bristol, I thought that some good might be done.

While I was speaking to the Ambassador there was handed to me the telegram which your Excellency had sent, recording your conversation with Mr. Lansing about the possibility of hurrying-on the negotiations as to the Turkish Peace Treaty.<sup>2</sup> I said to the Ambassador that, as Mr. Lansing had suggested that, in the interests of the debate in the Senate and of the ratification by the United States of the Peace Treaty with Germany, it might be desirable to postpone the Turkish negotiations for another ten days, we should of course do nothing that would at all complicate the situation in America.

Mr. Davis said that he saw no reason why, if we so desired, we should not

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Chap. III.

at once enquire among our Allies whether they would be willing to consider the early resumption of negotiations on that aspect of the general peace, of the desirability, and indeed the necessity, of which he was as much convinced as we were; and, although he knew that Mr. Polk was anxious to return to the United States to spend Christmas with his family, he did not think that, if he were pressed to stay, there would be any insuperable obstacle to his taking part in the negotiations, whether they were conducted here or at Paris.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 348

*The American Ambassador in London to Earl Curzon*

(Received November 3)

[148099/19165/444]

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, October 31, 1919

My dear Lord Curzon,

In the matter of our conversation of yesterday,<sup>1</sup> I have just received a despatch from the State Department saying that it is informed by the Standard Oil Company of New York that a representative sent to Bagdad to investigate petroleum conditions in Mesopotamia is forbidden to operate by British authorities while a geologist, probably employed by the Shell group, has been working in Mesopotamia for four months past. Naturally there is complaint, based upon the assertion that representatives of private American concerns are not being allowed equal privileges with those of British or other nationalities in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the adjacent regions.

I am most anxious to forestall any misunderstanding to which these repeated charges of discrimination may give rise. May I therefore renew, entirely upon my own responsibility, the suggestion which I made during our conversation as to the propriety of drawing a line between operation and investigation, treating the former as including both the physical operation for oil—road-making, drilling, pipe-laying, &c.—and the procurement of concessions, which might well be prohibited pending the settlement of the political status of the occupied territories, and the latter as relating to geological inspection and survey which can in no way alter the *status quo*?

I quite appreciate the reasons which have actuated you in this matter, but offer for your consideration the possibility that the inconvenience which might arise upon the admission of these persons, if they should come in any appreciable number, is perhaps counterbalanced by the irritation which is being caused by their exclusion.

Believe me, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS

<sup>1</sup> See No. 347.

No. 349

Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 17)

No. C.P.O. 297 [152698/87018/44]

CAIRO, November 1, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Foreign Office Telegram No. 25009 [250]<sup>1</sup> of 9th August 1919 and your Lordship's despatch No. 234<sup>2</sup> of 9th October, 1919, I have the honour to state that I am unable to trace any concessions in Syria or Palestine in which British interests participate.

As far as can be ascertained there are no pre-war concessions held by British subjects in Palestine.

I transmit herewith list of concessions, other than British, which has been compiled from the very scanty information available.

The Authorities of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (West) have not replied as yet to my queries on this subject—I will forward any further information as and when it comes to hand.<sup>3</sup>

I have &c.,

W. F. STIRLING  
Colonel, for  
Chief Political Officer

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 349

Concessions Granted within O.E.T. (South)

Concession.	Nationality.	Date of Concession.	Name of Concessionaire.	Remarks.
OIL Standard Oil Company.	American	Pre-war	..	..
Lighthouses Administration générale des phares de l'Empire Ottoman.	French	Pre-war	P. de Vaureal (Manager, Constantinople).	..
DRAINAGE OF LAKE HULEH MARSHES	..	Pre-war.	Mr. Salim Ali Salim.	..
RAILWAYS Jerusalem-Jaffa Railway.	French.	Pre-war.	M. Pavie, Director.	..
JERUSALEM Tramways, water, light and electricity.	Greek.	Pre-war.	M. Mavromatis.	..

<sup>1</sup> No. 240.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This formal covering despatch transmitted to Cairo a copy of document No. 517.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Meinertzhagen reported in Cairo telegram No. 502 of November 27, 1919 (received December 1): 'O.E.T. Administration West now informed us that there are no concessions in his [sic] area'.

O.E.T.A. (EAST).

Concession.	Nationality.	Date of Concession.	Name of Concessionaire.
<b>HASHAYA</b> Hummar Woods. Makaim Wadi el Tarasouk Petroleum. Aleppo	Ottoman. ?	9/7/328 [sic] ?	Khalil Eff Absi. (Not confirmed owing to absence of records.)
Tar and Pitch. Aleppo	Ottoman.	?	Moh. Zeki Eff & Co. (do.).
Trams & Lighting.	Ottoman.	?	Turkish Co. in Constantinople (do.).

O.E.T.A. (NORTH).

N I L.

O.E.T.A. (WEST).

Information not yet to hand.<sup>3</sup>

No. 350

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1295 [146334/2117/444]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 3, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's telegram, No. 1129,<sup>1</sup> dated 26th [28th] of October, on the subject of the evacuation of Syria before the French troops can take over from our garrisons, I understand that the War Office have now issued orders in the sense suggested by Lord Allenby. They point out, however, that the difficulty is a practical, and not a political one. If the movement of Troops is not begun early in November, the state of the roads, and the difficulties of transport, will prevent its being carried out at all.

This explanation may prove of service to Your Lordship, if any occasion should arise for use to be made of it.

I am &c.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 346.

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy.

No. 351

*Note from the French Chargé d'Affaires in London<sup>1</sup>*

[148719/2117/444]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES

Il semble qu'il se soit produit un léger malentendu au sujet de la ligne de démarcation entre les régions de Syrie où les troupes britanniques seront remplacées par les troupes françaises et les troupes arabes. Cette ligne doit être la ligne Sykes-Picot et c'est bien cette ligne qui a été prise pour base

<sup>1</sup> This note was handed to Lord Hardinge by M. de Fleuriau on November 4, 1919.

dans les conversations entre les États Majors français et britannique. Cependant, d'après des renseignements venus de Beyrouth, les Arabes remplaceraient les troupes britanniques dans des districts (Kaberia et Racheria [sic]) à l'ouest de la ligne Sykes-Picot. Il doit y avoir une erreur que M. de Fleuriel est chargé de signaler.

ce 4 novembre 1919

No. 352

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck<sup>1</sup> (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received November 22)  
No. 2077 [154433/2117/44A]*

My Lord,

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 5, 1919

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated 3rd November, which I have received from the Sublime Porte, enclosing copy of a note sent to the French High Commissioner, on the subject of the replacement of British troops by French in Cilicia.

2. I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir Eyre Crowe in Paris, and to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

I have &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 352

*Turkish Note to the British High Commissioner*

SUBLIME PORTE

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

le 3 novembre, 1919

J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à Votre Excellence une copie d'une note que je viens d'adresser à Son Excellence Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française au sujet du remplacement des troupes d'occupation britanniques dans les sandjaks d'Aintab, d'Ourfa et de Marache par des troupes françaises.

En espérant que Votre Excellence donnera à cette communication l'importance qu'elle comporte, je saisis cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

M. RÉCHID<sup>2</sup>

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 352

*Turkish Note to the French High Commissioner*

Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que lors de la conclusion de la convention de Moudros<sup>3</sup> les troupes ottomanes se trouvaient au nord d'Halep dans une

<sup>1</sup> British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> The Armistice of Mudros. The text of this armistice of October 30, 1918 with Turkey is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers 1917-1918*, vol. cxi, pp. 611-13.

position qui allait de l'embouchure de la rivière Mahr-el-Assi, sud d'Antioche, sud de Tel Erfad et aboutissant sur l'Euphrate à Deir-i-Zor. Ainsi les sandjaks d'Aintab, d'Ourfa et de Marache étaient restés en dehors de la zone où les forces alliées étaient parvenues avant la signature de la susdite convention.

En dépit de cette démarcation provisoire instituée par l'acte de l'armistice jusqu'au retour définitif de l'état de paix, les forces britanniques avaient occupé lesdits régions par l'envoi de petits détachements chaque fois que selon elles le besoin se faisait sentir. Ce procédé démontre suffisamment le caractère provisoire de ladite occupation qui ne pouvait même se baser sur l'article VII de la convention d'armistice qui accorde aux Alliés la faculté d'occuper tout point stratégique au cas où leur sécurité serait menacée, car aucun événement pouvant justifier une pareille appréhension ne s'est jamais produit dans les susdites régions.

D'autre part, la population en grande majorité musulmane et turque de ces trois sandjaks, qui avait manifesté en maintes occasions pendant cette longue période d'armistice son profond et inébranlable attachement envers la mère-patrie, attendait avec confiance l'évacuation desdites régions. Or il résulte des informations parvenues dernièrement à la Sublime Porte qu'il règne dans les susdits trois sandjaks et dans les régions environnantes une grande effervescence à la suite de la nouvelle du remplacement des forces britanniques par les forces françaises. Cette substitution de troupes d'occupation, effectuée dans un moment où la nation toute entière est dans l'attente de la conclusion prochaine de la paix et partant de l'évacuation complète des territoires turcs, est considérée par la population comme un indice très sérieux de la prolongation de l'état d'incertitude actuel, ce qui ne manque pas d'augmenter la surexcitation dans les esprits.

Devant cette nouvelle situation, il est fort à craindre que la population, qui [sic] confiant dans le haut esprit de justice et d'équité qui préside aux décisions de la Haut[e] Assemblée de Paris et convaincus que les principes proclamés par Mr. le Président Wilson serviraient de base au règlement du sort de leur patrie, ne soit portée au désespoir. Aussi, dans son désir de voir couronnés de succès ses efforts tendant à maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité, la Sublime Porte se fait-elle un devoir de prier Votre Excellence de bien vouloir signaler au Conseil suprême cet état de choses et faire appel à sa perspicacité afin de rétablir dans ces régions l'état existant à la date de la conclusion de l'armistice.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

### No. 353

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 1216 Télégraphic [146382/2117/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 7, 1919

Colonel Meinertzhagen's despatch 31/1 14th October<sup>1</sup> submitting draft declaration on Zionism.

We do not feel able to approve Colonel Meinertzhagen's draft, since it

<sup>1</sup> No. 328.

(a) appears to pre-judge the decision of the Peace Conference as to the mandate; (b) commits His Majesty's Government further than desirable in the direction of endorsing Zionist aspirations and guaranteeing their future conduct.

We have accordingly drafted following declaration on the lines of Colonel Meinertzhagen's draft which is as far as we are at present prepared to go. Please consult Colonel Meinertzhagen and telegraph your views as to publication.

The attention of His Majesty's Government has been called to the growth in Palestine of an attitude of hostility towards Zionism which is partly to be ascribed to the deliberate fomenting of trouble between races and religions by irresponsible persons and to a belief that the settled policy of His Majesty's Government and their Allies with regard to the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine can be influenced by agitation; but partly also to a genuine misconception of the nature of the policy of the Allies in this respect and the consequences to be anticipated from its introduction.

In these circumstances and as the Power at present responsible for the Administration of Palestine, His Majesty's Government think it well to state clearly that the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which has been endorsed by the Allied and Associated Governments and to which they adhere does *not* contemplate either:

(a) any interference with the custody of the Holy Places of Christians and Mohammedans by the adherents of these religions or, more generally, any curtailment whatsoever of religious liberty, subject always to the maintenance of public order and security; or

(b) the flooding of Palestine with Jewish immigrants. As is recognised by the Zionists themselves, the foundation of a National Home for the Jews must necessarily be a gradual process and it is not anticipated that Jewish immigration will do more than keep pace with the general improvement in the prosperity of the country, which is to be expected from the introduction of the capital and technical skill at the disposal of the Zionists; or

(c) spoliation or eviction of the present landowners in Palestine or the grant of profitable concessions to individuals; or

(d) the Government of a majority by a minority. Those who profess to apprehend this consequence overlook the fact that the Administration of Palestine will be controlled by a great Power or combination of Powers under a mandate.

None can deny the present backward state of industry and agriculture in Palestine. It is in the co-operation of the Zionists with the future Mandatory Power that a remedy for this unhappy condition of affairs must be sought. Ends.

No. 354

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1324 [144109/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 7, 1919

My Lord,

I transmit herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to the Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, on the subject of the subsidy to His Highness Emir Feisal for the expenses of the Arab administration in that portion of the Occupied Enemy Territories of Syria and Palestine which has hitherto been known as Occupied Enemy Territory East.

I request that Your Excellency will take the necessary steps to inform both the French Government and His Highness the Emir that with effect from the 1st November 1919 the monthly subsidy of £150,000 hitherto paid by His Majesty's Government will be reduced to £75,000.

Your Lordship should add, in your communication to the French Government, that His Majesty's Government would remind them that Monsieur Clemenceau has undertaken on behalf of the French Government that with effect from the same date a similar monthly subsidy of £75,000 will be paid to His Highness Emir Feisal by the French Government: but in your communication to His Highness Emir Feisal Your Lordship should merely refer him, for the question of the remaining half of the subsidy, to the minutes of the meeting held at 10, Downing Street on Friday the 19th September 1919,<sup>1</sup> of which a copy was furnished to His Highness at the time.<sup>2</sup>

I am, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 354

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 5, 1919

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Intelligence, and begs to inform him that Lord Curzon's attention has been drawn to paragraph 3 of telegram No. EA 2748 of the 18th October from General Headquarters Egypt to the War Office.<sup>3</sup>

Major General Sir William Thwaites has no doubt seen a copy of the minutes of a meeting held at No. 10 Downing Street on the 19th September,<sup>1</sup> in the course of which the Prime Minister informed His Highness Sherif

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure in No. 283.

<sup>2</sup> The communications here indicated to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal were made accordingly by the British Embassy in Paris on November 8, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> This paragraph read: 'O.E.T. East is on different footing [from O.E.T. North and West as regards administrative expenditure] as sum [£]150,000, a ? sum inherited by H.M. Government, has been fixed sum irrespective of actual administrative needs and has included Feisal's privy ? purse. Presume this subsidy forms ? subject of discussion between H.M. Govt. and French Government. Proposed to cease payment after October pending instructions.'

Feisal that the French Government were prepared to undertake the payment of one half of the subsidy to the Arab administration of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration East.

Lord Hardinge presumes that the General Officer Commanding Egypt Force is being instructed to continue the payment of the subsidy sanctioned in Treasury letter No. 4315/19<sup>4</sup> of the 19th March 1919, but at the reduced rate of £75,000 per month instead of £150,000. The immediate discontinuance of the subsidy would, in Lord Hardinge's opinion, have a most undesirable political effect.

\* Not printed.

No. 355

*Letter from Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Lord Hardinge  
(Received November 10)  
Unnumbered [150511/2117/44A]*

PARIS, November 7, 1919

Dear Lord Hardinge:—

General Haddar [? Haddad] Pasha has just been to see me and asked me to transmit to the Prime Minister the enclosed letter from the Emir Feisal. There are three enclosures in the Emir's letter to Mr. Lloyd George:—

- (1) copy of a letter from Monsieur Clemenceau to the Emir, dated November 2;
- (2) copy of the Emir's answer to Monsieur Clemenceau, dated November 5 and,
- (3) a note addressed by the Emir to the Supreme Council, dated November 6.

General Haddar Pasha handed me at the same time the enclosed cypher telegram<sup>1</sup> for the Emir Zeid at Damascus from the Emir Feisal, and requested that it should be sent to the latter from the Foreign Office as has been done on previous occasions.

Yours very truly,  
GEORGE GRAHAME

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 355  
*The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George*

PARIS, November 6, 1919

Your Excellency,

I came to Paris, as you advised, and have been here about fifteen days. I have done my best to keep on good terms with the French Government, endeavouring to eliminate misunderstandings and to meet our mutual interests. In fact, I even told M. Berthelot and M. Gout that I am ready to write a letter to the French Government in which I will guarantee to uphold French interests in Syria, thereby giving them full confidence in my good-

\* Not attached to filed original.

will and proving that I shall take no stand against them in the future. I also invited them to discuss with me, through a committee which shall be held for that purpose, the withdrawal of British troops and the type of administration thereafter suitable for maintaining the unity of the country. I fully explained to them all my reasons for this, but you will see by the enclosed letter that M. Clemenceau does not approve of such a procedure.

To-day I lunched with M. Berthelot and thought that he intended to discuss the present situation with me. However, it was evident later that he intended to have me talk with General Gouraud, who was also present. As soon as we left the table M. Berthelot withdrew and left me alone with the General. We had a long talk, similar to my previous conversations with other officials. In this case there was a slight difference, for the General admitted that the Arabs were right and that they cannot accept the division of their country. He expressed his sympathy, but told me he would be obliged to carry out all orders he might receive. He further said that although he disapproved of bloodshed he could not hesitate to meet it if his orders required it.

This is a brief summary of what has happened in Paris, and will prove to your Excellency that I have made every effort to reach an agreement with the French Government, and that I have done my best to continue with them my ever peaceful policy. I have been obliged to refer the entire matter to the Supreme Council, trusting they will take it in hand and save me from bearing the responsibility of any unfortunate outcome. I abhor bloodshed but I see that the French Government may bring it about by insisting on the withdrawal of the British troops and the upheaval of the present regime in Syria, before any step is taken to reassure the people as to the future of their country and unity of the administration.

The Arab Syrian Nation will do everything in their power to defend their independence and this unity, and they intend to make every effort in this connection. Are the British Government and your country willing to stifle national feeling in Syria and to expose the innocent to annihilation? I wish greatly to know your ideas on this subject, because I earnestly desire to follow your advice in all these matters.

I beg, therefore, for your assistance before the Supreme Council, as you have kindly given it before in your approval of assembling a special mixed commission. Without that we can never put an end to the present disagreement.

I have, &c.

FEISAL

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 355

*M. Clemenceau to the Emir Feisal*

PARIS, le 2 novembre 1919

Altesse,

Vous avez bien voulu me signaler, par votre lettre du 25 octobre dernier,<sup>2</sup> l'inquiétude que vous a fait éprouver la décision prise par la Conférence de

<sup>2</sup> This letter was evidently not communicated to the Foreign Office.

la Paix le 15 septembre dernier relativement à la relève des troupes anglaises par les troupes françaises dans une zone définie en Syrie et en Cilicie.

Vous craignez que l'exécution de cette décision ne soit interprétée par les Arabes et les Syriens comme un partage de la Syrie et ne risque par là de donner naissance à des troubles dont vous voudriez dégager votre responsabilité.

En vue d'éviter ces éventualités, votre Altesse propose de constituer une Commission chargée d'étudier les modalités de l'évacuation des troupes anglaises, de créer une administration provisoire de nature à sauvegarder l'unité du pays, à conserver l'harmonie entre les différentes zones occupées et d'assurer les droits des habitants.

J'ai pris connaissance de vos vues avec beaucoup de sympathie et je tiens à vous déclarer, d'une manière générale, que le Gouvernement français n'a jamais cessé d'être sincèrement désireux d'assurer à la Syrie, comme à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays d'Orient délivrés par la victoire des Alliés, le régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès, conforme aux principes libéraux de sa politique, qui sont en même temps ceux de la Conférence de la Paix.

Je reste persuadé que la confiance établie entre les Arabes et leurs Alliés, pendant la guerre poursuivie en commun, permettra de régler leurs relations conformément à leurs traditions, aux vœux des populations et à la liaison de leurs intérêts. Les Gouvernements français et anglais resteront à cet égard aussi étroitement associés dans la paix qu'ils l'ont été dans la guerre.

La question que vous voulez bien poser aujourd'hui est moins étendue et me paraît d'une grande simplicité; il ne s'agit, en effet, que de faits, sans que le droit puisse être modifié. Ni la condition politique de la Syrie, ni ses frontières éventuelles ne sont en question. Vos inquiétudes et celles que la population pourrait éprouver doivent donc être facile[s] à dissiper. Dans les régions où les soldats français prendront la place des soldats anglais, j'ai la certitude que nos chefs militaires sauront rassurer les populations et maintenir l'ordre. Il vous appartient, avec votre haute autorité, d'agir de même à Damas et à Alep: je suis tout prêt à venir à votre premier appel pour vous aider à maintenir l'ordre, s'il venait à être troublé par des agitateurs qui ne pourraient que compromettre les intérêts des Arabes et diminuer la confiance que la Conférence est prête à leur accorder.

Un simple exposé des faits vous montrera que la nomination d'une Commission ne ferait actuellement que compliquer la situation et serait même en contradiction avec la décision du Conseil suprême.

Le 15 septembre dernier Mr. Lloyd George a fait connaître à la Conférence<sup>3</sup> que les nécessités de la démobilisation l'amenaient à retirer les troupes britanniques de la Cilicie et de la Syrie, et à proposer que les soldats anglais soient remplacés par des soldats français. Le Conseil suprême a sanctionné cette décision, en prenant acte des réserves faites par le Président du Conseil français sur tout autre point du mémoire de Mr. Lloyd George, et en déclarant que cet arrangement militaire n'avait qu'un caractère temporaire et

<sup>3</sup> See No. 278.

ne préjugeait pas la solution des questions de mandats et de frontières qui seront réglées en même temps que le problème oriental dans son ensemble.

Dans ces conditions, toute garantie est donnée au point de vue de l'avenir, la question politique est intégralement réservée, l'administration locale n'est pas modifiée, aucune décision n'est prise quant aux frontières. L'ensemble des intérêts dont vous vous préoccuppez si légitimement reste confié aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix. La nomination d'une commission pour étudier les modalités de l'évacuation et modifier l'administration actuelle du pays serait non seulement inutile, mais contraire aux décisions du Conseil suprême.

Je suis, d'ailleurs, tout disposé à envisager avec vous, au point de vue de l'avenir, les questions qui vous préoccupent, en tenant compte de nos grands intérêts communs.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

G. CLEMENCEAU

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 355

*The Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau*

PARIS, le 5 novembre 1919

M. le Président,

Je suis heureux de constater dans la réponse que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'envoyer, en date du 2 novembre 1919,<sup>4</sup> une nouvelle confirmation de la sympathie que le Gouvernement français n'a cessé de témoigner à ma nation et une preuve manifeste de son désir d'assurer à la Syrie comme à la Mésopotamie et autres pays arabes libérés, un régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès.

Les Arabes qui ont combattu pour obtenir leur indépendance ne peuvent que se féliciter de ces nouvelles assurances, qui viennent leur confirmer les déclarations antérieures et les promesses réitérées des Puissances alliées. J'en suis d'autant plus heureux moi-même que je n'ai cessé dès la première heure de travailler à l'inauguration de cette politique d'entente et de confiance réciproque qui a contribué à la défaite de l'ennemi et assuré la libération du pays.

C'est précisément dans le but d'entretenir cette amitié et de maintenir cette confiance que je me suis permis d'insister dans ma dernière lettre datée du 25 écoulé,<sup>2</sup> sur l'opportunité de former une commission chargée d'étudier les modalités de la relève des troupes et l'établissement en Syrie d'une administration provisoire propre à en sauvegarder l'unité, conformément aux vœux de la population.

Tout en remerciant votre Excellence de la bienveillance avec laquelle elle a bien voulu examiner mes propositions, je crois, cependant, de mon devoir d'attirer son attention sur les considérations suivantes :

Votre Excellence considère que la question de la relève est extrêmement simple, vu qu'elle ne modifie en rien le droit et qu'elle ne met en question ni

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 2 above.

la condition politique ni les frontières éventuelles de la Syrie. En effet, elle aurait été très simple s'il ne s'agissait que d'un simple retrait de troupes d'occupation, et si au régime de l'unité de l'administration on substituait un autre instrument qui assurerait la cohésion entre les différentes zones du même pays.

Si la condition politique et les frontières éventuelles ne sont pas en question, par contre la vie publique du peuple et l'unité de l'administration du pays sont gravement compromises. L'aide-mémoire de Mr. Lloyd George<sup>3</sup> traduit la préoccupation évidente de mettre à exécution l'accord secret de 1916 qui partage le pays, tue son existence et contre lequel nous n'avons cessé de protester. D'ailleurs, la lecture de cet aide-mémoire suffit pour démontrer qu'il ne s'agit nullement d'une simple opération de retrait de troupes, mais d'une délimitation de sphères d'influence politiques et économiques et en somme du règlement du sort futur de notre pays suivant des intérêts qui lui sont étrangers. Votre Excellence, il est vrai, n'a pas accepté l'ensemble de la proposition, mais il n'en reste pas moins acquis que c'est le point de vue du Gouvernement anglais sur quoi je n'ai pas manqué d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique; et c'est à la suite de mes protestations et après des conversations laborieuses que j'ai pu faire adopter mon point de vue concernant la constitution de la commission.

Ce sont ces graves conséquences de l'avenir qui entretiennent cette atmosphère d'inquiétude et d'angoisse chez le peuple arabe, inquiétude que j'ai eu l'honneur de signaler à votre Excellence et que rien ne saurait calmer tant qu'une nouvelle solution ne sera pas intervenue.

Mon expérience personnelle et ma connaissance du peuple arabe m'autorisent à affirmer à votre Excellence que le peuple syrien ne peut être entraîné par des agitateurs. C'est un peuple conscient de ses droits et de ses devoirs, dont la conduite est inspirée uniquement par le souci d'assurer sa liberté et son indépendance. C'est ce sentiment, c'est cette conscience de lui-même qui l'ont décider [*sic*] à participer à la guerre contre ses frères de religion au moment même où la victoire était encore indécise. Ce peuple n'hésitera pas aujourd'hui à défendre cette liberté et cette indépendance pour laquelle il a combattu, comme hier il n'a pas hésité à se sacrifier pour la conquérir. Tous ceux qui ont été en contact avec lui ont constaté cette suprême résolution, témoin la Commission américaine d'Enquête qui s'est rendue en Orient. Votre Excellence, sûre que tout mouvement qui pourrait se produire dans les régions occupées par les troupes françaises sera étouffé, se montre encore toute prête à venir à mon premier appel pour m'aider à maintenir l'ordre s'il venait à être troublé par des agitateurs dans la région qui m'est confiée.

Que votre Excellence me permette de lui soumettre que les événements qui pourraient se produire, et auxquels j'ai fait allusion, ne seraient nullement le fait d'agitateurs inconscients. Le mouvement qui se produira inévitablement dans le pays est un mouvement essentiellement national où il serait un peu délicat de faire appel à des troupes étrangères, dont l'intervention ne serait pas comprise par le peuple syrien. D'ailleurs, le sentiment développé chez le peuple de Syrie est directement inspiré par les déclarations officielles des

hommes d'État alliés et pour le triomphe duquel les grandes nations, la France à leur tête, ont soutenu la plus terrible et la plus effroyable des guerres.

Les grands chefs de l'armée française, qui ont forcé l'admiration du monde par leur héroïsme en défendant en même temps leur patrie, les principes immortels du Droit et de la Liberté, seraient eux-mêmes dans l'embarras pour tirer l'épée contre un peuple qui, en réclamant son indépendance, ne demande que le droit et la liberté pour lesquels ces mêmes chefs héroïques ont si valeureusement combattu.

Le Conseil suprême, en prenant acte du changement prévu dans la situation actuelle en Syrie, sans m'avoir entendu, m'a imposé une responsabilité grosse de conséquences.

Les Arabes se sont toujours attachés à mériter la confiance des Alliés; et c'est en invoquant les principes que ceux-ci ont proclamés qu'ils fondent leurs espérances pour obtenir la réalisation de leurs légitimes aspirations. Il dépend beaucoup de votre Excellence que cette espérance ne soit point déçue et que leurs convictions ne soient point ébranlées.

Quant aux inquiétudes qui m'assègent et à l'insistance que je témoigne, elles ne proviennent nullement de préoccupations personnelles. Guidé par le constant souci de servir ma nation et d'être loyal vis-à-vis de nos Alliés, j'estime de mon devoir de mettre sous les yeux de votre Excellence la situation telle qu'elle se présente dans la réalité et non telle que d'aucuns voudraient la présenter. J'ai dans mon âme et conscience une vision nette de l'effervescence qui va agiter tout le pays. Encore une fois, le souci de maintenir les meilleures relations entre les Arabes et leurs Alliés et d'écartier tout danger de nature à menacer l'existence de notre jeune nation, me porte à insister auprès de votre Excellence en la priant de soumettre la question à un nouvel examen.

Votre Excellence estime que cette procédure est en contradiction avec l'acte par lequel le Conseil suprême a pris connaissance de la décision de deux Gouvernements alliés. Ma responsabilité étant de ce fait directement engagée, je crois de mon devoir de m'adresser au Conseil suprême lui-même et j'ose croire que votre Excellence voudra bien employer sa puissante influence et son bienveillant concours pour me faciliter ma tâche et m'aider à me dégager des grandes responsabilités qui pèsent sur moi.

En terminant, je remercie votre Excellence des dispositions favorables qu'elle a témoignées en se montrant prête à envisager avec moi, au point de vue de l'avenir, les questions qui nous préoccupent. Je me permets de lui réitérer les déclarations que j'ai déjà faites à M. Berthelot concernant mon vif désir d'arriver promptement à un accord définitif pouvant assurer, avec la liberté et l'indépendance, le progrès et le développement du peuple arabe.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

FEISAL

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 355

*The Emir Feisal to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference*

November 6, 1919

I was called in September from Damascus by his Excellency the Prime Minister of Great Britain to discuss the Syrian Question with the Great Powers. In London, his Excellency handed me an *aide-mémoire* involving certain changes in the present administration in Syria. He said that similar copies were handed to the representatives of France, America, and Italy. I understood from the correspondence and interviews which ensued that the said *aide-mémoire* was not based on an agreement between Great Britain and any other Power, but it is simply a statement showing the decision of Great Britain taken for reasons of economy as to the withdrawal of her troops from certain Arab provinces. The whole question is supposed to be a provisional military arrangement, neither administrative nor political, taken for the maintenance of order until the final decision of the Peace Conference as to the future government of the country.

Having carefully read this document and having closely observed the general situation in the Arab provinces since the Treaty of Truce was signed with Turkey (and as you know I am in a good position to judge of the affairs of my country), I came to the conclusion that the execution of this project would not only entail disagreement with the rights of nations, but would also be detrimental to the interests of the country and my people, and destructive to public peace throughout the East. I am persuaded that the Great Powers with interests in the East will suffer harm in proportion to their respective interests. The two Powers cannot have been aware of the troubles which may arise from any alteration in the *status quo* established since the occupation; for this agreement will alter the provisional administration established since the occupation without making any suitable arrangement in lieu of it.

When the British Government informed me of this plan, which they called a 'suggested project', based on the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, I protested, and put on record my reasons for so doing. The British Government, having realised the gravity of the situation, accepted the proposal to appoint a Committee of American, British, French, and Arab delegates to consider the questions involved in the impending evacuation and to establish a unified provisional administration to take the place of the present régime. When, however, the proposal was referred to the French Government, I was informed by Lord Curzon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that M. Clemenceau did not approve the suggestion, and expressed the desire to see me in Paris. Furthermore, the French Government also refused to agree, as they informed me themselves, to the British proposal, except in regard to the evacuation of British troops on November 1st. The two Governments, considering exclusively their own interests in the question, have not given full consideration to the effect it will have on the Syrian people. As I am responsible for the safety and welfare of my country, I have similarly informed the French Government of the reasons for my inability to agree to the arrangement, and

again proposed a mixed commission. The French Premier in his reply declines to accept any of my proposals, because he says that he cannot go against a decision taken by the Supreme Council, adding that French troops are ready to maintain order in their zone and to assist me to do the same in my own district on my first call. I believe that M. Clemenceau is under the impression that the movement of which we are afraid will be due to 'agitators', and not a spontaneous outburst of national feeling. I doubt if the Supreme Council and public opinion throughout the civilised world would approve of suppressive measures against perfectly legitimate national movements that could only result in bloodshed. The Supreme Council, I understand, has taken no decision in the matter, having merely 'noted' the fact of the agreement, on September 15th, 1919,<sup>3</sup> and communicated to me by the French Government. The Council presumably believed that the suggested project was simply to relieve troops and did not entail any political or administrative change in the occupied enemy territory now administered in the name of the Allies. It is clear, therefore, that the 'suggested project' was not approved by the authorities concerned, and should therefore be given fresh consideration and discussion by the Supreme Council. I beg herewith to briefly expose some of the principal reasons for my objections to the proposal which will plunge the people into despair as to their future.

1. I find it difficult to understand that the project is a purely military one. It seems to me that it contains many economic and political points that should only be decided by the Peace Conference. The fact of taking away the supreme power of administration from a single head and the division of the country into three different zones, each reporting to a separate Government and acting through a different system, is surely a very important change in the present administration, and cannot be called a military measure. Such matters as the railway arrangements and zones of influence, &c., &c., do not come within the measures to be taken for the preservation of order, until a final settlement of the Syrian Question by the Peace Conference.

2. According to the proposed arrangements the Arab provinces are to be divided into three districts, one under British administration, another under French, and the third under the Arab Government. This is to say that the Syrian nation, which has always been looking forward to a unity of administration, is now to be split up and each part put under a separate Government. The harm resulting therefrom is a deadly blow to the country. Dissension between the inhabitants of different districts, possibly fostered and encouraged by ignorant officials, or even competition between different administrators, will increase, and thereby neutralise any benefits which might have come through one distinct administration. Troubles will begin on the frontiers and will spread into the heart of the country.

Furthermore, that portion left to the Arab Government is said to be an independent Arab province, but is again divided into different zones of influence, one under the British and the other under the French. Any assistance required for one of these two sub-divisions should be asked for from the Power which exercises influence over it. Has ever a nation in the history of

the world been able to make any progress under such obstructive circumstances? This arrangement will undoubtedly dishearten the people and create disaffection among them. They will feel distrust of the Allies and will do everything in their power to defend the unity of their country. They are a weak nation and they will be unable to resist for long, but they will nevertheless meet death for their just cause. Who will then be responsible before the civilised world for such a sacrifice? No one can persuade the people of the country that they are wrong in their fixed ideas. Every one who has had experience of the prevailing feeling amongst the people can say that public order can never be maintained without bloodshed.

3. The withdrawal of British troops is proposed to be made on a ruling which is not recognised by the Arabs nor by the United States Government, who declared on entering the war that they would not recognise any secret agreement. I refer to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which dealt with the country as if it were a private estate or a mere parcel of goods, at a time when her young men were pouring from Syria to the desert and offering their lives for her independence. Any action based on a ruling not recognised by the Peace Conference cannot be executed without a special discussion from that Conference.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, when the Allied troops occupied Syria, ordered me to withdraw my agents from the coast, and made a declaration to the Syrian people that he proposed to occupy the country and establish a unified Government in the name of the Allies. His administration thus formed would remain active until such time as the Peace Conference gave its last decision. The Syrians considered this declaration as a pledge given by the Allies, and their country as being placed as a trust in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, acting on behalf of the Allies, and establishing one single administration which he promised to maintain as above stated. I take it that no change in the fundamental basis of this arrangement can be made before the proper time comes or before another administration based on the same principles is established. Great Britain recognises this pledge, but says it was not anticipated that such a long delay would pass before such a decision should be taken by the Conference. Is this delay the fault of the Arab Syrian nation, or have we committed any disloyalty which deserved such a punishment? We have always shown complete loyalty to the Allies, ever since we rose against the Turks, and the least we expect is the fulfilment of a promise given by the Commander-in-Chief.

5. The over-excited feeling now prevailing in the Arab provinces, as well as all other Moslem provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, caused mainly by unwise foreign interference, is no longer a secret. Any person having the slightest knowledge of what has been going on in the Syrian province is undoubtedly convinced that there will be trouble, and in many places, if the *status quo* of the present administration is changed.

I therefore beg you in the name of humanity and the interests of peace, in the name of the Arab nation and in the name of the multitudinous interests

of France, Italy, Great Britain, and America in the eastern world, that no new doors be opened for further troubles, of which we all may see the beginning, but of which the end cannot be foretold. The incidents of Smyrna and other places are still fresh in our memory.

I very much fear that the mischief will spread throughout the Moslem world. The people will think that there is a definite intention to persecute Islam. You may still remember that the rising of the Arabs, headed by my father the King, has given the first blow against the hated principle of fanaticism. The Arabs attacked the Moslem Turks because they were oppressors, and joined the Allies believing that they were fighting for right and justice irrespective of religion. I personally throughout the war have been fighting fanaticism at every time and place. Arabs gathered around me from every direction and every religion. Our unity was national and not religious. A great number of men who are working with me now in this national cause do not belong to my religion. This must prove to you how distressed I shall be if this high ideal is debased to religious conflict through misunderstanding, mismanagement, and imprudence.

You must agree with me that it is in the interests of all to preserve the utmost tranquillity during the short period of time previous to the final decision of the Peace Conference, rather than cause trouble to occur for no logical reason. I am therefore of the opinion that the Great Powers should be informed of the serious situation as we know it, so that immediate steps be taken for the interested Allied Powers and brethren in arms to consider the interests of each Government according to the ideal of justice for which we have fought together.

I conclude by emphasising my request to be allowed to lay in person a full statement of my case, which touches my country more closely than it does any other, for it will be on me and my people that the results of any action, whether for good or evil, will fall.

FEISAL

No. 356

*Letter from Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Mr. Campbell<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/France]*

My dear Campbell,

PARIS, November 9, 1919

Your private telegram of yesterday's date and my telegram of today's date about Syria.<sup>2</sup>

I presume that Lord Curzon will have seen my private letters to Lord Hardinge dated November 5<sup>3</sup> and November 7.<sup>4</sup> I enclosed in the latter a letter in an open envelope addressed to the Prime Minister by the Emir Feisal containing copies of correspondence between him and M. Clemenceau, and of the note addressed by the Emir to the Supreme Council.

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> These private telegrams are untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> This private letter is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>4</sup> No. 355.

I transmit to you herewith an interview with General Gouraud which appeared in the *Matin* this morning.<sup>5</sup> You will see that he expects to leave Marseilles for Syria probably on the 13th instant. He will be accompanied by a strong civil and military staff.

General Haddar [sic] Pasha told me that when M. Berthelot invited the Emir alone to luncheon to meet General Gouraud, the Emir thought that he was to have a heart-to-heart talk with them both. Politics were, however, not mentioned at luncheon, and immediately afterwards M. Berthelot left the Emir and General Gouraud *tête-à-tête*. I imagine from the account of what passed given me by Haddar Pasha, that M. Berthelot's design was to get General Gouraud to tell the Emir bluntly that if there should be any trouble in Syria between the French and the Arabs, he, as a soldier, would carry out inflexibly the orders of his Government, whatever they were, and thus to impress the Emir with a sense of what he has to expect if he runs up against France.

There must necessarily be a quantity of questions which will arise between the Emir Feisal's administration and that of General Gouraud in the immediate future. The latter is not the man to expose himself to a military disaster, and presumably he will be supplied with sufficient troops to control the situation.

In any local negotiations between the French and the Arabs it seems to me that the Emir Feisal will stand a poor chance of success when confronted with General Gouraud's administration, which will have a strong diplomatic position in virtue of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. There is also the question of the monthly subsidy of £75,000 from the French to the Arab administration, which will doubtless be used as a lever and the payments made dependent on the attitude of the Emir Feisal towards France.

Yours very truly,  
GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

### No. 357

*M. Clemenceau to Mr. Lloyd George<sup>1</sup>*

[155729/2117/44A]

[Translation]

PARIS, November 9, 1919

The Prime Minister,

I have to thank you for the perfect clearness with which you have expressed your point of view concerning our Syrian negotiations, just as I have myself, counting on the friendly intentions of British policy with regard to France.

You gave us the proof of your intentions when you declared to the Emir Feisal that you took responsibility for the relief of the British troops by French troops, and that you advised him to come here to reach an understanding with the French Government.

In point of fact, if this procedure had been followed at once at the begin-

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter was communicated to the Foreign Office on November 11, 1919.

ning, that is to say, at the time of the occupation of Damascus a year ago, the recent misunderstandings would without doubt have been avoided. I am pleased to think that henceforth there is no chance of their recurring between us, and that the Peace Conference will have nothing to do but to sanction our agreement for the French mandate in Syria and the British mandate in Mesopotamia. Each of us will arrange with the Arab Governments and administrations of our respective mandates the liberal conditions under which we will respectively give our effective support and assistance in accordance with our agreements.

I have never called in doubt the sincerity of the sentiments of the British Government, nor have I ever suspected the uprightness of Sir E. Grey, whose character is just as deeply respected in France as in Great Britain; but in my view, the secondary agents on the spot, who do not realise the complexities of the situation, have let themselves be influenced by the fact of the British occupation of the Syrian territories.

I do not intend to take up point by point the detailed historical discussion contained in your note of the 18th October,<sup>2</sup> although I continue to regret that we were not called upon to defend our interests ourselves at the time of the agreements of 1915, not even the text of which had been communicated to us, just as our agreements of 1916 had not been communicated to the Arabs—a dangerous omission, whence spring the principal difficulties with Feisal, who considers the agreements of 1916 as a secret understanding between us for the partition of the Arab countries, contrary to the agreements, in too absolute a form, of 1915 with King Hussein.

I interpret in a manner less restrictive than you the rights which result for the French and British Governments with regard to the Arab Governments from the text of the agreements of 1916 and the declaration of November 1918. These rights will, moreover, be finally defined by the terms of the mandate which the Conference alone is qualified to determine.

I must, however, make two points clear:—

The replacement (which I had failed to notice) of the term ‘protéger’ by that of ‘soutenir,’ effected several months after the signature of the agreements and accepted by M. Paul Cambon on his own initiative, had as its only object to avoid an ambiguity, our intention being not to exercise a protectorate over the Arab federations, but merely to lend them our exclusive assistance in every form.

As regards our conversation of December 1918, I cannot admit that I consented without an equivalent to the extension of the British mandate to Mosul and to Palestine. It would have been unprecedented that such concessions should have been made without any precise definition on paper, all the advantage being on the one side. You may remember that, when the question was on the point of being taken up again, I proposed to you, as well as to President Wilson, a new distribution of the mandates in Asia Minor. Perhaps you have kept the map which I thought it necessary to communicate to you to this effect.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 334.

The case of Mosul has, moreover, this special aspect, that the town is included in the Arab zone of the French mandate under the same category as Damascus and Aleppo, *and is claimed by our Arab Allies under the same conditions.*

I welcome with the greatest satisfaction the assurance that the Arabs have not received a single rifle, machine-gun, or gun, contrary to the reports furnished by our agents on the spot, just as I have read with the greatest pleasure the declarations made to the Emir Feisal.

I share your opinion as to the very serious importance of an agreement with the Emir Feisal. The negotiations pursued on our side with him at Paris have been very courteous, although they have not yet resulted in an agreement. The essential difficulty lies not in the excessive ambitions of France, but in the absolute designs of the Emir, who does not seem yet really to understand the necessity for the Arabs to accept a French mandate and a British mandate with a view to organising and developing the Arab States. His general attitude makes as difficult for you as for us the unequivocal understanding which we all desire, but which demands from each of us equivalent concessions. However this may be, the intermediate phase of the mandate, the utility of which has notwithstanding been confirmed by the Conference, is not yet frankly admitted by him. I would not despair of convincing him.

The French Government have not failed to confirm to him that they were resolved to remain in full agreement with the British Government in peace just as in war, and that every attempt to separate the two policies would be in vain. The alliance of the two peoples, and the depth of the sentiments which bound them after five years of war carried on in common, are the most certain and the most precious guarantee for the peace of the world.

Please accept, &c.

CLEMENCEAU

### No. 358

*Colonel Meinertzhang (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)*

*No. C.P.O. 311 [156779/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, November 10, 1919

My Lord,

In amplification of my cable No. 49305 [493]<sup>1</sup> of the 6th instant, I have the honour to submit the following report on the present situation in Syria and Palestine.

#### *Situation in Syria*

The temperament of the inhabitants, already strained by uncertainty and delay, is rendered doubly suspicious and alarmed by the commencement of the evacuation and the increasingly violent tone of Turkish propaganda. Turkish influence is gradually creeping back, and signs are not wanting of a

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received November 8) briefly summarized the first part of the present despatch.

rejuvenated popularity of Turkish rule with all its forgotten disadvantages. The main theme of all propaganda is the religious argument, which is producing an anti-European and pan-Islamic feeling. This is not confined to Syria alone, but has been recently traced in Jerusalem and other Palestinian centres.

1. There are, however, two distinct schools of political opinion. The one is anxious to accept any Government which gives security and permits healthy development; the other is above all anti-French, but also would prefer the exclusion of all foreign elements and the reinstatement of pre-war conditions. This latter party is in the majority in the towns and along the Arab-French borders. To the more moderate party, who are willing to accept a French mandate, belong the more educated business men, the majority of the Bedouin, and the Druzes of Jebel Druze. Great efforts have been made by the Arab authorities to win over these two latter peoples, but it is my opinion that the Rualla tribe under Nuri Shalan are not concerned with the choice of a mandatory Power or the unity of Syria. They are willing to accept any Government which does not attempt to control them, but which is willing to buy their friendliness with subsidies. The Druzes have alone shown a willingness to accept a *fait accompli*, and have given signs of ingratiating themselves with the French, this being due to our persistent attitude of neutrality and not to any liking for the French. Their threat to give active assistance to their brethren in the Lebanon is, I consider, as empty as any Bedouin threat to leave the desert and assist Feisal in military operations in the Lebanon and on the Syrian coast. I may add that I recently visited the Rualla tribe encamped some 50 miles east of Damascus, where I found them most friendly, though they pointed out that French officers would not be allowed to wander about the desert in motor-cars. They were, however, willing to accept a subsidy from the French so long as it was paid to them in Damascus and not in the desert. I do, however, intend to get into closer touch with the Druzes of Jebel Druze when the evacuation is complete, at the express invitation of their head, Selim Pasha-el-Atrash.

Yasin Pasha, the leading spirit in Syria, is now known to be in correspondence with Mustapha Kemal, though actual proof could only be obtained by using violence on the disguised Turkish officers who act as carriers. Yasin is aiming at reinstating Turkish rule in Syria, not so much on national or pan-Arab grounds, as on those of personal power; in this he is an open disciple of Jemal. There is little doubt that at the present moment Yasin's influence has replaced for the bad the more moderate and reasonable influence of Feisal. He now carries with him the army and the majority of the people. It is even doubtful now whether Feisal can assume control over an administration which must move with public opinion or disappear.

A situation which contains a large percentage of genuine national feeling and a conviction of having been unfairly treated cannot fail to be dangerous when religious feelings are used as a stimulant and when the leading spirit is governed by personal ambition and imbued with a brain which is as quick as it is unscrupulous.

2. Damascus is the natural centre of political feeling; other towns will be largely guided by events in that city. I therefore do not anticipate any serious trouble till we commence to evacuate Damascus. Arab feeling has been changed from anti-French to anti-European. This is now noticeable in propaganda where hostile allusions are made to the English and friendly overtures made to Turks and even Germans. Unarmed demonstrations, previously of rare occurrence and with good-natured intent, have now given place to armed demonstrations of almost daily occurrence. It is noteworthy that in Damascus the Arabs are trying to win over the Christians and even the Jews to assist them against the French. An offer of arms has been made to both these communities. On the frontier between O.E.T.A. East and West incidents have occurred between French and Arab gendarmerie, which, though trivial in themselves, might at any moment necessitate military intervention. In the Lebanon there are frequent but isolated acts of violence in which French troops have on more than one occasion been used.

Though bad in themselves, the above factors constitute nothing more than was to have been expected; when taken collectively they build up an anxious situation, whose future improvement or otherwise is at present difficult to foresee.

Our military policy is to conduct the evacuation without incident. Our political policy has been to remove the bitter anti-French feeling among the Arabs, to explain to them the purely temporary nature of the Anglo-French *aide-mémoire* of the 13th Sept., 1919,<sup>2</sup> and to induce them to accept it, using much the same arguments as were used in your letter to Feisal dated the 9th Oct., 1919.<sup>3</sup> I regret to say that such arguments have not produced much effect in Syria. Similarly with the French local authorities, I have endeavoured to explain to them our one desire to work whole-heartedly in assisting them, our innocence of the various anti-French intrigues and propaganda of which they continue to accuse us, and the necessity of their showing a more conciliatory attitude to the Arabs. Their policy in this respect can only be described as irritating, and is not free from a suspicion that they are trying to embroil us with the Arabs before evacuation.

Under these circumstances political officers find it most difficult to maintain a strictly neutral attitude, and their refusal to take sides, when two distinct sides exist, has been the cause of a considerable loss to our prestige among the Arabs and increased mistrust by the French.

The French, moreover, take a totally different view of the situation. Their contempt for the Arab is undisguised, and it is typical of their attitude that M. Picot informed me only a week ago that ten French soldiers could do anything and go anywhere in Syria either during or after the evacuation.

3. Trans-Jordan has remained remarkably apathetic to events in Syria. Beyond the normal inter-tribal and inter-village quarrels, which often involve the loss of life, there has been no untoward incident during the last two months. The country is very loosely administered, and the local responsible natives depend considerably on the advice of political officers.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 278 and Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

<sup>3</sup> No. 309.

The evacuation of Syria by our troops and the splitting up of O.E.T.A. East into a northern and southern zone, under French and British mandates respectively, brings up the question of the administration of the southern zone. Presumably the present system will be continued; that is to say, it will be administered by the British Commander-in-chief, through an Arab Administration whose headquarters are necessarily at Damascus. Doubtless your Lordship has considered this anomaly and the advisability of having a British official at Arab Administrative Headquarters at Damascus who can deal with the Arab Administration on all questions affecting the southern zone.

There are other questions which require an early ruling, such as the administration of the Deraa-Haifa Railway, now that its workshops at Damascus cease to be under British influence, the control of the Arab Army in the two zones, and whether Feisal can be permitted to move troops freely from one zone to another, and the eastern boundary of the southern zone. These points have been referred by the Commander-in-Chief to the War Office.

#### *Situation in Palestine*

In Palestine there has been a marked improvement in the political situation.

The assembly of the newly constituted Zionist Commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Weizmann has already done a great deal to relieve the burden of trivial detail from our Administration and to weld together the Jewish elements in Palestine. M. Usshiskin's attitude at the outset was one of overbearing intolerance with a contempt for compromise. His relations with British officials were of an unhappy nature, which was accentuated by the fact that he cannot speak English. This has now been remedied by confining M. Usshiskin's activities to pure routine matter within the Zionist Commission. Dr. Weizmann has been well received wherever he has gone, his personality going a long way to allaying feeling among the more responsible Moslem heads. The Arab national and irreconcilable elements have so far failed in producing any political effect, and their threats have not materialised, though their activities, directed against the British and Zionists, still continue.

My conviction that anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine is largely artificial and has been exaggerated both locally and at home is more than ever confirmed on further investigation. I do not anticipate any serious trouble in the initial stages of Zionism with the present moderation displayed by Zionist leaders.

There are, however, certain factors which still continue to foment a feeling antagonistic to Zionism and a British mandate over Palestine.

Events in Egypt and Syria are reflected in Palestine in an exaggerated form, and a serious situation or disorders in either of the two former countries would produce a wave of feeling in Palestine which would find its butt in Zionism.

The Arabs in Palestine are well armed and have plenty of ammunition.

I do not pay much attention to this quite normal state of affairs, though it produces a feeling of insecurity among the community who regard Zionism as the spark which may light a general Palestinian conflagration, an opinion which I do not share.

I have confronted the local French authorities with their anti-Zionist propaganda in Palestine, and they agreed to stop it. I was gratified to hear that French officials have already received instructions from Paris that their attitude towards Zionism is to be of a more friendly nature.

Italian propaganda is of a more serious and complex nature, and has been conducted in a much more subtle manner. Up to the present it has been difficult to gauge either its scope or intention. The Banco di Roma has fallen under suspicion as a political agency, Italian Roman Catholic organisations in Palestine have been active in furthering Italian popularity, and Cardinal Giustini's recent visit to Jerusalem assumed an ill-concealed political role. It is also known that the Vatican is violently opposed to Zionism, as has already been reported to your Lordship.

I do not, however, anticipate much effect from any of these disturbing factors, though they will have to be carefully watched and countered.

There are in Palestine at the present moment two points calling for attention, neither of which is due to outside or hostile influence.

The first is lack of co-ordination and patience among the Jews themselves. This is being satisfactorily dealt with by the Zionist Commission and will be largely dissipated by the publication of the declaration embodied in your telegram No. 1216<sup>4</sup> of 7th November.

The second feature is the lack of some visible sign of the birth of Zionism in Palestine. This opens up several important questions which must be faced in the near future. I wish now to draw your Lordship's attention to the very great hardships now being experienced in Palestine from the delay in signing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Industrial and agricultural progress is impossible under the laws and usages of war, the influx of capital is checked owing to uncertainty in the future, and general stagnation is writ large on the face of Palestine. We cannot stand by indefinitely and see Palestine and the Zionist cause rotting, more especially when the obstruction is the Allies' delay in settling peace with Turkey. Such conditions cannot and should not be allowed to continue and, in fairness to all sections in Palestine, I consider, they are and have been patient under very trying circumstances, and that they have every right to demand a modification on certain lines. The Zionist Commission have drawn up a constructive scheme of work which they wish to undertake at once, and of which the following is a summary.

The Zionists are the only organisation now in Palestine with the necessary brains, energy, and resources to institute a commencement to progress, and in accordance with the policy of His Majesty's Government, the Zionists are the right and proper body to undertake preparatory measures for building up their national home and for easing the general economic situation.

\* No. 353.

The following suggestions are, in my opinion, admissible and can materialise under the strict letter of the laws and usages of war:—

1. The taking over of the Wieland Factory at Jaffa by the Zionists on a lease for a term of years, with a view to the manufacture of building material. The factory is German owned.
2. The purchase of land by the Zionists to enable them to construct one or more cement factories in suitable but as yet undecided localities. I am informed that £300,000 is available on this account.
3. The acquisition of the Sarona and Wilhelmina colonies, where some 70 houses give the Zionists a suitable housing basis for immigrants of the skilled classes.
4. The building of good hotels in certain centres. This is a want which is largely felt by all classes in Palestine.
5. The opening of a large store which would benefit all classes in Jerusalem, with branches elsewhere.
6. The opening of the Land Registries on a limited and strictly controlled scale.
7. Permission to introduce some 500–700 skilled workmen into Palestine to develop the above schemes.

I submit this comprehensive programme with hesitation, but only after fully going into each point. I am satisfied that the schemes are not only practicable but desirable from a general utility point of view. They establish first-class industries, give a large employment to Arabs, bring about a considerable circulation of new money, they constitute work of a preliminary nature and vital to the success of Zionism, they generally benefit the whole community and fall within the scope of the laws and usages of war.

I have outlined the above programme only in an anticipatory sense. Each and every scheme where policy is involved will be submitted to you for sanction before its inauguration.

I have, &c.  
R. MEINERTZHAGEN

#### No. 359

*Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 13)*

*No. 1568 Telegraphic [150660/2117/44A]*

*CAIRO, November 11, 1919*

Following is paraphrase of telegram sent by Feisal to Zeid.

Your telegram 222 of November 10.

British Government accepted my suggestion to form Committee to study question of withdrawal but French Government refused on the ground that 'the (?) question is personal' and that Syrians are not prepared for defence by arms. How is situation with you on this matter of defence?

As for my suggestion I have appealed to Supreme Council and am awaiting their decision. (Ends.)

*Letter from Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris) to Mr. Kidston*

(Received November 13)

Unnumbered [151612/2117/44A]

PARIS, November 11, 1919

Dear Kidston,

I am sending you herewith a copy of a minute which I wrote for Crowe bringing out some points which the course of a conversation I recently had with M. Robert de Caix seemed to indicate. As you know he has just left for Syria as civil assistant to General Gouraud. I thought they might be of interest to you, especially as M. Robert de Caix is doubtless regarded in England as in some respects Anglo-phobe. This might perhaps be a justifiable inference from the nature of certain articles he wrote in the spring and summer, notably a long one in the *Bulletin de l'Asie Française*.<sup>1</sup> Our conversation was very frank and I do not think it is just to consider him as anything but most sincerely anxious to co-operate with us.

I omitted one point in my minute, and that is that de Caix spoke about the possibility of dividing the French mandate in such a way that there might be more direct French administration in the Lebanon and in a zone round Alexandretta, with a much looser control over Feisal's state in the interior and of giving Feisal a port such as Tripoli or Latakia with access to the sea. M. de Caix said that the difficulty of this was that his Government were very opposed to ships under the Arab flag appearing in the Mediterranean and calling, for instance, at Algerian or Moroccan ports—for obvious reasons.

It was suggested in our conversation that the difficulty might be overcome by the ships flying a special flag, some combination of the French and Arab flags or some special mandatory flag of the League of Nations and that even if Feisal could not be given a port, special facilities and rights could be given him at one of the ports on the coastal area.

Yours ever,  
ERIC FORBES ADAM

N.B. The correspondence referred to in paragraph 3 of the enclosed minute was enclosed in our despatch No. 628<sup>2</sup> of April 30.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 360

*Minute by Mr. Forbes Adam*

*Copy.*

1. It seems clear that the French realise now that they cannot oust Feisal and set some one else in his place. There have been recently indications that they thought this.
2. In his recent conversation with M. Berthelot and M. Clemenceau Feisal has invariably tried to raise the question of the ultimate settlement and

<sup>1</sup> See No. 228.

<sup>2</sup> See Introductory Note.

refuses to accept the decision as to the evacuation of British troops and the entry of French troops into the blue zone as anything but a first step of the ultimate settlement (as indeed it is in practice if not in theory). The French particularly wish to avoid raising any such question now because they think that they will be in a better position to judge the situation and to negotiate with Feisal when they are in the coastal area. They also think or allege that it may be easier for Feisal to save his face with his own people and accept a French mandate when the French are on the spot. M. de Caix emphasised that they have however no intention of seeking to penetrate into the interior or occupying Damascus.

3. M. Clemenceau is very angry with Feisal because he thinks Feisal has not acted up to the spirit or letter of the correspondence between them last April which M. Robert de Caix had a hand in. M. Robert de Caix emphasised this point and said that he had tried to bring Clemenceau round again to more amicable relations with Feisal, but that Clemenceau, who always acts on instinct, had taken an aversion to Feisal as to other personalities, e.g. M. Bratiano and nothing could be done to move him from his obstinate attitude!

4. The French regard a mandate as something very like a protectorate and rather an annexationist form of protectorate and they hope that the trouble that Feisal's idea of Arab unity may give us in Mesopotamia will lead us to support them in this idea.

5. But they are very anxious to co-operate with us. De Caix emphasised this many times and they realise they can hardly do this, if they use Feisal badly. On the other hand, they are determined not to discuss politics, as Feisal wants, until their troops are in the coastal area. There is thus no basis, they say, for any kind of arrangement with Feisal here in Paris.

November 7.

### No. 361

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)*

*No. 495 Telegraphic [152101/2117/444]*

CAIRO, November 12, 1919

Your telegram No. 1216<sup>1</sup> of 7th November.

Commander-in-Chief agrees with your draft subject to following alteration in paragraph A which begins, 'Any interference with religious customs or holy places by adherents of any religion' and not as in your draft.

Propose publication on receipt of your assent to alteration.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 353.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office telegram No. 340 of November 18, 1919, to Colonel Meinertzhangen at Cairo: 'I agree to publication with the suggested alteration.'

*Note from the French Peace Delegation to the Supreme Council<sup>1</sup>*

[153212/2117/444]

La note que la Délégation du Hedjaz a adressée au Secrétariat général de la Conférence<sup>2</sup> ne paraît pas répondre à la situation présente et ne semble pas susceptible de suite immédiate. Son double but essentiel est en effet:

1. De revenir sur la décision prise par la Conférence le 15 septembre<sup>3</sup> relativement à la relève des troupes anglaises par les troupes françaises en Syrie;

2. De demander à être entendue sur le fond de la question concernant l'administration des populations de la Syrie.

Touchant la relève, aucune modification ne paraît ni utile, ni possible. En fait, d'ailleurs, l'exécution de la mesure est commencée depuis le début du mois et se poursuit dans des conditions qui indiquent que les inquiétudes de l'Émir Faysal ne sont pas justifiées.

La décision de la Conférence a nettement marqué que la relève n'avait que le caractère d'un arrangement purement temporaire et provisoire réglant la continuation de l'occupation militaire indispensable.

Au point de vue de l'avenir, la décision de la Conférence a marqué que la solution définitive des questions de mandats et de frontières n'était pas préjugée par les mesures pratiques et limitées prises en ce moment et ne pourrait être examinée isolément, mais serait étudiée comme partie du problème général de paix avec la Turquie, au moment où la Conférence examinera le règlement d'ensemble de la question d'Orient.

Le Gouvernement français a déclaré verbalement et par écrit à l'Émir Faysal que tel était bien le sens de la résolution de la Conférence du 15 septembre et l'interprétation qu'il y donnait. Il a ajouté que, dans ces conditions, un mouvement indigène ne serait nullement justifié.

Il a eu soin, pour ôter tout prétexte aux agitateurs, de porter à la connaissance des populations syriennes le sens exact des décisions du Conseil suprême et de l'exécution de la relève, en affirmant la volonté commune des Alliés d'assurer aux pays d'Orient libérés par leur victoire le régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès promis aux populations et inspiré de leurs désirs, de leurs vœux et de leur intérêt.<sup>4</sup>

Dans ces conditions, il ne semble pas qu'aucune modification puisse être apportée à la décision concernant la relève, qui ne prête à aucune équivoque, n'engage pas le fond de la question et est en cours d'exécution.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note was transmitted by Sir E. Crowe to the Foreign Office on November 17, 1919 (received November 19).

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 4 in No. 355.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 278.

<sup>4</sup> In this connexion the French Embassy in London had on November 11, 1919, communicated to the Foreign Office the text of a telegram of the previous day from M. Clemenceau to the French representative at Beyrouth instructing him to issue a declaration in the sense here indicated concerning the French relief of British forces in Syria, and the appointment of General Gouraud.

Il ne semble pas, davantage, opportun que le Conseil suprême entende la Délégation hedjazienne sur le fond du problème syrien, qui ne peut être détaché de l'étude d'ensemble de la question d'Orient.

PARIS, le 13 novembre 1919.

No. 363

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [152286/2117/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1919

Present situation in Mesopotamia is causing us considerable anxiety. The existing military administration, which has been necessitated by circumstances of case, is rigid, costly, and hampering to development either of civil administration or of whatever form of native Government is decided in future. It is for the most part in the hands of young officers necessarily lacking in age and experience. We are endeavouring as quickly as possible to transfer departments from military to civil side, but this process is slow and does not meet needs of case. Meanwhile the system of civil administration which is in course of being set up appears neither to fulfil joint declaration of November 1918, nor to satisfy local aspiration, nor to proceed with sufficient rapidity. It is a system of British Government advised by Arabs (and this only to a small extent) rather than of Arab Government by British; and it appears in certain respects to be developing upon familiar Indian lines.<sup>1</sup> Already this system is subjected to severe criticism from many quarters. The French are insisting upon the absolute parallelism of Mesopotamia and Syria, and ask why we should do in Irak what we protest against their doing in Syria. Feisal is quite capable in his difficulties with the French of embarrassing us by similar tactics. His officers are loud in denunciation of Baghdad administration and have now appealed to Peace Conference for immediate constitution of a local national Government in that country and the despatch of an inter-Allied or American Commission of Enquiry to Mesopotamia to take a referendum as to future constitution.<sup>2</sup> A number of local leagues and societies are agitating in similar direction. Finally we receive very disquieting reports from some of our own officials who witness with growing anxiety the existing trend of administration.

Every one agrees that the first condition of recovered confidence and of future settlement is your return as High Commissioner. I share your own feeling that it may be difficult for you to do this until mandate has been given and you can act with undivided authority. This seems to be unlikely until beginning of New Year, although we will do our best to expedite decision of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 204, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> The reference was evidently to an appeal, dated at Damascus, September 20, 1919, from the 'Comité Al-Ahd', claiming to represent 'le peuple arabe de l'Irak tout entier'. A copy of this appeal (not printed), which was as here indicated, was received by the British Delegation in Paris on November 3, 1919, and was transmitted next day to the Foreign Office.

Peace Conference. I think it desirable, however, in any case to make early announcement of your intended return.

But question today is what steps if any should be taken in the interval before your arrival in order to meet legitimate criticism, and to pave way for future constitutional development. Various suggestions have been made:

(1) That a renewed pronouncement of our intentions should be made on lines of November 1918 Declaration.

(2) That a scheme for future Constitution should be worked out by experts either in London or by despatch of a British Commission to Mesopotamia.

(3) That Mesopotamia notables, whether in Mesopotamia or Syria, should be requested to advise.

(4) That an assurance be given to the District and Municipal Councils now in course of formation that, on the grant of the mandate, they will be invited to formulate their own ideas.

Some of these suggestions may be found impracticable. But we are strongly of opinion that something must be said, and in all probability something done, without delay, and we shall be grateful for your advice before taking action. Best solution would no doubt be that you should yourself devise form of Government which it will be your function to administer; and I would gladly suggest this, did I know how it can be managed. Perhaps you may be able to find a plan.

#### No. 364

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

No. 623 [147731/142/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 15, 1919

My Lord,

I have received Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 508<sup>1</sup> of the 16th October in which he raises the question of the succession to the Emirate of Mecca, and suggests that King Hussein may announce his abdication at an early date. I am of the opinion that King Hussein's abdication might even be of advantage to His Majesty's Government provided that it were certain that he would nominate Abdullah as his successor, but that the nomination of Ali would lead to an embarrassing situation. If, therefore, Hussein is likely to appoint Ali, which I understand to be the case, I would prefer that his abdication should be deferred at any rate until after the Turkish settlement.

I should be glad to be informed of Your Lordship's views on the matter, and whether you consider that the subsidy should be used to influence King Hussein to nominate the successor whom His Majesty's Government would prefer to see on the throne.

Your Lordship will doubtless bear in mind that any steps taken by His Majesty's Government with this object might well be regarded as an interference in the prerogatives of the Caliphate, in view of the impossibility of dissociating the temporal functions of the King of the Hejaz from the quasi-

<sup>1</sup> No. 332.

spiritual functions of the Emirate of Mecca. Indeed, it appears possible that as soon as it were known that His Majesty's Government were attempting to influence King Hussein in his choice of his successor, the Sultan might reply by appointing his rival, Ali Haidar, to the Emirate.

I should be glad to have a reply from Your Lordship on this question at your early convenience.

I am, &c.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy.

### No. 365

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 22)*

*No. 499 Telegraphic [154755/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, November 17, 1919

Following from Emir Zeid is for Feisul if you think fit.<sup>1</sup>

It has been shown to French Liaison officer here.

Begins. I cannot stop revolution. The incidents Maa Houleh,<sup>2</sup> the encroachments by French Mazra at Ehshouf (? in) Lebanon, and burning the village,<sup>2</sup> the refugees coming from that village to (? Damascus and) beginning war at Telke Lakh, between (? Daabbdahéh) and French (? boundary) have magnified excitement of people. General Headquarters informed us British forces will deliver Baalbec, Rayak el Muallaka to French before they evacuate and I told them Nation is going to keep present boundaries until future of country decided. If French advance one span from boundaries battles will start. If you like no bloodshed, do best to keep French in present zone. Otherwise responsibility for what occurs in future rest[s] on those who are the cause, consider matter thoroughly, report the results as soon as possible because revolution very near. Zeid (ends). Incidents referred to are in first case a minor frontier gendarmerie affair and in second case French report has not been received.

<sup>1</sup> On November 27, 1919, Lord Curzon transmitted a copy of this telegram to Lord Derby in Paris with instructions to communicate a paraphrase thereof to the Emir Feisal and to inform the French Government at the same time that he had done so.

<sup>2</sup> See below.

### No. 366

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 15)*

*No. C.P.O. 181 [161829/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, November 17, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to approach you on the subject of the future boundaries of Palestine.

I note that Mr. Clemenceau in his memorandum of October 10, 1919,<sup>1</sup> in reply to your memorandum of September 13, 1919,<sup>2</sup> respecting Syria, claims

<sup>1</sup> No. 314.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 278 and Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

in para. 7 that the Palestine-Syrian frontier has been fixed by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and is in accordance with the interests of the two countries. This frontier, as you are aware, leaves the coast, south of Tyre, passes the north end of the Sea of Galilee, and thence across the Yarmuk valley to a point south of Deraa.

The purely provisional line, which for convenience I shall refer to as the Deauville Line and which demarcates the southern limit of the present British evacuation, passes considerably further north of the Sykes-Picot line, leaving the coast at the mouth of the Litany River, follows that river to its bend north, thence to Banias, the Wadi Muganiye and the western edge of the Leja.

The Sykes-Picot Line was fixed before His Majesty's Government was committed to Zionism, and cannot in any sense be said to satisfy the economic interests of Palestine.

The Deauville Line has similar objections in not satisfying the economic interests of Palestine, and appears to be a compromise between the Sykes-Picot Line and the frontier which was proposed in Paris by the British Delegation early this year, and which formed the basis of a discussion between the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau.<sup>3</sup>

The Deauville Line, though of a provisional character, will, from the previous history of such provisional arrangements, have considerable influence on the final decision and will tend to harden into the eventual boundary.

The ultimate development of Palestine west of the Jordan primarily depends upon agriculture by virtue of its soil, climate and proximity to the sea coast. Economic health in Palestine can only be assured by irrigation on a large scale, and the introduction of water other than rain. This water is only procurable in Northern Palestine, from the Jordan sources and the Litany River. Should Palestine be deprived of means of irrigation and water power on a most generous scale, its whole fabric is economically crippled from the outset. The loss of these waters to the Power occupying Syria is small in comparison.

If these economic conditions are to be secured, the northern boundary should (see map attached)<sup>4</sup> run from the sea, just north of the Litany River and following up, and at some distance from, the right bank, cross it from west to east about the Litany gorges. The boundary should thence be guided by including those of the Hermon waters which flow into the Litany or Jordan basins. The Deauville Line, running as it does up the Litany thalweg, neutralises the water, and can only lead to disputes.

Except in the Gaza and Beersheba areas, Palestine west of the Jordan contains no large area of good grain producing country. The Gaza-Beersheba grain area is not a sufficiently large proportion of such land to the rest

<sup>3</sup> The reference is uncertain but was probably to the discussion in the Supreme Council on March 20, 1919, for which see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, pp. 1-14.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. The proposed boundary was as here indicated.

of Palestine, and should be supplemented by areas east of Jordan. This necessity is further emphasised by the desirability of Palestine having control of the Jordan valley as a whole, and the lower waters of Jordan tributaries flowing from the east. The eastern boundary of Palestine should therefore pass some 25 to 30 kilometres west of the Hedjaz railway, after crossing the Yarmuk valley about half-way between Deraa and Samakh.

The Dead Sea offers great chemical possibilities and should be wholly within one mandated territory: the eastern border should therefore continue south, east of the Dead Sea, and thence to a point on the Gulf of Akaba, just east of Akaba town.

Access to the Red Sea, though now of small importance to Palestine, will mean a great deal in the future for an industrial community which desires direct access with India and the far East.

The southern boundary can well remain the old Turkish-Egyptian boundary from the gulf of Akaba to Rafa.

In proposing such a boundary, no effort has been made to introduce arguments of a strategic value. Neither has much attention been paid to Kaza boundaries. Where these exist, they are purely arbitrary, and their alteration involves nothing more than a slight and temporary administrative inconvenience to local inhabitants. In fact the present Kaza boundaries of Syria and Palestine were deliberately made by Turkey with the object of splitting up Communities.

The eastern boundary does, however, cut through country periodically visited by Bedouin. This offers neither difficulties nor hardships, as there is no reason why Bedouin should not continue to undertake their seasonal migrations, provided they conform to the laws of the land. A parallel can be found in the thousands of Afghans with their flocks who migrate every winter from Southern Afghanistan to Sind. History also shows that when we come into direct contact with untamed and lawless communities, an increased security grows up. This is even now beginning to show itself in the Jordan valley.

I have, &c.

R. MEINERTZHAGEN

### No. 367

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received November 29)*

*No. 2166 [156735/2117/44A]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 19, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to the second paragraph of my despatch No. 2083<sup>1</sup> of the 6th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of places from

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The second paragraph of this despatch (received November 22) read: 'The announcement of the decision to substitute French for British occupation of Syria and Cilicia has given a new stimulus to agitation in favour of the contention that Cilicia is a natural and inseparable portion of Turkey. I have received a number of telegrams of the type usual on these occasions, protesting against the French occupation.'

which I have received telegrams of protest against the occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash by the French.

2. The telegrams are of a more or less uniform character, and possess no individual interest. The signatories telegraph for the most part on behalf of local 'national defence' committees. My object in forwarding the list is to show how widespread are the ramifications of the national movement organisation, and how untiring are the efforts of its organisers to popularise the idea of resistance to any decision at the Peace Conference tending to the dismemberment of the territory which remained under direct Turkish administration at the time of the armistice. My French colleague informs me that he also has received a very large number of similar communications.

3. Of more importance than these telegrams from all and sundry is a recent demonstration by the leaders of the national movement themselves. I enclose a full translation of a violent pronouncement issued by them on the 12th November in the form of a telegram to the Turkish Press Association, and to each of the High Commissioners here. This document is sufficiently important to receive your Lordship's special attention.

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's pronouncement was censored out of some of the local papers, but appeared in a sufficient number both in Turkish and in other languages to ensure wide publicity. It created some little stir in the French High Commission, which has a very direct interest in the agitation against the new form given to the occupation of Cilicia. I understand, confidentially, that M. Defrance<sup>2</sup> has been considering the advisability of enlisting the participation of myself and the Italian High Commissioner in a request that the Turkish Government should define their view of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's action in addressing himself direct to the High Commissioners on a matter so exclusively the concern of the Turkish Government as such, and in language so menacing.

5. M. Defrance has not as yet taken action in this sense, but he enquired in conversation with Rear-Admiral Webb<sup>3</sup> what I proposed to do in the matter. Rear-Admiral Webb replied that he had not yet consulted me, but that he thought it probable that I should take no notice of the communication beyond reporting it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 367

*List of Towns in Turkey from which telegrams have been received protesting against the occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash by the French troops, giving the date of the telegrams.*

Aintab . . .	October 25.	Viran Shehir . . .	October 28.
Mardin . . .	{ October 25, 28. November 11, 15.	Kilas . . .	October 28.

<sup>2</sup> French High Commissioner at Constantinople.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

Nassibin	. {	October 29. November 11.	Orkhan Ili	. November 11.
Siverek.	. {	October 30. November 12.	Eski Shehir	. , " 11.
Midyat	. {	October 31. November 13, 14.	Selefke	. , " 11.
Ourfa .	. {	November 1, 7, 12.	Guevyé Akhissar	, " 11.
Elbistan	. .	" 11, 17.	Isnik	. . , " 11.
Maden	. .	" 2, 15.	Mot	. . , " 11.
Dersim	. .	3.	Boz Kir	. . , " 11.
Tokat .	. .	3.	Kangal	. . , " 11.
Elaziz .	. .	4.	Orkhan Ghazi	. , " 11.
Cæsarea	. .	8.	Kastamouni	. , " 11.
Rodosto	. .	8.	Karaman	. , " 11.
Erzindjan	. .	8, 11.	Boghazlayan	. , " 11.
Adrianople	. .	9.	Arabisson	. , " 12.
Yozgat	. .	9.	Selvan	. , " 12.
Seid Ghazi	. .	9.	Havza	. . , " 12.
Tchimishguezek	" .	9.	Divriki	. . , " 12.
Kara Hissar Sharki	" .	9.	Bartin	. . , " 12.
Téké .	. .	9, 11.	Mirefte	. . , " 12.
Rize .	. .	9.	Konia	. . , " 12.
Baba Eski	. .	10.	Ineboli	. . , " 12.
Keshan	. .	10.	Demir Keuy	. . , " 13.
Ismidt .	. .	10.	Mahmoudié	. . , " 13.
Merzi Foun	. .	10.	Bor	. . , " 13.
Bolou .	. .	10.	Zongouldak	. . , " 13.
Tchoroum	. .	10.	Kérédé.	. . , " 13.
Karadsa Bey	" .	10.	Inoz	. . , " 14.
Ak Dagh Maden	" .	10.	Oulou Bouzlou	. . , " 14.
Keupru	. .	10.	Res-ul-Ayn	. . , " 14.
Alaiyé .	. .	10.	Avanos.	. . , " 14.
Oulou Kishla	" .	10.	Mabavri	. . , " 14.
Kirk Kilisse	" .	10.	Akseray	. . , " 15.
Broussa	" .	10.	Kara Hissar	. . , " 15.
Develou	" .	10.	Ladik .	. . , " 15.
Pedjbar	" .	11.	Trebizond	. . , " 16.
Sparta .	" .	11.	Tchopé (?)	. . , " 16.
Sidi Shehir	" .	11.	Biledsik	. . , " 16.
Medrini	" .	11.	Anamor	. . , " 16.
			Seert	. . , " 16.
			Anay Bazar (?Ada Bazar)	, " 16.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 367

*Translation of a telegram, dated November 12, 1919, despatched from Sivas by Moustapha Kemal (Pasha) in the name of the Representative Committee for the Defence of National Rights in Anatolia and Roumelia.*

The localities of Aintab, Marash, and Ourfa, which were occupied by the English, contrary to the provisions of the armistice and were recently evacuated, have now again been occupied by the French. The Entente Powers therefore by no means renounce their plan of depriving our nation of these, the most beautiful parts of our country, and they are carrying out their schemes on the ground apparently that this occupation is provisional and preventive, without awaiting the decisions of the conference. They are unwilling to take into consideration the glorious history of the Ottoman Empire, dating from seven centuries ago, or the circumstances and elements of its prompt and powerful development, or its rebirth. They are working to establish an equilibrium of interests among themselves by dismembering our country. The acts of these Powers are inhuman and such as to be an offence against justice and right, against the principles proclaimed with all pomp and ceremony in the Peace Conference, and against the promises made to Turkey before all the world by article 12 of the principles of Wilson.

The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried out in the vilayet of Aidin, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view to opening the way to a division of Turkey, are identical with those perpetrated in the localities of Marash, Ourfa, and Aintab, dependencies of the vilayet of Adana, which the French have occupied, using the Armenians as their instrument. These acts are the last of a series of flagrant injustices of a political nature.

We protest with all our energy against the illegal proceedings of the Entente Powers up to date, and we hope that they will of their own accord return to more humane and equitable sentiments towards our country and our nation, who will continue resolutely to defend its existence and its lawful rights with all the material and moral forces at its command, rather than consent to dismemberment and slavery.

We wish to advise the Powers of the Entente that our whole nation, in the widest sense of the word, is united in this legitimate and sublime decision, a continuation of this inhuman policy which the Entente Powers, deaf to the legitimate voice of our nation, are following may entail fatal consequences, not only for a few countries, but also possibly for the two hemispheres.

The responsibility before Providence and humanity of such a disaster lies naturally with the Entente Powers. We are here acting as interpreters of the desire for unity cherished by our nation, whose only object is the defence of its rights to exist. We wish our legitimate cries to reach the nations of Europe and America, and we are convinced that they will not give their sanction to all this injustice.

No. 368

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 22)*

*No. 2179 [154417/2117/444]*

*PARIS, November 20, 1919*

Sir Eyre Crowe presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith 2 copies of the undermentioned paper.

*Name and Date.*

Secretariat General, November 17.

*Subject.*

Situation in Cilicia.

**ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 368**

*The Secretariat-General to the British Delegation*

*PARIS, le 15 novembre 1919*

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat Général de la Délégation Britannique: copie d'une lettre en date du 12/11 adressée à Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix par la Délégation Arménienne au sujet de la situation en Cilicie.

**ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 368**

*The Armenian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference*

*PARIS, le 12 novembre 1919*

Monsieur le Président,

Nous avons l'honneur d'attirer votre bienveillante attention sur la situation alarmante de la population arménienne de Cilicie.

Jusqu'en ces derniers temps, grâce à l'occupation du pays par les forces alliées, les Arméniens y jouissaient d'une sécurité relative, dont ils étaient fort reconnaissants envers les Puissances protectrices. Malheureusement, cette situation loin de s'améliorer, s'est subitement aggravée et devient de jour en jour plus menaçante pour les populations arménienes.

Sous l'instigation de meneurs nationalistes, de nombreuses bandes turques bien armées viennent de faire simultanément leur apparition en différents points de la Cilicie, et le sang arménien coule de nouveau.

Une de ces bandes, opérant dans les environs de Djihan, a razzié le 14 octobre, les villages de Papakhli, Hamdilli, Kerumé Kaupru, Yénidjé et Mersjin, pillant tout sur son passage. Dans cette dernière localité tous les habitants de la ferme Keklikian, y compris les femmes et les enfants, ont été massacrés.

Une autre bande turque a attaqué le même jour le village de Sheikh Mourad près d'Adana, en tuant onze de ses habitants arméniens, dont des femmes et des enfants, et en blessant un grand nombre. D'après les récits de témoins oculaires, c'était une bande montée, très forte et armée de fusils Mauser allemands. Un grand nombre des hommes qui la composaient portaient l'uniforme de gendarmes turcs. Elle a poursuivi le lendemain sa route, en attaquant plusieurs villages et mettant à mort des Arméniens.

Ces événements, au cours desquels un grand nombre d'Arméniens inoffensifs ont trouvé la mort, sont d'autant plus graves que la Cilicie est une des rares régions arméniennes se trouvant sous l'occupation des forces alliées et qu'environ 150,000 Arméniens s'y sont réfugiés, sous la sauvegarde et la protection des Puissances de l'Entente.

L'audace de ces forcenés est telle qu'ils osent même s'aventurer en pleine ville d'Adana. Un de ces Turcs a été tué à coups de fusil, près de l'hôpital municipal, par ordre du Colonel Normand, Gouverneur Militaire d'Adana. De prompte[s] et énergiques mesures ont déjà été prises, sous la direction du Colonel Brémont, par les Autorités Militaires Françaises de Cilicie, pour les combattre et les chasser.

Les nouvelles reçues de Marache et d'Ourfa sont aussi alarmantes que celles d'Adana. Les meneurs nationalistes fomentent des troubles à Ourfa et cherchent une occasion propice pour massacrer les Arméniens. Par deux fois, des paniques s'y sont produites et les magasins de la ville, fermés par la population affolée, ont été dévalisés par les pillards.

Le bruit court que des massacres ont au [eu] lieu à Diarbéki.

En vous exposant ces faits, Monsieur le Président, nous venons instamment prier la Conférence de vouloir bien prendre les mesures qu'elle jugera les meilleures pour mettre un terme d'une façon définitive à cette situation déplorable. Les autres parties de l'ex-empire Ottoman sont encore, à l'heure actuelle, victimes de la tyrannie turque et se trouvent sous la menace de nouveaux massacres, — et cela sans aucune provocation de leur part, — exactement un an après la victoire éclatante des Alliés.

En ce qui concerne la Cilicie, pour y assurer la sécurité des populations arméniennes, il serait urgent de désarmer d'une façon générale et effective les Musulmans, de punir sévèrement les coupables et d'expulser tous les meneurs et émissaires du parti nationaliste, qui ne sont en réalité que des Membres déguisés du parti néfaste Union et Progrès.

Quant aux régions de Marache, Ourfa, etc., dont les troupes d'occupation britanniques vont bientôt être relevées par des troupes françaises, nous espérons que toutes les précautions seront prises, afin de ne pas laisser le pays un seul instant inoccupé, car s'il en était autrement, les populations arméniennes de ces régions seraient exposées à une extermination certaine.

Faisant de nouveau appel aux sentiments d'humanité et de justice de la Conférence de la Paix, nous vous prions, Monsieur le Président, d'agrérer les assurances de notre plus haute considération.

Le Président de la Délégation de la République Arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.

signature.

Le Président de la Délégation Nationale Arménienne.

signature.

No. 369

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

*No. 2081 Telegraphic [151365/2117/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 20, 1919

In view of our evacuation of Syria can you obtain consent of United States Government for American Consuls to take over British interests at Aleppo and other towns in Arab zone, pending other arrangements?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Grey replied in Washington telegram No. 1647 of December 5, 1919 (received December 6): 'State Department are glad to allow United States representatives in Aleppo and other places in Arab zone to take over British Interests and will notify their Consular officers at Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut accordingly upon receipt of information as to date on which you desire this action to be taken and of any instructions which you may desire to issue.'

No. 370

*Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador in London<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 148099/M.E. 44A [148099/19165/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 21, 1919

The question of permitting investigations or operations for oil in the Occupied Enemy territories of Palestine and Mesopotamia, to which Your Excellency alluded in your recent conversation with me of the 31st [30th] ultimo<sup>2</sup> has had careful consideration, and I now send you my promised reply.

As regards operation, that is, the active development of oil fields, building of roads etc., the view which has been held about economic questions in general affecting Occupied Enemy Territories is this:—that the provisional character of the military occupation does not warrant the taking of decisions by the Occupying Power in matters concerning the future economic development of the country. Accordingly, our policy has been to prohibit the initiation of any new undertakings or the exercise by concessionaires of rights, which they may have acquired but not taken advantage of, before the war.

This view has equally governed our attitude in regard to investigations and surveys which private individuals or firms may wish to undertake in Occupied Enemy Territories, and our action in prohibiting this class of operations has been further ruled by the principle that nothing should be done which might in any way compromise the future authorities of the country, to whom, we consider, should be left the decision as to the methods and measures necessary to be adopted for ensuring the development of the mineral resources of the territory which they will be called upon to administer.

We have also felt that to open the occupied territories to prospectors during temporary military tenure would be most undesirable, as it would inevitably lead to a rush of speculators and others who, under the guise of simple investigation, would aim at securing definite and exclusive rights or options

<sup>1</sup> For this letter cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919*, vol. ii, pp. 260–1.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 347.

from native landowners. Further, while a certain amount of freedom of communication with towns and ports in Mesopotamia and Palestine has been allowed in the interests of trade, it would be quite incompatible with the conditions of war which still prevail in those countries, that this freedom should be extended to individuals who desire to travel and carry out investigations in the interior.

With regard to the Standard Oil Company, I realise that their complaint arises out of the fact that a representative of the Shell group visited Mesopotamia in the early part of this year. I think, however, you already know that the visit of this representative was undertaken without the knowledge or consent either of this Department or of the India Office, and that steps were immediately taken for his recall as soon as the object of his mission had been ascertained. The two members of his party who remained behind were not permitted to work any oil lands except for military purposes, and have only been allowed to stay<sup>3</sup> because their services have been required by the military authorities for the repair and working of certain refineries at Quaiyara in order to obtain supplies of oil needed for military and transport purposes. They will be recalled as soon as there is no further use for their services in this direction.

I greatly regret that the mistake to which I have referred was committed. But the worst way of rectifying it would be to consent to its repetition. So innocent indeed have His Majesty's Government been of any conscious discrimination that we have refused at least eleven applications from British firms and syndicates to carry out investigations and studies in various parts of Occupied Enemy Territory and to this policy I propose, so long as the existing conditions prevail, unflinchingly to adhere.

<sup>3</sup> The immediately following words 'in the country' were inadvertently omitted from the filed fair copy.

### No. 371

#### *British Note to the French Ambassador in London<sup>1</sup>*

[155721/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 21, 1919

A paper was recently left with Lord Hardinge by the French Ambassador stating that the French Govt. had received information that munitions and stores, consisting of 17 guns, 2 aeroplanes, 22 large and 20 small automobiles, had arrived at Damascus on the 12th of October, and were destined for the Arab Army.<sup>2</sup> A careful enquiry conducted by the military authorities has proved that these allegations have no foundation in fact.

The rumour that guns had been received by the Arabs may have owed its inception to the fact that a few old gun parts, and some other derelict material, were removed from Kadem station by the Arabs, and may have arrived at Damascus about the date in question.

<sup>1</sup> This note was handed to the French Ambassador by Lord Hardinge on November 21, 1919.      <sup>2</sup> This brief undated French paper (not printed) was as here indicated.

With regard to the twenty small automobiles, the Hedjaz Delegation to the Peace Conference requested the British military authorities on the 13th of September last, to facilitate the shipment to Syria of 20 Ford Cars which they had purchased in Paris for transport purposes, from the American Red Cross.

The military authorities, however, declined to act in the matter, and suggested that the Hedjaz Delegation should approach the French Government. Information has since been received that 20 Ford Cars were landed at Beirut at the end of October.

These are, presumably, the cars purchased from the American Red Cross.

Nothing whatever is known of the arrival at Damascus of aeroplanes or any other automobiles than those mentioned above, which were presumably transported to Beirut by the French authorities.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In reply to the present note a French note of January 9, 1920, expressed the gratitude of the French Government for the information supplied, while observing that 'une inexactitude, d'ailleurs sans grande importance, s'était glissée dans la note du Foreign Office. Les 20 voitures achetées à Paris par la Délégation du Hedjaz se trouvaient encore à Marseille le 12 décembre dernier et le Gouvernement français était saisi à leur sujet d'une demande d'embarquement faite au nom de l'Emir Faysal.'

## No. 372

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 21)*

*No. 1187 Telegraphic [154212/2117/444]*

PARIS, November 21, 1919

Emir Feisul had a long interview with me this morning. He informs me no progress has been made in negotiations with French who have not met him in any way. He came to France on advice of British Government and has done all he can to find an honourable solution of question. He does not consider he has been treated with proper respect or courtesy. He has tried to see Clemenceau again but latter has declined to see him on the ground that he was leaving Paris. I told Emir that I knew this was true but he told me he had private information that Clemenceau did not mean to see him. The Emir has therefore written a letter to him suggesting a solution as follows:—

1. The maintenance of Arab troops in limits of zone they occupied since Armistice: of British troops in Palestine: and French troops in 'first zone of West' now occupied by them. Further that nothing should be held to justify a change in actual limits of these zones before decision of Conference.

2. The nomination of a Commission composed of three members, French, English and Arab designated each by command of respective zones. This Commission would sit in a town which should be chosen in Syria; it should have as its mission to regulate by common accord the differences which might arise between three zones and should be charged with maintaining adhesion and liaison between different administrations.

To this he has received no official reply but he understands officially<sup>1</sup> that proposition will not be accepted.

The Emir is writing a letter to British Government of which I have seen a draft. In it he complains that French troops are proceeding to El Buka, Balback [sic] and Zabadani where he alleges that British Government had undertaken to establish independent Arab Government and he wishes it to be clearly understood that if troops do so proceed the Arab Army will oppose them.

He was very anxious to know what I thought of position. I was very careful to say nothing to him. I only expressed hope that General Gouraud might be able to find a satisfactory solution when he arrives in Syria.

Emir in circumstances thinks that he had better leave for Syria as soon as possible. He does not wish to proceed in a French ship and he asks me to request you to (? make) arrangements by which he could proceed in an English ship. He will await return of Haddad Pasha<sup>2</sup> and is anxious if

<sup>1</sup> It was suggested on the original that this word should be 'unofficially'.

<sup>2</sup> In this connexion Colonel Joyce, then in Paris, had stated in a letter of November 18, 1919, to Colonel Gribbon at the War Office (copy communicated to the Foreign Office on November 22):

'Haddad has left for England with numerous points upon which Faisal would like advice, but the main issue remains unchanged, and that is that the French are waiting for Faisal to fall into their arms on their own terms, and so far he shews no indication of doing so. The more important point for the moment appears to be the retention of the "Bukas" under Arab administration until the final decision of the peace conference[.] Faisal is confident that whether he orders it or not hostilities will occur if French troops relieve British troops in this area and for which he cannot be responsible. There are so many arguments on the Arab side for the retention of this area which has been under their administration for upwards of a year that it is hoped our Government will represent their case most strongly. To concede this point would be taken by Faisal as a further direct withdrawal of British support and his request to leave the matter to the decision of the peace conference appears very reasonable—but in the meantime *no* relief of British troops by French troops in this area must be permitted. I had a conversation with Forbes-Adams [sic] yesterday on this subject and in concurrence with his opinions strongly urged Faisal to make a personal appeal to Clemenceau. Letters between the Emir and the French Government have apparently got to the stage of getting hung up indefinitely and therefore as this is an urgent matter he promised to apply for a personal interview today.'

'I strongly urge that the military section of the Delegation should be instructed to inform Faisal daily of the movements of troops at present taking place in Syria. From what stations British troops have been withdrawn and whether relieved by French troops or not, etc. etc. He is at present entirely in the dark as to what is taking place, a very unsatisfactory state of affairs from his point of view and as before pointed out his letters and appeals to the French Govt. bring forth no satisfactory replies. . . .

'As regards Faisal's own return to Syria he is well aware that he is losing touch as well as dignity by remaining here where he is practically ignored as far as representing Syria goes, and treated now as a distinguished stranger who appears to be labouring under a misapprehension that he has any right or part in the future of Syria. Faisal thoroughly realises this but is most anxious to keep his contract with the British Govt. by endeavouring to keep the peace until the future of the country is settled. He is well aware that his final appeal will be more weighty if no hostilities occur in the meantime and for which he might personally be held responsible if he returned to Syria, at the same time inaction here is galling and he will most probably leave for Syria shortly, informing the British Government before he does

possible that you should make necessary arrangements for his return with Haddad bearing in mind that he wishes to return as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup>

so. As regards the subsidy he proposes to accept nothing from France, it being quite out of the question to do so under present circumstances. Their general attitude is to decline to discuss any vital questions or to come down to facts with Feisal on any subject relating to Syria; he is repeatedly informed that General Gouraud [sic], who thoroughly understands Syria, will do anything for the welfare of the country, but details get no further and the situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory.'

<sup>3</sup> Lord Curzon minuted on this telegram:

'The day after sending his telegram of Nov. 21 Lord Derby wrote to me that Berthelot was not unfavourably disposed to Feisal's 2 suggestions, that Clemenceau might possibly take the same view & that Feisal had been asked to stay on in Paris.

C. 25/11.<sup>4</sup>

The private letter from Lord Derby here referred to is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

### No. 373

*The Emir Feisal to the Earl of Derby (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

[155730/2117/444]

PARIS, November 21, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to hand your Lordship the enclosed letter for forwarding to the Prime Minister; also a copy of my last letter to M. Clemenceau for the perusal of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

FEISAL

### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 373

*The Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George*

PARIS, November 21, 1919

Sir,

I have come to realise that the French Government, in spite of continued suggestions for an amicable settlement, intend as a result of your *aide-mémoire* of the 15th September, 1919,<sup>2</sup> to occupy some of the districts evacuated by the British troops around Damascus, such as Bekaa, Baalbek, Zebdani and also other places around Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

These districts, as you know, are part of the territory where the British Government undertook to establish an independent Arab State, and in accordance with this they handed over the administration to the Arab Government at the time of occupation. Any violation of the boundary by any Government or in any way contrary to the wishes of my father the King and the expressed desires of the people will be considered as an aggression which the Arab army cannot be blamed for actively resisting. This violation is expressly a breach of international law and the sacred rights of the people.

In the name of my father the King and his Government I call upon the

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter was received in the Foreign Office on November 26, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 278.

British Government to immediately help in the difficulties arising from this arrangement which is alleged to be temporary, until such time as the Peace Conference will have determined the future of the whole country, the littoral as well as the interior.

I again beg to remind the British Government that they cannot exonerate themselves from the responsibility of their agreements with us which we still expect them to carry out.

I reserve to myself the right to bring once more before the Peace Conference our country's cause.

I have, &c.

FEISAL

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 373

*The Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau*

PARIS, le 20 novembre 1919

M. le Président,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 13 novembre,<sup>3</sup> en réponse à celle que j'ai adressée à votre Excellence en date du 5 de ce même mois.<sup>4</sup>

J'ai eu le profond regret de voir que ma lettre ne vous a pas paru correspondre à la situation présente, et que mon interprétation de l'acceptation par le Gouvernement britannique de ma demande, concernant la nomination d'une commission, ne vous a pas semblé tout à fait exacte.

Si ce n'était le souci de vous éviter de longs détails, j'aurais bien voulu donner à votre Excellence de plus amples explications pour justifier mon point de vue et ma façon d'envisager la situation. Néanmoins, je me permets de vous soumettre le passage de la lettre de Mr. Lloyd George, datée du 10 octobre,<sup>5</sup> en réponse à la proposition que je lui ai faite pour la nomination de la commission. Il y est dit textuellement:

'Ils seraient très heureux d'arranger une réunion immédiate entre vous et des représentants français, anglais et américain, pour régler de la façon la plus amicale, et à la satisfaction de tous les intéressés, les problèmes que comprend le retrait prochain des troupes britanniques de la Syrie le 1<sup>er</sup> novembre 1919.'

Il me semble que le sens de cette lettre ne prête à aucune interprétation équivoque, et démontre clairement que le Gouvernement britannique a agréé en principe ma proposition. Aussi dans l'espoir d'obtenir votre assentiment, je me suis empressé de répondre à votre aimable invitation, transmise par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères britannique, et je suis venu à Paris, pour m'entretenir et régler en premier lieu avec votre Excellence les problèmes découlant nécessairement de l'opération de la relève.

A cette occasion, je tiens à vous réitérer les assurances que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous répéter. Ce n'est nullement la relève des troupes britanniques, en

<sup>3</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives; cf., however, No. 362 of that date.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 3 in No. 355.

<sup>5</sup> No. 313.

elle-même, qui provoque le trouble et l'inquiétude, mais bien l'exécution de cette relève sur les bases et d'après les limites du Traité Picot-Sykes.

En effet, l'opération, telle qu'elle est prévue, entraînera de fait un changement dans les limites et dans l'administration actuelles des zones, et cela ne peut que provoquer une grande effervescence parmi la population, malgré toutes les déclarations antérieures et toutes les assurances qu'on pourrait lui donner. Le peuple qui m'a accordé sa confiance et m'a chargé de la responsabilité de sa direction politique, comme je m'étais chargé de la responsabilité de sa direction pendant la guerre, a le droit d'attendre de moi des garanties effectives et des assurances formelles pour dissiper ses inquiétudes. De mon côté, je crois avoir le droit d'attendre des Alliés leur concours bienveillant pour m'aider à maintenir la confiance réciproque entre eux et les Arabes, œuvre à laquelle je me suis sincèrement consacré, et que j'ai jusqu'à ce jour menée avec succès. Je suis, cependant, obligé d'avouer que, malgré tous les efforts que j'ai déployés depuis mon arrivée ici, je n'ai pu encore obtenir aucune garantie efficace qui puisse m'autoriser à rassurer la population.

La seule entrevue relativement courte que j'ai eu l'avantage d'avoir avec le Général Gouraud n'a fait que confirmer l'opinion que j'avais déjà des grandes qualités de ce brillant chef de l'armée de la victoire, elle justifie amplement sa grande réputation et l'opinion exprimée dans la lettre de votre Excellence. Je n'ai à aucun moment douté de la sincérité et de la noblesse de vos sentiments, ni des bonnes dispositions de la grande nation française envers mon pays. Je suis aussi convaincu que le Gouvernement de la République est très désireux de prendre en considération les vœux de ce peuple qui s'est rangé aux côtés des Alliés au moment le plus critique de la guerre, et qui a apporté sa modeste contribution à l'œuvre de la victoire en Orient. Aussi je ne fais qu'interpréter les vœux de ce peuple et sa foi dans l'esprit de justice et d'équité de votre Excellence, en me permettant d'insister pour arriver à une solution qui puisse lui donner la conviction que son existence n'est nullement menacée.

Votre Excellence m'ayant fait comprendre que la question était du ressort de la Conférence de la Paix, qui en avait déjà pris acte, j'ai cru de mon devoir de m'adresser au Conseil suprême,<sup>6</sup> non pas pour amener une décision définitive, mais plutôt pour trouver une solution propre à concilier tous les intérêts, en attendant que la Conférence règle définitivement le sort de l'Orient.

Je suis toujours d'avis que c'est au Conseil suprême qu'il appartient de rechercher une solution satisfaisante, si toutefois votre Excellence ne juge pas opportun de prendre en considération la suggestion suivante que je me permets de lui soumettre. C'est, d'ailleurs, la proposition que je comptais exposer à la Commission dont j'avais demandé la formation, et que j'estime indispensable pour dissiper les inquiétudes et me permettre de pouvoir rassurer la population, et éviter les malentendus. Cette solution consiste:

1. Au maintien des troupes arabes dans les limites de la zone qu'ils

<sup>6</sup> See enclosure 4 in No. 355.

occupent depuis l'armistice, des troupes britanniques dans la Palestine et des troupes françaises dans la zone ouest occupée par elles. D'autant plus que rien ne justifie un changement, dans les limites actuelles des zones, avant la décision de la Conférence.

2. La nomination d'une commission composée de trois membres: un français, un anglais et un arabe, désigné chacun par le commandant de la zone respective. Cette commission siégera dans une ville qui sera choisie en Syrie; elle aura pour mission de régler d'un commun accord les différends qui pourraient surgir entre les trois zones et sera chargée de maintenir la cohésion et la liaison entre les différentes administrations.

Je considère que cette solution aura le grand avantage de sauvegarder l'unité du pays et de faciliter la tâche des trois Gouvernements. C'est encore le seul moyen de convaincre la population que la mesure adoptée est de caractère purement militaire et provisoire, qu'elle ne vise pas le partage du pays, ne contredit ni les déclarations des Alliés, ni les doctrines qu'ils ont proclamées, et ne préjuge pas non plus la solution définitive de la question qui reste réservée à la décision de la Conférence.

Le désir que votre Excellence a manifesté de rechercher les bases d'une entente tenant compte des vœux des populations et de nos intérêts respectifs, m'encourage à insister auprès d'elle pour la prier de donner une suite favorable à ma présente demande, afin de m'aider à préparer les voies à une entente effective.

Mon absence s'étant trop longtemps prolongée, je me vois obligé de rentrer bientôt en Syrie; je serai donc très heureux de recevoir un [? au] moment plus tôt une réponse favorable de votre Excellence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

FEISAL<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> In connexion, presumably, with the foregoing, the Emir Feisal addressed a telegram (date not given) to King Hussein and the Emir Zeid, of which a paraphrased copy received in the Foreign Office on December 3, 1919, read as follows:

'French Government refused the suggestion I made on Your Majesty's behalf re Syria although England accepted it. France is determined to occupy important parts of provinces of Damascus and Aleppo in execution of Mr. Lloyd George's note which he submitted to Conference in September and of which I have already informed you. As this is contrary to rights and arrangements between Britain [? and] Your Majesty, I have decided to inform Powers that your army will resist any aggression against limits of present zones. I wrote today to British Government assuring them of our confidence in their sincerity and reminding them of their promises to Your Majesty on October 24th.'

'We do not desire more than to be in complete accord with our first Ally, the British Government, the supporter of our . . . [text uncertain]; and with rest of Allies, including France accepts my last suggestion [sic], namely to keep the present frontiers as they are and to form a committee to unify administration in all three zones until final decision of Conference.'

No. 374

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon  
(Received November 25)

No. 1614 Telegraphic [155461/2117/44A]

CAIRO, November 21, 1919

My telegram No. 1604.<sup>1</sup>

Hussein has sent me to forward to Europe a letter under open cover (? addressed) to Emir Feisal. It contains following sentence begins. 'Moreover if Syrians decide to fight for their liberty and independence I will not hesitate in going over to them to co-operate with them in my capacity as an individual Arab so that they may know that I did not betray them.' Ends.

I have returned letter to British Agent Jeddah instructing him to inform King that while I appreciate his frankness in sending such a letter under open cover, I cannot undertake to forward on his behalf letters containing sentiments to detriment of Entente and implying a secession from his Alliance with His Majesty's Government and that his action in doing so was most improper.<sup>2</sup>

From letter it appears that Feisal has taunted King with his inaccurate conception of, and reports on, his agreement with Sir A. H. MacMahon [*sic*] and His Majesty's Government which have misled every Arab.

It is possible that King's statement reported above may be a forlorn attempt to justify himself in Feisal's eyes as to his good faith, but in making such a proposal to Feisal under open cover through me he has acted in a most improper manner, and I have instructed Colonel Vickery to emphasize this rather than political side of question which I do not wish to exaggerate.

In a telegram written subsequent to his letter King has asked me that Feisal shall not remain in France but be sent back to London or Arabia.

Despatch follows by bag.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 1280 of November 29, 1919, to Cairo Lord Curzon expressed his approval of this action by Field-Marshal Allenby.

<sup>3</sup> This covering despatch No. 571 of November 22, 1919 (received December 15) transmitted the following 'literal translation' of the full text of King Hussein's letter to the Emir Feisal:

'Mecca, 5th Safar, 1338 (November 1, 1919).

'Sir,

'I cabled you on the 30th Moharram '38, informing you of the receipt of your letter of the 25th September, 1919. I enclose herewith a copy of the same telegram as well as copies of former telegrams [not on file] for confirmation. After this and before any discussion I only pray God to be your support and mine.'

'Sir, as for your enquiry about the date and the *ease of conscience which were created by your accusations* in the matter of what happened in connection with the conditions of our preliminary agreements with Great Britain, and especially your reminding me of my saying to you when you visited us at Jeddah that they are in my pocket, I do not know, Sir, what to say about this, except to beg you to consider my letter to his Excellency the High Commissioner of the 20th Zil Ki'da '36 [cf. No. 388, note 2], a copy of which I sent to you and of which you acknowledged the receipt. You will find in it that which will not only acquit us of what you have referred to, but will also show something additional in our favour. Thank God I maintain those principles until this day, and will maintain them after this day and'

until God knows when. Had it not been for strong insistence I would not have sent the date of his Excellency's letter in which he says, "I am pleased to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Government has approved all your demands." The same hesitation, which is caused by my feelings of aversion to protesting against (? arguing with) Great Britain, also now prevents me from naming the date of another letter of his Excellency's, in which he says, "Great Britain has accepted the Basra tribute, but she desires to postpone fixing the amount to what may be agreed upon." I spoke very frankly in my letter mentioned above (20th Zil Ki'da, 1336). Can it be said after such frankness that I understood our agreements wrongly or that something had happened which necessitated modifying them? And then to say that it is urgent for me to withdraw from the situation and give it up! On that date I receive your remarks on what concerns conscience! Reflect, Sir, on all that is in this, and then accuse me of whatever you please. Supposing, Sir, that there was nothing of that; was it right of Great Britain, after admitting that we have fought with her side by side, when neither France nor Italy could help her, to gratify France by giving her our country and our independence? Therefore, the result is, Sir, that if I encounter an incident (notwithstanding the patience and tolerance promised), and if anything interferes with my decisions, as you have already done more than once, I will withdraw that same moment. Please understand this as you understand the day from night. Moreover, if the Syrians decide to fight for their liberty and independence, I will not hesitate in going over to them to co-operate with them in my capacity as an individual Arab, so that they may know that I did not betray them. God will not guide traitors. This, Sir, is the extent of my intellect. You will excuse me if I do anything which you may think wrong. Deeds are according to intentions. God is Master of all, and He is my Guardian over you.

Hussein.'

### No. 375

*Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador in London*

[15741/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 22, 1919

My dear Ambassador,

Communications are passing between our respective military authorities with regard to the evacuation by the British troops of the coastal areas in Syria as defined in the provisional agreement recently concluded between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in Paris. It has been agreed that this is a purely military operation, and is not intended to prejudge or compromise the future political and administrative settlement of those areas by the Peace Conference. It may be well, however, for me to place on record that it is being carried out by His Majesty's Government without prejudice to the future determination of the northern and eastern boundaries of Palestine, which will require to be examined and readjusted in the final settlement.

I am, yours sincerely,  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

### No. 376

*Sir P. Cox (Hamadan)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received December 1)*

Unnumbered. Telegraphic [157324/2117/44A] .

HAMADAN, November 23, 1919

Your Lordship's private telegram November 14.<sup>2</sup> Situation in Mesopotamia. I beg to offer observations on points therein.

<sup>1</sup> Sir P. Cox was visiting Hamadan.

<sup>2</sup> No. 363.

**Paragraph 1.<sup>3</sup>**

Military Administration; I agree but I gather from routine papers received and from General M'Munn,<sup>4</sup> who visited me recently, that Departments were being handed over with all possible speed.

**Paragraph 2.<sup>5</sup>**

It is not quite clear whether your reference to youth and inexperience of officers employed refers to military or civil administration. If to latter I do not think that it is altogether justified. For example referring to last month's distribution lists<sup>6</sup> I note officers in charge of principal Departments and those permanently in charge of Divisions are almost all senior men of much administrative experience and mostly my own nominees to those or similar posts.

**Paragraph 3.<sup>7</sup>**

I agree that existing system of Administration does not fulfil in all respects either letter or spirit of Anglo-French declaration of November 1918, but it did not do so at the time and at all events up to recent date no Arab material has been available which would have made it possible to form Administration strictly on those lines and indeed I always doubted whether that declaration provided practical basis for administration of Mesopotamia.

**Paragraph 4.<sup>8</sup>**

As to criticisms now being directed against Administration I would observe since I have been in Teheran I have been kept in touch with progress of Bagdad Administration as far as possible by routine reports from Civil Commission and by intercourse with numerous Persians passing to and from Mesopotamia, and from these I derived impression that general public and settled tribes were well content with their lot, and I had heard nothing which might lead one to suppose from an internal point of view there was anything in situation calculated to cause anxiety to His Majesty's Government. I may mention that I gather from Moors, the *Times* correspondent who recently returned to Teheran via Mesopotamia, that he was very favourably impressed with all he had seen and heard.

I deduce from above and from remarks in your telegram that criticisms which we have to reckon with are mainly from outside and are connected with relations of Mesopotamia and neighbouring states rather than with internal situation.

**Paragraph 5.<sup>9</sup>**

As to disquieting reports received from our own officers I cannot comment without knowing who they are, but it may be that they are also referring to effect caused by character of Mesopotamian Administration on other

<sup>3</sup> i.e. the second sentence of No. 363.

<sup>4</sup> British Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamia.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. the third sentence of No. 363.

<sup>6</sup> Apparently lists of personnel in the Mesopotamian administration.

<sup>7</sup> i.e. the fifth sentence of No. 363.

<sup>8</sup> i.e. the seventh sentence of No. 363.

<sup>9</sup> i.e. the last sentence of the first paragraph of No. 363.

Administrations with which they are connected. As one of this category I can safely say it has had no harmful effect on our administrative reputation or interests in Persia.

Paragraph 6.<sup>10</sup>

I am still convinced of inexpediency of my return until Peace is signed or His Majesty's Government get free hand by some other means. On the other hand provided that Col. Haig who is now functioning as head of Chancery in Legation can be appointed to take over charge from me for the present I (? no longer) see any objection to announcement being made regarding my prospective appointment as High Commissioner. But in that case I should like to inform Persian Prime Minister myself before he hears it from elsewhere.

Paragraph 7.<sup>11</sup>

As to steps to be taken or announcements to be made in the matter of prospective constitutional development if it is decided that some (? announcement) is unavoidable then I think fourth alternative namely assurances to Local Councils is only safe and possible one. In this I beg to recall declaration regarding self-determination made last year by local inhabitants and Miss Bell's analysis thereof.<sup>12</sup> I had had (*sic*) no reason to think that situation had materially changed since then.

Paragraph 8.<sup>13</sup>

Although as above mentioned I have been able to (keep) fairly close touch with developments in Mesopotamia I am by no means equally well informed in regard to situation in Syria and Turkey[;] as it seems from your telegram that our policy in regard to Mesopotamia cannot ignore our commitment(?)s and) relations with French and Arabs in Syria I should (? greatly) prefer to bring myself up to date in that respect for . . . ing<sup>14</sup> definite suggestions for future Administration. To this end if time admits from point of view of His Majesty's Government may I (proceed) incognito if necessary, via Khanikin, Kirkuk, Mosul, to Aleppo and Damascus and thence to Constantinople via Beyrout or Egypt and (? there)after to London to confer with your Lordship? I should take opportunity on the way of studying Kurd situation with which I am imperfectly acquainted. I estimate that I could do above journey in month or five weeks from Teheran (?). If proposal is approved I must take Civil Commissioner Bagdad into confidence as I shall depend on him for . . .<sup>15</sup> facilities.

<sup>10</sup> i.e. the first sentence of the second paragraph of No. 363.

<sup>11</sup> i.e. the third paragraph of No. 363.

<sup>12</sup> Miss Gertrude Bell was at that time an Assistant Political Officer at Bagdad. Miss Bell's analysis was a memorandum of February 1919 entitled 'Self-Determination in Mesopotamia'. This memorandum is printed by Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 330-41.

<sup>13</sup> i.e. the last paragraph of No. 363.

<sup>14</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that it should read 'before formulating'.

<sup>15</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 377

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. Campbell (Received November 28)*

[156471/142/444]

10 DOWNING STREET, November 27, 1919

Dear Campbell,

I enclose a telegram which has come to the Prime Minister from King Hussein. I don't know whether you have received it from other sources. You will observe that Hussein threatens to resign unless he gets his answer within 30 days. The telegram appears to have reached here on the 21st and I greatly regret the delay in forwarding it to you. Could you bring it to Lord Curzon's attention at once, and ask him what reply he thinks the Prime Minister should send?

Yours sincerely,

P. H. KERR

ENCLOSURE IN No. 377

*King Hussein to Mr. Lloyd George*

I most respectfully beg to submit to your Lordship the following, being prevented twice of visiting the great city of London to lay my humble respects to His Majesty the King Emperor and the veterans (?) of His Majesty's Great Britain. Therefore I beg your Lordship sending a big official for consultation about misunderstanding and I am leaving the confirmation of this to your Lordship. In the event of receiving no reply within thirty nights of to-day's date I will withdraw myself of my job safe of every harm. In conclusion I offer my best respects and kind regards to your Lordship.

HUSSEIN

November 21st 1919.

No. 378

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon*

(Received December 2)

No. 1642 Telegraphic [157332/2117/444]

CAIRO, November 28, 1919

Paraphrase as follows of Hussein's telegram 108 to Feisal. Begins:—

It is certain that people North-West of Aleppo are in negotiations with Kemal Pasha. You must realize what will be the result of this. Inform whom it may concern not to forget my advice or to commit a mistake as they neglected my warning in question of Smyrna and . . .<sup>1</sup> about my repeated warnings also Gaafar. Ends.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was minuted as follows by Major H. W. Young:

'This rather cryptic message appears to be a warning against intrigue with the Turks. Gaafar (Pasha) is presumably the Vali of Aleppo.'

'H. W. Young.  
2/12.'

No. 379

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1284 Telegraphic [157169/2117/444]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 28, 1919

Your telegram No. 1187<sup>1</sup> of November 21.

Your private letters<sup>2</sup> subsequent to above telegram led me to think that the two suggestions there put forward would be favourably regarded by French Government and that Feisal had been invited to stay for that object. Meanwhile at the other end Gouraud at meeting with Congreve<sup>3</sup> agreed to postpone occupation of Bukaa by French forces and to leave Arab troops there. Congreve however now wires on 27th that Gouraud refuses to modify original orders of French Government for occupation, or to delay their execution, and that relief will take place on 30th. From this it would appear that Gouraud is acting under fresh orders from Paris, which are quite inconsistent with attitude reported by you; and that we are on the brink of the crisis which we have striven so hard to avoid. Can you at once visit Foreign Office, to ascertain facts, and, if you think it expedient once more point out consequences? Is Feisal still in Paris? If he knows, he will be off at once.

<sup>1</sup> No. 372.

<sup>2</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives. Cf. No. 372, note 3.

<sup>3</sup> General Congreve was G.O.C. British forces in Egypt.

No. 380

*The Emir Feisal (Paris) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

[384/1/1/20848]

PARIS, November 28, 1919

My Lord,

Brigadier-General Haddad has reported to me the interest you have taken in my case and the effort you have made to arrive at an amicable understanding. I have the honour therefore to now express my gratitude for all you have been pleased to do the result of which has had a good effect.

I enclose herewith the correspondence exchanged with the French Government on the subject, and I beg to call your attention to the fact that only the contents of my last letter to M. Berthelot dated November 28, 1919<sup>2</sup> covers the actual agreement entered into with the French Government.

I have, &c.

FAISAL

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain, no copy of this document having been traced in the contemporary files of the Foreign Office itself. The present copy is supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation to which it was communicated by General Haddad Pasha.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 3 below.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 380<sup>3</sup>

Document 1

*M. Berthelot to the Emir Feisal*

PARIS, 26 novembre 1919

Monseigneur,

Je m'empresse de vous envoyer le texte du télégramme dont vous avez agréé la rédaction. M. le Président du Conseil ayant également donné son adhésion, je le fais partir à destination du Haut Commissaire de la République à Beyrouth.

Je vous serais très obligé de votre côté de vouloir bien me communiquer une copie du télégramme d'instructions que vous devez envoyer, aux termes de notre accord, à Son Altesse Royale l'Emir Zeid.

Je ne doute pas que Votre Altesse Royale ne partage ma satisfaction d'avoir pu arriver à une entente par une conciliation loyale qui est un gage d'une collaboration fructueuse dans l'avenir au profit de toute la Syrie.

Veuillez agréer, Monseigneur, l'assurance des sentiments de haute considération et de sincère sympathie que je professe pour Votre Altesse Royale.

BERTHELOT

Document 2

*Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères au Général Gouraud, Haut Commissaire à Beyrouth.*

PARIS, le 25 novembre 1919

J'ai eu plusieurs conversations avec l'Emir Faissal, dont les dispositions pour une entente sincère avec la France sur la base du mandat exercé avec l'aide de conseillers financiers, judiciaires, administratifs et pour l'enseignement, ainsi que d'officiers instructeurs de la gendarmerie qui pourrait être organisée dès le retour de l'Emir Faissal à Damas, se sont manifestées et seront prochainement précisées.

L'Emir m'a demandé de ne pas faire occupée [sic] la Beka par des troupes françaises et de constituer une Commission composée d'un officier français pour la zone occupée par nos troupes, d'un officier arabe désigné par Faissal pour la zone occupée par les troupes arabes et d'un officier anglais désigné par le Commandement Britannique de Palestine.

Je lui ai répondu que pour la Beka je pourrais dans un esprit de conciliation et de confiance mutuelle accepter la combinaison suivante tenant compte à la fois des susceptibilités arabes et de l'impossibilité pour la France de renoncer totalement à la décision d'occupation provisoire prise par la Conférence: les troupes françaises n'occuperaient pas le Beka et les troupes arabes seraient retirées par l'Emir: il ne resterait sur place en particulier à Balbeck, Hasbeya et Rachbeya que la gendarmerie locale sous les ordres des Caimmacams. Une mission d'inspection composée de trois officiers français, de trois officiers arabes d'un bon esprit venant de Damas serait envoyée simultanément dans la région pour veiller d'un commun accord à la bonne

<sup>3</sup> All the documents in this and the following enclosures to No. 380 were copies of originals. In these copies a number of missing accents have been restored.

exécution du service de la police et de la gendarmerie responsable d'assurer la sécurité dans la Beka. Dans le cas où la gendarmerie existante actuellement serait jugée insuffisante par les officiers français et arabes elle pourrait être renforcée par d'autres contingents de gendarmerie venant de Damas. Ces officiers adresseraient leur rapport au Caimmacam et au chef militaire dont ils dépendent.

Quant à la Commission demandée par l'Emir, j'ai dit que j'en acceptait le principe, sous réserve qu'elle se réunirait à Beyrouth, serait présidée par vous ou par votre délégué et serait appelée à éviter ou régler tout incident sur les frontières des occupations provisoires actuelles.

L'Emir Faissal s'est déclaré d'accord et va envoyer un télégramme d'instructions à son frère l'Emir Zeid à Damas. Je préviens le Gouvernement anglais pour que le maréchal Allenby soit avisé par lui conformément au désir qui m'a été exprimé du côté britannique je [sic] cherche à concilier les intérêts communs et pense que toute entente entre l'Emir Faissal et le gouvernement français a d'avance l'approbation du gouvernement anglais.

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 380

##### Document 1

[*The Emir Feisal to M. Berthelot*]

Cher Monsieur le Directeur,

PARIS, le 26 novembre 1919

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint le texte du télégramme que je désire, au terme de notre accord, envoyer à l'Emir Zeid.

Je vous remercie des efforts que vous avez dépensé[s] de votre côté, en vue d'arriver à une entente cordiale entre la France et la Syrie.

A ce sujet, je ne puis que vous prier de vouloir bien exprimer ma reconnaissance à Monsieur le Président du Conseil d'avoir accepté mes propositions concernant la question de la relève.

Vous ne doutez pas, cher Monsieur le Directeur, que je suis heureux d'avoir pu, grâce à votre collaboration efficace, arriver à cette première entente qui serait très prochainement, je l'espère, suivie par une autre entente plus générale et d'un intérêt plus grand au profit de tous. Car, comme vous le savez bien, je n'ai pas cessé, depuis mon arrivée à Paris, d'insister sur ce point à savoir que mon intention était d'arriver à conclure une entente avec le Gouvernement Français qui, sous la réserve que la souveraineté nationale reste assuré au peuple syrien, voudrait bien sur ma demande prêter au pays son aide financière ainsi que des conseillers en vue d'une collaboration amicale avec le gouvernement national établi par la population.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

##### Document 2

*The Emir Feisal to the Emir Zeid (Damascus)*

PARIS, le 27 novembre 1919

J'ai la grande satisfaction de vous informer que le Gouvernement Français a accepté la formation de la Commission que j'avais demandé[e] et qui sera

composée d'un Français, d'un Anglais et d'un Arabe pour régler les différends qui pourraient surgir entre les différentes zones. Dans le but de rassurer la population de Syrie que le dernier accord est purement militaire et provisoire, les troupes françaises n'occuperont pas la Beqaa, ni aucune autre partie de notre zone actuelle, et pour marquer notre confidence [*sic*] mutuelle les troupes arabes seront aussi retirées de la Beqaa. Seule la gendarmerie arabe y demeure chargée du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité, sous les ordres du Caimacam. En cas de nécessité des contingents de gendarmerie seront appelés de Damas, si les effectifs existants n'étaient pas suffisants. Une mission composée de trois officiers français et de trois officiers arabes, sera chargée simultanément, d'un commun accord, de veiller à la bonne exécution du service de la police et de la gendarmerie dans cette région, et d'en référer au Caimacam. Les négociations avec le Gouvernement Français se poursuivent dans un esprit de sincérité et de mutuelle confiance. Que la population se rassure et se tranquillise. Le Gouvernement a communiqué cet accord au Général Gouraud.

FAISSAL

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 380

*The Emir Feisal to M. Berthelot*

28 novembre 1919

Monsieur le Directeur Général

Dans ma dernière lettre du 26 courant,<sup>4</sup> j'ai eu l'honneur de vous exprimer ma gratitude pour l'arrangement qui a permis, grâce à votre heureuse intervention, de solutionner amicalement le problème soulevé par la relève des troupes britanniques.

Je vous ai envoyé la dépêche d'instructions que j'ai transmise à mon frère l'Emir Zeid et qui a obtenu votre adhésion.

A cette occasion je me permets de vous rappeler que dans les dépêches envoyées en Syrie, il n'a pas été fait mention du retrait, en même temps que des troupes britanniques, du détachement d'artillerie française se trouvant à Damas.

Je vous serai donc reconnaissant de vouloir bien aviser le Général Gouraud, Haut Commissaire de la République, afin qu'il soit procédé à ce retrait.

Ce sont autant d'heureux présages qui me font espérer que l'entente à laquelle vous avez fait allusion dans votre dépêche au Général Gouraud, quoique n'ayant pas été encore entamée, ne tardera pas à se traduire par des négociations qui nous permettraient d'arriver à un accord propre à concilier nos intérêts communs.

Veuillez agréer &c.

FAISSAL

<sup>4</sup> Document 1 in enclosure 2 above.

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 380

*M. Berthelot to the Emir Feisal*

PARIS, le 28 novembre 1919

Monseigneur,

Je tiens d'abord à vous marquer la satisfaction qu'a éprouvée M. le Président du Conseil, en prenant connaissance de l'accord auquel nous sommes arrivés, dans un esprit de conciliation réciproque, au sujet de la commission militaire devant régler les différends qui pourraient surgir entre les différentes zones d'occupation et au sujet de la situation dans la Bekka.

Sur ce dernier point, j'estime que la parfaite franchise qui doit être le guide de nos conversations, exige qu'il soit bien établi entre nous que c'est pour rencontrer un désir personnel que vous avez exprimé, et pour rendre hommage aux sentiments de cordiale loyauté dont vous avez fait montre, que le Gouvernement français a provisoirement renoncé au droit, que la Conférence avait sanctionné, de faire occuper par les troupes françaises le territoire de la Bekka.

Si donc l'accord provisoire, auquel nous venons d'aboutir, ne se trouvait par [sic] confirmé par un accord satisfaisant et définitif d'ici trois mois, il est bien entendu que les deux parties reprendraient leur liberté d'action.

Je ne doute pas d'ailleurs, que l'esprit de conciliation qui nous anime des deux côtés ne permette à cet accord définitif d'être conclu au mieux des intérêts de tous avant l'expiration de ce délai.

Veuillez croire, Monseigneur, aux sentiments de haute estime et d'amicale sympathie que je professe pour Votre Altesse Royale.

BERTHELOT

No. 381

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)*

No. 1201 Telegraphic [156907/2117/44A]

PARIS, November 29, 1919

Your telegram No. 1284<sup>1</sup> of November 28. General Haddard [sic] Pasha has been to see me this morning. He has shown me all correspondence that has passed between Emir and French Government<sup>2</sup> copies of which are being sent you to-night. In that correspondence it is stated French will not at present occupy Bekaa plain which Haddard Pasha says includes all places mentioned in my former telegram 1187<sup>3</sup> of November 21. Haddard showed me telegram sent by French Government to General Gouraud giving definite instructions to that effect and I cannot therefore make out why he is not carrying them out. Haddard expresses himself as fully satisfied with arrangement as a temporary measure. M. Clemenceau is to see Emir this afternoon and I will endeavour to see Berthelot.

<sup>1</sup> No. 379.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 380.

<sup>3</sup> No. 372.

No. 382

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)*

*No. 1202 Telegraphic [156923/2117/444]*

PARIS, November 29, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Have seen Berthelot. He confirms in every respect information given me by General Hadaad [*sic*].

Necessary instructions were sent to Gouraud November 27 evening, and French Ambassador in London was instructed to inform you of decision arrived at.

<sup>1</sup> No. 381.

No. 383

*Note by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with the French Ambassador in London*

[157334/2117/444]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 29, 1919

The French Ambassador called this morning and informed me that according to a telegram received by him from Paris, Lord Allenby and General Congreve have asked General Gouraud to delay the occupation of Bukaa in order to avoid possible trouble with the Arabs. General Gouraud answered that he had been ordered to occupy the whole of the blue zone, and an agreement having been come to between the French and British Governments it was only the two Governments who could modify it if they thought proper to do so.

This was reported to the French Government, and Monsieur Clemenceau has now informed General Gouraud that, in accordance with the desire expressed by the Prime Minister and General Allenby, he had been endeavouring to come to an agreement with the Emir Feisal. This agreement with the Emir Feisal must be kept secret for some time, but it contains the acceptance of the French mandate for Syria under certain conditions.

By this agreement the occupation of Bukaa is to be delayed, but the right of France to occupy this territory is recognised by the Emir Feisal. In the meantime order is to be maintained by the local police under the orders of the Caimakams. Three Arab officers of Damascus, selected by agreement between General Gouraud and the Emir Feisal, will be entrusted with the duties of inspection, and the Emir Feisal will withdraw his troops to leave a free hand to the police to maintain order.

This arrangement has been accepted by Feisal, who has telegraphed confidentially to his brother, the Emir Zeid, to see to its execution.<sup>1</sup>

Monsieur Clemenceau asks that His Majesty's Government will warn Lord Allenby of the arrangements arrived at in order that no complications should

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure 2 in No. 380.

arise in connection with his negotiations with the Emir Feisal, which are as much to our interests as to the interests of the French.

In order to save time, I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the C.I.G.S.

H.

No. 384

*Additional Note by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with the French Ambassador in London*

[158008/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 29, 1919

The French Ambassador told me to-day that he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that Lord Allenby and General Congreve have asked that British troops should occupy the southern portion of the blue zone, and in particular the region of Tyre. M. Clemenceau has decided that, in view of the occupation of this territory by French troops having been sanctioned by the Supreme Council, there is no reason to raise this question, which has been decided by the Conference.

H.

No. 385

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 2)*

No. 504 Telegraphic [157668/2117/44A]

CAIRO, November 29, 1919

Picot accompanied by two French officers is proceeding home via Asia Minor and has arranged to meet Mustapha-Kemal on the way. This action lends colour to a report that French policy in Near East is now to win over Arabs and Turks with the view to throwing whole weight of combination against British influence and interests.

Addressed to London. Repeated to Constantinople and Baghdad.

No. 386

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon  
(Received November 30)*

No. 1645 Telegraphic [156998/142/44A]

CAIRO, November 30, 1919

Our relations with King Hussein have become very delicate owing to reduction of subsidy, its payment in notes instead of gold, and Syrian question.

There is a constant danger of King resigning and forcing his sons to accompany him when he leaves Hedjaz.

I am above all anxious to avoid this.

King Hussein has asked you to send a high official to discuss current affairs.<sup>1</sup>

His request could be satisfied by my inviting Emir Abdullah to Cairo as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hedjaz Government.

I have addressed a strong Note to King on the subject of transfer of subsidy money to Syria<sup>2</sup> and I would like Colonel Vickery, when delivering it to be able simultaneously to convey my invitation to Abdullah. I have hopes that this course of negotiation would stave off King's resignation.

Please inform me by telegraph if you approve of Abdullah's visit as my message to King Hussein will reach Jeddah on December 4.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 377.

<sup>2</sup> H.M. Government objected to the transfer by King Hussein to Syria of monies drawn from the subsidy paid to him by H.M. Government for the local needs of the Hejaz.

### No. 387

*Letter from Mr. Campbell to Mr. Kerr*

*Unnumbered [156471/142/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 1, 1919

Dear Kerr,

With reference to your letter of the 27th ultimo<sup>1</sup> enclosing copy of a telegram from King Hussein to the Prime Minister, I enclose copy of a telegram which Lord Curzon has just despatched to Lord Allenby, with a copy of the instructions to Colonel Wilson<sup>2</sup> to which it refers.<sup>3</sup> Lord Curzon suggests that the Prime Minister should reply on the following lines to King Hussein's telegram.

'Colonel Wilson Pasha is returning to Jeddah at once with messages from H.M.G. which I hope will be satisfactory to you. I earnestly trust that you will await his arrival before taking any steps. You may rest assured of the unaltered friendship and respect of H.M.G.'

Yours sincerely,

R. H. CAMPBELL

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 387<sup>4</sup>

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 1285 Telegraphic*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 1, 1919

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the position between King Hussein and Ibn Saud and opportunity has been taken of the presence in this country of Ibn Saud's<sup>5</sup> son Feisal for definite proposals to be formulated. Colonel Wilson leaves England as soon as possible with instructions to attempt to induce Hussein to meet Ibn Saud personally. I have directed him

<sup>1</sup> No. 377.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel C. E. Wilson was British political and military representative in the Hejaz.

<sup>3</sup> Copies of these two enclosures have been supplied from the immediately following file 156472/142/44A.      <sup>4</sup> See note 3 above.      <sup>5</sup> In error for 'King Hussein's'.

to discuss with you before proceeding to Jeddah and I shall be glad of your observations on his instructions in due course. Ibn Saud will not be approached officially until Hussein has expressed his readiness to meet him. It is hoped that a personal meeting followed if necessary by British arbitration, will obviate the necessity for actual demarcation of the boundary by a British official or commission.

Please inform Hussein that Colonel Wilson is returning to Jeddah with a message from His Majesty's Government which they hope will be satisfactory to him.

Despatch follows by bag.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 387<sup>4</sup>

*Foreign Office to Colonel Wilson*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 1, 1919

Sir,

I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that on your return to the Hedjaz you should take the earliest opportunity of getting King Hussein to come to Jeddah for a full and frank discussion on the following lines.

You should inform him that you have just returned from London, where the whole question of his relations with Ibn Saud has been discussed by His Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has himself taken a great personal interest in the question, and is very anxious that the two rulers should compose their differences.

After listening to the arguments put forward by you on the King's behalf, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that he has a strong case. So strong indeed does it appear to be that they cannot understand why His Majesty should decline to state it either in person or before some impartial arbiter to be appointed by His Majesty's Government.

If it is the case, as King Hussein contends, that his ownership of Khurma and Turaba is incontestable, there does not appear to be any valid objection to his producing the proofs which would convince any impartial person at once of the justice of his claims.

He should realise that there is at present no question of the public demarcation of the boundary by a British Commission. It is only suggested and strongly urged by His Majesty's Government that he should agree to meet Ibn Saud personally with the object of arriving at an agreement on all points at issue between them. You should remind King Hussein that he has previously expressed his willingness to meet Ibn Saud should His Majesty's Government so desire, and add that they will readily arrange for the meeting to take place at Jeddah, Cairo, or Aden.

It is not anticipated that public opinion in the Hedjaz and elsewhere will necessarily jump to the conclusion from the fact of this meeting that the ownership of Khurma is being arbitrated upon. It may not even be necessary for an arbiter to step in at all, and only in the event of King Hussein and Ibn

Saud failing to come to an agreement might it be necessary to suggest the appointment of an impartial British official to assist in arriving at a conclusion. In the event of King Hussein making difficulties about a personal interview with Ibn Saud you should point out to him that the alternative of a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two parties would not be likely to produce so satisfactory a result, though His Majesty's Government would prefer even this alternative to direct intervention on their part.

King Hussein must realise that if, without an agreement between the two parties, Ibn Saud were now called upon to withdraw his forces, the result might be that the whole militant power of the Akhwan<sup>s</sup> would be let loose upon the Hedjaz. There was nothing in the circumstances of the recent conflict to lead His Majesty's Government to believe that King Hussein's troops would be able to resist such an advance. They might even lose Mecca and thus incur the odium of the Moslem world in general and subject his own name to the greatest stain that could rest on the memory of a Moslem ruler. No one knows better than His Majesty that British troops could not come to his assistance. He would be the last to invite or expect them to do so. In these circumstances it seems the height of unwise to provoke a further advance which His Majesty has not the means to resist, but which equally with him His Majesty's Government would deplore. The interests of both Governments are in fact the same, viz., to avoid any such calamity and, by an agreement between the two powerful potentates principally concerned, to bring about a condition of peace and unity in the Arabian peninsula.

Ibn Saud for his part has also demanded from His Majesty's Government a definite recognition of his various claims, but has been told that His Majesty's Government must decline even to discuss them until he has made a real effort to come to an agreement without their intervention. It is believed that Ibn Saud will be quite ready to come to Jeddah and have a friendly conversation with King Hussein on the latter's territory; and he is also being told that in the event of negotiations failing His Majesty's Government will have no alternative but to propose the decision of an impartial arbiter.

His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary at this stage to discuss the question of Khurma. They are aware of the strong feelings entertained by King Hussein on the subject, and they have not receded from the attitude which they have previously adopted. Only in the event of the King and Ibn Saud failing to come to an agreement on the matter would it be necessary for a British arbitrator to investigate the case and to arrive at a decision.

His Majesty's Government are hopeful that by these suggestions they may have once more testified their sincere regard for King Hussein and their recognition of the great services which he has rendered to the Allied cause during the war. They take this opportunity of again assuring him of their entire faith and trust in his good intentions, and in his true friendship and loyalty to Great Britain; and you are authorised to inform His Majesty that

<sup>s</sup> i.e. of the Wahabis.

nothing would give greater pleasure to His Majesty's Government than to receive him in London in the course of next year and discuss the many interests that they have in common. But before he comes to England it is essential that the risk of hostilities between himself and Ibn Saud should be entirely removed so that trouble should not break out in his absence.

A copy of these instructions is being communicated to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, with whom you should discuss them before proceeding to Jeddah.

I am, &c.  
GERALD SPICER

No. 388

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon*

(Received December 6)

No. 1649 Telegraphic [159011/2117/44A]

CAIRO, December 1, 1919

Following is a paraphrase of King Hussein's telegram 116 to Feisal.  
Begins.

I (? knew) nothing of either your first or second visit to Europe until you had left and I agreed to please Britain. I now remind you of my telegram 9 of 9th Moharram<sup>1</sup> in which I said 'I pray you to settle question in one of two ways as explained in my letter to High Commissioner dated 20th Zul Kida 36 (August 27th 1918)<sup>2</sup> a copy of which you acknowledged receipt'. It is impossible for me to accept my position in Hedjaz if any partition takes place and there is no more need for your absence from the country.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 317.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 317, note 2.

No. 389

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon*

(Received December 7)

No. 1652 Telegraphic [159612/2117/44A]

CAIRO, December 2, 1919

Following is paraphrase of (?) King Hussein's) telegram 115 to Feisal  
(Begins.)

(? Ze)id has informed me of withdrawal of British troops<sup>1</sup> and arrest of Yassin.<sup>2</sup> I do not know what more to say except to beg you to make (? haste).

<sup>1</sup> A telegram of December 4, 1919, from British General Headquarters, Egypt, to the War Office reported that 'with following exceptions withdrawal from Syria, Cilicia and Trans-Jordan territory complete. (A) Guards on stores etc. left until December 6 at Rayak and Baalbek at the request of French on [sic] awaiting embarkation. (B) Troops in Beirut area embarking or awaiting embarkation. (C) Half battalion from Amman and Es-Salt on march to Jerusalem via Jericho.'

<sup>2</sup> Yasin Pasha had recently been arrested by the British military authorities. According to a communication by the Director of Military Intelligence (transmitted to Foreign Office on December 8, 1919) the reasons for Yasin Pasha's arrest 'are that he was conducting active anti-French propaganda and making military preparations to resist French occupation of the Blue Area'.

No. 390

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 7)*

No. 507 Telegraphic [159421/73497/44A]

CAIRO, December 2, 1919

Commander-in-Chief wishes to extend an invitation to the Rt. Hon. Herbert Samuel to visit Palestine with a view to investigation and advice regarding future line of policy in development of finance and administration of Palestine. It is considered essential to institute preliminary investigations so as to be prepared before mandate is settled. Any such (preliminary?)<sup>1</sup> investigation would be in interests of present population of Palestine and would conform to pledges given by His Majesty's Government to Zionism.

If you concur would you forward invitation?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> The invitation was forwarded to Mr. Samuel in a Foreign Office letter of December 20, 1919, wherein it was stated that 'Lord Curzon entirely approves Lord Allenby's invitation'.

No. 391

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 19)*

No. C.P.O. 92 [163275/2117/44A]

CAIRO, December 2, 1919

My Lord,

At the request of the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a report No. 37 from the Political Officer at Damascus, dated the 15th October, 1919.

I understand that the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, in communicating with your Lordship desires to refer in particular to this report.

I have, &c.

(For Chief Political Officer),

W. F. STIRLING

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 391

*Report No. 37*

The political situation in Damascus and Syria generally remains somewhat obscure. There are signs that a considerable section of the people, while disliking the idea of a French mandate as much as ever, are nevertheless becoming resigned to it, and the ardent Nationalist and pro-English party are rather despairing.

Some of the notables are already approaching the French with a view to securing their future should the latter come to the country. Amongst them are Mohamed Fauzi Pasha El Azm, Abdul Rahman Pasha El Yusuf, Sheikhs Mithgal and Mashur-ibn-Faiz, while two of the sheikhs of the Aneiyeh, near Aleppo, are also reported to have decided to work for the French.

The Nationalist and anti-French movement, in fact, appears to be rather

losing its force, and should the French come in with troops, they would be unlikely, I think, to meet with any organised resistance. There is only one factor which might revive the former widespread feeling against them, and that is religion. With the vast majority of Moslems Arab Nationalism and Islamism are synonymous terms. This is now recognised by the Christian supporters of the Nationalist movement, and they are becoming slightly uneasy as to the possible results of their efforts to inculcate national ideas into the people of the country. It is, and always has been, just as clearly recognised by the prominent Moslem leaders of the movement, including Feisal himself, and the Bagdadi party, and the activities of these are turning more and more towards encouraging the Islamic movement. This movement may not take the form of a definite 'Jehad,' although given favourable conditions this is by no means impossible, and will certainly be attempted by the leaders of the Bagdadi party and other extreme sections. It will, however, inevitably lead to a rapprochement with the Turks and with Mustafa Kemal. It is safe to say that the majority of the Moslems in Aleppo vilayet, and a very large number in the vilayet of Damascus, are in sympathy with Turkish aspirations, and would prefer union with Turkey to being under an unpopular European Power.

Turkish propaganda is increasing in Aleppo and Damascus. I attach translations of two pamphlets which were recently distributed in Aleppo—one from Mustafa Kemal, setting out his aims, and the other addressed to the people of Syria.<sup>1</sup> Also a report of an agent, a Mesopotamian officer, formerly a member of the [Mesopotamian] league.

2. While the report is possibly exaggerated, and too much reliance cannot be placed on the truth of the statements made about particular people, nevertheless, it is confirmation of talk that has been going on for some time in Damascus. The feeling against the Sherifian family has undoubtedly been growing in strength for some time. They have failed to appeal to the classes, who merely desire security owing to the miserable ineptitude of the Administration, and the encouragement, or at least tolerance, extended to the Bedouin, especially men like Nuri Shalaan. On the other hand, they are not sufficiently extreme for the more ardent Nationalists and the irreconcilable anti-French party.

The reports which reach Damascus of the state of affairs in the Hedjaz have not added to the popularity of Sherifian rule. King Hussein's name carries no weight whatever, and there is no question in Syria of accepting him as Caliph.

The request made by Emir Zeid on the 14th to be allowed to return to Mecca may mean that he realises that his position is becoming difficult. I can think of no other reason for his wishing to leave Syria. His position and that of Feisal is undoubtedly unenviable, since they are mistrusted and disliked by many of the people, and can hope for no active support from us.

3. Various notables, in conversation with the intelligence officer here,

<sup>1</sup> This latter enclosure (appendix 2 in original) is not printed. It was a variant translation of the proclamation printed in No. 333, note 2.

stated that all the lower and middle classes were pro-Turk, and trouble might be expected if all European troops were withdrawn, though they stated there would be no organised massacres of Christians, as all the people of Damascus wished for was peace and security. I think, however, the risk is considerable, in view of the state of feeling in the Lebanon and the Islamic movement now on foot.

4. The situation in Aleppo, as observed in a visit there last week, appears much the same as here, though the Turkish factor predominates there.

5. Large numbers of prisoners of war continue to return. There have recently arrived in Damascus amongst them four officers from the Yemen and eighteen from African Tripoli. These are all trying to get north with the Turks. They are professional soldiers, and the only army which can offer them a career is the Turkish army; it would appear, therefore, that if the release of prisoners continued Mustafa Kemal is not likely to suffer from shortage of officers.

6. The commanders of the three brigades of the Arab Army have recently been changed. The General Officer Commanding Aleppo brigade is now Rushdi Safadi, an Arab officer trained in Germany, and on the staff at Constantinople throughout the entire war. He returned from there about two months ago. The General Officer Commanding Damascus brigade and the post commandant Damascus are both Turks, though domiciled in Damascus. They also returned only a month or two ago. The General Officer Commanding Deraa brigade, an Arab from north of Aleppo, was formerly military attaché at Vienna, and during the war served entirely on the European fronts. He returned to Syria two months ago. These officers are certainly considerably more efficient than those they have replaced, but their politics will require watching.

7. An incident occurred recently at Kuneitra, which has now been amicably settled. A certain Circassian, a relative of Emir Said-el-Jezairly, managed to obtain some twenty-five to thirty recruits for the gendarmerie in O.E.T. West. The Arabs and Bedouin sought to find in this an excuse for a quarrel with the Circassians, and issued an ultimatum to the Circassians demanding the return of these gendarmes. The Arab Government despatched troops to the spot and ordered the Arabs to abandon their attitude, and I am informed that the matter has now been peacefully settled. An armoured car also visited Kuneitra on the 12th, and produced an excellent impression.

J. N. CLAYTON  
Major.

DAMASCUS, October 15, 1919.

APPENDIX I TO NO. 391  
*Circular (printed in Turkish)*

1. We do not want to have a war with foreigners.
2. We do not want to have a foreign Government in our country.
3. We promise security to the public without distinction in religion.

4. We shall defend the rights of our nation until death, in order to avoid its fall into the hands of the foreigners.

5. We wish to join together the parts which belong to Turkey against Wilson's principles.

6. Let everyone keep to his work and business. Our arm is justice.

7. We shall put to death without mercy everyone who stands against what we have already mentioned, whether he be a Moslem or a Christian.

8. The Moslems who love our Sultan. We have the right to the Caliphate.

9. Our nation have [*sic*] taken up arms for this cause, from east to west, from Erzerum to Smyrna.

10. Those who gave right to 300,000 Armenians did not give right to 16,000,000 Turks. In order to live, and no matter what life is worth, we shall defend our right.

#### APPENDIX 3<sup>2</sup> TO No. 391

#### *Report on Mesopotamian League*

The league is definitely divided into the extremist section, which is a large majority, and the moderate section, led by Kaimakam Subhi Bey Halim, Rais Mahkamat-il-Tanis, Damascus, Bimb Saddar-id-Din Mamu, and Kaimakam Ismail Hakki, Director of Technical Services, Arab army.

The latter have a small following, possibly numbering about thirty officers, and too much importance should not be attached to the movement, as in case of trouble the members might be expected to throw in their lot with the extremists.

At a recent meeting arranged with Miss G. Bell, a political officer from Mesopotamia, passing through Syria, the above leaders of the Moderate Party stated they were willing to accept a British mandate for Mesopotamia, but asked for a measure of self-government by the people. A great deal of time was taken up in talking of the faults of the present Administration, and no very clear suggestions as to the policy desired were put forward. It was fairly apparent that the first requirement of the Moderate Party would be employment for themselves in the new Government.

It is reported that there is now complete understanding between the various Syrian and Mesopotamian societies in this country. These include the Ahad-el-Iraqi, the Ittihad-is-Suri, the Committee of National Defence (Lijnat-id-Difaa-el-Watani), the Syrian Conference (Mu'temmar-is-Suri). The Arab Club is the stronghold of the Palestinians, and is practically controlled by them, and there is stated to be a particularly close union between them and the Iraquins [*sic*].

#### *Meetings at Damascus*

Apparently the league has called for a conference, and the following leaders are now in Damascus:—

Jaffar Pasha El Askari, Military Governor of Aleppo;

<sup>2</sup> For the omission of appendix 2, see note 1 above.

Rushdi Bey Safadi, Divisional Commander, Aleppo;  
Rashid Bey El Madfai, Military Governor of Amman;

in addition to Yasin Pasha and Maulud Pasha, the latter acting as adviser to Emir Zeid.

Private meetings between these members of the league are taking place daily, and whether by intention or accident at this moment, the proclamation by Mustafa Pasha Kemal, calling on the Syrians to receive his army as friends and to assist him to drive out the Allied troops from Syria, has been issued simultaneously in Aleppo and Damascus.

It is reported that the object of the present conference is the perfecting of plans for a general rising over the whole of Arabistan, in conjunction with any move made by the army under Mustafa Pasha Kemal. The movement is definitely anti-European, and is directed equally against the British and French. A most important point is that, while the whole plan is Pan-Islamic, and the essence of it is religion, it is strongly anti-Sherifian, and should it materialise the Sherifian family will be denounced as traitors to Islam and will be thrown off. In the latter event the Emirs Feisal and Zeid can look for practically no support whatever, either in Syria or in the Hedjaz.

No doubt it is suspected that Feisal will accept an arrangement favourable to the French, and public opinion has veered so strongly in favour of the Turks that he will be accused, not only of selling Syria to the French, but also of having betrayed Islam to the British by siding against Turkey during the war.

On the other hand, there are many of the upper classes in Syria who are secretly approaching, or preparing to approach, the French with a view to gaining their favour. There is also a large body of the middle and lower classes who wish only to settle down under a strong Government and to carry on trade or agriculture, and do not want any more war.

At the same time the position is that a strong and determined body of men, who absolutely control the army and probably the gendarmerie, is preparing to declare a holy war should circumstances permit.

### No. 392

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 4)*

*No. 1209 Telegraphic [158597/2117/44A]*

*PARIS, December 4, 1919*

Emir Feisal just been to see me. Very much upset at report published in Egyptian paper that Arab Chief of Staff has been removed from his post and deported from Damascus.<sup>1</sup>

French liaison officer has informed him that report is true and deportation was by order of Lord Allenby.

I have told him that probable explanation is that Chief of Staff went to Beyrouth to meet Allenby as all dates given coincide, and that many people

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 389, note 2.

have interest in putting mischievous paragraphs in paper. He has begged me however to enquire from you whether any truth in report and if true to ask that Chief of Staff may be allowed to return to Damascus where Emir will make enquiries and take necessary disciplinary action.

Am writing you fully<sup>2</sup> about interview but Emir presses for this telegraphic request.

<sup>2</sup> Evidently in a private letter, untraced in Foreign Office archives.

### No. 393

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 1300 Telegraphic [156471/142/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 4, 1919

Following from Prime Minister for King Hussein begins:—<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram of the 21st November.<sup>2</sup>

Colonel Wilson Pasha is returning to Jeddah at once with messages from His Majesty's Government which I hope will be satisfactory to you. I earnestly trust that you will await his arrival before taking any steps. You may rest assured of the unaltered friendship and respect of His Majesty's Government. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Kerr had informed Mr. Campbell on December 3 that Mr. Lloyd George approved the reply to King Hussein proposed in No. 387. Mr. Kerr asked Mr. Campell to have the message sent to Field-Marshal Allenby for transmission to King Hussein.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 377.

### No. 394

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6)*

*No. 1666 Telegraphic [159013/142/44A]*

CAIRO, December 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 1299.<sup>1</sup>

I consider Emir Abdulla's visit to Cairo would be helpful in preparing ground for meeting between King Hussein and Ibn Saud and in providing an opportunity for ventilation of all the King's other grievances. I propose therefore that Prime Minister's message to King Hussein (your telegram No. 1300)<sup>2</sup> should accordingly be reworded as follows:

Begins.

'I have received your telegram of 21st November and wish to assure Your Majesty of His Majesty's Government's unaltered sincerity and respect. I trust these happy relations may for long be maintained and I extend to your noble son the Emir Abdulla the cordial invitation to visit His Excellency Viscount Allenby in Cairo at an early date when matters to our common interest may be satisfactorily discussed.'

Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This short telegram of December 4, 1919, in reply to No. 386, inquired whether, in view of Colonel Wilson's approaching return to Jeddah, Field-Marshal Allenby still considered it desirable that the Emir Abdulla should visit Cairo.

<sup>2</sup> No. 393.

I consider this visit would appeal to the King's sense of his own importance and have a tranquilizing effect on his present unsettled state of mind.

I am not delivering Prime Minister's message pending your reply to my telegram No. 1662.<sup>3</sup>

Please telegraph your decision as I wish to give Abdulla his invitation as soon as possible if it has your approval.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This administrative telegram referred to the question of Colonel Wilson's return to Jeddah.

### No. 395

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo)*

*No. 351 Telegraphic [156779/2117/44A]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919

My telegram No. 340<sup>1</sup> (November 18).

Has declaration been published and if so with what results?

<sup>1</sup> See No. 361, note 2.

### No. 396

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 14)*

*No. 513 Telegraphic [161583/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, December 9, 1919

Your 35105[351]<sup>1</sup> Declaration not yet published. Situation has improved and it may possibly be undesirable to do so but will report further at early date.

<sup>1</sup> No. 395.

### No. 397

*Draft Mandate for Palestine*

*[385/3/3/20870]*

*Dec. 11, 1919*

#### CHAPTER V.<sup>1</sup> PALESTINE

*Draft provisionally agreed upon between Zionist Organisation and British Delegation.<sup>2</sup>*

The High Contracting Parties:

Recognising the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to reconstitute Palestine as their national home (Erez Israel);

Associating themselves accordingly with the Declaration originally made by the British Government and assented to by the other Allied and Associated Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 299, note 7.

<sup>2</sup> The provisional agreement of this draft resulted from discussions early in December 1919 between Mr. Forbes Adam and Mr. Malkin for the Foreign Office, and Mr. Cohen for the Zionist Organization.

for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country;

Considering that this object can best be secured by the administration, for as long as may be necessary, of Palestine, by a State member of the League of Nations;

Have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. The boundaries of Palestine are defined in Annex I to this Convention.<sup>3</sup> A Commission representing the Governments of . . .<sup>4</sup> shall be appointed at once to trace these boundaries on the spot.

(N.B. The Zionist Organisation are particularly anxious to be represented on the Boundary Commission even though this Commission will only be concerned with details of boundary, especially if an Arab State has a representative on the Commission.)

2. The High Contracting Parties, (considering) that . . .<sup>4</sup> should be the Power selected to conduct the administration of Palestine and to secure the observance of the provisions of this convention, hereby confer upon . . .<sup>4</sup> a mandate to that end, including the right to exercise as such mandatory all the powers inherent in the Government of a sovereign state, in so far as such powers shall be consistent with the control of the League of Nations and save as they shall be limited by the terms of this convention. . . .<sup>4</sup> hereby accepts the mandate thus conferred upon it.

3. . . .<sup>4</sup> shall be responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the development of a self-governing Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

4. . . .<sup>4</sup> will encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities consistent with the prevailing conditions.

5. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body with power to advise and co-operate with the Government in all administrative, economic, social and other matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine and subject always to the control of the Government to assist and take part in the development of the country. It shall have a preferential right, upon fair and equitable terms, to construct or operate public works, services and utilities not undertaken by the Government, or to develop the natural resources of the country. No private profits distributed by such agency shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the mandatory. The Government will consult with the agency { in before } granting concessions for the construction or operation of such public works, services

<sup>3</sup> Not annexed to filed copy.

<sup>4</sup> Punctuation as in original.

and utilities or for the development of such natural resources as are not undertaken by the agency.

The Zionist Organisation shall forthwith be recognised as such agency on the understanding that it shall take steps in consultation with the mandatory to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

6. ....<sup>4</sup> in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 5 shall promote Jewish immigration and close settlement by Jews on the land, and shall open for such settlement all public lands and all other lands that can be made available, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.

7. (i) Jews who within seven years of the coming into force of the Treaty become resident in Palestine:

(a) will, after the expiration of twelve months from the date of their arrival, have the right to obtain Palestinian citizenship by application in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed:

(b) will, failing such application become citizens of Palestine, *ipso facto*, on the expiration of a period of two years from the date of their arrival unless within the said period of two years they declare before the competent Palestinian authority their desire not to become citizens of Palestine. The Government of Palestine may { permit } such persons to remain in Palestine after the making of such declaration.

Persons who become citizens of Palestine under the provisions of this Article will *ipso facto* lose their existing nationality.

For the purpose of the provisions of this Article the status of a married woman will be governed by that of her husband, and the status of children under eighteen years of age by that of their parents.

(ii) The Government of Palestine shall also enact a Nationality Law so framed as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews other than those who acquire such citizenship under Para. (i) of this Article and will become resident in Palestine.

8. The immunities and privileges of foreigners as well as the rights of consular jurisdiction and protection formerly established in the Ottoman dominions by the capitulations and by usage are abolished in Palestine. It will be the duty of the mandatory to ensure that the judicial system established in Palestine (a) reasonably safeguards the interests of persons of western race or civilisation: (b) reasonably safeguards in relation to certain matters based on the religious tenets of particular communities (such as Wakf and questions of personal status) the law and (to such extent as the mandatory may consider desirable) the jurisdiction hitherto applicable in Palestine.

The extradition treaties now in force between foreign powers and the mandatory power will apply to Palestine.

9. The Government of Palestine shall have full power to reserve the development of the country for local interests, including the Jewish agency referred to in Article 5, and such other Jewish bodies approved by it as may be organised to facilitate the development of the Jewish National Home, and are officially recognised by the Government.

In the construction and operation of public works, services and utilities and in the development of the natural resources of the country, the establishment of the Jewish National Home shall be a guiding principle.

The Government shall provide for public ownership or effective public control of the natural resources of the country and of the public works, services, and utilities established and to be established therein; shall safeguard the interests of the community against their exploitation, and shall limit private profit from their development to a reasonable return on the capital employed therein, taking into account the extent and character of the risks assumed.

The Government shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, and adequate to prevent the evils of land speculation, which shall, among other things, further the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land and discourage its uneconomic use or non-use, prevent the evils of mortmain, and limit the maximum areas of holdings.

10. The foreign relations of Palestine shall be conducted by . . .<sup>4</sup> and citizens of Palestine shall be entitled to the protection of . . .<sup>4</sup> when outside the limits of Palestine. All States members of the League of Nations shall have the right to station consular officers in Palestine.

11. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites of Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights therein, of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship therein, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by . . .<sup>4</sup> who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected therewith.

12. . . .<sup>4</sup> will be responsible for providing that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are transferred to the permanent possession and control of suitable bodies selected or appointed by it and representing the adherents of the religion concerned. The selection of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites to be so transferred will be made by . . .<sup>4</sup>

. . .<sup>4</sup> will also be responsible for deciding, after investigation by a Commission appointed by it and containing representatives of the denominations concerned, questions arising in connection with any Holy Places, religious buildings or sites which, in the opinion of . . .<sup>4</sup> should be dealt with under this article, but whose ownership or control may be disputed by two or more denominations.

In all cases of transference, however, the right and duty of the . . .<sup>4</sup> to maintain order and decorum in the places transferred shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws

relating to public monuments as may be enacted by the Government of Palestine.

The rights of possession and control conferred under this Article are guaranteed by the League of Nations, and shall never be subject to any diminution or modification whatsoever, unless by the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

13. The responsibility for the protection of all religious interests being thus exercised on behalf of the League of Nations by . . .<sup>4</sup> all such protectorates previously exercised by any foreign states shall cease to operate in Palestine.

14. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief. Freedom of conscience and religious toleration shall be allowed to all inhabitants of Palestine, including the exercise of all forms of worship and no discrimination of any kind shall be made between any citizens of Palestine on the ground of race, sex or religion. No civil or political right of any citizen of Palestine shall be conditional upon, nor shall its exercise be affected by, any consideration of race, sex or faith or a change of faith, provided that this shall not prevent the selection of official representatives of races or faiths or forbid the definition of the franchise for their selection on the basis of race or faith. No hindrance shall be offered in spiritual matters either to the organisation of the different communities or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government may impose) shall not be denied or impaired. In particular the administration of the Jewish educational system shall be entrusted to the Jewish agency referred to in Article 5 or to such other agencies as may be designated or approved by it for the purpose.

15. The organisation of religious communities as where it exists already shall be maintained by the Government of Palestine as long as the Government considers it desirable.

16. Missionaries of all denominations the subjects or citizens of any member of the League of Nations shall be allowed freely to travel and reside with a view to prosecute their calling and to maintain their schools subject only to the requirements of public order, and there shall be no discrimination against such schools and institutions as compared with other establishments providing similar standards of education, it being understood that such schools and institutions shall not have the right to be assisted from public funds. Missionary bodies will be allowed, subject to local laws, to erect such buildings and to acquire and hold such property as may be necessary for the conduct of their religious and educational work. But the Government of Palestine shall have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government, and take all measures required for such control.

17. The Government of Palestine may organise a local gendarmerie for

the preservation of peace and order, but with this exception, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by Palestine, nor shall any fortifications be created or bases established therein. Such forces as shall be raised shall be on a voluntary basis. Such . . .<sup>4</sup> forces as shall be stationed in Palestine shall be confined to such numbers as may be necessary for the maintenance of the internal order and protection of the frontiers against raids. No Palestinian territory shall be ceded, leased, or in any way placed under the control of any foreign power for the establishment of a naval, military or aerial base.

18. Subject to the provisions of Articles       <sup>5</sup> the commerce and navigation of all States members of the League of Nations while engaged in lawful enterprises shall enjoy equal treatment in Palestine. No attempt shall be made by . . .<sup>4</sup> to obtain in Palestine for the commerce or navigation of its own subjects treatment more favourable than that which is accorded to the commerce and navigation of other nations.

19. . . .<sup>4</sup> shall secure the observance, so far as local conditions permit, of all international conventions dealing with matters referred to in Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

20. English, Hebrew and Arabic shall be the official languages of Palestine, and shall be employed *inter alia* on the stamps and money of Palestine.

21. The Government shall recognise the Jewish Sabbath and the Jewish holidays as legal days of rest without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of non-Jews and shall permit to all inhabitants the pursuit of their ordinary vocation on all days other than their respective days of rest and holidays.

22. (Whatever clause regarding annual report is agreed upon by Mandatory Commission for 'A' Mandates with due regard to the special character of the Mandate for Palestine.)

23. The Government of Palestine will co-operate, so far as religious and other local conditions permit, in the execution of a common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

24. The Government of Palestine shall take steps within twelve months from the exchange of ratifications of this convention to enact and thereafter to execute a Law of Antiquities based on the instructions contained in Annex 2<sup>3</sup> of this convention, which shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities. No attempt shall be made by . . .<sup>4</sup> to obtain for the archaeological research of its own citizens, treatment more favourable than that which is accorded to the archaeological research of other nations.

25. The Mandatory Power recognises the obligations accepted by it under this convention to be matters of international concern of which the League of Nations has jurisdiction.

26. Without prejudice to the principles embodied in the Preamble to this convention, changes in its provisions may be made with the consent of the

<sup>5</sup> Omission in original.

Council of the League of Nations, and it shall be the duty of the Council to advise the reconsideration of the present Convention, should the terms in its opinion have become inapplicable to existing conditions.

27. If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation of the application of the present convention which cannot be settled by friendly negotiations, such dispute shall be submitted to the permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

### No. 398

*Second part of M. Berthelot's note of the 12th December<sup>1</sup> regarding Arab countries, with comments<sup>2</sup> of the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation (not communicated to M. Berthelot).*

[167432/151671/44]

(D) *Entente franco-anglaise avec les Arabes (en Syrie, Palestine, Mésopotamie et Arabie).*

La question a été si souvent discutée qu'il n'est pas utile d'entrer aujourd'hui dans tous ses détails. Les bases essentielles en sont d'ailleurs posées dans les accords entre Français et Anglais en 1912 (Déclaration de Lord Grey)<sup>3</sup> et 1916 (Lettres Convention Grey-Cambon)<sup>4</sup>, entre Anglais et Arabes en 1915 (Lettres Sir H. MacMahon [sic] et le Roi Hussein, juillet et octobre 1915) entre Français, Anglais et Arabes (Déclaration du 11 novembre 1918), à la Conférence de la Paix (Résolution du Conseil Suprême du 15 septembre 1919), enfin entre les Français et les Arabes (Accord verbal de principe entre Faysal et M. Clemenceau).

En réalité pour que les promesses faites aux Arabes soient tenues et

<sup>1</sup> The first part of this note, relating to Turkish affairs, was treated at the time as a separate document and is printed as No. 631, app. I in Chap. III. Cf. Chap. III *passim* for the visit to London at that time of M. Clemenceau and M. Berthelot, and for Anglo-French discussion of Turkish affairs.

<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand column below, as in the filed copy.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 314, note 3.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

With regard to the northern and eastern frontier of Palestine, the French Memorandum apparently accepts a rectification of the Sykes-Picot frontier. (This line runs from a point south of Tyre, passes the northern end of the Sea of Galilee, and crosses the Yarmuk valley to a point just south of Deraa, and then passes in a north-easterly direction across the desert.)

But the Memorandum protests against any extension of the northern frontier as far as 'la banlieue de Damas' or any cession of the Hauran or the 'fertile plains round the basaltic outcrop of the Jebel Druz', or of 'all the waters of Damascus'. This anxiety may perhaps be inspired by the first line proposed by the British Military Authorities last summer, behind which British troops were to be withdrawn. This line ran roughly from a point south of Sidon, round the Nahr Hasbani basin to Jebel Jenin, thence east of Rasheya to a point south-east of Hermon, and thence east past Jebel Manias to a point about 40 miles south-east of Damascus, thence north to a point

pour qu'une entente commune et viable avec eux et entre Français et Anglais soit possible, il est indispensable que Faysal, qui a été présenté par le Gouvernement anglais à la Conférence de la Paix et accepté par celle-ci, du consentement de la France, comme représentant des Arabes, puisse constituer un Royaume Syrien homogène. Le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de l'intérêt commun et du désir manifesté si souvent et si fortement par le Gouvernement anglais, s'est décidé à faire à Faysal les sacrifices nécessaires pour qu'une entente loyale et complète puisse s'établir. Mais il ne peut faire seul toutes les concessions. Aussi tient-il fermement aux points suivants: les limites fixées par les Accords de 1916 seront respectées, le tracé du chemin de fer anglais Caïffa à Bagdad ne saurait être relevé vers Damas, Palmyre, Deir el [sic] Zor et Mossoul, sinon il n'y aurait plus d'État Syrien viable et indépendant sous mandat français et tout accord avec Faysal en particulier serait rendu impossible. (Les prétentions de l'Émir arabe étaient bien plus considérables et de son côté il a fait de grandes concessions sur ses rêves primitifs pour s'assurer une réalité solide du côté français, en ne cachant pas qu'il se propose également de revendiquer auprès des Anglais pour la Palestine, Mossoul et le statut exact de la zone B.)

Pour arriver à une entente avec Faysal, la France a modifié grandement ses vues primitives. Pour rester en plein accord avec le Gouvernement anglais, M. Clemenceau est disposé également à se prêter à ses vues et à faire des concessions sur l'Accord de 1916 en ce qui concerne

about 40 miles due east of Damascus, and thence in a north-easterly direction along the Jebel Wustani and across the desert so as to include Tadmor (Palmyra) in the British zone. This line is in any case superseded by that proposed for British evacuation last September, which leaves the coast at the mouth of the Litani river, follows that river to its bend north, thence to Banias, the Nahr Mughaniye, and the western edge of the Leja.

It is true that if the former line were made the permanent frontier the French would lose the Hauran and the Jebel Druz area, as they fear in their memorandum, unless the line, instead of being extended eastwards, were run due south from Leja to cut the Sykes-Picot line.

The following line, supported by the Chief Political Officer at Cairo, satisfies Zionist aspirations in the north, but is understood to fall somewhat short of them on the east. It runs from the sea just north of the Litani, and, following up and at some distance from the right bank, crosses it from west to east about the Litani Gorges. The boundary thence runs so as to include those of the Hermon waters, which flow into the Litani or Jordan basins, *i.e.*, the whole of the Nahr Hashani basin and the towns of Hasbeya and Rasheya. Thence it falls due south to the summit of Mount Hermon. Thence it runs south-west of the head waters of the Nahr Mughaniye, just east of the Wadi el-Rukhad, and, after crossing the Yarmuk valley about halfway between Deraa and Samakh, passes some 25 to 30 kilometres west of the Hejaz railway; thence west of Amman in a south-

Mossoul et la Palestine, mais il ne peut, sans renoncer à toute possibilité et à toute valeur d'un mandat syrien, étendre les limites Nord de la Palestine, jusqu'à la banlieue de Damas au bénéfice des Sionistes, renoncer au Hauran et aux plaines fertiles qui dépendent des coulées basaltiques du Djebel Druz, abandonner aux colonies juives toutes les eaux de Damas, accepter la modification de caractère politique du tracé du chemin de fer anglais, renoncer non seulement à Mossoul (qui d'ailleurs fait partie de la zone A indépendante arabe et non de la zone bleue où devait seulement s'étendre d'après l'accord de 1916 l'administration directe française, fait qui est relevé spécialement par Faysal) mais à l'Hinterland du mandat français à l'Est et au Nord.

Les vues françaises sont d'ailleurs raisonnables et conciliantes; il est parfaitement possible d'assurer aux colonies sionistes, auxquelles la France porte également beaucoup d'intérêt, la disposition d'une proportion importante des eaux des sources qu'elles réclament, mais bien entendu sans abandonner la possession territoriale qui causerait un détriment capital à la Syrie et nous empêcherait de nous accorder avec Faysal.

De même pour le tracé du chemin de fer, s'il est reconnu nécessaire, d'un commun accord, après examen contradictoire et pour des raisons techniques, d'empiéter légèrement sur la zone A, un droit de passage peut être concédé, mais cela ne peut changer la souveraineté territoriale ni aboutir à une modification politique du chemin de fer anglais, qui, de Caïffa à Bagdad, deviendrait un

westerly direction to the end of the Dead Sea.

It will be seen that as regards the eastern frontier this line does not, as the French fear, include either the Hauran or Jebel Druz in Palestine. As regards the northern frontier, it does include the whole Nahr Hasbani basin, to which the French will doubtless object, as it is essentially Arab nationalist country, and brings the Palestine frontier due east and almost north-east of Damascus. It may at once be said that the economic is the only really defensible and justifiable basis on which the British proposals for a considerable rectification of the Sykes-Picot line in Palestine in favour of the Zionists can be founded in negotiation with the French. The Allied pledge of a national home involves gradual Jewish immigration into—and colonisation of—Palestine, and, if the present native population is not to be abruptly dislodged, the territory available for Jewish immigrants must be much developed and made as far as possible self-supporting. The military and air arguments in favour of the inclusion of the greater part of Mount Hermon in Palestine cut both ways, Mount Hermon dominating Damascus as well as Northern Palestine. Further, it is difficult to discuss a frontier with the French on purely military grounds, when the hostilities which are to test the frontier's efficacy must almost certainly be between France and Great Britain. The military argument cannot therefore well be pressed.

The case for the eastern and northern frontiers outlined above, however, admittedly rests on economic

chemin de fer Caïffa-Damas-Mossoul, supprimant en fait nos propres lignes et le mandat syrien français.

grounds. As regards the eastern frontier, the Gaza and Beersheba district at present gives the only good cereal-growing area in Palestine. The inclusion of the strip of fertile territory east of the Jordan but west of the Hejaz Railway would supplement Palestine's deficiency in this respect. The French zone, on the other hand, will include the fertile Bekaa valley, the Damascus plain, and the Hauran and Jebel Druz country, and will be more than self-sufficing from the point of view of cereals.

The Zionist proposal for a northern frontier is designed to cover an extensive scheme of irrigation and electric power development, involving the carrying of the waters of the Litani into the Nahr Hasbani basin and the conservation of all the northern waters flowing from Mount Hermon into the Jordan and Litani basins. The economic argument for it has already been developed above, and the French, who are equally pledged to the policy of the national home, should find it difficult to argue that Syria will suffer by this scheme to an extent which would outweigh the advantages to Palestine and Zionism. Economically Syria would hardly be effected by the realisation of the Jewish scheme, and we do not agree with the French Memorandum on this point.

On the other hand, we believe that the Zionist aims in this direction can be substantially met if the frontier, instead of including the whole Litani valley from the sea to the bend northwards, be made to run more or less from the present point of departure of the Sykes-Picot line, north of Acre, north-eastwards so as to

include in Palestine the bend of the Litani itself and a small portion of the [?] area] to<sup>s</sup> the north of the bend. Thence it might run due east to the southern slopes of Mount Hermon south of Rasheya and cutting the Nahr Hasbani.

This latter suggestion, leaving to Syria the coastal area north of Acre and round Tyre, and also the nationalist districts of Hasbeya and Rasheya would be a very fair compromise.

If such a territorial compromise should prove unattainable, the Zionist desiderata might conceivably be met by an economic agreement with the French, which, indeed, the French Memorandum appears to contemplate. This, however, would not be satisfactory. It is doubtful whether the French would or could face the financial outlay involved by the highly technical plans already elaborated by the Zionists.

In preference to a mere economic agreement we recommend that we should revert to the proposal for American arbitration on the northern frontier of Palestine already made last September.<sup>6</sup>

If the French accept the modification of the Sykes-Picot line described above in regard to the northern and part of the eastern boundaries of Palestine, we do not think we can press for any further modification, *i.e.*, from the point south of Deraa across the desert to Abu Kemal, more especially as the French appear from the Memorandum disposed to cede Mosul on certain economic conditions. It should be added that there has been considerable local opinion on our side that if the line could not be deflected as far north as

<sup>s</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>6</sup> See Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

Rakka—an obvious impossibility—Abu Kemal would be more satisfactory for administrative reasons than any intermediate point.

With regard to the French disinclination to modify the *tracé* of the Haifa-Baghdad Railway by allowing us to run it as far north as Deir es Zor, a survey is at present being made of the possibility of construction entirely within our own zone. No report, however, can be expected at present. If no railway within our zone is practicable, we must, of course, insist on our rights under Article 7 of the Sykes-Picot agreement; but we do not think we can go further.

In regard to Mosul, we note that the French now ask, in return for the fulfilment of M. Clemenceau's promise to Mr. Lloyd George, an equal share in Kurdish and Mesopotamian oil.

Under the suspended Long-Bérenger arrangement<sup>7</sup> the French obtained 20 per cent. interest in the new company, or 25 per cent. if the 10 per cent. allowed for local capital was not taken up.

There are thus two points of difference between this arrangement and the present French demand. The latter apparently claims a share of the oil *output* as distinct from an interest in the working company, and asks that this share should be *equal* to that of the British.

We sympathise with the French plea as to the inadequacy of their oil resources, compared with their future needs, although we are ourselves in a similar case. From the technical

Enfin la concession sur Mossoul, en ce qui touche la France, a pour contre-partie essentielle, réclamée par l'industrie et le Parlement français, la stricte égalité dans l'exploitation des pétroles de Mésopotamie et du Kurdistan. Ce point a une importance capitale, en raison de la privation absolue et des besoins de la France en pétrole. Comme le fer et le charbon, le pétrole a pris dans la vie du monde et comme élément essentiel de l'indépendance et de la 'Self-Defence' des peuples une valeur vitale. La volonté de la France et de l'Angleterre de se mettre d'accord pour assurer la paix doit se manifester clairement sur le terrain industriel comme sur les autres. Le principe étant admis, les modalités seront faciles à régler en ce qui concerne le passage et la liberté des pipelines.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See Chap. IV.

<sup>8</sup> An English translation of this paragraph is printed by D. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 1100-1.

point of view it is difficult for us to express an opinion on our respective needs and resources in the matter of oil. From the political point of view we think there is a case for a certain measure of generosity to the French in this respect. Anglo-French friendship and co-operation must be the foundation of the League of Nations and of British policy within any measurable period.

The actual extent to which the French demand can be met must be a matter of bargaining; but we suggest that a considerable advance on the proportions of the Long-Bérenger arrangement might be made in return for the satisfaction of our desiderata in the Arab countries generally and in particularly in the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>9</sup>

If, however, British oil requirements make it impossible to satisfy the French even at a lower figure than 50 per cent., a suggestion has been made which might induce the French to waive or lower their demands. Briefly the suggestion is that the line of division between the French and British Arab zones under the Sykes-Picot agreement should be brought down so as to make the southern frontier of the former coterminous with the northern frontier of the independent State of the Hejaz. The western frontier of the French Arab zone would thus be the eastern frontier of Palestine down to the neighbourhood of Akaba.

Apart from the question of oil, the advantages of this suggestion are:—

(a) A lever for obtaining the desired modification of the Sykes-Picot

<sup>9</sup> Note in filed copy: 'These observations regarding Mesopotamian oil are modified by subsequent arrangements between Sir John Cadman and M. Bérenger.' (See Chap. IV.)

line in regard to the northern frontier of Palestine.

(b) The satisfaction, partial at least, of Arab aspirations towards unity, and as regards the frontiers of Palestine by eliminating the division of Feisal's kingdom into British and French spheres of influence.

The disadvantages, which seem to outweigh the advantages, are:—

(a) That the possibility of an all-British railway and pipe-line linking Mesopotamia and Palestine, and running probably entirely in the British zone, would disappear.

(b) That it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in practice our desideratum of a monopoly of political influence in the Arabian Peninsula.

We note with satisfaction this conditional promise of French support as regards Palestine. There seems, however, no reason to apprehend Italian claims in this respect, especially if Italian desiderata are satisfied in Anatolia and Africa. Nor would the internationalisation of Palestine seem at this stage a contingency to be contemplated, since the Zionists, who are primarily interested, are known to be strongly opposed to it. We must hope that close Anglo-French co-operation in the treatment of the Arab problem will suffice to reassure the Arabs and to satisfy their legitimate aspirations. For the rest, we welcome an exchange of views regarding the new régime in Palestine.

Pour la Palestine, le Gouvernement français, si l'accord définitif s'établit, appuiera le point de vue du Gouvernement anglais: mais il y aura évidemment à faire face aux partisans de l'internationalisation dans le monde, aux revendications de l'Italie et également aux réclamations des Arabes, basées sur les promesses anglaises, dont ils prétendent faire état. Un échange de vues sur les possibilités sionistes et la situation respective des différents éléments de la population devra avoir lieu mais ne soulèvera sans doute pas de difficultés entre nous.

Ce premier exposé des règlements essentiels, en ce qui concerne l'Empire turc (État neutre international de Constantinople et des Détroits, État turc ramené en Asie Mineure

et Anatolie, reconnaissance de l'indépendance de l'Arménie dans les limites imposées par l'Histoire, la Justice et la Raison,<sup>10</sup> Entente définitive sur l'indépendance des pays arabes et syriens sous mandat respectif français et anglais) sera complété par un échange de vues en ce qui concerne le Caucase, le Kurdistan et la Perse, sur lesquels il ne semble pas que des dissensiments puissent se produire, car ce n'est que dans la mesure où ils sont intéressés par les règlements présents qu'il en sera question.<sup>11</sup>

We were already aware of these schemes, which strain both imagination and pocket. It will suffice to comment on them when they are presented in a more concrete form.

E. G. FORBES ADAM  
ROBERT VANSITTART

*Foreign Office, December 18, 1919*

Quelques suggestions seront également apportées au sujet des ententes économiques éventuelles, spécialement en ce qui concerne le régime des grands chemins de fer internationaux, si essentiels pour le développement de la civilisation (Chemins de fer de Bagdad prolongé [sic] le long du littoral persan jusqu'à l'Inde, chemin de fer du Hedjaz qui se détache du Bagdad au Nord d'Alep; Transarménien qui reprendrait à partir d'Eskichehir le tracé primitif de la ligne de Bagdad par Angora et Siwas, puis par Erzeroum, les abords d'Erivan, atteindrait Tauris et de là Téhéran, puis rejoindrait le chemin de fer transcaspien, une extension prévue vers l'Est pénétrant en Chine par la route historique de Kachgar irait aboutir au Hoang-Ho doublant le Transsibérien par un tracé de Constantinople à Pekin, tracé plus méridional en pays plus riche; le Transpersan, depuis longtemps projeté, qui conduirait de Moscou à Kurachee sur l'Océan Indien par Vladikaukaz, Tiflis, Tauris, Ispahan et Kerman).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. note 1 above.

<sup>11</sup> An English translation of this paragraph is printed, *ibid.* p. 1101.

Il y a lieu en Asie comme en Europe de prévoir une organisation internationale de chemins de fer qui représente une des garanties de paix et de progrès pour l'humanité. Elle contribuera à assurer la sécurité et le progrès dans ces pays qui ont été le berceau de notre civilisation. Elle fera concourir tous les pays à ces grandes entreprises et donnera un support matériel à l'amitié internationale de la Ligue des Nations.

No. 399

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received December 29)*

*No. 2321 [165694/2117/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 12, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 2166/M/2027<sup>1</sup> of 19th November, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a further telegram from Moustapha Kemal Pasha complaining of the proceedings of the French authorities at Adana.

2. The strenuous attitude taken up by the leaders of the Nationalist movement in regard to the new arrangements in Syria and Cilicia goes far to discredit the view widely held in this country, and especially by the advocates of what is called an 'English policy', that there is a definite working understanding between the French and the Nationalists.

3. It is probably true that many individual Frenchmen, including persons in official position, sympathise with the national movement, and would for one reason or another welcome a solution of a Turkish question based on what is the main plank in the Nationalists' programme, namely, the maintenance of an undivided Turkey proper.

4. I have no reason to suppose that the highest French authorities here are pushing this policy in anticipation of the decisions of the Conference. If they were doing so, there could be no greater set-back to their efforts than the action of their own Government in choosing this moment to take charge in Syria and Cilicia.

5. Further indications that the French are not really taking too much trouble to soothe Nationalist susceptibilities is [*sic*] afforded by the fact that they filled the columns of certain local French papers with glowing descriptions of the benefits conferred by French administration on the vilayet of Adana.

6. Following upon the enclosed telegram from Moustapha Kemal Pasha,

<sup>1</sup> No. 367.

I have received a number of telegrams of the usual type from committees of national defence, &c., at various places in the interior complaining of the alleged action of the French in forcing the people of Adana to fly French flags.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK<sup>2</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN No. 399

*Telegram despatched from Sivas on November 28 by Moustapha Kemal Pasha in the name of the Representatives of the Association of the Defence of Rights*

(Translation.)

The French, acting in principle contrary to the clauses of the armistice by remaining in occupation of the Adana district, have recently through police agents and gendarmes distributed French flags among the whole population of the town and have forced the inhabitants to hoist them not only over private houses, imposing a fine of £100 in case of non-compliance, but also over official buildings.

According to information received from Adana, the whole Mahommedan population in the last degree pained and disgusted at this act, which is contrary to international law. We protest energetically in the name of Ottoman national unity against this act and we demand redress.

<sup>2</sup> This despatch was minuted as follows by Mr. Kidston, Sir J. Tilley, and Lord Curzon: 'M. Picot's visit to Mustapha Kemal at Sivas, of which, I learn, the W[ar] O[ffice] have now received sure confirmation, does not seem to have been very effective.'

'We can well afford, I think, to encourage French penetration in Asia Minor. It is likely to keep their hands very full & may compel them to slacken their more objectionable activities elsewhere.'

'G. Kidston Dec. 31/19

'J. A. C. Tilley

'31/12.

'They do not realise what they are in for.

'C 1/1.'

No. 400

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1479 [159836/2117/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 17, 1919

My Lord,

I transmit herewith for your Excellency's information copy of letter No. 0152/5283 (M.I. 2) of the 8th December from the War Office on the subject of the boundary between the spheres of British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria.

2. As your Excellency is aware, the existing boundaries between occupied enemy territory administrations are not identical with the boundaries of the various zones of the agreement of May 1916,<sup>1</sup> which was referred to in the *aide-mémoire* presented by the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau on the 13th September.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Sykes-Picot Agreement.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 278 and Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

3. In this *aide-mémoire* the Prime Minister proposed that the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia should be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be replaced by an Arab force.

4. It was, however, stipulated that British troops should remain in Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and that until the boundary of Palestine was determined, the British Commander-in-chief should have the right to occupy outposts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government.

5. His Majesty's Government have recently decided to waive their right to remain in occupation of that portion of occupied enemy territory administration east which lies opposite to occupied enemy territory administration south. The reason which prompted His Majesty's Government to modify to this extent the proposals set forth in the Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire* was the imminent danger of a regrettable outburst on the part of the population of Syria, who regarded any alteration in the existing temporary administrative boundaries as an indication of permanent changes of a nature calculated to prejudge the decisions of the Peace Conference.

6. Actuated no doubt by the same motive, the French Government are understood to have also agreed to accede to the request of His Highness Emir Feisal, and to refrain for the present from occupying the districts which lie between the eastern boundary of the blue zone and the existing administrative boundary between occupied enemy territory administrations east and west.

7. The logical corollary to these two concessions to local feeling is that the existing boundary between the spheres of British and French occupation should also remain unaltered, and His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided to withdraw their troops from that portion of occupied enemy territory administration west in which they had hitherto intended to retain them, and to restrict the area of their occupation in Palestine to occupied enemy territory administration south.

8. Your Lordship should take an early opportunity of communicating this decision to the French Government, pointing out that it is a substantial concession as compared with the proposals contained in the Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire*, and expressing the hope that in the light of the considerations outlined in this despatch they will raise no objection, and will inform General Gouraud accordingly. You should make it clear at the same time that this decision has been arrived at by His Majesty's Government without prejudice to the future determination of the northern and eastern boundaries of Palestine, which will require to be examined and readjusted in the final settlement.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 400

*War Office to Foreign Office (Received December 9)*

0152/5283(M.I.2)

WAR OFFICE, December 8, 1919

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copies of telegram No. E.A. 2894,<sup>3</sup> dated the 29th November, which has been received from Lord Allenby, with reference to his conversations with General Gouraud at Beirut on the 27th November.

I am to draw particular attention to paragraph 3 of this telegram regarding the northern boundary of Palestine, and am to say that the Council have not the least doubt that General Gouraud will eventually claim to occupy the country down to the southern boundary of the blue area, which is, as Lord Curzon is aware, south of the northern border of the administrative area known as 'O.E.T.A. South,' which Lord Allenby desires to establish as a temporary line between his own troops and those of General Gouraud.

I am to say that the Council agree with Lord Allenby in thinking that a definite understanding on this question should be arrived at between His Majesty's and the French Governments. For, although it may be considered that this is a purely military arrangement which should be made between the local commanders on the spot, I am to point out that, as is shown in Lord Allenby's telegram No. E.A. 2892<sup>4</sup> of the 27th November, General Gouraud acts under the orders of his own Government in these matters, and will doubtless quote such orders on the subject to Lord Allenby when the time comes. Lord Curzon will remember that it was not until orders were sent by the French Government that General Gouraud would consent to any delay in penetrating into the Bekaa.<sup>5</sup>

The Army Council, therefore, consider that much time, correspondence, and friction may probably be avoided if the French Government is officially approached at once on this matter, and I am to ask that Lord Curzon will take the necessary steps as early as convenient.

In the meantime the Council are despatching the attached telegram<sup>6</sup> to Lord Allenby.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 400

*Mr. Churchill to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

Your E.A. 2894,<sup>3</sup> dated 29th November, paragraph 3. Foreign Office have been asked to obtain necessary understanding with French Government.

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure 3 below.

<sup>6</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 383.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 400

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Mr. Churchill*

*No. E.A. 2894 Telegraphic*

Continuation of my E.A. No. 2892.<sup>4</sup>

1. After General Gouraud had informed me he was determined to proceed with the occupation of the Bekaa, we agreed to send Colonel Walters [Waters] Taylor and a French (?) staff officer to Damascus to announce the decision to the Arab authorities, and that General Gouraud did not intend to interfere with Arab administration, and would permit Arab troops to remain in Bekka under certain conditions. I sent a personal message in code to Emir that General Gouraud's decision had my full approval, and that I trusted the Arabs to maintain the same relations with French troops as they had with mine.

2. I think that the Arabs may possibly allow French troops to relieve ours peacefully, but sooner or later I think a conflict will occur between the French and Arabs. Though Gouraud himself is anxious to be on good terms with Arabs, it is my impression that he will have difficulty in resisting political pressure from that party of French opinion which is frankly hostile to the Arabs, and would be glad of any pretext to occupy Damascus and the interior.

3. I discussed the northern boundary of Palestine with Gouraud, and informed him that I intended to occupy northern boundary of O.E.T. South as the dividing line between our area at present without prejudice to future arrangements. I understood him to agree to this but am not sure he may not later put forward the original Sykes-Picot line as the line given to him by his Government. Under Sykes-Picot line Safed would be claimed by French. Therefore I consider it important that His Majesty's Government should come to a definite understanding with the French Government that the northern boundary of O.E.T. South is to be boundary during present period.

4. I returned to Cairo to-day.

No. 401

*The Emir Feisal (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 22)*

[164094/2117/44A]

PARIS, December 19, 1919

My Lord,

I have been informed by the French Government that French troops have attacked Bekaa and have proceeded to Balbak on the grounds that a French sergeant was wounded in the course of a dispute between a French officer and some Arabs. This proceeding is in direct contradiction with the agreement lately made with M. Clemenceau about the Bekaa district. At the request

of the French authorities and in compliance with the terms of this agreement, I had ordered the Arab regulars to be withdrawn from that region on the explicit condition that in case of reinforcements being required for the maintenance of public security, such forces should be obtained from the Arab Government in Damascus without the interference of any foreign troops being resorted to. Instead of the French authorities acting on this distinct and clearly laid down engagement, they hastened, without even any attempt at an enquiry, to invade Bekaa with French troops, the reported incident having occurred it is said on the 14th December and the march of the troops taking place on the 15th.

I have asked the French Government for the immediate withdrawal of their troops in conformity with the above engagement and protested vehemently against the breaking of its terms. I trust that the British Government in this critical situation will not refrain from giving their indispensable assistance to secure peace in the East, which has always been the aim and attitude of your glorious nation.

Awaiting your favourable reply,<sup>1</sup>

I have, &c.  
FAISAL

<sup>1</sup> No written reply was made to this note. On December 24, 1919, Mr. Kidston noted that he had informed General Haddad Pasha verbally that he did 'not see how we can help or intervene in any way. We should very strongly resent any French protest as to our action in Mesopotamia or even in the Vilayet of Mosul or on its borders and the French position with regard to the Bekaa is somewhat analogous.'

## No. 402

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 20)*

No. 1237 Telegraphic [163888/2117/44]

PARIS, December 20, 1919

French Government have put forward to Feisal their proposal for permanent Syrian arrangement which according to my reading establishes whole country as a French Protectorate. Feisal is to see President of Council to-day and will be asked to sign it immediately in order that Berthelot can take it to London to-morrow.<sup>1</sup> Copy of proposal will be sent to you by hand to-morrow.<sup>2</sup> Emir does not intend to sign but is doubtful whether in the

<sup>1</sup> M. Berthelot was returning to London for discussions with Lord Curzon concerning Turkish affairs. Cf. No. 398, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this French proposal was received in the Foreign Office on December 24, 1919, and read as follows:

"Le Gouvernement de la République Française se référant d'une part à la déclaration franco-anglaise du 9 novembre 1918, d'autre part aux principes généraux de libération des peuples et de coopération amicale proclamés par la Conférence de la Paix, confirme sa reconnaissance du droit des populations de langue arabe, fixées sur le territoire syrien de toutes confessions, à se réunir pour se gouverner elle-même à titre de nation indépendante.

"S[on] A[utesse] R[oyale] l'Émir Faissal reconnaît que les populations syriennes ne sauvaient actuellement, en raison de la désorganisation sociale résultant de l'oppression turque

circumstances he should remain in France or carry out his original proposal of leaving to-morrow, Sunday night, for Syria. I have strongly advised his going unless he hears from you to the contrary. He can perfectly give as a

et des dommages subis pendant la guerre, réaliser leur unité et organiser le fonctionnement de la nation sans les conseils et l'aide d'une nation coopératrice, coopération qui sera enregistrée par la Société des Nations, lorsqu'elle sera pratiquement réalisée.

'Au nom du peuple syrien, c'est à la France qu'il fait appel pour cette mission.

'Le Gouvernement français s'engage à prêter son concours sous toutes les formes à la nation syrienne et à garantir son indépendance contre toute agression, dans les frontières qui lui seront reconnues par la Conférence de la Paix.

'Dans la délimitation de ces frontières, le Gouvernement de la République française s'efforcera d'obtenir toutes les rectifications équitables au point de vue ethnique, linguistique et géographique.

'2. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal s'engage à demander au Gouvernement de la République française, et à ce gouvernement seul, les conseillers, instructeurs et agents techniques nécessaires pour organiser toutes les administrations civiles et militaires. Ces conseillers et techniciens recevront du Gouvernement syrien leur investiture et leurs pouvoirs d'exécution.

'Pour permettre la réorganisation financière qui est la base essentielle de toute l'administration du nouvel état, le conseiller financier participera à la préparation du budget [sic] en dépenses et en recettes et recevra obligatoirement communication de tous les engagements de dépenses des différentes.

'Il contrôlera la partie de la dette publique ottomane afférente à la Syrie. Le conseiller des travaux publics aura sous sa juridiction les voies ferrées concédées.

'Dès la conclusion du présent accord, le Gouvernement français prêtera son concours pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie, de la police et de l'armée.

'S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal reconnaît au Gouvernement français le droit de priorité complète pour les entreprises et emprunts locaux sauf à l'encontre des nationaux agissant pour eux-mêmes et ne servant pas de prête-nom au capital étranger.

'3. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal entretiendra à Paris, auprès du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, un agent plénipotentiaire, délégué de son secrétaire pour les Affaires Étrangères, chargé de suivre les questions extérieures intéressant la nation syrienne. Il confiera aux représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation des intérêts extérieurs de l'État syrien.

'Le délégué plénipotentiaire syrien à Paris aura sous ses ordres un délégué à Londres, un délégué à Rome et un délégué à Washington, placé dans le cadre de l'Ambassade de France et chargé de régler les questions de statut personnel syrien.

'Il délivrera aux Consuls leur commission consulaire syrienne.

'4. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal reconnaît l'indépendance du Liban, sous le mandat de la France, dans les limites qui lui seront assignées par la Conférence de la Paix.

'5. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal au nom de la nation syrienne, s'engage à faciliter l'organisation des Druses du Hauran sous la forme d'une unité autonome à l'intérieur de l'État syrien, munie de la plus large autonomie compatible avec l'unité de cet état.

'6. La nation syrienne s'engage à fournir en toute occasion et avec toutes ses forces à la France son entier concours en reconnaissance de l'engagement pris à son égard par le Gouvernement français.

'Elle prêtera éventuellement son appui au Hedjaz, d'accord avec la France en reconnaissance des sacrifices que le Hedjaz a consentis pour sa libération et en raison de son caractère sacré pour les musulmans.

'7. La langue arabe est reconnue comme langue officielle, administrative et scolaire. La langue française sera enseignée comme langue auxiliaire et privilégiée.

'8. Damas sera la capitale administrative et législative, résidence du chef de l'État et du Parlement. Le Haut Commissaire français, représentant la puissance mandataire, aura sa résidence ordinaire à Alep, se maintenant ainsi à proximité de la Cilicie, zone frontière où les troupes de protection seront normalement concentrées. Le chef de l'État syrien et le

reason that for such an important proposal he must consult his own people. If you wish to stop him you must wire immediately. I am writing full details.<sup>3</sup> Haddad remains here.

Haut-Commissaire français auront une résidence d'hiver à Beyrouth qui jouira de son autonomie municipale.

'Le présent accord, qui fixe les principes généraux, restera secret entre les parties jusqu'à la signature de l'accord définitif et détaillé; il sera rédigé dès le retour en France de S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal et porté en temps utile à la connaissance de la Conférence de la Paix.'

*'Projet provisoire d'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal.'*

The Foreign Office also received on December 24 the following counter-draft which the Emir Feisal then proposed to lay before the French Government:

'1. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal reconnaît que les populations syriennes, étant donnée la désorganisation résultante de l'oppression turque et les dommages subis pendant la guerre, ont le plus grand intérêt à demander le concours d'une grande Puissance, concours qui sera enregistré par la Société des Nations dès qu'elle sera pratiquement réalisée.

'Au nom du peuple syrien, c'est à la France qu'elle fait appel pour cette mission.

'2. Le Gouvernement français reconnaît l'indépendance absolue, politique et administrative de la Syrie, et s'engage à prêter son concours à la nation syrienne et à faire garantir par ladite société des nations son indépendance contre toute agression, dans les frontières qui lui seront reconnues par la Conférence de la Paix.

'Dans la délimitation de ces frontières, le Gouvernement français s'efforcera d'obtenir toutes les rectifications équitables au point de vue ethnique, linguistique et géographique.

'3. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal s'engage à demander au Gouvernement de la République française les conseillers, instructeurs et agents techniques que le Gouvernement syrien trouvera nécessaire[s] pour organiser les administrations civiles et militaires.

'Le nombre des conseillers et techniciens de nationalité française ne doit pas dépasser la moitié des conseillers et techniciens nécessaires et le reste sera choisi parmi les ressortissants d'autres puissances étrangères, sous réserve, toutefois, que la nombre des agents d'une même nationalité ne dépasse pas la moitié du nombre de Français. Tous ces agents seront soumis aux ordres de, et nommés par, le Gouvernement syrien par un contrat spécial et pour un[e] période limitée. Si le Gouvernement juge nécessaire de se passer des services d'un de ces agents avant l'expiration de cette période, il en aura le droit, à condition de lui verser une indemnité qui sera prévue dans le contrat d'engagement.

'Pour permettre la réorganisation financière qui est la base essentielle de toute l'administration d'un nouvel état, le Ministre des finances participera à la préparation du budget [sic] en dépenses et en recettes et recevra obligatoirement communication de tous les engagements de dépenses des différents départements.

'Le contrôle de la partie de la dette publique ottomane afférente à la Syrie sera exercé par l'entremise du Conseiller français des Finances[s] syrienne[s].

'4. Le Ministre des Travaux Publics aura sous sa juridiction les voies ferrées concédées, à l'exception du Chemin de fer du Hedjaz et de ses embranchements.

'Le Parlement syrien aura seul le droit de faire des lois, d'établir des impôts, de voter les budgets [sic] et d'exercer tous les droits dont jouisse[nt] les Parlements des pays civilisés.

'5. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal reconnaît au Gouvernement français le droit de priorité complète pour les entreprises et emprunts, sauf à l'encontre des nationaux agissant pour eux-mêmes et ne servant pas de prête-nom au capital étranger. Il est bien entendu que dans l'octroi de ces entreprises et de ces emprunts, il sera avant tout tenu compte des intérêts du pays.

'6. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal entretiendra des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires dans les pays ayant des intérêts et des relations importants avec la Syrie, et ces représentants

[Note 3, see facing page.]

diplomatiques et consulaires relèveront directement du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Gouvernement syrien.

'7. S.A.R. l'Émir Faïsal reconnaît l'indépendance du Liban dans ses limites actuelles et son droit de disposer de son sort.

'8. La langue arabe est seule reconnue comme langue officielle administrative et scolaire.

'9. Damas sera la capitale de la résidence du chef de l'État et du Parlement syrien. Pour se maintenir à proximité de la Cilicie, le représentant du Gouvernement français aura sa résidence à Alep. Le chef de l'État syrien et le représentant français auront une résidence d'hiver à Beyrouth.

'10. Le Gouvernement arabe existant actuellement sera la base du nouvel État syrien.

'11. Aucune troupe étrangère ne sera maintenue dans les limites du nouvel État syrien.

'12. Cet accord restera en vigueur pendant un délai de dix ans, et passé ce délai chacune des parties contractantes reprendra sa liberté d'action.'

<sup>3</sup> The reference was evidently to a private letter untraced in Foreign Office archives.

### No. 403

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 22)*

*No. 1743 Telegraphic [164282/142/44A]*

CAIRO, December 22, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 1314<sup>1</sup> and 1342.<sup>2</sup>

I have received a telegram from King Hussein expressing great gratification at my forthcoming visit. He desires that his highest respects be conveyed to Prime Minister.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram of December 9, 1919, referred to No. 394 and informed Field-Marshal Allenby that his 'suggestions regarding invitation to Abdallah [sic] are approved and the Prime Minister's message may be delivered as redrafted by you'.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In his telegram No. 1682 of December 8, 1919 (received December 13), Field-Marshal Allenby stated that he understood that Colonel Wilson was returning from England with presents and a message for King Hussein (see enclosures 1 and 2 in No. 387) and observed: 'I am going to Soudan early in January and propose with your approval to call at Jeddah about January 7, delivering him the presents and message in question.' Field-Marshal Allenby's proposed visit was approved in Foreign Office telegram No. 1342 of December 15, 1919, which further stated: 'Prime Minister's telegram [cf. No. 393] modified to correspond with decision arrived at should in any case be despatched without delay.'

### No. 404

*Notes of an Anglo-French Meeting held at the Foreign Office, London,  
at 11.30 a.m. on December 23, 1919*

*[166415/151671/44]*

The Anglo-French discussion was continued<sup>1</sup> at a meeting at 11.30 a.m., the 23rd December, in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office.

The same representatives were present as on the 22nd December,<sup>2</sup> but Lieutenant-Colonel Gribbon also attended on behalf of the War Office. . . .<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the opening of this general discussion concerning the Turkish settlement, see No. 631.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 631.

<sup>3</sup> The following discussion on Kurdistan and the Caucasus, not here printed, is printed in No. 633.

### *Arab Countries.*

LORD CURZON then suggested that a discussion on the second part of M. Berthelot's note of the 12th December regarding the Arabian countries (see Appendix to this Minute)<sup>4</sup> might well now be undertaken. The subject seemed naturally to fall into the four following questions:—

1. Mosul and oil.
2. Frontiers of Palestine.
3. British railway from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia, and
4. Arabia.

M. BERTHELOT agreed, and began by explaining that M. Clemenceau had promised Mr. Lloyd George last December that he would not claim Mosul, although it fell in the French Arab zone under the Sykes-Picot agreement, provided, however, that the French reached a satisfactory agreement regarding the oil in this area, and that they were satisfied with regard to their Syrian mandate.

The discussion then turned on the question of oil, and LORD CURZON recalled how the temporary agreement made between Senator Bérenger and Mr. Long last summer had been dropped, owing to a difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau.<sup>5</sup> He understood however that, as a result of M. Clemenceau's recent conversations with Mr. Lloyd George, negotiations had been reopened between Sir John Cadman and M. Bérenger with the result that an agreement had been reached,<sup>6</sup> of which he did not yet know the details, but which was understood to give the French a 25 per cent. share in the capital of the company which was to work these oilfields.

Lord Curzon believed that the agreement had been accepted by the Prime Minister.

M. BERTHELOT said, however, that it had still to be accepted by M. Clemenceau, and he added that M. Bérenger had only acted as an oil expert and had not been competent to regard the question from a political point of view.

M. Berthelot also explained that a difficult legal question was raised as to the German shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company, which represented the portion which was to fall to the French. He agreed, however, with Lord Curzon that this was an expert question on which Sir John Cadman and M. Bérenger had doubtless satisfied themselves.

At this stage M. Berthelot said that he wished to make clear that he thought that neither side had quite understood the true purport of the Long-Bérenger Agreement when it was dropped last summer. The British seemed to think that it gave advantages to the French only, and the French *vice versa*. It was really not the French Government, however, who were responsible for drop-

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained the French text of the note in No. 398 together with an English translation thereof, but without the comments of the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 398, note 7.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 398, note 9.

ping the agreement. M. Berthelot also made a reference to the difficulties of the French oil position, especially as a result of the unfortunate cutting of the pipe-lines between Baku and Batoum, and of the way in which Americans had forced up the price of oil in that part of the world. He thought, however, that these difficulties were being overcome.

Finally, M. Berthelot explained that before M. Bérenger had come over this time, M. Clemenceau had instructed him to claim 50 per cent. of the ownership of the oil fields in the Mosul area and Southern Kurdistan for political reasons. M. Berthelot had replied that this was impossible. The question must be treated concretely. For technical reasons connected with the formation of the working company, 25 per cent. of the capital was the most they could hope for. M. Clemenceau had then said that the French ought to be given compensation in the matter of oil elsewhere, *e.g.*, in Romania [sic].

LORD CURZON said that to him, personally, the revised agreement seemed fair. He added that M. Bérenger on coming to London had explained to him that it was impossible to reconstruct the company on the basis of a 50 per cent. share for France. He hoped, however, that the agreement which appeared to have been reached between M. Bérenger and Sir John Cadman would prove acceptable to M. Clemenceau and settle the matter.

M. BERTHELOT agreed with this, and thought M. Clemenceau's acceptance probable.

#### *Frontier [? of] Mosul Vilayet.*

MR. VANSITTART suggested that as the French had made the question of Mosul dependent on a satisfactory settlement in Syria as well as on oil, it might be well to discuss the Syrian question first and return to the Mosul frontier.

M. BERTHELOT agreed to this method of procedure.

He thought the question of Mosul and oil was practically settled.

#### *Emir Feisal.*

M. Berthelot explained that he was in communication with the Emir in Paris. He had impressed on the Emir the necessity of dealing loyally with the French if a satisfactory arrangement was to be made. Feisal had, at first, made a good impression on M. Berthelot. Since then, however, he appeared to have begun bargaining on certain points in a manner which disappointed M. Berthelot. However, Feisal had told M. Berthelot, before the latter's departure from Paris, that on his return an agreement would certainly be reached.

#### *Palestine Frontiers.*

The discussion then turned to the question of the Palestine frontiers. M. Berthelot began by explaining the French point of view. M. Clemenceau took his stand on the line (from a point just north of Acre, through the north end of the Sea of Galilee to a point south of Deraa) laid down by the

Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. M. Clemenceau had consented on certain conditions to the cession of the Mosul area, and to the grant of a mandate to Great Britain for the State of Palestine, although internationalised under the above agreement.

He was now further prepared to agree that 33 per cent. of the water-power of the waters flowing from Mount Hermon southwards into the Palestine of the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be allotted to the Zionists under an economic arrangement with France. The French could not do no [sic] more than this.

MR. VANSITTART and COLONEL GRIBBON explained that it was essential for economic reasons, and if the policy of the National Home was to be effectively carried out, that the streams flowing south from the Hermon into the Jordan basin, and a bit of the Litani, should fall within the Palestine territory.

The expenditure of much money and large operations of a technical nature, both of which the Zionists alone were likely to undertake, were required for the full use of these waters.

A map showing the northern and eastern frontiers of Palestine, as recommended by the Chief Political Officer at Cairo, was then shown to the French.

Mr. Vansittart explained that this represented more or less the ideal frontier from an economic and Zionist point of view, and might not be capable of complete attainment. He proposed accordingly, as a compromise, that it might be modified by a line from a point north of Acre, including the Litani bend towards the west, thence across to Mount Hermon well to the south of Hasbeya, and thence southwards between the Jordan valley and the Hedjaz railway to the old Sykes-Picot line. M. BERTHELOT stated that he was not in a position to accept this.

LORD CURZON said that he could not understand why the French Government insisted on the Sykes-Picot line, even in places where it had been drawn regardless of political, geographical, or economic facts. The Prime Minister had spoken publicly of the Palestine of the future as comprising the territory from ancient Dan (represented more or less by Banias) to Beersheba, and he felt sure that he was not prepared to give way on this point.

M. BERTHELOT said that he was equally sure that M. Clemenceau was not prepared to yield. They wanted the Sykes-Picot line, also, because the country to the north of it included the rich Kaza of Safed and, east of the Jordan, the waters of the Yarmuk valley and the Jebel Druz area. He believed that there were at least three different regions inhabited at different times by the tribe of Dan, according to the Old Testament. M. Clemenceau thought that he had already made a great cession in respect of Palestine.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the British acceptance of a mandate for the Zionists could hardly be regarded as a cession on the part of France, who was probably only too glad to be quit of the responsibility, and that the French must remember that the Zionists, who were very anxious for this northern frontier, were difficult people to deal with, and might even, by some arrangement with Feisal, make trouble for the French.

(*At this point the meeting adjourned till 3 o'clock in the afternoon.*)

No. 405

*Notes of an Anglo-French Meeting held at the Foreign Office, London,  
at 3 p.m. on December 23, 1919*

[166415/151671/44]

The Anglo-French discussion was continued at a meeting at 3 p.m. on the 23rd December in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office.

*The Chairman of the International Commission at Constantinople.*

LORD CURZON opened the meeting by explaining that after the morning's meeting<sup>1</sup> he had had a conversation with the Prime Minister who wished to know how the discussions with M. Berthelot were proceeding. The Prime Minister was inclined to favour the nomination of an American to the chairmanship of the International Commission at Constantinople in preference to the principle of rotation.<sup>2</sup> This point might be further considered later. M. BERTHELOT said that he knew that M. Clemenceau was averse from the plan of an American chairman in view of the present American attitude generally.

*Frontiers of Palestine.*

LORD CURZON said that the Prime Minister had also spoken to him about the northern frontier of Palestine. There were two good reasons for maintaining the view that the Sykes-Picot line should be taken north so as to include the Litani bend, the headwaters of the Jordan, and the streams flowing south from Mount Hermon in Palestine:—

1. When the Sykes-Picot agreement was concluded it was on the hypothesis that France and England would make approximately equal efforts in the matter of men and money in conquering Turkey. Unfortunately it had turned out that the war in this theatre had had to be fought almost entirely by Great Britain, who had expended some £750,000,000 on all the Turkish operations. By this no reflection was intended on the magnificent effort made by France in the European theatre. If the French Government would reimburse His Majesty's Government one half of this sum they might have any boundary they liked here or elsewhere.
2. The Prime Minister had publicly committed himself on more than one occasion to the formula of including in Palestine all the ancient territories from Dan to Beersheba. He could not recede from this attitude.

If, however, M. Berthelot had no authority to make an agreement on this matter and if the French Government adhered to their attitude, Mr. Lloyd George was quite willing that the question should be submitted to arbitration by the United States.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 404.

<sup>2</sup> For this question see No. 631.

M. BERTHELOT asked that he might be allowed to reply at once to the case put forward by Mr. Lloyd George point by point:—

1. It had never been agreed in connection with the Sykes-Picot agreement (and the documents made no mention or hint of it) that the two parties to the agreement were to make equal efforts in prosecuting the war against Turkey. He did not wish to belittle the splendid effort which Great Britain had made, and had been in the fortunate position of being able to make, against Turkey. But he wished to recall the intense sacrifices which France had made in the main theatre of the war as well as the predominant part she had played in the important and victorious campaign at Salonika. In any case, he did not think it wise or quite fair for Allies to dispute or bargain on the basis of their respective losses in men and money. The spirit of their alliance did not justify it.
2. With regard to the second point, M. Clemenceau had never agreed to Mr. Lloyd George committing himself in this way. The French Government regretted that Mr. Lloyd George found himself in a difficult position *vis-à-vis* the British public in this matter. They would do what they felt just and possible to help matters.

In any case, M. Clemenceau could not agree to American arbitration. He thought it was a matter which the British and French Governments ought to be able to settle themselves and, apart from this, America was not the proper quarter to appeal for arbitration.

M. Berthelot wished, however, to find a solution, and suggested that an Anglo-French Commission, or Commissions, of technical experts should be sent out and should make recommendations to the Governments after examination on the spot—

1. As to how the needs of the existing Zionist colonies for water-power could best be met.
2. As to the best *tracé* for the British railway from Haifa to Baghdad. Territorial modifications might be made after the experts had reported. The question would thus be taken out of the political sphere and treated on economic grounds. M. Berthelot added that the French had no objection to the railway from Haifa running through the Yarmuk Valley to Baghdad, but they did not wish it to follow a *tracé* north via Deir-es-Zor to Mosul, thus impinging on their zone near Damascus.

LORD CURZON doubted whether this would advance matters; peace with Turkey, which was so essential, would be delayed, and the technicians were quite likely to disagree, and could hardly eschew political considerations. He asked Colonel Gribbon's opinion.

COLONEL GRIBBON said that he thought he could speak for the British War Office on this matter. They felt there was enough technical information now available to settle the question at any rate in principle without delaying peace with Turkey.

M. BERTHELOT interposed that he felt sure he could find a French engineer who would consider the question quite impartially.

M. DE FLEURIAU then reverted to the question of the Sykes-Picot agreement. He had examined the documents leading up to the Sykes-Picot agreement. There was no mention or thought of equality of effort. The agreement was based on the discussions at Cairo in 1915 and negotiations with King Hussein. M. Picot had had the documents relating to these negotiations under his eyes when discussing the 1916 agreement.

M. de Fleuriau wished also to recall that M. Clemenceau had already made a concession not only as regards Palestine, but also as regards Mosul, and has [*sic*] been strongly attacked by French public opinion for the latter.

LORD CURZON said that this might be quite true. Nevertheless it was not then foreseen that we in practice would have to do all the fighting and spend so much money in the East.

MR. VANSITTART pointed out that the technical experts, who would not gain much more information than we had already, were quite likely to disagree, and we would then probably come back to the same necessity for arbitration with which we now seemed to be faced, and after perhaps a disastrous delay.

M. BERTHELOT did not think the French Government would regard the delay so seriously, and agreed that it might eventually prove necessary to have an arbitration. He did not exclude the possibility in the last resort of technical arbitration by a good American engineer.

LORD CURZON asked what precisely M. Berthelot meant by the word 'technical' in this connection.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that the Railway Commission would have to decide what was the most direct practical route from Haifa to Baghdad, and the Hydraulic Commission whether the Zionists needed territorial acquisitions as well as an economic arrangement for securing the waters which they required.

LORD CURZON observed that such terms of reference as the latter would not really satisfy the British point of view as regards the Zionists. It was not the existing Zionist colonies of which he was thinking so much as the future immigration into these northern districts, and the development of colonisation. The mere grant of so much water would not suffice to satisfy those who looked to the reclamation of the country both north and south of the Sykes-Picot line, and would never be satisfied if confined exclusively to the latter, with an allowance of so much irrigation water from the region beyond.

M. BERTHELOT replied that the Zionists, not content with a frontier further to the north, would soon reach to Damascus. He must maintain his standpoint.

LORD CURZON thought that in the circumstances no agreement seemed possible at present, and that they must each report to their respective Prime Ministers and Governments how the matter now stood and the arguments used by both sides.

### *The Railway.*

LORD CURZON then briefly explained the railway position, and said that for technical reasons any railway from Haifa into the interior must pass through the Yarmuk Valley.

M. BERTHELOT stated that the French were perfectly willing for the railway to pass through the Yarmuk Valley or through the polygon of territory mentioned in the Sykes-Picot agreement and so to Baghdad. They objected, however, to the more northerly *tracé* which had been proposed to Deir-es-Zor and Mosul. It would impinge on their sphere and upset their own plans.

COLONEL GRIBBON explained that this proposal had been dropped for some time. The British were now trying to find a *tracé* completely in the British zone under the Sykes-Picot agreement. Nevertheless it was desirable to know exactly how the Sykes-Picot line ran as regards the Yarmuk Valley. It had been originally roughly drawn on a small scale map, which left in doubt the precise topographical features.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this point need not create difficulty and could be settled by a boundary commission on the spot.

### *Transjordania.*

M. Berthelot said that Feisal had approached him about his (Feisal's) State, including the whole of the Hauran, which he apparently regarded as going as far south as Maan. He also wished to discuss the question of Mosul, which, he had pointed out, fell even under the Sykes-Picot agreement in the Arab zone.

M. Berthelot had told Feisal that in both cases it was a matter for discussion with the British.

LORD CURZON agreed that this was the correct attitude. Great Britain must settle these matters direct with Feisal.

### *Western Boundary of Mosul Area.*

M. BERTHELOT explained that the French Government desired their Syrian zone to extend far enough east as to include the whole basin of the River Khabur. COLONEL GRIBBON said that the War Office accepted the French point of view in this matter, and it was agreed to.

### *Future of French Blue Zone under Sykes-Picot Agreement.*

M. BERTHELOT stated that, in spite of the probable hostility of French public opinion, his Government contemplated making the Syrian coastal area as far north as Alexandretta a part of a Syrian State with Feisal as prince. As regards the blue area in Cilicia, they intended, as already explained, to arrange for some kind of mandate with some nominal connection with Turkey. They would also facilitate Armenian settlement here. They proposed, however, to give up to Turkey all the upper part of the blue area, the mountainous country round Sivas and eastwards towards Kharput. They would, however, keep the strip of territory (in the blue area) running east from Cilicia and north of Syria, including the towns of Aintab, Marash,

Urfa, Birjik, which they now occupy. They would also occupy the country round Arghana, Maaden and Diarbekir (also in the blue area) and join up to the east of Diarbekir with the south-west corner of the Armenian State. In reply to an enquiry of Lord Curzon as to whether France would not therefore be prepared to take the responsibility for looking after the proposed Armenian State, M. Berthelot said that this was impossible; they would, however, see to the protection of Armenians and all Christians in the area above described.

The question of Jeziret-ibn-Omar was also raised, and COLONEL GRIBBON explained that from the military point of view the War Office saw no objection to this falling into the French area. (A question has since been raised on this point, and it may have to be reopened.)

M. BERTHELOT claimed that the French were making considerable concessions in putting the blue coastal area into the Syrian State and abandoning the Sivas area to the Turks. LORD CURZON said that it seemed to him that these were hardly concessions so much as measures of expediency, designed in the French interest. The French would not even assume responsibility for the Armenians, as the British were doing for the Zionists.

M. BERTHELOT replied that the British appeared to be in the happy position of having a claim over territories which expediency did not require them to abandon. He agreed, however, with Lord Curzon that in any case neither France nor England were going to be badly off in the general settlement as proposed.

#### *Water of Tigris.*

M. Berthelot said that the French Government would of course adhere to the stipulations of clause 4 [? of] and the Sykes-Picot agreement regarding the conservation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates.

#### *Arabia.*

M. Berthelot stated that he had no proposal to make regarding Arabia. LORD CURZON recalled that in 1917 or 1918 discussion had taken place with M. Picot and M. Cambon, and a 'projet d'arrangement' had been drafted (but never confirmed) in which the French Government accepted the view of the British Government that the latter should have a preponderant position in the Arabian peninsula owing to its proximity to Egypt and the Persian Gulf, and to Great Britain's special interests and arrangements with the Arab chiefs. This view had, he thought, also been expressed in a note from the French Government to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris in 1917. The matter should be regulated by special clauses in the Treaty with Turkey.

M. BERTHELOT said he thought that there would be no difficulty in this matter, and that he would examine the question on his return to Paris. He agreed with Lord Curzon that in principle the question might be taken up in Paris at the point where the question of the above-mentioned 'projet d'arrangement' had left it.

(*The meeting, in so far as Turkey was concerned, then terminated.*)

No. 406

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)*

No. 1235 [165674/2117/44A]

PARIS, December 27, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 1241<sup>1</sup> of to-day's date, copy of the note which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the boundary between the French and British spheres in Syria.

I have, &c.  
(For H.M. Ambassador),  
NEVILLE M. HENDERSON<sup>2</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 406

*Note respecting Boundary between French and British Spheres in Syria*

Par une note du 20 décembre courant,<sup>3</sup> son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a bien voulu entretenir le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la question des limites entre les sphères d'occupation militaire française et anglaise respectivement en Syrie et Palestine, et exprimer le sentiment que le Gouvernement français serait d'accord sur le maintien de l'occupation anglaise au nord de la Palestine dans une partie de la zone bleue, contrairement aux demandes du Général Gouraud.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, a l'honneur d'informer Lord Derby qu'il insiste de la manière la plus pressante pour que satisfaction soit donnée au Général Gouraud, qui, s'appuyant sur la décision de la Conférence de la Paix en date du 15 septembre 1919,<sup>4</sup> ainsi que sur les instructions qu'il a reçues, estime indispensable que l'occupation militaire française s'étende sur la zone bleue entière. Si l'on se reporte à la décision précitée du Conseil suprême, on voit que toute autre solution serait une violation de la résolution des Alliés.

Le mémorandum du Premier Ministre britannique exprimait les vues de Mr. Lloyd George, mais il n'a pas été accepté par M. Clemenceau (qui a exprimé, à son tour, ses vues dans un mémoire responsif du 13 [*sic*] octobre).<sup>5</sup> La seule décision à laquelle on puisse référer est celle de la Conférence de la Paix.

Il y a lieu de remarquer, d'autre part, que si les limites des zones d'administration déterminées par le Maréchal Allenby ne concordaient pas avec les zones fixées par les accords franco-anglais de 1916, après une étude minutieuse des régions syriennes, cette modification a été faite arbitrairement et malgré les protestations formelles du Haut-Commissaire français, M. Picot.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received December 27) briefly summarized the note printed below.

<sup>2</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Embassy in Paris.

<sup>3</sup> Communication to the French Government in pursuance of instructions contained in No. 400.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 278.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 314.

Quant à la décision française de retarder l'occupation de la Béka, elle a été inspirée uniquement par le désir de donner une satisfaction à l'Émir Feysal et de faciliter l'accord avec lui conformément aux demandes du Gouvernement britannique. Ce n'est nullement le cas pour le caza de Safed, car l'Émir Feysal, loin de désirer le maintien de l'occupation anglaise sur ce point, souhaite vivement que les troupes anglaises d'occupation se retirent non seulement de cette région, mais des parties de la Transjordanie occupées.

Il y a lieu d'ajouter qu'en se conformant à la résolution du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre dernier,<sup>4</sup> qui prescrit le remplacement des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises dans toute la zone bleue, les Gouvernements français et anglais ne préjugent nullement la solution définitive des frontières, qui est du ressort de la Conférence de la Paix.

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES, PARIS,  
le 26 décembre, 1919.

No. 407

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Bayley<sup>1</sup> (New York)*

No. 724 Telegraphic [165850/801/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 27, 1919

Following for Frankfurter of Zionist Organization from Mr. Herbert Samuel<sup>2</sup>:

'Further your cable 10.<sup>3</sup> Negotiations about to begin in Paris. British Govt. attitude mandate boundaries completely satisfactory, but French strongly opposing our Northern boundary. Following is confidential. I go Palestine middle January at Allenby's invitation confirmed by Foreign Office to advise on future administration and finance.'

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Consul-General at New York.

<sup>2</sup> The cost of this telegram was recovered from the Zionist Organisation.

<sup>3</sup> Not in Foreign Office archives.

No. 408

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon  
(Received January 2, 1920)*

No. 1766 Telegraphic [167103/2117/44A]

CAIRO, December 29, 1919

Following are paraphrases of cypher telegrams recently sent to Mecca by Emir Zeid. . . .<sup>1</sup>

(1) Zeid to King Hussein November 30:

Losing on English notes. Please therefore remit Egyptian bank notes to cover our late losses.

(2) Zeid to King November 29:

Yassin el Hashimi has been taken by English under arrest.<sup>2</sup> This will

<sup>1</sup> A confidential reference is here omitted.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 389, note 2.

affect honour of Your Majesty's army. Please issue orders for his immediate release. His arrest has caused great agitation and regrettable things may happen.

(3) Zeid to King November 29.

The last British troops withdrew today. Detachments of them will however remain at Koneitrah, Deraa and Amaan. Public opinion greatly excited against British on account of Yassin el Hashimi incident. I am unable to smooth matter, especially after their dividing up country and condemning it to death.

(4) Zeid to Emir Ali November 29.

Received pounds Egyptian 14,625 for repairing line.

(5) Zeid to King Hussein November 28.

Nouri Es Said has arrived from Paris. His news is satisfactory. The national movement is good. Do not be (?) afraid of anything happening against public interest.

I pray for immediate material help.

(6) Zeid to Premier November 22.

No rashness. The national movement is going on. I have explained all in my telegram of (?) awaiting arrival of Nouri Es Said. Please send us immediate help.

(? 7, omitted) Zeid to Premier, Mecca, November 21.

The agreement on dividing country and giving us only 4 large towns almost without environs will ruin it in near future morally and economically. The French troops will replace English even in Baalbeck and Biqsic within our zone annexing Hasbaya and Rashaya to zone beyond.

The British are withdrawing to El Qasmiah, near Damascus.

This arrangement has excited the people to extent of revolution and desire to fight.

We cannot maintain our honour in face of Arabs without sacrifices, whether we fight or not.

I beg of you to comply quickly with my request. The reason people of country predict danger for us and for you. Not making plain from beginning is cause of failure of my brother's efforts in Paris and London.

(8) Zeid to the Premier, Mecca, November 7.

(a) The country is being divided in spite of will of the nation through insistence of the French.

(b) The English are following an obscure policy. Apparently they support French.

(c) The monthly subsidy is suppressed. Beginning of revolt is not far off. Do what you like; we shall do our national duty. Awaiting your answer.

(? 9, omitted) Zeid to the King November 17.

I pray you in the name of our interests to remit immediately £50,000.

(10) Zeid to Premier, Mecca, November 17.

On account of great need I pray you to send engineers remittance.

(11) Zeid to Premier, November 17.

Aazaz went before. I shall send important documents concerning Hedjaz and intentions of foreigners which will take effect.

(12) Zeid to Premier, November 14.

People are determined on France.

I appealed to you repeatedly for help but you did not listen. The revolution is at doors. Supply us with cash, arms and war provisions. If you neglect us you will be responsible before God.

(13) Zeid to King Hussein November 14.

On account of shortage of money here and great need of His Highness the Emir Feisal please remit through shortest means possible to name of Nejib Shoukair, Arab agency, Paris, 50,000 francs.

#### No. 409

#### *Memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam on France and the northern frontier of Palestine*

[166023/50535/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 30, 1919

1. In the recent discussions with the French representatives regarding the northern frontier of Palestine,<sup>1</sup> the latter adopted a more or less *non-possumus* attitude. Basing themselves on the Sykes-Picot Agreement they claimed that concessions had already been made to us (a) by the cession of the Mosul area on certain conditions regarding oil and (b) by their consent to a British, instead of an international, mandate in Palestine. Beyond an economic arrangement with the Zionists as to waterpower they would make no further concession: the northern frontier of Palestine must be, more or less, the Sykes-Picot line from a point north of Acre across the northern end of the Sea of Galilee to a point just south of Deraa. All the economic arguments in favour of our northern frontier, which were strongly pressed, failed to move them.

2. From the general tenour of these discussions it seems obvious that the French and British conflict of opinion on this matter fundamentally arises from their different interpretations of the declaration as to a national home for the Jews, to which both Governments, in company with the Italian and U.S. Governments, have subscribed. The French Government interpret this declaration as a promise to protect and somewhat extend the existing Zionist colonies (M. Berthelot repeatedly spoke of 'les colonies Sionistes existantes').

It is true that there are Zionist colonies north of the Sykes-Picot line and the most northerly—that of Metullah—is on the southern slopes of Mount

<sup>1</sup> See Nos. 404 and 405.

Hermon, but the biggest and most flourishing are to the south of the line. Incidentally the French may also be wishing to keep in their area and under their protection as many as possible of the Jewish Colonisation Association's Jewish colonies (the original Rothschild foundations) some of which are near Safed: these have for some time been under the aegis of the Alliance Israélite, a French body largely opposed to Zionism and its aims, whose representative, Sylvain Lévi, spoke more or less against Dr. Weizmann when both were heard the same day by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference early this year.<sup>2</sup> Zionism does not carry weight in France.

3. It is possible that the French attitude also partly rests on their desire to reach an agreement with Feisal and therefore on their reluctance to give away any territory to which Arab nationalists aspire. As a matter of fact, however, although some of Feisal's entourage dislike Zionism, Feisal himself and his most influential supporters are understood to realise that they can look to Zionism for sound advice with both men and especially money as an offset to the French. The Zionists have several times received satisfactory assurances from Feisal personally as to his attitude towards their general programme.

4. On the other hand the British Government by their support of Zionism have to a much greater degree accepted the natural implications which Zionists give to the declaration of a National Home, i.e., an attempt to make Palestine a state in its natural geographical and historic frontiers and by gradual immigration and special economic facilities to turn this state into a Jewish state. Only time and experience can show how far the Zionist aspiration is realisable; while it is not expected that Palestine will ever be able to give a home to all the Zionists in the world, it is thought that eventually some three (3) million instead of the present 60,000 Jews may be able to settle, and that hope and self-respect may be given to a large part of Eastern Jewry who can never actually go to live in Palestine.

Behind British policy, therefore, is the recognition of the principle of Jewish nationality, which is the essence of Zionism and the intention to lay in the Turkish Peace Settlement the foundation for the reconstruction of a Jewish Palestine, as of an Armenia for the Armenians.

5. If this aspect of British policy is to be fulfilled it is obvious that the frontiers of Palestine must be drawn on the same sort of principles as those of other reconstructed countries. It also seems clear that some such frontiers are required in order to give that impetus and encouragement to Zionists, at this crisis of their fortunes, which will enable them to secure the right number of suitable immigrants and the large sums of money, essential to the success of their cause.

6. How is the French and British conflict regarding the northern frontiers of Palestine, itself based on this more fundamental difference of attitude towards Zionism, to be overcome? The proposal (already made) to submit

<sup>2</sup> On February 27, 1919: see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 161–70; also Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (London, 1949), p. 304. (The date is there given incorrectly as February 23.)

to American arbitration would meet our case: America takes our view of Zionism, but at the present stage while any American participation in the Turkish settlement is doubtful, it is difficult to press the proposal on France and in any case, as between us and France, the Sykes-Picot agreement holds and the French Foreign Office will continue to take their stand on that Agreement.

7. Secondly there is the possibility of a bargain. This is certainly what the French Foreign Office want and they seem to have persuaded M. Clemenceau to take the view that he has made sufficient concessions to the British already over Mosul and the Palestine mandate and that he should not give more away without a *quid pro quo*. During the last few months the French Foreign Office have dropped hints that if we would leave them to settle the Tangier question with Spain to their own satisfaction, they would be more accommodating in the near East, e.g., as regards the northern frontiers of Palestine. They have also talked privately of the cession of Gambia.<sup>3</sup> Lastly from a remark made by M. Berthelot during the recent meetings as to Feisal's aspirations for extending his homogeneous kingdom over the Hauran as far south as Maan, it looks as if M. Berthelot is thinking of a possible agreement on the northern frontier of Palestine, if the French Syrian mandate were extended down the eastern frontier of Palestine to the northern frontier of the Hejaz. This latter proposal is understood to be unacceptable because it would bring French influence down into Arabia and make it impossible to link Bagdad and Haifa by a railway and pipeline entirely in British territory. It is equally understood that H.M.G. cannot contemplate meeting the French by a bargain over Tangier and Gambia or indeed by any bargain of this nature at all. There may be other possible bases for a bargain, but no others are known to have been suggested as yet from the French or British side.

8. If no bargain is permissible, there seems at the moment only one possible chance of reaching an agreement with France satisfactory to us, and that is by explaining to M. Clemenceau *direct* precisely and frankly how we view Palestine and the Zionist case and appealing to him to help to effect a just settlement on that basis of nationality which we and France have supported throughout the Conference and intend to support elsewhere in the Turkish settlement. Such an appeal, if made to the French Foreign Office, might fall on deaf ears; if made in the above way and direct to M. Clemenceau (who takes a broader view in these matters than his F.O.) it holds out some real chances of success.

E. G. FORBES ADAM<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 324.

<sup>4</sup> This memorandum was minuted as follows by Mr. Vansittart and Lord Curzon:

'I agree that the move suggested in the last paragraph should certainly be tried.'

'Robert Vansittart'

December 30'

'It is worth remembering that in the suspension of the Anglo-American guarantee of the E. frontiers of France we have a powerful lever.'

'I would not give way on the Palestine Frontier points.  
'When Clemenceau said to the P.M. You may have Palestine he meant a reasonable & feasible Palestine.  
'Neither can it be worth while for the French to set against themselves the Zionists of the whole world.

'C.  
29[sic]/12'

No. 410

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 67 [165674/2117/444]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 8, 1920

My Lord,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 1235<sup>1</sup> of the 27th December, enclosing copy of a note from the French Government on the subject of the boundary between the spheres of temporary British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria.

The French Government maintain that the only decision to which appeal can be made in this matter is that of the Supreme Council of the 15th September, 1919,<sup>2</sup> and this decision His Majesty's Government have no desire to dispute. By it the Supreme Council took note of the fact that 'M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the French Government, accepted *Mr. Lloyd George's* proposal for the evacuation of the British army of Syria . . . and their replacement by French troops . . . in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line.'<sup>2</sup>

His Majesty's Government have loyally carried out this agreement; but they cannot accept the position that the French conception of Syria must of necessity be allowed to prejudge the question of the northern boundary of Palestine. Upon this point His Majesty's Government have never concealed their opinion. Indeed, it was explicitly stated by the Prime Minister in the *aide-mémoire* to which reference is made, and although the French Government withheld their acceptance of those parts of the *aide-mémoire* which did not relate to the exchange of British and French troops, this could not be held to involve the abandonment by the Prime Minister or the British Government of the views with regard to the borders of Palestine which they have repeatedly expressed and which they have once again defined.

In these circumstances, and in view of the improved prospect of an early settlement of the whole question and the purely temporary character of whatsoever military administration may be installed in the small area concerned, His Majesty's Government express the hope that the French Government will agree to the maintenance of the present administrative boundary pending the final decision of the Peace Conference.

You should reply to the French note of the 26th December in the above terms.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>1</sup> No. 406.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 278.

No. 411

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 10)*

No. 33 [169364/2117/44]

PARIS, January 8, 1920

My Lord:—

With reference to my telegram No. 10<sup>1</sup> of January 6, I have the honour to report that in announcing the departure of the Emir Feisal the *Temps* of last night made the following apparently authoritative statement:—

'It appears that the conversations which took place between the Emir and the French Government have resulted in a complete agreement before his departure. We understand that the general lines of that agreement, which was submitted to the approval of the Conference, are as follows. The Emir agrees to a French mandate for the whole of Syria. In return, France consents to the formation of an Arab state to include the four towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo, and to be administered by the Emir with the assistance of French advisers and inspectors.'

'In the district of Bekaa, which is claimed both by Lebanon and the Arab state, the police administration will be provisionally carried out by an Arab gendarmerie officered by French military inspectors. The ultimate attribution of that district—either to Lebanon or to the Arab State—will be decided by the Peace Conference; but it appears probable that the claims of Lebanon will be favoured.'

'The economic and financial assistance of France will be accepted by the Emir to the exclusion of that of other countries.'

In an interview, however, accorded to the *Journal* just before his departure the Emir himself is reported to have stated that there was no written agreement, but that something better than a convention had been arrived at, namely 'a harmony of views founded on a mutual feeling of confidence'.

This morning, however, the announcement in the *Temps* is contradicted categorically in an official communiqué made to the Press by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that there is no truth in the report that a definite agreement had been arrived at, but that it is to be expected that after the Emir's return to France the friendly conversations which have already taken place will result in a solution satisfactory to both countries.

The *Temps* this evening, however, asserts that in spite of this official denial, the information published in its edition of last night is correct. It declares that it is even in a position to give more precise details. It is, it states, an undeniable fact that the negotiations between the Emir and the French Government have resulted in an actual agreement the main points of which it quoted yesterday, and that the journey of the Emir to Syria is in fact to persuade the Musulman extremists in that country to concur in it. The French advisers and inspectors are, it continues, to be appointed for two years and can be renewed; while as regards the Bekaa district it has been

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This short telegram (received January 7) reported that the Emir Feisal was leaving Paris for Beyrouth on January 7, 1920.

settled that the Conference is to be requested to arrange for a plebiscite to decide whether it is to be attributed to the Lebanon or to the Arab State.

I have etc.

DERBY

No. 412

*Letter from Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris)<sup>1</sup> to Major Young  
(Received January 15)*

*Unnumbered [170484/2117/4A]*

PARIS, January 12, 1920

My dear Young,

With reference to my letter of yesterday<sup>2</sup> I have now seen one of my French friends who is usually well informed about Arab matters and he told me confidentially that a secret agreement had been reached between Feisal and the French before the former's departure from Paris. As far as I could make out the gist of the agreement was (1) that a compromise had been reached in the matter of advisers generally, whereby they were to receive contracts for two years which were only to be renewed after discussion and agreement between Feisal and the French. Feisal had previously insisted that the advisers were to be dismissed whenever he liked; (2) Feisal is to be proclaimed a prince and his kingdom is to include some of the coastal area, excluding, however, as far as I could make out, the Lebanon, Tripoli and Alexandretta. The question of special facilities at one of these ports is left open on the understanding that something will be done for Feisal in the matter.

The Bekaa is to continue under some sort of special Franco-Arab régime. For the rest the French have agreed to Feisal's proposal, but all disputed frontier questions whether in Northern Palestine or the Bekaa should be referred for decision to a Commission composed of a Frenchman, an Englishman and an Arab. I do not know whether the procedure of this Commission or its method of reaching a decision has been settled between Feisal and the French.

I have not yet learnt any further details of the agreement or exactly how comprehensive the system of advisers is to be, but presumably there is some special arrangement about finance.

My informant told me that the French were rather nervous as to whether Feisal would be able to maintain his position on his return to Syria and for this reason the agreement was to be kept secret at present and Feisal was to return with an ostensibly clear hand.

I rather believe the general outline of the agreement as given above has already appeared in the *Temps*<sup>3</sup> and therefore probably been quoted in the English Press. You will probably know this however. I have not yet had time to trace it in the *Temps* files.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Forbes Adam had recently rejoined the British Peace Delegation in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 411.

For the present please regard this information as secret as my informant was insistent on the point.

Yours sincerely,  
ERIC FORBES ADAM

P.S. As far as I can gather the reports of Du [De] Caix (who is, I believe, coming back) clearly show that the French realise that they are in danger of rather heavy commitments in Syria unless they pursue the policy of a very loose rein. The prospects therefore look hopeful for their accepting the draft of the Treaty<sup>4</sup> regarding the Arab countries in something like the form you desire if the Authorities here eventually agree to that being made our policy. At present discussion centres round Constantinople and Turkey proper.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The treaty of peace with Turkey.

<sup>5</sup> See Chap. III.

### No. 413

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received January 29)*

*No. F.O. 10 (C.P.O. 311/6) [174490/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, January 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report on recent events in Syria and Palestine.

Syria.

Damascus was evacuated on 26th November last. On the day previous to evacuation a party of four British Officers arrived in Damascus by motor car from Mesopotamia. An awkward situation was with difficulty avoided owing to the Arab Administration threatening to hold them as hostages for our return. It is however noteworthy that one of these officers did, after our complete evacuation of Syria, successfully return by motor car in early December to Deir ez Zor, where he arrived only to be taken prisoner by the Arab Force which raided that place on the 11th December.

Since our evacuation, trustworthy information from the Interior of Syria and indeed from the French coastal strip has been fragmentary and unreliable. This has been due to General Gouraud's refusal to allow a British Liaison Officer at Damascus and of [? to] the disinclination or inability on the part of French officials to give British officers any news whatsoever of what is happening in Syria. General Gouraud did however, on the 3rd January last, accede to our request for a British Liaison Officer at Damascus, and Lieut.-Colonel Easton left Cairo on the 9th January to take up the appointment. Our information is therefore based solely on what can be gathered from travellers and from a few private letters from trustworthy Syrians in the main centres.

It is not at all clear what happened in O.E.T.A. (East) immediately after our evacuation but it appears that the first act of aggression was undertaken by the inhabitants of the Lebanese village Zahle, who entered Maalaka in the Bekaa, pillaged the Government schools, buildings, etc. and insulted the Arab flag.

On the 6th December an unimportant fracas occurred near Ryak between French troops and the local inhabitants. Since that date the Bekaa appears to have been dominated by so-called brigands who no doubt are working under the extremist party in Damascus.

On the 19th December the French sent a Liaison Officer to Baalbek. On his arrival by train he was forcibly put back into his carriage and was compelled to return. The French therefore occupied Baalbek with a detachment of troops and are reported to have reinstated their Liaison Officer though they suffered considerable casualties in an action outside Baalbek. French troops are now occupying Maalaka and Ryak in the Bekaa but it is not clear whether they still occupy Baalbek.

In Damascus on the 12th December demonstrations took place against the Emirs Feisal and Zeid.

On the 14th the Chief Administrator Ali Riza was forced to resign and his place was taken by Abdul Hamid Pasha who also resigned soon after taking office. It is not clear who now is at the head of the Arab Government in Damascus, though the Emir Zeid still remains the figure-head.

On the 11th December Deir ez Zor was attacked by an Arab party under Ramadan Shalash. Though this act of aggression took place probably without Feisal's knowledge, there is little doubt that Emir Zeid under the influence of Yasin Pasha was fully cognisant of the intentions of the expedition even if he did not issue direct orders for the attack on Deir ez Zor. But no proof of the guilt of the Arab Administration has as yet been obtained.

In O.E.T.A. (West) the French have had considerable trouble near Tripoli where an official has been murdered and a state of anarchy is said now to exist.

On the 15th December some Bedouins attacked the village of Hamarah situated near Lake Huleh when they killed a French soldier and captured a machine gun.

On the 8th January the French Liaison Officer reported that a French Force had been attacked by Bedouin in the Marj Ayoun district, north of Lake Huleh, the French losses being serious whilst that of the Bedouin was unknown. From another source it is reported the French lost 2 machine guns in the affair.

In the Lebanon the French Administration have caused considerable discontent by directly controlling the affairs of the Lebanese Administration and depriving them of the independent nature of their Government which they have always enjoyed during the old *status quo*.

As far as can be judged the general situation in Syria seems to be as follows:—

The Arabs for lack of a leader and a stable government are impotent and have to confine their activities to raiding and acts of brigandage. They have hitherto refrained from attacking the French with their regular troops. Lack of funds is being felt, and owing to all revenues being used for military purposes, all normal communications and means of ensuring internal security are neglected. Such a state of affairs cannot last long. No Arab Government

such as could be formed at present could exist without ample funds. Their two courses are, to openly attack the French and maintain themselves on doubtful military successes, or to accept French money with a direct French Administration, and it is doubtful whether French policy aims at anything less. Should they adopt the former course the eventual result would be identical with any result of acquiescence to French control in Damascus, a fact which is by no means fully appreciated by the people of Syria.

Yasin Pasha is still held a prisoner in Palestine. This we are doing at the desire of General Gouraud and doubtless Your Lordship has considered the complete lack of moral right which has justified us keeping Yasin Pasha a political prisoner after our evacuation of Syria. On the other hand it must be remembered that if Yasin Pasha were to return to Damascus at the present moment, Arab national feeling would find in him the one quality which they now lack and his arrival would be the signal for open hostilities against the French, and probably an open alliance with Turkey.

The date of arrival of Feisal which varies from day to day and which never materialises is still unknown here. It is unlikely that Feisal can return to his old position in Damascus, bringing with him the recent agreement between the French and British Governments regarding Syria. His three alternatives are to throw in his lot with the extremists, to allow himself to be reinstated in Damascus by French bayonets, or to abandon his position in favour of an extremist leader. Feisal's nature does not lend itself to the policy of the extremists which is a moderate form of Bolshevism, and it is unthinkable that Feisal should allow himself to be reinstated by French troops, though doubtless this latter course is the one which will be urged on him by the French. For this reason the French are not inclined to regret the present state of anarchy and lack of security in Syria, and make no secret of their delight in the idea of reinstating Feisal with the inevitable permanent occupation of Damascus by French troops.

#### *Trans-Jordan.*

There is little to report from Trans-Jordan. Following on our evacuation certain missionary bodies and Christians from Es Salt and Madeba attempted to migrate to Palestine on the heels of our troops. Certain missionaries, with the concurrence of the Bishop in Jerusalem, have left their stations and are at present in Palestine, but in nearly every case the native Christians have been reassured, and no migration has taken place.

On the 14th December last, a survey party under Major Hislop in connection with the Trans-Arabian railway reconnaissance was surprised and robbed of all property. The party was however released the same day and it is believed that all the property has been recovered. The excuse given for this act of violence was that the party were mistaken for French officers.

On the 27th December last a small armed party of Bedouin entered Palestine, at the north end of the Jordan Valley and committed some minor acts of violence, which appear to have been due to their anxiety that we should recognise certain pastoral rights. The matter is now being enquired into,

and it is hoped will be amicably settled. At the same time, there is evidence of increasing unrest in Trans-Jordan which may lead to raiding into Palestine. Every effort will be made to frustrate this without recourse to military action.

*Palestine.*

In Palestine, the visit of Dr. Weizmann had a marked effect, not only on his own people but on the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. He was able to co-ordinate Zionist effort, and moderate the extremist and too-progressive elements. He got into personal contact with many of the Arab notables in Palestine and did a great deal to dispel the many illusory ideas on Zionism which have been saturating Palestine from foreign and badly-informed sources. He established a cordial relationship with the Palestine administration.

The general political situation in Palestine has also improved from other causes. A relaxation of French and Italian anti-Zionist propaganda, a general feeling that the policy of His Majesty's Government must be accepted and a better knowledge of what Zionism means. There is nevertheless still a large section of public opinion in Palestine opposed to Zionism, while any unfortunate occurrence or increase in anti-Zionist propaganda would fan opposition into a renewed and violent flame of Demonstration.

It is with a view to stifling this, whilst it is still latent, that I have advocated the publication of the Declaration on Zionism (vide your telegram 1216<sup>1</sup> of November 7), but hitherto the consensus of opinion in the Palestine Administration doubts the advisability of such a course. I am all the more anxious to press for the publication of the Declaration, as it will once and for all dispel the anti-Zionist attitude of a large section of the European community in Palestine, who still doubt the permanency of Zionism.

The repatriation of many pre-war Jewish residents in Palestine has given alarm to certain sections who regard such steps as the initial stages of wholesale immigration, but as far as I can ascertain none but an infinitesimal proportion of Jews entering Palestine have evaded our Permit authorities.

With reference to my Despatch 311 of 10th November, 1919,<sup>2</sup> the following progress has been made in preliminary Zionist work:—

- (a) A lease of the Wieland factory has been secured by the Zionist Commission.
- (b) A sub-lease from an Arab of the Sarona and Wilhelma colonies has also been secured.
- (c) Application has been made to the War Office (telegram E.A. 2902<sup>3</sup> of Dec. 1, 1919) for permission to re-open the Land Registries to a limited extent, but so far no reply has been received.
- (d) The Zionist Commission are making arrangements to send a representative to Southern Russia to recruit certain skilled labourers, for preliminary work in Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> No. 353.

<sup>2</sup> No. 358.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

As Your Lordship will realise, the foundation of all serious preparatory work is the re-opening of the Land Registries, as without this permission not only can the housing problem not be tackled, but building material factories cannot be erected. Lack of such permission is also blocking the erection of hotels and stores, which are so badly needed through the country.

I have, &c.

R. MEINERTZHAGEN

No. 414

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Khartoum)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon*

(Received February 6)

No. 74 [176615/142/44]

KHARTOUM, January 15, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 1682<sup>2</sup> of the 8th Dec. 1919, I have the honour to submit the following report on my visit to Jeddah.<sup>3</sup>

I arrived at Jeddah in H.M.S. *Centaur* about one o'clock on January 7. Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Vickery, C.M.G., D.S.O., the British Agent at Jeddah, came on board, and introduced the Emirs Ali and Abdulla, the French Representative, Commandant Catroux and the Italian Representative, Signor Bernabei. Shortly after the conclusion of this visit, I went ashore and was met by the King in the Customs building at the landing stage. The King greeted me in the most cordial manner and expressed his great satisfaction that I had been able to visit his country. I then went to the British Agency, and thence made an official call on the King at his house, which His Majesty returned within half an hour, coming in person to the British Agency. No matters of importance were discussed, the usual compliments were exchanged and the King repeatedly expressed his pleasure at the honour done to him by my visit. The French and Italian Representatives were present while the King was at the British Agency, and after His Majesty had left I received the two princes and all the leading personalities of Jeddah, native and foreign. I returned on board H.M.S. *Centaur* at sunset.

Two interviews with the King at his own house to discuss official matters had been arranged for January 8. The first of these took place at about 11.30 a.m. after a parade of the Jeddah garrison under Kaisuni Pasha, Minister for War, which was attended by the King and myself. At this interview, Colonel Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel Vickery, the Emirs Ali and Abdulla and Kaisuni Pasha, were present. Lieutenant Colonel Vickery acted as interpreter and after exchange of compliments, I read the King a message based on Your Lordship's instructions to Colonel Wilson of December 1 (No. 156472/M.E./44)<sup>4</sup> and drawn up in consultation with Colonel

<sup>1</sup> Field-Marshal Allenby was visiting Khartoum.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See No. 403, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Field-Marshal Allenby had briefly reported on this visit in a telegram of January 11, 1920 (received January 14).

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 2 in No. 387.

Wilson and Lieutenant Colonel Vickery. I attach a copy of the actual message delivered.<sup>5</sup>

The King replied at considerable length. Briefly, the line he took, though much obscured by verbiage, was as follows:—

'I am much honoured by this visit and I welcome the opportunity of putting forward my views. His Majesty's Government has sent me a message regarding the question of Ibn Saud: this question I regard as of minor importance, my mind is full of the problems of Syria and my own position as regards the Arabs. I am very conscious of my debt to Great Britain, without her help I should have accomplished nothing; and never shall I stand in her way or do anything contrary to her interests. But the policy which Great Britain is now following, in handing over Syria to her ally, France, is rendering useless all the work which Great Britain and the Arabs have accomplished as allies. I hear from Zeid that Mustafa Kamal's forces have driven the French out of Aintab and Kilis. This is but one instance. There is strife in Syria, and Great Britain and I fought to bring peace to the Arabs. I could, but am ashamed to, produce written proofs that Great Britain called upon me to lead the Arabs. The Arabs look to me now, ask why Great Britain has deserted them and call on me to act as their spokesman with her. How am I to explain my position? I cannot say that Great Britain has changed her mind—that would damage her: I am even prepared to say that I misunderstood the matter from the beginning.'

I had explained that I had not come to discuss matters affecting Syria or the leadership of the Arabs, and that my present object was to facilitate a settlement of the Ibn Saud question. This did not check the King in any way: he became more and more excited, and spoke quickly and with vehemence until finally he wept and became almost hysterical. I then left him to think over things.

Early in the afternoon Emir Abdulla called on me at the British Agency and informed me that the King agreed to meet Ibn Saud at Jeddah. I then visited the King again. He spoke at some length, still adhering to the same themes as in the morning, but he was much quieter, showed great gratitude for all that had been done for him and expressed extreme pleasure at His Majesty's Government's invitation to him to visit London.

In the evening the King gave a dinner party in my honour and the next day His Majesty, and his sons Ali and Abdulla, lunched on board H.M.S. *Cairo*.

Our personal relations were throughout extremely cordial, the King's consent to a meeting with Ibn Saud in Jeddah has been obtained and I trust that the general effect of my visit may be useful.

I shall be glad to receive your instructions regarding any further steps you may wish me to take to prepare the King for Ibn Saud's visit. I consider the proposal that he should go to Jeddah should be made direct to Ibn Saud by

<sup>5</sup> See enclosure below.

His Majesty's Government and not by way of invitation from King Hussein, and I recommend that when the meeting between them takes place, Commander Hogarth<sup>6</sup> should be present at Jeddah.

I have &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.<sup>7</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 414

His Majesty's Government have recently discussed in London the whole question of the relations between Your Majesty and Ibn Saud and are very anxious that the differences between you should be settled.

His Majesty's Government are of opinion that Your Majesty has a strong case—so strong indeed does it appear to be that they cannot understand why the matter should not be capable of easy adjustment.

If it is the case, as Your Majesty contends, that your ownership of Khurma and Tarabah is incontestable, [? there] does not appear to be any valid objection to your producing the proofs which would convince any impartial person at once of the justice of your claims.

Your Majesty should realize that there cannot at present be any question of the public demarcation of the boundary by a British Commission. It is only suggested and strongly urged by His Majesty's Government that Your Majesty should agree to meet Ibn Saud personally with the object of arriving at an agreement on all points at issue between you. His Majesty's Government will readily arrange for the meeting to take place at Jeddah, Cairo or Aden. His Majesty's Government would point out that their own interests and those of Your Majesty's are, in fact, the same, viz.:—to avoid such a calamity as further strife and by agreement between Your Majesty and Ibn Saud to bring about a condition of peace and unity in the Arabian Peninsula.

Ibn Saud, for his part, has also demanded from His Majesty's Government a definite recognition of his various plans, but has been told that His Majesty's Government must decline to discuss them until he has made a real effort to come to an agreement without their intervention. It is believed that Ibn Saud will be quite ready to come to Jeddah and have a friendly conversation with Your Majesty on your territory, or elsewhere as may be desired.

His Majesty's Government are hopeful that by these suggestions they may have once more testified their sincere regard for Your Majesty and their

<sup>6</sup> Of the staff of the Arab Bureau in Cairo.

<sup>7</sup> Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office despatch No. 167 of February 12, 1920, to Field-Marshal Allenby that 'the proposal that Ibn Saud should visit Jeddah has been made direct to him by His Majesty's Government and I consider that, pending receipt of his reply, no further steps should be taken to prepare King Hussein for his visit. Your Lordship's suggestion that Commander Hogarth should be present when the meeting between the two rulers takes place is under consideration.'

'I wish to take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the manner in which Your Lordship conducted the negotiations with King Hussein and my gratification at the results attained.'

'It will be the cause of great satisfaction to His Majesty's Government if your conversations with King Hussein result in a meeting between himself and Ibn Saud and in the establishment of friendly relations between the two rulers.'

recognition of the great services which Your Majesty has rendered to the Allied Cause during the war. They take this opportunity of again assuring Your Majesty of their entire faith and trust in Your Majesty's good intentions and in Your Majesty's true friendship and loyalty to Great Britain. It is essential that the risk of hostilities between Your Majesty and Ibn Saud should be entirely removed.

I have been instructed to inform Your Majesty that as soon as this has been done and when it is certain that trouble will not break out in Your Majesty's absence, nothing would give His Majesty's Government greater pleasure than to receive Your Majesty in London and discuss the many interests which Your Majesty and Great Britain have in common.

No. 415

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received January 29)*

*No. F.O. 11 (C.P.O. 311/6) [174491/2117/44A]*

CAIRO, January 16, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report, received from Lieut.-Colonel Waters-Taylor, dealing with a recent interview with General Gouraud, which may be of interest.

I have, &c.

[?] REGINALD BANCROFT<sup>1</sup>  
for Colonel  
Chief Political Officer.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 415

*Report received from Lieut.-Col. Waters-Taylor dealing with a recent interview with General Gouraud.*

GS/ET/571

With reference to your cipher wire addressed to Colonel Waters Taylor, No: O.A. 1736<sup>2</sup> dated 18.12.19. I left Haifa on the 29th of December by the French flag-ship *Du Chayla*, Admiral Moruet having kindly offered me a passage. On the 30th at 11 a.m. I had an interview with General Gouraud, and learned from him that the arrival of Emir Feisal was put off for several days and perhaps longer, and that the Emir was now engaged in conversations with M. Clemenceau.

2. On the question of Yasin Pasha, General Gouraud was very insistent on his non-return to Damascus. He did not wish to have anything to do with him and took up the attitude that, as the British had arrested Yasin, he, Yasin was entirely our affair; but that having removed him, for presumably sufficient cause, before our evacuation, his return, now it was completed, would be prejudicial to French interests. I reminded General Gouraud that it was because of Lord Allenby's orders that he was arrested. In interviews

<sup>1</sup> The signature is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> Not in Foreign Office archives.

also with M. de Caix it was apparent that the French wish to shift the responsibility of the future of Yasin on to our shoulders. M. de Caix suggesting Mesopotamia or Malta as suitable places for his internment. From a conversation I had with Colonel de Meru at Haifa on the 28th I am inclined to believe that the French might be persuaded to take over Yasin, but I thoroughly agree with them as to his undesirability in Syria.

3. On the question of the appointment of a B[ritish] L[iaison] O[fficer] in Damascus General Gouraud was exceedingly loath to accede and it was only at 10 p.m. on the 3rd that he consented, in the terms of the letter, (copy attached).<sup>3</sup> His refusal was based on the statement that the presence of any British Officer in Damascus, in an official capacity, would lend strength to the party who hoped for our return, and who stated that our evacuation was only temporary, and to embarrass the French. I spoke very strongly to M. de Caix on the morning of the 3rd as to the absurdity of giving credence to such rumours, and further as to the real necessity to ourselves of having a Liaison Officer with the Arab Government in view of our responsibility in Zone B. It also appeared that such an appointment, having regard to the accepted policy of both our Governments, should be of undoubted assistance to the French Liaison Officer. I asked that General Gouraud should give me the reasons for his refusal in writing as I scarcely felt that I could report to Lord Allenby the reasons which I had received, as they evinced such mistrust of the Officer who might be selected to carry out the Field Marshal's orders. M. de Caix promised that I should have a letter from the Colonel at 3.30 p.m., but it was only after sending an Officer round at 8 p.m., having postponed my departure from the afternoon of the 3rd to the morning of the 4th, that the answer was sent. M. de Caix stated that the French were extremely touchy and jealous as regards our influence in Zone A, that pending the final solution he had given orders for all French Agents to cease their activities in Zone B etc. etc., that the French intended adhering to the 1916 agreement until other agreements might be come to between our respective Governments.

I pointed out that a B.L.O. in Damascus regularized the channel of communication with G.H.Q. and that his functions would consist solely in communications affecting British interests.

4. General Gouraud's attitude as regards the subsidy was as follows, that, as he had been approached in the matter, he would be grateful if we would suspend payment for the present, or until the arrival of Feisal. I pointed out that our evacuation had weakened public security, and that if in addition all pecuniary aid was withheld, the Administration, even if under a Clemenceau, or a Lloyd George, could not hope to function. We had withheld the subsidy until we were secure that the Arab Government would not use it to assist their troops against the French, but that the Government were now at the end of their resources and without money anarchy would result. There was no fixed date for Feisal's arrival and that I felt both French and English were responsible if we abandoned the Arab Government indefinitely. Gouraud

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

then informed me that he had offered the Emir Zeid a French subsidy some time ago and that the latter had asked him to keep the money on deposit in Beirut until he had need of it. Gouraud therefore considered that the Arabs had no justification in pressing us for our share of the subsidy. This refusal by the Arab Government to accept French money is I think the most expressive proof of their antipathy to anything in the way of French control or assistance that we have yet heard. Further interviews with Gouraud convinced me that the French wished the Arabs to be starved into a pecuniary surrender and that any alternative of joint French and British assistance did not appeal to him. General Jaffar Pasha arrived in Beirut via Haifa from Damascus on the 2nd bringing with him a letter from Emir Zeid (copy attached).<sup>4</sup> Jaffar gave me to understand that in addition to Zeid's request that I should ask Gouraud to assist in a friendly solution of their outstanding difficulties, Zeid was prepared now to accept a French subsidy. This was in accordance with the advice given by me to Jaffar on his previous visit to Haifa to convey to Emir Zeid, on the lines of paras: 9 and 10 of my GS/ET/571<sup>2</sup> dated 23.12.19. I took Jaffar with me to interview Gouraud. I saw the General alone and showed him Zeid's letter and also told him that Zeid was now willing to accept a French subsidy. Gouraud, although he said he was pleased with the friendly attitude of Emir Zeid, laid great stress on the fact that the letter was written to me and not to him or Lieut.-Colonel Cousse, F.O.O. Damascus. I explained that it was in answer to a letter of mine which I showed him and also because Zeid knew from Jaffar that I was in Beirut. Gouraud then had a very long interview, one hour and a half with Jaffar, who told me the main discussion was as to the reasons which always made the Arab authorities correspond *with [sic]* the British in preference to the French; the other point was the evacuation of Baalbek by French troops. I met Gouraud again in the evening and he told me that my message from Zeid had been confirmed by a wire from Cousse stating Zeid was now prepared to ask the French for a subsidy. At my final interview with De Caix he informed me that he had himself, that morning, the 3rd, given orders for the payment of £25,000 to the Arab Government. I informed De Caix that we would pay a proportion of our subsidy immediately on my return to Haifa and that I would inform him of the amount paid. Jaffar Pasha informs me that the Army have been without pay for 3 months and are in a dangerous state in consequence; I propose paying therefore the balance of the October and November subsidies, keeping December in reserve for Feisal, or failing his arrival in a fortnight, I recommend the payment of that also, without further delay.

5. I announced to M. De Caix, as a *fait accompli*, the appointment of an Arab Liaison Officer to G.H.Q., for the special transport duties outlined in your telegram.<sup>2</sup> Emir Zeid has already selected a suitable Officer and I will have him despatched on Jaffa's return to Damascus tomorrow 6th.

6. De Caix informed me that the French are instituting their own, or rather a special currency note for their Zone, that it is being printed in

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to filed copy.

England and will not be put into circulation before March at earliest. He promised to send full particulars as to their proposed financial policy. He had not arrived at a solution of the *mettalik* problem<sup>s</sup> but he would be glad of our decision on the subject as he agreed that joint action appeared both necessary and desirable. A banking expert, M. Maurice Berard, informed me that at present rate of exchange the *mettalik* is worth 4 centimes. I suggest that any conclusions arrived at by our Financial Experts may be communicated to the French.

7. Another point of interest was the discovery that customs dues are levied at Tariff rates i.e. 25 francs to the pound sterling and that in addition dock dues are charged, the aggregate imposition on importers thus, at the depreciated value of the franc, amounting to approximately 30% on Invoice Rates. (This, and the preceding para: are only included in this report as my files on these subjects are with you.)

8. M. Maurice Berard was pessimistic as to the economic future of O.E.T. (West) and he, as well as other informed French opinion, look to Cilicia for their future prosperity. General Gouraud in his speech to the assembled Officers at his New Years Day reception, sketched to them the glories of Beirut as their capital 'rayonnant la prospérité' to Cilicia, and the Eastern and Western Zones. I think that there can be no doubt that the French intend to interpret whatever mandate they may be given in the Country into actual occupation and exploitation. Mr. Knabenshue, the American Consul General, mentioned casually as a matter of common knowledge, that the French as soon as they were strong enough in troops would occupy the four Arab towns. All French opinion unites in considering Feisal and the Arab State an artificial British creation. De Caix considers our policy, as he sees it, of a strong Arab State or States to be a future Pan-Islamic danger and fails to take into consideration that any unfair dealing by the Western to the Eastern races may result in their combination, and the very Pan-Islamic conflagration that he fears. In fact, their policy is here, as elsewhere, that of the Clerical Colonial Party, and the Arab Government fully realize this, hence their fear and opposition. I very much fear that the French will not accept Feisal, save as their creature, and that will result in his ruin with his own people, perhaps the end desired. All suggestions as to a strong Arab Government under dual French and British influence are received with mistrust and jealousy; they appear incapable at present to overcome the obsession that we are still intriguing in their sphere of influence, nor to realize our responsibilities *vis-à-vis* the Arabs being equal to their own.

I do not wish that anything written in this Memorandum should give the impression that my reception at Beirut was lacking in cordiality. My reception was most friendly and in all my interviews the sentiments expressed were most cordial. General Gouraud made a markedly friendly little speech when I dined with him on New Years Eve and again at his official reception the next day, but I wished to make it clear that any suggestion we may make,

<sup>s</sup> The *mettalik* was a Turkish nickel coin (cf. below) then in surplus circulation in Syria owing to its demonetization by the British authorities in Mesopotamia.

with the best of intentions, will be scrutinized scrupulously for an *arrière-pensée*.

WATERS TAYLOR  
Colonel G.S.O.E.T.

MOUNT CARMEL, 5.1.20.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 415

*General Gouraud to Colonel Waters-Taylor*

Le Général Gouraud,  
Haut Commissaire de la République  
En Syrie, Cilicie  
Commt. en Chef de l'Armée du Levant.

BEYROUTH, le 3 janvier 1920

Mon cher Colonel,

Je vous ai exposé dans les entretiens que j'ai eu le plaisir d'avoir avec vous l'inconvénient que pouvait présenter le rétablissement dans les circonstances actuelles, de l'Officier de liaison britannique à Damas; il me paraît à craindre en effet que les extrémistes à Damas sinon le Gouvernement Chérifien ne voient en lui un point d'appui dans la lutte contre les intérêts français.

Mais d'autre part, je comprends parfaitement l'intérêt que le Commandement Britannique peut avoir à rétablir un agent de liaison à Damas pour les questions que peut soulever avec Damas l'occupation militaire de la Palestine et l'influence britannique dans la Zone B.

En conséquence si vous estimez un intérêt véritable au rétablissement de l'Officier de Liaison Britannique à Damas j'accepte cette mesure malgré l'inconvénient personnel que je puis y voir et certain que les instructions qui se-sont [sic] données à votre Officier de liaison atténueront cet inconvénient dans toute la mesure du possible.

Bien vôtre  
GOURAUD

No. 416

*Mr. Vansittart<sup>1</sup> (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 19)*

No. 5 [171637/2117/44A]

PARIS, January 17, 1920

Mr. Vansittart presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to transmit copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Name and Date.

Subject.

Communicated by General Haddad      Agreement between the French Pasha, Jan. 16.      Govt. & Emir Feisal.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Vansittart was temporarily head of the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation after the departure from Paris of Sir Eyre Crowe.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 416

Document 1

*Agreement between the French Government and the Emir Feisal (at present secret), communicated secretly to Colonel Gribbon by General Haddad Pasha, January 16, 1920.*

Le Gouvernement de la République française se référant d'une part à la déclaration franco-anglaise du 9 novembre 1918, d'autre part aux principes généreux [? généraux] de libération des peuples et de collaboration amicale proclamés par la Conférence de la Paix, confirme sa reconnaissance du droit des populations de langue arabe, fixées sur le territoire syrien, de toutes confessions à se réunir pour se gouverner elles-mêmes à titre de nation indépendante.

S[on] A[ltesse] R[oyale] reconnaît que les populations syriennes ont un grand intérêt en raison de la désorganisation résultant de l'oppression turque et des dommages subis pendant la guerre, à demander les conseils et l'aide d'une grande puissance pour réaliser leur unité et organiser le fonctionnement de la nation, conseil et aide qui seront enregistrés par la Société des Nations, lorsque celle-ci sera pratiquement réalisée.

Au nom des populations syriennes, c'est à la France qu'il fait appel pour cette mission.

— 1 —

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à prêter son concours à la Syrie et à garantir son indépendance contre toutes agressions dans les frontières qui lui seront reconnues par la Conférence de la Paix.

Dans la délimitation de ces frontières, le Gouvernement français s'efforcera d'obtenir toutes les rectifications équitables au point de vue ethnique, linguistique et géographique.

— 2 —

S.A.R. s'engage à demander au Gouvernement de la République française, et à ce Gouvernement seul, les conseillers, instructeurs et agents techniques nécessaires pour organiser les administrations civiles et militaires. Ces conseillers et ces techniciens seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement syrien. Leur investiture et leurs pouvoirs d'exécution seront fixés d'un commun accord entre les deux gouvernements par contrat indiquant la durée et les garanties de leur mission.

Le Gouvernement de la République et S.A.R. sont d'accord pour établir en Syrie un régime constitutionnel assurant les droits politiques des populations, confirmant les libertés antérieurement acquises, et conformes à leurs vœux qui comportent l'établissement d'un Gouvernement responsable devant le Parlement. Pour permettre la réorganisation financière qui est la base de toute l'administration du nouvel État, le Conseiller financier participera à la préparation du budget [*sic*] des dépenses et des recettes et recevra obligatoirement communication de tous les engagements de dépense des différents départements. Il contrôlera la partie de la Dette Publique Ottomane afférente à la Syrie et sera chargé des questions concernant l'application à la Syrie des clauses financières du traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

Le Conseiller des Travaux Publics aura sous sa juridiction les voies ferrées. Le statut spécial du chemin de fer du Hedjaz sera respecté: toutes dispositions altérant le libre fonctionnement économique des voies accédant à Damas au profit d'un tiers seront nulles et non avenues.

Dès la conclusion du présent accord, le Gouvernement français prêtera son concours pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie, de la police et de l'armée.

S.A.R. reconnaît au Gouvernement français le droit de priorité complète pour les entreprises et emprunts nécessaires au bien du pays sauf à l'encontre des Nationaux agissant pour eux-mêmes et ne servant pas de prête-nom au capital étranger.

### — III [sic] —

L'État syrien sera représenté à l'extérieur et le Gouvernement français lui prêtera ses bons offices pour son entrée dans la Société des Nations.

S.A.R. entretiendra à Paris auprès du Gouvernement français un délégué diplomatique. Il confiera aux représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la France à l'étranger la représentation des intérêts extérieurs de la Syrie.

### — IV —

S.A.R. reconnaît l'indépendance et l'intégrité du Liban sous la [le] mandat de la France.

Les limites seront fixées par la Conférence de la Paix, en tenant [tenant] compte des droits, des intérêts et des vœux des populations.

### — V —

La langue arabe sera reconnue comme langue officielle, administrative et scolaire. La langue française sera enseignée de façon obligatoire et privilégiée.

### — VI —

Damas sera la capitale et la résidence du Chef de l'État. Le Haut-Commissaire représentant la France aura sa résidence ordinaire à Alep, se maintenant ainsi à proximité de la Cilicie, zone frontière, où les troupes de protection seront normalement concentrées; leur appel à l'intérieur de la Syrie se faisant sur la demande du Chef de l'État syrien d'accord avec la [le] Haut-Commissaire français.

### Document 2

[*French Government to the Emir Feisal*]

PARIS, le 6 janvier 1920

Altesse,

Je tiens à préciser dans la présente lettre l'interprétation que nous donnons en commun à quelques-uns des articles du projet de l'accord provisoire que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous soumettre, afin d'être signé.

En ce qui concerne le Liban, il est prévu que l'on fixerait ses limites en prenant en considération à la fois ses droits historiques, ses intérêts économiques et le libre vœu des populations. Je tiens à vous confirmer qu'à cet

égard le Gouvernement de la République veillera à ce que la consultation, d'accord avec vous, se fasse en toute impartialité.

Il nous a paru aussi que l'octroi d'une autonomie municipale pourrait être accordé à Beyrouth et à Alexandrette, dont les conditions économiques doivent faire l'objet d'une étude attentive, puisqu'elles sont les ports naturels de Damas et de Mossoul et sont appelées ainsi à jouer un rôle très important dans la prospérité de la Syrie.

Je suis heureux de constater la possibilité de l'accord de la Syrie et de la France et de vous souhaiter un excellent voyage et un prompt retour en vous présentant mes vœux déférants et mes sentiments de haute estime.

#### No. 417

*Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 17)*

*No. 3 Telegraphic [171538/2117/44A]*

PARIS, January 17, 1920

Following from Vansittart for Kidston: Not for Sections.<sup>1</sup>

Our despatch No. 5<sup>2</sup> of January 17.

General Haddad states definitely that agreement enclosed therein is French draft and has not been signed by Feisal, who took draft back with him to Syria.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 171, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> No. 416.

#### No. 418

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received January 22)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [172653/102161/44A]*

CAIRO, January 18, 1920

Presume you have seen Troopers<sup>1</sup> Telegram from London No. 83265 M.O.2.<sup>2</sup> of January 15 of which a copy has been distributed to me amongst other telegrams, stating that three employés of Asiatic Petroleum Company<sup>3</sup> from Persia are to be sent to General Headquarters, Baghdad, in connection with a certain survey. I merely draw your attention to fact in view of your conversation with<sup>4</sup> United States Ambassador on November 21st.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. War Office.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram to Field-Marshal Allenby stated, in particular:

'It is proposed to despatch from United Kingdom 3 A.P. Oil Company experts to G.H.Q. and to send 3 from Company Employees in Persia to G.H.Q. Baghdad. These will accompany survey. They will not wear uniform. For survey of pipe line no aeroplanes will be provided. General Officers Commanding concerned will arrange with A.O.C. R.A.F. to provide such aeroplanes as may be necessary either for protection purposes or for furthering the survey of the railway, as part of the escort. Should permanent air route eventually follow that selected for the railway the survey will obtain general information which will be useful to the R.A.F.'

'Presume you concur in Anglo-Persian Oil Company personnel being sent forthwith and that you anticipate no difficulty in sending our survey party at once.'

<sup>3</sup> In error for Anglo-Persian Company.

<sup>4</sup> It was suggested on the original that this phrase should have read 'note to': see No. 370.

No. 419

Sir H. Rumbold<sup>1</sup> (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received January 30)  
No. 52 [174753/147999/444]

WARSAW, January 24, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in original, a communication from the Central Committee of the Zionist Organisation in Poland expressing, on the second anniversary of its promulgation, the gratitude of that body for the declaration made by His Majesty's Government in regard to the reestablishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine together with the hope that the project in question may shortly be carried into effect.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 419<sup>2</sup>

To His Excellency,  
His British Majesty's Ambassador [*sic*]  
in Warsaw.

Central Committee  
of the  
Zionist Organisation in Poland

To [*sic*] the second anniversary of the promulgation of His British Majesty's Government's Declaration concerning the reestablishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, we have the honour to address to you, Excellency, the expressions of our gratitude to the Great British Nation and its Government, as was resolved by the Central Committee of the Zionist Organisation in Poland at its solemn session on November 2.

As the foreteller of salvation and consolation, as the champion of deliverance and liberation was this declaration to us at the time of extreme distress and merciless persecution hoisted [*sic*] against our nation. Great and numerous were the sufferings we shared since that Great Day, terrible and cruel the misfortunes we experienced. Almost in all of the countries of Eastern Europe our nation dwelt in an atmosphere of bloodshed and tears. And only one hope supports our soul and saves us from despair, and that is the unique hope that the day will arrive when all promises given will be realised and permission will be granted to us to return to our Homeland and rebuild it for a new and bright life.

During the last two years, the Nation of Israel, wretchedly suppressed and tormented with no equal in the world, has been expecting the Great Day, when the gates of Palestine would open to him and thus would be commenced the return of a nation to its motherland after two thousand years of wandering life, and the gigantic enterprise towards the rebuilding of its ruins in that land would thereby be started.

That Day has not come yet, but in the latter days some signs were displayed indicating the approach of that Day. Such a sign we see first of all

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> This document is printed as a specimen of a number of similar communications from Zionist authorities received at this period in the Foreign Office.

in the order given by the 'Great British Government to the administrative authorities in Palestine to recognize and regard the promise made in the Declaration as a 'chose jugée'<sup>3</sup> even now, before peace with Turkey is signed. We strongly hope that this sign will be followed by new ones, and preparations will commence for the rebuilding of our Homeland and the return of its expelled sons, who during the whole period of the Diaspora have not for a moment forgotten her. And when the day will come when Peace with Turkey is signed, and the full deliverance of Palestine will be duly announced to the whole world, the wandering nation of Israel will begin the return to the land of his fathers, to Eretz Israel.

For the Great Day that will have no similar in all the history of our Diaspora, we, Jews, are waiting all over the world, in every country of our dispersion, and are preparing ourselves with the strong and full confidence in the invincible will expressed by the Great British Nation to reconstitute the liberty of the Jewish Nation.

May it please your High Excellency to transmit the expression of our gratitude and hope to His High Government.

*Chairman: D. M. KUML.*

*Members of the Central Committee: A. PODLISZEWSKI, I. GRÜNBAUM, W. H. GOTTLIEB, L. SHALKONIK, [three signatures illegible].*

*WARSAW, 2nd November, 1919.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 236.

#### No. 420

*Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup> to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo)*

*No. 69 Telegraphic [172653/102161/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 26, 1920

Your private and secret tel. of Jan. 18.<sup>2</sup>

W[ar] O[ffice] took this action with our concurrence. Lord Curzon informed American Ambassador that he would not allow investigations and surveys by private individuals and firms with a view to obtaining concessions, but this is an investigation by the W[ar] O[ffice] on behalf It is<sup>3</sup> of H.M. Govt. whose intentions for the present are to take all necessary measures to utilise oil products discovered in occupied territory to their own advantage.

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon was at that time on holiday in Cannes.

<sup>2</sup> No. 418.

<sup>3</sup> In the filed copy the two preceding words were inadvertently not struck out from an earlier draft, and should not be in the text.

#### No. 421

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received January 27)*

*No. 531 Telegraphic [174005/2117/44]*

CAIRO, January 26, 1920

i. Colonel Waters Taylor met the Emir Feisal on arrival at Beyrout on January 14.

He reports Emir has apparently come to an agreement with French but before signing it wishes to obtain consent of his people to its clauses.

2. Agreement has not been seen but the following (? appear to be) principal points:

- A. United Syria including Palestine, under French assistance.
- B. An autonomous Lebanon.
- C. An autonomous Hauran.

Both B and C being included in Syrian Kingdom.

- D. Withdrawal of all French troops from Syria.

E. Acceptance of French political and expert advisers who would be considered as public servants of Syrian Kingdom and not as French officials.

Feisal stated this agreement was largely distasteful to him, and would be unpopular with his people but that attitude of British authorities gave him no choice and that he had been (? handed over) tied by feet and hands to French.

3. Waters Taylor informed Feisal that while fully recognising that his only chance of success was to represent to his people that a French mandate meant (? an) undivided Syria we still relied on his alliance and friendship to prevent any propaganda which might result in unrest in zone at present in British occupation. That we held to our present agreements both with French and Arab Governments until these were cancelled or modified by Peace Conference.

4. Feisal in reply said that although as political move he had to claim Palestine he had neither hope nor wish for success and considered French had no hope in that direction either, although Clemenceau had promised to do his best to help him.

Can you inform me how far you have confirmation of Franco-Arab agreement?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In reply, a copy of the enclosure in No. 416 was sent to Colonel Meinertzhangen on January 30, 1920.

## No. 422

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 3)*

*No. 277 [175723/2117/44A]*

*PARIS, February 2, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 67<sup>1</sup> of the 8th January (165674/M.E./44a), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the boundary between the spheres of temporary British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria.

I have, &c.  
DERBY

<sup>1</sup> No. 410.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 422

*Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

Par une note du 10 de ce mois,<sup>2</sup> l'Ambassade britannique a bien voulu rappeler au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères le point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en ce qui concerne les limites septentrionales qu'il juge nécessaires à la Palestine.

Elle a fait ressortir que M. Clemenceau s'est abstenu de répondre au paragraphe de l'aide-mémoire de Mr. Lloyd George du 13 septembre<sup>3</sup> demandant une extension des limites de la Palestine au delà de la ligne Sykes-Picot. Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères estime, en plein accord avec l'Ambassade britannique, que de ce fait on ne peut conclure ni que le Gouvernement a renoncé à son point de vue, ni que le Gouvernement français l'a accepté. Dans l'opinion de ce dernier, la question demeure régie par l'accord Sykes-Picot 1916 et la résolution du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre 1919.<sup>3</sup>

En décidant la relève des troupes britanniques par les troupes françaises 'en Syrie à l'ouest de la ligne Sykes-Picot,' le Conseil suprême n'a certainement pas entendu supposer l'existence de territoires qui, bien que situés à l'ouest de cette ligne, ne seraient pas 'en Syrie.' Cette interprétation par l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté d'un texte qui jusqu'à ce jour avait paru exempt de toute ambiguïté ne pourrait se soutenir que si une délimitation précise de la Syrie et de la Palestine avait été préalablement établie — ce qui manifestement n'est pas. Le Gouvernement français ne peut donc que s'en tenir, en ce qui concerne l'occupation militaire, à la décision du Conseil suprême et en réclamer l'application intégrale.

D'autre part, ainsi que l'indique, *in fine*, la note de l'Ambassade britannique, c'est de la Conférence de la Paix que la décision finale doit être attendue sur ce point comme sur toutes les questions orientales.

Le Gouvernement français tient cependant à préciser que, si sur certaines dispositions de l'accord Sykes-Picot il s'est montré disposé à admettre d'importantes modifications, il ne peut, par contre, consentir à un déplacement, dans la région visée, des limites établies par cet accord.

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES, PARIS,

*le 31 janvier, 1920.*

<sup>2</sup> Communicated to the French Government on instructions contained in No. 410.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 278 and Volume I, No. 57, appendix B.

No. 423

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received February 6)*

*No. 102 Telegraphic [176775/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 4, 1920

French High Commissioner called and informed me that he had received telegram from General Gouraud [*sic*] to the effect that latter viewed situation

in the area north of Aleppo arising from events at Marash<sup>1</sup> with grave concern. Situation was such that it could no longer be called armistice, and that there was in effect a (? state) of hostilities between his forces and the Turks. General Gouraud's information was that Turkish regular formations were moving from central Asia Minor and area north of (?) against his troops in Marash area. I informed High Commissioner that British in Constantinople had received no information to show that such movements were taking place. On the contrary, reports had been received to the effect that plans of Nationalist leaders were based on idea of concentrating all available forces on Smyrna front for general attack on Greeks should Smyrna be given to latter by the Allies.

French High Commissioner is making representations to Turkish Government on the subject of hostile movements of Turks against General Gouraud. I consider Cabinet has no control over Nationalists, and its position even in Constantinople is insecure pending crystallization of attitude of Chamber towards it. On 31st January Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation with me (?) put forward fresh complaints regarding French conduct similar to those reproduced in my telegram No. 75<sup>2</sup> of 25th January (? 'and' omitted) he gave me to understand Turkish Government took most serious view of whole situation in Cilicia. I have no means of getting (?) unbiassed account of what happened in Marash area.

If, as seems possible, these events are beginning of general military activity on the part of Nationalists, the contingency may arise of French either asking us effectively to control movements of Turkish armed forces in General Milne's sphere of Asia Minor<sup>3</sup> or to give free hand to General Franchet d'Esperey<sup>3</sup> to deal with them. Latter is believed to have twenty battalions at his disposal in European Turkey. I contemplate making representations to Turkish Government in support of my French colleague.

Repeated to Egypforce and Political, Bagdad, for General, Bagdad.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 424.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received January 26) reported that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had on January 24, 1920, referred in conversation to the 'dreadful state of things which he said prevailed in regions recently evacuated by us and now occupied by French, notably Marash and Urfa. He said Government were receiving streams of complaints mainly from local populations of brutal conduct of French. He spoke with special bitterness of Armenians who, he said, got hold of French uniform without right to wear it. He cited alleged proclamation of French Superior Officer in one place containing warning that anyone found with arms in his possession would be instantly shot and that for one French soldier killed two would be taken indiscriminately and shot and other similar threats.'

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Chap. III.

No. 424

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received February 12)*

*No. 119 Telegraphic [E 32/3/44]<sup>1</sup>*

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 10, 1920

Mr. Harold Buxton,<sup>2</sup> who left Adana 4th February, gives following account of situation.

At that date Marash was still isolated, said to be burning and great part destroyed. Zeitoun and Aintab sanjak were in revolt against French occupation, and Nationalist bands, possibly with Arabs co-operating, were active throughout districts of Marash, Bagche and Biejjik.

After fighting at Marash had begun, inhabitants of some seven Armenian villages in the vicinity were massacred. Chief Administrator of Cilicia puts down number of (?) survivors<sup>3</sup> at 1,500.

(? French) at Adana say Nationalist plan is to advance south in three columns through Marash, Sis and a point further west, with the object of cutting railway at Bagche and Bozanti. Colonel Brémond considers that he has situation in hand.

Two American relief workers, Messrs. Perry and Johnstone, have been murdered between Killis and Aintab.

Buxton says that French Governor of Marash district, Captain André, had made a mess of things and mishandled situation until trouble, which had been brewing for a few months past, came to a head.

On 31st January Armenians in Adana, who were much dissatisfied with French management of things, held mass meeting, as result of which leaders of community put following demands to Chief Administrator:—

1. Formation of an exclusively Armenian militia.
2. Gendarmerie to be cleared of all Moslem suspects, and majority of force to be Christian.
3. Distribution of arms for self-protection to Christian inhabitants.
4. Dismissal of Governor of Marash, André, who is accused of following pro-Turkish policy.

These demands were telegraphed to General Gouraud, whose reply is believed to have been satisfactory to Armenians.

Repeated to Egyptforce Cairo 9, political for General, Bagdad.

<sup>1</sup> For the new file-notation cf. Preface to Volume III.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the American Relief Mission in the Near and Middle East.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that this should read 'victims'.

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 11)*

*No. 385 [177874/2117/44A]*

PARIS, February 10, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that after the meeting of the Ambassadorial Council<sup>1</sup> this morning, which I attended in the absence of His Majesty's Ambassador, the American Ambassador spoke to me on the subject of Palestine.

It appears that Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Chairman of the Zionist Association in America, has been in communication with President Wilson on the subject of the future boundaries of Palestine, with the result that the State Department has telegraphed to Mr. Wallace directing him to mention the matter to the French President of the Council and to the British Ambassador for the information of His Majesty's Government. The message was that President Wilson considers that Palestine should have rational boundaries in the North and East, (the Litany river, the watershed of the Hermon and the Haulon and Yaulon [*sic*] Valleys), and that it was to be hoped that the French and British Governments were not carrying out the Sykes-Picot Agreement to the detriment of Mr. Balfour's Declaration as to the Palestine of the future.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>1</sup> The Allied Council of Ambassadors for the supervision of the execution of the treaties of peace had commenced its sessions in Paris on January 26, 1920.

## CHAPTER III

# Conversations and correspondence concerning Turkish affairs before the First Conference of London

June 25, 1919—February 12, 1920

### INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the First World War His Majesty's Government had entered into four main undertakings concerning the subsequent attribution of Turkish territory in Asia Minor. These secret undertakings were: first, the so-called Constantinople Agreement of March–April 1915 between Great Britain, France, and Russia; secondly, the Treaty of London of March 26, 1915 between Great Britain, France, and Italy, printed in Cmd. 671 of 1920; thirdly, the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 between Great Britain, France, and Russia, printed in the Introductory Note to Chapter II above; fourthly, the Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne of 1917 between Great Britain, France, and Italy.

For the circumstances of the Constantinople Agreement and for translations of Russian documents relating thereto, see H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, volume vi, pp. 4–9. The correspondence embodying this agreement read as follows:

- (i) *Russian circular telegram of March 4, 1915, concerning Constantinople and the Straits<sup>1</sup>*

'Le cours des derniers événements amène Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas à penser que la question de Constantinople et des Détroits doit être résolue définitivement, selon les aspirations séculaires de la Russie.'

'Toute solution serait insuffisante et précaire si la ville de Constantinople, la rive occidentale du Bosphore, de la mer de Marmara et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la Thrace méridionale jusqu'à la ligne Énos–Midia, n'étaient désormais incorporées à l'Empire russe.'

'De même, et par nécessité stratégique, la partie du littoral asiatique comprise entre le Bosphore, la rivière Sakharia et un point à fixer sur le golfe d'Ismid, les îles de la mer de Marmara, les îles d'Imbros et de Ténédos devront être incorporées à l'Empire.'

'Les intérêts spéciaux de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne dans la région ci-dessus désignée seront scrupuleusement respectés.'

<sup>1</sup> The heading and text of this document are as in the Confidential Print of the Foreign Office. The document was handed, as an *aide-mémoire*, by M. Sazonov to Sir G. Buchanan, then H.M. Ambassador at Petrograd, on March 4, 1915. On that day Sir G. Buchanan telegraphed an English translation of the *aide-mémoire* to the Foreign Office (received March 5). On March 6, 1915, the Russian Ambassador in London communicated to Sir E. Grey the French text in an *aide-mémoire* of that date.

'Le Gouvernement Impérial se plaît à espérer que les considérations ci-dessus seront accueillies avec sympathie par les deux Gouvernements alliés. Lesdits Gouvernements alliés sont assurés de rencontrer auprès du Gouvernement Impérial la même sympathie pour la réalisation des desseins qu'ils peuvent former en d'autres régions de l'Empire ottoman comme ailleurs.

'PÉTROGRADE, le 19 février/4 mars, 1915.'

(ii) *British aide-mémoire communicated to the Russian Government.*

'Subject to the war being carried on and brought to a successful conclusion, and to the desiderata of Great Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realised, as indicated in the Russian communication herein referred to, His Majesty's Government will agree to the Russian Government's *aide-mémoire* relative to Constantinople and the Straits, the text of which was communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador by his Excellency M. Sazonof on February 19th/March 4th instant.

'PETROGRAD, February 27/March 12, 1915.'

(iii) *British memorandum communicated to the Russian Government*

'His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to make the following observations with reference to the *aide-mémoire* which this Embassy had the honour of addressing to the Imperial Government on February 27/March 12, 1915.

'The claim made by the Imperial Government in their *aide-mémoire* of February 19/March 4, 1915, considerably exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by M. Sazonof as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time to take into consideration what their own desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace, Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes shall be satisfied with regard to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that M. Sazonof will realise that it is not in the power of His Majesty's Government to give a greater proof of friendship than that which is afforded by the terms of the above-mentioned *aide-mémoire*. That document involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government, and is in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiments at one time universally held in England and which have still by no means died out. Sir Edward Grey therefore trusts that the Imperial Government will recognise that the recent general assurances given to M. Sazonof have been most loyally and amply fulfilled. In presenting the *aide-mémoire* now, His Majesty's Government believe and hope that a lasting friendship between Russia and Great Britain will be assured as soon as the proposed settlement is realised.

'From the British *aide-mémoire* it follows that the desiderata of His Majesty's Government, however important they may be to British interests in other parts of the world, will contain no condition which could impair Russia's control over the territories described in the Russian *aide-mémoire* of February 19/March 4, 1915.

'In view of the fact that Constantinople will always remain a trade entrepôt

for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government will ask that Russia shall, when she comes into possession of it, arrange for a free port for goods in transit to and from non-Russian territory. His Majesty's Government will also ask that there shall be commercial freedom for merchant-ships passing through the Straits, as M. Sazonof has already promised.

'Except in so far as the naval and military operations on which His Majesty's Government are now engaged in the Dardanelles may contribute to the common cause of the Allies, it is now clear that these operations, however successful, cannot be of any advantage to His Majesty's Government in the final terms of peace. Russia alone will, if the war is successful, gather the direct fruits of these operations. Russia should therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, not now put difficulties in the way of any Power which may, on reasonable terms, offer to co-operate with the Allies. The only Power likely to participate in the operations in the Straits is Greece. Admiral Carden has asked the Admiralty to send him more destroyers, but they have none to spare. The assistance of a Greek flotilla, if it could have been secured, would thus have been of inestimable value to His Majesty's Government.

'To induce the neutral Balkan States to join the Allies was one of the main objects which His Majesty's Government had in view when they undertook the operations in the Dardanelles. His Majesty's Government hope that Russia will spare no pains to calm the apprehensions of Bulgaria and Roumania as to Russia's possession of the Straits and Constantinople being to their disadvantage. His Majesty's Government also hope that Russia will do everything in her power to render the co-operation of these two States an attractive prospect to them.

'Sir E. Grey points out that it will obviously be necessary to take into consideration the whole question of the future interests of France and Great Britain in what is now Asiatic Turkey; and, in formulating the desiderata of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Ottoman Empire, he must consult the French as well as the Russian Government. As soon, however, as it becomes known that Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir E. Grey will wish to state that throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.

'Sir E. Grey is as yet unable to make any definite proposal on any point of the British desiderata; but one of the points of the latter will be the revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 so as to recognise the present neutral sphere as a British sphere.

'Until the Allies are in a position to give to the Balkan States, and especially to Bulgaria and Roumania, some satisfactory assurance as to their prospects and general position with regard to the territories contiguous to their frontiers to the possession of which they are known to aspire; and until a more advanced stage of the agreement as to the French and British desiderata in the

final peace terms is reached, Sir E. Grey points out that it is most desirable that the understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French, and British Governments should remain secret.

'PETROGRAD, February 27/March 12, 1915.'

(iv) *Note verbale communicated by M. Paléologue to M. Sazonov on April 12, 1915.*

'Le Gouvernement de la République donnera son agrément à l'aide-mémoire russe remis par M. Isvolsky à M. Delcassé, le 6 mars dernier, et relatif à Constantinople et aux Détroits, à condition que la guerre sera poursuivie jusqu'à la victoire et que la France et la Grande-Bretagne réalisent leurs desseins en Orient comme ailleurs, ainsi qu'il est dit dans l'aide-mémoire russe.'

The Constantinople Agreement lapsed after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the withdrawal of Russia from the war.

The background to the other hitherto unpublished agreement, that of Saint Jean de Maurienne, is indicated in document No. 6, note 14, and in document No. 573, note 3. It would appear that the salient facts as regards this agreement are as follows: an Anglo-Franco-Italian conference was held at Saint Jean de Maurienne on April 19, 1917, the principal representatives being the prime ministers of the three powers (Mr. Lloyd George, M. Ribot, Signor Bozelli) and the Italian foreign minister, Baron Sonnino. At this meeting certain preliminary decisions were reached upon questions of common interest and the more particularly upon that of Italian claims in Asia Minor, as recorded in the official British document I.C. 19. This document is headed 'Anglo-French-Italian Conference, April 19, 1917. Decisions', and is dated at foot, 'Saint-Jean de Maurienne, le 19 avril 1917'. The document contains the French and English texts of the decisions, of which the relevant English text reads as follows:

*'Asia Minor.'*

'M. Ribot made objections regarding assignment of Mersina and Adana to Italy, but admitted facilities should be granted to commerce of the Interior in the direction of Mersina as in the case of Alexandretta and Haifa. The Italian zone will commence at a point to be determined west of Mersina.'

'Baron Sonnino asked for the inclusion in Italian zone of occupation of everything which so figures on Mr. Balfour's map [see No. 6, note 14]. He asked, besides, that the northern part of the vilayet of Smyrna be also included. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Ribot undertake to submit this claim to their Governments.'

'It was agreed that the interests of the other Powers already established in the different zones shall be scrupulously respected, but that the Powers concerned in these interests shall not make use of them as a means of political action.'

'An exchange of views took place as to the situation which might result for the Allied Powers at the moment of peace with respect to the Ottoman

Empire. After the discussion, Mr. Lloyd George made the following proposal, which was accepted:—

'It is agreed that if, at the time when peace is made, the total or partial possession of territories contemplated in the agreements concluded between France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, as regards attribution to them of a part of the Ottoman Empire, could not be granted entirely to one or several of the Powers in question, then the interests of those Powers would be taken afresh into equitable consideration.'

After recording other decisions with regard to Allied action in Greece, the document concluded: 'In a general way, the Ministers undertook to recommend the above decisions to their Governments.' (The immediately succeeding document, i.c. 20, contained notes of the discussions at Saint Jean de Maurienne resulting in the above decisions. This is the document which, with slight verbal variation, is quoted by Mr. Lloyd George in his account of this conference: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. ii, pp. 773 f.)

It would appear from Foreign Office archives that the above was the only formal measure of agreement reached actually at Saint Jean de Maurienne, although there is printed in *Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. xxiii, pp. 467-9 (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 1930) a document headed: '20 aprile 1917. San Giovanni di Moriana. Memorandum firmato dall' Italia, Francia e Gran Bretagna concernente la Siria.' (A. Giannini had previously published the same document under the same date: *I documenti diplomatici della pace orientale*, Rome, 1922, pp. 17-20.) The printed text of this document is, however, undated at foot and unsigned; it would seem likely that it was in fact a draft of agreement elaborated in connexion with the tripartite negotiations on the question which were conducted in London as a consequence of the conference of Saint Jean de Maurienne and which resulted in the final text of agreement of August 18, 1917. The correspondence embodying this agreement, usually referred to as the Agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne, read as follows:

(a) *Marquis Imperiali to Mr. Balfour*

[Translation]

'AMBASSADE D'ITALIE, LONDRES, le 18 août, 1917

'M. le Secrétaire d'État,

'Conformément aux ordres reçus, j'ai l'honneur de notifier à votre Excellence le consentement du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté aux dispositions suivantes, reproduisant le résultat des conversations tenues entre les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie à Saint-Jean de Maurienne et dans les conférences ultérieures relativement à l'Asie-Mineure. Ces dispositions doivent rester secrètes:

(Suit mémorandum [see (b) below].)

'En priant votre Excellence de me faire l'honneur d'une réponse énonçant formellement l'adhésion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique aux dispositions ci-dessus, je saisis, &c.  
IMPERIALI.'

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1917

'Your Excellency,

'In reply to your Excellency's note of the 18th instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government agree that the following provisions embody the results of conversations between the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Italy at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, and of subsequent conferences concerning Asia Minor. These provisions should remain secret:—

' "Sous réserve de l'assentiment russe:

' "Le Gouvernement italien donne son adhésion aux stipulations contenues dans les articles 1 et 2 des accords franco-britanniques en date des 9 et 16 mai, 1916. De leur côté, les Gouvernements de France et de Grande-Bretagne reconnaissent à l'Italie, dans les mêmes conditions d'administration et d'intérêts, les zones verte et (C) indiquées dans la carte ci-jointe.

' "2. L'Italie s'engage à faire de Smyrne un port franc en ce qui concerne le commerce de la France, de ses colonies et de ses protectorats, ainsi que le commerce de l'Empire britannique et ses dépendances. L'Italie jouira des droits et priviléges que la France et la Grande-Bretagne se sont réciproquement assurés dans les ports d'Alexandrette, de Caïffa et de Saint-Jean d'Acre, suivant l'article 5 des accords susdits. Mersina sera un port franc en ce qui concerne le commerce de l'Italie, de ses colonies et de ses protectorats, et il n'y aura ni différence de traitement, ni avantages dans les droits de port qui puissent être refusés à la marine ou aux marchandises italiennes. Il y aura libre transit par Mersina et par le chemin de fer à travers le vilayet d'Adana pour les marchandises italiennes destinées à la zone italienne ou en provenant. Il n'y aura aucune différence de traitement direct ou indirect aux dépens des marchandises italiennes sur quelque chemin de fer que ce soit, comme aux dépens des marchandises ou des navires italiens dans quelque port que ce soit le long de la côte de Cilicie, desservant la zone italienne.

' "3. La forme de l'administration internationale dans la zone jaune dont il est question dans l'article 3 de l'arrangement susdit des 9 et 16 mai, sera décidée d'accord avec l'Italie.

' "4. L'Italie, pour ce qui la concerne, donne son agrément aux dispositions relatives aux ports de Caïffa et d'Acre contenues dans l'article 4 des mêmes accords.

' "5. L'Italie adhère, en ce qui concerne la zone verte et la zone (C), aux deux paragraphes de l'article 8 des accords franco-anglais concernant le régime douanier qui sera maintenu dans les zones bleue et rouge, ainsi que dans les zones (A) et (B).

' "6. Il est entendu que les intérêts que chaque Puissance possède dans les zones revenant aux autres Puissances seront scrupuleusement respectés, mais que les Puissances que ces intérêts concernent ne s'en serviront pas comme moyen d'action politique.

' "7. Les dispositions contenues dans les articles 10, 11 et 12 des accords franco-anglais, concernant la péninsule arabique et la mer Rouge, seront

considérées comme appliquées également à l'Italie, comme si cette Puissance était nommée dans ces articles avec la France et la Grande-Bretagne, à titre de partie contractante.

“8. Il est entendu que si, à la conclusion de la paix, les avantages envisagés dans les accords stipulés entre les Puissances alliées quant à l'attribution à chacune d'elles d'une partie de l'Empire ottoman ne pouvaient pas être assurés entièrement à une ou à plusieurs desdites Puissances, alors dans toute altération ou arrangement des provinces de l'Empire ottoman comme conséquence de la guerre, le maintien de l'équilibre de la Méditerranée sera tenu en équitable considération en conformité de l'article 9 de l'accord de Londres du 26 avril, 1915.

“9. Il a été entendu que le présent mémorandum sera communiqué au Gouvernement russe, afin de lui permettre de faire connaître ses vues.”

‘I have, &c.

A. J. BALFOUR’

(c) *Mr. Balfour to M. de Fleuriau*

‘FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1917

‘Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, in reply to a note addressed to me on the 18th instant by the Italian Ambassador in London, I have officially notified his Excellency that His Majesty's Government agree that the following provisions embody the results of the conversations between the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Italy at St. Jean de Maurienne and of subsequent conferences concerning Asia Minor.

I have at the same time informed the Marquis Imperiali that these provisions should remain secret.

(Memorandum follows.)

‘I have, &c.

A. J. BALFOUR.’

(d) *Signor Raggi to M. Ribot*

‘AMBASSADE D'ITALIE, PARIS, le 21 août, 1917

‘M. le Ministre,

Conformément à ce qui a été convenu, j'ai l'honneur de communiquer ci-après à votre Excellence le texte du mémorandum reproduisant les résultats des conversations tenues entre les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie à Saint-Jean de Maurienne et dans les conférences ultérieures relativement à l'Asie Mineure:

(Suit mémorandum.)

Je serais très obligé à votre Excellence de me faire connaître si elle est d'accord avec le Baron Sonnino sur les termes du mémorandum, qui devra rester secret.

‘Veuillez, &c.

SALVAGO RAGGI’

(e) *M. Ribot to Signor Raggi*

'PARIS, le 22 août, 1917

'M. l'Ambassadeur,

'Par une lettre en date du 21 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer, avec une carte jointe, le texte du mémorandum ci-après reproduisant les résultats des conversations tenues entre les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie à Saint-Jean de Maurienne et dans les conférences ultérieures relativement à l'Asie Mineure:

(Suit mémorandum.)

'Pour répondre au désir exprimé par votre Excellence, je m'empresse de lui faire connaître que je suis d'accord avec son Excellence le Baron Sonnino sur les termes dudit mémorandum, qui devra rester secret.

'Veuillez, &c.

RIBOT'

(f) *M. Cambon to Mr. Balfour. (Received October 1)*

'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, le 26 septembre, 1917

'M. le Secrétaire d'État,

'Par une lettre en date du 18 août dernier, vous avez bien voulu communiquer au Chargé d'Affaires de France à Londres le texte du mémorandum relatif à l'Asie Mineure, échangé le même jour entre votre Excellence et l'Ambassadeur d'Italie à Londres.

'M. de Fleuriau n'avait pas manqué de faire parvenir ce document au Gouvernement français.

'M. Ribot m'a chargé de vous accuser réception de cette communication.

'Veuillez, &c.

PAUL CAMBON'

A reproduction of the map annexed to the memorandum of agreement, signed by Mr. Balfour and dated August 18, 1917, is printed by L. Aldrovandi Marescotti, *Guerra diplomatica* (Milan, 1936), illustrations at end. In this reproduction only the Italian zones are coloured; for other colouring see the map printed by D. Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. ii, p. 1024. (The brown zone on that map corresponds to the yellow zone referred to in the memorandum of agreement.)

At the Peace Conference of Paris Mr. Lloyd George impugned the continued validity of the Agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne on the grounds that it had been conditional upon Russian agreement and upon a considerable Italian military effort against Turkey (see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. v, pp. 484 and 720; also L. Aldrovandi Marescotti, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-2).

On October 30, 1918, the Allied Powers had concluded the Armistice of Mudros with Turkey, and the supervision of the execution of the Armistice was entrusted to British, French, and Italian High Commissions at Constantinople. On May 12, 1919, the Council of Four in Paris authorized the

landing at Smyrna of Greek forces and small Allied detachments (see Volume I, document No. 10, note 8). On May 30 the Council of Four agreed to grant a request from the Turkish Government to be permitted to send a delegation to the Peace Conference. The Turkish Delegation made a statement before the Supreme Council on June 17, 1919: cf. document No. 426, note 5.

### No. 426

*Notes of a meeting held at President Wilson's house in the Place des États-Unis, Paris, Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>*

C.F. 92 [Secret/General/162]

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

*France*: M. Clemenceau.

*British Empire*: Mr. Lloyd George.

*Italy*: M. Sonnino.

*Japan*: Baron Makino.

*SECRETARIES*: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and Mr. Portier.

*INTERPRETER*: Professor Mantoux.

... Turkey<sup>2</sup>

16. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that the question of Turkey might be considered. President Wilson would shortly be leaving. It was unreasonable to maintain a state of war with Turkey for the next two months. Would it not be possible, he asked, to agree on some Peace Terms which would put Turkey out of her misery, outlining the frontiers of Turkey, but leaving the final disposition of the territory that had not to remain Turkish until it was known whether the United States would accept a mandate?

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the final dispositions [*sic*] of Turkey ought not to be left for two months. His colleagues knew his mind on the subject, and could discuss the future arrangements of Turkey. He suggested that the portions which Turkey was to lose might be cut off and the Treaty might provide that she should accept the dispositions of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to them, just as had been done in the case of Austria.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that this involved the question of Constantinople.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the amputations would involve Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. The Allied troops would remain there to keep order until the final settlement between the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what would be done about Armenia. There were no Allied troops there. Turkey at present had some responsibility for the maintenance of order. If Armenia was cut off from Turkey, the Turkish

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 669 f.

<sup>2</sup> The preceding minutes related to other matters.

troops would be withdrawn, and the Armenians would be left at the mercy of the Kurds. It would involve putting in some garrisons.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what would be done about the Italians in Asia-Minor.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this would not concern the Turks. He thought some formula might be worked out.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the district in question either belonged to the Turks or it did not. If it did, the Turk would say: 'What are the Italians doing here?' and the Allies could only reply that the Italian occupation had been made without their knowledge or consent.

M. SONNINO demurred to this statement.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his proposal in regard to Turkey would be to cut off all that Turkey was to give up; and to oblige Turkey to accept any conditions with regard to over-sight or direction which the Allied and Associated Governments might agree to. His present view was that a mandate over Turkey would be a mistake, but he thought some Power ought to have a firm hand. Constantinople and the Straits should be left as a neutral strip for the present, and it was already in Allied occupation. He would make the Sultan and his Government move out of Constantinople, and he would say what was ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He was only arguing now as to what could be legally settled as a basis for a Treaty, and he was not attempting to decide an ultimate settlement. He only proposed an arrangement similar to what was being made in the case of Austria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this involved the question of whether the Turk was to go out of Constantinople.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that so far as his judgment was concerned, that was decided. He had studied the question of the Turks in Europe for a long time, and every year confirmed his opinion that they ought to be cleared out. . . .<sup>3</sup>

#### *. . . Note<sup>2</sup> to the Turkish Government*

21. With reference to C.F. 83, Minute 1,<sup>4</sup> the Council agreed that the final text of the Note to the Turkish Government, together with the document read by the Turkish Delegation to the Council of Ten,<sup>5</sup> should be published after it had been sent to the Turks. (Appendix IX.)

#### *Note from the Turkish Delegation*

22. The Council had before them the Note from the Turkish Delegation dated the 23rd June, which was read aloud to President Wilson. (Appendix X.)

(It was generally agreed that the document was not a very serious one.)

<sup>3</sup> The meeting passed to the consideration of other matters.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This minute is printed op. cit., vol. vi, p. 617.

<sup>5</sup> On June 17, 1919: cf. Introductory Note. The document in question is printed op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 509-11.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that before a reply was sent, a full discussion on the Turkish question should take place. It would be a great advantage if a short, sharp Peace with Turkey could be decided on while the Turkish Delegation were still in Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was not very hopeful of reaching a result.

(The proposal was agreed to). . . .<sup>3</sup>

#### APPENDIX IX TO NO. 426

W.C.P. 1044.  
(Revised 23.6.19.)  
(2nd Revise, 24.6.19.)

#### *Answer to the Turkish Delegates*

(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers  
on June 23, 1919.)<sup>6</sup>

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have read with the most careful attention the Memorandum presented to them by Your Excellency on the 17th June,<sup>7</sup> and, in accordance with the promise then made, desire now to offer the following observations upon it.

In your recital of the political intrigues which accompanied Turkey's entry into the war, and of the tragedies which followed it, Your Excellency makes no attempt to excuse or qualify the crimes of which the Turkish Government was then guilty. It is admitted directly, or by implication, that Turkey had no cause of quarrel with the Entente Powers; that she acted as the subservient tool of Germany; that the war, begun without excuse, and conducted without mercy, was accompanied by massacres whose calculated atrocity equals or exceeds anything in recorded history. But it is argued that these crimes were committed by a Turkish Government for whose misdeeds the Turkish people were not responsible; that there was in them no element of religious fanaticism; that Moslems suffered from them not less than Christians; that they were entirely out of harmony with the Turkish tradition, as historically exhibited in the treatment by Turkey of subject races; that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is necessary for the religious equilibrium of the world; so that policy, not less than justice, requires that its territories should be restored undiminished, as they existed when war broke out.

The Council can neither accept this conclusion, nor the arguments by which it is supported. They do not indeed doubt that the present Government of Turkey profoundly disapproves of the policy pursued by its predecessors. Even if considerations of morality did not weigh with it (as doubtless they do), considerations of expediency would be conclusive. As individuals its members have every motive, as well as every right, to repudiate the actions which have proved so disastrous to their country. But, speaking generally, a nation must be judged by the Government which rules it, which directs its foreign policy, which controls its armies; nor can Turkey claim any

<sup>6</sup> Cf. op. cit., vol. vi, p. 617.

<sup>7</sup> See note 5 above.

relief from the legitimate consequences of this doctrine merely because her affairs, at a most critical moment in her history, had fallen into the hands of men who, utterly devoid of principle or pity, could not even command success.

It seems, however, that the claim for complete territorial restoration put forward in the Memorandum is not based merely on the plea that Turkey should not be required to suffer for the sins of her Ministers. It has a deeper ground. It appeals to the history of Turkish rule in the past, and to the condition of affairs in the Moslem world.

Now the Council is anxious not to enter into unnecessary controversy, or to inflict needless pain on Your Excellency and the Delegates who accompany you. It wishes well to the Turkish people, and admires their excellent qualities. But it cannot admit that among those qualities are to be counted capacity to rule over alien races. The experiment has been tried too long and too often for there to be the least doubt as to its result. History tells us of many Turkish successes and many Turkish defeats—of nations conquered and nations freed. The Memorandum itself refers to the reductions that have taken place in the territories recently under Ottoman sovereignty. Yet in all these changes there is no case to be found, either in Europe or Asia or Africa, in which the establishment of Turkish rule in any country has not been followed by a diminution of material prosperity, and a fall in the level of culture; nor is there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been followed by a growth in material prosperity and a rise in the level of culture. Neither among the Christians of Europe, nor among the Moslems of Syria, Arabia and Africa, has the Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered; never has he shown himself able to develop in peace what he has won by war. Not in this direction do his talents lie.

The obvious conclusion from these facts would seem to be that, since Turkey has, without the least excuse or provocation, deliberately attacked the Entente Powers and been defeated, she has thrown upon the victors the heavy duty of determining the destiny of the various populations in her heterogeneous Empire. This duty the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to carry out, as far as may be in accordance with the wishes and permanent interests of the populations themselves. But the Council observe with regret that the Memorandum introduces in this connection a wholly different order of considerations based on supposed religious rivalries. The Turkish Empire is, it seems, to be preserved unchanged, not so much because this would be to the advantage either of the Moslems or of the Christians within its borders, but because its maintenance is demanded by the religious sentiment of men who never felt the Turkish yoke, or have forgotten how heavily it weighs on those who are compelled to bear it.

But surely there never was a sentiment less justified by facts. The whole course of the war exposes its hollowness. What religious issue is raised by a struggle in which Protestant Germany, Roman Catholic Austria, Orthodox Bulgaria and Moslem Turkey, banded themselves together to plunder their neighbours? The only flavour of deliberate fanaticism perceptible in these

transactions was the massacre of Christian Armenians by order of the Turkish Government. But Your Excellency has pointed out that, at the very same time and by the very same authority, unoffending Moslems were being slaughtered in circumstances sufficiently horrible, and in numbers sufficiently large, to mitigate, if not wholly to remove, any suspicion of religious partiality.

During the War, then, there was little evidence of sectarian animosity on the part of any of the Governments; and no evidence whatever so far as the Entente Powers were concerned. Nor has anything since occurred to modify this judgment. Every man's conscience has been respected; places of sacred memory have been carefully guarded; the States and peoples who were Mohammedan before the War are Mohammedan still. Nothing touching religion has been altered, except the security with which it may be practised; and this, wherever Allied control exists, has certainly been altered for the better.

If it be replied that the diminution in the territories of a historic Moslem State must injure the Moslem cause in all lands, we respectfully suggest that in our opinion this is an error. To thinking Moslems throughout the world, the modern history of the Government enthroned at Constantinople can be no source of pleasure or pride. For reasons we have already indicated, the Turk was there attempting a task for which he had little aptitude, and in which he has consequently had little success. Set him to work in happier circumstances; let his energies find their chief exercise in surroundings more congenial to his genius, under new conditions less complicated and difficult, with an evil tradition of corruption and intrigue severed, perhaps forgotten, why should he not add lustre to his country, and thus indirectly to his religion, by other qualities than that courage and discipline which he has always so conspicuously displayed?

Unless we are mistaken, Your Excellency should understand our hopes. In an impressive passage of your Memorandum, you declare it to be your country's mission to devote itself to 'an intensive economic and intellectual culture'. No change could be more startling or impressive; none could be more beneficial. If Your Excellency is able to initiate this great process of development in men of Turkish race, you will deserve, and will certainly receive, all the assistance we are able to give you.

#### APPENDIX X TO NO. 426

W.C.P. 1066.

Document I

*Memorandum concerning the New Organisation of the Ottoman Empire*  
(Translation.)

OTTOMAN DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

June 23, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith a memorandum concerning the new organisation of the Ottoman Empire. This is

the memorandum the despatch of which I announced at the meeting of the Supreme Council of Peace on the 17th June.<sup>7</sup>

The preparation of a document of this importance having necessitated lengthy labour, I beg Your Excellency to excuse me for the delay in forwarding it to you.

I have the honour, &c.

HAMAD [DAMAD] FERID

To His Excellency M. Clemenceau.

## Document 2

*June 23, 1919*

The Ottoman Delegation, in accordance with the desire expressed by Their Excellencies, the Allied Plenipotentiaries, at the interview which it had the honour to have with them on the 17th June, begs leave to set forth as follows the views of the Imperial Ottoman Government as regards the new organisation of the Empire:—

Although the Political and Economic situation of Turkey and her time-honoured relations of friendship with the Western Powers, made it incumbent on her to observe towards them an attitude of friendly neutrality, she was, owing to unfortunate circumstances and in spite of the manifest opposition of the national will, dragged into a fatal war.

It would be idle to dwell at length on the misdeeds committed during these last four years, which brought sufferings upon the Mussulman population quite as much as upon the Christians.

Turkey has a glorious history and a glorious past. She has given proof of power not only on the field of battle but also in manifestations of an intellectual order, and the mere organisation of an Empire which was one of the most vast in the world, proves, above all, a very pronounced political sense. The Ottoman Empire was never, in spite of affirmations of certain peoples interested in her downfall, a curse or a cyclone, such as were the Empires of Genghis and of Tamerlan. Its political organisation was at one moment able to assure a peaceful existence for some hundred millions of subjects established on different continents and of distinct races and religions. The Patriarchates, Communities and Sects had, in matters of faith, broad religious autonomy thanks to a wise and tolerant administration.

On the day that the Turks recognised the advantages of European civilisation, they did not hesitate to adopt a series of reforms; they were helped with much interest in this assimilation of modern civilisation, which worked so well, that in less than a quarter of a century Turkey was received into the European concert. The Turks, who still remember the brilliant position which they thereby attained, only desire to begin their forward march towards improvement with the help of the Great Powers of the West.

Having set forth what occurred in the past, the Ottoman Delegation comes to questions affecting the present and declares, in the first instance, that

although the question which concerns Turkey presents three different points, it is in regard to its solution indivisible.

These points are the following:—

- (a) Thrace in Europe.
- (b) The Turkish parts of Asia.
- (c) Arabia.

The Ottoman Delegation has therefore the honour to submit to the Peace Conference the following considerations:—

#### 1. *Thrace*

In order to ensure a durable peace in this part of Europe, it is desirable to lay down a frontier line which will prevent the town of Adrianople, on which depends the security of the capital, from being easily attacked. The districts situated to the north and west of the vilayet of Adrianople, including Western Thrace, where the Turks are in great majority, should, by virtue of President Wilson's principles, as well as for economic reasons, come within the limits of that vilayet. This problem was examined at length in 1878 at Berlin by the Delegates of Great Britain and Russia, who found no other solution than that of adopting a frontier line beginning at Zoitun-Burnu, to the Black Sea, running into the interior by way of Demir-Halny to Mustafa-Pasha, and from there to Kara-Balkan. From Keucheva the frontier should follow the river Kara-Su, which flows into the Ægean Sea, to the east of Kavalla, exactly opposite the island of Thasos.

#### 2. *Asia Minor*

In Asia the Turkish lands are bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on the east by the Turco-Russian and Turco-Persian frontiers as they were before the war, including on the south the vilayets of Mosul and Diabekir, as well as a part of the province of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean.

#### 3. *The islands near the coast*, which belong to Asia Minor from an historical and economic point of view, should remain under Ottoman sovereignty with a great measure of autonomy, in order that it may be possible to prevent smuggling and ensure the safety of the coast.

#### 4. *Armenia*

If the Armenian republic established at Erivan is recognised by the Powers of the Entente, the Ottoman Delegation will consent to discuss *ad referendum* the frontier line which is to separate the new republic from the Ottoman State. The Imperial Government would grant to the Armenians who wish to expatriate themselves in order to establish themselves in the new republic, all facilities in its power. As regards those who might wish to remain in Turkey and who are scattered in Thrace, the Caucasus and elsewhere, they would enjoy, like the other minorities, free cultural, moral and economic development.

## 5. *Arabia*

The Arab provinces lying to the south of the Turkish countries, and including Syria, Palestine, the Hedjaz, the Asyr, the Yemen, Irak, and all the other regions which were recognised as forming an integral part of the Ottoman Empire before the war, would have a large measure of administrative autonomy, under the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Representatives of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan would be appointed at the Holy Places (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem), and will have a guard of honour of limited numbers.

The hallowed custom of sending every year the sacred caravan (*surre*) to the Holy Places shall be maintained with its usual ceremonies and in its usual form, as the despatch of this caravan is one of the ancient prerogatives of the Khalifate.

The distribution of the revenues of the pious foundations (*vakfs*) shall continue without hindrance as in the past. These *vakfs* were founded partly by the Ottoman Sultan and partly by private individuals, and have always been administered by the Khalifate. This system shall be maintained in its entirety.

The Governor of each autonomous province shall be appointed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, except in the Hedjaz, to which may be granted a special organisation in agreement with the Power most directly interested in it. In all the Arab countries the Ottoman flag shall fly on the territory of the *emaret* (principality) or autonomous province. Justice shall be done in the name of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, and the coinage shall bear his name, Tughra.

## 6. *Egypt and Cyprus*

The Ottoman Government is quite willing to enter into negotiations at the proper moment with the Government of His Britannic Majesty with a view to define clearly the political status of Egypt and of the island of Cyprus.

The Ottoman Government, having stated above its opinion as regards the new organisation of the Empire, reserves the right also of communicating subsequently to the Peace Conference its point of view regarding financial, economic and juridical questions.

It is understood that as soon as this organisation is settled, the Inter-Allied forces of occupation shall be withdrawn from Ottoman territory in a short time which shall be settled by agreement unless their provisional retention is necessary in some parts of Arabia.

Nobody in Turkey is unaware of the gravity of the moment. The ideas of the Ottoman people are, however, well defined.

It will not accept the dismemberment of the Empire or its division under different mandates. No government may oppose the will of the people, among whom are counted populations from beyond the Taurus and even Nomads of the Desert, who will not separate themselves from that Ottoman unity which has been established and hallowed for so many centuries.

From the manifestations of a great number of patriotic Committees formed in the provinces, and from the great meetings held at Constantinople (in which hundreds of thousands of citizens took part on every occasion) and from the language of the telegrams which the Government daily receives from all classes of the population, there emanates but one constant thought: unity and independence.

Trusting in the sentiments of justice of the Peace Conference the Ottoman people does not despair of reaching a solution in conformity with its legitimate aspirations and one fitted to ensure in the East that durable peace which is so greatly needed.

#### No. 427

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe<sup>1</sup> (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received June 26)*

*No. 1330 Telegraphic [94273/17115/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 25, 1919

Following for Anglo Persian Oil Company Limited from (? Stock). (Begins.)

Concessions have been issued to Standard Oil Company for Marmora, Syria and Dead Sea. Twelve American engineers arrived to start work on Marmora claims. (Ends.)

<sup>1</sup> British High Commissioner at Constantinople and Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

#### No. 428

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received June 27)*

*No. 1333 Telegraphic [104604/78941/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 26, 1919

D.O.T. Circular May 31.<sup>1</sup>

So far as is known no concessions have been granted by Turkish Government since Armistice either to Americans or British.

I have agreed with my French and Italian colleagues that no concessions granted since Armistice shall be recognised as valid.

Scramble for concessions has already commenced and we must be ready to support British enterprise (see my telegram No. 1332<sup>2</sup> to-day).

It is impossible to give even approximate figures of orders placed in United Kingdom and United States since Armistice.

American Relief Expeditions in Asia Minor are being used to advertise and push American trade and great preparations are being made by strong American financial and commercial groups to secure a hold on trade in Turkey but British groups are also active.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this circular the Department of Overseas Trade requested information as to concessions, contracts, &c., secured in Turkey since the armistice by American and British enterprises.

<sup>2</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

No. 429

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 909 Telegraphic [98259/70100/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 26, 1919

We are being asked in the House of Commons on July 1st (1) why it was necessary for Greek troops to land at Smyrna and to advance inland; (2) what is the Allied policy with regard to Smyrna.

Can you suggest a reply?

No. 430

*Notes of a meeting held at President Wilson's house in the Place des États-Unis, Paris, Friday, June 27, 1919, at 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>*

*C.F. 96 [Secret/General/162]*

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

*France*: M. Clemenceau.

*British Empire*: Mr. Lloyd George.

*Italy*: M. Sonnino.

*Japan*: Baron Makino.

*SECRETARIES*: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and Captain Portier.

*INTERPRETER*: Professor Mantoux.

. . . Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood that the upshot of recent conversations was that the Turkish question must be postponed until it was known whether the United States of America could accept a mandate.

(It was agreed—

- (1) That the further consideration of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should be suspended until such time as the Government of the United States of America could state whether they were able to accept a mandate for a portion of the territory of the former Turkish Empire.
- (2) That the Turkish Delegation should be thanked for the statements they have made to the Peace Conference,<sup>3</sup> and that a suggestion should be conveyed to them that they might now return to their own country.

The view was generally expressed that Mr. Balfour should be invited to draft the letter to the Turks.) . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 723 f.

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of these minutes related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 426.

No. 431

*Notes of a meeting held in the foyer of the Senate Chamber of the Chateau at Versailles shortly after the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany,  
Saturday, June 28, 1919, at 5 p.m.<sup>1</sup>*

C.F. 99 [Secret/General/162]

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

*France*: M. Clemenceau. M. Simon.

*British Empire*: Mr. Lloyd George.

*Italy*: M. Sonnino.

*Japan*: Baron Makino.

*SECRETARIES*: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and Captain Portier.

*INTERPRETER*: Professor Mantoux.

. . . *Reply to Turkish Delegation.*<sup>2</sup>

4. With reference to C.F. 97, Minute 6,<sup>3</sup> the attached redraft by Mr. Balfour of a letter to the Turkish Delegation was approved. (Appendix II.)

(The letter was handed to Captain Portier to prepare a French copy for M. Clemenceau's signature.) . . .<sup>2</sup>

APPENDIX II TO NO. 431

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to thank the Turkish Delegation for the statements<sup>4</sup> which they requested permission to lay before the Peace Conference.

These statements have received, and will continue to receive, the careful consideration which they deserve. But they touch on other interests besides those of Turkey and they raise international questions whose immediate decision is unfortunately impossible. Though, therefore, the Council are most anxious to proceed rapidly with the final settlement of Peace, and fully realise the inconvenience of prolonging the present period of uncertainty, an exhaustive survey of the situation has convinced them that some delay is inevitable.

They feel that in these circumstances nothing would be gained by the longer stay in Paris at the present time of the Turkish Delegation which the Turkish Government requested leave to send to France. Though, when the period arrives at which further interchange of ideas seems likely to be

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 751 f.

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of these minutes related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This brief minute from a meeting of the Supreme Council at 11 a.m. on June 28, 1919 (printed ibid., vol. vi, p. 741) recorded that 'the Council had before them a draft letter prepared by Mr. Balfour inviting the Turkish Delegation to return to Paris [sic]. Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the first paragraph of the letter should make it clearer that the Turkish Delegation had come here on their own initiative and had not been invited by the Powers. (Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to ask Mr. Balfour to modify the letter accordingly.)'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 426.

profitable, they will not fail to communicate with the Turkish Government as to the best method by which this result may be conveniently and rapidly accomplished.<sup>5</sup>

*June 28, 1919.*

<sup>5</sup> The Turkish Foreign Minister, Damad Ferid Pasha, replied to this note in a note dated at Paris, June 30, 1919, in which he stated, in particular:

'Je suis heureux de pouvoir, avant de quitter la France, remercier le Conseil des Puissances Alliées, tant en mon nom qu'en celui de la Délégation, des assurances qu'il a bien voulu me donner pour le rétablissement de la Paix.'

'Le Gouvernement Ottoman, conscient du sérieux inconvenient qu'il y a à prolonger l'incertitude actuelle, est ardemment désireux de retourner à l'état de paix définitif aussi promptement que possible afin d'assurer, sans plus de délai, l'ordre et la tranquillité à l'intérieur par une organisation sage et juste et de rétablir sur une base rationnelle les relations extérieures de l'Empire Ottoman.'

### No. 432

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 29)*

*No. 1105 Telegraphic [95405/70100/44]*

PARIS, *June 28, 1919*

Your telegram No. 909<sup>1</sup> (June 26?).

We suggest reply to prior part of question might be that there is nothing to add to answer given by Mr. Harmsworth to Colonel Herbert<sup>2</sup> and as to second part of question that no statement can usefully be made at a time when Turkish settlement is still under consideration of Council of Four.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 429.

<sup>2</sup> On May 26, 1919, Mr. Harmsworth had stated in reply to a question by Lt.-Col. Herbert, M.P.: 'The landing at Smyrna was carried out by the direct orders of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in accordance with the terms of article 7 of the conditions of the Armistice with Turkey.' (See *Parl. Debts. 5th Ser., H. of C.*, vol. 116, col. 813.)

<sup>3</sup> On July 3, 1919, Mr. Harmsworth replied as here suggested to a question by Lt.-Commander Kenworthy, M.P.: *v. op. cit.*, vol. 117, col. 1133.

### No. 433

*Letter from Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Sir R. Graham  
(Received July 15)*

*Unnumbered [103149/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 28, 1919*

My dear Graham,

I was on the point of writing when your letter of the 16th June<sup>1</sup> arrived.

The trouble over the Greek complaint of lack of co-operation has now died down.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Canelopoulos<sup>3</sup> made me a most ample apology, and I am more

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek authorities had earlier complained of alleged lack of co-operation from the British and French High Commissioners in Constantinople.

<sup>3</sup> Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople.

than grateful for the way in which you took the matter up at the Foreign Office.

What I was going to write about was the increase of friction out here between Greeks and Turks. It has now become most serious, and of course it all dates back to the time of the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops. This occupation has led, not unnaturally, to much bloodshed, and now it is leading to trouble everywhere in Turkey. Panderma, Broussa, Sivas, Samsoun; the story is always the same. The fact is that the Turks are getting extremely frightened, and therefore also extremely dangerous; they are concocting all sorts of wild plots, sending officers into the Interior, and generally stirring up trouble everywhere they can.

All this is really due to the indefiniteness of the situation, which gives everybody the hope that they will be altering the decision by creating a 'fait accompli', the Greeks by occupying places in the Interior, ostensibly on the plea of lack of public security, and the Turks by organizing defensive measures to impress upon Europe the strength of National feeling.

We have just been concocting a telegram to you on the subject<sup>4</sup> for Admiral Calthorpe's approval, to try and make it clear that [? the time for] local expedients is past. Up to the time of the Smyrna landing we were getting on quite well. The Turk was, of course, somewhat troublesome, but we were gradually getting the bad Valis, Mutessarifs, &c., removed, and I think we could have got along very well without any big trouble until the Peace. It was just a matter of sitting tight, and getting the Turkish Government to do what we wanted. But now things are quite changed. Greeks and Turks are killing one another wholesale in the Aidin Vilayet. Moustapha Kemal is busy round Samsoun, and so far refuses to come to heel. Raouf Bey and one or two others are getting very busy down Panderma way,<sup>5</sup> and there are symptoms which seem to point to the Ministry of War here at Constantinople being the organizing centre of the disturbances.

There is a point which very closely affects our prestige, and our often expressed desire for the avoidance of bloodshed. Both parties to the quarrel—both Greeks and Turks—are fully aware that when the Smyrna decision was arrived at, and communicated by us to the Turkish Government, we were throwing an apple of discord down between the two parties. The discord has taken place, and has led to much bloodshed. Both sides now look to the Entente as a whole, but to us in particular, to clear up the mess, to define the

<sup>4</sup> No. 434.

<sup>5</sup> In this connexion Admiral Calthorpe had reported in Constantinople telegram No. 1320 of June 23, 1919 (received June 24): 'Mustapha Kemal Pasha who made considerable reputation for himself during Gallipoli fighting was appointed about a month ago Military Inspector General in Samsoun by Grand Vizier doubtless in all good faith but since he arrived at Samsoun he appears to have made himself a centre for National and anti-foreign feeling. His recall has been demanded but this has so far had no effect though (? Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs) has assured me that orders have been sent him to return here and that these orders would be repeated. Another dangerous person is Raouf Bey (? late of) Ministry of Marine with whom I signed Armistice. He is agitating in vicinity of Panderma'. For the requested recall of General Mustafa Kemal Pasha see further No. 460.

situation, and to have it confirmed, not by orders which may arrive from day to day, but by the printed text of the Treaty of Peace.

You will readily realise that our reiterated advice to both parties to live in amity and affection is considered somewhat hypocritical when we do our best to create a situation which sets them at each other's throats in the present, and lays up the seeds of hostility indefinitely in the future.

Quite apart from anything else, the economical effects resulting from this situation are disastrous to a country which has been brought to the verge of financial and economic ruin, and I venture to think that we are hopelessly prejudicing the future chances of recuperation for thousands of Christians, whose welfare we have so much at heart, and concerning which we have made so many protestations.

I cannot press this point too strongly, for it may quite possibly result in this country having to be fed from the outside next winter, instead of feeding others, as it might have done, to the benefit of its exhausted exchequer.

All these considerations can only lead up to one conclusion, and that is the essential need for giving Turkey *a very early peace*. I hope and believe that the peace terms will be severe and drastic, but let us have them quickly. Every day makes the situation more difficult and dangerous, and every day adds to the degree of hate, now extremely intense, which exists in this country between Moslems and Christians.

Since writing the above Admiral Calthorpe has approved our tel. (No. 1356)<sup>4</sup> and I have also had an agitated visit from M. Canelloopoulos on much the same subject which is embodied in our telegram No. 1353.<sup>6</sup> These complaints by Greeks and Turks are getting beyond anything, and I think the plan of English Officers attached to G.H.Q. might prove a good one. I gather that General Milne in his telegram to W.O. recommends a Liaison Officer, and I can't really see any objection.

Meanwhile it is worth remembering that if Commodore Fitzmaurice<sup>7</sup> has to leave Smyrna and is replaced by, say, a French or Italian S[enior] N[aval] O[fficer] there may be further complications; but it is no use looking for trouble!

I suppose that the future arrangements at this High Commission when Admiral Calthorpe ceases to be Naval Commander-in-Chief (early in August) will soon be under consideration if they are not already.

The matter is naturally one of considerable personal interest to myself and my personal staff, as in the event of his remaining as High Commissioner only it becomes a question whether our retention here is necessary. But I am, of course, quite ready to do anything that is required of me.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This telegram of June 28, 1919 (received July 1), reported that M. Canelloopoulos had complained that Turkish sources were circulating garbled versions of the number of Turks killed by Greek troops in connexion with the occupation of Smyrna. The Greek High Commissioner therefore asked 'that English officers should be attached to Headquarters of Greek Army if [of] occupation in Asia Minor in order that by their impartial evidence it may be possible to establish truth and to prevent formation of calumnious accusations'.

<sup>7</sup> Senior Allied Naval Officer at Smyrna.

Very hot here now, and we feel the loss of the Therapia Embassy badly.<sup>8</sup>  
But it would in any case have been impossible to migrate out to there 'en bloc', as the office (or Chancery) is far too big to admit of being moved.

I apologize for this long screed.

Yrs sincerely,  
RICHARD WEBB

<sup>8</sup> The former summer residence of H.M. Ambassador in Turkey had been damaged.

No. 434

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received June 30)*

*No. 1356 Telegraphic [95673/95673/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 29, 1919

Your despatch No. 203<sup>1</sup> May 8 has already been answered by mail but I feel considerable anxiety at the increasing number of similar complaints which are being handed to me by Greek High Commissioner on one hand, and by Turkish Government on the other. You are aware that I have made every effort in my power to verify the truth of allegations made by either side and on the whole the result of these investigations has borne [? been] to show the inaccuracy of charges which have been presented. This fact is ominous as it goes to show the extreme tension of men's minds, and indications are not lacking that this feeling is on verge of finding expression in acts.

I exclude from above all events in Aidin Vilayet where to judge by all reports that have reached me the atrocities which have been and are being committed by either side appear approximately equal. I consider the temper of Turks is the more dangerous of the two at present time because I find they are mainly under influence of fear. This is true not only of Aidin and the adjacent country, but also of Thrace and Constantinople as well as the Black Sea coast.

I am satisfied that the matters have now gone too far for successful application of any (? sophistical) remedy,<sup>2</sup> and the tension between Turks and Greeks has become so grave that only measure now left which might yet (check) the bloodshed and avert threatening dangers is very early declaration of terms upon which Peace will be (secured) to Turkey.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This formal covering despatch transmitted a copy of a note of April 12, 1919, addressed to M. Clemenceau by M. Venizelos; in this note M. Venizelos protested against alleged Turkish atrocities against the Greek population in the Vilayet of Aidin, and against the alleged attitude of suspicion adopted by local Allied authorities towards Greek organizations at Smyrna.

<sup>2</sup> It is possible that this passage should read '... of any local remedy': cf. Nos. 433 and 471.

No. 435

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)*

No. 47 Telegraphic [385/1/15/13666]

PARIS, June 29, 1919

M. Venezelos has informed President of the Peace Conference on June 23 that Turks are advancing against Greek zone from the north, east and south-east. In view of danger to Greek troops and to population he has therefore instructed the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna to inform you that on his own responsibility and without waiting for the authorization of the Council of Four he has thought it his duty to order Greek troops to advance and take the necessary action to stop the enemy advance and prevent the concentration of Turkish troops.

Please enquire and telegraph your views and those of local authorities as to how far Turkish concentration is serious and justifies M. Venezelos' orders. If you consider some further advance by Greek troops should be authorized, please telegraph what limits of such advance should be or whether for the present complete liberty of action should be allowed.

Repeat[ed] Foreign Office No. 1106.

No. 436

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Mr. Balfour (Paris).*

*Received July 2)*

No. 99 Telegraphic [357/1/3/14223]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 1, 1919

Your telegram of June 29.<sup>1</sup>

I again urgently call your attention to my telegram 85 to Paris and No. 1326 to F.O. of June 24.<sup>2</sup> Although I am not altogether satisfied as to accuracy of information given to President of Peace Conference by M. Venezelos I feel very little doubt about root of<sup>3</sup> cause of situation to which he calls attention. This cause is indefiniteness which has characterized whole situation in Aidin Vilayet during and subsequent to occupation of Smyrna. The Turks as you are aware accepted fact of occupation with ill grace enough, but all my information tends to show they were prepared to sit down under a *fait accompli* on condition that occupation was well defined in limits and conducted with some measure of decency. Information so far received appears to show that neither of these conditions have been fulfilled. As far as any official information in the hands of Turkish Local Authorities<sup>4</sup> goes

<sup>1</sup> No. 435.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram emphasized the deterioration of order in Asia Minor in consequence of the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and urged that fixed limits to this occupation should be communicated to the Turkish Government jointly by the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople.

<sup>3</sup> This word was probably inserted in error.

<sup>4</sup> The text as received in the Foreign Office here read '... Turkish Government'.

territory at present occupied by Greeks is merely a prelude to further advance and events on the spot have fully borne out this conjecture. This constant menace of invasion which Turks ascribe not to decisions of Paris Conference but to exorbitant ambitions of Athens politicians coupled with contemplation of Greek behaviour in areas occupied by them has roused the Turks of all classes from attitude of passive surliness to one of active hostility. Without entering into details of fighting of last few days I do not consider it accurate to speak of 'Turkish heart and . . .'.<sup>5</sup> What is undoubtedly happening is that Turkish bandit bands and other die-hards in menaced areas outside Greek occupied zone, swelled in ranks by those flying from Greek occupied zone, are preparing guerilla operations against further advance of Greek troops. As no limit is seen to this advance so these preparations are gradually spreading throughout the country. As to danger to Greek population mentioned by M. Venezelos I would ask you to consider plight of Christian population in rest of Turkey surrounded by increasingly exasperated Moslems. Although this state of affairs unavoidably prolonged<sup>6</sup> beyond safety point I feel still fairly confident of restraining Turkish Government and through them, I hope, Turkish population, if definite boundary be set to Greek occupation and undertaking given that this shall not be passed without authority of British Senior Naval Officer, who on account of his impartiality alone can be trusted to decide when and where and why this boundary may be passed.

Repeated to F.O. No. 1375 and Athens No. 85.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain, but that received in the Foreign Office read ' . . . "Turkish advance and concentration".'

<sup>6</sup> The text as received in the Foreign Office here read ' . . . this state of affairs has already been prolonged'.

#### No. 437

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received July 5)*

*No. 1398 Telegraphic [98268/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 4, 1919

Following dated July 2nd has been received from Commodore Fitzmaurice at present Senior Allied Naval Officer at Smyrna. (Begins.)

Greek troops in occupation of town of Aidin numbering 2,400 have been heavily attacked by Turkish troops with heavy guns and by local inhabitants from south and east. Greeks have been driven out of the town and have retired to neighbourhood of Kara Punar with loss. This morning Wednesday I interviewed General Nider<sup>1</sup> and Monsieur Stergiadis<sup>2</sup> and find Greek troops are being reinforced by them with a view to advancing on Aidin and re-occupying it. I consider sole prospect peace in Aidin Vilayet is to withdraw Greek troops into Smyrna Sanjak. My opinion is being communicated to Monsieur Venizelos by Monsieur Stergiadis. I think so long as Turks will guarantee not to attack Greeks both he and General Nider would not be

<sup>1</sup> General commanding the Greek Army of Occupation in the district of Smyrna.

<sup>2</sup> Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna.

averse to this proposal. Stergiadis requests a British force may take over Aidin railway between Ayasusok [Ayasoluk] and that place but is exceedingly anxious that no allied forces should be landed. I entirely agree with this proposal and if it is approved I am confident that with 300 marines I personally could make necessary arrangements to keep the peace with Turks. (? Affairs) will drift into war between Turkey and Greece in which allies must presumably support latter, if some such steps are not taken. Cassaba and Magnesia are however important strategic military posts which guard approach to Smyrna town from north east and must for the present continue to be occupied by Greek troops. (Ends.)

I am consulting General Officer Commanding in Chief and comment follows.

Repeated to Peace Conference, 103.

#### No. 438

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)*

*No. 50 Telegraphic [362/1/2/13059]*

PARIS, July 4, 1919

Recognition of the Italian occupation of a zone in Western Asia Minor, when demanded by the Italian representative at the Council of Four, was specifically refused by the other representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers.<sup>1</sup>

There can be now no question of delimiting such a zone as it would be regarded as tantamount to a recognition of the Italian occupation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 426 (also Volume I, No. 10, note 8).

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was sent in reply to a request of June 18, 1919, from Admiral Calthorpe for an indication of the limits of Italian occupation in Asia Minor. A copy of the present telegram was sent by bag to the Foreign Office on July 5 (received July 7).

#### No. 439

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 956 [98689/52517/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 4, 1919

My Lord,

. . . I then resumed with the Ambassador<sup>1</sup> my conversations on two topics which had been the subject of recent discussion between us.

The first was the appointment by the Persian Government, under pressure from the French, of a large number of so-called professors at Tehran. The Ambassador had, I reminded him, told me that his pledges as to the political disinterestedness of France in Persia held good, and that they were not at all affected by the appointment at Tehran of a number of gentlemen skilled in

<sup>1</sup> The first part of this despatch recorded discussion of other matters in a conversation between Lord Curzon and the French Ambassador in London on the afternoon of July 4, 1919.

medicine, surgery, and mathematics. This I admitted might be true, and said that, if the appointment of these instructors was a continuation of a practice which had prevailed before the war, I was not inclined to protest. But, I asked, how could four French professors of law possibly be required in a country where no law, certainly no European law, existed, and where they could hardly be needed to explain the religious code of Islam? What were the legal professors, I asked, to do? The boundary line between law and politics was, I said, admittedly thin, and the French legal professors, in the absence of any serious employment, would, I feared, before long develop into amateur politicians.

But I said that I was disposed to argue the case with the Ambassador on rather wider grounds. Let me imagine a parallel case. Let me suppose the French in a position of political influence at Damascus, Constantinople, or some other place where the British had recognised their predominance and agreed to leave them an open field. Let us suppose that one day the French Government heard that, behind their backs, without any intimation to them, the local British representative had secured the engagement by the native court of twelve British professors or instructors, and these were about to be launched on their career there. Would not M. Cambon himself be the first to call upon me at the Foreign Office, and what would be the nature of the protest that he would make?

His Excellency listened to my protest with admirable patience, and asked me whether I would be satisfied if the French professors at Tehran were confined to such professions as medicine, surgery, literature, &c., without trenching upon a wider field? Upon my answering in the affirmative, he said he would reopen the matter in Paris on the occasion of his impending visit.

The second subject upon which I assailed him was the revival of the spirit of rivalry and competition between the French and ourselves in Constantinople. Evidence of this revival continued to reach me in great abundance. Up till a short time ago, the two Powers had acted upon the hypothesis that the Turk must be treated alike by both, that neither was to seek his favour, and that until peace was concluded he was to be treated as a culprit awaiting sentence. To this tacit agreement the British High Commissioner had been absolutely loyal. I could tell the Ambassador that many representations had been made to us from leading Turks, from the highest downwards, appealing for British forgiveness, imploring British protection, and expressing an urgent desire to place their future entirely in our hands. To all these appeals we had turned a deaf ear, replying that the war was not concluded, and that the settlement of the Turkish question must be made in Paris, not in Constantinople. But from this understanding the French High Commissioner had departed in the two cases, to which I had before referred, of the visit of the Turkish Delegation to Paris and the telegram to the Turkish Crown Prince;<sup>2</sup> and every mail now brought me evidence of an active French propaganda,

<sup>2</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 215–16 and 232–3.

designed to convince the Turks that France, and France alone, was their friend, and that Turkey should put her interests exclusively in French hands. I said that, if these tactics were continued, we might be tempted to take a hand in the game ourselves, reluctant as we were to do so. But, I went on, what was the meaning and what was the need of these local manœuvres if the French adhered, as I had no reason to doubt that they did, to the policy which the Ambassador had more than once explained to me? If neither of us was anxious to take hand in the political future of Constantinople, why should the officials of either party indulge in this underhand game? It was placing the Turk once more in the position which he so much relished of playing off two European Powers one against the other, while meantime in the background the Italian was not above having a little intrigue on his own account with the Committee of Union and Progress.

My protest, at which his Excellency was somewhat concerned, and about which he promised to make further enquiries in Paris, elicited from him an emphatic restatement of the position of France in the matter. She neither desired nor sought any political preponderance in Turkey in the future. I concluded by saying that this was in itself a sufficient condemnation of the tactics which were apparently being pursued by French officials in Turkey.

The Ambassador retaliated to my artillery by once again firing off his machine-gun concerning the Haifa-Jerusalem Railway.<sup>3</sup> This is too complicated and detailed a matter to be contained in the present despatch, and I must take an opportunity of explaining it elsewhere.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>3</sup> See No. 173.

#### No. 440

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)*

No. 1116 Telegraphic [96597/17115/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 4, 1919

Your telegram 1330<sup>1</sup> (June 25).

Please report by telegraph full particulars of concessions referred to and by what authority they have been granted.

In what district of Marmora are Americans beginning operations? Is it in Allied military occupation and if so by whom is it controlled?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 427.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Webb replied to this telegram in Constantinople despatch No. 1481 of August 21, 1919 (received September 1) transmitting information to the effect that the concessions in question were four in number covering a total area of some 14,330 djeribs or hectares and all situated in the district of Gallipoli, which was considered to be in occupation by Allied forces. The concessions were stated to have been granted by the Turkish Ministry of Commerce on applications made before the outbreak of the First World War.

No. 441

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 18)*

No. 1144 [104604/78941/44]

**CONSTANTINOPLE, July 5, 1919**

My Lord,

With reference to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 1333<sup>1</sup> of 26th June, I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of a report by Lieutenant J. S. Perring, Suffolk Regiment, Repatriation Officer at Samsoun, dealing with the commercial side of American Relief work on the occasion of a visit to that port by Admiral Bristol,<sup>2</sup> U.S.N.

I have, &c.,  
A. CALTHORPE

**ENCLOSURE IN NO. 441**

*Lieutenant Perring to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe*

SAMSOUN, 26,6,19

Sir,

I have the honour to report the arrival of Rear Admiral Bristol U.S.N., on the 22nd inst., accompanied by:—

Mr. Thomas Standard Oil Company.  
Mr. Hutchins National City Bank, New York, and financial adviser  
or of The International Corporation.  
Hutchings

They were also accompanied by a Press Representative.

The Standard Oil Coy. appointed a local Agent (Greek) on a 3% Commission on all sales for them. The party sailed by U.S. Destroyer on the evening of the same date for Heraclea.

The above party spent all their time on shore in inspecting tobacco ware-houses and stocks.

I have, &c.,  
J. S. PERRING  
Lieut.

No. 428.

<sup>2</sup> American High Commissioner at Constantinople.

No. 442

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 18)*

No. 1152 [104612/707/44]

**CONSTANTINOPLE, July 5, 1919**

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for the information of your Lordship, copy of a memorandum (with enclosure), dated the 28th June, addressed

by the British Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean station, to the Commodore Commanding, British Aegean Squadron, relative to the naval measures to be taken as a result of the Italian decree establishing a naval base in the Dodecanese.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 442

*Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, to the Commodore Commanding  
British Aegean Squadron*

No. 5505.

H.M.S. IRON DUKE, June 28, 1919

Herewith is forwarded for your information a copy of an Italian decree regarding the establishment of a naval command in Dodecanese.

2. The terms of the decree would appear to imply the desire on the part of the Italians to inaugurate an exclusive Italian control in these waters, and on the shores of the mainland, and it has already become apparent that they would, if they had the right, resent the presence of British ships in these parts.

3. The important point is that we must on no account encourage this idea by refraining from visiting these waters, or by acquiescing in the exclusive use by Italians in [sic] these ports, most of which, according to international agreement, still come within the limits of the British Aegean command.

4. They should therefore be visited as frequently as the resources of your command permit, and it would appear that the sloop which up to the present has been normally stationed at Suda or Syra would generally be available for this service.

5. In this connection, it should be noted, that for the above purposes the limits of the Aegean command have been extended as far along the Karmanian coast as longitude 31° 50' E, see my communication of the 6th June, 1919, No. 5404.<sup>1</sup>

A. CALTHORPE  
Vice-Admiral  
British Commander-in-Chief

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 442

*Extract from the 'Official Gazette' of April 16, 1919*

(Translation.)

No. 487 of the Collection Law and decree of the kingdom contains the following decree:—

We, Thomas of Savoy, Duke of Genoa, Lieutenant-General of His Majesty Victor Manuel [sic] III, &c., in virtue of the authority delegates [sic] to us, in view of the Royal Decree of the 28th February, 1904, relative to the attributions and duties of commanders of naval stations abroad, in view of the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

regulation for military discipline for the naval forces of the 29th October, 1903, in view of the regulation on special duties afloat, approved by Royal Decree of the 16th May, 1907, and its successive modifications, recognising the necessity of uniting under a single command the ships scattered in the islands of Dodecanese and on the coasts of Asia Minor from the Gulf of Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna as far as Adalia and beyond, as well as the services of the Royal Navy on shore in the above localities: have decreed and decree:—

*Single Article*

From March 16, 1919, there is established in the Dodecanese a 'Naval Station Command' with coastal jurisdiction over the islands of the Dodecanese and over the coast of Asia Minor from the Gulf of Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna as far as Adalia and beyond, under which are placed all the ships operating in these waters as well as the services of the Royal Navy on shore in the above localities. We order that the present Decree, to which the Seal of State is attached, be inserted in the official collection of the Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, enjoining on all whom it may concern to observe it and cause it to be observed.

Given at Rome this 23rd day of March, 1919.

(Signed) THOMAS OF SAVOY

DE BONO.

Seen: The Keeper of the Seals:

(Signed) FACTA.

No. 443

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received July 6)

No. 1402 Telegraphic [98771/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 5, 1919

Following from Morgan<sup>1</sup> Smyrna, July 4 (begins):—

Hellenic troops retook Aidin to-day Friday.<sup>2</sup> (Ends.)

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Morgan was the representative at Smyrna of the British High Commission.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Morgan further reported in a telegram of July 5, 1919, from Smyrna (transmitted to Foreign Office in Constantinople telegram No. 1404 of July 6, received next day): 'Commodore has informed Greek High Commissioner in writing that (? the) recent despatch to Aidin of Greek troops after Commodore's warning and without authority from him is serious breach of procedure. Greeks want to occupy Akhissar and Soma and it is possible that they may determine to again disregard orders of Commodore in this respect.'

No. 444

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 8)*

No. 1412 Telegraphic [99717/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 7, 1919

Commodore Fitzmaurice informs me Aidin was reoccupied by Greek troops by M. Venizelos' direct orders.<sup>1</sup>

Addressed to Foreign Office and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> In this connexion Mr. P. H. Kerr recorded in a note of a general conversation concerning the Greek occupation of the Smyrna region which, at the request of Mr. Balfour, he had with M. Venizelos in Paris on the evening of July 7, 1919 (cf. No. 453): 'I asked him why it was that the Greeks had advanced without obtaining the authority of the High Commissioner. M. Venizelos replied that this was largely due to the delays in communications with Smyrna. At the outset it had taken from eight to fifteen days for his messages to reach the local Greek authorities, largely owing to the fact that the Italians held up his telegrams and that even after he had begun to use the Malta route the congestion on the lines had involved great delay. He further said that after the recent reverses at Aidin, the British Admiral himself had suggested the importance of retaking it in order to prevent the Turks from pursuing their attacks again.' Further to the above Mr. Morgan reported in a telegram of July 7 from Smyrna (transmitted in Constantinople telegram No. 1423 of July 9, received in Foreign Office July 10): 'Greek High Commissioner acknowledged to Commodore to-day that re-occupation of Aidin by Greeks without permission was wrong and stated that Monsieur Venezelos by whose orders re-occupation took place was of the same opinion but that he would explain to Paris Conference. He said that prestige rendered it necessary and stated that no advance would be made towards Nazali. He states that during Turkish occupation of Aidin many Greeks were massacred.'

No. 445

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Mr. Balfour (Paris).*

*Received July 9*

No. 110 Telegraphic [357/1/3/14817]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 8, 1919

My telegrams Nos. 99<sup>1</sup> to Paris and 1375<sup>1</sup> to F.O. Grave situation in Asia Minor must be my excuse again for reminding you of urgency of taking definite decision as to limits of Greek occupation, enforcing respect for those limits on the part of Greeks and announcing those<sup>2</sup> quite definitely that they will not be passed until peace terms are announced except in the case of grave disorder and then only with authority of British authority on the spot.

Turkish Government are well aware of limits originally prescribed by Conference and of extent to which Greeks have overstepped them.

The Italian occupation is also causing Turks serious misgivings. Resultant impression in Turkish mind can only be that Supreme Council wants in reality to give Greeks and Italians a free hand. Nothing could contribute more to the success of 'national defence' movement which already threatens

<sup>1</sup> No. 436.

<sup>2</sup> This word was probably inserted in error.

to take shape of open defiance of Allies and of central Government here. Latter is weaker than ever. Situation described in my telegram 1358<sup>3</sup> remains un . . .<sup>4</sup>

In my opinion this country is now confronted with possibility of rapid disintegration of all authority and all security over wide areas.

In addition to above I am assured financial situation is now finally desperate. I have become sceptical on this point after prophecies as to bankruptcy in February last had proved continually (? false)<sup>5</sup> but it seems very doubtful whether salaries for next month can be paid. I hope to send full report on this shortly. My main fear of course is that once order is irretrievably lost the heavy task of reestablishing it will fall upon H.M.G.

Repeated to F.O. No. 1419 and Athens No. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed: cf. below.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is uncertain. The text as received in the Foreign Office here read 'unresolved'. <sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain.

#### No. 446

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 10)*

No. 1420 Telegraphic [100668/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 8, 1919

In my telegram No. 110<sup>1</sup> to Paris, 1419<sup>1</sup> to Foreign Office I reported my personal views on (? situation).

Since writing it I have received a visit from Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs who had been sent by Sultan to represent impossible state of things now existing. They read several telegrams reporting further outrages in Smyrna district, and it must be admitted that their general tenour is confirmed by reports of British officers there who (? place) responsibility squarely upon Greeks. They presented in name of Sultan renewed requests, first, to know the limits (? assigned) by Peace Conference to Greek occupation, and secondly, that British officers should be attached to Greek troops in order to watch and, where necessary, control their actions.

They said they could not believe it was the intention of Allies to create in Anatolia a still more grievous situation than that which had so long prevailed in Macedonia.

I informed them that of my own initiative I had already telegraphed to you on both the points they raised but I undertook to press again for a reply.

The Minister informed in view [*sic*] of renewed Greek attacks upon Aidin and other points, it was hopeless to expect that Mustafa Kemal would return to Constantinople in obedience to orders he had received, and I learned last night that he had in fact telegraphed from Erzeroum refusing to do so. A British officer interviewed him on June 22 and he claimed that occupation of Constantinople, Smyrna and Adalia were in violation of Armistice. He

<sup>1</sup> No. 445.

hated Germans and had never been connected with Committee but he was bitterly disappointed by proceedings of Allies. Many (? demobilised) officers are with him and Raouf Bey, late Minister of Marine and other persons of mark are actively working with him.

Crown Prince is becoming more and more the head of faction here in opposition to Government and the Sultan with whom he has had several very stormy interviews lately.

Repeated to Paris 111.

No. 447

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 9)*

No. 1421 Telegraphic [100500/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 8, 1919

My telegrams No. 1420<sup>1</sup> to Foreign Office and 111<sup>1</sup> to Paris.

Sultan has caused a private message to be conveyed to me in which he states he is informed that Armenians are preparing an attack on Erzerum: that vilayet of Aidin has become a slaughter-house: that if steps are not taken to check the excess [? excesses] of Greeks it will be absolutely impossible to restrain people of Anatolia: that as army has been demobilized he has no troops to send to maintain order whilst Allies have no troops there. His Majesty characterizes course of events as very dreadful and dangerous. He can see no hope for checking these inevitable calamities save in H.M.G.

Repeated Peace Conference 112.

<sup>1</sup> No. 446.

No. 448

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 10)*

No. 1429 Telegraphic [100983/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 9, 1919

I was informed yesterday by General Milne that G.O.C. three Turkish Army Corps Samsoun had sent a communication to British Military Control Officer there to the effect that as British troops had been disembarked at Samsoun<sup>1</sup> without knowledge and consent of Central Government he no longer accepts responsibility for public order in that place. Further that on account of state of public order he does not consent to despatch of Gurkhas to interior and that if they be despatched without consent of Central Government resistance will be offered and, abandoning Samsoun to Civil Authorities, he will withdraw his troops to interior. Upon this I sent a note by General

<sup>1</sup> A company of British infantry stationed at Samsoun had recently been replaced by a Gurkha battalion in view of the increasing anti-Christian agitation in that district subsequent to the Greek landing at Smyrna.

Deedess<sup>2</sup> to Grand Vizier ordering immediate return to Constantinople of G.O.C. three Turkish Army Corps repeated<sup>3</sup> my demand for return of Mustapha Kemal whose complicity in above affair I surmised.

Grand Vizier who with Ministry [? Minister] of War saw General Deedess acknowledges the accuracy of my above surmise but stated Government had no longer any official relations with Mustapha he having resigned from Army. Government however propose at once to notify all Military and Civilian officials in Eastern provinces that Mustapha is to be considered an outlaw. These instructions are to be seen by me. As to G.O.C. three (G.C. sic) I am sending Turkish Officer in destroyer to Samsoun tomorrow to convey orders of Turkish Government (? for his) return to Constantinople by same destroyer. If he declines Government will treat him in same manner as above described for Mustapha. I am unable as yet to appreciate extent of movement in interior or degree of complicity therein of Turkish Higher Command but I am keeping in close touch with General Milne on the whole question.

Sent to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Military Attaché on the British High Commission.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that the word 'and' should be inserted before 'repeated'.

#### No. 449

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)*

No. 53 Telegraphic [383/1/6/14003]

PARIS, July 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 1353<sup>1</sup> of June 28 to the Foreign Office.

We regret that proposal as to British officers cannot be entertained as it would tend to give colour to erroneous, though apparently prevalent, belief that Greek occupation was result of a British not an allied decision.<sup>2</sup>

Repeated to F.O. No. 1135.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 433, note 6.

<sup>2</sup> In Constantinople telegram No. 122 of July 13, 1919, to Paris (received July 15) Admiral Calthorpe asked Mr. Balfour to reconsider this decision, observing that 'the only possible means of arriving at the real facts in all the maze of charges and counter-charges brought by Greeks and Turks is (?) to employ impartial witnesses'. The proposal in question was, however, superseded by the decision of the Supreme Council on July 18 to send an Allied Commission of Enquiry to Asia Minor: see No. 461, note 2.

#### No. 450

*M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received July 9)*

[385/1/31/14835]

PARIS, le 9 juillet, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation Britannique 2 exemplaires

(copie) d'un mémorandum que le prince Lvoff, M. Sazonoff et M. Maklakoff<sup>1</sup> ont adressé à M. le Président de la Conférence.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 450

*The Russian Political Conference to the President of the Peace Conference*

PARIS, le 5 juillet 1919

M. le Président,

La Conférence de la Paix devant élaborer le traité de paix avec la Turquie et examiner les questions touchant aux territoires de l'ancien Empire Ottoman, les soussignés estiment le moment venu d'exposer les revendications russes à l'égard de la Turquie, comme ils l'ont fait déjà par rapport à l'Allemagne<sup>2</sup> et à l'Autriche.<sup>3</sup>

Vis-à-vis de la Turquie, les soussignés invoquent les mêmes principes généraux qu'ils ont définis dans leurs mémoires du 9 avril 1919.<sup>2</sup> Ces principes comportent le droit pour la Russie à être traitée sur un pied d'égalité avec les grandes Puissances alliées et associées pour tout ce qui regarde le règlement de comptes final avec l'ennemi commun, tant pour les questions d'ordre politique, financier et économique.

La Turquie devra reconnaître l'annulation des Traité de Brest-Litovsk, ainsi que de tous les accords et conventions complémentaires avec telle ou telle autre partie de l'ancien Empire de Russie.

En outre, les soussignés au nom du Gouvernement Provisoire Russe croient de leur devoir d'attirer l'attention de la Conférence de la Paix sur l'importance particulière que présentent pour le peuple russe tous les problèmes se rattachant à la question d'Orient.

*Détroits et Constantinople.*

De tous ces problèmes, le plus important au point de vue russe est celui des Détroits et de Constantinople. L'importance primordiale des Détroits au point de vue du commerce russe est évidente. Il suffit de remarquer que 40% de l'exportation totale de la Russie et 54% de l'exportation maritime passent par les ports de la mer Noire et de la mer d'Azov. Il résulte des statistiques annexées,<sup>4</sup> que la plus grande partie des céréales russes, (75%) du naphte (88%), du manganèse (93%), du minerai de fer (61%), etc. est exportée par la Mer Noire. C'est précisément le commerce de la Mer Noire qui assure l'activité du bilan de commerce russe.

Ces considérations suffisent amplement pour démontrer l'intérêt que la Russie a de voir la liberté de son exportation par la Mer Noire et les Dardanelles assurée aussi bien en temps de paix qu'en temps de guerre. Toute interruption de l'exportation est désastreuse; ainsi la guerre italo-turque, pendant laquelle les Détroits sont restés fermés seulement un mois, a porté au commerce russe des dommages énormes. Une interruption prolongée du

<sup>1</sup> Members of the Russian Political Conference in Paris in the interest of the administration of Admiral Kolchak: cf. Volume III, Chap. II. <sup>2</sup> See Volume III, No. 275, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume III, No. 721, note 1.

<sup>4</sup> Not annexed to filed copy.

trafic de la Mer Noire amènerait fatallement la passivité du bilan de commerce russe et [et] écoulerait [sic] la Russie à une situation économique critique. Les intérêts de la Russie réclament un régime qui rende ses relations commerciales avec le monde extérieur indépendantes de tous conflits internationaux pouvant porter atteinte à la liberté de passage par les Détroits.

Outre l'intérêt économique, les Détroits ont pour la Russie une importance primordiale au point de vue de la défense du pays. Si l'entrée dans la Mer Noire est libre à tout moment pour les vaisseaux de guerre des Puissances non-riveraines, la Russie est obligée de fortifier ses côtes d'une longueur de 2.230 kilomètres et d'entretenir une grande flotte, en grévant pour cela le peuple russe de lourds impôts. La Russie qui, tant au point de vue du commerce que de la longueur des côtes, possède une situation prédominante dans la Mer Noire, a, en toute justice, le droit d'utiliser la configuration de cette mer pour assurer la sécurité de son littoral méridional, sans imposer des charges excessives à sa population.

Cette double situation commerciale et stratégique explique la tendance séculaire de la Russie à exercer le contrôle sur les routes maritimes donnant accès à la Mer Noire, contrôle qui lui est plus indispensable encore que celui du Canal de Suez ou du Détrroit de Gibraltar à l'Empire Britannique. Ce ne sont donc point des visées annexionistes qui depuis les temps les plus reculés sont les nécessités inéluctables de l'existence même de l'Etat Russe et du développement de son peuple.

Le seul régime des Détroits conciliable avec les intérêts de la Russie devrait être établi sur la base des principes suivants :

1) Garantie réelle de la liberté du passage par les Détroits pour les navires de commerce de toutes les nations, en temps de guerre aussi bien qu'en temps de paix.

2) Liberté du passage par les Détroits pour les navires de guerre de toutes les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, en temps de guerre aussi bien qu'en temps de paix.

3) Fermeture des Détroits pour les navires de guerre des Puissances non-riveraines de la Mer Noire en temps de guerre aussi bien qu'en temps de paix.

Le principe de l'ouverture des Détroits pour les navires de guerre russes et turcs et combiné avec celui de la fermeture des mêmes détroits pour les bâtiments des autres Puissances a été adopté par les traités russo-turcs de 1798, de 1805 et de 1833. Les traités européens de 1841,<sup>5</sup> de 1856<sup>6</sup> et de 1871,<sup>7</sup> ont, par contre, établi le principe de la fermeture des Détroits pour tous les navires de guerre. On sait que ces derniers traités avaient pour but de remplacer l'influence prépondérante que la Russie exerçait jusqu'alors en Turquie par une tutelle collective des Puissances, dont la pointe était dirigée contre la Russie. Cependant si ces traités enfermaient la flotte russe dans la Mer Noire, ils protégeaient du moins le midi de la Russie contre une

<sup>5</sup> Treaty of London: text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxix, p. 703.

<sup>6</sup> Treaty of Paris: text op. cit., vol. xlvi, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Treaty of London: text op. cit., vol. lxi, p. 7.

attaque inattendue par des flottes ennemis. C'est pourquoi, malgré les inconvénients de cette situation qui vouait à l'inaction sa flotte de la Mer Noire, la Russie a néanmoins toujours préféré cet état de choses à l'ouverture de cette mer aux bâtiments de guerre de toutes les Puissances. Il est évident qu'après la guerre pendant laquelle la Russie a porté tant de sacrifices, sa situation ne saurait être rendue plus difficile encore qu'auparavant. Par conséquent le *statu quo ante bellum* devrait être considéré au pis aller comme préférable, au point de vue russe, à un régime qui permettrait à un ennemi éventuel de concentrer ses forces devant les côtes méridionales de la Russie. Il est vrai que les conditions stratégiques peuvent se modifier dans l'avenir à mesure que se réaliseront les principes généraux qui forment la base de la Société des Nations. Toutefois, tant que le désarmement envisagé ne sera que partiel et n'affectera que la quantité et non la proportion des forces militaires, la Russie sera obligée de se préoccuper de sa défense nationale.

Par les accords de 1915,<sup>8</sup> les Alliés, rompant avec leur ancienne politique, ont explicitement reconnu les intérêts vitaux de la Russie dans les Détroits et dans la ville de Constantinople. La crise que traverse actuellement la Russie ne saurait changer le fond de la question, d'autant plus que le souci d'établir une paix durable fait mieux encore ressortir la nécessité de faire droit aux aspirations légitimes de la Russie.

L'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations inaugure le nouveau régime des mandats qui doit remplacer celui des annexions et des sphères d'influence qui primait autrefois.

La Russie nouvelle a incontestablement le droit d'être associée à l'œuvre de régénération que les Puissances alliées et associées se proposent d'entreprendre dans les territoires qui ont appartenu à la Turquie.

La question des Détroits pourrait de cette façon être le plus équitablement résolue par l'attribution à la Russie d'un mandat pour l'administration des Détroits au nom de la Société des Nations. Une telle solution serait de nature à satisfaire tant les intérêts russes que ceux du monde entier, car le meilleur régime applicable aux routes internationales de transit est celui d'en remettre le contrôle à la Puissance qui est le plus particulièrement intéressée à la liberté de ce transit.

Cette solution est aussi la seule qui n'inspirerait au peuple russe aucune des appréhensions qui [que]ne manqueraient pas de susciter en lui l'attribution du mandat en question à toute autre puissance et l'installation d'un pouvoir militaire étranger sur les Détroits.

Pour le moment, vu sa situation actuelle, la Russie s'accommoderait de l'établissement sur les Détroits d'une administration internationale provisoire qui pourrait lui transmettre, le moment venu, ses pouvoirs, et dans laquelle, en attendant, la Russie devrait occuper une place correspondante au rôle qui lui appartient dans la Mer Noire.

En ce qui concerne Constantinople, la Russie ne saurait envisager la cession de cette ville à l'administration exclusive d'aucune autre Puissance. Mais, si une administration internationale y était établie, la Russie devrait y

<sup>8</sup> i.e. the Constantinople Agreement: see Introductory Note.

tenir la place qui lui revient et participer à toutes les entreprises d'aménagement, d'exploitation et de contrôle du port de Constantinople.

De même la Russie ayant une situation spéciale dans le bassin de la Mer Noire, elle ne saurait rester indifférente au sort futur du littoral méridional de cette mer.

### *Arménie*

La Russie nouvelle salue avec vive satisfaction la délivrance de l'Arménie du joug turc.

Il est permis de rappeler qu'avant l'Article 61 du Traité de Berlin, l'Article 16 du Traité de San Stéfano obligeait la Turquie vis-à-vis de la Russie à réaliser des réformes en Arménie. On se souvient également que c'est la Russie qui a pris en 1914 l'initiative des réformes en Arménie, et que l'acte du 8 février assurant aux Arméniens certains droits de self-government — malheureusement moins étendus que ne l'avait voulu le projet russe initial — a revêtu la forme d'un accord russo-turc. La grande guerre étant survenue, la Turquie au lieu des réformes promises, a suscité de nouveaux massacres et ce ne sont que les victoires des armées russes qui ont permis à une partie des Arméniens de trouver un refuge sur le sol russe.

La Russie insistera pour que tous les coupables d'avoir organisé ou perpétré des massacres soient livrés à la justice conformément à l'avertissement donné avant ces massacres par la France, la Grande Bretagne et la Russie, sur l'initiative de cette dernière, au Gouvernement Turc.

Quant à l'avenir de l'Arménie, ce pays rentre dans la catégorie de certaines communautés, qui appartenaient autrefois à l'Empire Ottoman, dont parle le pacte de la 'Société des Nations', et qui ont atteint un degré de développement tel que leur existence comme nations indépendantes peut être reconnue provisoirement, 'à la condition que les conseils et l'aide d'un mandataire guident leur administration jusqu'au moment où elles seront capables de se conduire seules' (Art. 22).

En d'autres circonstances la Russie aurait volontiers assumé elle-même cette tâche provisoire. En tous cas, il est entendu que le mandat arménien conféré par la Société des Nations doit être entouré de toutes les garanties assurant à l'Arménie un concours désintéressé à son développement et excluant toute action qui tendrait à des avantages politiques ou commerciaux, au détriment de la nation arménienne ou de ceux qui jouissent dans ces parages de droits acquis. En outre, conformément à l'esprit du Pacte de la Société des Nations, le mandataire devra assurer aussi rapidement que possible le passage de l'Arménie à l'état d'indépendance.

### *Lieux Saints.*

Par les souvenirs pieux que tous les peuples chrétiens attachent aux lieux-saints ceux-ci occupent dans la vie spirituelle de ces peuples une place particulière. Parmi les autres nations chrétiennes, le peuple russe, en majorité dominante orthodoxe, est également très attaché aux souvenirs

séculaires qu'évoquent ces lieux, aussi la Russie s'était-elle toujours préoccupée de la protection des intérêts religieux du peuple russe et de l'Église orthodoxe en Palestine. Le sort des lieux-saints la touchait de si près que des clauses spéciales les concernant ont toujours été introduites dans les conventions diplomatiques conclues entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman.

Au moment où des changements vont survenir dans la situation politique de la Palestine, changements qui nécessairement entraîneront des modifications dans le statut des Lieux-Saints, la Russie, soucieuse comme par le passé des besoins moraux de son peuple, ne saurait se désintéresser du régime auquel les Lieux-Saints vont être soumis. Désirant voir s'établir dans ces Lieux un régime de tolérance religieuse très large, assurant une paisible coexistence de toutes les communautés et institutions religieuses et le libre exercice de tous les cultes chrétiens, la Russie croit devoir suggérer que pour obtenir ce résultat, l'ensemble des Lieux auxquels un intérêt religieux est attaché soit confié à l'administration de la Ligue des Nations. Dans le cas où la Ligue des Nations adopterait pour l'exercice de sa souveraineté sur les territoires qui lui seront soumis, le système des mandats, il serait désirable de prendre en considération qu'entre les clergés orthodoxe et catholique il existe depuis des siècles certaines rivalités regrettables au sujet des Lieux-Saints. Il serait donc à craindre que, si le mandat en question était confié à une nation pouvant paraître plus favorable à l'un ou à l'autre de ces cultes, il n'en résulte des récriminations et des griefs inopportunus. Pour éviter ces inconvénients il serait utile, au cas où le système mandataire était appliqué, d'en remettre l'exercice à une Puissance dont l'impartialité en cette matière ne pourrait être mise en doute. La protection des droits acquis aux institutions religieuses orthodoxes devra être assurée. Dans ce sens, les organisations et sociétés ayant pour but de prêter aide et assistance aux pèlerins — parmi lesquels les Russes sont particulièrement nombreux — devront être rétablies dans leurs anciens cadres. La plus importante de ces Sociétés était la Société Orthodoxe Russe de Palestine qui possédait à Jérusalem et dans beaucoup d'autres endroits des asiles, écoles, hôtelleries, etc. Il est évident que cette Société doit recouvrer tous ses droits et priviléges.

Du moment que la protection de la Ligue des Nations sur les Lieux-Saints serait assurée et que les intérêts religieux du peuple russe ainsi que de tous les autres seraient garantis, la Russie pourrait affirmer une fois de plus son attitude favorable vis-à-vis des aspirations sionistes tendant à la création en Palestine d'un 'Foyer National Israélite' si la réalisation de cette idée était envisagée par les Puissances Alliées et Associées.

#### *Mont Athos.*

Le Mont Athos est un autre lieu de vénération constamment fréquenté par les pèlerins russes. Il est étroitement lié à la vie religieuse russe par le développement de la vie monastique qui a toujours joué un grand rôle en Russie. Dès le XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, des moines russes étaient installés au Mont Athos et c'est de là que sont venus en Russie les fondateurs des premiers monastères russes. Depuis lors, les liens entre la Russie et l'Athos ont continué à se

raffermir et au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle le nombre des pèlerins russes se rendant et s'établissant au Mont Athos n'a fait que s'accroître.

Au temps de la domination turque, le Mont Athos constituait, comme on sait, une espèce de République théocratique autonome en territoire turc, et son lien avec la Porte était marqué uniquement par un léger tribut, par la douane turque et par la présence d'un fonctionnaire de police turc avec quelques gendarmes.

Le Mont Athos avait sa propre administration intérieure, élue, et au point de vue ecclésiastique était soumis au Patriarche oecuménique. Le territoire de l'Athos est partagé, sur la base du droit de complète propriété, entre vingt couvents, qui ont le droit d'être représentés dans l'administration intérieure, chaque couvent disposant d'une voix.

Avant la guerre les religieux du Mont Athos étaient au nombre de 10,000 environ répartis comme suit:

Russes . . . . .	5,000
Grecks . . . . .	3,500
Roumains . . . . .	750
Serbes . . . . .	250
Bulgares . . . . .	450
Géorgiens . . . . .	50

Pendant la Guerre Balkanique, la Grèce a occupé au début de 1913 la Montagne Sainte par un petit détachement, mais la Russie ayant fait des représentations à ce sujet, le Cabinet d'Athènes a répondu qu'il était disposé à maintenir les droits séculaires et les priviléges de la communauté du Mont Athos.

Le Traité de Paix signé par la Turquie, et les Alliés Balkaniques à Londres, le 17 mai 1913,<sup>9</sup> stipulait que le sort de la presqu'île devait être fixé par les cinq Grandes Puissances.<sup>10</sup>

Les propositions du Gouvernement Russe élaborées conformément à cette décision et tendant à placer le Mont Athos sous la protection de tous les États Orthodoxes — Russie, Grèce, Roumanie, Serbie, Bulgarie et Monténégró — ont reçu, en 1913, l'approbation du Gouvernement Grec.

La question de l'Athos intéresse exclusivement les États orthodoxes et parmi eux surtout la Russie, vu le grand nombre des moines russes qui s'y trouvent et le rôle que jouent ses couvents dans la vie religieuse du peuple russe. C'est pourquoi c'est aux Représentants de ces Puissances qu'il faudrait confier la tâche d'élaborer un nouveau règlement pour l'organisation politique et administrative du Mont Athos.

#### *Régime Capitulaire.*

En ce qui concerne le régime juridique auquel seront soumis dorénavant les étrangers dans les parties purement turques de l'ancien Empire Ottoman,

<sup>9</sup> Text printed op. cit., vol. cvii, p. 656.

<sup>10</sup> Note in original: 'Cet article est confirmé dans toute sa plénitude par l'Art. 5 du Traité entre la Grèce et la Turquie signé à Athènes le 1/14 Novembre 1913.'

il paraîtrait utile de procéder à une réforme du régime capitulaire destinée à le rapprocher du système mixte qui a fait ses preuves en Égypte.

Il va de soi que l'abrogation unilatérale du régime capitulaire par le Gouvernement jeune-turc, le 27 août—9 septembre 1914 contre laquelle ont protesté toutes les Puissances belligérantes, n'a aucune valeur juridique. Il est impossible de soumettre les étrangers à l'arbitraire d'une juridiction turque. Par contre, il serait désirable et conforme aux intérêts tant des étrangers que des indigènes, de remplacer dans les pays de langue turque, les multiples lois et tribunaux par une seule juridiction internationale appliquant un droit européen 'uniforme'.

La Russie devrait naturellement participer au même titre que les autres Grandes Puissances à l'organisation et au fonctionnement de cette juridiction internationale.

#### *Revendications Financières et Économiques.*

Le principe d'égalité de traitement avec les États alliés et associés dans le domaine des questions financières et économiques doit assurer à la Russie et à ses ressortissants tous les droits, avantages, priviléges résultant des conditions de paix, en particulier, en ce qui concerne les dommages infligés aux personnes comme aux biens (répartitions, restitutions, pensions, allocations etc.) ainsi que la participation (sur le même pied que les Grandes Puissances alliées et associées) à toutes les institutions de contrôle, d'exécution et toutes autres prévues par le Traité de Paix.

En outre, l'État et les ressortissants russes participeront sur un pied d'égalité aux organisations et entreprises ayant un caractère international et une importance générale.

S'il s'agit d'entreprises où des ressortissants allemands et autrichiens en Turquie avaient des intérêts et qui seront séquestrées et liquidées, la Russie aura le droit de réclamer, dans une proportion déterminée ultérieurement, les parts des ressortissants des pays adverses qui seront liquidées en vertu des conditions de paix.

Au cas où dans les entreprises en question il n'y aurait pas de part appartenant à des ressortissants ennemis, une entente devrait être recherchée avec le concours des États alliés et associés pour obtenir la participation de l'État et des ressortissants russes à ces entreprises.

Il est entendu que l'État et les ressortissants russes, personnes physiques et morales, seront rétablies dans l'intégralité de leurs droits, (concessions, options, participations dans les entreprises, etc.) et de leurs propriétés tels qu'ils se comportaient avant le début de la guerre, en particulier les droits appartenant à la Russie et aux ressortissants russes relativement aux chemins de fer et aux ports sur le territoire ottoman, antérieurement à la guerre, doivent être rétablis dans leur intégralité.

Sera remise en vigueur la convention conclue à Constantinople le 14 mai 1882 pour régler le mode de paiement de l'indemnité de guerre due à la Russie par la Turquie. En vertu de l'article 4 du Traité signé le 27 janvier 1879, les 350.000 livres turques représentant les annuités dues à la Russie

étaient gagées sur des revenus spécialement affectés à cet objet. Par la convention russo-turque de Pétrograde du 8 décembre 1909, le Gouvernement Russe a fait à la Turquie abandon de 40 annuités sur les 74 restant dues en substituant à la Turquie, comme sa débitrice, la Bulgarie, dont la Sublime Porte était créancière pour la somme correspondante de 125 millions de francs. Par conséquent, à partir de l'année 1950, la Russie est en droit de recevoir les trente-quatre annuités restantes, de 850.000 livres chacune, soit un total de 11 millions 900.000 livres turques.

A notre connaissance, l'administration de la dette ottomane serait chargée d'assurer le service de tous les emprunts ottomans, de percevoir tous les impôts et revenus de la Turquie et d'assurer le règlement de toutes annuités dues par la Turquie aussi bien celle résultant de charges antérieurement au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 que celles dues pour le règlement des restitutions, réparations, etc. aux Gouvernements alliés et associés et à leurs ressortissants. La Russie sera représentée dans le Conseil d'administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane au même titre et dans les mêmes conditions que les autres Grandes Puissances.

Les engagements contractés envers l'État et les ressortissants russes incomberont aussi bien à la Turquie qu'aux États qui deviendront concessionnaires des territoires ottomans en vertu du Traité de Paix.

En ce qui concerne les pertes et dommages causés par la Turquie ou ses ressortissants à la Russie ou à ses ressortissants, en conséquence de la guerre et depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914, sur les territoires ottoman, russe, persan ou autres, la Russie et ses ressortissants ont, en vertu du principe d'égalité de traitement, droit à toutes les réparations, restitutions, pensions, allocations, etc. dans les mêmes conditions que celles assurées par le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie aux Puissances alliées et associées et à leurs ressortissants.

En particulier, la Turquie devra donner à la Russie pleine et entière satisfaction pour la destruction par les autorités turques, de l'Église et du Mausolée élevés à la mémoire des officiers et soldats russes à San-Stéfano après le départ de l'Ambassade de Russie en 1914. Pour réparer cette violation des usages internationaux, la Turquie devra fournir les fonds pour la reconstitution de l'Église et du Mausolée de San-Stéfano et manifester ses regrets par une cérémonie militaire expiatoire où prendront part les Représentants du Gouvernement et de l'armée turque. Les détails de cette cérémonie seront réglés entre les Gouvernements Russe et Turc.

En particulier, la Turquie devra également restituer à l'Institut Archéologique Russe à Constantinople, sa bibliothèque et ses collections, confisquées par les autorités ottomanes; au cas où des livres ou objets appartenant au dit Institut auraient disparus, le Gouvernement Ottoman devra, d'après les indications du Gouvernement Russe, soit, en rembourser le prix, soit, fournir à l'Institut Archéologique des compensations en manuscrits ou en objets d'antiquité.

En ce qui concerne tout spécialement les dommages causés par la Turquie à l'armée et à la flotte russe, la restitution du matériel et des marchandises enlevées par les belligérants ennemis sur le territoire de la Russie ou ailleurs;

la question des prisonniers de guerre; les principes directeurs de la politique économique de la Russie; les droits de la Russie résultant de sa situation spéciale et notamment les délais s'appliquant à la présentation des déclarations concernant les dommages et restitutions réclamés par l'État et les ressortissants russes; les moyens d'assurer dans les circonstances actuelles, les déclarations des intéressés ou en matière de dommages et restitutions de toutes sortes; le régime temporaire à appliquer aux sommes encaissées pour le compte de l'État et des ressortissants russes et leur revenant pour les réparations et restitutions; le retrait des signes monétaires de toutes sortes émis ou importés sur le territoire russe par l'État Ottoman ou ses ressortissants et l'annulation des Traité de Brest-Litovsk, accords, conventions complémentaires, les soussignés se réfèrent aux considérations exposées dans leur aide-mémoire du 9 avril 1919<sup>2</sup> relatif aux conditions de paix avec l'Allemagne.

PRINCE LVOFF  
SAZONOFF  
MAKLAKOFF

No. 451

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 11)*

No. 1437 Telegraphic [101503/3050/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 10, 1919

My telegram No. 1430<sup>1</sup> and Civil Commissioners Baghdad telegram 53 [5353]<sup>2</sup> May 12th and your letter 77676 [77686]<sup>2</sup> of May 29th to India Office.

Major Noel<sup>3</sup> thinks great advantage might be gained from every point of view by assistance of Kurdish Chiefs along Northern mountain frontier of Mesopotamia.

Those who are in Constantinople now are (1) Abdul Kadir, whose territory is most easterly, (2) the Bedrikhans the most known and respected family in Kurdistan (both of these representing feudal system) and (3) less powerful representatives of more sedentary population . . .<sup>4</sup> who however occupy high posts in Turkish bureaucracy here. I have acceded to proposal that representatives of these three shall return to Kurdistan not altogether [*sic*] with but separately from Major Noel so as not to connect them intimately but with object of joining him there in order to track through country for purpose in first place of impressing on tribes necessity for maintaining order.

The two latter requested that I would guarantee safety of their families during their absence for they stated Kurdish Club at Diarbekir has been closed by orders of Turkish Government: that certain Kurds who had welcomed Noel on his journey hither had subsequently been molested and that

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See note 6 below.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is uncertain.

owing to Kurdish nationalist movement and their petition to Peace Conference (see my despatch No. (?) 564)<sup>2</sup> April 20th) which had become known to Turks they felt you might be alarmed on general lines. It was made quite clear to them that we (?) have no knowledge whatever of decisions which Peace Conference might take as regards either Kurds, Armenians or Turkish, as to form of Government which would be set up, or as to mandatory. But British were in Mesopotamia so that question before His Majesty's Government was merely that of assuring safety of frontier and (?) its vicinity rested with Headquarters. So long as their representatives went to Kurdistan with sole object of maintaining law and order and of protecting Christians and not of pushing their national aims their families ought to have nothing to fear from Turkish Government but should latter show hostility we would be prepared to use our best offices to protect them.

In second place they show great anxiety as to activities of Mustapha [sic] Kemal who has been<sup>5</sup> splendid material for propaganda in (?) Greek occupation of Smyrna and in rumours of a (?) territorial independence of Armenia as well as in . . .<sup>4</sup> Kurdish tribes. They wish to know whether this High Commission would be ready to shut their eyes to any action they might take against him. My acquiescence (?) in this might mean a tacit authorisation to make war on (?) Greeks which would be entirely undesirable and they were therefore informed they should take no action against Mustapha Kemal save in conjunction with recognized and established Turkish authority, though if he were to send emissaries into tribes to stir up trouble these might be arrested and disposed of according to desires of British Authorities.

I have been very much struck by wideness of present breach (?) between) Kurds and Turks and it must of course not be forgotten that former are not very strict Moslems a large percentage indeed not being Moslems at all.

The primary question at stake is securing of a safe and satisfactory frontier (?) for Mesopotamia but this inevitably leads us to corollary which is question of Kurdish independence and autonomy.

There was every appearance of genuineness in expression of desire of Kurdish chieftains (?) for British suzerainty and Noel assures me that this feeling is by no means unsupported in districts he has so far visited.<sup>6</sup>

I quite appreciate that matter is one which has a very large political importance but it has to be faced and it is essential to turn circumstances to best possible advantage and I cannot imagine any solution by which

<sup>5</sup> This word was probably inserted in error.

<sup>6</sup> In this connexion Major Noel had reported in a telegram to Col. A. T. Wilson, British Civil Commissioner at Bagdad, (transmitted to the Foreign Office in Constantinople telegram No. 1430 of July 10, 1919, received July 12) that the breach between Kurds and Turks is a very real one which can scarcely be bridged except by a repetition of Smyrna policy i.e. the formation of an Armenian state to include predominantly Kurdish areas. I think their pro-British sympathies are genuine but it is difficult to foretell how they would re-act to proposed inclusion in Irak of predominantly Kurdish areas such as Sulaimanah Akra etc as suggested in your telegram No. 6666 [not printed: cf. No. 492]. It would be premature to sound them on this point.'

Mesopotamia will not be confided to a British mandatory whilst good relations with Kurds are essential to peace of . . .<sup>4</sup> of Mesopotamia. I therefore trust that my action will meet with your approval.

Of course it has been made perfectly clear that we could say nothing of a definite and final (?) nature pending decisions of Peace Conference.

I think fact should not be lost sight of that if we can detach Kurds permanently from Turks it will go far to . . . ing<sup>4</sup> Turkish rule for evil.<sup>7</sup>

Repeated to Political, Baghdad 42.

<sup>7</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 1269 of July 30, 1919, to Constantinople, Lord Curzon approved the action reported in the present telegram.

### No. 452

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Mr. Balfour  
(Paris. Received July 11)*

*No. 116 Telegraphic [357/1/3/15046]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 10, 1919

Following received from Commodore Fitzmaurice, Smyrna.

Begins.

Greek troops have crossed river south of Aidin in spite of my orders to contrary and were near Giovval on July 8th 20 miles southward of river.

Shells fired by Greek artillery fell inside Italian lines. Italian General Officer Commanding has formally protested to me against both occurrences. Order from M. Venizelos is presumably responsible for this contravention of orders. I have written to Greek High Commissioner insisting that orders be given that Greek troops be immediately withdrawn to north of Aidin railway.<sup>1</sup>

Ends.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 1433, Athens 88.

<sup>1</sup> See Volume I, No. 10, appendix D and minute 7 for an Italian note of July 12, 1919 to the Supreme Council concerning these incidents, and for discussion of the note in the Supreme Council.

### No. 453

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 54 Telegraphic [357/1/3/14763]*

PARIS, July 11, 1919

I have been in touch with M. Venizelos<sup>2</sup> with the object of reaching an agreed settlement about limits of Greek occupation. I informed him that in view of the fact that Greek Authorities appear to have exceeded boundaries

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this telegram was sent by bag to the Foreign Office on July 11, 1919 (received July 12).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 444, note 1.

laid down by Council of Four not only without your consent but in contravention of your instructions, it was my opinion that the best course would be for Greek troops to withdraw immediately within the limits of the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali; and that he would do well to act on this friendly advice before the matter came up in the Council of Five.

M. Venezelos has urged me to modify this opinion on the following grounds. In the first place, that while he admits that local Greek Authorities have disregarded instructions in regard to advances they did so largely during the earlier period when communications between Paris and Smyrna were difficult and nobody on the spot was very clear as to what was authorised and what was not. He further points out that the earlier advances were largely prompted by the necessity of forestalling an Italian advance up the Meander. In the second place, he points out that to confine the Greeks within the Sandjak of Smyrna would be to leave them in a very bad strategic position for it would enable the Turks to concentrate troops along the railways uniting at Magnesia from which place it would be easy for them to attempt to rush Smyrna itself. M. Venezelos, therefore, who is anxious that line of occupation should be definitely settled beyond which neither side should be entitled to advance, pressed that the Greeks should be allowed to occupy line starting from Edremid and running as follows: Soma, Akhissar, Salihli, Akche and the bridges over the Meander. 1. [sic] He says that the adoption of this line will enable him to hold the area with fewer troops because it will make impossible railway lateral communication for the Turks between the various railway lines, whereas if he was forced to retire to the Sandjak he would have to maintain larger forces while the weakness of the Greek positions would be a constant provocation to Turkish aggression.

Part two follows.

*Part 2.* I should be grateful if you would send me a telegram as soon as possible on the following points:—

(1) As to how far Greek Authorities have disregarded your instructions and as to how far local circumstances such as the Italian advance or Turkish concentrations can be pleaded in extenuation.

(2) I should like to know your advice as to Venezelos' proposal. In giving your advice I should like you to bear in mind that the line to be occupied ought to be one which can be securely held until the Peace Conference has come to a final decision in regard to Turkey. I think everybody is agreed that the most important thing now is to draw a definite line and notify both the Turks and the Greeks that both must respect this line and neither advance beyond it. The drawing of this line will, of course, be without prejudice to the final settlement of the question of what territory, if any, is to be detached from Turkey and transferred to Greece. The views of my military advisers here, who state, however, that their information as to local conditions is inadequate are as follows:—

M. Venezelos' estimate of Turkish troops opposed to him (60,000) is very greatly exaggerated. They consider the further Greek troops advance into

Asia Minor the greater their commitments. They do not share the Greek apprehension of a convergent Turkish advance by rail on the Smyrna vilayet. They consider the Greeks have sufficient troops to secure the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Caza of Aivali; but they suggest that, in order to calm Greek fears of Turkish aggression, you might consider whether it would be advisable to have a small mixed commission of Greek and Turkish officers appointed at the strategic points of the Turkish railways radiating on Smyrna.

I doubt whether this last suggestion is practicable. What are your views? I should also be glad to receive at the earliest possible moment the views of Senior Naval Officer, Smyrna, on the whole of this telegram. It should be communicated to him immediately.

No. 454

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received July 24)<sup>1</sup>

No. 1191 [107164/70100/44]

My Lord,

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 11, 1919

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the report from my representative at Smyrna, relative to the treatment of British subjects by Greek soldiers in that place.

2. The universal hostility and apprehension with which local British opinion regards the prospect of the permanent installation of Greeks as the supreme authority in the Smyrna district is a not unimportant minor feature of the present situation. The feeling is very deep-seated, and dates from before the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks. It is based partly on personal grounds. It is felt that under a Greek Government equality of treatment will not be assured to foreign commercial enterprise, and that, in any case, the local labour market, which is largely supplied by Moslems, will be seriously dislocated.

3. The contents of the enclosed report show the Greeks have done nothing since the occupation to dissipate the apprehensions of the British community; and, in view of the importance of British commercial interests in Smyrna, I strongly urge that in the terms of any mandate given to Greece to administer, ample safeguard should be provided for the protection of British commercial and industrial rights.

4. It has been recently pointed out by His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Athens that foreign capital invested in Greece requires such protection, and the need of it will certainly be felt in Smyrna if left to the Greek rule. I would strongly emphasise this point.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon circulated this despatch to the War Cabinet under cover of the following undated note: 'The Cabinet are already familiar with the military consequences of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. They may like to read the following information as to its effect upon British local interests.'

ENCLOSURE IN No. 454

*Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to British High Commissioner, Constantinople.*

(No. 37/511.)

June 17, 1919

I have the honour to report that since the Greek occupation I have received a number of complaints from various British subjects to the effect that they have been insulted by Greeks on the score of their nationality or religion.

An examination of the various cases reported show on the part of the Greeks traits of narrow-mindedness and intolerance which are combined with an exaggerated sense of self-importance.

British subjects have been insulted here by soldiers on the ground that British troops are worthless, and that it was not until Greek troops entered the war that the European war was speedily brought to an end by Greek troops breaking the Bulgarian front.

I find this opinion held and expressed also by General Nider and Colonel Zaphiriou, who command the Greek Army of Occupation. Apart from this contempt of the British race a spirit of opposition to British people continuing to live in Greek Smyrna is frequently manifested.

In the matter of insults against religion, almost daily complaints are received from Maltese that they are insulted for being Catholics or 'Franks', and are told that as Smyrna now belongs to the Greeks they are only here on sufferance, and will soon be forced to leave.

I need not add that the Italian colony is subjected to similar abuses.

I have brought the matter officially to the notice of M. Sterghiadis, Greek High Commissioner, and a proclamation has been issued to the effect that Catholics are not to be insulted on account of their religion.

I have also cited numerous individual cases to M. Sterghiadis who promised to investigate them, but the investigation seems to have very little effect.

It is the state of mind of the whole people of Greece rather than that of a few which requires modification.

In these circumstances, it would be consoling if Greece could be made to feel that in case of insults to British subjects she might expect reciprocity in her dealings with Great Britain or less support by Great Britain, or similar treatment for Greeks in British possessions.

JAMES MORGAN

No. 455

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 974 Telegraphic [100439/70100/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 12, 1919

Recent telegrams from Constantinople notably Admiral Calthorpe's No. 110<sup>1</sup> of July 8th confirm view of situation in Asia Minor expressed in my despatch No. 4099<sup>2</sup> of June 20th to which no reply has been received.

<sup>1</sup> No. 445.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch is printed by the Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (London, 1928), vol. iii, pp. 267-8.

Although it is true that Italian occupation of zone in those regions has not been officially recognised by Allied Powers, yet it is also true that their initial appearance there was encouraged by us, and is defended on grounds of Treaty of London. In no case do we appear to have protested against occupation of this or that place. Thus to some extent Italian movements have had tacit sanction of Powers. In these circumstances it is surely open to us to point out consequences of further or unjustifiable encroachments and to utter warning against their unlimited extension.

But even if above-named considerations compromise our action in case of Italians, they do not apply to Greek advances which have been in frank violation of conditions of armistice, and are pursued as is admitted by M. Venizelos in defiance of sanction of Powers. Situation is thus developing which is already one of open warfare and promises continuous and sanguinary disorder until some limit is put to Greek aggression. Inevitable delay in Turkish settlement is likely to make situation not better but worse and points to desirability of a provisional understanding pending final solution.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 1169.

#### No. 456

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 14)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [102020/70100/44]*

PARIS, July 13, 1919

Your telegram No. 974.<sup>1</sup>

I fully appreciate desirability of putting definite limit to Greek advance but case put forward by M. Venizelos supported by documentary evidence tends to shew at first sight that Greek action was more or less sanctioned by our people at Smyrna whose language to local Greeks appears to conflict with reports sent to us. Whole matter is being carefully examined and I am asking our Representatives at Smyrna to send full account of what has actually passed between them and Greeks.

<sup>1</sup> No. 455.

#### No. 457

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Mr. Balfour  
(Paris. Received July 17)*

*No. 129 Part I Telegraphic [357/1/3/15544]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 16, 1919

#### *Part I*

Your telegram No. 54<sup>1</sup> of July 10 [11].

Following received from Commodore Fitzmaurice at Smyrna, begins:—

First. Following places were occupied by the Greeks in the beginning in spite of the instructions of Allied Council. Whole of Kazas of Magnesia and

<sup>1</sup> No. 453.

Cassaba and Meander Valley as far south as Mazilli [Nazilli]. There was no reasonable excuse for this occupation except in cases of towns of Magnesia and Cassaba which are strategic points. Following places outside limits laid down by Allied Council are still in Greek occupation. Towns of Magnesia, Cassaba, Meander Valley as far and including Aidin together with a few miles of territory east of Kaza of Aivali. Following are cases of Greeks disobeying my instructions

- a. occupation of Ak-Hissar
- b. occupation of Ayasulok-Aidin railway line
- c. waging warfare across the Meander River as far south as Girova
- d. unprovoked attack on Yeni-Chiflik north-east of Magnesia
- e. re-occupation of Aidin.

Secondly. I entirely disagree with the new limits proposed by M. Venelos which appear to be actuated by political motives and will cause much further bloodshed and transfer the present unrest still further eastward into the country. In any case the limits suggested by him are unwieldy and almost impossible to hold. Suggest following limits be adopted. Sandjak of Smyrna (within which the Greeks can take up any disposition convenient) as at present except that southern limit will run due east from the sea coast to Ayasoluk follow<sup>2</sup> railway line as far south as Azizie and then run due east to the frontier of the Sanjak. Reason for this extension is so that important tunnels north of Azizie may be guarded. Additional territory. In north the present line occupied by Greek troops viz. from a point on the sea coast seven miles north east of Aivali and from thence in a south easterly direction to frontier of the Sanjak of Smyrna at or about Baghozu.

In the neighbourhood of Magnesia and Cassaba. Western and southern limits of the frontier of the Sanjak of Smyrna. Northern limits the Gedis Chai River. Eastern limit a straight line running north and south drawn through a point two miles east of Cassaba from Gedis Chai River on the north to a position east of Ovajik on the frontier of the Sanjak of Smyrna.

These limits give Greeks slightly more territory and in addition (? provide)<sup>3</sup> them with very good strategical points for defence of Smyrna; if approved suggest I may be given discretionary power to alter the above limits to extent of one or two miles if found advisable for military reasons.

I am not in favour of a Mixed Commission of Turkish and Greek Officers which I consider would be a failure.

See three maps of Smyrna, Aivali and Aidin compiled by the Geographical Section of the General Staff. . . .<sup>4</sup>

It is my considered opinion that unless limits approximately as above specified are adopted and territory in Meander Valley restored to the Turks a peaceful occupation on the part of the Greeks will be impossible. But that

<sup>2</sup> In the text as received in the Foreign Office the word 'then' preceded the word 'follow'.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is uncertain. The text as received in the Foreign Office read '... General Staff (? No.) 2097.'

if the Greeks return to the proposed limits and the Turks are informed of the decision of the Conference organised attacks will cease.

The evacuation of Aidin by the Greeks if approved must not be carried out until arrangements can be made for regular Turkish troops to occupy the place. I should propose that the Greek and Turkish Governments be informed as to this and that the evacuation be carried out under my personal supervision.

The foregoing suggestions are dependent on the Greeks observing *status quo* until a decision is reached. If they will not many complications will ensue. Ends.

#### No. 458

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Mr. Balfour  
(Paris. Received July 17)*

*No. 129 Part II Telegraphic [357/1/3/15545]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 16, 1919

#### Part 2

I fully endorse Commodore's remarks<sup>1</sup> and urge his proposals be adopted.

I concur in considering that M. Venezelos' estimate of Turkish troops opposed to Greeks might not be very greatly exaggerated.<sup>2</sup>

I do not estimate Turkish regular troops at more than 2,000. The remainder consists of irregulars whose numbers are naturally difficult to compute. They have been brought into being owing to the extension of the Greek advance and their numbers will probably automatically decrease in proportion as Greeks remain on defensive within their prescribed limits. It must be remembered that all able-bodied men who possess or can acquire arms take field as soon as their area threatened.<sup>3</sup>

Whatever is decided I would strongly urge identical instructions be sent by British, French and Italian Governments to their High Commissioners here with orders to present a joint note to the Sublime Porte.

Repetition of suggested limits is as follows: . . . .<sup>4</sup>

Repeated Foreign Office No. 1475.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 457.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Calthorpe on August 4, 1919, telegraphed a correction amending this passage so as to read ' . . . Turkish troops opposed to Greeks is very greatly exaggerated.'

<sup>3</sup> The text as received in the Foreign Office here read 'as soon as their area (?) appears to be) threatened.'

<sup>4</sup> There followed a repetition of the passage in No. 457 beginning 'Sandjak of Smyrna (within which the Greeks . . .' and ending 'Ovajik on the frontier of the Sandjak of Smyrna.'

#### No. 459

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 17)*

*No. 1164 Telegraphic: by bag [104108/70100/44]*

Following for War Cabinet.

PARIS, July 16, 1919

The Council heard Mr. Venizelos this afternoon on situation in Asia Minor.

He pointed out that situation was very disquieting, the Turks being not more than 40 kilometres from Smyrna. He requested either (1) that liberty of movement should be granted to the Greek troops to take any measures necessary to prevent Turkish concentration now proceeding; or (2) that the strategic railways in that region should be occupied by the Allied troops which would be a moral guarantee for the Greeks. The Greeks could then reduce the number of their troops in Asia Minor and send them to Macedonia to keep the Bulgarians quiet. He pressed for collaboration between the Greeks and the Italians and appealed to Signor Tittoni to assist in bringing this about which the latter declared himself ready to do.

Mr. Balfour then set forth his views on situation. One great cause of trouble was mutual fear of Greeks and Italians. Turks also felt great fear lest the Greeks who had gone so far as Aidin should make a still further advance. If present situation were to continue massacres were very likely. This danger would be avoided if we could reassure the Turks and show them that there was no fear of any advance beyond a certain point. The limits should now be laid down dividing the Italians from the Greeks and both of them from the Turks, the last named being told that these limits would not be transgressed. Mr. Balfour suggested that General Allenby who was the supreme Allied authority in the whole of the Turkish Empire should be instructed to send officers to the spot to settle frontiers beyond which none of the litigants should go.

Signor Tittoni agreed that assurances must be given to the Turks but considered that the best way to proceed would be for the Italians and the Greeks to come to a direct understanding and to undertake not to exceed their present limits.<sup>1</sup>

M. Clemenceau favoured this scheme. He suggested that Signor Tittoni and M. Venizelos should endeavour to reach an agreement to-morrow and that the Conference should then inform the Turks that they need not fear invasion.

<sup>1</sup> In this connexion Mr. Balfour had recorded in a note dated at Paris, July 1, 1919, a general conversation which he had had there that morning with Signor Tittoni (cf. No. 4, note 3): 'As regards troops in Asia Minor, he [Signor Tittoni] informed me that M. Venizelos was an old friend of his, that he, Signor Tittoni, had always when in office pursued a pro-Greek policy, and that he did not doubt that a friendly conversation with the Greek Prime Minister would lead to the happiest results. I encouraged him in this idea, but when he suggested that perhaps the best immediate solution of the military question would be to draw, by mutual consent, between the Greeks and the Italians a line of demarcation which neither was to pass, I avoided giving any reply, favourable or unfavourable.'

'He raised the old Italian demand, which has always seemed to me curiously fantastic, for supplying Italian deficiencies in coal, iron and other raw material by concessions in Asia Minor, and he went back to the question which Baron Sonnino was fond of raising, of the coal mines at Heraclea. He had already, it seems, opened on this theme to M. Clemenceau. I said that M. Clemenceau was obviously more concerned in the subject than we were, seeing that the coal mines were at present worked by a French company. Signor Tittoni expressed in this connection a very sensible view, that merely to add square kilometres to Italian territory was worse than useless, and would merely increase Italian responsibilities. What was really wanted was, as I have already indicated, raw material.'

It was agreed that M. Venizelos and Signor Tittoni should endeavour to come to an understanding on the subject to-morrow. . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of this telegram reported discussion in the Supreme Council of other matters. The official minutes of this meeting of the Supreme Council are printed in Volume I, No. 12.

No. 460

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received July 30)*

No. 1230 [109747/75458/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 17, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of your Lordship, copy of a letter of the 2nd July, which I have addressed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the removal of General Mustapha Kemal Pasha and General Djemal Pasha from their posts, and copy of the reply received thereto of the 10th July.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 460

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs*

No. M. 2002

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 2, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, from reports received, there appears to be a serious movement in the districts of Sivas and Konia, having as its object the formation of armed bands and action contrary to the interests of the Allies.

2. This movement appears to be directed by agents of the Committee of Union and Progress, and to contemplate action independent of the Ottoman Government.

3. The principal instigators of this movement are General Mustapha Kemal Pasha, at Sivas, and General Djemal Pasha, at Konia.

4. On the 6th June, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, requested the Ottoman Minister of War to remove General Mustapha Kemal Pasha from his appointment. An order to this effect was despatched to that officer by the Ottoman Minister of War on the 8th June, but so far it has not been complied with.

5. I addressed a letter to your Excellency on the 17th June<sup>1</sup> in the same sense, but no reply has been given to my letter nor has any effect been given to the request contained therein.

6. It is my duty to draw the attention of your Excellency once again to the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

gravity of the information which is being received from the interior, to the disastrous effects of the occurrence there of untoward incidents, and to the immediate necessity of recalling to Constantinople, without conditions and without delay, both Generals Mustapha Kemal and Djemal Pashas.

7. I request that I may be immediately informed what action is taken on receipt of my letter, a copy of which is being forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 460

*Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe*

Sublime Porte

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

H. G. 16774

H. S. 315

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 10 juillet 1919

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser, le 2 juillet,<sup>2</sup> concernant l'agitation qui règnerait à Sivas et à Konia et la nécessité de rappeler à Constantinople les Généraux Moustapha Kémal et Djémal Pachas.

En réponse, je m'empresse d'informer votre Excellence que Kémal Pacha, n'ayant pas immédiatement obtempéré à l'injonction qui lui a été faite de rentrer sans retard à Constantinople, a été relevé, par iradé Impérial, de ses fonctions d'inspecteur de la troisième zone militaire. Il n'a donc plus aucune qualité officielle. Ce fait a été porté à la connaissance de toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de ladite zone.

Quant à Djémal Pacha, inspecteur d'armée à Konia, il se trouve déjà à Constantinople depuis plus d'une semaine.

En ce qui concerne l'agitation susvisée, je me permettrai de faire observer tout d'abord qu'elle n'existe pas avant l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes helléniques et qu'il ne serait pas exact de l'imputer uniquement aux affiliés de l'Union et Progrès. Elle est due, avant tout, à l'indignation profonde causée par l'invasion absolument injustifiée desdites troupes dans le vilayet d'Aidin et le caza d'Edremid et aux horreurs et atrocités inouies commises par elles de connivence avec les bandes grecques qu'elles ont formées sur les lieux.

La surexcitation des populations musulmanes a encore été accrue par les bruits concernant l'extension du territoire de la République arménienne jusqu'à Sivas, et la formation dans le vilayet de Trébizonde d'un nouvel État grec sous le nom de République du Pont.

A cette surexcitation, parfaitement compréhensible, des musulmans s'est ajouté naturellement le souci de défendre leur honneur, leur vie et leurs biens en cas où de nouvelles invasions viendraient à avoir lieu.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 1 above.

Bien que les massacres, les viols et les déprédatations de toute nature commis par les Grecs ne laissent pas que de justifier l'effervescence et les inquiétudes de la population dont il s'agit, le Gouvernement Impérial, dans son vif désir de maintenir la sécurité dans le pays et de prévenir toute perturbation, n'a pas manqué et ne manque pas de travailler, par tous les moyens qui lui restent, à l'apaisement des esprits et de recommander toujours la modération.

Je suis porté à croire qu'il vaut mieux ne pas avoir recours en pareille circonstance à des mesures de violence extrêmes qui pourraient bien avoir pour résultat une plus grande exaspération des populations en question. Cet inconvénient aurait existé même dans le cas où l'effectif de l'armée ottomane n'aurait pas été considérablement réduit, comme il l'est à l'heure actuelle.

Néanmoins, les autorités Impériales desdites provinces, conformément aux ordres catégoriques et réitérés qui leur ont été donnés, déploient tout leur zèle pour maintenir la sécurité qui, heureusement, ne peut pas être considérée comme étant troublée.

A ce propos, je crois de mon devoir d'attirer une nouvelle fois l'attention la plus sérieuse de votre Excellence sur le fait que des associations d'agitateurs politiques, patronnées et aidées par certaines institutions ecclésiastiques, tâchent de provoquer des troubles et de se livrer à des excitations et agressions dans le dessein d'irriter et d'exaspérer l'élément musulman et de l'amener à se porter à des représailles et à des excès. Le but qu'elles poursuivent est évident, comme j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de le relever. Elles veulent, par là, jeter le discrédit et l'opprobre sur le peuple turc, accréditer l'opinion que le Gouvernement est impuissant à remplir ses devoirs et obtenir ainsi la réalisation de toutes les visées et convoitises grecques.

Avant de terminer, je me permettrai de dire que le moyen le plus efficace de calmer les esprits et d'assurer le règne de la tranquillité serait de mettre les troupes hellènes en demeure d'évacuer les territoires qu'elles ont envahis en Asie Mineure, au mépris des droits les plus incontestables du Gouvernement ottoman et de la nation turque, et qu'elles continuent à souiller des crimes les plus odieux, avec l'assistance des troupes grecques.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Le Ministre *ad interim* des Affaires Étrangères.)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In Constantinople despatch No. 1296 of July 25, 1919 (received August 7), Admiral Calthorpe further transmitted a copy of a report of July 5 from Captain Perring at Samsoun that 'Moustafa Kemal Pasha has now been dismissed: he has left Amassia and is now on his way to Erzeroum with his staff. He has issued an appeal to the Turkish people telling them to obey his orders only, and that the Government is incapable and is selling the country. Orders have been received by all Government Officials to accept no orders from Kemal Pasha and notifying his dismissal. Although a certain amount of unrest has been caused by the meetings organised by him, the whole movement appears to have had little success and for the most part not much interest is taken; the worst feature is the organization of the brigand bands.' In his covering despatch Admiral Calthorpe stated that he intended to insist that the Turkish Government should treat Mustafa Kemal Pasha as an outlaw, and observed: 'The extent to which he may become a power for evil is difficult, for the present, to gauge. It will largely depend, I am of opinion, on the course of events in other portions of Turkey and also on developments that may occur in the Central Government consequent upon the return of the Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha.'

No. 461

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)*

*No. 60 Telegraphic [357/1/3/15709]*

PARIS, July 21, 1919

Your telegram No. 129<sup>1</sup> of July 16th.

Following resolutions were passed by Council of Five on July 18th.<sup>2</sup>

1. Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the Armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander in Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2. The Commander in Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic [*sic*] possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3. Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander in Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.<sup>3</sup>

Your [You] should inform the Turkish Government in the sense of resolution 1 as soon as your French and Italian colleagues are similarly instructed.

The Council also approved on July 18 the following agreement between Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Venezelos which had been reached as a result of discussions between them authorised by Council of Five:—

The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia

<sup>1</sup> Nos. 457-8.

<sup>2</sup> For the official minutes of the discussions and resolutions on Turkish affairs in the Supreme Council on July 18, 1919, see Volume I, Nos. 14 and 15. The latter document includes the record of the further decision, adopted that day by the Supreme Council, appointing an Allied Commission of Enquiry into the allegations in connexion with the Greek occupation of the district of Smyrna.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Balfour had commented as follows on these resolutions in a personal telegram of July 18, 1919, on various topics, for transmission to the Prime Minister (Peace Conference telegram No. 1178, received in Foreign Office, July 19): 'There may be objections to Asia Minor scheme; but no other that I can think of is likely to reassure Turks, to control Greeks and Italians, or to maintain position of Allied Council. Moreover it is logical result of our having made Allenby Commander-in-Chief (?) in Asia and Turkey. Tittoni made an appeal to us not to compel an Italian evacuation which he said would destroy his Government and do no good. We have not said yes or no to this appeal; in to-day's proceedings we specifically reserved point and by formally putting all Italian troops in Anatolia under a British Commander-in-Chief we greatly increase our power to guide course of events.' (For the appointment to the command-in-chief see, however, No. 476.)

Minor begins from the mouth of the river K. Menderez: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk-Scala-Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassoluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 metres from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greeks troops [*sic*] to protect the railway from sudden attacks from Comitagis.

The line will then reach the river Muschluk-Deresi which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuchk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite régime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations.

Please inform General Milne and explain situation to S.N.O. at Smyrna. Instructions are being telegraphed by the War Office to Generals Allenby and Milne, the latter being requested to give you a copy.

Repeated to Cairo No. 69 and F.O. (by bag) No. 1186.

#### No. 462

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 21)*

*No. 1180 Telegraphic [105291/707/44]*

PARIS, July 21, 1919

Your telegram No. 974.<sup>1</sup>

Reference to previous correspondence e.g. telegram to Sir R. Rodd No. 68<sup>2</sup> January 11th and his telegram No. 66<sup>2</sup> January 18th will show that Italian occupation has never received encouragement or tacit sanction from us. On the contrary Prime Minister has spoken to Italian representatives most strongly on subject e.g. at Council of Four on May 19th. 'Unless Italy removed her troops he would take no further part in discussion of Asia Minor. The Italian action was a direct defiance of Council, etc.'<sup>3</sup>

Situation is however now governed by decision of Supreme Council recorded in my telegram No. 1174<sup>4</sup> July 18th.

<sup>1</sup> No. 455.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, p. 719.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This telegram summarized the proceedings of the Supreme Council on the morning of July 18, 1919; the minutes of this meeting are printed in Volume I, No. 14; the decision in question was that recorded in minute 4 of that document (cf., in the present volume, No. 461).

No. 463

*Lord Acton<sup>1</sup> (Berne) to Earl Curzon (Received August 5)*

No. 460 [112009/27947/19]

BERNE, July 21, 1919

My Lord,

M. Alexandri, the Greek Minister at Berne, who has recently spent some time in Paris as expert adviser to the Greek delegation on the Thracian question, informed me yesterday in the course of a long conversation that, previous to his departure for America, President Wilson had intimated to M. Venezelos in confidence that although he would now conform to the attitude of Great Britain, France and Japan in the matter of the Greek territorial claims in Asia Minor and elsewhere, he was personally adverse from assigning to another state territory inhabited by an alien race. Mr. Wilson added that he now fully realised the mistake he had committed in advocating the union of German South Tyrol to Italy, which decision contained the element of endless future discord.

I am sending a copy of the present despatch to the British Delegates to the Peace Conference.

I have, &c.,

ACTON

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Berne.

No. 464

*Letter from Mr. Hohler<sup>1</sup> (Constantinople) to Sir J. Tilley<sup>2</sup>*

(Received August 6)

Unnumbered [112773/3050/44A]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 21, 1919

Dear Tilley,

I haven't the slightest idea who runs the Eastern Dept. now, but I notice you sign a good many despatches that come out here, so I hope it's you.

My present trouble is Kurds. Noel has arrived here from Baghdad, and he is a nice fellow and an able one, but he is another fanatic. He is the apostle to the Kurds. There is no one like them, so good and noble and generous! The Turks and Armenians are equally worthless and despicable. Kurds never killed any Armenians, but saved thousands of them, on the contrary; though the Armenians killed lots of Kurds. In fact they never did any harm. I am afraid Noel may turn out a Kurdish Col: Lawrence. Now please see our telegram 1437<sup>3</sup> of July 10, which was the result of much discussion and reflection. It appeared to me certain—as certain as anything can be—that Mesopotamia will be ours, and that it must have a northern frontier: that

<sup>1</sup> Political Officer of the British High Commission at Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> An Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office.

<sup>3</sup> No. 451.

this frontier can not be in the plains but on the mountains: that these mountains are essentially Kurdish; and that consequently it becomes essential to have a Kurdish policy, and to be on good terms with the Kurdish Chiefs, so as to be able to make use of them. At the present time, until some policy is formulated by His Majesty's Government, I conceive we should be most cautious and go very slow on the lines already laid down—that we will do our best to see that their just claims are not disregarded—and get such one of them for the moment as is demanded by the necessities of the moment. There is, at the present time, great need of tranquillizing the borderland in order to save the alternative need of doing so by force—either with Turkish or British soldiers. The latter cannot be spared, and while we have been asked several times to obtain the services of the former, I have opposed it to the utmost, as I think it is derogatory and undesirable in the highest degree to ask for the military help of those whom we have first conquered and then demobilized. Consequently we did some very careful sounding—much on the lines of the previous advances of the Kurds to us, especially by Abdul Kadir—and ascertained that they were willing to go back to Kurdistan and to use their influence for the maintenance of order. This having been done unofficially, I received them and had a long talk, when they brought up the question of the safety *here* of their families etc, as we knew they would. I made it as clear as words five times repeated can make things clear that we were *not* out for intrigues against the Turks, and that I could promise *nothing whatsoever* as regards the future of Kurdistan, but if they thought their influence would be successful in maintaining order in those regions, and if they were willing to go and use their influence, so long would we employ all our good offices, should necessity arise, on behalf of their families here. But we could not do so if they were found preparing a movement against the Turks or anything of that kind: pending the decision of the Peace Conference our *sole* object was the preservation of order—which was the vital interest of all parties. It had been arranged that, not to attract attention, they should not travel down with Noel, but go separately. I think there can be no objection to the above, and indeed there was no other course to take. The Chiefs agreed, declaring that they would do nothing whatever beyond try to maintain order. But Noel was not content to let well alone, but despite the warnings Ryan<sup>4</sup> and I gave him, accepted an invitation to the Kurdish Club, going there in his uniform, and what he further said I do not know. When I told him I thought this unwise, all he did was to accept an invitation to meet the Kurdish ladies with whom he spent three hours. Of course, this attracted great attention, as you will see from the enclosed extract from an intelligence report which is entirely confirmed. The situation thus created is unfortunate and commits us badly, both in regard to the Kurds and the Turks. Noel wasn't the least worried over it, but only thought how acutely his new friends had answered up. But we are likely to have some trouble out of it.

As I put in that telegram<sup>3</sup> I was surprised to find how deep and how

<sup>4</sup> Second Political Officer to H.M. High Commissioner at Constantinople.

genuine is the split between the Turks and the Kurds—among those that I saw, at all events, who at least are the biggest there are here, and have the best right to speak for their people, but it must not be forgotten that there is every shade of Kurd like there is every colour in the spectrum, and that all history goes to show that they are mighty unreliable. It must not be forgotten also that Turks and Kurds are both Moslems, even if the latter are in large part Shiite and in large part very bad Moslems, and many I believe get along very nicely without any religion at all. But it is a bond which is always capable, under certain circumstances, of pulling—to the breach. But the Kurds have been getting extremely bad treatment of late years from the Turks. Yet if it is the intention of His Majesty's Government—as appears to be the case—to weaken the Turks to the very utmost, it is no bad plan to detach the Kurds from them, and with care and patience I think it can be done to a large extent. Only it is impossible to proceed with too great circumspection, and this is not appreciated by Noel and others. I think I ought to warn you people in the F.O. of this, so that you may be able to shape your instructions accordingly. All these things would be so infinitely easier if one only knew what the desires of H.M.G. were, and how far it is thought in conformity with British interests to proceed. Here the question of the protection of the Mesopotamian frontier brings us up definitely and irrevocably against a very big question of policy in which an authoritative ruling must be given before very long. I wish Noel wasn't quite such an out-and-out Kurd! Another detail: while the Turks are feeling as shown in my enclosure, Baghdad is asking us to ask the Turks to instruct the Valis of Erzeroum, Bitlis, Van and Diarbekir to assist him in his journey. A little awkward, isn't it?

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter, and I wish you would tell me at the same time who is in charge now of the Department, if it is not you.

Yours ever,  
TOM HOHLER

It occurred to me that these families which the Chiefs want protected might conceivably serve in case of necessity as hostages in our hands.

#### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 464

##### Kurdish Affairs and Cabinet:—

It is very reliably reported that the Turkish Government summoned a delegation of the Kurdish notables residing here to explain the activities of the Kurdish party.

A delegation under the presidency of Sheikh Seyid Abdul Kader Effendi and comprising Mevlani Zadeh Rifaat Bey, journalist, Emin Ali Bey, former official at Adrianople of the Ministry of Justice, and Emin Bey, a Kurdish notable, attended at the Sublime Porte and were received by Avni Pasha, Minister of Marine, Ahmed Abuk Pasha, ex Minister for War and the ex-Sheik-ul-Islam Haidar Effendi.

These Ministers asked the delegation for explanations on their recent activities and desired to be informed on what authority the Kurdish party

were negotiating with the British in Constantinople on matters relating to Kurdistan. This, they pointed out, was a purely interior question the decision of which depended on the Porte, which was in a position to grant a large autonomy to the Kurds.

Mevlan Zadeh Rifaat Bey, speaking on behalf of the Sheikh Seyid Abdul Kader Effendi, replied that according to the Wilsonian principles every nationality had the right to work for their own welfare and that the Kurds were convinced that the only Power which could assure them freedom and security was Great Britain. They had therefore considered it desirable to approach the British Authorities. He asked how it could be possible for the Turkish Government to grant any form of autonomy to the Kurds seeing that the Turks themselves were not sure of their own position.

This last question angered Ahmed Abuk Pasha who jumped up fr[om]<sup>6</sup> his chair and said that the Government was now stronger than eve[r]<sup>6</sup> that they had decided not to hand over a foot of land to any . . . er<sup>6</sup> whatever; that orders had been given to all army commanders . . . [? in]<sup>6</sup> the Caucasus to oppose any advance of foreign troops and not . . . [? to]<sup>6</sup> allow the installation of the Armenian refugees.

Ahmed Abuk Pasha stopped there having been brought to ord[er]<sup>6</sup> by a look from Avni Pasha.

<sup>6</sup> The text here is torn.

#### No. 465

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 25)*

*No. 1525 Telegraphic [107802/75458/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 23, 1919

In the course of a long conversation with my French colleague on July 22nd we were entirely agreed on the following points:—

1. That our first duty was to see that Armistice was fully and completely carried out.
2. That we took no side in politics.
3. That we supported legally constituted authority with a view to maintenance of law and order.
4. That consequently we supported the Sultan and would oppose any kind of revolution.
5. That we considered under present circumstances elections were impracticable and even dangerous.

My French colleague is telegraphing in the same sense to his Government. We were unable to consult Italian High Commissioner<sup>1</sup> as he is now acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Rome and his 'locum tenens' is seriously ill.

My conversation with Monsieur Defrance was occasioned by extreme

<sup>1</sup> Count Sforza.

gravity of local situation. A political meeting was held on night of July 21st in Stamboul to demand resignation of new Cabinet<sup>2</sup> and mention was even made of dethronement of Sultan. Movement in favour of new elections is gaining impetus. Any (?) election(s) at present time even if speciously presented as necessary for the purpose of ratifying Peace Treaty (?) when ever that may be presented could not be anything but a farce and could only tend to strengthen Committee party which most Nationalist Turks are to-day viewing with increasing sympathy owing to (events)<sup>3</sup> at Smyrna.

Grand Vizier who visited me on July 22nd remains personally as hostile as ever to elections but his hand is forced by his colleagues. I allowed him to take careful note of above points which guide actions of this and French High Commissions. His Highness fears despite even this expression of our views as regards elections they will be called for and he hopes that they will be prevented by further action on our part. He again stated half internal trouble would be avoided if a proper definition of Greek Zone at Smyrna were given and I assured him that this most important matter was now occupying very serious attention of Peace Conference.

My French Colleague with whom I am working in complete agreement thinks great prolongation of armistice has brought Turkish Government as well as High Commissions into an exceedingly difficult position.

It has acted as a powerful dissolvent upon administration to a position of such dangerous weakness, to say nothing of financial position, that it threatens to fall into complete chaos so that Allied Powers may be forced to take charge of a situation which he regards with no little alarm. This opinion however I cannot fully share so long as capital remains the seat of Government for if even present and late Grand Viziers were to find themselves unable to carry on Government and were obliged to yield to Nationalist party even these would have (?) no one to look to but us and could probably be brought into line fairly easily as they are in no position for any effective hostile action.

Grand Vizier said that Mustapha Kemal was convoking Congresses at Sivas and Erzeroum and that one of subjects of discussion which was to

<sup>2</sup> Damad Ferid Pasha had, on his return from Paris (cf. No. 466), reconstituted his cabinet on July 21, 1919. In the new cabinet he was Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Sabri Effendi was Sheik-ul-Islam and Acting President of the Council of State. Admiral Calthorpe, in Constantinople telegram No. 1521 of July 23 (received next day), reported of this ministerial regrouping that Damad Ferid Pasha 'was by no means ready to abandon power, and he apparently secured ear of Sultan. Firman reappointing him leader lays stress on necessity for "neutral and homogeneous Ministry, unconnected with parties". Result is Cabinet as weak as any since the armistice and it comes into power at moment when influence of Central Government in provinces is at lowest ebb. Entente Liberals are furious, and may get it out at any moment. If it holds on at all, it will be by attempting to placate Chauvinists, who will have in most of its members lukewarm opponents or moderate sympathisers. Majority of Ministers seem also to be in favour of holding elections or pretending to hold them. Practically all parties desire or profess to desire single Mandate to be undertaken by England. If smallest encouragement were forthcoming on our side all sorts of now divergent elements would rally round this idea, especially if Greeks were confined within moderate limits in Smyrna region.'

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

commence he understood on July 23rd was to be the declaration of an Anatolia independent of Constantinople. He has issued circular instructions to Provinces that these meetings are illegal, unconstitutional and against the will of the Sultan. The results of this movement are to be awaited with interest as they will go far to show how far disintegration of Ottoman Empire has proceeded.

No. 466

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received August 7)*

No. 1286 [113174/83495/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 26, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a report dated 23rd July 1919, of the journey of the Turkish Delegation from Paris, which has been compiled by Lieut. Col. W. F. Blaker, who accompanied the Delegation.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 466

*Notes of the Journey of the Turkish Delegation from Versailles to Constantinople*

At 7.30 p.m. on 4th July the Turkish Delegation left Versailles for Lausanne where it had permission to remain til[!] 10th July for the purpose of attending to the repatriation of Turkish subjects marooned in Switzerland.

All arrangements for the entire journey to Constantinople were supposed to have been made by the French, Lieut. Le Révérend of the French Navy being the Liaison Officer particularly detailed to take charge. The arrangements were, however, hopelessly inadequate throughout, as the following narrative will show.

1. During the afternoon of 4th July, one of the Turkish Secretaries went to the Gare de Lyon to make sure that a sleeping car and a 1st Class Saloon carriage had been reserved and that the railway authorities had been duly warned of the departure of the Delegation. He was accompanied by a French Military Liaison Officer. The pair found that the railway authorities had received no intimation of any kind and spent 2 hours before the necessary negotiations with them were concluded.

2. Lieut. Le Révérend did not leave Versailles with the Delegation; instead he remained in Paris and followed later in the train that took the Delegates on from Lausanne.

The Delegation was told that rooms had been engaged for it at the Royal Hotel, Lausanne, and that a sleeping car had been reserved in the Orient Express leaving for Bukharest at 6.45 a.m. on 10th July. It was also stated that a dining car would be attached to the train throughout its journey but

no other details were communicated to the Delegation or to either of the Allied Liaison Officers who started with it viz Capt. Ferrari of the Italian Army and myself.

3. The original passports said to have been issued to the Turks when they left Constantinople for Toulon were retained in Paris by Le Révérend. It subsequently transpired that he took no steps either to provide others or even to ensure that the Swiss Authorities on the frontier had been informed of the impending arrival of the Delegation. Considerable trouble was consequently experienced at Geneva; the Swiss there threatened to send the Turks back over the French border and it took me more than an hour's arguing before I could persuade them to allow the Delegates to proceed; they consented in the end but only after I had given a written undertaking to obtain all necessary passports at Lausanne.

4. Thanks to Rechad Halis Bey, the Turkish Minister at Berne, the accommodation provided at the Hotel Royal was very good.

5. On 7th July, I interviewed the British Consul at Lausanne about my own passport. He telephoned to the British Minister at Berne on the subject and learned incidentally that the latter knew nothing about the journey of the Turkish Delegation beyond what had appeared in the Press. This being so I determined to go to Berne next day myself to see the British Minister and to discuss with him the whole question of passports etc.

6. I arrived at Berne at 10.30 a.m. on 8th July and explained the entire situation to Legation Secretaries Messrs. Craigie and Sargent who were acting for the British Minister in the temporary absence of Lord Acton. Mr. Craigie telephoned to the French and Italian Legations at Berne but only to find that they also knew very little about the Delegation and that neither had received any instructions to help it on its way. The following telegram was then despatched 'Urgent' by Mr. Craigie to Lord Derby:—

'Colonel Blaker requests that following may be communicated at once to the Mission Henri (see below) "Please ensure that all arrangements are complete for free passage of Turk Delegation to Constanza through the various countries through which the Delegation has to pass, particularly as regards viséing of passports by British, Italian, Serbian and Roumanian Missions in Paris. Difficulties have already been experienced owing to Delegation arriving without passports. French and Italian Missions here have no instructions to facilitate journey so I presume all arrangements are being made in Paris. Delegation due to leave for Constantinople 10th July. 6.45 a.m."'

(*Note*:—The Mission Henri is at Versailles where it forms a Liaison Group between Enemy delegations and Entente Governments; all Allied Liaison Officers belong to it and it is responsible for all matters connected with the surveillance, housing, movements etc., of all enemy delegations. Its Commander, Colonel Henri, of the French Army is directly under M. Dutasta, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference.)

7. I then proceeded to the Turkish Legation where I conferred with the Turkish Minister. He told me he did not know whether Le Révérend was

bringing any passports from Paris and that the only document so far prepared was a kind of Safe Conduct made out by himself to certify that the Delegation was authorised to proceed to Constantinople. This Safe Conduct had not been viséed by the representatives of any other Powers and was therefore practically worthless. I urged the Turkish Minister to have proper passports made out and viséed for all and to have them ready in case Le Révérend brought none. He promised to do this but did not succeed till [il] 4.30 a.m. on the 10th, i.e. about 2 hours before the Turkish Delegation was due to entrain at Lausanne. Passports were subsequently asked for before the train left Swiss territory, again in Italy and again in Roumania.

8. On my return to the British Legation I again saw Mr. Sargent who gave me a British Safe Conduct for the Delegation as a whole. Both he and Mr. Craigie helped me in every possible way, and I doubt whether the Turks would have got passports at all had it not been for them. Le Révérend brought no passports when he eventually arrived from Paris in the train by which the Delegation proceeded to Bukharest.

9. By the time the Delegation left Lausanne four young Imperial Princes and three so-called A.D.C.'s had been added to it, thus bringing the total (including Le Révérend) to 24 people. One or two of the Princes had enormous quantities of baggage which brought the amount for the whole Delegation up to 5,000 kilograms. To compete with this and to reduce the risk of thefts and loss I engaged a whole truck which was sealed up and booked right through to Constanza.

10. The increased numbers of Delegates had also rendered one sleeping car insufficient and it was not known whether the French had arranged for the 1st Class Saloon carriage to be available beyond Lausanne. To be on the safe side I tried to take another saloon carriage but was unable to get one. I asked the Turkish Minister to wire to Milan and Trieste for a saloon to be available at one of these places but the wire (if it was ever sent) produced no result. The best that could be done was to engage a couple of compartments anywhere on the train. I did this but the outcome was unsatisfactory. The French had not arranged for a saloon beyond Lausanne; the overflow of Turks from the sleeping car was constantly jostled by other passengers in the two compartments I had engaged and a good deal of grumbling on the part of the Turks was the inevitable consequence.

11. Except for this all went fairly well till about 11 p.m. when Trieste was reached and the dining car detached from the train. This was quite contrary to what Le Révérend had said, so no arrangements had been made to meet the contingency. The journey was continued via Laibach, Agram, Jasenovaer [*sic*] and Brod to Vinkovce where the Belgrad line branches off. At most stations of any importance there was an undignified scramble for food but it was not easy to get enough for 24 people, and little beyond dry bread, cheese and water was procured. At Vinkovce, which was reached about 6 p.m. on the 11th, the more active members of the party made a dash for food at a restaurant nearly 2 miles away. A meal of sorts was obtained but the seniors, such as Damad Ferid and Tewfik Pasha got none of it. They had to be

content with such victuals as could be brought to them from the restaurant plus a few bottles of wine raised by somebody. Before the train left Vinkovce there was another undignified scene in the form of a quarrel about the baggage truck which had been forcibly opened and was being used for other baggage including some belonging to a French Mission on its way from Buda-Pesth to Arad. Le Révérend and I determined to hang on to our truck at all costs but offered to load the Mission's baggage with our own. We got our way in the end and compelled the station-master to put on a fresh truck for the baggage of other travellers, but the delay resulted in our not leaving Vinkovce till 10.15 p.m. It is possible that the obstruction of the railway authorities was deliberate and that palm-oil was what they really wanted. Several of the passengers from Buda-Pesth told me that at one place their train had been stopped on the plea that coal had given out; it did not proceed until the passengers paid for more coal out of their own pockets.

From Vinkovce onwards the train was crowded and the overflow Turks in their two compartments suffered considerable discomfort.

12. Buckharest [sic] was reached at 7.30 a.m. on the 13th. There was no one at the station to meet the Delegation, so Le Révérend and I went off to the French Ministry to make enquiries whilst the Turks were compelled to wait in the common waiting room. None of the French Staff Offices opened till 9.30 and it was 10 or later before we found any French Naval Officers who could tell us anything about the *Waldeck Rousseau*<sup>1</sup> which was supposed to be waiting for us at Constanza. They said that two or three telegrams had already come from the French Admiral who would be obliged to sail for Constantinople not later than 1 p.m. A telegram was sent asking him to wait if possible.

From the Naval Office, Le Révérend and I went to the French Ministry to see M. Cambon.<sup>2</sup> He knew nothing about the Delegation at all although, according to Le Révérend, a telegram had been despatched to him from Paris on 6th or 7th July; Le Révérend could not remember which. In the end, a wireless message was sent to the *Waldeck Rousseau* and a reply received to say she would wait.

Meanwhile, nothing was done for the Turks until I pointed out that they were still herded in the common buffet at the station. Cars were then promptly sent by M. Cambon and satisfactory arrangements made to feed and house the Delegation for the rest of the day in various hotels. All this was done by M. Cambon himself and by one of his Secretaries. Lieut. Le Révérend went off to lunch with friends and did not again appear until the train was due to start at 11.55 p.m., a fact which gave rise to a good deal of unfavourable comment from the Turks.

13. About 1 p.m. I went to the British Ministry and saw Mr. Rattigan.<sup>3</sup> I told him I considered the *Waldeck Rousseau* a very doubtful reed to lean on and suggested drafting a telegram for me to send by wireless from Constanza

<sup>1</sup> A French cruiser.

<sup>2</sup> M. Henri Cambon, son of M. Paul Cambon, was French chargé d'affaires at Bucharest.

<sup>3</sup> His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.

to the British High Commissioner in the event of it being necessary to ask for a British ship. I had told Le Révérend before that I proposed to do this; he agreed that the Turkish Delegation had already lost a good deal of prestige owing to events in Paris and that its prestige would sink still lower if it were seen to return to Constantinople in such small French craft as were likely to be available in place of the *Waldeck Rousseau*. Mr. Rattigan fully concurred and drew up the following for despatch if necessary:—

'To British High Commissioner, Constantinople. Colonel Blaker, Liaison Officer with Turkish Delegation returning from Paris, requests that, owing to absence of promised French Cruiser *Waldeck Rousseau* a British Cruiser may be immediately despatched to Constanza to fetch Turkish Delegation to Constantinople. You will appreciate the reasons which lead me to recommend Colonel Blaker's request to your favourable consideration. Rattigan.'

Later in the day I informed the Grand Vizier of the above draft telegram; he seemed to appreciate the plan.

During the afternoon and evening, whilst the Italian Liaison Officer attended to the Delegation, one of the Turkish Secretaries and I saw to railway accommodation, luggage etc. The French did nothing. Only a bad sleeping car without either light or water could however be procured besides a couple of equally bad compartments for the overflow party. The sealed baggage truck was the only vehicle that gave no trouble.

14. Fetesti was reached about 6 a.m. on the 14th and the Danube crossed by pontoon-ferry about 9. The ferry took the sleeping car and the truck which were hooked on to a train waiting for them on the Tchernavoda side. The new bridge of boats, some hundreds of yards above the ferry, is practically complete and rails are laid across it, but the approaches on the right bank are still sodden owing to recent floods. A Roumanian Engineer Captain in charge of the work told me that the bridge and approaches would be open for railway traffic about the middle of August.

15. When Constanza was reached at 3 p.m. it was found that the *Waldeck Rousseau* had gone and that three small French ships had been sent instead of her. They were the sloop *Altair*, the destroyer *Annamite* and the despatch vessel *La Scarpe*. The Grand Vizier was obviously displeased when he saw them more especially when he was told that, owing to lack of accommodation on the most imposing of the trio (i.e., the *Altair*) he would have to embark on the *Scarpe*. He took little pains to conceal his annoyance and asked whether a British cruiser could not be wirelessed for. I offered to send my message to the British High Commissioner, but he was finally prevailed upon to sail in the French ship when he heard that they were shallow-draft and therefore less liable to danger from mines. The Delegation embarked at 5 p.m. and was distributed as follows:—

On the *Annamite* Lt. Col. Blaker, Chevki Bey, Djemal Selman Bey and Rechad Nouri Bey.

On the *Scarpe*. The whole of the rest of the Delegation (less 1 A.D.C.), the Imperial Princes and the servants.

On the *Altair*. One A.D.C. only.

The ships left in the above-named order, the *Annamite* putting to sea about 7 and the *Scarpe* about 7.30. Their pace was regulated by the slowest of the trio, i.e., the *Altair* but I do not know when she sailed.

All went well until a sudden and severe local storm was met with about 4.30 a.m. From then onwards the voyage was distinctly unpleasant and caused a good deal of sea-sickness till the Bosphorus was entered about 7. All three ships dropped anchor in front of Dolma Bagtche.

16. The landing of the bedraggled and travel-stained Turkish Delegates was not an imposing spectacle and there is little doubt that they felt somewhat humiliated by the scant respect shown to them from the moment they were advised to leave Paris. They felt they had been unceremoniously bundled out, whilst the lack of arrangements made for their journey must have created the impression that the French Government, once its unwelcome guests were beyond the French frontier, was only too glad to wash its hands of them. It was particularly unfortunate that the Grand Vizier and an old frail man like Tewfik Pasha were subjected to avoidable discomfort and that they were denied the consideration demanded both by their status and by the rules of ordinary courtesy.

W. F. BLAKER

No. 467

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received July 28)

No. 1548 Telegraphic [108842/75458/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 27, 1919

In my telegram 1525<sup>1</sup> I referred to extreme gravity of local situation. I desire to explain exactly what I mean.

The Turks gradually came to realize their defeat and were (*sic*) prepared to (?) surrender great sections of their Empire including even perhaps Thrace and Constantinople. They were looking to His Majesty's Government for support and guidance. Then came the Greek occupation of Smyrna with its continuous series of mutual attacks and bloodshed following on Italian encroachments from Adalia and Scala Nova.

These events here inevitably led to the consolidation into one compact block of majority of Turkish parties; they have in fact resuscitated C.U.P. in a very vigorous and lively form for it appears clear to all Turks that they have nothing to hope for from any of the Western Christian powers but only from their own efforts, which will probably be equally futile as savage, taking the form of fresh attacks upon native christians.

Whereas only a few weeks ago in (?) Turkey officers<sup>2</sup> enjoyed wide influence and so were capable of doing great good, the tone has now entirely changed and they are regarded with sullen suspicion; they can now effect little or nothing, and question of withdrawing them may soon arise.

<sup>1</sup> No. 465.

<sup>2</sup> It was suggested on the original that this phrase should read '... a few weeks ago British officers'.

The present eagerness for election is all part of this state of affairs, and fact that it should have gained practically whole cabinet of so conservative a character as Grand Vizier's is highly (? indicative).

I think that elections are very undesirable as they will produce men of strongest chauvinistic and (Committee) feelings.

But to take overt action to check them is to interfere deeply in Turkish internal affairs and to override both Wilsonian principles and Turkish constitution (? so that) even if desirable it would be hard to defend.

Moreover, should meeting of Parliament be prevented here, there is nothing to prevent it assembling somewhere in the interior, indeed as you are aware Mustapha Kemal is already summoning a congress at Erzeroum.

I think you should take into consideration possibility of events taking such a turn as would result in establishment of an independent, and probably intensely fanatical and anti-European Government in Asia Minor rejecting authority of Constantinople and sovereignty of Sultan.

I fear definition of zones contained in Paris telegram No. 60<sup>3</sup> has come too late to contribute much to check the movement, and that, while it will not be difficult for officers under General Officer Commanding in Chief to put an end to disorder in that locality, there is a grave risk of our being confronted with still more serious outbreaks throughout Anatolia, the suppression of which will call for further efforts from His Majesty's Government.

<sup>3</sup> No. 461.

#### No. 468

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Barclay<sup>1</sup> (Washington)*

*No. 419 [106510/512/58]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 28, 1919

Sir,

I should be glad if you would endeavour to ascertain by unofficial enquiry whether the United States Government are making any preparations to send United States troops to Turkish Armenia in the event of their deciding to accept the mandate for that country.

I am, &c.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Counsellor in H.M. Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy.

#### No. 469

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received July 30)*

*No. 1559 Telegraphic [109740/109428/44A]*

My telegram No. 1548.<sup>1</sup>

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 29, 1919

General Officer Commanding in Chief informs me situation along Armenian Turkish frontier is fast becoming exceedingly serious and that fighting is taking place near Nacktchevan and South of Olti.

<sup>1</sup> No. 467.

He states that Kurds to number of 10,000 between Bayazid and Karakilissa are threatening to rise against Armenians, the movement being in his opinion doubtless engineered by Turkish officers and he thinks it would be advisable to press Turkish Government to do all in their power to check these movements before they spread further.

I intend to do this but in view of conditions stated in my . . .<sup>2</sup> telegram not much result is to be anticipated.

A very awkward situation might be created for Armenians and ourselves by a coalition of all Moslem populations including Tartars in those wild and remote regions where I understand our forces are not very strong and I think one should not exclude possibility even of Georgians joining them.

I take this opportunity of drawing your serious attention to fact that publication of Peace Terms of a nature favourable to Christians and unfavourable to Moslems without first taking steps to insure their execution would cause most serious danger. Nor can matter be indefinitely postponed.

All this talk about a greater Armenia is fanning flame of the national movement, is playing into hands of the extremists and by bringing Kurds back into line with Turks is strengthening forces of Pan Islamism.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read ' . . . in my above-mentioned telegram'.

#### No. 470

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received August 20)*

*No. 1422 [118411/521/44]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1919*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, reports<sup>1</sup> from Commander Heathcote-Smith R.N.V.R., from Capt. Perring, and from Lieut. Slade, who as members of the Greek and Armenian Section of this High Commission recently visited certain of the Black Sea Coast provinces of Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

#### 1. *Public Security*

The state of public security goes from bad to worse, and as has already been stated in recent reports the spread of the 'National Movement' has given a fresh impetus to outlawry and brigandage, the forces of which are now being enlisted in a Crusade nominally for the defence of Turkish independence.

Moustafa Kemal Pasha and those associated with him have severed connection with the Central Government, and impose their authority on the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. These reports were as summarized below.

<sup>2</sup> Commander Heathcote-Smith's report of July 24, 1919, described a journey (July 3-24) from Constantinople to Trebizond and back. Captain Perring's report of July 25 covered visits to Termé, Unia, Niksar, Erbaa, and Amassia. Lieut. Slade's report of July 22 described a visit to Kastamouni.

local officials. Their intention to convoke a national Congress at Erzeroum seems no longer doubtful, and although the establishment of an independent Government is not yet an accomplished fact, the gradual extinction of the authority of the Central Government is undeniable.

Accurate information with regard to the movement, its leaders, their resources and their programme is hard to obtain. As to its origin, however, and the secret of its rapid spread there can be little doubt. Greek occupations and Italian encroachments, coupled with rumours of a coming Pontine Republic and an independent Armenia, had aroused feelings of alarm and unrest among the Moslems of Anatolia, and made them an ideal field for the activities of Nationalist agitators, with which a weak and bankrupt Central Government has been unable to cope. The movement however does not appear to be a spontaneous one, but to be due in a very large degree to the instigations of its leaders assisted by the organization of the Committee of Union and Progress which is still in being throughout the provinces.

There is little doubt that the arrest and deportation of undesirables and the dismissal of certain officials and officers as recommended by our officers, would act as a considerable deterrent.

The attitude of the local Armenians does not seem to have been of a nature to give offence, but some provocation has been afforded by the injudicious language of certain prominent Greeks and by the ill-timed landing of Greek refugees in the coast towns under circumstances which gave rise to reports of an intended Greek occupation.

### *2. Restitution of Property*

Owing to the weakness and neglect of the local authorities, arrangements for the restitution of Christian property appears to have come to a standstill excepting during the temporary presence of British officers. In several districts, owing to growing insecurity, the returned Christian refugees are now showing anxiety to leave again for the coast, rather than to be placed in possession of their lands and houses, and in some cases where the deportation and massacre of Armenians was carried out with special thoroughness, practically no survivors are forthcoming to claim restitution. Under these circumstances it is questionable whether, in the absence of any power to enforce obedience, insistence on the execution of these measures may not act merely as an irritant, but be productive of more harm than good to returned refugees.

### *3. Recovery of Islamized Women and Children*

In this matter also activity seems only to be shown when the influence of British officers is brought to bear upon Turkish officials. It is believed that the majority of the Christian children who were in Moslem houses have been returned, but the same cannot be said of the women. Independently of the unwillingness of Moslems to surrender women who are inmates of their houses and have at least outwardly professed their faith, difficulty is often encountered in persuading the women themselves to return to their families.

In some cases they are terrorized into declaring falsely that they are contented with their lot; in others, and especially when they have borne children to their Moslem masters, they have to fear a cold reception from their own community, with very little prospect of a happy family life.

#### 4. *Relief*

Destitution in the area under report is widespread, and the measures for its relief are manifestly insufficient. The returned refugees are either unable to recover their lands, or fear to cultivate them owing to the prevailing insecurity. They complain that they are boycotted by their Moslem neighbours, and their tendency is to return to the coast towns where they would be still more dependent than they now are upon the doles received from relief organizations.

These latter are not in a position to undertake constructive operations for reestablishing the refugees in their former homes, providing them with timber and other requisites to make their ruined houses habitable, and enabling them to earn their own living, and the outlook for the coming winter is consequently an extremely gloomy one.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

#### No. 471

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received August 13)*

No. 1353 [115591/75458/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 31, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Hohler, regarding a conversation which he had yesterday with the Grand Vizier.

2. Among points touched upon in this interview, the first one which I wish to deal with is the question of the personal safety of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, in the event of the abdication of the one and the resignation of the other, as both of them have, according to every indication which has reached me, done their utmost to carry out the terms of the Armistice and to conform to them. I consider it will be proper and in conformity with the views of His Majesty's Government that I should take any steps that might be necessary to ensure that these persons should be treated with all proper respect, and that they should not be molested in any way, nor their safety endangered.

3. With regard to the political issues involved, I find myself confronted by very serious difficulties. It is not many days past that I telegraphed to you that the situation here has gone beyond the application of any local remedy,<sup>1</sup> and to this view I still strongly adhere, but no remedy is coming or appears to be in sight from outside, and it becomes therefore incumbent to consider

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 434.

what action, if any, should be taken in order to meet the present complications.

4. It is by no means easy to estimate accurately the importance which is to be attached to the 'congresses' which are now being held at Erzeroum, Sivas, and Amassia, and though at times the Grand Vizier is disposed to make light of them, it is only natural that a man in his position should do so in order not to admit that the authority of his own Government was seriously shaken. At other times he contradicts himself, and confesses that the situation is very serious, and it was only yesterday he admitted to Mr. Hohler, in plain words, the possibility of the provinces shaking off their allegiance to the capital.

5. The precarious position of the present Government is sufficiently clearly shown by the memorandum which I enclose. It is a Government which shows good-will, and is, I think, genuinely in favour of the Allies, understanding that the Turkish Empire can have no possible hope save in them. It is, however, little able to ensure that its orders shall be carried out in the provinces, and it appears to contain within itself certain disloyal elements. It seems certain that it can only be maintained in power by a very determined effort on the part of the Allies. But it has been our policy not to interfere more than appeared indispensable for the maintenance of public order in the internal affairs of the Empire, and whilst in a number of cases our interest on behalf of the Christian populations has carried us rather far in this respect, no interference has taken place which has been instigated with a view either to the political or the commercial advantage of His Majesty's Government. In other words, our interference has been purely altruistic, and on no occasion selfish. The results promised well, and would have, I believe, been entirely satisfactory, had it not been for the unfortunate events attending the Greek occupation of Smyrna. It was these that threw the whole of the Turkish people into the orbit of the Committee of Union and Progress, a faction which, but for these events, was rapidly being broken up.

6. According to the Grand Vizier, the Sultan states that he will never accept Izzet Pasha<sup>2</sup> as his Counsellor, but it may well be that events may prove too strong for His Majesty. It is true that it might, perhaps, be possible to deter Izzet from seeking office on the lines mentioned by Mr. Hohler, but I am not certain that this is desirable. If Izzet, who of course used to be an adherent of the Committee, came into power with a Cabinet composed of Unionists, it is probable that they would be possessed of much greater authority in the provinces than the present Government; the 'congresses' in the interior would be replaced by the 'Parliament' (Ferid Pasha has had to yield to the cry for parliamentary elections, though I understand that it is his intention to protract the proceedings as much as possible) in the capital, where it would be exposed to the powerful influences of the Entente forces; much lip service would be rendered to the Allied High Commissioners, but a tacit and sullen opposition to any of the measures which they might desire taken in the interior for the protection of Christians would have to be anti-

<sup>2</sup> Grand Vizier, October–November 1918.

cipated. In fact, we should exchange impotence and good-will for ill-will and influence.

7. The position which I have above outlined recalls forcibly to my mind the eighth paragraph of Mr. Balfour's private letter of instructions to me on the 9th November.<sup>3</sup> At that date it appeared incredible that the Armistice could possibly be so greatly prolonged, but the turn of events is again bringing us face to face with the situation which nine months ago he was contemplating. There will be more satisfaction, even if there should be more difficulty, in exacting hard terms from the Unionists rather than those who, one has reason to believe, are fundamentally well-intentioned and friendly.

8. It is my intention therefore to be guided by the principles laid down in my telegram No. 1525<sup>4</sup> of the 23rd instant, which, not having evoked any comment from you, has presumably met with your approval.

9. I should note that whilst I expressed to the Grand Vizier the opinion that it was not desirable at the present time to hold elections, yet I have taken no further or more active steps to stop them, as it appeared to me to do so would be in contradiction with the liberal spirit of the age, and the principles of President Wilson, although opinions may differ as to how much or how little those ideals are to be considered as adaptable to the conditions prevailing in this Empire. This High Commission will continue to act in the closest accord with the French, with whom I propose to discuss at the earliest possible moment the considerations I am presenting to you in this despatch.

10. I have hopes that a material amelioration in the situation will be

<sup>3</sup> The eighth paragraph of this letter of November 9, 1918, read as follows: 'You will in all probability be approached in Constantinople by members of the so-called Opposition Party in Turkey, anxious to displace the present Government and themselves assume power. You should not be too ready to entertain such overtures. It is true, indeed, that there has always existed in Turkey an opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress but since the death of Kiamil Pasha, that party has been deprived of any leading personality, and I am convinced that under present circumstances its accession to power would be followed by internal disintegration and disturbances which could only be to our disadvantage. It is obvious, moreover, that if such an alleged Ententophil party were to upset the Committee Government, they would recall from exile their various adherents, who have, since the Revolution, been living in Switzerland, Paris and elsewhere. These people would be able, with some plausibility, to claim that they had been exiled from their country owing to their loyalty to the Western Powers, and a certain moral obligation would be created to accord to a Government formed of such politicians more lenient terms than we should accord to a Cabinet constituted from the Committee of Union and Progress. The intentions of His Majesty's Government towards the future settlement of the Ottoman Empire are severe and definite, and it is not our wish to be placed in a false position in regard to the execution of terms which we are convinced are founded upon sound principles, and the application of which will conduce to the future happiness of millions of unfortunate people. It is thus preferable that the C.U.P. Government should remain in office pending the execution of the armistice and should themselves submit to the humiliation of the eventual imposition of peace terms. You should not therefore take any action to hasten their downfall, although you should not, of course, afford them support or seek to maintain them in power. The question as to whether the reconstruction of Turkey in Europe and Anatolia will be entrusted to a non-Committee Government is not one which will fall within the scope of your present mission.'

<sup>4</sup> No. 465.

produced so soon as my French and Italian colleagues receive their instructions to sign the Note informing the Porte of the decision of the Supreme Council limiting the Italian and Greek spheres in the Aidin vilayet, though the delay which still continues in making this pronouncement is every day more regrettable, and I fear lest the Grand Vizier be correct when he states that now it will be insufficient to allay the agitation in Asia Minor, and that its effect will be far inferior to that which it would have had two months ago.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 471

*Memorandum*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1919

The Grand Vizier came to see me this morning. He said that the situation was fast becoming impossible. The Committee were 'again raising their hydra heads', and the members of his Cabinet were continually receiving orders from them to resign, as well as threatening letters of all kinds. He was taking the most active steps in his power against its manifestations in the provinces, but he believed that the centre of the organisation was here. He said it had cost him five days' hard struggle before he could succeed, as he did last night, in getting orders sent for the arrest of Mustapha Kemal, Raouf Bey, an officer called Shakir, and a brigand chief near Ismidt whose name he had forgotten. Opposition to him in this had come from the military party, but especially the Minister of War, whom he believed was a traitor to him. The orders sent before with this object had been of a general nature, not specific like those sent last night. He stated that at the head of the movement were Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza, and Mahmoud Churouk Solou, and they had got the Crown Prince entirely into their meshes.

2. The Crown Prince had been to see the Sultan yesterday, and had neglected all the forms of courtesy which are usually used by the members of the Imperial House in addressing the Sovereign, and had simply abused him for maintaining the present Government, and as being the ruin of the country, the Caliphate, and the Sultanate. At the same time he had not made any proposals which had the slightest practical bearing.

3. Seeing the extreme difficulty of the situation, the Grand Vizier had, in the presence of Tewfik Pasha,<sup>5</sup> proposed to the Sultan to withdraw. The Sultan turned to Tewfik and asked him if he could form a Cabinet. Tewfik replied that it would be useless, because he could only make one exactly similar to the present, and it could not last. Also he referred to the indecorous circumstances which had attended his last fall from power.<sup>6</sup> The Sultan had expressed the firm decision not to summon Izzet Pasha to form a Cabinet, as he had suffered too much at the hands of the Committee during the past two

<sup>5</sup> Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid Pasha: see note 6 below.

<sup>6</sup> After a prolonged cabinet crisis Tewfik Pasha had on February 24, 1919, reconstituted his administration. A week later this reconstituted cabinet resigned and Tewfik Pasha was succeeded by Damad Ferid Pasha.

years, and he was unshakeably resolved not to call them in as his counsellors. Sooner than do this he would resign the throne.

4. The Grand Vizier asked me, supposing this were to take place, would Great Britain ensure that the person of the Sultan in such circumstances would be protected? He also asked the same question in respect to his 'insignificant self'. I said that he broached a grave question, which it would be necessary to refer to London, but if such an event happened before it were possible to get an answer, I could only say that I felt certain that this High Commission would take a lively interest in their fate, and would intimate to any succeeding Government that interest. I did not go so far as to express my personal opinion, which is that we should take every possible step to ensure their personal safety.

5. The Grand Vizier went on to say that the Sultan could see no one at all who was fit to take on the Government except himself and Tewfik, and it was for this reason that the situation was so extremely acute.

6. I asked the Grand Vizier whether it would produce a considerable effect for the better if it were known that the Peace Conference were taking steps, through British instrumentality, to define the zones of Greek and Italian activity in the Aidin vilayet, and he replied that it most certainly would, although at the same time he doubted whether it would be altogether sufficient. I told him then that steps of this nature were being elaborated and would shortly be communicated to him, together with the statement that the occupation of certain regions by Greek and Italian troops in no way prejudged the decisions of the Peace Conference as to the final disposal of those regions. I told him that he should regard this information, for the present, as entirely confidential, as the details had not been finally worked out. He regretted that it could not be used for publication, but expressed very great satisfaction at the news; but still, he said, this will not be sufficient entirely to calm the agitation which is being provoked by the Committee. He affected to attach little importance, nevertheless, to the Congress which is being held at Erzeroum, and said that the gatherings at Sivas and Amassia were really only in the nature of Committee meetings.

7. He again reverted with great insistence to the maleficent influence of Izzet Pasha.

8. He said that the Sultan had suggested his visiting both the French and the British High Commissioners, but he had replied that it was useless to go to the French as no effective assistance would be forthcoming. He had throughout his tenure of office sought help and advice for the government of the country from the British, and this had been the result of his efforts and convictions for thirty years past. He regretted that no action on the grounds of his previous suggestion in this direction had been taken, though he quite understood the situation which was caused by the imperative necessity of consulting the Peace Conference. He repeated his old statement that now more than ever before he had no hope save in God and Great Britain.

9. It appears to me fairly certain that Izzet is at the root of the present trouble, and I do not see that it could do any harm, and on the other hand

it might do much good, if an indication in polite terms could be made to him of the reasons why he would do well to abstain from causing trouble.

10. It appears to me that it would be most emphatically undesirable in the highest degree to have anything in the form of a Committee Government, and it looks as if we shall have to take perfectly firm action to stop such an eventuality. If therefore the warning were to prove insufficient, I am inclined to think that we should be prepared to face the necessity of arresting and deporting Izzet, and perhaps of one or two of his fellow-workers as well.

No. 472

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received August 13)*

*No. 1328 [115568/75458/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 1, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 1521<sup>1</sup> and 1525<sup>2</sup> of the 23rd July, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum on a manifesto published by the representatives of a large number of Turkish parties on the 22nd July and a translation (as published in a local French paper) of a circular issued by Damad Ferid Pasha immediately on his resumption of office.

2. The universal hostility with which the new Government is regarded by the party leaders and the press augurs ill for the future of the Cabinet. It is specially noteworthy that that larger fraction of the 'Entente libérale' party which follows Sadik Bey and disavows the Sheikh-ul-Islam have at last found common ground with parties whose advances the 'Entente libérale' had hitherto rejected.

3. The fact is that this country has now quite definitely reached the point at which every Turkish element in active political life is dominated more by national sentiment and the desire to conserve at least the unoccupied remnant of the Empire as an undivided whole than by any other consideration. Broadly speaking, the various elements, all equally nationalist, are ranged in two camps according as they think that there is still something to be hoped from the Entente Powers, especially England, or think that the time has come for resistance, however desperate, to the increasingly humiliating decrees of the Peace Conference.

4. The distinction between these two schools of thought is blurred in Constantinople, where both sides are for the moment united in detestation of the Grand Vizier, and where even the most Chauvinistic think it still advisable to affect respect for the Entente Powers as a whole and love of England in particular. In the provinces the second school of thought is definitely in the ascendant. The present Government cannot afford to fight the movement in the interior. Its only strength lies in the support of the

<sup>1</sup> See No. 465, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> No. 465.

Sultan, himself a rather uncertain factor, and in the fact that few of the parties have much solid backing, as the bulk of a Moslem population care nothing at all for politics, and demand only a quiet and well-fed life.

5. The issue of this confused situation is as difficult to foresee as ever. I see nothing, however, to make me alter the opinion which I have so often expressed that the combined result of adverse single decisions and the delay in announcing a general settlement must be to make all the active political elements coalesce more and more, and to make the centre of gravity of the growing coalition shift more and more in the direction of Chauvinism and resistance. If I were to hazard a definite prophecy, it would be that the Chauvinists will either gain a definite ascendancy here, as they have already done in the provinces, or will set themselves up in some provincial centre in open opposition to Constantinople.

6. Considerable uncertainty prevails as to what is going on in the more remote parts of the interior. The Grand Vizier himself remarked on the 25th July that he was in the presence of an enigma. Every sort of rumour was current, he said, about Chauvinist activities and provincial congresses, but a telegram just received from Erzeroum said that the situation there had never been so calm. This telegram proved to come from a military authority who would almost certainly be in sympathy with the Chauvinist movement, and on being asked what the civil authorities said the Grand Vizier lapsed into vagueness. My latest information leads me to believe that the congress is sitting, but I have not been able to obtain anything certain as to the line it is taking.

7. I do not think that I exaggerated the potentialities of the present situation when I stated in a recent telegram<sup>3</sup> that the country was faced with the possibility of a disintegration of order and security on a large scale. The new Government inspires no confidence in its ability or in the character of the majority of its members. Ferid Pasha is perplexed and easily deceived. The presence of Tewfik Pasha makes for sobriety, but, while less easily gulled than the Grand Vizier, he is to some extent accessible to the suggestions of an entourage steeped in Chauvinism. The Sheikh-ul-Islam, an outcast from his party, had already, before the Grand Vizier's return, played with the idea of a rapprochement with the Chauvinists. There is no outstanding figure among the remainder of the Ministers, and as a whole they may be expected to do any time-serving that is required of them.

8. As against this inadequate Central Government we have the Congress at Erzeroum, of which we know little except that it is dominated by dashing young soldiers, who are willing to stake everything on a gambler's throw, and who have purposely shifted the main scene of their activities east and north with the double purpose of securing a freer field and defending Armenia from the fate of Smyrna. The new Government has not dared, even if it wished, to remove from the Ministry of War the 'opposite numbers' of these provincial officers. It was rumoured on the morrow of its advent to power that Djevad Pasha, Chief of the General Staff and another equally notorious

<sup>3</sup> See No. 445.

sympathiser with the 'national defence' movement, would be removed. There was a storm of protest, and nothing more has been heard of the proposal.

9. A further indication of the desire of the Government to be all things to all men is the decision definitely taken on the 27th July to proceed with the elections. There is an endeavour to placate its critics here and to steal the thunder of the Congress at Erzeroum. If any serious attempt is made to give effect to the decision, it can only lead to fresh troubles, and the end may easily be to conjure into existence a Parliament representative of nothing but the unquiet ghost of the Committee of Union and Progress.

10. Taking it all round, the present outlook is more disquieting, from the point of view of tranquillity, than it has been at any time since the Supreme Council decided that Greek troops were to occupy Smyrna.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 472

*Memorandum*

Yesterday's *Idrak* newspaper ('Socialist') published a manifesto adopted by a meeting of party representatives at the 'Entente libérale' headquarters on Monday night, the 21st July.

The manifesto recites the names of the parties, &c., represented, as follows:—

'Entente libérale.'  
Sulh-u-Selamet ('Peace and Security').  
Milli Akrar ('National Liberal').  
Turkish Socialist.  
Social Democrat.  
Trebizond and District Decentralisation.  
Smyrna Defence of Ottoman Rights.  
National Congress.  
Kurdish National.  
Kurdish Club.  
Turkish Press.

The manifesto states that the representatives, considering the formation of a third Ferid Pasha Cabinet dangerous in the extreme to the national interests, after he has by his performances at home and abroad lost the confidence of the nation, unanimously adopted the following resolutions after three hours' continuous deliberations for submission to Caliph and the nation generally:—

1. The third Ferid Pasha Cabinet formed yesterday is an unconstitutional Cabinet.
2. The said Cabinet has no qualification or capacity to direct the foreign policy or internal affairs of the Empire.
3. Damad Ferid Pasha is absolutely undeserving of confidence, as a result of the incapacity displayed by him hitherto in defending and main-

taining the sacred rights of the nation. Consequently all the parties are united in seeing the necessity for the removal from power of a Cabinet of this kind and the formation in its place of a Cabinet enjoying general confidence and capable of defending the national interests.

July 23, 1919.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 472

*Circular respecting the Situation in Anatolia*

Le Grand-Vizir, Damad Férid Pacha, a adressé aux vilayets d'Anatolie une importante circulaire dont voici le texte:

Nous avons pris connaissance du télégramme-circulaire du commandant de la division de Karahissar dont un exemplaire nous a été transmis par le mutessarifat de Bordour. Cette circulaire porte à la connaissance des intéressés que la réunion d'un Congrès national, dans une région orientale de la Turquie convenablement choisie, Congrès chargé de régler et de fixer les destinées du pays, ayant été décidée, trois délégués devaient être élus et envoyés à Angora. De même, nous avons pris connaissance de divers télégrammes parvenus de Konia et relatifs aux frais de route de ces délégués.

L'état de désordre et de trouble dans lequel j'ai trouvé l'Anatolie après une absence de six semaines, motivée par mon séjour à Paris, à la Conférence de la Paix, m'a causé une grande peine.

Dans la Constitution que nous sommes tous tenus de respecter, la ville de Constantinople étant la capitale de l'Empire ottoman, il est clairement dit que l'Assemblée législative ne peut et ne doit être ouverte que par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Par conséquent, cette façon d'agir, qui est contraire à la Constitution, aux désirs et ordres de notre gracieux Souverain et aux intérêts supérieurs de la patrie, doit absolument cesser. Je vous demande donc tout particulièrement de faire des communications énergiques et réitérées dans ce sens, à tous les mutessarifs et caïmakans dépendant de votre vilayet.

Quant à savoir s'il y a lieu ou non de payer les frais de route aux délégués, l'acte de les élire étant tout d'abord illégal et contraire à la Constitution, il est du devoir des autorités civiles et militaires non seulement de ne pas faciliter un acte aussi illégal, mais surtout d'empêcher de pareils agissements.

Je vous recommande tout particulièrement et de la façon la plus catégorique d'agir dans le sens que je vous indique.

Le 20 juillet 1334/1919.

No. 473

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received August 4)

No. 1593 Telegraphic [111650/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 3, 1919

Greek Rear-Admiral here has communicated to me a telegram which he has sent to M. Venezelos in which he gives pessimistic account of situation

throughout Asia Minor and pointing out danger that visits to Sea of Marmora (?) and Black Sea ports may only stir up Turks against Christians.

He reports an Army of at least 100,000 men would be necessary to repress Turks and to maintain order and as he conceives that Allies are not in a position to furnish such a force, he suggests that it should be raised from amongst native Greek and Armenian population, being officered and commanded by British.<sup>1</sup>

It is unnecessary for me to comment on this proposal.

<sup>1</sup> In Constantinople despatch No. 1329 of August 1, 1919 (received in Foreign Office August 13), Admiral Calthorpe had transmitted a copy of an identic letter of July 14 addressed by the British, French and Italian representatives in Smyrna to their respective High Commissioners in Constantinople. This letter drew attention 'to the daily increasing seriousness of the situation created in the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek occupation, and the manner in which their occupation is being carried out. . . . Confronted with continually increasing difficulties, the Greek civil and military authorities seem unable to cope with them; they are aware of this and scarcely take pains to deny the fact. . . . Mr. Stergiades, Greek High Commissioner, certainly displays good will but he finds himself confronted with the intrigues of the orthodox clergy and the native Greek population, with whom he is at present in disagreement. . . . In the meantime blood is being shed and homes being destroyed and one foresees in the near future a shortage of food if not famine. In this dangerous situation any delay in restoring order may shortly place Europe in front of problems that perhaps cannot be solved. It is indispensable therefore to find an immediate remedy for this state of things which may exert an influence on the whole Moslem world. The only measure that now appears the proper one for putting a stop to these calamities is the stationing of Allied forces (who need not necessarily be very numerous) between Turks and Greeks, the latter being ordered to return within the limits of the Sanjak of Smyrna and of the Kaza of Aivali out of which they ought never to have moved.'

#### No. 474

*Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Mr. Kidston  
(Received August 14)*

*Unnumbered [115967/75458/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 4, 1919

Dear George,

I have got a letter from you somewhere, which I ought to answer, but as my table is knee-deep in papers of all kinds and description, I cannot find it.

I think things are perhaps a little worse than ever. There seems to be a fine old massacre going on at Nakhchevan. Milne has definite and peremptory orders to leave the Caucasus on the 15th of August,<sup>1</sup> and, in view of this, naturally and rightly refuses to send troops to Nakhchevan to be a temporary palliative. I wish we had shewn the same wisdom as regards the repatriation of Greeks and Armenians. We have quite rightly turned out a lot of Turks and given the property back to the Armenian and Greek owners, but there is no good in doing that unless we are able to guarantee their permanent security. As I feel perfectly certain that we are not going to have the mandate

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume III, Chap. II *passim*.

for Asia Minor, we shall not be able to carry through the responsibility we have thus incurred.

The Sultan and Grand Vizier continue to be even more alarmed as to the situation created by Mustapha Kemal and Co. in Anatolia.

After consultation with the French we have decided that it would be highly undesirable to have anything in the shape of a Unionist Government; ergo, we have got to back up the present one. We are going to do that by various means. Firstly, by the notification to the Grand Vizier of the delimitation around Smyrna. Secondly, by a combined intimation that he ought to deal more severely with the Committee. Thirdly, by telling the Crown Prince he has got to behave himself. I can only hope that these proceedings will receive your benediction, but we have to do something without delay for times are critical, and you will, I think, admit that the Foreign Office does not answer our telegrams with exactly lightning rapidity.

Yrs. ever,  
TOM HOHLER

No. 475

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received August 20)

No. 1368 [118381/75458/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 5, 1919

My Lord,

I reported in my despatch No. 1353<sup>1</sup> (paragraph 9) of the 31st ultimo that I intended to discuss with my French colleague the serious problems presented by the internal situation of this country. It is unnecessary that I should trouble you with the details of the two or three very long and friendly conversations which I have had with him; it will be sufficient if I acquaint you briefly with the results.

2. The acting Italian High Commissioner had not yet received instructions to sign the note to the Sublime Porte concerning the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones in Asia Minor, and I arranged with M. Defrance that he should call upon him to explain that whilst according to the terms of the telegram of the Italian Government<sup>2</sup> it was the presidency of the Supreme Council which was to notify the Turkish Government of the delimitation, yet it was the High Commissioners who were the channel of communication between the Supreme Council and the said Government. M. Lodifé accepted this interpretation, and agreed to sign the note (a copy of which I enclose herewith),<sup>3</sup> which was handed to the Grand Vizier on Sunday last, the

<sup>1</sup> No. 471.

<sup>2</sup> Conveying instructions to the Acting Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople.

<sup>3</sup> A copy of this note was not enclosed in the filed original, but had been transmitted to the Foreign Office under cover of Constantinople despatch No. 1355 of August 4, 1919 (received August 13). The note read as follows:

'Les Hauts Commissaires de France, de Grande Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de porter ce qui suit à la connaissance de Son Altesse le Grand Vizir:

'Le Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix a décidé de faire délimiter sans délai

3rd August. His Highness received it with great satisfaction, stating that it would greatly improve the position of his Government.

3. Next, as we were entirely agreed that the advent to power of a Government even moderately Unionist in character would be essentially undesirable in the interests of the Allies both for the purpose of maintaining order as well as for the reason that it would place additional obstructions to the continued observation of the armistice, and to the acceptance, eventually, of the terms of the peace which would be imposed, we were forced to the conclusion that it was necessary to give such support as we properly could to the present Government, although we felt we should continue to avoid, as far as possible, all interference in internal politics.

4. In order to reconcile these various aims we had decided that after presenting the note above mentioned, we would cause an intimation to be conveyed to the Grand Vizier by our Dragomans<sup>4</sup> that he would do well to proceed with greater severity against those whom he knew to be implicated in Unionist intrigues, or in plots which would have the result of placing obstructions in the way of the execution of the terms of the armistice.

5. This we did, and I again impressed this matter on his Highness's attention this morning, when he came to pay me a visit of farewell on the occasion of my approaching definite departure from Constantinople.

6. Ferid Pasha is thoroughly pleased to have our support in taking action against the Committee, to whom he is as entirely opposed as we are, but his Government is weak, and he asked whether, in the event of a number of arrests being effected, it will be possible for us to arrange that the persons arrested should be conveyed to a place of safety for confinement, such as Malta. I told him that I would enquire into this matter, which was not altogether unattended by difficulties. I believe it is his desire also that some should be allowed to proceed abroad, though not as prisoners.

7. I have further arranged with M. Defrance that we will cause a serious intimation to be conveyed to the Crown Prince to the effect that his name is being widely used by the Committee Party as being their leader, and to warn him of the unfortunate results which may attend such a connection.

8. News has reached me from General Sir George Milne as well as from une ligne au delà de laquelle, en Asie Mineure, ni les troupes grecques, ni les troupes italiennes ne seront autorisées à se déplacer, tous les droits reconnus aux Alliés par la Convention d'Armistice étant d'ailleurs réservés.

'Le Commandant en Chef des Forces des Puissances Alliées et Associées dans l'Empire Ottoman d'Asie est chargé de faire procéder à la délimitation des lignes militaires dont il s'agit.

'Le Gouvernement Turc est invité à retirer ses troupes et toute force turque régulière ou irrégulière derrière une ligne qui sera tracée par le Commandant en Chef.

'Les lignes mentionnées ci-dessus seront tracées le plus tôt possible et ne préjugeront en rien des décisions futures de la Conférence de la Paix quant aux questions territoriales.

'Constantinople, le 2 août 1919.

A. DEFRENCE  
A. CALTHORPE  
R. LODIFÉ'

<sup>4</sup> Interpreters.

other sources to the effect that Mustapha Kemal was organising something in the nature of an army at Erzeroum. It is clear that the Allies are not at the present time in a position to check a movement of this kind by force, and the only suggestion which General Milne had to make was that the port of Trebizond might be occupied. He did not think that this would have any great effect beyond providing a base to which Christians in the interior might retreat in the case of necessity, and rendering somewhat more difficult the question of movements of men and supplies to and from Erzeroum. I brought the above also to the attention of M. Defrance, who is giving it his best attention. He is quite alive to the seriousness of the matter, but he seems at present doubtful of the utility of occupying Trebizond. He has promised me to express his opinion on the question at the earliest possible moment, with a view that we may continue to work as hitherto in the closest agreement.

9. It was with no little regret that I parted with my French colleague, with whom my relations have always been most agreeable, and indeed, during the last few weeks, extremely close.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

No. 476

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

No. 5252 [106312/106312/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 7, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that on July 29th the French Ambassador called at this Dept. and in the course of conversation Sir Ronald Graham referred to the question of the spheres of command in Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

2. M. Cambon interrupted by saying that he had been informed from Paris of the appointment of Sir E. Allenby to the Supreme Command of the whole of Turkey in Asia. He did not know what this meant or why such a decision had been made. He considered, however, that such a decision took the question out of his domain and that he was no longer in a position to discuss it. Any further discussions on the subject should take place in Paris.

3. Sir R. Graham explained to M. Cambon that it was General Milne who had been appointed to the Supreme Command with a special view to exercising control over the Greek and Italian forces in Asiatic Turkey, and thereby obviating a recurrence of disorder and outrages.

4. M. Cambon said that he was glad to know this, but that he adhered to the view that he could no longer discuss the question of the military spheres.

5. As from General Milne's telegram to the W[ar] O[ffice] No. I. 6543<sup>3</sup> of July 19th (copy of which is enclosed herewith for convenience of reference) it appeared that there were various drawbacks to accepting the French conditions with regard to the division of spheres, Sir R. Graham did not pursue the matter further.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this despatch was sent to Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> For this question see No. 173.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

6. On the 31st ultimo, the French Ambassador called again, and with reference to the conversation which he had had with Sir R. Graham on July 29, said that, on referring to Paris, he had been instructed to continue the negotiations with regard to the military spheres of command in Turkey, and would like to conclude an arrangement before he left for Paris on Saturday.<sup>4</sup> Sir R. Graham said that he was not quite clear as to the attitude of the Military Authorities in the matter, but would give M. Cambon an answer the next day.

7. The W.O. objected that the new position given to General Milne in Asiatic Turkey rendered it undesirable to conclude the proposed agreement with the French. General Milne's forces were practically all of them in Turkey in Europe but might have to be transferred to Turkey in Asia in view of the new responsibilities cast upon him, and in this case he might wish to place them at Scutari. The W.O. asked that no further negotiations with the French should take place until they had consulted General Milne on the subject of his new position and duties.

8. The French Ambassador called again on the 1st instant and Sir R. Graham explained the military point of view to him. M. Cambon said he quite understood and had, indeed, expected that, in view of the new arrangement with regard to General Milne's position which had been sanctioned from Paris, the negotiations would be dropped.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> August 2, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy of original.

#### No. 477

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)*

*No. 1396 [118399/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 8, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of a report dated 29th July from Captain Perring, Relief Officer at Samsoun, relative to the activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Raouf Bey in that district.

2. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
*Acting High Commissioner.*

#### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 477

*Report by Captain Perring (Samsoun)*

SAMSOUN, July 29, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to report the following re Kemal Pasha. He is accompanied by Raouf Bey, ex Minister of Marine, and a staff of (at present) 38.

His aim is the formation of numerous bands under the command of Army officers, e.g. the band at Bel Dag at present numbers 600. For this purpose he has arranged to have practically every village visited by his delegates, who are advising the peasants to sell all properties, to buy arms, etc., stating that if they do not do this they lose their property in any case as the Allies intend to occupy this country, seize their property and drive out the Moslem.

His organisation provided for the point of concentration for this district to be at Amasia, intending to oppose any landing here; his bands are also intended for use in Armenia to oppose the separation of Armenia.

His headquarters are now at Erzeroum, and he has invited delegates to attend a congress there. So far the delegates appointed at Kavak, Kavza, Amasia and Tokat, have not moved, and according to my informant they do not intend to go to Erzeroum.

Meetings were organised at Kavza, Amasia, Tokat, Sivas, and although very fiery speeches were made, and delegates sent to surrounding villages, no great success was met with, and except in the Amasia and Erzeroum districts little success was obtained. The movement in Amasia district is well organised, and several bands are well armed. Practically the whole of the Military seem to be implicated. My informant includes Arif Bey the newly appointed commander of Amasia but I have been unable to confirm this up to date.

At Erzeroum a small meeting of delegates is taking place, and several cases of massacres of Christians have occurred as the first result. The movement is here having its greatest success, and many Bolshevik delegates are arriving, principally from the Kars area. My informant expresses the conviction that the larger movement is a failure and that attention is now being concentrated on organising small massacres and mutinous acts, e.g. the refusal of Rizé to accept or obey any orders from the Turkish Government.

My informant further states that Kemal offered him the command of several bands and that money was apparently very plentiful. He is also certain that Enver Pasha<sup>1</sup> is in close touch with Kemal, the former being, he states, recently at Schouscha.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING

<sup>1</sup> Former Turkish Minister of War and leader of the Young Turks.

### No. 478

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)*

*No. 1417 [118409/75458/44]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, August 9, 1919*

My Lord,

With reference to Admiral Calthorpe's despatch No. 1353<sup>1</sup> of the 31st ultimo, and his despatch No. 1368<sup>2</sup> of the 5th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that after careful discussion my French colleague and

<sup>1</sup> No. 471.

<sup>2</sup> No. 475.

I decided that we would each send a representative to converse with the Crown Prince to point out the dangers that would be attendant on any participation by His Royal Highness in the proceedings of the Unionist Party.

2. Prince Abdul Medjid on being sounded expressed his desire to see Mr. Hohler, but we thought it undesirable under present circumstances that any person of diplomatic rank should see him, and it was arranged that Mr. Ryan should go in the first place, being supported later by M. Ledoulx, of the French High Commission.

3. Mr. Ryan accordingly had his audience with the Prince yesterday morning (8th August), and I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a very interesting account of the conversation which took place.

4. It is difficult to reconcile the great divergence between the Crown Prince's language and the reports of him which reach me from the Grand Vizier, as well as from other sources.

5. The Grand Vizier's utterances are no doubt coloured by feelings of personal pique, whilst the Crown Prince is probably of a fickle character and is under the sway of the person who has last seen him.

6. I was glad to have an opportunity to refer to the reasons for which His Majesty the King did not answer the telegram which Abdul Medjid had addressed to His Majesty some three months ago,<sup>3</sup> and it served as a useful introduction for the more personal message which we had considered it advisable to convey to him.

7. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the second of Admiral Calthorpe's despatches above mentioned<sup>2</sup> he referred to the intention of himself and his French colleague to advise the Grand Vizier to proceed with greater severity against those who were connected with the Unionist Party. The result of this was that his Highness first communicated to me the names of some of those people whom he desired to see out of the way. It eventually appeared that his idea was not so much to cause these people to be imprisoned, which indeed would be difficult, as they have committed no definite crime or offence, but that they should be banished as political undesirables.

8. It was not long before the list of five or six grew to almost fifty, and it then transpired that he had by a misunderstanding believed that the arrests would be carried out by the Allies. He has been thoroughly undeceived on this point, and the question is now narrowed down to one of inviting the persons originally mentioned to go on a visit to Italy if the Italian Government have no objection.

9. At the same time, whereas some ten days or a fortnight ago a considerable agitation was going on, at the present time there is a marked apparent suspension of political movement, but I think it will be a great mistake to assume that on that account it has in any way ceased.

10. It would be difficult to exaggerate the complexity of the present situation with a Government which is moderately satisfactory in its general character, but too weak to ensure the execution of its orders, and to which

<sup>3</sup> See No. 439, note 2.

there appears to be only one alternative, namely, a Government which would be strong, but which would be definitely opposed to the aims and interests of the Allies, and to the execution of the terms of the armistice.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 478

*Account of Mr. Ryan's Conversation with Prince Abdul Medjid*

I saw the Crown Prince this morning as arranged. He received me with cordiality and spoke freely. The audience lasted nearly two hours.

I spoke first to the Prince in the sense of the attached note (which I had prepared beforehand and had communicated to M. Ledoulx), adding various politenesses and embellishments. The Prince listened carefully and without interruption. On my emphasising, in conclusion, the point that his name was being made use of, he denied categorically that he had any hand in the movement or that he had the smallest idea of putting himself at the head of it.

I knew, he said, what the circumstances of the Imperial family had been. Under Abdul Hamid they had been prisoners. After the Constitution<sup>4</sup> they had enjoyed personal liberty, but had been kept remote from politics. Princes were without influence in the political life of the country. His own convictions were that Turkey's policy should be that of Reshid Pasha and Ali Pasha—steadfast by the side of England. He had expressed his views freely before the war in conversations with, among others, Sir G. Lowther.<sup>5</sup> He did not know whether Sir G. Lowther had thought them worth recording, but they had taken place. He had held the same language successively to Sultans Abdul Hamid, Reshid, and Vahid-ud-din.

His relations with the present Sultan, the Prince said, were based on a community of opinion and a friendship which had lasted forty-five years. There was no quarrel between them. The one question on which they differed profoundly was that of Ferid Pasha, of whom the Prince spoke with the utmost bitterness and contempt. The Sultan's insistence on keeping Ferid Pasha in power was a fatal mistake. Ferid had admitted himself guilty in the matter of Smyrna, and yet had been recalled to power. He had made a fiasco of the delegation to Paris, and had again been placed in power. The people did not want him. What was necessary was a strong Government commanding the confidence of the people. Let the Sultan send for Tewfik Pasha, not a genius certainly, but a man of experience, intimate with British statesmen; or let him call some other person, who would appeal to the people, like Izzet Pasha, Tchoruksoulou Mahmoud Pasha, or Ahmed Riza Bey.

The people, he explained, did not want much. They wanted to see Turkey maintained, not as a fantastically extensive Empire, but Turk-peopled countries for the Turkish people; instead of which there was nothing but talk of partition, and the tragedy of Smyrna was before their eyes. A foreign

<sup>4</sup> The Turkish constitution promulgated in 1908.

<sup>5</sup> His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, 1908-13.

estimate, he was told, had put the butcheries committed by the Greeks in a short time at 20,000. The movement in the interior, of which I had spoken, was traitorous, idiotic, monstrous; but the people wanted something better than a Ferid Pasha Government, and if they responded to the incitements of people like Mustafa Kemal and Raouf, it was because their wishes were not respected. He gave his word of honour that he had no connection with the movement or its organisers.

I said that the views expressed by the Prince about the movement in the interior were the only ones that could be held by a sane and reasonable person. His word of honour was unnecessary therefore to prove that he held them; but, if it were given, it was the word of a Prince and a gentleman. As for the position of Princes in the political life of the country, it was true that they had no direct rule, but they could exercise great moral authority. That was why Abdul Hamid had sought to exclude them altogether. He was himself distinguished among the Princes by the efforts he had made to get a grasp of affairs from every standpoint, including the European.

I could not deny, I said, the unfortunate incidents which had followed the occupation of Smyrna. The figures which he had heard were, I thought, exaggerated. The incidents were tragic enough to need no exaggeration. They had been aggravated by the counter-movement, about which I had spoken to him. Anyhow, they were now to be the subject of investigation by an inter-Allied Commission. This could not undo them, but it would place them in their true light.

The most serious question which he had raised, I said, was that of Ferid Pasha. Turkey was poor in statesmen. Tewfik was all his Imperial Highness said, and might be a possible Grand Vizier, but he had tried three times; his third attempt had been a complete failure; and he was old and worn out. All the other men he had mentioned were more or less implicated in the movement in the interior, I was assured. Ferid Pasha seemed to be making a serious endeavour to get the situation in hand, and the confidence of the Sultan must count for a great deal. Everything I heard from the interior led me to believe that the real people desired only peace and quietness. There were agitators everywhere who pretended to be the voice of the people. They shouted a lot, and when Mustafa Kemal passed through any given place the real people, too, were momentarily stirred, because they were accustomed to see authority go hand-in-hand with violence. When Mustafa Kemal had gone by the agitators continued their work, but the real people subsided into passivity.

The Prince said he really knew nothing of what was going on in the interior. He had no sources of information. He saw little of any but a few intimates of his; not politicians. He was out of touch with the Government, because of Ferid Pasha's attitude towards him, which was incorrect and unmannerly. They had once been friends, and a cause of difference had arisen. It need not have prevented correct relations when Ferid came into power, but Ferid's conduct had been such that at last he himself had said he would not now respond to advances if they were made. These personal matters were too

petty to influence his own views. He only mentioned them to explain how little he was in touch with official sources of information. He kept clear of politics. He lived remote, and amused himself with art and literature. When he had views to express on the situation, as he sometimes had, he expressed them direct to the Sultan and to him alone. If his name was misused, it was not his doing. One of his objects in remaining at Tchemlidja, which I told him was being used to give colour to idle rumours, was to ensure his aloofness.

I remarked that the only thing which seemed to separate his Imperial Highness from the High Commission was the question of Ferid Pasha, unfortunately a very important one.

The Prince then spoke more generally. He reaffirmed his faith in the principle that Turkey's only policy was to march with England. He had held it before the war. He held it still. He had implored Sultan Reshid not to send Jemal Bey as Vali to Bagdad, and had deplored Jemal's wild ideas about Egypt. He had known Jemal as Mutessarif of Scutari; and had known him as a friend; no, not as a friend, the Prince added laboriously, as an acquaintance; in short, a man good enough for Scutari, disastrous in Mesopotamia. He (the Prince) had sought to stop the Armenian massacres. The Armenian Patriarch would confirm that, and he besought me to ask him to do so.

These were his views. March with England. Lord Palmerston's portrait hung on his wall, and had hung there throughout the war. He might one day be Sultan; not that he desired the throne, but it might happen in the course of nature. If it did, his views would be the same. He asked me to tell that to my chief, and to get him to tell the British Government. The position now was not unlike that before the war. The folly of our diplomacy had then given Turkey into the hands of Germany, despite the wave of pro-English feeling which followed the Constitution. There were now, in his view, only two Great Powers left—England and America, two peaks rising side by side. He did not know how complete our unity of view might now be, but we should have our disagreements in future. Let us not hand Turkey over to America, but keep her a friend and useful neighbour on the north of the stretch of country towards India held by us—Egypt and Mesopotamia.

The Prince invoked Wilson's principles emphatically in the course of the conversation, expressed no views about mandates, and only mentioned the Caliphate incidentally as an appanage of the Sultanate. I did not enter into any discussion of his views on general policy beyond suggesting that the surrender of Turkey to Germany was not so much a post-constitutional episode as the fruition of Abdul Hamid's policy. The Prince said, no, Abdul Hamid had sown a seed, but it was only a seed in a forest. I said I thought he had planted a tree in a field, and that in the fulness of time (i.e., after the Constitution) the tree had shadowed the whole field.

The Prince spoke without open bitterness of the episode of his telegram to the King. He had been disappointed at not getting a reply, as he had done from the other heads of States, but he accepted the explanation that each country had its own way of looking at things, and that for one reason or

another, including constitutional reasons, the King had found it impossible to answer him.

On my departure the Prince personally conducted me to another room to show me the picture of Lord Palmerston.

The Prince makes a favourable impression; speaks with at least an air of sincerity; shows considerable intelligence and reading; expresses himself well and easily in French; is obviously highly strung, and, I should say, impressionable.

M. Ledoux told me he intended to ask for an audience for Saturday, the 9th August.

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 478

##### *Note*

M. Hohler regrette de n'avoir pu se rendre au désir de votre Altesse Impériale pour telles et telles raisons.

2. Votre Altesse Impériale a témoigné de son intérêt direct et personnel dans la question de Smyrne par sa dépêche aux chefs des États ententistes. Elle sait, de son côté, que les Gouvernements de ces États ont étudié la question des événements suivant l'occupation de Smyrne de la manière la plus sérieuse.

3. La décision prise dernièrement par la Conférence donne satisfaction au Gouvernement ottoman à deux points de vue. Il y aura délimitation et l'on a déclaré formellement que tout cela ne préjuge en rien la solution éventuelle des questions territoriales.

4. Cette décision prive de toute ombre de justification l'agitation menée depuis quelque temps, à l'intérieur et même à Constantinople, dans le but peu caché de préparer une résistance aux décisions définitives de la Conférence. C'est pour cette raison que les Hauts-Commissaires d'Angleterre et de France, conscients de la responsabilité toute particulière qu'ils ont pour le maintien de l'ordre, ont suivi la note collective d'une démarche verbale pour attirer l'attention du Gouvernement encore une fois sur la nécessité de réprimer l'agitation à l'intérieur.

5. Les Hauts-Commissaires estiment que la responsabilité dont je viens de parler découle des termes même de l'Armistice. Ils sont résolus à s'en acquitter par le seul moyen possible, c'est-à-dire en soutenant l'autorité légitime du souverain et de son Gouvernement.

6. Les Hauts-Commissaires sont confiants que votre Altesse Impériale partage leurs idées et qu'elle se rend compte de l'effet dangereux que produirait sur les destinées de ce pays tout mouvement qui serait contraire à l'ordre ou qui mettrait en danger la vie des habitants. Ce serait compléter la ruine d'un Empire déjà ébranlé jusqu'à ses fondements par la folie des Gouvernements d'il y a cinq ou quatre ans.

7. Malheureusement des gens malveillants abusent du nom auguste de votre Altesse Impériale pour attirer vers ce mouvement les âmes simples. Les Hauts-Commissaires savent combien ces calomnies sont injurieuses pour

otre Altesse Impériale, qui ne saurait vouloir s'opposer à l'autorité du Gouvernement légitime ni s'associer à des menées tellement contraires aux intérêts de l'Empire et de chaque membre de la famille Impériale.

8. Le peuple ignorant est d'autant plus facilement trompé par ces calomnies que la résidence de votre Altesse Impériale à une certaine distance de la capitale donne lieu à toutes sortes de bruits relatifs à ses mouvements actuels et futurs.

No. 479

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Webb (Constantinople)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 1327 Telegraphic [112277/70100/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 1604<sup>2</sup> of August 4.

You should urge strongly upon the Turkish Government that massacres of Christians can only have effect of hardening opinion against Turkey: and do all you can to avert further massacres.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed in the original to Admiral Calthorpe who had, however, recently left Constantinople (cf. No. 487).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This short telegram (received August 5) transmitted the following report of August 3 from Mr. Morgan at Smyrna: 'I hear Turkish irregulars are killing Christians near Oushak.'

No. 480

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Webb (Constantinople)*

*No. 1329 Telegraphic [111916/87018/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 9, 1919

Please send by despatch as soon as possible for information of Peace Delegation all available information regarding concessions in any part of late Ottoman Empire other than Syria and Palestine in which British interests participate.

No. 481

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received August 11)*

*No. 526 Telegraphic [114493/707/44]*

ROME, August 10, 1919

Your despatch No. 427<sup>1</sup> referring to Constantinople despatch No. 1152.<sup>2</sup> Italian naval base in Dodecanese. Decree published in Italian official gazette July 12 abrogates as from August 1 decree establishing base.

Repeated to Constantinople.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This formal covering despatch transmitted to Rome a copy of No. 442 (cf. note 2 below).

<sup>2</sup> No. 442.

No. 482

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Webb (Constantinople)*

No. 1336 Telegraphic [112231/3050/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1919

I should be glad of your considered views on the question of the future of Kurdistan and Armenia, with special reference to proposals made by Major Noel in his report of the 18th July<sup>1</sup> and by Colonel Wilson in his telegram No. 6666<sup>2</sup> of the 13th June.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. For Major Noel's views cf. Nos. 451 and 492.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See No. 451, note 6, and No. 492.

<sup>3</sup> The present telegram was sent in connexion with the letter of August 1, 1919, from the India Office to the Foreign Office, printed in No. 545, note 2.

No. 483

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 5363 [112962/106312/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 14, 1919

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 5252<sup>1</sup> of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you that M. de Fleuriau called at this Office on the 5th instant and saw Sir R. Graham.

In leaving the note, of which a copy is enclosed, M. de Fleuriau took occasion to state that he was not satisfied with what Sir R. Graham had said to M. Cambon in the interviews reported in my despatch under reference, and that he did not consider that the question of the division of military spheres in Turkey should be dropped, but, on the contrary, that the arrangements summarised in his note, which were based on instructions from the French Government, should be carried into effect.

After reading the note, Sir R. Graham at once took serious exception to the first paragraph. This proposal, he pointed out, constituted an entirely fresh departure and entailed the substitution of a French officer for General Milne in command at Constantinople under General Franchet d'Espérey. In previous conversations M. Cambon had assured him that there was no intention on the part of the French Government to bring about any change in control at Constantinople, and he had so informed our military authorities.

M. de Fleuriau replied that the new functions allotted to General Milne by the Paris Conference appeared to him to necessitate some readjustment of the command at Constantinople. General Milne could scarcely exercise his new supreme command in Asiatic Turkey and at the same time remain commander at Constantinople.

Sir R. Graham said that M. de Fleuriau's proposal would be communicated to the military authorities, but that he could hold out no hope of its

<sup>1</sup> No. 476.

being accepted. The best course at the present moment seemed to him to be that the question of military spheres in Turkey should be allowed to sleep.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 483

*Note*

Le général français commandant l'armée d'Orient à Constantinople (actuellement le Général Franchet d'Espérey) exercera le commandement des troupes alliées à Constantinople; il désignera l'officier qui exercera effectivement le commandement militaire de cette ville.

La zone du commandement confiée au général français s'étendra sur le territoire asiatique de Constantinople jusqu'à la limite du Mutessariflik de Scutarie d'Asie. Dans cette zone, le contrôle du commandement britannique d'Asie Mineure s'exercera sur le chemin de fer d'Ismidt à Haidar-Pacha, y compris la gare et le port de la gare de Haïdar-Pacha.

Les mines de charbon d'Héraclée continueront à être exploitées sous le régime actuellement en vigueur, et le charbon extrait de ces mines sera utilisé, comme il l'était pendant les mois de mars à juillet 1919, pour l'approvisionnement de Constantinople et des chemins de fer de Roumérie.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE A LONDRES,  
*le 5 août 1919.*

No. 484

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)*

*No. 1585 Telegraphic [117065/117065/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 15, 1919*

Before separating early next week, Cabinet are anxious to discuss next step in regard to Turkey, and desire in this connection the best possible information as to:—

- (1) Date by which United States Government will be in a position to ratify Treaty of Peace with Germany:
- (2) What are the prospects of a Mandate being accepted by the United States Government for some part of the former Turkish Empire.

Please telegraph at once best forecast you can give on both points.

Repeated to Astoria No. 1088.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In his immediately following telegram No. 1089 of even date to Mr. Balfour in Paris Lord Curzon stated: 'I should be grateful for any information you can give.'

No. 485

*Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received August 17)*

*No. 1275 Telegraphic [117185/117065/44]*

Your telegram No. 1586 [1585].<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1919

1. Best opinion I can quote is that (?) of two Republican Senators bitterly opposed to League and President. Each told me (?) independently that Treaty will be passed on by Senate before October.

All estimates are very speculative. I had asked Secretary of State this very question just before receiving your telegram and he said he could give no view at all.

2. Question of Turkish Mandate is very obscure and I have no authoritative opinion to quote but from general impressions consider acceptance is most unlikely. President has so far made no statement whatever and will probably leave matter entirely to Congress. Secretary of State is decidedly opposed. Press has had good deal of correspondence from abroad but has adopted no line editorially as yet. In fact public opinion has not yet been formed on the subject but I confidently anticipate it will be hostile. Only elements favourable hitherto are some inconsiderable trade interests and missionaries. Latter are powerful, well organised and have put pressure on Senators and it is said on President himself. I do not think them strong enough to turn the scale.<sup>2</sup>

Repeated to Canada.

<sup>1</sup> No. 484.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was minuted as follows by Sir R. Graham: 'Special copies sent to Prime Minister & to Sir M. Hankey.

'As I informed Lord Curzon this morning, Mr. Polk told Gen. Bridges in Paris the other day that if President Wilson started a suitable propaganda at once he could easily bring the country & Congress round to the acceptance of a mandate. But both the President & Ministers were frightened at the idea of taking over such a hornets' nest & were deferring any propaganda on the subject.

R. G. 18/8.'

No. 486

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28)*

*No. 1457 [121950/70100/44]*

My Lord,

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 17, 1919

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1327<sup>1</sup> of 9th August, and to my telegram No. 1669<sup>2</sup> of 17th August, I have the honour to state that I have already on many occasions impressed upon the Turkish Government its responsibility for taking all possible measures to prevent massacres of Christians; I have pointed out that such occurrences can only result in opinion in Europe becoming more averse to Turkey. The Grand Vizier and the Cabinet realise this, and also the fact that disorders or massacres are most

<sup>1</sup> No. 479.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received August 18) advocated the withdrawal of Greek and Italian forces as suggested in paragraph 8 below.

prejudicial to Turkish interests and aspirations. I am continuing to make strong representations in this sense.

2. The difficulty is not due to failure on the part of the Turkish Government to realise the seriousness of such occurrences, but rather to its lack of authority, and to its powerlessness to enforce its will in many of the districts of Anatolia.

3. In this particular case (the reported killing of Christians at Oushak), the Turkish Government asked permission to send the 23rd Division, some 1,500 strong, from Afion Karahissar to restore and maintain order. This could not be agreed to, as General Milne was of opinion (in which I fully concur) that there was a danger of these troops making common cause with the irregulars who are opposing the Greek Army of Occupation. The Government has, however, no means of taking effective action to put down disorder except the army, and the feeling aroused in the army by the events following the Greek occupation of Smyrna is so bitter that it is most inadvisable to allow part of it to be employed near the area of occupation in order to put down Turkish risings directed against that occupation.

4. I am convinced that the present unsatisfactory situation in Anatolia (which tends to grow worse as time goes on) is the direct result of the presence of Greek troops in the Aidin vilayet, and the regrettable excesses of which, there is unfortunately no doubt, they have on several occasions been guilty.

5. It is hoped that the delimitation of the respective spheres of military occupation will bring about a more peaceful situation locally though, even at the best, I anticipate the continuance of guerilla fighting by bands of irreconcilables.

6. I would, however, urge that more than local conditions in and around the Aidin vilayet are affected by the continuance of the Greek and, in a lesser degree, the Italian occupations. Their effect has been to compromise the position of the Allies, seriously to weaken the authority of the Turkish Government, to increase racial animosity and lawlessness in other districts than Aidin, and to give into the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress and National Defence leaders a weapon of which they are making full use to work up Turkish opinion against the Allies.

7. The fact must not be lost sight of that every Turk, of no matter what party or political sympathies, is sincere in looking upon the Greek and Italian occupation as a violation of right and justice.

8. I consider that the difficult situation with which the Allies are now faced in Turkey would greatly improve if an agreement were come to by which both Greek and Italian troops were entirely withdrawn from Asia Minor. This withdrawal would, moreover, strengthen the prestige and authority of the Government and correspondingly weaken the National Defence Party by depriving it of its main *raison d'être*, and would thus largely assist to put an end to the present state of affairs which is the direct outcome of the landing of these troops.

9. The presence of a number of Allied officers in the districts evacuated by the Italian and Greek troops would, I consider, ensure that reprisals were

not carried out, and the Turkish Government, in its measures to maintain order, would have the support of all elements except the professional brigands and the Committee of Union and Progress leaders.

10. The present situation is that neither the Allies nor the Turkish Government are in a position to suppress sedition or disorder in the provinces. Unless we are prepared to undertake a military occupation, it is essential that the authority of the Government in the provinces be restored, and I can think of no measure by which the support of the moderate Turkish elements can be won back as long as the presence of the Greek and Italian troops remains a cause of irritation and unrest.

11. I am, of course, aware that the putting into effect of this proposal would mean the reversal of a decision already agreed upon by the Supreme Council, and that there are other considerations involved, such as the *amour-propre* of the Greeks and Italians, and the effect which would be produced upon public opinion in these countries by the withdrawal of their troops. Regarding the importance to be attached to these considerations, I can express no opinion. It is because I feel strongly that the only effective way to remove the most serious of the difficulties with which the Allies are confronted in Turkey is by carrying out the measure proposed, that I now put it forward for your Lordship's consideration.

12. The withdrawal of these troops would not, in my opinion, be taken by the Turks as a sign of weakness on the part of the Allies, but as evidence that they—the Allies—were able to control such smaller nations as are pursuing a policy of aggression and annexation, and as an indication that the final terms of peace, however severe would not entail the partition among various claimants of the predominantly Turkish parts of the Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress would doubtless endeavour to make capital out of this withdrawal, but their influence and power to cause trouble would be greatly reduced from the fact that the danger of Greek aggression in Asia Minor no longer threatened.

13. In submitting this proposal for your Lordship's consideration, I venture to express my opinion that, apart from the beneficial effect it would have on the situation now and during the remainder of the Armistice period, the withdrawal of Greek and Italian zones of occupation would greatly increase the possibilities of peaceful conditions being maintained in this country after the signature of peace, when presumably a large part of the forces of the other Allied nations will be withdrawn from Turkey. The permanent establishment of a Greek military occupation in Anatolia would only provoke disorder and unrest, bring about the komitadji hostilities between the two races which prevailed for so long in Macedonia, and be a constant danger to the maintenance of peace between Greece and Turkey.

14. I am keeping in close touch with my French colleague on this subject, and he has expressed his concurrence.

15. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.,

RICHARD WEBB

No. 487

*Letter from Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [357/1/3/20692]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 17, 1919

My dear Crowe,

As you are probably aware, Admiral Calthorpe is being relieved as Naval Commander-in-Chief by Admiral de Robeck and is turning over the duties of High Commissioner to him at the same time. The change is to take place at Malta on 26th August, and Admiral Calthorpe (who left here on 5th August) asked me to let you know that he proposed to leave on the 27th for Naples and Rome, proceeding thence to Paris where he proposed to come and call on you. I am not quite clear as to when he will reach Paris, but I should think somewhere about the 31st August. If Mr. Balfour is in Paris, perhaps he would like to see the Admiral also.<sup>2</sup> Anyway I will suggest to him (the Admiral) that he sends you a telegram giving the probable date of arrival in Paris.

I think the Admiral will be able to give you very fairly up-to-date information about Turkey, as there has not been much radical change since he left.

The situation in the interior, due practically entirely to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, is steadily getting more hazy and unsettled. Were this anywhere but Turkey I should say we were on the eve of a tremendous upheaval. But everything goes by opposites in this amazing country, so it is quite idle to speculate.

But one thing that is quite certain is that the worst day's work for his country which Venezelos ever did was when he induced the Supreme Council to allow Greek troops into Smyrna to 'pacify' the place. Apart from turning the whole district into a shambles, which never would have occurred if Allies had been left to control it, it has sown the seed of still more bitter animosity between Greek and Türk than existed before—an animosity which has to be seen to be realised, which is as unreasoning as it is rabid, which makes it almost a physical impossibility for one side to tell the truth about the other, and which is gradually becoming pretty nearly unquenchable.

The only *possible* hope for comparative peace and tranquillity in the future between the two races is the withdrawal of the Greek Troops, (as well as the Italians who are, I fancy, only too anxious to find an excuse for clearing out) from Asia Minor, and a return to the 'status quo'.<sup>3</sup>

I am glad to say that our relations with the French here are now on the best possible footing, and I shall do my utmost to keep them so. I think they are genuinely anxious to work with us, and I fancy that any recent

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain but was not later than September 4, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Balfour invited Admiral Calthorpe to lunch with him in Paris on August 30, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> A similar opinion had been expressed by Mr. Hohler in a similar letter of August 15, 1919, to Sir E. Crowe (not printed). Mr. Hohler stated in particular that 'things here . . . are in a real hideous mess. I see no hope of clearing it up *short of getting the Greeks AND the Italians out of Asia Minor*, and I guess there is no hope of that. I think that step [sic] was taken 50 or 60 years too soon.'

difficulties and the recent violent pro-French propaganda out here were rather dictated by ignorance of the policy which Paris wanted them to pursue, than from any active desire to run counter to us.

Meanwhile we are hoping that the Peace Terms for Turkey will not be much longer delayed. Surely the Americans can make up their minds by now what it is they are prepared to do here: if not, let us hope Lord Grey will help them to do so!<sup>4</sup>

Hope you are well, and that the press of work has now somewhat eased down in Paris. But there is no sign of its doing so here!

Yrs. very truly

RICHARD WEBB

<sup>4</sup> Lord Grey was about to proceed to Washington as His Majesty's Ambassador on special mission: see Volume V.

### No. 488

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 18)*

*No. 1277 Telegraphic [117652/117065/44]*

PARIS, August 18, 1919

Your telegrams 1088<sup>1</sup> and 1089.<sup>2</sup>

I fear I have no definite information to give but from various somewhat obscure hints let fall by Mr. Polk in private conversation I have gathered impression that he considers it unlikely United States Government will ratify Treaty with Germany before end of September at earliest, and that probability of American Congress and Senate agreeing to United States accepting mandate for any part of former Turkish Empire is diminishing.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to the British Peace Delegation of No. 484.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 484, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was minuted as follows by Sir R. Graham and Lord Curzon:  
‘The President is making no effort to obtain the assent of the Senate & Congress to the mandate.

R. G. 19/8.’

C. 19/8.’

‘Because he wants his treaty first.

### No. 489

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Webb (Constantinople)*

*No. 1369 Telegraphic [115591/75458/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1919

Your telegram No. 1525<sup>1</sup> and your despatch No. 1353<sup>2</sup> (of July 24th and 31st. Political situation).

I approve your proposal to ensure Sultan's safety and principles agreed on with French High Commissioner. But point No. 4 in your telegram should on no account be extended to cover use of force to prevent accession to power of Committee of Union and Progress nor against individual supporters of Committee as such.

<sup>1</sup> No. 465.

<sup>2</sup> No. 471.

**No. 490**

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)*

*No. 1281 Telegraphic: by bag [118234/117065/44]*

PARIS, *August 19, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1089<sup>1</sup> of August 15.

On the points raised we have no information which has not already been communicated to you and we find it difficult to express an opinion that would not be so purely speculative as to be practically useless.

While the most fashionable opinion seems to be that America will not accept mandates, we consider that this kind of dogmatism is as dangerous as its opposite.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No. 484, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> It is uncertain why this telegram was sent in addition to, and apparently independently of, No. 488. From internal evidence, however, it seems possible that No. 488 may have been Mr. Balfour's personal reply and No. 490 that drafted in the British Peace Delegation.

**No. 491**

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Admiral Webb (Constantinople)*

*No. 70 Telegraphic [342/1/9/18042]*

PARIS, *August 19, 1919*

United States Government are sending out shortly to Tiflis and other towns in Transcaucasia Major-General James G. Harbord accompanied by a staff of a dozen officers and civilians. He is to enquire into the situation in Armenia on behalf of the United States Government.

You should afford General Harbord and his party all facilities.

Please inform (or repeat to) Mr. Wardrop<sup>1</sup> and inform General Milne.

<sup>1</sup> Chief British Commissioner in Transcaucasia (cf. Volume III, Chap. II).

**No. 492**

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 19)*

*No. 1676 Telegraphic [118054/3050/44A]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 19, 1919*

Your telegrams 1336<sup>1</sup> and 1367.<sup>2</sup>

There are very grave objections to proposal in Colonel Wilson's telegram of June 13th<sup>3</sup> that Trebizond and Erzeroum Vilayets should form a single Armenian State under predominantly American auspices, the remaining four vilayets to form a Kurdish State under presumably British auspices.

Trebizond contains practically no Armenian population whatever while

<sup>1</sup> No. 482.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram of August 18, 1919, to Constantinople asked for a reply 'without delay' to No. 482.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 451, note 6, and No. 482.

Van and Mushsaud which have always been the only predominantly Armenian districts in Turkish Armenia, would be left to Kurdish State. This would be regarded as a betrayal of Armenian interests and in direct contradiction to assurances which have been given by Allied Powers. I do not feel in a position to express an opinion on question of a British mandate for Kurdish State. The (? interposition) of re-established authority over all the six vilayets under some form of European supervision is unthinkable unless such authority is to be purely nominal, and supervision take form of direct control.

A compromised solution such as is proposed in Major Noel's report of July 18th appears to be the only practical way out of difficulty. For reasons which he sets forth I consider it would be quite premature and most dangerous to attempt delimitation of frontiers of Armenia and Kurdistan at present whereas adoption of the proposed zone system would in process of time enable the different elements to sort themselves pending permanent delimitation.

As Major Noel points out this solution pre-supposes a single mandate backed by an army of occupation.

I do not share Major Noel's fears of consequences including in Mesopotamia the districts mentioned in Colonel Wilson's telegram June 13th,<sup>3</sup> always provided such inclusion does not irrevocably close door on legitimate Kurdish aspirations in the future.

With regard to danger of American Missionaries' influence see my telegram 1472.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This telegram of July 15 (received July 16) referred to the appointment of Colonel Haskell of the U.S. Army to be Allied High Commissioner in Armenia (see Volume I, No. 3, minute 3). Admiral Calthorpe had therein expressed the view that Colonel Haskell's administration 'must to a great extent be permeated by Missionaries' views. As you are aware in questions concerning Christians and Moslems, Missionaries are sometimes liable to place divisions of religious zeal before those of political expediency or common justice. Missionary zealots in Turkey differ in no way from those elsewhere and I am somewhat apprehensive that in their new capacity as administrators in Armenia under American auspices they will be found applying discriminatory measures against Moslems which little accord to His Majesty's Government's policy of religious non-interference. My apprehensions may be ill-founded but tendencies displayed by one or two individuals have induced me to call attention to possible danger contained in any endeavour to combine Americo-Missionaries and British methods of administration in countries, bulk of whose population is Moslem.'

### No. 493

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 24)*

*No. 1704 Telegraphic [120189/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 22, 1919

Following is text of communication which was handed yesterday August 21st to Grand Vizier by American High Commissioner, begins:—  
Embassy of United States of America, Constantinople, Turkey, August 21st,

1919, Memorandum for His Excellency the Grand Vizier Imperial Ottoman Government.

The President desires Turkish Authorities to be bidden that should they not take immediate and effective measures to prevent any massacres or like atrocities being perpetrated by Turks, Kurds, or other Moslems against Armenians in Caucasus or elsewhere then all rulings concerning a secure sovereignty over Turkish portions of present Ottoman Empire under article 12 Peace Terms will be withdrawn and that such withdrawal might result in complete dissolution of Turkish Empire and a complete alteration of conditions of peace. Should they put forward plea that they have no control over such occurrences it should be pointed out that if they expect to exercise any sovereignty over any portions of Empire they should demonstrate that they are not only willing but likewise able to prevent their co-nationals and co-religionists from perpetration of atrocities. Therefore no excuse of inability to prevent atrocities against Armenians will be accepted from Turks. (Signed) Mark L. Bristol. Rear Admiral, United States Navy. United States High Commissioner. Ends.<sup>1</sup>

High Commissioner informed Grand Vizier that he believed by Article 12 Peace Terms was meant twelfth of Wilson's points.

Grand Vizier is much alarmed at this announcement for he urges that his Government is doing all in its power to prevent massacres and disorders and to drag the country out of terrible confusion into which it was thrown by war . . . [? and]<sup>2</sup> by effects of occupation of Smyrna and that message could not be put in any form better calculated to incite Christians to provoke troubles and to place Moslem majority under Christian rule.

He conceived idea of travelling himself through interior on a mission of appeasement but I pointed out that greater good would be achieved by his controlling events from capital.

He read me a letter from Acting Vali, Erzeroum, offensive in tone stating that voice of people was different from voice of Government and that former was true one.

It referred however to conciliation so that His Highness still has hopes of inducing Mustafa Kemal to yield peaceably to Government.

I informed him that latest news I had was from my representative at Samsoun who stated that Erzeroum Conference had ended after deciding to oppose by all means occupation of any part of Turkey by Greeks, Italians or French though they would welcome a British or American mandatory if it were for all Turkey (see my telegram No. 1701).<sup>3</sup>

It appears at all events fairly clear that situation created by Mustafa Kemal is now less acute.

Nevertheless Grand Vizier (?) is very insistent on necessity of sending an

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion concerning this communication in the Allied Supreme Council on August 25, 1919, see Volume I, No. 42, minute 5.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This short telegram of even date (received August 22) was as here indicated.

expedition to effect certain arrests and to reassure Christian population. He pointed out that if he could not move troops to point of danger how was he to be held responsible according to terms of President Wilson's note?

He also referred to extreme penury of Treasury. I informed him of sense of last paragraph of Paris telegram No. 36 [66]<sup>4</sup> of August 10th [9th] which I discussed with my colleagues yesterday when it was decided to form a Commission. His Highness was relieved at this news and undertakes to supply the Commission with all possible details.

Please repeat to Paris.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This telegram contained a summary record of the discussion of Turkish financial questions in the Supreme Council on August 8, 1919, for which see Volume I, No. 31, minute 4. The last paragraph of this telegram communicated the terms of resolution (3) at the end of this minute.

#### No. 494

*Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received August 25)*

*No. 1298 Telegraphic [120555/512/58]*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1919

Your Despatch No. 419.<sup>1</sup>

Military Attaché informs me absolutely no military preparations for any action in Armenian Turkey are being made or even contemplated by United States War Department.

<sup>1</sup> No. 468.

#### No. 495

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received September 3)*

*No. 1525 [124460/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 25, 1919

My Lord,

The Grand Vizier has several times lately spoken with great bitterness and, I am bound to admit, with equal truth of the impossible situation to which the country had been brought by the prolonged duration of the armistice, pointing out that every department of the administration was equally fettered and rendered incapable of action.

2. He has been quite willing to admit that all naval and military activities were rightly and properly checked and suppressed, but he complained of the paralysis endured in the Ministries of the Interior and Finance in particular, and also in the organisation of the gendarmerie.

3. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I have just received from his Highness enclosing copy of a telegram which he desires may be sent to the President of the Peace Conference.

4. I shall at once consult my colleagues on the matter,<sup>1</sup> but am forwarding

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Webb subsequently reported in Constantinople telegram No. 1745 of August 29 (received August 30): 'After consultation with my colleagues it was decided that French

the note to your Lordship before doing so, so as not to lose the advantage of sending it by the King's messenger who starts almost at once.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 495

*Grand Vizier to Admiral Calthorpe*

Sublime Porte

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères

H.G. 17507

H.S. 276.

*Le 24 août 1919*

Excellence,

L'histoire enregistre rarement une période aussi prolongée entre la suspension des hostilités et le retour définitif à la paix, état normal des sociétés humaines.

Les événements tragiques de Smyrne troublèrent toute l'Asie Mineure, bouleversée déjà par une guerre néfaste. Partout dans l'Empire, le peuple musulman et non musulman, délogé de ses foyers, suivit en masse un mouvement d'émigration et de migration sans pouvoir se fixer nulle part sur les terres dévastées. L'approche de l'hiver augmente actuellement les soucis de leur triste existence. Jamais le genre humain, même dans l'antiquité chaldéenne, n'a enduré une souffrance aussi poignante.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'attache pas plus d'importance qu'il n'en convient aux troubles signalés en Asie Mineure. Ils sont provoqués par quelques jeunes exaltés, ambitieux ou mécontents, qui trouvent un terrain facile à exploiter dans le sentiment national exaspéré par la question de Smyrne. Ce n'est aujourd'hui qu'un mouvement superficiel et restreint, mais qui, à la longue, pourrait n'être pas sans danger. Le Gouvernement Impérial déploie, pour le réprimer, la même énergie dont il fit preuve dès le commencement de la crise, mais, sûrement, il convient d'en supprimer la cause pour en prévenir les effets. En butte à des difficultés continues, inhérentes à l'état actuel du pays, préoccupé à déjouer d'incessantes intrigues, le Gouvernement Impérial perd un temps considérable à remédier à cette situation, alors qu'il aurait pu le consacrer entièrement aux intérêts généraux de l'Etat et à la prospérité de ses nationaux. Aucune organisation, aucune réforme administrative, judiciaire, financière, aucun progrès moral, aucune amélioration du sort du peuple n'est possible tant que dure cette incertitude. Ce n'est ni la guerre, ni la paix; et, cependant, tous les malheurs de l'une continuent à sévir dans le pays, sans que celui-ci puisse profiter des bienfaits de l'autre.

Aux considérations ci-dessus exposées, il y a lieu d'ajouter les difficultés de High Commissioner should forward telegram to President of Conference whilst Italian High Commissioner and myself should inform our Governments, recommending request to their most earnest attention.'

toute nature qui entravent l'action gouvernementale, et les mouvements d'indiscipline qui n'ont pu se dessiner que parce que les conditions de l'armistice ont considérablement réduit les moyens militaires dont les autorités Impériales peuvent disposer. D'autre part, la situation actuelle du pays prive, comme de juste, le Gouvernement Impérial des ressources normales du budget qui n'est point en mesure de subvenir efficacement aux dépenses qu'entraîne la réorganisation de la gendarmerie et de la police, nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre public.

Par toutes ces raisons, je viens prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir faire connaître à la Conférence de Paris la vraie situation en Orient et faire auprès d'elle le plus pressant appel afin que les Délégués ottomans soient autorisés à se rendre à Paris aussi promptement que possible.

A cet effet, j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-après à votre Excellence une dépêche adressée à son Excellence M. le Président du Conseil suprême de la Paix, avec prière de vouloir bien la faire parvenir à sa haute destination.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

DAMAD FÉRID

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 495

*Grand Vizier to M. Clemenceau*

*Le 24 août 1919*

L'armistice dure depuis dix mois. Le retard apporté à la signature de la paix pendant si longtemps arrête le fonctionnement régulier de tout le rouage de l'État. Le Gouvernement, privé des ressources normales de son budget, éprouve des difficultés pour faire face aux dépenses qu'entraîne la réorganisation de la police et de la gendarmerie, d'ailleurs limitées par l'armistice bien au-dessous des chiffres nécessaires.

Les finances, la justice, enfin toutes les branches de l'administration, ainsi que l'industrie et le commerce souffrent de cette incertitude prolongée, et les efforts inlassables du Gouvernement tendant à une réforme générale restent stériles. Il s'ensuit un malaise général et une complication dans les affaires de l'État, dont les effets se manifestent à Smyrne et dans d'autres provinces de l'Empire.

Une foule de peuple musulman et non musulman, délogés de leurs foyers, pendant le cataclysme des cinq dernières années suit un mouvement d'émigration et de migration sans pouvoir se fixer sur leurs terres dévastées. L'approche de l'hiver augmente les soucis de leur triste existence. Exaspérée de leur misère, ils peuvent devenir un élément de danger pour l'ordre et la sécurité en Orient.

Comme votre Excellence avait reconnu elle-même par sa note du 27 [? 28] juin<sup>2</sup> l'inconvénient qu'il y aurait à remettre les négociations à une époque ultérieure, je viens la prier de bien vouloir autoriser de nouveau la Délégation ottomane à se rendre à Paris dans le délai le plus rapproché pour le rétablissement définitif de la paix, état normal des nations.

DAMAD FÉRID

<sup>2</sup> See No. 431, appendix II.

No. 496

*Letter from M. Nabokoff<sup>1</sup> to Sir R. Graham (Received August 27)*

No. 929 [121318/512/58]

AMBASSADE DE RUSSIE, À LONDRES, August 26, 1919

Dear Sir Ronald,

I have the honour to transmit herewith the enclosed Memorandum which has been forwarded to me by Monsieur Sazonoff, with the request that the desperate position of the Armenian population in the Caucasus upon the withdrawal of British Forces, may receive the sympathetic consideration of His Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,  
C. NABOKOFF

ENCLOSURE IN No. 496

*Translation*

16th August, 1919

*Memorandum<sup>2</sup>*

'Owing to the proposed evacuation of the Caucasus by British Forces, the Armenian population in that region is placed in a desperate situation.

'According to information received, Armenia, having recently refused to join the Tartar-Georgian League, is on the eve of a combined invasion by the Tartars of Azarbajian, the Georgians, the Shahsavans and the Turks. Turkish regular troops are concentrated in the direction of Olti and Sarkamish. One division is in the region of Zavin-Khorasan and another in Sahart. Turkish officers are organizing Kurdish bands all along the frontier. There is not the slightest doubt that a general massacre of Armenians will follow the retreat of the British troops, as their small army would be unable to offer any effective resistance.'

'As, in the present circumstances, Russia is unable to offer any assistance to these unfortunate people, the Russian Government, endeavouring to remain true to their traditions of extending protection to Armenia, deem it their duty to address an urgent appeal to the British Government in the earnest hope that they may continue to defend the Armenians in the Caucasus against the menace of the Turco-Tartars.'

<sup>1</sup> Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in the interests of the administration of Admiral Kolchak.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this memorandum had been communicated to the British Peace Delegation by the Russian Embassy in Paris on August 16, 1919.

No. 497

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28)*

No. 1729 Telegraphic [122089/72535/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 27, 1919

Grand Vizier has been very insistent lately on question of Moslem population between the Maritza, the Karassu, the Rhodope and Aegean, and is most desirous that this matter receives careful attention of Peace Conference.

Question is undoubtedly difficult as this district contains very solid Moham-median block.

Unfortunately Grand Vizier does not lessen difficulty by soliciting that it may be left as a (?) republic under British protection.

No. 498

*Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Mr. Clerk Kerr  
(Received September 17)*

*Unnumbered [130271/3050/44A]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 27, 1919*

Dear Clerk Kerr,

I never saw your tel. 1336<sup>1</sup> till our reply 1676<sup>2</sup> had been written and sent which vexed me as I have been more or less conversant with Kurdish affairs for the past 25 years, whereas my Admiral<sup>3</sup> is quite new to them and I can't make out who he consulted this time only it was neither me nor Ryan. My views are contained in the accompanying draft which has been hanging up now for a week and may or may not go in a week more, but I wish you to have them *some* time. You see I approach the thing from a different angle altogether and I believe mine to be the right one. We do not care a row of pins about Kurds quâ Kurds I imagine, nor about Armenians except from a humanitarian point of view—I suppose we may now consider ourselves free of our responsibilities under the Cyprus convention?<sup>4</sup> Some, however, must I fear still stick—but I fear we cannot afford in these hard times to go in too heavily for humanity and *must* base ourselves in the first place on considerations of British interests. Therefore I take it we must deal with the Kurdish question almost exclusively from the Mesopotamian point of view. I'm rather frightened of Wilson: he seems to me too slap-dash, and his intelligence has been very faulty so far and his actions consequently rather imprudent, while his agents don't inspire confidence. Noel didn't, however much I liked him personally: he was a fanatic. Mind you, I don't pretend to anything but a sketchy paper knowledge of Kurds and their ways, but the people who have got more than this are altogether rare birds. I agree with tel. 1676<sup>2</sup> as to leaving the frontiers of Armenia and Kurdistan vague, therefore, but go further: it is impossible with our present knowledge to make any proper delimitation. *We* must begin therefore by getting our Mesopotamian frontier right, to start with, and then we and the other mandatories can start in investigating and within 4 or 5 years work out something sound.

In great haste,

Yrs. sincerely  
T. B. HOHLER

<sup>1</sup> No. 482.

<sup>2</sup> No. 492.

<sup>3</sup> Evidently Admiral Webb.

<sup>4</sup> For this convention of 1878 see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxix, p. 744.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 498

*Draft telegram from British High Commission, Constantinople, to Foreign Office*

My tel. 1676.<sup>2</sup>

Please see my tel. 1437,<sup>5</sup> which met with an expression of your approval. The whole basis of our action as regards Kurds should be in my opinion the assurance of a satisfactory boundary to Mesopotamia. Such a boundary cannot possibly be secured I imagine in the plains, but must be found in the Kurdish mountains. As has so often happened before, the question of a sound frontier entails a large tribal policy. I have not the slightest doubt but that British administrators could manage to secure peace and justice to the Kurds as well as to the Armenians although these two things are more congenial to the latter than to the former. The efforts of these administrators would need very careful assistance of a political nature for some time to come from the British Rep. in Constantinople. But what appears to me the main point is to secure a satisfactory frontier for Mesopotamia taking on only so much of the barren mountains of Kurdistan as may be indispensable for this purpose. As the Govt. of Mesopotamia develops it will by degrees become possible to ascertain what rectifications are necessary. In the meantime it would seem desirable to leave the definition of Kurdish and Armenian zones exactly as vague as is our present knowledge of the real value of their present claims both of which are without doubt equally preposterous. It seems to me perfectly obvious that no scheme which could possibly satisfy the League of Nations can by any means be evolved pending a far closer contact with the realities of the situation than anything we at present possess. This contact must be established by the Mesopotamian authorities.

From the local point of view I find it impossible to take Sherif Pasha's claims<sup>6</sup> seriously.

<sup>5</sup> No. 451.

<sup>6</sup> General Chérif Pasha at that time claimed to speak for Kurdish interests at the Peace Conference in Paris.

No. 499

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 31)*

*No. 1309 Telegraphic: by bag [124570/11067/58]*

PARIS, August 29, 1919

Following for War Cabinet.

Proceedings of Council this morning.<sup>1</sup>

. . . 3.<sup>2</sup> A telegram was read from Colonel Haskell, Inter-Allied Commissioner in Armenia, stating that it was absolutely necessary to send troops there to take the place of the British troops now in the course of evacuation

<sup>1</sup> The official minute of the proceedings of the Supreme Council summarized below is printed in Volume I, No. 46, minute 4. See also Volume I, No. 42, minute 5.

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of this telegram reported discussion of other matters: see Volume I, No. 46.

to save the population from destruction. M. Clemenceau announced that about 12,000 French troops would be sent from Cilicia.<sup>3</sup> A note from the French General Staff was read outlining a scheme for carrying out this engagement. The question was adjourned for further consideration. . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The text here should probably read '... be sent to Cilicia'.

No. 500

*Mr. Russell<sup>1</sup> (Athens) to Earl Curzon (Received September 10)*

*No. 161 [127346/70100/44]*

ATHENS, August 31, 1919

My Lord,

I have received your Lordship's despatch No. 166<sup>2</sup> of the 5th instant enclosing reports from His Majesty's High Commissioner in Constantinople and from his representative at Smyrna.<sup>3</sup> I beg leave to say that Mr. Morgan's statements respecting the hatred and the insults encountered by British subjects from Greeks have been read by the staff of this Legation and by myself with profound surprise. Our experience in Greece is entirely contrary to anything of the sort. In common with our countrymen here, we are under the impression that British credit and prestige stand high with the Greeks, and that Englishmen are regarded with feelings of amity and respect. I have heard it stated here by Greeks and foreigners that Great Britain appeared to have now a preponderant position in Greece. I know that it is unsafe to generalize in such matters, but I think it may be said with truth that the French and Americans are not esteemed here, and that they tend to lose ground. The Italians, as Your Lordship knows, are cordially disliked, and this, under present conditions, leaves England alone in the field.

Mr. Morgan's assertions regarding the contempt in which the British Army is held by Greeks are to me astounding. General Hoare Nairne, Military Attaché, agrees with me. He tells me that not only in Athens and Salonica, but in the remoter garrisons of Macedonia, he has invariably met with a welcome from Greek Officers as testified to feelings of genuine regard for the British Army. An English resident here of long standing lately said to me: 'The best propaganda that was ever done for us here, was done by the British Salonica Army, and its effect will last for years'. In these circumstances, Your Lordship will understand that I strongly dissent from the view expressed in Mr. Morgan's penultimate paragraph that the state of mind of the whole people of Greece requires modification.

I can well believe, as stated by the High Commissioner, that the prospect of Greek rule in Smyrna is viewed with hostility by British residents. This, as His Excellency says, is partly based on personal grounds; for the personality of the Greek is not attractive, while the Turkish character, as Your Lordship well knows, makes a strong appeal to the sentiments of most Englishmen.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Claud Russell was H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This covering despatch was as indicated.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. No. 454.

I believe, however, that it would be wrong to conclude from this fact anything favourable to Turkish rule. I think the High Commissioner overlooks that what weighs most with foreign residents in Turkey is the prospective loss of their extra-territoriality, and the privileged position that goes with it. Moreover, they are used to the conditions of Turkish rule of which they know the ins and outs, and, on the principle that the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know, they view any change with apprehension. I believe the rich Greeks of Smyrna themselves share these feelings. The substitution of one system of misgovernment for another means a general dislocation of habits which all are anxious to avoid whose nationality or money insure them a privileged position under the existing régime. I do not think, therefore, that the opinion of these people should be taken as evidence of the demerits of Greek rule. Even if it were ideal, they would yet prefer a bad government under which they were above the law.

Equality of treatment would, no doubt, as the High Commissioner anticipates, not be assured to foreign commercial enterprise under Greek government. But it seems to me unjust to make this a special count against the Greeks, because, in my experience, no civilized government (except the British Government) give equality of treatment to foreign commercial enterprise. Such undertakings are penalized at the outset, and, when they are successful, they are squeezed. I agree, therefore, that it is most desirable that this contingency should be provided against if Greece, or any other Power, is to extend its rule over Turkish territory.

I have, &c.

CLAUD RUSSELL

#### No. 501

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 2)*

*No. 1312 Telegraphic: by bag [123464/11067/58]*

Armenia

PARIS, August 31, 1919

For War Office.

The position as regards Cilicia is this:—

All American and British Authorities on the spot agree that in the absence of external aid there will be an appalling massacre of Armenians. The only aid which the Americans are apparently in a position to give is to threaten the Turk with final destruction if he does not himself prevent the impending horrors. To which the Turk replies that since the Allies will neither permit him to enlist an army nor help him to pay one, he is utterly powerless. All the British can do is to protest that neither the state of their army nor the state of their Treasury permit them to retain a single battalion in the Caucasus though every Armenian throat should be cut in consequence of their leaving. Thereupon the French come forward and offer to deal with the situation.<sup>1</sup> Now it is quite true that (1) a tenderness for the Armenians however genuine has very little to do with their offer. (2) That it is easier to

<sup>1</sup> See No. 499.

get to Erzeroum from Trebizond and Batoum than from Messina and Alexandretta. (3) That the added length of the sea route and the added difficulty of finding ships for the transport of horses and material which under the French plan are to go by the Anatolian Railway, may not be enough to counterbalance the long land march to Erzeroun [sic] from the railhead at Nasibin. (4) That the French are delighted to put us in a difficulty over our military arrangements in Syria and Cilicia. (5) That they may have ulterior schemes directed partly against what they suppose to be American ambitions, and partly against what they suppose to be British. But to my mind all these considerations count for little. It would be the worst possible policy to hamper the French plan by raising small difficulties, and formal objections. I doubt their scheme succeeding, but do not let it be said that we have made it fail. They will be ready enough to throw the blame on us if either criticism in the French Chamber or military difficulties in Anatolia make them regret their offer. Meanwhile our own position in regard to Armenian massacres is not wholly satisfactory and we cannot afford to see it aggravated. Nor can we dwell too much on the position of Allenby seeing that we sent Greek troops to Smyrna without consulting Milne. Therefore brush aside all small objections, give without haggling the only material they ask for, namely frozen meat, and let our people at Mersina and Alexandretta freely help to the best of their power.

In my opinion you ought to send here some one with the requisite authority to discuss details with French General Staff.

## No. 502

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 2)*

*No. 1317 Telegraphic [123928/11067/58]*

PARIS, September 2, 1919

Following for C.T.G.D. [C.I.G.S.]<sup>1</sup>

I quite understand landing of a French force in Cilicia and its passage to Armenia may raise local difficulties about command. But surely best way of dealing with these technical questions is to send, as I requested, a military representative who could discuss them with the French headquarters and with me.

On broad question of policy I cannot see any danger. From outlines of plan which French have put forward we must assume that they propose to go to Armenia by way of Mardin and Diarbekir. But even if they do follow

<sup>1</sup> This telegram evidently bore reference to the following 'telephone message from London' to the British Peace Delegation (as recorded on file 342/1/6/18473) on September 2, 1919: 'C.I.G.S. does not want to "haggle", but it is *not* a military operation to go to Erzeroum from Alexandretta. Proper ports are Samsun, Trebizond, and Batoum. Therefore considers it essential to raise question of command (just as French would do if we proposed to send troops from Salonica into Bulgaria or Serbia) in order to find out where French really *are* going. Clemenceau himself said a short time ago that there were no Armenians in Cilicia, and C.I.G.S. is convinced that French mean to go to Nasibin and *Mosul*. Only way of getting definite declaration is by raising question of command.'

this route I cannot see that passage of a small French force through upper valley of Euphrates will hurt us either politically or militarily, so long as we hold Aleppo and Mosul.

No. 503

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

No. 1128 Telegraphic [123979/11067/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 2, 1919

A special meeting of Cabinet was held this morning to consider question of the Armenians and your telegram No. 1312.<sup>1</sup> There is not the least desire to stand in way of French willingness to help imperilled Armenia provided plan prepared has slightest chance of effecting that object. But it was pointed out with unanswerable force that a French expedition to Alexandretta can have no effect whatever upon situation at Kars or Erivan, where the danger lies, that the force will never reach Erzerum, a distance of nearly 500 miles over a country without roads or resources and that coming from that direction it is much more likely to provoke hostility of Turks than it is to save existence of Armenians. I need not enlarge upon military difficulty that would arise in connection with commands of Allenby and Milne, under one or other of whom force would be. The plea of helping Armenians in this way was indeed regarded as fantastic, and was felt to mask a purely political design, either to occupy Cicilia or even to secure line of Sykes-Picot agreement in direction of Nisibin and Mosul. Cabinet did not feel justified in aiding any such venture, nor could they regard their objections as formal or difficulties as small. On the other hand they were prepared gratefully to accept French proposal, and to offer every assistance in our power, provided force is sent by only practicable route, namely Black Sea, to only suitable ports, namely Batoum or Trebizon, for only possible destination, namely regions where 300,000 Armenians are now collected in danger of massacre, either from neighbouring Tartans [Tartars] of Azerbaijan or from Turkish armies at Erzerum. This is the obvious and most expeditious route, particularly for the French troops, which are, we understand, to be drawn from Franchet d'Esperey's command, i.e. from Bulgaria or neighbourhood of Constantinople, and are thus already within a short distance of their destination. This would greatly reduce shipping difficulties. We will do all in our power to help French in this respect, will hand over to them all available military stores and supplies and will even delay our own evacuation of Caucasus until their troops have arrived and assume control. If the object is to rescue Armenians this appears to us to be the only way in which it can be done, while the French plan seems not only certain to fail, but likely to produce political consequences of a very serious nature. Chief of the Imperial General Staff who has seen and approved this telegram is temporarily confined indoors but will be ready to come to Paris, if required, in a day or two to discuss arrangements.

<sup>1</sup> No. 501.

No. 504

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 3)*

No. 1319 Telegraphic [124572/11067/58]

PARIS, September 3, 1919

Your telegram No. 1128.<sup>1</sup>

I quite agree with criticisms of French plan to help Armenia expressed by Cabinet. But their criticisms are essentially military and practically those advanced by C.I.G.S. and military authorities here.

What we and especially I myself in Supreme Council, have to consider is political aspect of question.

Public opinion in America, Great Britain and France wants to save Armenia.

United States Government and His Majesty's Government are confessedly powerless to do so. At this juncture in response to an appealing telegram from Inter-Allied High Commissioner in Armenia, who is an American, French Government come forward and say that they will step into the breach with 12,000 men.

Whatever we may think or even know of the real motives of France it seems to me that politically it would be (? fatal) to do anything except to accept this offer with gratitude. The French have taken full advantage of a situation which plays into their hands, but we shall only make things worse if we show openly our distrust of their proceedings.

Nor can I as a civilian object to the French plans on military grounds. That can only be done as a matter of technical discussion between the two military Headquarter Staffs. It is also the only way to get French to expose their real schemes. I must therefore beg that Chief of General Staff, or a fully qualified representative, may come out here without delay<sup>2</sup> to discuss question with French.

Meanwhile I propose to maintain my attitude of general political approval.

<sup>1</sup> No. 503.

<sup>2</sup> The text as sent from Paris here read 'without further delay'.

No. 505

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 8)*

No. 1764 [126329/1300/19]

PARIS, September 6, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Supreme Council, at their sitting of the 2nd instant<sup>1</sup> agreed to adopt as the southern frontier of Bulgaria the line indicated in the accompanying map (Map 1).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The official minute of this meeting is printed in Volume I, No. 49. See Volume I, Chap. I *passim*, for earlier discussions and negotiations relative to the Thracian question, as indicated below.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The line on this map was that indicated on the map annexed to the Treaty of Neuilly: see Cmd. 522 of 1920. Further, on map 1 the two zones of Bulgarian Thrace

2. This decision, though sufficiently definite to allow of the completion of the treaty to be imposed upon Bulgaria, represents, unfortunately, no final settlement of the Thracian problem. Bulgaria is obliged to cede to the Allied and Associated Powers the former Bulgarian territory lying to the south of her new frontier. No provision, however, is made in the treaty as to the manner in which the territory so ceded is to be disposed of.

3. I desire to place on record the reasons which have rendered impossible any more complete or satisfactory solution of this question.

4. As your Lordship is already aware, the Committee on Greek Territorial Affairs recommended unanimously on 6th March last that the whole of Bulgarian Thrace should be ceded to Greece.<sup>3</sup> The report of this committee was not, however, approved, or even examined, by the Supreme Council, and the question remained in abeyance for some four months until it was again raised by the necessity of drafting the treaty of peace with Bulgaria.

5. At the first meeting of the committee which had been appointed for the purpose of co-ordinating the work already done regarding the Bulgarian frontiers, the American delegates announced their intention of repudiating the recommendations of the Greek committee, and proposed that Bulgarian rule over Western Thrace should be maintained. They suggested even that the frontier left to Bulgaria in this region should be that of 1915, and not that which existed before the present war.

6. This proposal was strongly opposed by the French and British delegations. It was pointed out that Bulgaria had no claim either ethnical or moral to this district; that her economic interests could well be safe-guarded by international guarantees, and that the Powers who had been at war with Bulgaria could not but resent the proposal of America to give Bulgaria not only Western Thrace as secured by her after the Balkan wars, but even that additional portion of territory which was ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey as the price of the former's entry into the war against us.

7. The Italian delegation, for obvious reasons, associated themselves with the American reservations. The committee confined themselves, therefore, to presenting a report to the Supreme Council embodying the disagreement which had arisen.

8. This report was discussed by the Supreme Council on the 21st July. The discussion merely emphasised the disagreement which had manifested itself in the committee, and the matter was, therefore, no further advanced when the Bulgarian delegation arrived in Paris on the 26th July.

9. M. Venizelos was not slow to ascertain and realise the position in which he was now placed, and he succeeded in making a separate arrangement with M. Tittoni under which the latter pledged himself to support the Greek claims in Western Thrace.

respectively marked in map 2 (facing p. 750) 'To Greece' and 'Autonomous State' jointly carried the superscription 'To be ceded to Allied and Associated Powers'. The zone of Turkish Thrace marked 'To Greece' in map 2 was unmarked in map 1.

<sup>3</sup> This report of the Committee on Greek Territorial Affairs is printed by D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1924 f.), vol. x, pp. 263-310.

10. This Greek-Italian understanding did not, however, produce any very real effect upon the discussions, since the issue really turned upon the difference existing between the Franco-British point of view and that now defended by the United States delegation. The repeated discussions which took place in the Council, and in which both M. Clemenceau and myself used every argument to convince the United States delegation that their contentions were unjustified and inexpedient, did not result in re-establishing the original recommendations of the Greek Committee. The issue was, however, narrowed down to an alternative of either giving the Greeks a continuous but reduced strip of territory in Thrace, or of constituting two international zones as indicated on map 2.<sup>4</sup>

11. Every endeavour was made, both by M. Clemenceau and myself, to point out to the United States delegation the desirability of adopting the former and more simple alternative in preference to so complicated a solution as the creation of two international zones, each comprising Greek populations and bordering on Greek territory. The United States delegation, who by this time had practically abandoned the ethnical and economic arguments on which they had formerly relied, took a firm stand on the political argument to the effect that to place in Greek hands the Bulgarian access to the sea would be to lay the seeds of future friction in the Balkans. Although I myself was prepared to accept as a compromise the constitution of two international zones, M. Clemenceau consistently maintained his opposition and protested that such an arrangement was unworkable and unjust.


12. In the face of these criticisms Mr. Polk decided to appeal to President Wilson, and on the 15th August a telegram was addressed by him to the President placing the two alternatives before him and asking for his decision.

13. Mr. Polk's action was not fortunate in its result, since, after keeping the Conference waiting three weeks, the President did not decide in favour of either of the two alternatives submitted to him, but produced a third, and to my mind a somewhat unjustifiable, solution. Mr. Wilson, while agreeing that Greece should obtain the districts of Zanthe and Gumuljina, proposed that the remaining portions of both Western and Eastern Thrace should be included in one State and incorporated within the future mandatory zone of Constantinople. His main explanation of this proposal was to the effect that the mandatory Power at Constantinople would be put to great expense and inconvenience, and would therefore require a large contiguous territory in order to compensate it for the duties and obligations assumed.

14. M. Clemenceau vigorously opposed this suggestion, and stated categorically that the French Government had always felt, and would always feel, that the zone of Constantinople and the Straits should be restricted to the minimum territory necessary for the efficient execution of the mandate involved.

15. In view of the fact that the elements of any logical discussion of this question could only be forthcoming after a decision was available regarding the Power or Powers to whom the mandate over Constantinople and the

<sup>4</sup> Opposite.





Straits is to be entrusted, and of the fact that it was obviously essential to present the treaty to the Bulgarians with the least possible delay, I suggested that the Council should confine itself to agreeing upon the southern frontier of Bulgaria, and that the eventual disposal of the territory south of this frontier should be left for later consideration.

16. This view having been accepted by my colleagues, the line indicated upon the map<sup>4</sup> was discussed and adopted by a special committee, and instructions issued for the necessary provisions to be at once inserted into the treaty with Bulgaria.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR J. BALFOUR

No. 506

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)*

No. 1624 [130723/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 7, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of a report<sup>1</sup> by the Military Control Officer at Afion Kara Hissar, entitled 'Summary of Events in Afion Kara Hissar since the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Troops', and a second report<sup>1</sup> from the Control Office at Eski Shehir on the subject of the National movement in that town, which have been sent out to me by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

2. This first report, I consider, contains a very impartial and straightforward review of the different phases of the situation which has arisen in Anatolia since the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna, and, with reference to certain matters therein referred to, I have the honour to submit the following observations for your Lordship's consideration.

3. Up to the time of the Smyrna landing the situation was not only generally satisfactory but was, moreover, steadily improving, and armed conflicts between Christians and Moslems did not commence until the decision was taken by the Peace Conference to send Greek troops to Smyrna; the authority of the Central Government was, in fact, fairly well established.

4. Following on the events at Smyrna came a short period of uncertainty and depression, during which the communication of some definite decision by the Allies was awaited, without however any general change taking place in the attitude of the population, except in the areas into which Greek troops had penetrated. Towards the end of June began the organisation and gradual extension of the National Defence Movement, due to the efforts of the corps of officers and the partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress and strong Nationalist groups, working on the feelings of a population which,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

if not actively in sympathy with its objects, passively approved the organisation of measures to ward off the threatened danger of domination by the Greeks and the partition of the country.

5. A later development, which tends to become more pronounced as time goes on, is the antagonism to the present Government of the leaders of the movement. The present Cabinet is looked upon as weak, unable to uphold Turkish rights, unrepresentative of Turkish sentiment, and under the influence of the Allies. Although no open and general disavowal of the authority of the Cabinet now in power (such as resulted in the eastern vilayets from Mustafa Kemal's activities) has yet been made in more central and western provinces of Anatolia, still the opposition to the Central Government has, nevertheless, shown itself by the expulsion or suppression of the civil authorities at provincial centres such as Ushak and Alashehr, and by certain other acts on the part of local military commanders clearly indicating that they look upon the Valis and Mutessarifs as in a position of merely nominal authority.

6. The present policy of the National Organisation appears to be to wait on events and to do nothing likely to prejudice the change of opinion in favour of Turkey, which is believed to have taken place as a consequence of Greek actions in the Aidin province. It is noteworthy that, except at two or three places within or in close proximity to the zone of operations in the Aidin vilayet, where Christians were massacred by irregular and uncontrolled bands in retaliation for Greek atrocities, there have been nowhere any instances of massacre of the Christian inhabitants by the Moslems.

7. Thus, the rumour of a massacre at Ushak (the subject of my telegram No. 1604<sup>2</sup> of the 4th August and your Lordship's telegram No. 1327<sup>3</sup> of the 9th August) proves to have been without foundation, and though the town was occupied by irregulars belonging to the National Army, measures were taken that the Christian population should not be molested.

8. Though the situation in Anatolia is at present outwardly quiet, I foresee the probability of grave troubles arising should terms of peace be imposed upon this country which will comprise the establishment of Greek authority over any part of Asia Minor, or the division of Anatolia into spheres to be administered by different Powers.

9. I am of opinion that any such decision would be followed by the repudiation by the provinces of the authority of Constantinople, and the setting up of one or a number of Nationalist and largely military congresses to control the country. If such a situation arises the Allies will be faced with a far more serious problem even than that which exists already in the Eastern vilayets, and the execution of such terms as are imposed upon Turkey will necessitate the undertaking of military measures on a very considerable scale.

10. I feel most strongly that the establishment in the future of normal peaceful conditions in this country is entirely dependent upon consideration being given, in settling the terms of peace, to the justifiable and reasonable claims of the Turks that they should not be subjected to the rule of an alien

<sup>2</sup> See No. 479, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> No. 479.

and hostile race like the Greeks, and that that part of the Empire which the Peace Conference decides to leave to them should not be divided up amongst various interested European Powers. The sentiment against any such conditions is universal and very strong, and in order to assure future peace and security it is, to my mind, essential that the general Turkish population should not be left with the conviction that it has been harshly and unjustly treated by the Allies in respect of these two points.

11. It has become more and more clear to me that the only solution of the problem of the future status of Anatolia which will provide an acceptable and stable settlement is that of a mandate, under a Power whose control will be welcomed by the great mass of the Turkish population. There is no arrangement except that of a mandate under Great Britain<sup>4</sup> or, failing her, the United States which the Turks will willingly accept, and although in putting this opinion forward for your Lordship's consideration, I am aware of the many and great difficulties which are involved, it does not appear to me possible or desirable to close one's eyes to the real facts of the situation.

12. In connection with this subject, I would refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 1601<sup>1</sup> of the 3rd September, on the subject of the Mutessarif of Samsoun.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

<sup>4</sup> Under cover of Constantinople despatch No. 1626 of September 8, 1919 (received September 18: not printed) Admiral Webb transmitted two reports from Captain Perring at Samsoun 'relative to the growing demand amongst the Turks in that region for a British Mandate'. In one of these reports, dated August 23, 1919, Captain Perring stated that a British mandate 'is now the one great hope of the Turk'.

### No. 507

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)*

*No. 1633 [130732/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 8, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1525 /M/1095<sup>1</sup> of the 25th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Grand Vizier has again complained of the very great difficulties which were being created for the Turkish Government by the indefinite duration of the armistice, and said the only way by which it seemed to him it might be possible to shorten it would be by coming to a secret understanding with Great Britain. I at once replied that such an idea was quite out of the question; we would never dream of taking any step except in conjunction with our Allies, and what would they say if they found that His Majesty's Government had indulged in any conversations with the Turkish Government?

2. His Highness said he had taken into consideration these things, but his idea was somewhat different. Great divergences of opinion had come to the surface over the treaty with Germany, where the negotiations were fairly

<sup>1</sup> No. 495.

plain sailing, and where great international rivalries were not brought into question. I must admit, he said, that from the moment of his assuming office he had never once sought to play off one Power against another according to the traditional policy of the Porte (and this is certainly true), but it was Great Britain that had fought with and had conquered Turkey and it was Great Britain that had the greatest interest in Turkey. Had not the Prime Minister just said so, stating in his speech of the 18th August<sup>2</sup> that vital British interests were involved in the Turkish settlement with which Great Britain was most intimately concerned? That expression of opinion had appealed to him most strongly, for, in his opinion, Turkish interests were absolutely dependent upon Great Britain and upon no other Power.

3. His Highness referred to the proposal he had made on the 30th March last (see despatch to Foreign Office No. 453<sup>3</sup> of 3rd April), and said incident-

<sup>2</sup> This speech in the House of Commons is printed in *Parl. Debts., 5th Ser., H. of C.*, vol. cxix, cols. 1979-2022.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This despatch reported a conversation which Admiral Calthorpe had had with the Grand Vizier on March 30, 1919. In the course of this conversation the Grand Vizier had affirmed 'the submission of Turkey to England, but to England alone' and had communicated to Admiral Calthorpe, for transmission to the Foreign Office, 'a hasty translation of a Turkish draft prepared by the Sultan and himself'. This document read as follows:

*'Asie'*

'Pays de la langue turque, ainsi que les provinces se trouvant entre l'Anatolie et l'Arabie peuplées de races différentes, sont soumis directement à la souverain[e]té du Sultan. Les pays de la langue arabe auront la plus large autonomie.'

'Le Hedjaz sera octroyé héritairement à la famille d'Aon (famille actuelle). Indépendance absolue dans les affaires intérieures, mais un agent politique sera placé à côté de l'Emir (Prince) pour assurer l'harmonie de sa politique extérieure avec celle de l'Empire. L'agent ottoman aura à sa disposition un bataillon de 100 hommes. A Médine il y aura une garnison turque avec un général, symbole de l'unité religieuse.'

'Dans les pays gouvernés par Imam Yahia et Idris (Yémene) *statu quo ante*.

'Les lieux [liens] religieux des peuples musulmans avec le Khalif sont intégralement maintenus; tous les pays autonomes de l'Asie antérieure, depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à la mer de l'Arabie au sud (Syrie, Mésopotamie, Irak, Hedjaz, Yémen) resteront soumis religieusement au Khalif de Constantinople.'

'Dans tous ces pays le droit de frapper la monnaie appartiendra au Sultan; c'est au nom du Khalif qu'on fera la prière de vendredi (Hutbé); le drapeau ottoman flottera partout.'

'L'Angleterre occupera en Europe et en Asie pendant 15 ans, soit dans les provinces directement soumises à la souveraineté du Sultan, soit dans celles jouissant de l'autonomie, les points qu'elle croira nécessaires, en vue d'assurer l'indépendance de la Turquie à l'égard de l'étranger, et d'assurer la tranquillité de l'intérieur.'

'L'Arménie sera constituée en République indépendante ou autonome, selon le désir de l'Angleterre, d'accord avec d'autres Puissances.'

*'En Europe'*

'Les Eminé Balkan, près de Bourgaz, sur la mer Noire, aboutissant à Samakow, et de là, à peu de distance à l'ouest d'Énos, sur la mer Égée, définiront les frontières de l'Empire en Europe. C'est la frontière naturelle du vilayet d'Andrinople que ces chaînes de montagnes entourent comme les murs d'une propriété Prince.'

*'Les Détroits'*

'Dans les deux détroits de la mer Noire et des Dardanelles toutes les fortifications seront rasées, et ils seront occupés par l'Angleterre.'

*'Intérieur'*

'L'Angleterre, par un sentiment d'amitié, voudra bien consentir à la nomination par le

ally that, so far as our Allies hearing of any negotiations was concerned, they had never heard of that communication, so why should they of any others; to which I rejoined that he must remember that no *suite* had ever been given to the proposal his Highness referred to.

4. He repeated his statement that he in no way or form was seeking to sow dissension or distrust among the Allies, nor wished to do anything that could lead to such a situation, which he would be the first to deplore, as he was perfectly certain that the results could only be all the worse for Turkey. His object was to clear the air and to arrive at an understanding of the claims of the Allies, but more especially of Great Britain, so that when the Turkish question came up for discussion a large part of the obstacles in the way of settlement might be already removed beforehand, and the Turkish delegates would know approximately what ground they had to stand on. He instanced the conclusion of the treaty with Persia,<sup>4</sup> which could not but redound to the happiness and prosperity of that land, and his highest desire, under any circumstances, would be to unite Turkey and Great Britain by some similar instrument.

5. I refrained from expressing to Ferid Pasha my conviction that the Turkish terms would be nothing less than a matter of dictation, even if the Allies have some difficulty in arriving at the exact wording which they will dictate, and I contented myself with pointing out that Persia during the war had observed an attitude of friendly neutrality; that the conclusion of so harmless and reasonable a treaty had provoked much criticism in Western Europe, and that the slightest suspicion, even of any separate negotiation, could not possibly fail to create exactly that dangerous situation of mistrust and rivalry which his Highness so clearly and wisely understood it was imperative to avoid. Therefore, whilst I appreciated the advantages that were offered to all parties concerned by the one side of his proposal, yet they were so outweighed by the disadvantages on the other that I could only advise him to withdraw the suggestion.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

Sultan des Sous-Sécrétaires d'État anglais dans les Ministères ottomans, où leur présence est nécessaire.

'De plus, il sera nommé dans chaque vilayet un consul général anglais qui remplira, en même temps, la fonction de conseiller auprès du vali pendant 15 ans.'

'Les élections municipales aux conseils provinciaux et au Parlement se feront sous le contrôle des consuls anglais.'

'L'Angleterre aura le droit d'établir un contrôle sur les finances, soit à la capitale, soit en province.'

'La Constitution sera simplifiée conformément à l'aptitude et à la capacité politique des peuples de l'Orient. A ce sujet j'avais présenté au Sénat un rapport, il y a 10 ans (le 15 février 1910).

'Les Chambres seront appelées à voter le budget et à faire connaître au Gouvernement central les besoins locaux. Le Sultan sera absolument libre de diriger la politique extérieure de l'Empire.'

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter V.

No. 508

*Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Campbell (Received September 8)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [126931/11067/58]*

*September 8, 1919<sup>1</sup>*

I reach London 9 tonight. Have no information as to latest phase of Caucasus question. Am all for accepting French offer but only if it will save Armenia which from South it cannot possibly do. I think it pity to add third European invasion of Asia Minor to Greek and Italian invasion which everybody now regrets. French will get Cilicia anyhow and have no need of troops there now. They will certainly be used to coerce Syria later on.

CURZON<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is evident that Lord Curzon was temporarily in the country. The place from which this telegram was sent is not indicated on the filed copy.

<sup>2</sup> It appears that the question of sending a French expeditionary force to relieve Armenia was subsequently allowed to lapse.

No. 509

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received September 22)*

*No. 1651 [132284/70100/44]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, September 10, 1919*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a report dated 3rd September by the Military Control Officer at Akhissar, which I have received from the Military Authorities, relative to the constitution and organization of the Irregular Turkish Army.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 509

*A general Report on the Irregular Turkish Army acting round the territory occupied by the Greeks; and on the feelings of the Turks in the Interior, which have given rise to the 'Irregular Movement'.*

By the Control Officer, Akhissar.

Information was gained from purely Turkish sources during a ride from Akhissar to Nazilli and back to Alashehr. The Control Officer met all the leaders civil and military of the movement, and on the Akhissar front itself went round the actual positions held as the Turkish defensive line. Except at Nazili, where he was received with great suspicion and an antipathetic attitude, he was shown every kindness, and the officials talked very frankly of their reasons for fighting, their aims and the condition of the Irregular Forces. The information given can, therefore, probably be relied upon.

*The Irregular Turkish Army*

<i>Area</i>			<i>Numbers</i>
1. Aivali	organised from Balikessir.		Not visited.
2. Pergama	" " "		5/6000 when the Greeks were driven out of the town.
3. Soma	" " "		1200 three weeks ago now probably 1700.
4. Akhissar	organised from Akhissar.		4000, with 8 MG's.
5. Salihli.	" " Alashehr.		2600, with 4 MG's.
6. Odemish	" " "		2800.
7. Aidin	" " Nazli.		18000 with MG's (number unknown), 4 or 5 mountain guns.
8. Chinar			not visited.

These numbers comprise only those forces which have actually been employed on the fronts from time to time.

In addition there are reserves:—

Aidin Front . . . . 17,000.

Alashehr Front . . . . 5,400, can be increased to 8000 in five days.

The numbers are increasing day by day, and when the harvesting is over—that is to say by the middle of September—the Commanders of the various fronts expect their numbers to be vastly increased; estimating at the smaller fronts an increase to at least  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times their present strength.

*The Commanders at the various fronts are as follows:*

Aivali. (?)

Pergama. Ali Bey, called Kel Ali Bey (bald Ali).

Soma. Hulussi Bey.

Akhissar. Edhem Bey, military; Bahri Bey, civil.

Salikli. Rechid Bey and his brother Edhem. } under Mustafa Bey of

Odemish. Musta Bey and Mesten Effendi. } Alashehr.

Aidin. Hajji Shukru Bey, military.

Hajji Shukru Effendi.

Hajji Suleiman Effendi.

Chinar. (?) A Major from the Regular Turkish Army, whom the British Control Officer met at Nazli, but whose name was not given.

The Irregular Forces are paid; a soldier getting 50 piastres a day, an Officer 100 piastres. The pay is obviously not the reason for the very great majority of the Irregulars joining the movement, as they could raise much more money a day as farm labourers and harvesters during the great shortage of labour that at present exists.

*Co-operation.* Up to the present time all eight fronts have been separate fighting forces, and there has been no military co-operation between them. They are not even connected by telephone. On the Akhissar front, the various

positions on that front itself are connected by a system, and probably this is the case on the other fronts.

On August 16th a Congress of about 50 men from all parts of Turkey met at Alashehr, and it seems that one of the chief subjects for discussion was to be the choice of a single command for at any rate the Odemish, Salikli and Akhissar fronts.

The Aidin Commander considers himself strong enough to be successful against the Greeks without any direct co-operation with the other fronts, and he said so. He was quite content that there should be other forces fighting the Greeks, but did not feel that these forces were essential to his success.

*Efficiency.* From Soma to Odemish the military organisation is weak and very amateurish. No provision is made for the following-up of a successful attack, and there is little in the way of transport or medical arrangements. At present, on these fronts, guerilla warfare would be the best name for the situation.

On the Aidin front, however, an attempt has been made to run the forces on the lines of a regular army, and complete battalions are formed and drilled. The troops are rationed, and the leaders appear to work very hard.

The Control Officer received the general impression that there was a great lack of munitions; and that, at present, on all the fronts except Aidin; of which he was informed that the forces have insufficient ammunition to sustain severe fighting even for 10 days.

The forces are armed with every kind of rifle—English, French, German, Russian and Turkish, and with more than one mark of these. This constitutes a great difficulty in attaining an efficient supply of ammunition.

To counteract these many defects, however, there exists a real feeling of intense hatred against the Greeks and the undoubted bravery of the men—especially of those from the mountain country where the Zebeks and Yuruks are without fear.

The general morale is very high, and the forces feel confident of driving out the Greeks.

#### *Turkish Feeling in the Interior*

During the journey of this officer from Akhissar to Nazili he talked with military leaders, civilian notables, irregular troops and civilian peasants, with the result that he became convinced that the irregular movement has been formed solely to fight against the Greeks. All the Turks took pains to explain that it was in no way aimed against the rest of the Allies. Under the control of any one of the others they will be content until the Peace Conference shall make its final decision.

As one proof of this they cite the fact that it was known in Turkey that an occupation would take place, long before it did take place; and no preparation was made to resist this occupation, for the simple reason that no one imagined that the Smyrna area would be occupied by Greek troops alone. Even when the Greek occupation took place, no organised movement was started till the Greeks persisted in their cruelties, and continued to burn

villages, massacre Turks, rape and murder their women folk and kill their children.

Now the Turks say that their feelings of hatred against the Greeks have grown so intent that they can never submit to be controlled by them. Thinking little of their lives, they would sooner be exterminated fighting against the Greeks, than have the country a second Macedonia.

### *Refugees*

With regard to the wholesale emigration of Greeks from far and near towns and villages outside the Greek zone to those within the Greek zone, the British Officer reported that at Akhissar at any rate the 6000 Greeks who left had no cause for so doing, and he was firmly convinced that this emigration took place under orders from Greece itself.

As his reason for such a belief he put forward the following:—firstly a desire on the part of the Greeks to prove that a state of affairs dangerous to Christians existed outside the limits of their zone, with a view to being allowed to increase that zone; and secondly to reduce the obvious error in the statistics given by Venezelos to the Peace Conference on the relative numbers of Greeks and Turks in this part of the country. In confirmation of this the British Officer was told that large numbers of Greeks have come in from Greece itself, and also from the islands round the coast.

### *Religious Feelings and Politics*

As has been said the irregular movement has been aimed solely against the Greeks, and at present there is no question of Moslem against Christian. This is proved by the fact that they are quite willing to accept the occupation of any other Allied Christian nation. Nor is it a Turkish political movement, such as that of Mustapha Kemal. It is true that they do not recognise the Government, because the Government do not recognise them; but the movement is not working to overthrow that Government.

*Preference of Allied Nations.* As regards choice of the nation to occupy or control the country, England is certainly the one they prefer; then America. The British Officer received the impression that Italy would be preferred to France.

The effect in the Interior of the arrival of General Milne was great. Everyone was pleased, and it is a fact that the Irregular leaders in various places stopped reinforcements coming which were on their way. At Salikli a Zebek chief, who was to arrive with 300 of his men, came in alone, saying that he had heard of the arrival of British Officers in Smyrna, who would surely turn the Greeks out, and there would be no need of further fighting. The general opinion in the Interior is that England is going to help Turkey out of her present troubles.

*Economic Conditions.* The present state of unrest and uncertainty has made it impossible for the harvest in the affected parts to be collected. In the coming winter this will undoubtedly produce a serious poverty among many thousand Turks and Greeks. Outside the occupied zone Turkish Committees

have been formed to help people who have been made homeless and have lost their harvests. The Committees get money from rich Turks and Greeks alike, and both the Greek and Turkish poor are looked after. In the same way to prevent brigandage, should the Greek troops evacuate the country and the irregular troops be dispersed, funds have already been started to provide the men with a livelihood until conditions become once more normal.

*Congresses.* The Congresses that meet have for their aim to put clearly in written form the state of affairs resultant on the Greek occupation, and to show this to the Allied Authorities. Again, they are concerned with the ways and means of the Irregular Movement, and are thought to be working to connect up the various fronts under one central organisation. The men forming the Congresses come from all parts of Turkey.

*Note by G.S. 'I'.* It is reasonable to suppose that the Turkish Irregular leaders will put the total of their followers at the highest possible figures.<sup>1</sup>

*Constantinople, 3rd September, 1919*

<sup>1</sup> This report was minuted as follows in the Foreign Office:

'This report on the Turkish irregulars who are opposing the Greeks in Aidin Vilayet is based on information from Turkish sources. The suggestion that this movement is distinct from that of Mustafa Kemal can hardly be correct.'

'W. S. EDMONDS

'23/9/19

'We are receiving a very large number of similar reports from the interior but I am not submitting them unless they contain something of particular interest.'

'The fact that the "Irregular" movement is so far independent of Mustapha Kemal is probably due solely to the allied hold on the railway and that hold, thanks partly to the doubtful attitude of the Italian and French forces responsible for part of it, does not seem likely to afford an effective barrier for much longer.'

'G. KIDSTON  
'Sept. 24/19

'Interesting. J. A. C. TILLEY  
24/9'

## No. 510

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 14)*

*No. 1812 Telegraphic [129080/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 13, 1919

I had a long conversation with Grand Vizier this morning September 13th in the course of which he gave me an explanation of situation which has I think already been reported to you accurately and fully by Admiral Webb.

I was however particularly impressed by what His Highness had to tell me concerning movements under Mustapha Kemal, to which he attaches an increasing importance. He said it was engineered by a comparatively small number of officers, perhaps 500 throughout provinces of Angora, Sivas and Erzerum, that they showed an equal hostility to Turkish Government and to Allies, and that whereas they used to assert their loyalty to Sultan they are now assuming a different attitude. The remedies he (?) could propose were

either that Allies should permit the despatch of a Turkish army ? to<sup>1</sup> crush them or that an Allied force—(?) and in this case) a far smaller number of men would be sufficient—should be sent to occupy important strategic points.

I said it seemed to me that first solution would be tantamount to a declaration of civil war : and that as to second, the Allies were absolutely tired of war, and wished to leave no stone unturned to avoid further bloodshed; it seemed as if His Highness' Government, and according to his statement the mass of the people, recognised power of Allies and were prepared to accept the decisions of Peace Conference, whereas adherents of Mustapha were for a continuation of war which was as foolish as unpatriotic.

I suggested possibility of treating with him, impressing upon him extremity of dangers to which he was thus exposing his country.

Grand Vizier said he feared it was too late now for this course to be successful. I shall report to you further after discussion with my colleagues and British Military authorities.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 511

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 16)*

*No. 1818 Telegraphic [129615/11067/58]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 15, 1919

Reference to Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 1312<sup>1</sup> of August 31 to Lord Curzon.

May I suggest another possible motive for this proposal by French to land troops in Cilicia and send them through Asia Minor to Armenia. The French force will probably arrive at Mersina too late in the season to undertake a march to Armenia via Mardin and Diarbekir and French will therefore say that they must find suitable stations for troops until the spring. This they will do by occupation of important places in Syria.

It is hard to think that proposed march is seriously considered by French.

<sup>1</sup> No. 501.

### No. 512

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 18)*

*No. 1830 Telegraphic [131054/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 17, 1919

My telegram No. 1812,<sup>1</sup> of September 13th.

Sivas Congress have issued proclamation to the effect that they, the representatives of Asiatic as well as of European Turkey, have broken off all

<sup>1</sup> No. 510.

relations with the present Turkish Government which they allege is not lawfully formed, which is trying to create discord amongst various (? Moslem) elements, which act [? acts] in an arbitrary manner, and which have [? has] lost all the confidence of the Turkish Nation.

They state that new Government must be formed which shall possess the confidence of the nation. They guarantee public security and state that they are only opposed to present Cabinet.

Meanwhile nationalist movement is spreading and officers of Mustapha Kemal have according to statement of Minister of Interior seized numerous telegraph offices.

Armenian Patriarch has received ambiguous telegram from Amassia which may betoken trouble there.

The simultaneous presence of Major Noel and Kurdish Chiefs as well as of Ghalib Bey new Vali of Kharput at Malatia was singularly unfortunate and has imbued the Sivas Congress with belief that they together with the present Government are working in combination to hand over the country to His Majesty's Government.<sup>2</sup>

In conversation with French High Commissioner on September 16th I found that we were in entire agreement on following points:—

1. That present Government, or something like it, was most in conformity with desire of peace conference.
2. That it would be useless to replace it by any other of similar nature as they would be in the same position.
3. That any other change would only be in unionist direction and would be quite undesirable.
4. That Grand Vizier's proposal of sending troops against Nationalists could at least only end in civil war and, in alternative, in these troops joining Mustapha Kemal.
5. That proposal His Highness had suggested that Turkish force (? should be) accompanied by Allied troops or (? at all events) officers was out of the question.
6. That as a matter of fact Turkish Government and Allies were powerless to apply any real (? remedy) or to give any effective support to present Government.

We considered possibility of sending Emissaries to discuss matters with Mustapha Kemal, but this also appears hopeless so long as we are ignorant of decision or intentions of Peace Conference.

We also took into consideration hopelessness of financial position of the country which may shortly render other Government impossible.

I am going to interview Grand Vizier and General Milne (? shortly), will report again later.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral de Robeck had transmitted a report in Constantinople telegram No. 1819 of September 16 (received September 17, not printed) that Ghalib Bey 'who was on his way from Kharput to Sivas with strong escort was compelled by threatening attitude of Mustafa Kemal party to retreat to Kyakhte, that Noel accompanied him, and that Mustafa Kemal party at Sivas have ordered them both to be captured alive or dead'.

No. 513

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 19)*

*No. 1831 Telegraphic [131407/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 17, 1919

My telegram No. 1830.<sup>1</sup>

(? I have) since had long conversation separately with Grand Vizier and General Milne who are both of opinion that a grave crisis is at hand.

The situation which is most complicated presents itself to me as follows:—

The Nationalist Party under Mustapha Kemal was engineered by events following occupation of Smyrna and must be regarded as (? direct) descendant of Committee of Union and Progress. Starting at Erzeroum it has now spread over Vilayets of Angora (? and Sivas) and is threatening also Kastamouni and Kharpout. British occupation of Anatolian Railway checks it to a great extent from linking up fully with movement in Aidin and other districts in West.

According to all (? information) it is steadily moving in direction of an independent Republic in Anatolia. It receives however considerable support from Constantinople notably from Ministry of War and it (? almost) certainly is in touch with Heir Apparent.

Just as C.U.P. grew from a small cryptic body until it . . .<sup>2</sup> seems to me only natural that this new Nationalist party should represent spirit of people far more easily<sup>3</sup> than does present Government and I believe<sup>4</sup> best chances for future of Turkey lie in submitting to decisions of Peace (? Conference); the party judging by events at Smyrna and by fears aroused by talk of a great independent Armenia and . . .<sup>5</sup> place no hopes in Christian Europe.

A peace accepted by Government would be no peace because Nationalists would not accept it and it would have to be imposed on them by force of arms. And at present moment will of Government is fast ceasing to run as I have already informed you.

It has been suggested to me that there is a somewhat strong parallel between present situation and that created in 1908 by overthrow of Sultan at hands of young Turks. On both occasions Grand Viziers were sound friends to Great Britain for whom considerable enthusiasm was shown then as now by considerable sections of country, though fruitlessly, the reason perhaps being that Turk is willing to be helped but not to be led or administered. At all events useful deductions may be drawn from similarity.

The Grand Vizier reiterated to me this morning the (? assurance) that he

<sup>1</sup> No. 512.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that it should read ' . . . until it embraced whole country, it seems to me' &c.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that 'easily' might be a mistake for 'nearly'.

<sup>4</sup> It was suggested on the original that this passage should read ' . . . than does present Government. Government and I believe', &c.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain.

would be quite ready to retire were it not that this would mean abandonment of Sultan who was resolved to abdicate rather than to call in a Grand Vizier and Cabinet from party which had caused His Majesty and his family so much suffering and indignity. I should regard this abdication with same indifference as I should . . .<sup>6</sup> Nationalist Party did if not apprehensive that a situation very (?) disagreeable to us would thereby be created, for any disorders in this country always find their vent on Christian populations and so far as I am able to judge the trend of present events, task of clearing up a state of affairs which conscientious world and especially America can hardly permit, is likely to fall (?) upon His Majesty's Government.

The immediate question which confronts me is that of our policy and (?) responsibility as regards use of armed forces of Allies upon which General Milne is also requesting instructions from War Office in his telegram I 710<sup>7</sup> of to-day's date which I suggest you should see.

. . .<sup>8</sup> His Majesty's Government had (?) previously laid down that they intended that protection should be given to legally constituted authority that is to Sultan and Government appointed by him (see my telegram No. 158<sup>9</sup> and your telegram No. 2(?) 14 [? 233])<sup>9</sup> a limitation was placed upon this by your telegram No. 1369<sup>10</sup> in which this principle was not to be extended to prevent accession to power of a Committee Government.

In order to avoid possibility of a clash with Nationalist Party General Milne is already withdrawing his troops from Samsoun district. The only other places where he has troops in interior are along Anatolian railway.

Owing to attempt to . . .<sup>5</sup> the newly appointed Turkish military command at Angora by blowing up a bridge General Milne has closed Angora branch until Turkish Government can guarantee its safety.

At Koniah are two Italian battalions under his orders who do all in their

<sup>6</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the word 'imagine' had here fallen out.

<sup>7</sup> In this telegram General Milne reported that ' . . . although the Nationalist movement is not openly directed against the Allies I am convinced that secretly it is working against our interests. It is supported undoubtedly by the C.U.P. and probably by many important personages in Constantinople.'

'3. I wish to know the policy His Majesty's Government desire me to adopt in the event of the movement being proclaimed in the Vilayets bordering the Anatolian railway. Am I or am I not to support the Turkish civil authority? There is at present an Indian battalion at Afium-Karahissar, an Italian battn. at Konia, and an Indian battn. at Eski-Shehr.'

'4. Our position on the railway will become most difficult if we do not support the Turkish civil authorities, in fact if we surrender the Government of the towns along the railway to the Nationalists I consider it inadvisable to retain the present garrisons to protect the railway. It must be remembered that Constantinople depends on the Anatolian railway for its food and that the French will probably claim to protect it if we cease to do so.'

'5. In conclusion I desire a decision whether I am to support the present civil administration along the Anatolian railway using force if necessary or if this is not approved whether I am to retain the garrisons along that railway. An early reply is requested as the situation might develop rapidly'.

<sup>8</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the word 'Although' had here fallen out.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> No. 489.

power to curry favour with any kind of Turk. The Grand Vizier recently asked Italian High Commissioner what they would do in case (? town) was menaced by nationalists: latter showed great reserve and said he must consult his Government, as to matter. . . .<sup>11</sup> came to knowledge of General Milne who pointed out to Italian liaison Officer that they were there under his orders. Officer admitted they were using their (position?) there for purely political purposes and expressed his regret for improper action which had been taken. But incident shows how little reliance can be placed upon this body.

There is a French detachment having its headquarters at Afion Kara Hissar to guard (? lines from) westward and there are British forces there and at Eskishehir.

It is exceedingly (? difficult to) combine the three aims of (one) supporting legally constituted authority with a view to maintenance of law and (? order) (two) continuing strictly to enforce conditions of armistice and (three) remaining impartial and passive confronting increasing ill-will of nationalists.

It is hardly possible to withdraw the troops as this would imply closing of railway upon which this capital very largely depends for its food supply; it would mean the removal of the one barrier existing in Anatolia against complete lawlessness and it (? would be) so highly detrimental to our prestige that I could not possibly recommend it.

On the other hand French Government are not . . .<sup>12</sup> their position cannot fail to be very invidious and somewhat precarious.

It must be borne in mind that this will not be temporary but will continue to exist so long as Greeks and Italians are permitted to remain in possession of sections of Asia Minor which so far as I can see can lead to nothing but unending strife. In the eyes of the Turks we are responsible for situation for they can only admit that they were defeated by us and they therefore regard chastisement or annexation at hands of Greeks and Italians or even French as our doing. As I have said the nationalist movement was brought about by occupation of (Smyrna?) which it is its (? main) object to terminate. We cannot leave our Greek Allies in lurch. I do not here refer to Italians for their actions have never received sanction of Peace Conference and I can see no other alternative than (a) a resumption of hostilities which would entail a guerilla warfare in a most difficult country, in winter or (b) the withdrawal of Greeks as well as Italians (see my [sic] despatch 1457<sup>13</sup> August 17th).

It may with truth be pointed out object for which Smyrna was occupied has now been attained namely the restoration of order though result was achieved by a commission of British officers and not by Greek army. Whilst I cannot too strongly emphasize urgent necessity for an early peace yet no peace can be a lasting one which does not take above into fullest consideration.

<sup>11</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read '... as to matter. Matter came to knowledge', &c.

<sup>12</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read '... are not unaware that their position', &c.

<sup>13</sup> No. 486.

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)*  
*No. 1835 [131677/106312/44]*

PARIS, September 18, 1919

My Lord,

I transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from the High Commissioner at Constantinople, No. 181 of September 16th. Although this telegram is marked private and addressed to Mr. Balfour it should obviously be considered by Your Lordship.<sup>1</sup> You will observe that it is reported that the reason for General Franchet D'Esperey's visit to Paris<sup>2</sup> is to obtain the recall from Constantinople of General Milne, and this report is to some extent borne out by other indications obtained here.

I also transmit for convenience of reference a copy of a memorandum written on this subject by the Secretary of State for War during his recent visit to Paris.<sup>3</sup> I presume that such a suggestion would not be entertained.

I am, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 514

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Mr. Balfour<sup>4</sup>*

*No. 181*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 16, 1919

Private and personal for Mr. Balfour.

My telegram No. 1313<sup>5</sup> June 21st to F.O.

A rumour has reached me to the effect that one reason for General Franchet D'Esperey's visit to Paris is to obtain recall or removal from Constantinople of General Milne.

You are no doubt aware of General D'Esperey's attitude and behaviour towards General Milne especially of late. This attitude can only result in grave difficulties in keeping up even a semblance of harmony between British and French here in spite of close touch between my French colleague and myself.

Your telegram to Lord Curzon No. 1312<sup>6</sup> of August 31 emphasises necessity for our people at Mersina, Alexandretta freely to help the landing of 12,000 French troops to best of our power but experience points to probability amounting almost to certainty that if this expedition is under General D'Esperey smooth and cordial co-operation even with best will in the world will become practically impossible.

There is also a contrary rumour that General D'Esperey will not return and it would be satisfactory if this were true. Please see my telegram No. 72<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Balfour had left Paris on September 11, 1919, and was then on holiday.

<sup>2</sup> General Franchet d'Esperey had recently left Constantinople on a visit to Paris.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War, had recently visited Paris.

<sup>4</sup> This telegram was received in Paris on September 17, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> No. 501.

June 17 to you. His presence here cannot possibly serve any useful purpose and only tends to increase confusion. Obviously the necessity for a Generalissimo has now disappeared.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 514

*Memorandum by Mr. Churchill<sup>7</sup>*

(1) If it is desired to make an historical survey of the causes which led to the present occupation of Constantinople, it is necessary to begin earlier than the attached paper.<sup>8</sup> The salient fact about Turkey is that it was conquered by the British Armies, and that at least nine-tenths of the blood and treasure spent in the war against Turkey was won by the British Empire. The great victories which finally brought Turkey to her knees in 1918 were gained almost exclusively by the British and native forces of the British Empire under Field-Marshal Lord Allenby. Nor were these great exertions against the Empire of Turkey accompanied by any weakening of the efforts of the British Armies to sustain their French comrades on the Western battlefields. On the contrary, while these victories in the East were being gained, the British Armies in France and Flanders during the years 1917 and 1918 suffered much heavier casualties and made greater captures both in prisoners and guns from the Germans than any other army in the Western theatre. The effort which struck down Turkey was in the main an effort of the Oriental and Indian portions of the British Empire and was in no way achieved at the expense of the effort of the British Armies in France. But for that effort, Turkish troops in very large numbers would assuredly have appeared on the Western battlefields.

(2) The British forces at present in Turkey are described in this paper<sup>8</sup> as amounting only to one feeble division. As a matter of fact, in the Army of the Black Sea alone, there are at present more than 50,000 men. It is quite true that all of these are not in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, some being in the forts of the narrows and a considerable portion in the Caucasus. It is pointed out that the French troops in Constantinople will shortly be augmented by divisions brought back from Bulgaria and from Hungary. It is not known for what purpose this addition to the garrison of the Constantinople district is to be made. No reason known to the British military authorities requires or justifies such a step. If more troops were needed they could easily be found from the British troops now coming back from the Caucasus, the evacuation of which is proceeding from day to day with the utmost rapidity. Moreover large reserves of British and Indian troops are available at short notice in Egypt and Palestine. It must be remembered that the British have in Syria and Cilicia at the present time no fewer than 35,000 troops who are engaged in maintaining order in difficult circumstances in provinces in which the British have never intended or desired to remain. And in any enumeration of the relative forces available at Constantinople, the British forces engaged in holding Syria

<sup>7</sup> This memorandum was evidently communicated by Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau on September 15, 1919, in reply to the French memorandum of September 13 (enclosure 3 below): cf. Nos. 518 and 525, also Volume I, No. 57, minute 4 (a).

<sup>8</sup> Enclosure 3 below.

until French troops are ready to replace them must certainly be taken into consideration.

The naval forces maintained by Great Britain in the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the part played by these forces in the events of the last few months, must also be taken into consideration in any comparison of the relative contributions of the Great Powers concerned, which it may be necessary to make.

The question of the arrangements which should be made pending the final decision of the Allied Powers as to the future of Constantinople and of Turkey in general could not in any case be decided by a mere balancing of numbers. The British Government have maintained, are maintaining, and are prepared to maintain in this sphere whatever troops are necessary during the interim period.

(3) The relative rôles which it is suggested should be assigned to the French and British Commanders during the interim period should be examined.

Firstly, the command in chief in Palestine and Syria is exercised by the British only until the French choose to take over their agreed sphere of responsibilities.

Secondly, the command in chief of the Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire is indeed an exceedingly sterile and thankless function. It consists in the first place of Great Britain having been compelled against her interests and against her will to maintain for eight months at great expense an Army Corps in the Caucasus. From this Britain is now withdrawing after having vainly endeavoured to persuade the Italians or the Americans to undertake the responsibilities which we have hitherto discharged there at so much cost and inconvenience.<sup>9</sup>

Thirdly, General Milne has been deputed by the Peace Conference, in spite of the protests of the War Office, to discharge the still more thankless and indeed odious task of endeavouring to mitigate and modify the quarrels which are proceeding between the Italians and Greeks and between the Italians and the Greeks and the Turks.

On the other hand, it is suggested that it is fair offset to these burdens that France should for her part enter into absolute control of Constantinople and of all the Allied troops in that region, including a British force which apparently is neither to be above nor below the strength of a Division, and that the British Commanders are to quit the Turkish capital and transfer themselves to some unspecified town in Asiatic Turkey. It is needless to observe that such a proceeding would strike a fatal blow at British prestige not only in Constantinople, but throughout the Turkish Empire, and would be accepted by the Mohammedans in every part of the world as a humiliation of the most glaring kind inflicted on the British power. Having regard to the fact that Great Britain is incomparably the greatest Mohammedan power in the world, and has at this moment on the soil of the late Turkish Empire, including large reserves in Egypt, between three and four hundred thousand men, such a proposal could not be accepted.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Volume III, Chap. II, *passim*.

It might well be the signal for risings against the British authority in many parts of the Turkish Empire, which would endanger the safety of our troops and could only be extinguished by the shedding of blood.

(4) Although the position in Constantinople during the interim period before final arrangements can be agreed upon between the Great Powers assigns—and rightly assigns—the primacy to Great Britain, France is at no disadvantage in this respect. For all the British Armies in France and Flanders are and have long been placed under the Supreme Command of a French Generalissimo from whom, at this moment, our Commanders await their orders.

15. 9. 19.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 514

*Note sur l'Organisation du Commandement en Turquie d'Europe<sup>10</sup>*

No. 11.893 D.

PARIS, le 13 septembre 1919

I. Sur la demande expresse de Monsieur Lloyd George, il fut décidé le 6 octobre 1918, après l'armistice avec la Bulgarie que la 'Section Orientale de l'Armée Alliée de Salonique marchera sur Constantinople et sera placée sous le commandement direct d'un Général Britannique placé lui-même sous les ordres du Général Commandant en Chef Français des Armées Alliées d'Orient'.

Le Général Franchet d'Espérey constitua, en effet, sous les ordres du Général Milne, une armée comprenant 3 Divisions britanniques, une Division française et des détachements italiens et helléniques. Une partie de cette armée comprenant une division française et une division anglaise fut constituée en un corps placé sous les ordres du Général Anglais Wilson, corps qui devait opérer sur la Basse Moritza.

Les opérations contre la Turquie qui devaient se dérouler sous les ordres supérieurs du Général Franchet d'Espérey et sous la direction immédiate du Général Milne ne furent menées que jusqu'à la fin de la période préparatoire lorsqu'intervint l'armistice avec la Turquie.

D'accord avec le Général Milne, le Général Franchet d'Espérey, suivant d'ailleurs les instructions données par les Gouvernements Alliés, décide [sic] de confier au corps interallié du Général Wilson (1 Div. anglaise, 1 Div. française, 1 détachement italien, 1 détachement hellénique) l'occupation de la Turquie d'Europe.

Cette situation *de fait* dure encore.

Elle ne correspond plus aux conditions actuelles.

En premier lieu, les considérations *d'effectifs* qui ont conduit à placer sous le commandement britannique l'aile orientale de l'armée d'Orient sont absolument renversées.

Alors, en effet que l'armée du Général Milne comprenait 3 divisions britanniques et 1 division française, il n'y a plus maintenant en Turquie d'Europe qu'une faible division britannique<sup>11</sup> alors que les forces françaises viennent d'être portées à deux divisions<sup>12</sup> du fait de l'arrivée des troupes de Hongrie et bientôt à trois dès que l'occupation de la Bulgarie ne sera plus indispensable.

<sup>10</sup> This note was evidently prepared by the French military authorities: cf. No. 525.

<sup>11</sup> Note in original: '8.212 hommes'.

<sup>12</sup> Note in original: '20.000 hommes'.

En ce moment même se trouve à Constantinople 14 bataillons français et 4 groupes d'artillerie.

II. La situation actuelle *au point de vue commandement* est donc paradoxale puisque le commandement *effectif* appartient au Général Anglais Wilson qui s'intitule 'Commandant des troupes alliées en Turquie d'Europe' et qui à ce titre exerce notamment la direction de la police de Constantinople, décide de la répartition et de l'occupation de différents locaux dont plusieurs appartenant à des sociétés françaises<sup>13</sup> mises de ce fait dans l'impossibilité de fonctionner, etc., etc.

III. Cette situation devient d'autant plus inadmissible du fait des attributions dévolues au Général Milne.

Cet officier général placé initialement complètement sous les ordres du Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées d'Orient n'y est plus ultérieurement resté qu'en ce qui concerne les troupes britanniques d'Europe sud-orientale, lorsqu'une partie des forces britanniques dont il disposait a été envoyée au Caucase. (Résolution de la Conférence Interalliée de Londres du 3 décembre.)<sup>14</sup>

De plus dans sa séance du 18 juillet le Conseil Suprême admettait que le Commandement Interallié serait exercé dans l'Empire Ottoman d'Asie par un Général Anglais qui devait être initialement le Général Allenby mais qui se trouva être en définitive le Général Milne.<sup>15</sup>

De sorte que ce dernier, nominalement sous les ordres du Général Franchet d'Espérey à Constantinople, commande en chef en Turquie d'Asie et au Caucase.

Il en résulte entre autres inconvénients que le Général Milne est amené à considérer qu'il dispose entièrement des troupes britanniques sous ses ordres y compris *celles de Constantinople* et à faire au besoin des prélèvements sur ces dernières, sans accord préalable entre les Gouvernements Alliés contrairement à la résolution de Londres du 3 décembre 1918.<sup>16</sup>

En résumé la situation actuelle peut se résumer ainsi:

Le Maréchal Britannique Allenby commande en Chef en Syrie, Palestine, Mésopotamie.

Le Général Britannique Milne commande en Chef dans l'Empire Ottoman d'Asie.

Le Général Britannique Milne résidant à Constantinople a sous son autorité le Général Britannique Wilson qui exerce le commandement *effectif* à Constantinople et en Turquie d'Europe.

Cela revient à dire qu'en fait, le commandement britannique s'exerce à peu près seul dans tout l'Empire Ottoman.

Le Gouvernement Français ne peut croire que cette situation correspond aux vues réelles du Gouvernement Britannique.

<sup>13</sup> Note in original: 'Usine à gaz de Constantinople par exemple'.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. No. 518.

<sup>15</sup> See No. 461.

<sup>16</sup> Note in original: 'A titre d'exemple le Q.G. et 2 batteries de la 130<sup>e</sup> brigade d'artillerie appartenant aux troupes anglaises de Turquie d'Europe ont été transportées en Anatolie sur l'ordre du Général Milne et sans accord préalable avec le Commandement Français'.

Il lui paraît donc indispensable de compléter les décisions qui ont confié le commandement intérallié dans l'Empire Ottoman d'Asie à un Général anglais (à savoir le Général Milne) par leur *contre-partie naturelle* en précisant que le commandement intérallié en Turquie d'Europe sera *effectivement exercé* par un Général Français (à savoir le Général Franchet d'Espérey).

Il y aurait lieu à cet effet de se mettre d'accord sur les points suivants :

a) Les troupes britanniques maintenues en Turquie d'Europe ne seront plus placées sous les ordres du Général Milne commandant en Chef en Turquie d'Asie. Leur nature, leurs effectifs, seront précisés (une division) et ne peuvent être modifiés sans accord préalable entre les Gouvernements.

b) Ces troupes au même titre que les autres troupes alliées sont placées sous les ordres directs du Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées d'Orient et qui exercera effectivement le commandement à Constantinople et dans le détroit, et y sera chargé de l'ordre et de la police, ce qui entraînera, *ipso facto*, la suppression immédiate du 'Commandement Interallié de Turquie d'Europe' du Général Wilson.

c) Comme conséquence naturelle du Commandement attribué au Général Milne dans l'Empire Ottoman d'Asie et pour éviter tout conflit d'attributions, le Général Milne transportera son Quartier Général sur le territoire où s'exerce son commandement.

d) La limite du Commandement entre les Généraux Commandant en Chef de Turquie d'Europe et dans l'Empire Ottoman d'Asie sera fixée d'une façon générale par les détroits. Toutefois en raison de l'impossibilité de séparer Constantinople de la rive asiatique du Bosphore, celle-ci sera comprise dans la zone d'action du Général Commandant en Chef les Armées d'Orient, sous réserve que la gare d'Haidar-Pacha tête de lignes ferrées de l'Asie Mineure déservant [sic] la zone d'action britannique sera maintenue sous le contrôle britannique.

Enfin les besoins éventuels de la vie économique de Constantinople et le fonctionnement des Chemins de fer de Turquie d'Europe étant intimement liés au charbonnage d'Héraclé, il ne devra être apporté aucune entrave administrative ou autre à l'exploitation et à l'utilisation du charbon d'Héraclé dans les conditions où elles se font actuellement.

### No. 515

*Letter from Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Sir J. Tilley*

*(Received September 23)*

*Unnumbered [132818/132818/44]*

PARIS, September 20, 1919

My dear Tilley,

Crowe is away this week and I am not sure if he has answered your letter of September 18<sup>1</sup> enquiring as to 'the probability of the Treaty with Turkey

<sup>1</sup> Note on original: 'We have no record of the letter to Sir E. Crowe.

'M[iddle] E[astern] Reg[istr]y  
25/9/19'

being signed within the next two or three months at the latest'. I therefore answer in order to make sure of your receiving an immediate reply.

I do not believe that we shall even be able to begin definite work upon it until the end of next month, for it does not seem in the least likely that we shall have a definite pronouncement from America until then.<sup>2</sup> Even when we do begin, it will almost certainly take several months to complete, judging by the analogies of the other treaties; and judging by the signs that we have already encountered I should say there would probably be even greater divergencies of view about Turkey, so that if anything it will take longer. I would have therefore no hesitation in saying that the answer to your letter is emphatically in the negative.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT VANSITTART

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume I, No. 57, minute 4.

### No. 516

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 20)*

*No. 1843 Telegraphic [131934/13/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 20, 1919

Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 66<sup>1</sup> (? August 10).

According to information which it has been possible to gather so far, a minimum monthly sum of 2,000,000 pounds Turkish is necessary for next six months including (? September) to prevent a complete breakdown of Administration.<sup>2</sup>

Details by post.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 493, note 4.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the Turkish administration.

### No. 517

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 2)*

*No. 1723 [136070/87018/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 21, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's telegram No. 1329<sup>1</sup> of 9th ultimo, asking for all available information regarding concessions in any part of the late Ottoman Empire, other than Syria and Palestine, in which British interests participate, I have the honour to furnish the following list of concessions outside the Province of Aidin, and a copy of Mr. Morgan's despatch of the 12th instant, giving particulars of concessions in the Aidin Province:—

Banks:—

*Imperial Ottoman Bank.*

*National Bank of Turkey.*

<sup>1</sup> No. 480.

*Railway:*—

*Mersina-Adana*, now held chiefly by Germans, but a few shares and debentures still in British hands.

*Mines:*—

*Borax Consolidated Company Limited*—holds the concession to work the boracite mines of Sultan Tchair, Sandjak of Karassi, Vilayet of Brusa.

*Keshan Collieries Limited*.—Coal mine near coast of Aegean.

*Chrome Mines in Brusa district*.—Concession held by Paterson & Co., of Smyrna.

*Astyra Gold Mine in the Troad*.—In the name of Alexander Hill.

*Copper Mines in the Province of Trebizond*:—

*Israel and Karakaya*.—Concessions held by Henry Pears as trustee for the Cape Copper Co.

*Kerlak*.—Held by Henry Pears as trustee for the Orient Syndicate Limited.

*Kark Keui and Mursel*.—adjudicated to Henry Pears but concession not complete.

A Copper Mine held in the name of Thomas Swan near Trebizond.

*Marble Quarries*:—

Quarries under Permis d'Exploitations des Carriers [?Carrières] de Marbre, belonging to Walton, Goody & Cripps, Marble Merchants, London, in Cripps' name.

*Miscellaneous*:—

*Constantinople Cold Storage Co.*

*Constantinople Telephone Co.*

*Société Impériale Ottomane Co-intéressée de Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions Navales*. (See page 7 of Constantinople Trade Report for 1913, No. 5374.)<sup>2</sup>

*Constantinople Quay Company*. (Société Anonyme Ottomane des Quais, Docks et Entrepôts de Constantinople.)

*Société Anonyme Ottomane de Fabrication de fils et d'étoffes en coton et laine*.—Cotton mill outside Seven Towers. Bulk of the shares are in British hands.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 517

Mr. Morgan (Smyrna) to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)

No. 181/23

SMYRNA, September 12, 1919

With reference to your telegram No. 132<sup>2</sup> of 21st August 1919, I have the honour to send herewith a list of mining and industrial undertakings in the Vilayet of Aidin in which British subjects are interested as Concessionaires.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

I have also attached a list of other mining and industrial undertakings in which British subjects are interested otherwise than as concessionaires.

JAMES MORGAN

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 517

*List of Mining and Industrial Undertakings in the Vilayet of Aidin  
in which British Subjects are interested as 'Concessionaires'*

Railways.	Aidin (Ottoman) Railway Co.
Gas.	Ottoman Gas Co., (town of Smyrna and suburbs).
<i>Mines:—</i>	
Emery.	Abbott's Emery Mines Ltd., (For full particulars see Annex A). <sup>2</sup>
„	Edward Hadkinson (deceased) (Caratash & Gueuzépé) (Representative Alwyn Hadkinson) (Annex E). <sup>2</sup>
Chrome.	Paterson & Co. (Fuller particulars in Annex B). <sup>2</sup>
Gold &	P. G. Barff & Co. Ltd. (See Annexes C & D). <sup>2</sup>
Silver.	Edward Hadkinson (deceased) (Euren, Sandjak of Aidin) (See Annex E). <sup>2</sup>
Antimony.	Thomas Bowen Rees (Tchinli Kaya, Village Mesdjildli, Nahlé of Birghé, Odemish). (Messrs. Rees & Co. hold various concessions in Adana Vilayet.)
Various.	Mrs. Wilson of Crofton near Wakefield, Yorks.
Coal, Iron, &c.	Three Coal Mines near Torbali. Iron Mine near Ayasmat, Aivali. She holds other concessions but particulars are not available here; she has no local representative.
Mercury.	J. W. Whittall & Co., of Constantinople. (For fuller particulars apply to the firm.)
Lime.	Wm. Hadkinson. Lime Kilns, Smyrna.
Marble.	C. H. Wilkin, at Akbouk near Kulluk, Quarries.
„ ?	Alfred Charnaud (Particulars promised).

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 517

*Other Mining and Industrial Undertakings in which British Subjects are  
interested but not as 'Concessionaires'*

<i>Mines.</i>	
Calamine.	C. Whittall & Co. (See Annex A). <sup>2</sup>
Chrome.	Paterson & Co. (See Annex B). <sup>2</sup>
<i>Factories.</i>	
Valonia Extract.	C. Whittall & Co. (recently sold out?) McArthur.
Iron Works.	D. Issigonis Works.

<i>Foundry, etc.</i>	Rankin and Demas.
	Rice Brothers.
	Alfred Sanson.
<i>Oil-Press.</i>	Albert Smith (Kalissa Keuy Pergama).
	Robt. Hadkinson, Aidin.
<i>Flour-mill.</i>	Whiteman, Menemen.
<i>Carpets.</i>	Oriental Carpet Manufacturers.
<i>Dye-works.</i>	Paterson & Co.

### No. 518

*Note from the French Government*<sup>1</sup>

[136765/106312/44]

PARIS, le 21 septembre 1919

La question du commandement à Constantinople a été réglée par la résolution prise le 3 décembre 1918 à Londres:

'Les Gouvernements britannique, français et italien décident que les troupes britanniques en garnison dans *quelque partie que ce soit de la Turquie d'Europe* restant avec leur Général sous le commandement du Général Franchet d'Espérey, le reste de l'armée du Général Milne pourra être transféré dans le Caucase ou ailleurs et cessera dans ce cas d'être sous les ordres du Général Franchet d'Espérey. Les Gouvernements intéressés auront dans chaque cas à convenir de la légitimité de ce transfert.'

En fait cette décision n'est pas respectée: le Général anglais Wilson, qui avait été chargé par le Général Franchet d'Espérey d'occuper la Turquie d'Europe avec un corps allié comprenant une division anglaise, une division française, un détachement italien et un détachement hellénique, a conservé le commandement effectif à Constantinople même après que le Général Franchet d'Espérey, commandant en chef des troupes alliées, dont il dépend, y a transféré son Quartier Général (février 1919). En demandant que le Général Franchet d'Espérey commande à Constantinople le Gouvernement français ne revendique que son droit.

La note remise par M. Lloyd George à M. Clemenceau le 15 septembre<sup>2</sup> invoque divers arguments contraires: elle déclare que la Turquie a été vaincue et soumise par les armées britanniques au prix de sacrifices d'argent et d'hommes exceptionnels, sans diminuer le soutien apporté par l'Angleterre sur le théâtre occidental de la guerre où son effort a été aussi élevé que celui d'aucune autre armée en 1917 et 1918. Le memorandum anglais conteste d'ailleurs la supériorité d'effectifs français à Constantinople (en se basant sur les 50,000 hommes que l'Angleterre a dans la mer Noire, les 35,000 en Syrie et Palestine et les 300,000 qu'elle entretient dans l'ensemble de l'empire turc); il ajoute que l'augmentation des troupes françaises à Constantinople

<sup>1</sup> This note was communicated to Mr. Lloyd George by the French Ambassador in London on September 29, 1919 (see No. 526). A copy of the note was communicated to the Foreign Office by Mr. Lloyd George and was received on October 4.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 514, enclosure 2.

n'est pas nécessaire et que la question du commandement ne pouvait être décidée par une simple comparaison d'effectifs. La note affirme enfin que le commandement anglais ne saurait sans une perte de prestige fâcheuse transporter son Etat-Major en Turquie d'Asie. L'Angleterre est la plus grande puissance musulmane du monde et a le droit de revendiquer à Constantinople la première place.

Ces arguments ne peuvent rester sans réponse: la défense de l'Egypte, l'occupation de la Palestine et la conquête de la Mésopotamie n'ont été rendues possibles que par l'expédition de Salonique dont l'idée, la direction et le succès sont dus essentiellement à la France, qui y a maintenu 200,000 hommes dans l'intérêt général des alliés, au détriment de la défense même de son sol national. L'effondrement et la capitulation de la Turquie sont dus directement, non aux opérations de Mésopotamie et de Syrie qui, si brillantes qu'elles aient été, n'ont jamais menacé sérieusement l'Asie Mineure ni la capitale turque, mais à la défaite et à la capitulation de la Bulgarie, réalisée par l'effort de l'armée d'Orient sous le commandement français, capitulation qui coupait Constantinople de ses alliés et rendait la continuation de la lutte impossible.

L'emploi de près de 900,000 hommes en Turquie d'Asie ne peut être représenté comme sans répercussion sur la puissance de l'effort anglais sur le principal théâtre de la guerre; de même l'effort magnifique de l'armée anglaise dans les deux dernières années de la guerre sur le sol français ne doit pas faire oublier que pendant les deux premières années ce sont les sacrifices et l'énergie de la France qui ont permis à l'Angleterre de former ses puissantes armées pour la défense des intérêts généraux des alliés en France, et de ses intérêts propres en Orient. Il n'y a donc là aucun titre spécial à revendiquer l'exclusivité du commandement dans toutes les parties de l'empire ottoman.

A la fin de 1918 le Gouvernement français possédait le commandement sur terre et sur mer, le Généralissime des armées alliées d'Orient était français et l'Amiralissime pour la Méditerranée l'était également. C'est par un acte amical et pour tenir compte d'une demande de M. Lloyd George que le Gouvernement français a consenti d'une part à laisser le Général Milne prendre le commandement de l'aile droite de l'armée d'Orient dirigée vers Constantinople, et d'autre part à accepter que l'Amiral français s'effaçât pour laisser un amiral anglais négocier l'armistice avec les Turcs. C'est dans le même esprit de libéralisme cordial que le Gouvernement français a accepté récemment que le Général assumât le commandement des troupes alliées en Asie Mineure; mais ces différentes concessions ne sauraient aujourd'hui être invoquées comme un titre pour priver le Général Franchet d'Espérey du commandement en Turquie d'Europe et à Constantinople, qu'il tient non seulement de sa situation de commandant en chef des armées d'Orient, mais de l'accord positif de Londres du 3 décembre 1918.

Cela serait d'autant moins légitime que les intérêts français à Constantinople et dans l'ensemble de l'empire ottoman, matériellement et moralement, sont infiniment plus considérables que ceux de l'Angleterre qui ne peut

invoquer que le chiffre supérieur de son commerce. La France possède une situation prépondérante dans les chemins de fer (30 % du Bagdad et plus des 3/5 du capital des autres lignes); elle a créé ou possède une situation prépondérante dans les grandes sociétés d'intérêt public (quais, docks, phares, eaux, tramways, électricité, charbonnages, tabac, routes etc.). Au point de vue financier la France a plus de 3 milliards engagés en Turquie dont les 2/3 en fonds d'état. Au point de vue des écoles, de la diffusion de la langue française, des œuvres d'assistance etc. sa supériorité est également écrasante. Comme l'Angleterre elle est d'ailleurs une grande puissance musulmane et ses intérêts de cet ordre sont aussi considérables et vitaux que ceux de l'Angleterre.

Dans de telles conditions comment serait-il justifié que l'Angleterre revendiquât le commandement total des troupes alliées sur tous les points de l'empire ottoman, sans tenir compte des considérations de droit et de fait, avec le Général Wilson en Turquie d'Europe, avec le Général Milne en Asie Mineure, avec le Maréchal Allenby dans le reste de l'empire ottoman: le Général Franchet d'Espérey continue à être désigné en théorie comme le commandant en chef des armées alliées d'Orient, mais son commandement ne s'exerce plus nulle part et les généraux qui lui sont subordonnés en Turquie d'Europe comme le Général Milne et le Général Wilson disposent de troupes sans son autorisation et échappent entièrement à son commandement.

Le Gouvernement français (sous réserve de l'indication donnée que le commandement en chef en Syrie n'est exercé par les Anglais que jusqu'à ce que les Français prennent cette responsabilité dans leur zone) n'élève aucune contestation sur les commandements respectifs du Maréchal Allenby et du Général Milne en Turquie d'Asie, mais il revendique le respect du commandement du Général Franchet d'Espérey en Turquie d'Europe et l'exécution de l'accord du 3 décembre 1918. Il ne peut s'arrêter à l'idée que l'Angleterre subirait une humiliation et une perte de prestige en observant la convention sur ce point. Sinon quelle humiliation et quelle perte de prestige la France aurait consenties en acceptant successivement d'abandonner les priviléges du commandement en chef sur terre et sur mer à la fin de 1918.

### No. 519

*M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received September 23)*

[342/1/6/19095]

PARIS, le 22 septembre 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation de l'Empire Britannique copie d'une lettre de la Délégation arménienne en date du 20 septembre 1919 relative à la situation désespérée de l'Arménie.

*The President of the Armenian Delegation to the President of the  
Peace Conference*

PARIS, le 20 septembre 1919

M. le Président,

D'après les dernières dépêches officielles émanant du Gouvernement de la République arménienne, la situation de notre pays est désespérée. Voici en effet ces nouvelles alarmantes :

'Les troupes turco-tartares dirigées par des officiers turcs ont complètement encerclé notre pays. Les attaques incessantes de ces bandes disposant d'officiers, de soldats, de mitrailleuses, de canons turcs, nous ont obligés de procéder à l'évacuation de Kars, où des combats ont été livrés.

'Plusieurs milliers de réfugiés arméniens de Turquie qui venaient de se fixer dans les localités voisines de la frontière ainsi que la population arménienne locale qui, depuis quelques mois seulement, était retournée dans ses foyers, ont dû fuir encore une fois devant l'envahisseur; leur situation est lamentable. Les Tartares menacent les lignes de chemins de fer Ouloukhanlou-Etchmiddzine; ils ont pris Davalou et Koulp.

'Les centres d'agitation se trouvent à Erzeroum, Nakhitchevan et Bakou, d'où les forces ennemis reçoivent de l'argent, des armes et des munitions.

'Le départ des Anglais, le manque de munitions, réduisent nos forces à l'inaction. Nous ne pouvons comprendre pourquoi la Conférence de Paris ne nous envoie aucun secours. Nous sommes complètement abandonnés.'

Connaissant l'esprit d'abnégation du peuple arménien et le moral de notre armée, nous sommes convaincus que, malgré le manque de munitions et les privations inouïes, la lutte sera opiniâtre et peut-être réussira-t-on, une fois de plus, à repousser les agresseurs qui menacent l'existence même du peuple arménien.

Vu les forces supérieures de nos ennemis et leur plan bien arrêté, de nouvelles attaques de leur part sont inévitables.

En face d'une situation si angoissante, la Délégation se voir [voit] obligée, malgré toutes les démarches faites auprès de la Haute-Assemblée, démarches qui malheureusement sont jusqu'ici demeurées sans résultat, de s'adresser encore une fois à la Conférence de la Paix, la priant très respectueusement de prendre des mesures immédiates afin de mettre un terme aux souffrances dans lesquelles le peuple arménien s'est débattu pendant la guerre et se débat encore, en dépit des clauses de l'armistice et des promesses faites à la Nation arménienne.

Nous pensons que pour empêcher d'une manière définitive les attaques des éléments agressifs turco-tartares et pour mettre, à l'avenir, la population arménienne à l'abri de tout danger, il serait nécessaire de:

1<sup>o</sup>) Maintenir les forces alliées en Arménie, et nous aider à réorganiser les troupes arméniennes en y envoyant immédiatement munitions, armements et équipements, pour déjouer ainsi, avec le concours de ces troupes, le plan agressif turco-tartare.

2º) Assurer à l'Arménie, sous le contrôle des alliés, un libre accès sur la Mer Noire et la Mer Caspienne, lui permettant de se servir sans entraves des voies ferrées Batoum-Erivan et Bakou-Erivan.

3º) Prendre des mesures énergiques pour le repatriement de plus de 300,000 réfugiés arméniens de l'ancienne Turquie dans les provinces limitrophes de la République arménienne; cette mesure s'impose d'autant plus que, vu la crise économique en Arménie caucasienne, une agglomération d'un surplus de population aggrave la situation déjà très pénible du pays qui, depuis un an et demi est en proie à la famine et aux épidémies.

4º) Hâter la solution du problème arménien, dans son ensemble solution qui seule peut mettre fin à toutes ces agitations et toutes ces crises et rétablirait la paix dans ces contrées.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

ACEHARONIAN [AHARONIAN]

Président de la Délégation de la République  
Arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.

## No. 520

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received September 24)*

*No. 1854 Telegraphic [133121/13/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 23, 1919

Reference to my telegram No. 1843<sup>1</sup> of September 20th.

Following is translation of our identic telegram sent by my colleagues and myself to our Governments.

Begins.

I have repeatedly had occasion to report to you the financial difficulties encountered by Ottoman Government in carrying on their Treasury services. They are in fact unable to collect taxes in Anatolia and Aidin Vilayet while the prolongation of armistice deprives them of receipts from occupied territories.

In a note of Grand Vizier's to three High Commissioners the probable deficit for current year is estimated at 29 million Turkish pounds. This figure is under the mark; the Grand Vizier's note speaks of certain increased or new receipts which will certainly not be realised as for instance an increase in customs tariff which appears inadmissible by Allies.

For moment the most urgent requirements are for army pay, civilian salaries, pensions, &c., and three millions of Turkish pounds are wanted monthly for these purposes. Grand Vizier accordingly requests authority to take necessary funds from sums destined for foreign bondholders now lying idle with Imperial Ottoman Bank or Public Debt. He holds that this operation would be in no sense a loan since Ottoman Government are in fact creditors of public debt for about 12 millions pounds as they have made

<sup>1</sup> No. 516.

payments to Ottoman Bondholders since Balkan War which ought to have been made proportionately by different States which annexed Turkish territory in Roumelia.

It is difficult to meet these suggestions favourably. But my colleagues and I consider there is urgent need of extending financial assistance to Ottoman Government in a form which is yet to be established. If present situation is prolonged grave events may result. After consultation we have therefore decided to propose to our 3 Governments to advance to Ottoman Government the monthly sum of 3 million pounds Turkish which is regarded as indispensable, each of our Governments participating for  $\frac{1}{3}$ : the Public Debt would be charged to control expenditure of this sum (?). At final settlement this fresh indebtedness would be charged to debit account of Ottoman Government with Allies. My colleagues and I attach importance to an early reply on this subject. Ends.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Admiral de Robeck further reported in Constantinople telegram No. 1891 of September 30, 1919 (received October 1):

'Grand Vizier has again represented to me the great urgency of this matter. I hear that there is a prospect of selling a sum of about £500,000 Turkish silver to Ottoman Bank, this money was derived from ordinary taxation. If Nationalist Government comes into power financial position might give us considerable hold on them though (it is to be) anticipated that they will have recourse to illegal and drastic methods to obtain money as in fact they are doing at present.'

#### No. 521

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received September 24)*

*No. 1858 Telegraphic [133251/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 23, 1919

My telegram No. 1831.<sup>1</sup>

Question of journey of Grand Vizier into interior at all events as far as Eski Shehir where it might be possible to arrange meeting with Mustapha Kemal and Reouf has again come to the fore. British Military Authorities saw no objection and even welcomed suggestion and were ready to provide facilities but after several changes of plan it now looks as if a Commission of several Generals and (?) delegates under General Hadi Pasha might be sent to discuss with Mustapha Kemal.

Attitude of latter is obscure. His avowed intentions are to secure dismissal of present Government and to prevent partition of Asia Minor. He affirms he is not connected with C.U.P. whereas Grand Vizier maintains contrary with every show of reason. He professes no hostility to Allies and General Milne is not disposed to attach any serious importance to incident reported in first paragraph of my telegram No. 1839.<sup>2</sup> It is of course many months

<sup>1</sup> No. 513.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram of September 19, 1919 (received that day) had reported that a British detachment guarding a railway-bridge between Eski Shehr and Angora had been attacked by 'a nationalist band'. Admiral de Robeck subsequently reported on

since Grand Vizier received statement of His Majesty's Government that their forces here would be employed for maintenance of law and order and upholding of constituted authority and it has been carefully explained to him in accordance with your telegram No. 1369<sup>3</sup> that this does not cover accession to power of a Committee Government nor use of force against supporters of Committee. He points out however, that at present time there is a movement of rebellion against his legally constituted authority, that we do not allow him to use scanty forces of Government to oppose it and that we take no action to check it ourselves.

What, he enquires, would be the attitude of British troops in Eski Shehir if Nationalists under Ali Fuad were to advance against it, an eventuality which seems by no means remote? Nationalists' movement does not seem striking its roots down into people but it continues to gain adherents particularly among demobilized officers and to spread through their push and audacity over an ever increasing area.

Turkish Government is thus placed in a most difficult position without taking into consideration their financial plight on which I am addressing you separate telegrams and my French colleague and I have grave doubts whether situation which is thus being allowed to mature is not calculated to be very detrimental to aims of Peace Conference. Monsieur Defrance and I are therefore more than ever convinced of great and urgent necessity for: 1. A speedy termination of armistice. 2. The withdrawal of Greek and Italian troops from Asia Minor.<sup>4</sup>

All my information goes to prove that both Greek and Italian troops would probably welcome a withdrawal and this would to a large extent discount the original motive, and still one of the principal driving forces in National movement viz: the occupation of Smyrna by Greeks.

September 22 that this report proved to have been exaggerated: 'A few shots were fired at men guarding party who were repairing (? bridge).'

<sup>3</sup> No. 489.

<sup>4</sup> On September 25, 1919, Mr. Kidston minuted with regard to these proposals: 'Neither of these measures can be carried out by H.M.G. alone and the decision must necessarily rest with Paris.' Lords Hardinge and Curzon minuted on this as follows:

'Measure no. 2 is now impossible of realisation.'

H.

'For the moment.'

C.'

### No. 522

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

No. 559 [130732/521/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 23, 1919

Sir,

I have received Rear-Admiral Webb's despatch No. 1633<sup>1</sup> of the 8th instant reporting a conversation which he had with the Grand Vizier.

<sup>1</sup> No. 507.

I request that you will convey to Rear-Admiral Webb my approval of the attitude adopted by him at this interview.

I am, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

No. 523

*Colonel Meinertzhangen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 1)*

No. 455 Telegraphic [135610/3050/44]

CAIRO, September 27, 1919

Reference Egyptforce telegram E A 2637<sup>1</sup> of August 25th.

A report from my political officer northern area indicates that Noel is conducting dangerous form of anti-Turkish and pro-Kurd propaganda and that he considers present unsatisfactory state of things in area due to conduct of certain members of Noel's party.

Noel has been informed and has been ordered with his party to return to Aleppo.

What are your wishes regarding Noel's future movements?

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Baghdad and War Office.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

No. 524

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 6781 [130528/33635/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1919

Sir,

I have to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> dated the 17th instant from the Petroleum Executive relative to the grant by the Ottoman Government of certain oil concessions in the Gallipoli district to the Standard Oil Company and to the desirability of not questioning the validity of rights granted by the Turkish Government before the war.

2. It will be necessary to explain that in the early part of 1914 the Standard Oil Company—through their representative in Constantinople Mr. L. I. Thomas—obtained licences to prospect for oil in certain areas in the Gallipoli district, and in due course applied for the necessary firmans of concessions.

3. The issue of these firmans seems apparently to have been left in abeyance, for official notices which appeared in the Constantinople Press of the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This letter stated, in particular: 'Mr. Long is not quite clear whether the note addressed to the Porte by the Allied High Commissioners [see below] covers these concessions and whether the latter are to be regarded as suspended. They have not resulted from entirely fresh negotiations as they are the outcome of prospecting licences granted before the war, and the view of the Petroleum Executive has been that it may not be desirable to question the validity of rights granted by the Turkish Government before the war, even if not on a quite formal basis. Mr. Long is, therefore, disposed to recommend that, if the Porte is likely to retain control over Gallipoli, no obstacle should be placed in the way of confirmation of the concessions in question to the Standard Oil Company.'

10th June last announced that subject to there being no legal or reasonable local objection—which should be notified within the delay of two months—the Government would proceed with the grant of the concessions to Mr. Thomas for a period of sixty years.

4. With regard to the validity of these concessions, I would observe that, as you are aware, the three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have recently informed the Sublime Porte that the Allied Governments will refuse to recognise the validity of any concessions granted by the Turkish Government during the period of the war. The action taken by the High Commissioners was approved of in your despatch No. 1836<sup>2</sup> of the 18th instant, and an expression of the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the action taken has been conveyed to His Majesty's High Commissioner.

5. In view of these circumstances, it follows that any concessions which the Standard Oil Company may have actually obtained from the Ottoman Government during the period of the war, will be considered and treated as invalid. Their holdings in the Gallipoli district, however, will not be affected, so long as the concessions are not granted, and, if the issue of the necessary firmans of concessions are delayed until the conclusion of Peace with Turkey, the rights which the Standard Oil Company had originally acquired in 1914 will presumably come under such clauses as may be provided in the Peace Treaty for dealing with foreign concessionary rights in Turkey.

I am, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

V. WELLESLEY

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

### No. 525

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1199 [131677/106312/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1919

My Lord,

According to information which I have received from several sources, it appears that the real reason for General Franchet d'Espérey's visit to Paris is to obtain the recall from Constantinople of General Milne. In case you should be approached in the matter by the French Government I think it well to inform you that His Majesty's Government have no intention of recalling General Milne.

2. I enclose, for your information, a copy of a Memorandum drawn up on the subject by the French Military Authorities,<sup>1</sup> and a copy of a Memorandum which was drawn up in reply by Mr. Winston Churchill<sup>2</sup> and which was, I understand, handed by the Prime Minister to the French Government in Paris.

I am, &c.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This document is printed as enclosure 3 to No. 514.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This document is printed as enclosure 2 to No. 514.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking in filed copy.

No. 526

*Record by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with the French Ambassador in London*

[135763/106312/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1919

The French Ambassador called this afternoon and told me that he had been much surprised to receive from his Gov<sup>t</sup>. copy of a note addressed by the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau on the 15th Sept.,<sup>1</sup> together with copy of M. Clemenceau's reply dated the 21st Sept.<sup>2</sup> which he had been instructed to hand to Mr. Lloyd George, relating to the division of spheres at Constantinople. He reminded me that this was a question which he had already discussed and settled satisfactorily with you.

He sent M. Clemenceau's reply to the Prime Minister this morning. He offered to read to me M. Clemenceau's reply, but I did not agree to his doing so.

H.

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure 2 in No. 514.

<sup>2</sup> No. 518.

No. 527

*Earl Granville<sup>1</sup> (Athens) to Earl Curzon (Received September 30)*

No. 422 Telegraphic [135480/27912/19]

ATHENS, September 29, 1919

Following from Constantinople No. 133 September 26.

*Secret.*

From information I have received from Smyrna it seems evident a very strong campaign is being run in Greek Army against M. Venizelos. Large numbers of both officers and men appear to be involved.<sup>2</sup>

Have you any confirmation of this?

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Athens.

<sup>2</sup> In this connexion Admiral de Robeck had, in Constantinople covering despatch No. 1756 of September 26, 1919, to the Foreign Office (received October 13: not printed), transmitted a brief covering report of September 16 from Mr. Morgan at Smyrna 'concerning the activity of Royalists and Germanophile Greeks in this district. It would appear that the division between Royalists and Venizelists is growing more marked in Athens.' Mr. Morgan's report transmitted to Admiral de Robeck a copy of a report of September 15 upon this subject by the British Naval Representative at Smyrna. The latter report stated notably: 'It is estimated that about 40 per cent. of the [Greek] officers here are Royalists.'

No. 528

*Earl Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon (Received September 30)*

No. 421 Telegraphic [135409/27912/19]

ATHENS, September 29, 1919

Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 421.

Following sent to Constantinople No. 98.

Secret.

Your telegram No. 133<sup>1</sup> of September 26.

I have heard similar rumours but have been unable to obtain any confirmation. I spoke to Acting President of the Council this morning. He said they were fully aware that there were still Constantinists in army particularly amongst officers and that these did their best to create dissatisfaction and run a (? party) against M. Venezelos. Russian adventure had been made good use of for the purpose but occupation of Smyrna had improved situation. (? Government) were watching these proceedings (? carefully) and were quite satisfied that there is no (? danger).

<sup>1</sup> See No. 527.

### No. 529

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 1)*

No. 1889 Telegraphic [135892/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 30, 1919

My telegram[s] No. 1831<sup>1</sup> and 1858.<sup>2</sup>

Proposed journey of Grand Vizier did not materialize.

Mustapha Kemal's influence continuing to spread, General Milne (who had informed Turkish Government that in view of incident related in first paragraph of my telegram 1839<sup>3</sup> he would not run trains on that section until they could supply proper security for it) explained this was hint that they should send forces there, and when subsequently he was approached by Minister of War on the subject, after consulting me he replied the proposed scheme should be submitted to me in writing.

On September 28th Grand Vizier addressed me two notes stating in first, with regard to safety of railway, that strict application of armistice had so much reduced the numbers of army that latter was quite incapable of ensuring military protection to so great a system as Anatolian Railway which moreover was under exclusive control of British Authorities who occupied all the principal points on it.

In the other note His Highness stated situation in Anatolia kept growing more serious, the rebels endeavouring to cut all communications with capital, attacking weak spots on line, holding rich up to ransom and forcibly enrolling the poor. To put an end to this state of things, Minister of War thought it necessary to despatch at once to Eskişehir 2,000 men which he considered were sufficient to restore order.

His Highness requested me to inform British Military Authorities so that those forces could be at once despatched.

I at once consulted General Milne who telegraphed his views to War Office, September 29.

<sup>1</sup> No. 513.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. See No. 521, note 2.

<sup>2</sup> No. 521.

Please see his cable.<sup>4</sup> In the meantime news was received that Vali and Military Governor of Konia who had previously been reported at head of 3,500 Government troops had thrown (?) up omtd. ? struggle) and had returned to Constantinople.

I then discussed matter thoroughly with my French and Italian colleagues who thought we could not do otherwise than adopt opinion of our Military Adviser and we therefore decided to tell Grand Vizier (1) that despatch of 2,000 men would be altogether insufficient to re-establish order especially since Konia incident which showed how little reliance could be placed on them; (2) that despatch of a larger force would throw country into civil war; (3) that to anticipate such an event Allied Military Authorities think that they would have to withdraw their troops on Anatolian line at least to Gulf of Ismid; (4) that result of this would be to deliver immediately to insurgents the railway thus cutting off capital from all connection with Interior and rendering revictualling of population impossible; (5) that therefore under Article V of Armistice<sup>5</sup> High Commissioner felt unable to authorise proposed despatch and disposition of troops.

My colleagues and I further decided to inform our respective Governments in above sense.

Grand Vizier visited me September 29 when I delivered to him this message. I again explained to him instructions in your telegram No. 1369<sup>6</sup> pointed out His Majesty's Government desired to leave entire political liberty to Turkey but to prevent all forms of disorder and bloodshed and that it was necessary that we should not side with any party during Armistice.

His Highness said we were preventing him from moving his troops whereas rebels could move unchecked. He asked whether, as we intended preserving neutrality of railway, troops might be sent to Brusa or elsewhere and whether we would take steps to ensure life and liberty of Sultan or of himself and his own followers. There were rumours already current, he said, of conspiracies to seize Ministries, etc.

I said first was a military question on which I should have to consult General Milne and that the second was entirely covered by what I had said regarding maintenance of order and I promised him that every measure should be taken to guarantee safety of Sultan and himself and his partisans. I think it is clear he will resign.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In this telegram No. I.Z. 234 General Milne stated in particular: 'Firstly. As practically the whole of the Turkish Army in the provinces is nationalist a force of 2,000 Turkish troops is quite insufficient to restore law and order. Secondly. The despatch of Turkish troops would either result in their joining the nationalists or in civil war.'

<sup>5</sup> Article 5 of the Armistice of Mudros regulated the demobilization of the Turkish forces: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 611.

<sup>6</sup> No. 489.

<sup>7</sup> This telegram was minuted by Lord Hardinge and initialled by Lord Curzon as follows:

'I must say that we do not really give Damad Ferid a chance, but we ought to encourage him if possible.'

H.  
C.'

No. 530

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 3)*

*No. 1902 Telegraphic [136454/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 2, 1919

Turkish Cabinet has resigned.

No. 531

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 4)*

*No. 1907 Telegraphic [137062/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 3, 1919

Grand Vizier,<sup>1</sup> Ali Riza Pasha. Sheykh ul Islam, Ibrahim Haidari Zadé. War, Kyutchuk Djemal Pasha. Marine, Salih Pasha. Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha. Interior, Damad Sherif Pasha. Public Instruction, Said Bey. Public Works, Abouk Pasha. Justice, Mustafa Effendi. Council of State, Abdurrahman Sheref Bey. Mines and Forests, Hadi Pasha. Finance, Tewfik Bey. Pious foundations not yet filled.

<sup>1</sup> In the new Turkish cabinet.

No. 532

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 4)*

*No. 1908 Telegraphic [137186/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 3, 1919

My telegram 1902.<sup>1</sup>

Grand Vizier resigned on afternoon of October 1st ostensibly on grounds of health.

New Cabinet contained in my immediately following<sup>2</sup> telegram<sup>3</sup> assumed office on October 2nd. It is composed of men who are respectable but who have been in the main nationalist and in some cases also C.U.P. sympathisers.

As regards new Grand Vizier see Embassy despatches 93 and 110 of 1909.<sup>4</sup>

He has not been conspicuous in political life since then though he was Minister of Marine for some time subsequent to Armistice. He is known as honest and fairly distinguished soldier rather than as politician.

Sheikh-ul-Islam is part Kurd part Arab and has Pan-Islamic leanings with special eye to Mesopotamia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is same though amiable individual who held

<sup>1</sup> No. 530.

<sup>2</sup> This word was corrected on the original to 'preceding'.

<sup>3</sup> No. 531.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

office under Tewfik Pasha after Armistice. He has C.U.P. associations and may be expected to give free hand to strong Nationalist Group in his Ministry.

Most significant new elements are Minister of War and President of Council of State. Former was up to his neck in Nationalist movement at Konia in early days of Mustapha Kemal movement. He was recalled and I made point of insisting that he should not be allowed to return. New President of Council of State is stalwart of Old Guard identified with C.U.P. and subsequent attempts to rally the national efforts.

Most significant retention is Abouk Pasha who is Circassian. He was supposed to be member of late Cabinet most in sympathy with Mustapha Kemal movement.

Imperial rescript to new Grand Vizier enjoins measures to end dissension prevailing in the country and earliest possible convocation of Parliament. Otherwise it is colourless. Sultan was most reluctant to let Ferid go but has made the best of bad job and seems to have accepted Ali Riza . . .<sup>5</sup> as Cabinet of Transition, but it is too soon to judge of this.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 533

*Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Mr. Kidston<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [141458/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 4, 1919

My dear George,

I received your letter of 11th September<sup>2</sup> a day or two ago.

I quite agree with you that we are going deeper into the mire, but at the same time it is hard to speak too highly of Ferid's conduct during the tenure of power. He did everything that was possible for his country, whilst behaving in the most correct and friendly way towards us. He is a very old personal friend of mine, but I have been amazed [sic] at the very real ability he displayed amidst almost impossible circumstances, and for the last few weeks has shown great courage, both physical and moral for he has been threatened in every kind of way.

It is practically impossible to judge rightly at the present time what the Mustafa Kemal party are worth or will do. As you know they started by Ferid sending Mustafa to be a sort of super-inspector in Anatolia, and almost at once, that is to say some five months ago, he started out in opposition. It would seem that he had no great following among the mass of the people, but attracted to himself all the demobilised Officers and unpaid Officials, and malcontents. The people as a whole, undoubtedly, are entirely tired of warfare, and simply want to be left quiet, but Mustafa with his band of more or less educated men kept holding his congresses, and taking over the governorship of one town after another. Ferid, as you know, was always anxious

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain, but was probably October 15, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> This private letter is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

up to the last minute to go in person with a force or at least to send a force, and we prevented him from doing this. The result was that really we helped Mustafa, whose freedom of action we could not check, whilst we could, and did check that of Ferid, i.e. the 'constituted Government', but I think on the whole we were undoubtedly right for if a force had gone against Mustafa, one or [?] of two things would have happened. The most probable that the force would have gone over to Mustafa's side; the second that a civil war would have been let loose on the country, the burden of which, in all probability would have fallen on the Christians.

We have been in close touch with the French and in less close with the Italians, and as a result of our conversations, we decided the other day to tell Ferid the following:

Firstly, the despatch of 2,000 troops would be altogether insufficient we considered after a consultation with the Military Authorities to re-establish order, and the account of the defection of Konia to Mustafa, which had just reached us, shewed that the troops could not be relied upon.

Secondly, the despatch of a large force would throw the country into civil war.

Thirdly, in this case the Military Authorities (i.e. General Milne), think they would have to withdraw their troops in Anatolia, at least to Ismidt.

Fourthly, the result of this would be to deliver immediately to the insurgents the Anatolian Railway.

Fifthly, the Capital would thus be cut off from all relations with the Interior, which would, among other things, entail the impossibility of re-victualling the capital.

Sixthly, consequently the High Commissioners feel they cannot authorise the further despatch of troops.

I felt very sorry to have to tell Ferid this, though at the same time, after carefully explaining the matter to the Admiral, we also told him that every steps [*sic*] that were possible should be taken to ensure the safety and liberty of himself, his adherents and the Sultan, for we did not intend, so far as lay in our power, to permit of a rule of violence and tyranny. Nevertheless the announcement did mean his inevitable withdrawal from power though he still delayed three or four days before resigning.

I do not know what to say yet of the new Government, which seems to be a kind of a compromise between the Sultan and the Kemalites, but I am not grievously troubled over the present outlook, though Ryan is. It reminds me so much of Mexico when one had to deal with a succession of Presidents and Generals of all sorts and kinds;<sup>3</sup> I had certainly very strong preferences among them, of course, but treated them all in exactly the same manner, saying that I had nothing to do with the Government of the country, nor did I care who came into power, but I was resolved to be on perfectly good terms and friends with whoever was in power, and they on their side must help me in my duty of protecting British interests. It seems to me exactly the same here, only we

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Hohler had served as First Secretary in His Majesty's Legation in Mexico City, 1910-17.

have got to add that we *will not* permit disorder or the ill-treatment of Christians. I do not anticipate that they will be very hard to deal with, though they will probably not be so directly helpful as Ferid was. They represent undoubtedly, I think, a much more solidified Turkey, but this was only natural with an Armistice that has lasted the preposterous length of almost a year. They will probably offer a much more resolute opposition to the decisions of the Peace Conference than would have been the case had those decisions been come to within a reasonable time of the conclusion of the fighting. The Kemalites profess not to be the Committee of Union and Progress, though I think the old members of the Committee must inevitably have joined them. What they say is, that they are not to be identified with the Committee, but that they stand for sovereignty and the independence of Turkey. They say that England is the one power whose friendship and help is indispensable to Turkey, but their confidence in us is shaken by the belief that we have been supporting Ferid's Government against the Nationalists with a view to the crushing and dismemberment of Turkey, and by the Smyrna incident, which ostensibly was the sole work of England. It is a very wide-spread view, which you ought to take full account of, that H.M. Government had recognised the awful mistake the Smyrna occupation had been, and had consequently recalled Admiral Calthorpe, who had been responsible for it. Nothing one can say can drive this lunatic idea out of their minds, and both in justice to the Admiral and for the advantage of H.M. Government, it is very desirable to explode this fable, and to explain that the Smyrna incident, like all questions of mandates, Armenia, and the general future of Turkey, appertain exclusively to the competence of the Peace Conference. It seems to me that the best way to do this would be for Lord Curzon to make some public declarations in this sense, perhaps in reply to a question in the House of Commons, pointing out as well the entire impartiality of our attitude here on the lines on which we spoke to Ferid, as described in telegram No. 1889;<sup>4</sup> that while Ferid's Government had behaved very correctly and our relations with it had been very harmonious, yet we had not given it any assistance, and that we are quite ready to treat with any Government that might be legally constituted, and that preserves public order. And if it is the desire and intention of H.M. Government to preserve the independence of Turkey, it would, from a local point of view, be very desirable to state that also.

I think Ferid resigned just at the right time for the towns as near as Adabazar, which is just down the Gulf of Isdmit [*sic*], even, had gone over to Mustafa, and a conflict would have been almost inevitable had he clung right to the bitter end. The Nationalists are not interfering with the Railway at all, nor with our troops, and I think it is all right having them on the Railway line, though they cannot but be regarded somewhat as hostages for there are only some two or three battalions of them.

There are only two ways to set about things, it seems to me. One is to arrange matters and to improve the administration and to protect the

\* No. 529.

Christians through the help and good-will of the Turkish Authorities, and the other is to send a force of 50 to 100,000 men to subdue thoroughly the country; the choice seems obvious. It is what I have always pointed out, though I never contemplated that the Allies would reduce their military forces so thoroughly before they had made peace and imposed their conditions. We have acted on the reverse principle of the Japanese, whose old proverb is, that the end of the fight is the right time to tie on your helmet.

I was particularly sorry when our Battalion was withdrawn from the Samsoun district. It looked like withdrawing before Mustafa, and any sign of weakness never escapes an Oriental.

Well, the future will soon shew us what we are to get from Grand Vizier Ali Riza; at present no one knows.

Yrs. ever,  
TOM HOHLER

No. 534

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received October 15)

No. 1823 [141458/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 6, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith an account of an interview which my Military Attaché, (Lieutenant Colonel Ian Smith), recently had with the first A.D.C. of the late Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pacha.

2. Kemal Bey called ostensibly on some small business connected with the Armistice Commission, but took advantage of this call to launch the statement set out in the interview.

3. The statement is an interesting one, especially in view of the fact that Kemal Bey was not in any way in the confidence of the late Grand Vizier, though obviously very closely in touch with the Nationalist Leaders.

4. Kemal Bey is under several delusions, which are possibly very wide spread and are certainly very regrettable. As Your Lordship is aware, we are not in any way backing up anyone, or any party, nor are we intervening in internal Turkish affairs, but are leaving them severely alone, while at the same time equally ready to treat with any Government that comes into power.

5. The reference to Admiral Calthorpe is, I submit, particularly unfortunate and inaccurate. The opinion expressed by Kemal Bey in this connection seems to be very wide spread, and is equally unjust to Admiral Calthorpe as it is detrimental to His Majesty's Government.

6. In this connection, it is worthy of note that the Greeks are exploiting the departure of Commodore Fitz Maurice from Smyrna<sup>1</sup> in an exactly opposite sense. That is to say they are spreading the report that he has been replaced owing to the opposition which he offered to the carrying out of M. Venizelos' orders in the occupation of Aidin by the Greek troops.

<sup>1</sup> Commodore FitzMaurice had recently been transferred from Smyrna.

7. I do not see what can be done to rectify this state of affairs, but it is at least gratifying to know that we are attacked by both sides, a sure proof, I submit, of our impartiality.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
for High Commissioner

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 534

*Report of Interview with Kemal Bey*

Kemal Bey, (who since 7 days has been 1st A.D.C. to the Grand Vizier as well as Member of Armistice Commission), came and spoke at great length this evening on the political situation. He is, I feel sure, quite in the know of the Nationalist movement (though not Committee of Union and Progress), and may very likely have come as the unofficial mouthpiece of the leaders of this movement in Constantinople and the provinces.

His appointment as A.D.C. just at this juncture is not without significance.

He did not come at any rate to express unofficially any views of the Grand Vizier, and he has never talked politics with me before.

He was on very good personal terms with Mustafa Kemal and knows him intimately.

I think, therefore, that he may have come to acquaint us unofficially with the views and desires of the Nationalists and put forward a proposal.

His conversation summarized is as follows:—Great mutual interest of England and Turkey.—The Turks have no use for the French, whose day moreover is done and they are in for trouble at home. They have no use for the Italians, who count for little and in whose country a revolution is only a matter of months.

America will never agree to accept responsibilities in the East, she has no interests here, nor is there anything in common between her and Turkey.

The whole mandate business is impossible and unworkable, and the Turks will never accept this blow to their sovereignty on the part of any power. France and Italy know this quite well, and have shown it to the Turks. There is a lot of propaganda going on against us on this question by our allies, and we are shown up to the Turks as the one nation which is out to down the Turkish nation. Our marked attitude of reserve is given as proof, and the idea is spread everywhere that we are pushing on the Grand Vizier into taking measures to suppress the nationalists.

The Nationalist Movement is not C.U.P. at present, though there are C.U.P. people amongst it. It will, however, probably become so unless we give some sign. ('Mustafa Kemal had a message from Enver a short time ago proposing to come to Erzeroum—Mustafa Kemal replied that he would arrest him if he came.') The Nationalists are led by very intelligent men, who know quite well that it will be fatal for them to allow any hostilities to break out against the English, and they know also that the English are not out to put them down by force of arms. The *people* however are taken in by

appearances, and there is the real danger that, under C.U.P. propaganda, they may develop a real anti-English feeling. Smyrna shook their confidence in England, as it was ostensibly all done by England. The relief of Admiral Calthorpe however, showed the educated Turks that England realised a mistake had been made and therefore changed her Representative out here (*Kemal would not believe that Admiral Calthorpe had gone in the ordinary course of things, though I tried to make this clear*).

The present Grand Vizier, the best Turks knew, was working for his country just as much as Mustafa Kemal was. The country as a whole however did not think so, and considered him as weak, and ready to accept anything the Allies demanded. He is particularly looked on as being kept up by England and doing what she tells him. He is badly informed by his colleagues (Minister of War and Minister of Interior, who are simply trimmers), and is not aware of the real weight of the Nationalist movement and its seriousness. In his turn, he gives quite a wrong idea to the Sultan. The *personal* antagonism to the Grand Vizier on the part of the Nationalist leaders is due to this fact.

The Sultan himself is quite an intelligent man, and is very well disposed to England, and knows that England is the only power which can help him and his country, if she will. Quite recently the Sultan published a proclamation to the people, showing that he was at heart with them in desiring the integrity of the country, and exhorting them to abstain from aggression. This proclamation was *his own* and not dictated by the Grand Vizier. Much propaganda is being used against us, partly C.U.P. and partly on the part of our allies. There were strong rumours that last few days many English wounded had come down the line to Haidar Pasha, that the English were sending troops from Constantinople to Eski-Shehr etc. to suppress the Nationalists. These rumours were very harmful and there was a real danger of their exciting the Turks against us.

It was really time that England should recognise the seriousness of the Nationalist movement and show that she was not out to suppress it. If she really did try to do that, she would create an intensely hostile Turkey, with which it would be impossible to come to any arrangement, and the C.U.P. element would come to the top and run the nationalist movement.

It was high time that England recognised that the time had come for the war with Turkey to be considered as over. The Nationalists' leaders were not of the intransigent Enver, Jemal type. They were reasonable in their aims and wanted a rapprochement, as long as we did not aim at destroying the integrity of the country and its sovereignty. But the time had come for something to be done and a continuance of the present conditions was impossible.

Some overtures should be made. The Grand Vizier would accept our advice. Why not tell him that we did not object to having relations with a Government which did represent the Nationalist movement, and that we saw no reason why he should not establish relations with it? If the Nationalist leaders stood out against him personally, he would see that it was in the common interest for him to give place to another. In this connection, Izzet

Pasha was mentioned. If we did not like the idea of advising the Grand Vizier in this sense, could it not be possible to approach the Sultan who would certainly listen to any advice we offered? In entering into pourparlers with the Nationalists, it would be found that they would not hesitate to publicly disavow the old C.U.P. and cast adrift the members who were now with them.

The old C.U.P. of Enver and Talaat was dead and damned, no one wanted it, and if the Nationalists associated themselves with it, it would be a weakness to them. They did not want to be mixed up with it and would be ready to disavow it publicly and to arrest the really wrong ones of the party.

Really in our own interests, if we wanted in the future to have to deal with a well-disposed Turkish nation, and not a hostile one, we should show what our attitude was. The more we abstained and gave the impression of wishing to subdue the Nationalist movement, the more power we gave to the old C.U.P. and the more grounds we gave for an anti-English feeling to be developed amongst the general run of Turks.

The Armistice could not last for ever, and after the peace, did we want to have a Turkey which looked to England for help and direction, or a country which looked upon England as the power which had done all it could to suppress the Turks—as opposed to the C.U.P.?

The summary is:—

By backing Damad Ferid against the genuine national sentiment, we are harming ourselves and alienating reasonable patriotic Turkish opinion. Why not get Damad Ferid to make terms with the Nationalists, or if necessary get him to realise that we do not object to a representative Government coming in?

A Nationalist Government will not prove anti-English and is quite disposed to be reasonable and work in with us, realising that we are the power which can do them most good or harm—as long as we are not out to do away with Turkish independence. The matter is urgent and we should not let matters slide any longer or a really anti-English sentiment may develop over the country.

IAN SMITH  
Lieut. Colonel.  
Military Attaché

*September 30, 1919.*

**No. 535**

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received October 22)*

*No. 1858 [144305/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 6, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I received a visit this morning from Mustafa Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government which has just been formed.

2. The personality of the Pasha is well known to you, so that it is unnecessary for me at the present time to give any description of him.

3. The conversation contained nothing of any special interest, beyond that I took the opportunity to impress upon him, as clearly as words can do so, that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain as good relations as were compatible with the present anomalous position with whatever Turkish Government might be in power, that the constitution of the Government was a matter of complete indifference to me, but that there were two points which we shall insist on, and those were the strict observance of the terms of the armistice and the maintenance of public order; the latter especially applied to the Christian populations, but also to the absence of political strife or the employment in political affairs of methods of violence.

4. His Excellency assured me that I need feel no uneasiness on these points, as the new Government were fully alive to the importance of them. He said that the situation presented by the indefinite prolongation of the armistice placed the most extraordinary difficulties in the way of the administration, which, he said, looked to the Allies, but above all to Great Britain, for assistance and advice. He said that, above all, the financial situation was most critical. I informed him of the steps which had been taken by the ex-Grand Vizier in this matter, and that I and my colleagues were still awaiting the replies of our Governments to the telegrams which we had sent setting forth the facts of the situation.

5. I enquired what was the position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who, from being a rebel, appeared now, according to the press, to be one of the pillars of the present Government. His Excellency replied that the Pasha could hardly be described in these terms, but that his feelings of patriotism had driven him into open opposition to the last Government, which he had believed not to be acting in the best interests of the country, especially over the matter of the occupation of Smyrna. I replied that I could hardly imagine that any human being could do more than had been done by Ferid Pasha. Reshid Pasha said that the whole of the present difficulties sprang from the Smyrna incident. The great duration of the armistice would have mattered but little had it not been for that untoward occurrence. He did not think that his Government would have any serious trouble in arranging matters with Mustafa Kemal.

6. In this connection, however, I hear from independent sources that the relations between Mustafa Kemal and the new Government are still a matter of negotiation.

I have, &c.  
(For High Commissioner),  
RICHARD WEBB<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> With reference to this despatch, Lord Curzon stated in Foreign Office despatch No. 668 of November 1, 1919, that the attitude 'adopted towards Mustafa Reshid Pasha has my entire approval'.

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)*

*No. 1418 Telegraphic: by bag [138649/70100/44]*

PARIS, October 7, 1919

Subject of General Milne's proposal re delimitation of line between Greeks in Sanjak of Smyrna and Turks and Italians was discussed this morning by Supreme Council.<sup>1</sup> A copy of the paper which I circulated to the Conference on the subject is being sent separately by this messenger.<sup>2</sup>

General Milne's telegram No. 0695<sup>2</sup> of 1st September was before the Council. I pointed out that there appeared to be no objections to the line laid down in para. 11, and stated that M. Venezelos had been consulted regarding para. 13. He had consented to withdrawal of Greek troops to frontier of Sanjak in order to avoid further bloodshed on condition that void thus caused was filled by Allied troops and that Greek detachments should be equal in strength to detachments of other nationalities. It must be assumed that General Milne did not propose to alter the Venezelos-Tittoni line<sup>3</sup> in so far as it concerned northern limit of Italian zone of occupation. Venezelos would certainly not consent to occupation of vacated zone by Italian troops nor of participation by them in an Allied occupation.

Italian military representative took exception to assumption that Venezelos-Tittoni line would still hold good as far as Italians were concerned. Italian troops were on the spot and were the obvious troops to fill gap. Wherever Italian troops were present in Asia Minor, peace reigned.

Mr. Polk said Council was morally bound to help Greeks whom they had invited to go to Smyrna, but was unaware that Italians were in Asia Minor on invitation of Allies.

Italian representatives replied that their presence was accepted and regularised by Council when it asked Venezelos and Tittoni to mark out line between Greeks and Italians and when Council issued instructions to Allied C.-in-C. of Asiatic Turkey concerning his duties (vide Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 60<sup>3</sup> of 21st July).

Mr. Polk and M. Pichon and I felt unable to agree to this, and it was ultimately decided unanimously that Greeks should withdraw to boundaries of Sanjak of Smyrna, that Allied troops, including Greeks but excluding Italians, should occupy Meander Valley, and that Italians should not advance north of Venezelos-Tittoni line. Allied representatives were to ask their respective Governments as to possibility of finding detachments for this occupation.

(Note.—It was assumed that boundary meant in para. 13 of General Milne's telegram was southern boundary of Sanjak from Bademma to where it cuts the Venezelos-Tittoni line, and thence along this line to the sea.)

I then raised question of General Milne's position in Asiatic Turkey, as requested by C.I.G.S. Pichon asked that subject be deferred for presence of

<sup>1</sup> The official minute of this discussion is printed in Volume I, No. 70, minute 9.

<sup>2</sup> This document, not here printed, is printed in Volume I, No. 70, appendix H.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 461.

Clemenceau, who was absent, on ground that discussions were already proceeding between French and British Governments re command in Constantinople.<sup>4</sup>

Please inform War Office.

<sup>4</sup> On this question see, further, the minute of the discussion in the Supreme Council on November 1, 1919, printed in Volume II, No. 10, minute 1.

No. 537

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)*

*No. 663 [144328/512/58]*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith copies of a joint resolution introduced by Senator Williams before the Senate on 9th September.<sup>1</sup> This resolution seeks to authorize the use of American troops in Armenia and is therefore a test of American opinion on a mandate in the Near East.

As will be seen from the accompanying copy of the *New York Tribune*<sup>2</sup> the opposition to this measure take the line that the United States has never been at war with Turkey; a point of view analogous to the arguments used against the employment of American troops in Siberia. The resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs before whom Mr. Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, testified on September 30th as to the danger of the annihilation of the Armenians by the Turks and Tartars. His testimony was supported by documents from the American Relief Commissioners, who urged the immediate despatch of American troops to Armenia. The Press has hinted that the estimates of the new American army forecasted by the Secretary of State for War, are based upon the knowledge that the administration intend to press for an American army of occupation in Turkey. Articles from the *New York Herald* have recently purported to show the desire of the inhabitants of Syria for an American mandate; but opposition to the use of American troops as garrisons abroad is strongly voiced in the Press in general.<sup>3</sup>

I have, &c.  
(For H.M. Ambassador)  
R. C. LINDSAY

<sup>1</sup> This joint resolution read as follows: 'Whereas the withdrawal of the British troops from the Caucasus and Armenia will leave the Armenian people helpless against the attacks of the Kurds and the Turks, and whereas the American people are deeply and sincerely sympathetic with the aspirations of the Armenian people for liberty and peace and progress: Therefore be it

*'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use such military and naval forces of the United States as in his opinion may seem expedient for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in Armenia until the settlement of the affairs of that country has been completed by treaty between the nations.'*

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This enclosure was an extract, headed 'Turks slaying all Armenians, Senate is told', from the *New York Tribune* of October 1, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Grey further reported in Washington telegram No. 1439 of October 10, 1919

(received October 11): 'Chance of Senate accepting mandates for America in Europe or Asia Minor was never good. It is now rendered more than ever remote by President's illness; indeed it seems to be altogether out of the question.'

### No. 538

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)*

*No. 1933 Telegraphic [138706/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 8, 1919

The Ex-Grand Vizier expresses great uneasiness as to safety of Sultan which he is no longer in a position to do anything to ensure.

Whilst His Majesty is undoubtedly an enlightened and amiable sovereign with strong pro-British proclivities it does not seem possible to take any steps to prevent his dethronement should Nationalist Party decide on that, unless of course their action were accompanied by serious public disorder.

Ferid Pasha desires to go to England and France to recover his health which has suffered severely from his exertions during his tenure of office. My French colleague agrees with me in recommending his request. May permission be granted for his journey? Request early decision.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In reply Admiral Webb was instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 1623 of October 13, 1919, to Constantinople: 'Damad Ferid should not come either to Paris or London pending the settlement with Turkey and you should put this view before your French colleague.'

'But we see no objection to his going to a neutral country or even to the Riviera.'

### No. 539

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)*

*No. 1426 Telegraphic: by bag [139635/70100/44]*

PARIS, October 9, 1919

My telegram No. 1418<sup>1</sup> of October 7.

The Supreme Council having after careful consideration and prolonged discussion decided in favour of an inter-allied occupation of that portion of the Meander valley which is not to remain in exclusively Greek occupation, I earnestly trust His Majesty's Government will give without delay necessary sanction to employment of a small British force for this purpose. The Italians having agreed to stand out, General Milne will no doubt be able to arrange that British, French and Greek troops will be employed in equal proportions, there being presumably no American troops available. M. Venizelos' acceptance of the arrangement was made dependent on Greek contingent being at least equal to that of any other ally.

So soon as Cabinet has sanctioned employment of British contingent, General Milne will no doubt be instructed direct by the C.I.G.S. to issue the necessary orders for giving effect to the decision of the Supreme Council.

<sup>1</sup> No. 536.

No. 540

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 1216 Telegraphic: by bag [137918/70100/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 9, 1919

Italian Ambassador left following memorandum here on Oct. 4th.

'The Italian Government understand that General Milne intends to withdraw the Greek line towards Smyrna, pending the conclusions of the commission of enquiry and the subsequent decisions of the Conference.

'Whenever the evacuation of Aidin takes place, the Italian Government think it desirable that Italian troops should be sent there which, while they would provide a sure guarantee for the maintenance of order and tranquillity, could also easily arrange for the return and organisation of the Turkish exiles who are at present taking refuge in the Italian zone.

'The Italian occupation would of course have the same provisional character as the French occupation of Cilicia.'

We are replying that this is matter which can only be discussed in Paris.

We assume no attention will be paid to Italian suggestion.

No. 541

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received October 18)

No. 1941 Telegraphic [143057/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 10, 1919

My telegram No. 1933.<sup>1</sup>

My French colleague and I have become acquainted with telegram from Moustapha Kemal defining his relations with new Government. He demands immediate elections under supervision of Nationalist party; also arrest and trial of certain members of late Government, including Grand Vizier, Minister of War, and two successive Ministers of Interior as well as of certain Governors.

My colleague and I, when visiting Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 9th told him Allies would not countenance any measures of violence against members of late Government, and warned him such action would have most unfavourable effect upon Turkish cause;<sup>2</sup> despite assurances to the contrary it will not surprise me if such arrests are attempted.

It must be clearly understood whatever professions present Government may make, they are in any case subject to exactions and will of Committee of Union and Progress, and while a little time may elapse before they appear in their true colours, we must be prepared to meet them with firmness and determination.

<sup>1</sup> No. 538.

<sup>2</sup> With reference to this action Lord Curzon stated in Foreign Office telegram No. 1691 of October 25, 1919, to Constantinople: 'I approve your action.'

Of course no other issue could be anticipated from so great delay in enunciating terms of peace combined with steady diminution of our military forces and aggravation by Greek occupation of Smyrna.

Arrests such as I have referred to would be entirely objectionable to His Majesty's Government as they are to my colleagues and myself and should in any case not be permitted.

No. 542

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 22)*

No. 1885 [144381/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 10, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the summary of a telegram sent by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Government here, which was given to me by the French High Commissioner.

2. There is every reason to believe that it is authentic, and it is of considerable interest, as showing the lines which Mustapha Kemal intends to follow. He is still a good deal of an enigma, and though he states, with a certain amount of truth, that he has nothing to do with the Committee of Union and Progress, yet I think it is probable that many members of the Committee have enrolled themselves in his party, and, if events are allowed to pursue their present course, I believe it will not be long before the one will be indistinguishable from the other.

3. It is regrettable to see that he desires to follow the old Turkish plan of executing vengeance upon his political enemies, and, as I have reported in my telegram No. 1941<sup>1</sup> of the 10th October, I arranged with my colleagues that when we returned the call of Mustapha Reshid Pasha, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, we should severally inform him that the Allies would view with entire disfavour any attempt upon the life and liberty of the late Government or the employment of any methods of violence. His Excellency protested vehemently that there was no intention of doing anything of the kind, but when I observed that I could expect no other answer from a man of his education, yet could he give me that answer in the name of the Government as a whole, he was very much less positive, and said that if anything of this kind were done he himself would at once retire.

4. My anxiety on this point is increased by the fact that the kaimakam of Eski Shehr was recently murdered by two individuals, who would have appeared to have been of the Mustapha Kemal Party, and who succeeded in effecting their escape. In the meantime, the ex-Grand Vizier, as well as Ali Kemal Bey, one of his Ministers of the Interior, have requested authorisation to leave the country, and, in concert with my colleagues, I am arranging to accord them facilities.

5. I should add that Mr. Ryan also saw a copy of the telegram which forms

<sup>1</sup> No. 541.

my enclosure, and in this copy he noticed a reference to the withdrawal of the British troops from Samsoun. Damad Ferid had not been able, Mustapha Kemal said, to prevent these troops from landing on Turkish soil, while he, by his competent management of affairs, and without fighting, had succeeded in obtaining their withdrawal.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 542

*Summary of Telegram*

Réunion immédiate de la Chambre.

Avant que la Chambre ne soit réunie, ne prendre aucun engagement concernant le sort de l'Empire et de la nation turcs vis-à-vis de n'importe qui.

Envoyer à la Conférence des hommes capables de comprendre la volonté de la nation et de défendre les droits et les intérêts nationaux.

Cela est l'essentiel.

Nous avons d'autres demandes accessoires, par exemple:

Prendre dès maintenant toutes mesures pour que Damad Férid Pacha, Suleyman Chefik Pacha, Ali Kémal Bey et Adil Bey ne puissent ni s'enfuir ni se cacher, en vue de les renvoyer, dès l'ouverture de la Chambre, devant la Haute-Cour.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Karpouth, de Konia, le Gouverneur de Malatia et le Directeur général des Postes devront être immédiatement traduits devant la cour martiale.

Les fonctionnaires civils et militaires, qui ont été destitués ou emprisonnés à cause du mouvement national, doivent être libérés et rétablis dans leur poste; de même les gens du peuple qui ont été incarcérés doivent être relâchés.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Castamouni, d'Angora et de Trébizonde, qui ont été réfractaires au mouvement national, doivent être destitués et exclus à tout jamais des fonctions publiques.

Les sympathies des étrangers nous sont complètement acquises. Nous sommes en contact avec les Américains. Nous devons maintenir les amitiés avec les Français et les Italiens et observer les Anglais.

Faites-nous connaître votre manière de voir.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Under cover of Constantinople despatch No. 1938 of October 18, 1919 (received October 29, not printed), Admiral de Robeck further transmitted a copy of a telegram of September 25 addressed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to General Solly-Flood, a British officer on mission at Eski-Shehr, for communication to Admiral de Robeck. This telegram read as follows:

'Sivas, September 25, 1919 (1335)

'To be forwarded to the British High (Extraordinary) Commissioner at Constantinople.

'The proclamations of the congresses convoked in Erzeroum in the name of Eastern Anatolia, and in Sivas in the name of the whole Ottoman fatherland, dated respectively the 7th September, 1919 (1335), and the 11th September, 1919 (1335), the nation wishes

publicly to make known to the world their lawful purpose which led to the present unity and organisation; also their fellow-feeling of patriotism which they maintain towards the non-Moslem elements.

'2. Although complete peace prevails in the whole Ottoman fatherland, inasmuch as without any distinction of religion or nationality the protection of personal freedom is being maintained, we are informed that some ill-wishers are trying to attribute the movement which has sprung up from the national conscience to a movement against the non-Moslem elements.

'3. On the 18th September, 1919 (1335), circular notes informed all the vilayets and dependent sub-provinces that every subject of His Majesty possesses the same rights; also strangers in our country must be objects of Ottoman hospitality, provided that they are not discovered in any action against our country and our nation.

'4. The present demand of the nation is that, instead of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet, whose acts of treachery to the country have been asserted, a lawful and trustworthy Cabinet which complies with the national wishes should come to power.

'5. Therefore I beg to state and confirm the maintenance of peace existing in our country, and the safety of our non-Moslem comrades who are protected against any kind of attack.

'I remain, &c.

'On behalf of the Representative Committee for protecting  
the rights of European and Asiatic Turkey,

MUSTAPHA KEMAL'

### No. 543

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received October 22)

No. 1836 [144283/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 10, 1919

My Lord,

The change of Government reported in my telegram, No. 1908,<sup>1</sup> of the 3rd October, marks a complete change in the political situation in this country. The moment is, therefore, appropriate to review the course of events, since I had the honour to address your Lordship on the situation as a whole in my despatch No. 1535<sup>2</sup> of the 27th August.

2. In that despatch I pointed out that, notwithstanding every source of weakness, Ferid Pasha appeared upon the whole to be gaining ground; that, unless swept away by some spectacular new development, such as a *coup d'état*, a sudden intensification of the movement in the interior, or a financial crash, he might weather his difficulties altogether; and that he and the Sultan seemed to be moving in the direction of a mild form of despotism.

3. Nothing could be more remarkable than the calm which prevailed upon the surface of things in Constantinople early in September. The pressure of the national movement was still remote. The Cabinet held together with an appearance of stability and solidarity almost without precedent since the Armistice.

Ferid Pasha was cheerful. The Ministers of War and the Interior worked

<sup>1</sup> No. 532.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch was designed 'to summarize the development of the internal political situation in Constantinople since the reconstruction of the Cabinet after Ferid Pasha's return from Paris' as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

in harmony. Though they were both persons with somewhat spotted pasts, there was nothing in their overt action which could be regarded as other than an honest attempt to bring the dissidents in the interior under control of the Central Government.

4. About the 11th September a change came over the spirit of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior. They would not admit that a grave situation had arisen in the provinces, but they were obviously perturbed by what they heard, and by the increasingly menacing telegrams with which the organisers of the national movement bombarded Constantinople. Their dismay was increased when the rebels seized telegraph offices and cut off communication between the Government here and all important provincial centres, except Eskişehir and Broussa. The Grand Vizier began to urge with ever-growing insistence that the Allies owed it to him either themselves to arrest the growth of the national movement, or in the alternative, to allow the Government to use what small forces it could dispose of to resist the rebels.

5. In the light of the fuller information now available, it is easy to sum up broadly what was really happening in the interior. The Congress at Sivas was a definite step in advance of that at Erzeroum. The latter professed to represent the Eastern vilayets only, but the Congress at Sivas, which assembled on the 4th September, claimed to represent the whole country, including, very significantly, Turkey in Europe. It adopted various resolutions, issued various manifestos, and assumed the functions of Government in the areas controlled by the 'national forces'.

6. The Congress declared all Ottoman territory within the boundaries fixed by the Armistice to be one indivisible whole. That territory, it said, was everywhere inhabited by a vast preponderance of Moslems, and all the Moslems in it were brethren. The national forces and the national will would be directed to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman dominions, and to uphold the Caliphate and the Sultanate. No projects for the creation of an independent Greek or Armenian State in Ottoman territory would be tolerated, and while the equal rights of non-Moslems would be respected, they would be allowed to enjoy no special privileges. Measures had been taken, it was stated, to uphold the national rights in case the Turkish Government were constrained by outside pressure to cede territory. The Entente Powers were called on to abandon any idea of partitioning the territory within the Armistice boundary. Foreign economic help would be welcomed, so long as there was no encroachment on independence. A speedy peace based on those equitable principles was earnestly desired. The Central Government must rest on the national will and the National Assembly must be convoked without delay. Existing national associations were now merged in a single Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, of which all the declarants' Moslem countrymen were natural members. The association was independent of party. A representative committee of the association would direct the general organisation of the national movement, which had everywhere been unified and strengthened.

7. Such was the main 'programme' of the Congress issued on or about the 11th September. In other utterances of one sort or another the Congress or its executive declared that Ferid Pasha's Government was anti-national, unconstitutional, and a barrier between the people and the Sultan; that the immediate object was to get rid of that Government which would in the meanwhile be ignored and boycotted; that the safety of non-Moslems was guaranteed; and that foreigners would be respected and treated as guests so long as they refrained from any action contrary to the national interests. An oath was taken by those present to the effect that they would pursue in the Congress no individual objects other than the good of the country, that they would not work for the revival of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that they would not seek to serve the ends of any political party.

8. Meanwhile the national forces extended their operations west and south. It can hardly be doubted that attempts were made to establish some sort of liaison with the anti-Greek movement in the country surrounding the Smyrna area, and to draw into the main national movement the various bands of a semi-Bolshevist type in the Ismidt area. These manifold physical activities continued after the Congress had definitely declared war on the Central Government. By the end of September the latter exercised no effective authority in Asia outside a circle on the circumference of which lay Ada-Bazar, Eski-Shehir, Kutahia, and, say, Panderma.

9. Ferid Pasha's position was more desperate than he would admit. It was perhaps even more desperate than he realised, but he was determined to save the situation if he could. He seized eagerly on a hint given by me, in consultation with my French colleague, and General Milne, that he would do well to endeavour to treat direct with Mustapha Kemal. He at once projected a personal progress into the interior. His project was more grandiose than what we, on our side, had in mind, but it was not difficult to combine his idea and ours in a common formula. In order to prepare the way, he obtained from the Sultan, on the 20th September, a rescript, designed to rebut the suggestion that the Government were concealing from His Majesty the wishes of the people, and to impress on the country the need for confidence in the Government, and for presenting an united front to Europe. I enclose a translation of this document.<sup>3</sup> It created a certain impression here, and this impression was heightened by steps taken to elicit loyal counter-expressions from representative bodies, including one association of retired military officers. The Entente Liberal Party, or some of its fractions, appear to have made up their minds, too late, to rally to the Government.

10. Events moved so rapidly that the Grand Vizier lost all confidence in the idea of a settlement by negotiation alone, and reverted with insistence to the necessity for making some display of force. An attempt to strike at the heart of the national movement by secretly and rapidly despatching Ghalib Bey, Vali of Kharpout, to assume control at Sivas, supported by a force of gendarmerie, had failed, because the national leaders succeeded in decyphering the telegraphic instructions. They threatened Malatia, where Ghalib

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Bey paused to recruit his force, so successfully as to drive him and the local Governor, a Bedrkhan, into flight across the British lines. The new military scheme was to send a force of 2,000 men from here to Eski-Shehr to hold the Nationalists in check and at least to prevent Constantinople from being threatened.

11. As this would have been a purely military operation, it lay principally with General Milne to say whether it should be allowed or not. He was at first definitely opposed to it, as he had been opposed to similar proposals made earlier, and the Grand Vizier was so informed on the 21st September. A few days later, however, it appeared that it might be desirable to give the Government a free hand rather than leave them absolutely at the mercy of the National movement, and it was conveyed to Ferid Pasha in a discreet and non-committal manner, that if he could put forward a concrete proposal, it would be considered in consultation with General Milne and the French and Italian High Commissioners. Ferid Pasha's hopes were unfortunately raised too high. Further examination of the question convinced us that we could not countenance the proposal to send troops, and Ferid Pasha was so informed on the 29th September, as reported in my telegram No. 1889.<sup>4</sup>

12. This communication was the *coup de grâce* to Ferid Pasha's Government. That there was no improvement in the situation in the interior had already been proved by the extension of the national movement to Konia, whence the Vali, its most vigorous opponent in Asia Minor, had been compelled to fly on the 24th September. The allegiance of Broussa had also become more than shaky. What faint hope remained, not any longer of subduing the movement, but of holding it in check by a display of force at Eski Shehr and then treating with its organisers, was finally destroyed by the communication made by me on behalf of my colleagues and myself on the 29th September. Ferid Pasha resigned on the 1st October.

13. On the 3rd October, the military authorities at Broussa surrounded the Government House and delivered to the Vali, whom Ferid Pasha had sent there in haste, five days earlier, an ultimatum ordering him to leave the Government House at once, and to leave Broussa the next day.

14. Thus was effected another of those minor revolutions which have occurred at intervals in Constantinople since 1908. Power has passed from a party which, however anxious to save as much as possible of the Empire, saw salvation in submission to, and collaboration with, the Entente authorities, to a party whose avowed object is to contest any attempt on the part of the Entente to impair the integrity and independence of Turkey, and who, in their programme, have made it quite clear that their 'Turkey' comprises as a minimum all territory not occupied at the time of the Armistice, while leaving it vague in how much more of the old Turkish Empire they hope to uphold the rights of the Caliphate and the Sultanate.

15. The pretensions of the new rulers of Turkey might well have seemed ludicrous nine, or even six, months ago. They are sufficiently reasonable

<sup>4</sup> No. 529.

to-day to justify in Turkish minds the hope that the Peace Conference will let Turkey off lightly rather than try conclusions with the national movement. There can be little doubt that an army of occupation would now be needed to impose terms which would have been regarded as merciful in the hours of ruin and dejection following the Armistice. The hopes of the organisers of the national movement are strengthened by the feeling that there is no real union among the Allies; that neither France nor Italy desire to be hard on Turkey; that the British Government have come round to the same point of view, partly under the influence of Islam in India, and that the antics of an American journalist named Brown, who attended the Sivas Congress and acclaimed its ideals, represent the judgment of the American people.

16. It must not be assumed that the party now in power will necessarily take up an aggressive attitude towards the Allies in Constantinople itself. In defining the character of the new Cabinet in my telegram No. 1908,<sup>1</sup> I have probably if anything over-emphasised its nationalist complexion. The new Grand Vizier is regarded by some as being to-day more of a palace *persona grata* than anything else. Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a person of the greatest flexibility. The Minister of the Interior is rather a dark horse. He is a brother-in-law of the Heir Apparent, whose chauvinist sentiments are well known, but he was formerly a colleague of Kiamil Pasha, and he has the name of being sober and rather conservative. The Minister of Finance has been retained, and will doubtless impress on his new colleagues that the only possible financial policy is to try to cajole the Entente Powers into making advances or a loan. In these circumstances, it seems probable that the Cabinet will do its best to keep the Entente sweet.

17. On the other hand, the Government will certainly remain in power only so long as in internal affairs and in the main tendency of their foreign policy they dance to the piping of the authors of the national movement. The Minister of War, though he has a clean record as a soldier, has been in that movement from the start. From the 4th October onward the press has been allowed to advertise and glorify the doings of the Sivas Congress. Noble-looking portraits of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf Bey adorn the local Turkish papers. It is confidentially anticipated that they will be restored to their military ranks. It is also announced in the Nationalist papers that Jevad Pasha, who, as Chief of the General Staff, helped enormously to organise the movement until he was removed from his post, and the officers of the same kidney will also be reinstated.

18. Numerous changes in the civil administration are to be expected, and it can hardly be hoped that the same readiness to comply with the wishes of the Allied authorities will be shown in the future as in the past. It will have to be very carefully considered, in the light of the events of the next couple of weeks, how far the policy hitherto followed by this High Commission of practically dictating the removal of undesirable officials and advising the Government in a more limited number of cases as to appointments can be adhered to without challenging issues which His Majesty's Government might be unwilling to see through.

19. It is impossible not to regret that the brewing of these, the most considerable events which have happened in Constantinople during the Armistice, should have coincided with a period during which His Majesty's Government have presented the appearance of wishing to disinterest themselves in the affairs of the non-Arab parts of the pre-war Turkish Empire. The recent withdrawal of the British force from the Samsoun area, however easily explained to ourselves, appears in native eyes in the light of the surrender of a British position under the menace of the national movement. Events such as these are small in a world-perspective, but they are sufficiently important on the little local stage to impress the various native elements, all unanimous in imagining that every act of His Majesty's Government contributes to some deep unvarying central purpose.

20. The native Christians are much alarmed by the course of events. They see in the Mustafa Kemal movement a regeneration of the spirit which triumphed in 1908 under the motto: 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice', only to breed the Adana massacres of the year 1909; and which, again triumphing in January 1913, worked steadily up to the 'boycott', deportations, and massacres of the years 1914 to 1916. They had hoped that the Allies, and more particularly Great Britain, were determined that the Turkish element would be deprived for ever of the power to work their will on the non-Moslem population. The more sober and less timorous admit the indisputable fact that for the moment the Nationalist movement has been attended by an improvement rather than otherwise of public security, but they point out with unerring logic that they are left at the mercy of a party who stand for a perpetuation of the conditions in which all their previous miseries arose. Armenian lives may be safe to-day between Samsoun and Erzeroum, but they are safe by the good will and pleasure of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates.

21. The disillusionment of the Christians is the greater because of the brave show which His Majesty's Government especially has made since last November of redressing their grievances and repairing their wrongs. Seeing what they see to-day, they are filled with apprehension, not only for the near future, but for the long future after the peace. They begin to feel that the Peace Conference, impressed by the Nationalist movement and anxious to avoid further trouble with it, will, after all, decide to leave the main body of Turkey intact and independent. In that event, all that the Allies, and especially Great Britain, have done for the Christians in the last ten months will only expose them to the greater wrath of their rulers in the time to come.

22. Those Moslem elements which really disapprove of the policy which brought Turkey into the war against the Entente, are also puzzled and depressed by the attitude of the Allies. They had never been able to get it out of their heads that the war was fought on our side, not against the Turkish people, but against the Committee of Union and Progress, a view for which I believe they find some authority in the utterances of at least one Entente statesman. They refuse (and in this they are at one with the Christians), to regard the organisers of the national movement as anything but a new

manifestation of the Committee. It completely baffles them to see that we have not attempted to back them up against the Nationalists, but have, in effect, backed the latter by leaving the Nationalist forces free to act while we have checked every proposed move of the Central Government to combat them effectively. These phenomena are again easy to explain to our own satisfaction, but our arguments carry no conviction with Orientals.

23. Great Britain has played the leading rôle in the war against Turkey, and Great Britain is still the cynosure of all eyes in this country. It is instructive to consider how our attitude is viewed, not by Christians and well-affected Moslems, but by the organisers of the Nationalist movement themselves. Centrally placed in Asia Minor, they are better in touch with the situation as a whole than any other element. To the north, they see British troops leaving Samsoun. To the north-east, they see us abandoning the Caucasus, and leaving behind between Ararat and the Caspian a fruitful field for Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish propaganda. To the south-east, they see us slowly drawing in our horns in south-eastern Kurdistan. To the south, they see us preparing to disinterest ourselves in Cilicia and Syria. To the west, they see a more hopeful situation in the Smyrna area, for the occupation of which they still hold Great Britain more responsible than the other Allies. To the north-west, they see British forces motionless before their own advance, and British officers ready to enter into negotiations with them.

24. These people cannot conceive of a British lion too simple to mistrust them, too indifferent to care what they do, too economical to fight. They are conscious that they are themselves fundamentally anti-British, because it is Britain which defeated them, and because their hope of future greatness lies in an appeal to a Moslem world in which England is the greatest ruler, and of which she is therefore represented as the greatest oppressor. In presence of the phenomena enumerated in the preceding paragraph, they probably supposed that some strange weakness of brain or sinew has overcome us, and that further exhibition of vitality on their part will produce further manifestations of weakness on ours.

25. The unfortunate coincidence of Major Noel's presence at Malatia while the Sivas Congress was sitting, and while Ghalib Bey was organising his abortive coup, coupled with an *en clair* telegram sent by Major Noel to this High Commission and intercepted by the Nationalists, convinced the latter that we had some unholy compact with the late Government involving British designs on Kurdistan. This belief inflames the anti-British feeling but Nationalist comfort can also be drawn from it, because here again the British lion has the appearance of having abandoned his imaginary project on the first display of Mustafa Kemal's teeth.

26. If I have laboured these aspects of the present position, it is not that I think that the clock can be now put back. I emphasise them partly in order that it may be realised at home that the Allies are confronted with a new situation which may probably call for new methods on their side of dealing with current questions. I emphasise them still more in order to show that Turkish chauvinism, feeding as it does on the delay in announcing Peace

terms for Turkey, is still a growing force. It would be more difficult to-day than it would have been eight months ago to impose on Turkey a distasteful Peace Treaty without fresh resort to force.

27. Whether the organisers of the national movement can properly be called Committee men or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in personality. Indeed, they are just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, and present horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, however, the same. They want Turkey for the Turks. They want no foreign interference or foreign protection. Ottoman Christians are their cattle, and they want to do with their own what they will. They want to fight Europe, and, above all, England, with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the Empire, but a lease of new life.

28. I cannot too strongly repeat and emphasise that the time has gone by when it was possible to assume that any Turkish Government must accept any peace which the Allies might choose to offer, and when it was legitimate to prefer, if anything, that the reins of power here should be in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress for the sake of the moral effect of poetic justice of making those who ruined Turkey subscribe to her death warrant. Every day the Armistice is prolonged sees the Turk recovering more and more from the overwhelming sense of disaster which General Allenby's victorious advances, followed by crushing Armistice terms, instilled into him. The prolonged delay and the events which followed the Armistice gradually gave him breathing time and opportunity to collect and reorganise himself. The occupation of Smyrna by the hated and despised Greek galvanised him into action, and that action has gone on steadily, day by day, week by week, until to-day the Allies are confronted with an entirely different Turkey to that which signed the Armistice.

29. Every week that the Peace terms are delayed, sees further acquisition to the power of resistance which Turkey means to oppose to any 'humiliation' which such terms may impose.

30. The great majority of the intelligenzia and the officer class (the only ones which count in Turkish politics) is in sympathy with the Nationalists, and it is probable that the leaders of the movement will, in order to justify themselves in the public eye, maintain a very unaccommodating attitude with regard to Peace conditions of even moderate severity. The possibility (which every week's delay tends more and more to transform into probability) that Turkey will reject the proposals of the Allies, must therefore be taken into serious consideration, necessitating a review of what means the Allies will, in that event, be prepared to employ, in order to secure the execution of the Peace terms they mean to impose.

31. There is, moreover, the danger that if things drag on as at present, the Nationalist leaders, as a means of maintaining their political supremacy and prestige, may force the pace by presenting the Allies with demands with regard, for instance, to Smyrna, which will bring matters to a head.

32. It has to be borne in mind that although the Allies dispose of a formidable weapon in the pressing financial needs of Turkey, the Nationalists on their side possess a valuable hostage—to which European public sentiment cannot remain indifferent—in the exposed situation in which the Christian population in Turkey will be placed should trouble arise.

33. The delay in dealing with the Turkish situation, is, therefore, breeding new complications, rendering the imposition of severe Peace terms more and more difficult, and involving the necessity for more and more armed forces being employed on the part of such Ally or Allies as may be charged with the duty of imposing the terms of Peace.

34. That such duty will in greater or less measure devolve on Great Britain appears to me inevitable, and it thus results that it is directly in our own interests that the Peace Terms should be settled and announced with the least possible delay and certainly within the next few weeks.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB

No. 544

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received October 22)*

No. 1879 [144375/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 12, 1919

My Lord,

The new Grand Vizier, Marshal Ali Riza Pasha, called on the Allied High Commissioners on the afternoon of 11th October accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. A question had arisen among the High Commissioners as to whether they should themselves call first on the Grand Vizier. It was decided to leave it to him to make the first visit, and he responded readily to a discreet hint through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that this was expected of him.

2. After the usual preliminary civilities, the Minister for Foreign Affairs reverted spontaneously to the conversation reported in my telegram No. 1941<sup>1</sup> of 10th October. The High Commissioners had, he said, expressed anxiety lest the recent developments should be followed by acts of political revenge. He had reassured them on the subject, and he now desired to confirm in the presence of the Grand Vizier and in the name of the whole Government the assurances which he had given.

3. The Grand Vizier had, hitherto, listened with approval but in almost unbroken silence to what had passed. At this point he intervened, and, speaking in Turkish, explained at length his views and intentions.

4. I knew, His Highness said, the circumstances in which the Government had come into power. He was not a diplomatist, and would not try to speak like one, but rather as the plain soldier that he was. The country had broken in two. He and his colleagues had come into power, with the sole purpose of

<sup>1</sup> No. 541.

bringing the dissentients together and rallying them round the person of the Sultan, in order that, when Turkey had to appear before the Peace Conference, which they prayed might be soon, her delegates might represent an united country.

5. The members of the Cabinet, His Highness went on, were men of known antecedents. He and his Minister for Foreign Affairs had been in Tewfik Pasha's Cabinet after the fall of Izzet Pasha. They were all neutral and independent of party. They were men who had disapproved of Turkey's entry into the war and regarded it as an unnatural break in a tradition of friendship with Great Britain. They desired to return to that old and sound tradition.

6. The Grand Vizier described the definite immediate objects of his Government as twofold. The first was to prepare the elections. The second was to promote concord and security. They were against party strife, and would not countenance party reprisals, such as arrests on political grounds, or for any other reason outside the law. They desired to respect the rights of all, Moslem and non-Moslem alike, he observed with emphasis.

7. I replied that I heard with pleasure these assurances. It was satisfactory to know that the Government associated themselves so completely with what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had already said about abstention from party reprisals, which could only produce a most unfavourable impression in Europe. I promised the Grand Vizier the full cooperation of the British authorities in the maintenance of order.

8. The Grand Vizier then spoke about Smyrna. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had already in the preliminary conversation spoken of a Greek advance in the Aidin area, about which he had made written representations. His complaint appears to be based principally on the authorised occupation of Guere, a place between Aidin and Eudemish, but as it is still the subject of correspondence between me and my representative at Smyrna, I did not enter into any discussion. The Grand Vizier's own remarks were more general. There were, he said, two disquieting features of the situation. Firstly, the Greeks were engaging in operations, small it was true, outside the authorised military frontier. Secondly, they were fortifying positions and massing troops *inside* the military frontier in a manner which had no counterpart on the Turkish side. These things tended to perpetuate excitement and dissatisfaction among the Turkish population.

9. I observed that these matters were not directly in my province, as General Milne had been put in charge of the military situation at Smyrna, and the Greek troops in that region were now directly under the General's orders. I undertook, however, to communicate what His Highness had said to General Milne, and also to inform His Majesty's Government.

10. The Grand Vizier said he wished to make it clear that the new Government regarded the crimes committed during the war, the deportations, the massacres, and the profiteering, as a stain on the honour of Turkey which must be wiped out. This had been the conviction of himself and his colleagues, when they had formed part of previous Governments. There was no wavering

on their part now. Tribunals had been set up by the previous Governments of which he spoke to deal with these crimes, and these tribunals must complete their task in order that justice should be done and the stain removed.

11. The Grand Vizier concluded with an appeal for English help, without which he could not hope to succeed in his task. I replied that it was outside my province to speak of British help in the wider sense of future political support or guidance. As regards that, I could only say that the decisions of the Peace Conference must be awaited. I reiterated my assurance, however, that in all matters relating to the immediate object we all had in view, namely, the maintenance of security, the Grand Vizier could confidently look to me for cooperation, and need not shrink from asking for such help as he required.

12. Before leaving, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said he wished to make a fresh appeal for moderation in requisitioning houses, &c., for military purposes. This is a familiar subject here, and the difficulties of dealing with it are very great, owing to the reduction of the number of houses by fires, the influx of civilian population, and the very great requirements of the Allied forces. I listened to Reshid Pasha with guarded sympathy, and promised to convey what he had said to General Milne and to Your Lordship, pointing out at the same time that the requisitioning was a military necessity consequent on the state of war still existing.

13. I took this opportunity to draw the attention of the Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs to the extremely improper Note Verbale on the question of Requisitioning which formed the subject of my despatch No. 1500<sup>2</sup> of 23rd August to Your Lordship and pointed out that such a question must not be raised again by the Turkish Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of course disclaimed all knowledge of the Note, as it had been written during the term of office of the late Grand Vizier, but I think the warning will have a good effect.

14. I further enquired whether the return of Turkish Prisoners of War which was now taking place should, in the opinion of the Turkish Government, be suspended in view of the admitted shortage of housing accommodation in Stamboul. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was at considerable pains to reassure me on the point remarking that the great majority of the returning prisoners did not belong to Constantinople itself but rather to the surrounding country and that their chief object was to get back to their houses and farms as soon as possible.

15. The Grand Vizier gives me the impression of being a thoroughly well-intentioned and honest man. His political grasp is probably small, and he has only the most limited power of expression in French. In his own language he speaks, I understand, in a straightforward and sensible manner. It certainly sounds so. I think that, so long as the present Government lasts, he may be relied on as a moderating influence, but the prevalent impression here is that the Government will probably have to make way even before the elections for a Cabinet with a more pronouncedly national character.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

16. Meanwhile, His Highness Tewfik Pasha has again joined the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, but I gather that his assistance takes the form of little more than the moral support derived from the inclusion of his name.

I have, &c.  
for High Commissioner,  
**RICHARD WEBB<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>3</sup> In a brief Foreign Office despatch, No. 648 of October 28, 1919, to Constantinople, Lord Curzon stated that he had read the present despatch with interest and that he approved the language used to Marshal Ali Riza Pasha.

### No. 545

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

*No. 1939 [141417/3050/44A]*

*PARIS, October 12, 1919*

Sir E. Crowe presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and has the honour to transmit the accompanying copies of a correspondence with General Chérif Pasha,<sup>1</sup> regarding Kurdish aspirations.

2. In communicating the statement, a copy of which is enclosed,<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Forbes Adam General Chérif Pasha stated that he intended eventually to submit a memorandum of the Kurdish case to the Peace Conference in which he would ask for a British mandate for Kurdistan and that he hoped such a memorandum would meet with the prior approval of His Majesty's Government. He asked that meanwhile this statement<sup>1</sup> should be studied here and by the Foreign Office.

3. In this connection Sir E. Crowe ventures to point out that the question of whether or not the United States eventually decide to take a mandate for Armenia appears scarcely to affect the question of Kurdistan, as appears to be suggested in the letter from the India Office of August 1st to the Foreign Office,<sup>2</sup> a copy of which was enclosed in His Lordship's despatch No. 5614<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. For General Chérif Pasha, cf. the enclosure in No. 498.

<sup>2</sup> This letter, No. P. 4284, from Mr. Shuckburgh in the India Office to Lord Hardinge (cf. No. 482, note 3), read as follows:

'Sir, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite reference to Mr. Wakely's letter of 26th June 1919, No. P. 3299 [not printed], and connected correspondence, regarding the future political status of Kurdistan.'

'The standing orders of His Majesty's Government on the subject are those contained in the Secretary of State's telegram of 9th May last, authorising the Civil Commissioner Baghdad to proceed with the creation of an "Arab province of Mosul, bordered by a fringe of autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs with British political advisers". These instructions were of course of a provisional character, all final arrangements being necessarily held in abeyance pending the general settlement with Turkey at the conclusion of peace. It is with some reluctance that Mr. Secretary Montagu is constrained to raise the question at the present juncture. He recognises that the ultimate solution of the Kurdish problem must depend on a variety of factors, some of which (e.g. the question of the extent and character of the proposed Armenian State), are still indeterminate. But it is evident from recent reports transmitted by the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, that the absence of a settled

[Note 3, see over.]

of August 23, though it may doubtless affect the precise trace of the northern frontier of Kurdistan. The experts of the American Peace Commission have always contemplated that the northern<sup>4</sup> frontier of the future Armenian state, if one were eventually established under an United States mandate, should cross the Euphrates in the neighbourhood of Chunkush, pass between Arghana Maaden and Diarbekir and follow the crests of the high hills to the north of the Tigris in a north-westerly<sup>5</sup> direction to the crest of the Harokol Dagh, thence eastwards to the Kokubulend Dagh and north-eastwards to the Persian frontier at the Karahissar Dagh. They hoped that the Kurdish areas to the south of this line would be placed in some form under the Mesopotamian mandate accepted by His Majesty's Government. Moreover, as it is believed to be their wish to leave wherever possible the predominantly Kurdish districts outside Armenia, they may eventually be anxious that the above frontier should be pushed even further to the north.

4. In these circumstances it seems clear that His Majesty's Government will have to decide eventually before the Peace Treaty with Turkey comes to

policy in regard to Kurdish affairs is re-acting most unfavourably upon the local situation; and it appears to Mr. Montagu very desirable that His Majesty's Government should take the whole question into early consideration, with a view to placing themselves in a position, when the time comes, to submit concrete proposals to the Peace Conference.

The recommendations of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, in regard to Kurdistan were summarised in his telegram No. 6666 [see No. 451, note 6, and No. 492] of the 13th June, a copy of which accompanied the letter cited above. The proposal that Great Britain should accept responsibility for the "predominantly Kurdish area", as defined in Colonel Wilson's telegram, is open to obvious criticism. It is difficult to regard without misgiving so serious an extension of British military and political commitments in these remote regions. On the other hand, Mr. Montagu finds it hard to believe that any other Western Power would accept a mandate for Kurdistan or would undertake the thankless task of superintending its affairs. The alternative of re-establishing Turkish suzerainty would appear from Admiral Calthorpe's telegram No. 1456 [not printed] of 13th July to be impracticable. It may perhaps not be possible, without sacrificing the interests of the local Christian elements, to abandon the Kurd to his own devices, without European supervision of any kind. Moreover an uncontrolled Kurdistan might prove an unpleasant neighbour not only to the new Iraq State, but also to the mandated Armenian Kingdom further north. The effect upon Persian Kurdistan, to which the nationalist movement would inevitably spread, must also be taken into account. The authority exercised by Persia over her Kurdish districts is of the weakest; but their loss would be a damaging blow to Persian *amour propre*, the effect of which, at a moment when Persia is about to enter upon a new era under British auspices, would be singularly unfortunate.

In all the circumstances Mr. Montagu is inclined to the view that some such arrangement as that proposed by Colonel Wilson may prove to be the only practicable solution of the difficulty. But he would suggest that, as a preliminary to its fuller examination by His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople should be invited to furnish a considered statement of his views on the whole question.

'A copy of this letter is being communicated to the Director of Military Intelligence, War Office.

'I have, &c.  
F. E. SHUCKBRUGH'

<sup>3</sup> This formal covering despatch is not printed.

<sup>4</sup> It was suggested on the original that this word was a mistake for 'southern'.

<sup>5</sup> It was suggested on the original that this direction should be 'N.E. and S.E.'

be discussed by the Allies, whether they are prepared for the reasons advanced by the India Office in their above-mentioned letter, to extend some form of mandatory control over, at any rate, the greater part of Kurdistan. In this connection it must however be borne in mind that the French Government, even if they eventually acquiesce in the Mosul area being placed under the British mandate, may insist that all the territory (whether Kurdish or Arab) to the south of the southern frontier of Armenia, if an Armenian state under an United States mandate is established, and to the west of a line drawn due north from the mouth of the Khabur Su (which they at present appear to regard as the westerly limit of the Mosul area) to the southern frontier of Armenia should be placed in some form or another under the French mandate.

5. Sir E. Crowe wishes to add that Chérif Pasha has verbally requested that the Foreign Office might be asked to instruct His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople to use his good influences to 'protect' the members of the Kurdish Club at Constantinople, should they be personally threatened by the new 'Nationalist' Government at Constantinople. The General was informed that his request would be passed on to the Foreign Office for such action as Earl Curzon might consider possible or desirable. No hope was held out to him, however, that any action could be taken.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> With reference to this request from General Chérif Pasha, Admiral de Robeck was instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 1671 of October 22, 1919, to Constantinople: 'If any protection is necessary, you should use your discretion in taking such measures as may be possible.'

#### No. 546

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)*

*No. 1447 Telegraphic [141244/50535/44]*

*WASHINGTON, October 13, 1919*

For Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

Following is view of an unofficial but very competent American about prospect of mandates.

Anti-Wilson and party feeling renders it out of the question that any mandate will be conceded by Senate to present administration. It is, however, possible that General Leonard Wood may be selected as Republican candidate for Presidency at next election.

Republican success is expected. General Wood takes a broad view of Foreign politics and in his first year of office might ask and be authorized to accept an American mandate for Constantinople etc.

This is a chance which makes it worth while if it be possible to make temporary arrangements for Constantinople etc. which would keep door open for an American mandate later on. Idea should, however, be kept secret (?) as if it became known it might (?) prejudice progress of political contest here over Presidential election.

No. 547

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)

No. 1435 Telegraphic; by bag [141191/70100/44]

PARIS, October 13, 1919

Your telegram No. 1216<sup>1</sup> of October 9th. Italians and Aidin area.

These suggestions were put forward by the Italian military representative at the meeting of the Supreme Council recorded in my telegram No. 1418<sup>2</sup> of October 7th, and were unanimously rejected by the Council. See also my telegram No. 1426<sup>3</sup> of October 9th.

<sup>1</sup> No. 540.

<sup>2</sup> No. 536.

<sup>3</sup> No. 539.

No. 548

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20)

No. 1972 [143288/117065/44]

PARIS, October 17, 1919

Sir E. Crowe presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and has the honour to transmit the accompanying copy of a private and confidential letter from Mr. Buckler of the American Peace Commission regarding General Harbord's recent visit to Turkey and the Caucasus.

2. While General Harbord's telegram throws no really fresh light on the situation in the near East, it is interesting to note that the tenor of the report appears to be in support of what are understood to be the general conclusions of the report of the American Commissioners to the Near East, regarding Constantinople and the Straits' Zone, Anatolia and Armenia,<sup>1</sup> namely, an integral United States mandate, possibly sub-divided in some way for the three above regions. For the rest, the report is also interesting as tending to contradict recent communications from Armenian sources (see in particular His Lordship's despatch No. 6962<sup>2</sup> of October 10) regarding the imminent danger of a massacre of Caucasian Armenians by the Turks.

3. The article by 'Pertinax' in the *Echo de Paris*, to which Mr. Buckler refers in his letter to Mr. Forbes Adam, was typical of a campaign now being waged in the more conservative French press, to the effect that the Conference should at once settle the question of Peace with Turkey without waiting for an American decision regarding mandates—in the sense of the integrity and independence of the whole of Turkey (including European Turkey but exclusive of the Arab countries) under some form of *international* supervision under the League of Nations. Such a solution may be found to be the only 'pis aller', if and when the United States refuse all mandates for Turkey, but unless the international régime in question takes a form quite other than any experiment in this direction hitherto tried and certainly quite other than that desired by the above-mentioned section of the Paris press, it can hardly be

<sup>1</sup> This report is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. xii, pp. 751–848.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

doubted that the solution will not work either in the interests of the subject Christian races of Turkey or indeed in the interests of the Anatolian peasantry. Doubtless the French interests, by whom this campaign is inspired, (and incidentally there is no reason to suppose that it is directly inspired by the French Government) hope, however, to secure under such a régime the political and economic influence (railways and economic concessions generally) which the Germans were obtaining before the war, and, in point of fact, the régime seems likely to make not only for the recrudescence of C.U.P. activities and influence but also for something like the pre-war international rivalry and intrigue—especially as it involves leaving the Sultan and his Government at Constantinople.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 548

*Letter from Mr. Buckler to Mr. Forbes Adam*

PARIS, October 14, 1919

Dear Forbes-Adam,

I am sending you for strictly confidential information the paraphrase of a report just received from General Harbord, the first we have had. He himself should be here in four or five days.

What 'Pertinax' says to-day would appear to be true, i.e., that the chief causes of this Turkish Nationalist movement are the 'projets de partage'.

The comparative safety of the Armenians, at least for the present, is welcome news.

Yours sincerely,  
W. H. BUCKLER

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 548

*From Harbord. Received Oct. 10*

1. I report my arrival at Batum after successful journey through Asia Minor, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaidjan. Mission travelled Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Mardin, with two days Adana and vicinity. By motor car Mardin, Diarbekr, Kharput, Malatia, Sivas, Erzerum, Kars, Erivan, Tiflis. By rail Tiflis to Baku and Batum. Also covered route parallel to Turkish frontier from Trebizond to Bayazid. One of my Representatives also visited scene of hostilities between Azerbaidjan and Armenia near Persian border. I have had long conferences with Ministers of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidjan, and at Sivas had long conference with Chiefs of Nationalist movement.

2. The purpose of Nationalist movement is to try to preserve integrity of Ottoman Empire under mandatory for whole. They are under great fear of territorial encroachments by great powers. I believe that Turkish officials are carrying out terms of Armistice, and that army is demobilized to skeleton. We find appalling loss of population in Turkey due to war and disease. Estimated that not more than twenty per cent. of men who went to war have

returned and absence of men 20 to 35 years is very noticeable. Found survivors from Armenian deportations slowly returning, expressing no fears for their safety. Turkish officials state that Armenian refugees in Trans-Caucasia who fled before the war or with Russian retreat would be permitted in Turkey now, if properly documented to prevent entrance with them of Russian Armenians whom Turkey believes revolutionary. We saw nothing on whole journey to indicate purpose of Turkey to cross the frontier and massacre Armenians, as anticipated in cablegrams from Trans-Caucasia prior to our departure from Paris, and no such iniquities were reported by Armenian authorities. I believe that Turkey has neither disposition nor ability to carry out such purpose, and that her present officials appreciate fatal defect in policy of former Government.

3. Whole country is becoming uneasy owing to events at Smyrna, representations by agents of foreign governments and conflicting orders of foreign military commanders. There is some unorganized border warfare along southern frontier of Russian Armenia, apparently the result of old animosity between Kurds, Tartars and Armenians unrestrained by their weak governments. Undoubtedly some former Turkish officers and soldiers out of employment on account of demobilization have sought service with forces of Azerbaijan. The latter, though normally at peace with Armenia, is prosecuting border operations near Persian frontier near Nakhichevan and Sharrour, in which a small salient with Armenian villages separates two regions with Tartar population across which Azerbaijan hopes to build an all-Moslem railroad into Turkey. These districts lie within temporary Armenian borders as fixed by British and approved by Colonel Haskell. These minor operations are in process of settlement through the fixing of neutral zone proposed by Haskell which I have supported in interviews with local governments. Pending action of Peace Conference, I do not believe that Armenians either in Turkey or in Trans-Caucasia are in danger excepting in these local affairs.

4. Actual attitude of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia towards one [an]other is very discouraging for future peace in this region except under some strong hand. All are corrupt, all are existing on salvage from Russian collapse, all reflect Bolshevik influence especially Georgia. Principal cause of friction is dispute as to boundaries. Greatest obstacles to tranquillity are uncertainty as to whether a mandatory will be given for Trans-Caucasia and the fear that Denikin may come into the region.

5. Great scarcity of food in Turkish as well as Russian Armenia, but conditions are improving. Russian Armenia cannot become self-sustaining before autumn 1920. Haskell requires minimum 7,000 tons wheat flour or equivalent monthly for ten months to begin arriving Batum December 1st. Winter season will witness many deaths unless adequate food, medical supplies, and clothing are provided from outside sources. Railroads of Trans-Caucasia cannot be consolidated for rehabilitation and operation without foreign control. Foreign credit is badly needed for purchase of farming implements, clothing, medicines, and manufactured articles. Caucasus branch of Near East Relief is rapidly reorganizing, expanding and

increasing activities to meet conditions and to administer any quantity of relief that may be provided. Unquestionably the administration of Colonel Haskell has greatly improved conditions throughout Trans-Caucasia.

This problem is one which includes both Turkish Armenia and Trans-Caucasia because of inextricable mingling of races, religions and interests. Whole of this region is familiar with principle of self determination and generally expresses faith in disinterested mandatory under League of Nations as the only solution for desperate situation.

Our Mission leaves Batum for Constantinople Oct. 7th via Trebizond and Samsoun, and will probably sail from there about October 15th.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> These papers were minuted as follows by Lords Hardinge and Curzon:

'It is now certain that the U.S. Govt. will not obtain a mandate for any country in the Near East. Consequently some other scheme must be found for peace with Turkey. In any case the activities of French capitalists is conclusive of the importance of removing from Paris the negotiations for peace with Turkey.'

H.'

'I expect that General Harbord is in general accurate. Since we first heard nearly 3 months ago that the Armenians were on the brink of being butchered almost to a man—whereas nothing happened—I have always been sceptical as to the impending massacre.'

'Moreover the butchers and the victims are confabulating & fraternising.'

'The French want to be the mandatory for Turkey under the suspicious and dangerous disguise of international finance.'

C. 25/10'

#### No. 549

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 29)*

*No. 1939 [146649/146649/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 18, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith an account of a conversation which took place here recently between Mr. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy, who is Chief of the Staff to General Harbord. (The mission of the latter has now come to an end, and General Harbord is returning to Paris and Washington to make his report.)

2. The interview was fortunate, as General McCoy is an eminently sound and sensible man, and able to take a somewhat larger view than the majority of his compatriots who visit the Near East. It is to be hoped that it will have the effect of removing several misconceptions, and especially with regard to Major Noel's activities, concerning which such an unfortunate and entirely erroneous idea has sprung up in the minds of Turks, Americans, and, I am afraid, Allies alike.

3. As giving some idea of the views held at the United States High Commission here, I enclose also an account of a conversation which recently took place between a British officer and Lieutenant R. Dunn, U.S.N., Intelligence Officer to Admiral Bristol.

4. It seems hopeless to try and refute the arguments, or rather the definite and fixed opinions, of so many Americans concerning our political activities and our propaganda out here. As your Lordship is aware, England is practically the only nation which has kept aloof from all the intrigues which are going on in this country, and which has refused all overtures of friendliness on the part of the Turks, no matter what may be their political complexion.

5. As a result, we are credited with some deep and mysterious policy which it seems to be the endeavour of everyone to ascertain. Consequently, when some slight occurrence takes place, such as the Noel incident at Malatia, everyone at once reads into it just the explanation of our conduct which they want to prove. The result is sometimes diverting, but always wholly erroneous, for the simple reason that the policy, other than our avowed one of complete non-interference, is of course non-existent.

6. The fraternisation with the Turks, which is now so much on the increase, is naturally having a very bad effect. A recent alleged interview with Mrs. Bristol, wife of Admiral Bristol, of which I enclose a copy,<sup>1</sup> is a case in point. I understand that Mrs. Bristol denies the interview, but no denial has been published, and of course the Turks firmly believe the protestations of friendship therein expressed, to the no small alarm of the native Christian committees.

7. Again, the Americans, as your Lordship is aware, publish an uncensored copy of all wireless press news received by them; though, in view of Foreign Office despatch No. 601<sup>1</sup> of 8th October, it is difficult to say whence these messages emanate. I attach a page of this news, including a very unfriendly and, of course, wholly erroneous statement concerning British activities in stirring up strife in the interior. The news presumably comes from some irresponsible wireless station, but an unfortunate effect is produced by the fact that the publication has an official heading, i.e., U.S. Navy Radio Press.

8. I do not think the Americans are following any definitive line out here at present, but, as individuals, they take colour from their surroundings. Very few of them have any previous knowledge of the Near East, of the Committee of Union and Progress, or of the political history of the past ten years. In fact, they are 'green', easy for the Nationalists to spoon-feed, and ready to rise to such catchwords as independence and self-determination.

9. A certain number, chiefly trade representatives, some missionaries and young officers, desire to see an American mandate over the whole of Turkey, for the respective purposes of money, security and progress, and Imperialism.

10. The American journalist is, of course, a law unto himself, out for sensation, and with a very superficial judgment of, or regard for, facts. Their utterances are taken very seriously by the Nationalists, and one individual of this breed recently persuaded the Sivas Conference that the Nationalist movement was wholly patriotic, and had the complete endorsement of everyone except England.

11. The anti-British colour shown is really more a reflection of Nationalist

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ideas than anything else, though there is, of course, a certain amount of hereditary jealousy. I am inclined to think that, in a good many cases, though the voice may have a strong Yankee twang, yet the sentiments are those of Mustapha Kemal and his party. The opportunity of giving another twist to the British lion's tail is, in fact, too good to be missed.

I have, &c.  
(For the High Commissioner),  
RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 549

*An Account of a Conversation between Mr. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy*

General McCoy, second to General Harbord, came to see me this morning. He is of the regular United States army and is an old friend of mine from Mexico and Washington.

His journey is accurately described in the annexed extract from the *Stamboul*.<sup>2</sup>

He said that he had been very agreeably surprised by the tranquillity—apparent at all events—prevailing in the interior, but he attributed this tranquillity to that which had struck him above all during his journey, namely, the exhaustion of the Turkish people. There were really, he said, no men left. He had been prepared to find that the Christians had suffered greatly, but not to discover that the Turks had suffered quite as much or more. He had been favourably impressed with Mustapha Kemal, who had treated the expedition extremely well. The movement would never have taken place had it not been for the occupation of Smyrna, but, as it is, the people are all solid for Mustapha Kemal, though they do not want to be bothered, they want to be left alone and to rest, and it will be a long time before they are again in a position to raise their heads; at present they are 'down and out'. Mustapha Kemal had made every sort of eulogy of the Americans, just, said General McCoy, as a Mexican would whilst talking face to face with an American. But for the rest, he showed himself strongly anti-British, and complained bitterly of our encroachments. I asked what these were, and General McCoy said they were acts done after, and, the Pasha claimed, contrary to the armistice; he mentioned specifically the Urfa region, the district north of Mossoul, and the efforts made to create an independent Kurdistan by certain British officers, who had been almost arrested at Malatia, Major Noel and Colonel Bell.

I was very glad of the opportunity thus presented to explain to the American general what had been up to the present the lines upon which this High Commission has been acting. I told him therefore that we were the last to have any objection to patriotism—a quality which he had been highly praising in Mustapha Kemal—but that experience showed that Turkish patriotism was different from any other, and was very apt—very unfor-

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This extract of October 13, 1919, gave the itinerary of General Harbord's mission, for which see No. 548, enclosure 2.

tunately—to take the direction of wiping out Christians. In the course of his remarks, he had said that there were very few Armenians left in the vilayets which were to form—according to the press—the new Armenia; only Kurds were left. We eagerly desired to see the remnant of the Armenians protected. But Mustapha Kemal had set himself up against the Central Government, having inherited the adherents, the organisation, and, I feared, also the spirit of the Committee, and it looked as if he hoped to establish himself somewhere in the interior where he was intangible, and whence he could direct all the proceedings of the regularly constituted Government, who would dance to his tune. The inconvenience of such methods were obvious, and we had represented it to His Majesty's Government, who had, nevertheless, issued instructions that we were in no way to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, even if such inaction were to result in the establishment of a direct Committee Government. This decision was undoubtedly wise, though there were many reasons also which counted in favour of assisting a Government such as that of Ferid Pasha, and hoped by peaceful methods to mitigate the decisions of the Peace Conference rather than to avert them by force, as appeared to be the idea of the, to me, almost mythical Mustapha Kemal. Mustapha need be under no fear as to our encroachments. Urfa and other towns had been occupied by us in strict conformity with the terms of the armistice, which allowed us to occupy places where danger to the Christians was apprehended. I had been here during the tragedies of 1895 and 1896, and again in 1909, and after such experiences I could not bring myself to trust Turks with Christians any more than a fox with geese, and it appeared to me that the Christians still alive in Anatolia existed by the sufferance and goodwill of Mustapha Kemal, and were in the position of new hostages in his hands for the benevolent behaviour of the Peace Conference towards Turkey.

The same observation applied in great part to the Mossoul district where the massacres of Nestorians and other Christian sects had been terrible, and there were some 30,000 to 40,000 Christian refugees whom we were still feeding and clothing until we could get such security as would permit of their own districts in the Hekkiari, &c. But I imagined that there was another perfectly legitimate factor at work. Whatever Power received the mandate of Mesopotamia, it was indispensable that that province should have a sound defensible frontier, and that could only be found in the mountains and not in the plain. This had already been proved by various raids from which we had suffered. I had no knowledge that H.M. Government contemplated the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, and if Major Noel and his Kurdish companions had been spreading propaganda (as the general had said) among the Kurdish tribes in that sense, it was entirely unauthorised so far as this High Commission was concerned. The Kurdish chiefs had only been allowed to go south in order that they might use their influence for the preservation of order, and they had given their word before starting that they would not engage in any form of intrigue or hostility, either against the Turkish Government or against Mustapha Kemal, whom they appeared to

regard as their great enemy. It would appear that Major Noel had been carried away by his infatuation for the Kurds, whose apostle he had become. He seemed to think they were the incarnation of all manly virtues and could do no wrong. He had been recalled and would shortly be arriving here. I regretted that the general was leaving so soon as to make a meeting impossible. But the sole efforts of H.M. Government at the present time were directed to the maintenance of order and the protection of the Christians; not that I would admit that we had any greater responsibility in this matter than any other Power, but it was one to which very great attention and importance was lent in England.

As to the Urfa district, I understood we were already handing over all that region to French control.

I repeated that we were entirely prepared to treat with Mustapha Kemal or any other person who might be called to power; it was, as he had said, exactly like Mexico; no matter how many changes there might be in the individuals who were in authority, that was an internal matter, and did not concern us, we were ready to enter into good relations with any of them, only we expected them to safeguard British interests, but we also expected them to observe the armistice, which included the preservation of order, the most important part of which was the protection of the Christian populations.

T. B. HOHLER<sup>3</sup>

October 14, 1919.

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 549

##### *An after-dinner Conversation with an American Officer at Constantinople*

Lieut. R. Dunn, United States Navy, dined with me on the evening of the 4th October. He is Intelligence Officer to the American High Commissioner at Constantinople. He had lately returned from Smyrna, having been with Admiral Bristol on the Commission of Enquiry and was keen and communicative on Turkish affairs generally. To my knowledge, since he has held his present position at Constantinople, he has, other than his five weeks' stay at Smyrna on duties with the Commission, visited Tiflis, Trebizonde, and Samsoun, viâ Batoum, to which port he made the voyage in H.M.S. *Gardenia*. He arrived in Turkey about February of this year, and it is his first visit, and his only knowledge of Turkey and the East, as far as I am aware.

According to him, the American opinion of the Smyrna affair is that the Greeks' position and claims are untenable, as also is the position of the Italians, who, though on the same basis as the Greeks, have not sufficient forces to hold the Turks in check and are therefore, in these times of keener interest, allowed to remain unmolested by the Turks.

The conversation naturally drifted to a wider basis and the Nationalist movement came to the forefront. The American authorities could see

<sup>3</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 679 of November 5, 1919, to Constantinople Lord Curzon stated that he had read No. 549 with interest and requested that Mr. Hohler be informed that the language which he used to General McCoy was approved.

nothing but the 'old intriguing policy in the present dealings with Turkey by Allied European Powers'. Britain was not excluded from this general charge. The United States of America's policy was 'to find the present Turkish opinion and adopt that as the policy of the future Government of Turkey'. This they found in the Nationalist Party, which the British had done all in their power to suppress. That the British were opposed to the Nationalists was shown in their support of the previous Governments, some of whose members had even been nominated by the British authorities. The lack of success, or rather the feebleness of that Cabinet, had shown without doubt that the British were incapable of dealing with the present Turkish problem in the light of the new ideas. They were carrying on the intrigues of past years and, not only were they not attempting to solve a difficult problem, but were only engaged in furthering their own interests.

One of his duties is to read all the papers published in Constantinople. He remarked that the day after the fall of the Turco-British Cabinet, the only newspaper that did not report it was the *Orient News*. This led him to believe that the British were, as far as possible, trying to keep this 'defeat' from their own people. When told that the *Orient News* was not published for local purposes but for the quicker publication of home news and the general entertainment of the British forces in Turkey, he remarked that it was stated, in large type, that the paper was 'printed and published for the army of the Black Sea', and must therefore be considered published for propaganda purposes.

Reiterating the fact of British intrigue so often, I asked him to give me a case within his knowledge. He then told me of a visit to Malatia of a Major Noel, who was accompanied by some well-known Kurds. Major Noel, he asserted, was sent to stir up the Kurds against the Turks in order to push our Mesopotamian boundary further north. About this incident, the Americans had at least three, if not four, absolutely different sources of information which confirmed each other. He gave me three. The first, 'certainly only one of our missionaries, but he was a nice old chap, who could be relied on'. This missionary had asked what could be the idea of the British in deliberately stirring up trouble between the Kurds and the Turks. The second was the evidence of a 'major' of the United States Relief Committee, and the third was an intercepted telegram from Major Noel to the High Commissioner handed to the Americans by the Nationalists, in which Major Noel complains that he did not know that the Kurds accompanying him were liable to arrest. They had been arrested and requested instructions. Lieut. Dunn did not know if this telegram was in code or not. At all events, it was concluded that the telegram confirmed the other two points of information and he had reported to America this case of British intrigue, while stating that the telegram might be a forgery. He appealed to me for the true reason of Major Noel's visit to Malatia. I suggested that, as they had so thoroughly made up their minds as to the reason that they would probably not believe anything to the contrary whatever was told them. I also suggested that Admiral Bristol might take the intercepted telegram to the British High Commissioner. He,

however, was certain that Admiral Bristol would not do this and begged me to find out personally.

The Americans, he states, receive information from all sources and listen to everybody, but anything in the nature of complaints from the Turks about the Allies they dismiss immediately.

He persisted in America's disinterestedness in Turkish affairs and was sure that she would not accept a mandate for Armenia alone. Even if the territory round Constantinople were also offered, she would refuse. To accept a mandate for Turkey minus the Smyrna vilayet in control of the Greeks and the Adalia district in control of the Italians would be madness. Even the attempt to conciliate British and French interests in Syria was considered a wrong policy. The British claims to Mesopotamia and Palestine were reluctantly recognised, but anything beyond this was considered an unnecessary partition of Turkey, and would not satisfactorily settle the Turkish question. America would accept, although even this would be difficult to persuade their people in America, a mandate for the whole of Turkey ex [*sic*] Mesopotamia (not including the British attempted 'bulge') and Palestine.

American authorities in Constantinople did not think that Turkey should be allowed to govern herself as in pre-war days, but the French had already declared for this policy, seeing they could not get anything better from the alteration. I could not discover whether he had obtained this information from the local French official sources, or whether only from reading the French newspapers.

Whatever task America undertook in Turkey would be for the good of Turkey and the Turks, without thinking of their self-interests, but they must be given at least a chance of success. The Nationalists represented the Turkish opinion and included the best brains of the country. The basis of the Nationalist party may or may not be the organisation of the old Committee of Union and Progress, but, as the only possible British objection to the Committee of Union and Progress was its support of the Germans, all further opposition was unnecessary owing to the present impotence of Germany for harm. I asked whether even the American Relief Committee were as disinterested as, he asserted, was the American Government. He admitted that a few of that body may be commercially interested, but in the large majority of cases this was not so.

The British, he said, had made themselves thoroughly unpopular all over the East including Trans-Caucasus. Wherever the Americans went, they were asked to accept the mandate. British policy in the East was a failure proved by the discontent shown by the recent risings in Egypt, which had been under her guardianship for so long a time.

In the course of our conversation, Lieutenant Dunn remarked that the new British High Commissioner was anti-Turk.

I met Lieut. Dunn at the club next day. He 'rushed' at me and asked me if he had been rude to the British in his conversation the previous evening, as he could not remember all that had occurred. I answered him in the negative.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 549

*Extract from United States Radio Press, Constantinople, Turkey, October 15, 1919*

The Nationalist Party in Turkey

Mustapha Kemal said:—"The Nationalist party recognised the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country. It is our aim to secure the development of Turkey as she stood at the armistice. We have no expansionist plans, but it is our conviction that Turkey can be made a rich and prosperous country if she can get a good Government. Our Government has become weakened through foreign interference and intrigues. After all our experience, we are sure that America is the only country able to help us. We guarantee no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place.

'It is untrue that we are working with Enver Pasha. We believe his policies injured Turkey. We do not know his whereabouts. It is rumoured that he is with the Russian Bolsheviks. I saw a letter wherein he stated that he was going to form an independent Turkish Government, possibly at Azerbaidjan. It is untrue that the Nationalists are supported by Anglo-French capitalists, seeking to preserve their interests in Turkey.'

'British money is spent here to destroy Turkey. We are aware that the British gave £150,000 to Adeel Bey, ex-President of the Association of Turkish Friends in England, £200,000 to the Governor of Konia, perhaps a larger sum to the Governor of Angora.'

Reouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine, and known in the United States, speaking of the English, said, 'America is our only hope, otherwise we fight it out.' The Nationalists claim the control of 40,000 troops, but others say it is improbable.

Harbord's progress was facilitated by the posts of the American Commission for the Relief of the New East, whose agents, frequently women, are courageously occupying dangerous isolated positions, doing what Harbord termed civilising work under nearly hopeless conditions. They are conducting schools, hospitals, workrooms, caring for thousands of orphans and widows. The crops of the interior reported in fair condition for the winter, but the country is suffering from the lack of a stable Government. The people need soap, medicine, and clothing. It is estimated that at Kharput 70 per cent. of the young men are missing.

No. 550

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

*No. 1887 Telegraphic [141244/50535/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 18, 1919

Your tel. No. 1447.<sup>1</sup>

Willing as we should be to see America appointed as mandatory for Constantinople, I fear that prolongation of existing uncertainty for such a time

<sup>1</sup> No. 546.

as your suggestion postulates, or even creation of an interim form of administration to be replaced at a later date by an American mandate will be found very difficult. Existing delay in settlement caused by American exigencies is already producing lamentable consequences and may gravely imperil chances of Peace Treaty with Turkey. Moreover behind American scheme lie projects, at any rate in some minds, with which we have not much sympathy. See Constantinople tel: 1886<sup>2</sup> repeated to you 1801 and Paris tel: 1067<sup>3</sup> repeated to you 1851.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram of September 29, 1919 (received September 30), reported that the Grand Rabbi of Constantinople was leaving that city on a visit to Paris in order to meet Mr. Morgenthau, former American Ambassador in Turkey, 'who has telegraphed for him through American High Commissioner. He says he does not know for what reason. He now professes moderate and sane Zionism.'

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of October 7 (received that day) Lord Derby reported: 'Saw Morgenthau to-day. He volunteered to me that he had asked Rabbi to come from Constantinople with a view to talking over not only Jewish question but also all other questions connected with Turkey, as Rabbi is great personal friend of Talaat. He wishes me to see Rabbi and latter is calling here to-morrow. Rabbi I understand is strong anti-Zionist.' Admiral Webb commented on this telegram in Constantinople telegram No. 1965 of October 17 (received October 21): 'I think this is regrettable. Grand Rabbi was in close touch with Committee (of Union and Progress) by (means of) whom he obtained security for his flock. He will of course have no other object than this in view and will continue to seek to attain it by playing to Turkish Gallery. It must be remembered that he does not represent any such great community or interests as do either of patriarchates. He is unreliable and anti-British.'

## No. 551

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*No. 1249 Telegraphic: by bag [141460/70100/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 18, 1919

Your telegram No. 1426.<sup>1</sup>

War Office reply that they deprecate most strongly use of British troops in this area as they consider it impossible to gauge the extent to which we may be committed by an occupation of this nature.

They consider it essential that General Milne's status in Asia Minor should be clearly defined in terms which are recognised by the other Powers concerned.

<sup>1</sup> No. 539.

## No. 552

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 20)*

*No. 1978 Telegraphic [143405/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 19, 1919

Armenian Patriarch and Acting Greek Patriarch took unprecedented step of calling together on High Commissions on October 17th to represent in

strongest terms danger of situation created for Christian population of Turkey by triumph of national movement (?) and recent change of Government which they regard as nothing more or less than return to power of Committee of Union and Progress.

Situation was they urged so grave that they might have no alternative but to resign their functions and leave it to Entente (who they had been led to look to for protection) to see to interests and safety of their flocks.

Full report has been forwarded by despatch.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

### No. 553

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received October 29)

No. 1926 [146637/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 19, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to recent correspondence relative to the 'National movement' in Anatolia, and the change of Government in Constantinople, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, recording a conversation with the Grand Vizier on 16th October, regarding the position of the National forces in relation to the effective strength of the Turkish Regular army.

2. My French colleague had made representations to the Grand Vizier on this subject on the occasion of a personal visit, and requested me to associate myself with them. This I at once consented to do, and I accordingly despatched Mr. Ryan to convey a message to His Highness to the effect that I fully agreed with everything that M. Defrance had said.

I have, &c.  
for High Commissioner  
RICHARD WEBB

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 553

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan*

I spoke to the Grand Vizier this morning about the position of the 'National Forces' in relation to the effective force of the Turkish army as authorised under the Armistice.

2. Before calling on the Grand Vizier, I saw M. Ledoux. I understood from him that M. Defrance's representation had been in the nature of a serious warning rather than a categorical demand. I shaped my own language accordingly.

3. I said that Admiral Webb wished to associate himself with what M. Defrance, the doyen of the High Commissioners, had already said. Owing to recent developments, the 'National Forces' had changed their character from that of an insurgent body, which the Central Government

desired to repress, to that of troops recognized by the Government. They must therefore be held to form part of the military forces of the Government and should be included in the authorised effectives of about 40,000 men.

4. I said that Admiral Webb realized the embarrassing position of the Government and that the present representation was intended as a warning which might have to be followed by something stronger. The question was already an important one and might easily acquire greater importance. Our great desire was to avoid disagreeable situations arising, and we wished to anticipate and forestall a possible danger.

5. The Grand Vizier accepted the principle of what I said without dissent. He made, however, a distinction between the National Forces in the Smyrna area, and those in northern Asia Minor. He said there was no connection between the two, and that the National Forces in the Smyrna area were local levies of people who had stood up to defend their homes against the menace of a Greek advance, with its accompaniments of murder and rapine. He suggested that these forces should not be taken into account for the purpose under discussion. As for the National Forces in the north, they did not comprise any considerable number of irregulars. The regular army was so far below its normal strength, what with divisions of 1,000 or 1,500 men, that the whole of the forces under arms, regular and National, must be well within the authorised effectives. He had nevertheless asked the Minister of War to go into the matter carefully and see what forces there actually were.

6. I said I would report what His Highness said, but I must say at once that on one very important point I could not agree with him. He proposed, I said, to exclude the National Forces in the Smyrna area. From our point of view, there should no longer be any need even if the need existed before, for local defensive levies. The Greek troops were under General Milne's orders and the responsibility for determining the Military frontier and securing respect for it, devolved on General Milne. Assuming however, that there were any need for such a defensive force, the position appeared to me to be, that the Turkish Government were entitled to keep certain effectives under arms for general purposes. If it were considered necessary to retain forces under arms in the Smyrna area, for the particular purpose of defence against possible Greek action, such forces must form part of the authorised effectives.

7. The Grand Vizier seemed to entertain a good deal of doubt as to whether the Greeks could be trusted to respect a line, if there were no Turkish Forces in front of them. If it were as I had said, why, he asked, were incidents taking place outside the limits prescribed by the Greeks, and with what object were they massing troops inside them? I said I doubted whether incidents were still taking place outside the prescribed line, and that as regards the massing of troops, Admiral Webb was fulfilling his promise to convey to General Milne and His Majesty's Government His Highness' representations on that subject. I said I had myself drafted a despatch which Admiral Webb was sending to the Foreign Office and which dealt with the matter.

8. Early in the conversation the Grand Vizier observed that the position between the Government and the National Forces was that there was an agreement on all important questions, but that various subsidiary questions were still outstanding. The Minister of Marine, he said, had started for Sivas to discuss and effect the settlement of the subsidiary questions.

9. The Grand Vizier confirmed the news that Tewfik Pasha had definitely entered the Government as a Minister without Portfolio.

A. RYAN

*British High Commission,  
Constantinople, October 16, 1919.*

No. 554

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received October 29)

No. 1929 [146640/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 19, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1836/M/1031<sup>1</sup> of 10th October, in which I reviewed the general political situation in the country, I have the honour to transmit herewith a photographic reproduction of a cartoon<sup>2</sup> which was excluded by the Allied Censorship a few days ago from the *Tasvir-i-Efkar*, a daily illustrated paper, which is run in the Committee or quasi-Committee interest, and which has a large circulation.

2. This cartoon illustrates in a striking manner the spirit and ideals of the 'national movement'. Your Lordship will observe that the very large and undefeated Turk reclining on the map<sup>3</sup> has his feet well planted in Thrace. Constantinople and the Bosphorus lie snug beneath his garter. The middle portion of his manly frame reposes comfortably in Central Anatolia, while his drawn sabre is ready to sweep Konia, Adalia and Smyrna clear of their invaders, and his left arm stretches over potential Armenia and Kurdistan, with Van between the thumb and forefinger. His shadow lies black on Diarbekr, and extends southward into Syria. Azerbaidjan, no foreign land, is marked on the map and stretches from the Persian frontier to the Black Sea. His scabbard lies across Cilicia, and his menacing glance is evidently fixed on the further distance of Mesopotamia.

3. This, in the conception of the organizers of the national movement, is the Turk with whom the Peace Conference will have to reckon, should they presume to affect any superiority in their dealings with Turkey.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

<sup>1</sup> No. 543.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This cartoon was as described below.

<sup>3</sup> Of Asia Minor.

No. 555

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received October 29)

No. 1935 [146646/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 20, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 14th October, which I have received from my representative at Smyrna, relative to the activity of the Italians in Smyrna and its environs.

2. I would invite the particular attention of your Lordship to this report, in that it emphasises once again the desirability of the early withdrawal from Asia Minor of both the Greek and Italian troops (as set out in my telegram No. 1831<sup>1</sup> of the 17th September and in my despatch No. 1785/M/1913(9)<sup>2</sup> of the 1st October).

3. Their presence in these regions cannot possibly be claimed to be conducive to law and order, but has shown itself to be the exact opposite.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 555

*Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to  
Admiral Sir J. de Robeck*

October 14, 1919

No. 272/10.

I have the honour to report that Italian activity, whether military, naval, political, commercial, social, or otherwise, is making itself quite noticeable in this town and district.

Some of this activity may be attributed to the fact that they want to create or make a pretence of creating a large stake in the country in order to bargain subsequently in case some other Power is confirmed in the possession of Smyrna.

Their methods and their way of acting are very little removed from those of the Greeks, who are the more irritated against them in that they recognise in them adversaries of the same mentality.

There is no doubt that the decision to allow the Greeks to land in Smyrna was most distasteful to the Italians, and although they no doubt had to consent to it in Paris, they have worked actively against the Greeks within and without the Greek zone ever since.

In the Greek zone they are quick to seize upon any attempt on the part of the Greeks to assert authority, and outside the zone there is little doubt that they keep the Turks informed of what is going on at Paris and here and encouraging them in their resistance against the Greeks. The deplorable

<sup>1</sup> No. 513.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

conditions of the Aidin Railway and the districts adjoining it are due almost as much to Italian intrigue as to Greek disobedience.

That the Italians have become the carriers of the German and Austrian trade and that they readily lend themselves to be channels for Austrian and German penetration again into Turkey seems to be undoubted. By taking possession of all the best ports in the Adriatic and by seizing what was before the war the finest shipping line in the Near East, namely, the Austrian Lloyd, the Italians have obtained a preponderating influence in local commercial maritime affairs. The former offices of the Austrian Lloyd have been converted into those of the Lloyd Triestino, and the goodwill of the Austrian Company has passed to the Italian one.

In addition to acquiring the Austrian Lloyd steamers and connection, the Italians run the following lines of their own: Servizi Marittimi, Puglia, Marittima Italiana, Lloyd Sabaudo.

*Banking.*—Previous to the war, the Italians had no bank in Smyrna, and have now acquired the Hungarian Bank with its goodwill, and have turned it into the Banco di Roma. How far the Banco di Roma will be a cloak for Austrian or German finance remains to be seen.

*Schools, Churches, Hospitals.*—One of the most prominent buildings of the town is the Italian School, which existed before the war, and is the finest school building in the town. Since the Armistice, the Italians have taken under their protection an Austrian Church and the Austrian Hospital, much to the displeasure of the French delegate, who claims that all churches, hospitals, &c., in the Near East should be of French protection. The French delegate has succeeded in having a French flag hoisted along with the Italian over the former Austrian hospital, and on the day when a memorial service was held in the former Austrian Church was unable to attend through a diplomatic illness.

The Italians had no hospital in Smyrna before the war.

A new feature is the opening of an Italian Red Cross Delegation in Smyrna and the establishment of Italian dispensaries in various parts of the town where free drugs are dispensed and relief given. A good deal of this medical propaganda is done in the Moslem quarters. The opening of the Italian Red Cross establishment is undoubtedly a counterblast to the establishment, previous to the Greek landing, of Greek Red Cross missions in various parts of the country. These missions were looked on with great suspicion by the Turks, and presumably by the Italians, who did not let slip any opportunity of following up any Greek move by a countermove.

*Boy Scouts.*—Following on the establishment of Greek boy scouts, the Italians also formed an Italian Boy Scout Corps. French, Armenian, and Jewish boy scouts soon followed suit.

*Italian Protection.*—Since the day of the Greek landing, the Italian delegate has issued hundreds of papers of Italian protection to Moslems in this town, and also to Armenians, Jews, and a few Greeks. Any Moslem with the slightest pretension to having any connection with Italy or Tripoli, or even with the Italian 'zone' in Asia Minor, can obtain without the slightest

difficulty a paper of Italian protection. No previous residence is needed, nor is it thought necessary to await the annexation of the Italian zone in Asia Minor in order to convert Moslems who were born there but are now resident in Smyrna into Italian citizens. The Greeks undoubtedly feel very sore at the Italian pretension that these papers of special protection have any value, but as the Greek in Egypt or in Asia Minor or Macedonia finds little difficulty in issuing papers of Greek nationality to any Greek-speaking Christian, he can have little to complain of in the Italian action in this matter.

As regards Armenians, the Italians, like the French and ourselves, issue to them papers of special protection, but a fee is payable by Armenians who obtain such papers from the French or Italians, whereas we deliver these papers gratis. This practice should, I think, be altered.

*Italian Naval and Military Forces.*—Since and before the Greek landing, the Italians have always kept at least one of their largest naval units in Smyrna, and the number of their military officers and private soldiers is out of proportion to any work that has to be done there. I am informed that a short time ago a number of Italian soldiers marched through the main streets of the town carrying a large Italian flag inscribed 'Vivi Italia ed Asia Minore!'

*Newspapers.*—Before the war, there was no Italian newspaper. Now a special propaganda newspaper called the *Levant* has been started by them. A propaganda bureau has been started in the Parallèle Street, Smyrna.

*Italians and Greeks.*—Both these nations, recognising each other as enemies, spend a good deal of time in spying on one another, and in bringing to the notice of others the delinquencies of the other or the attempts of the other party to obtain any form of advantage. At the same time both parties realise that they can exploit their enmity to obtain from the other Powers concessions in order to prevent them coming to open conflict, which would be, perhaps, the best solution of Greco-Italian rivalry in Asia Minor and would not be an unmixed evil.

*Italians and Turks.*—The Italians are, in my opinion, very afraid of the Turks, and realise that they are dependent on Turkish favour and goodwill for remaining in the Italian zone. On this account they allow the Turk a free hand in their zone, and also actively help him in order to curry favour with him. It would, perhaps, be an evil day for the Italians if the Turks were to carry out their threat of driving the Greeks out of Smyrna, because the Turk would then probably turn on the Italian and drive him out of Scalanova and Adalia.

JAMES MORGAN

No. 556

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 21)

No. 1464 Telegraphic: by bag [143975/70100/44]

Inter-allied occupation of Aidin valley.

Your telegram No. 1249<sup>1</sup> of October 18.

We should, I am afraid, be placed in an awkward position if the views

<sup>1</sup> No. 551.

PARIS, October 20, 1919

expressed by the War Office were acted upon. The Greek occupation of the Smyrna region has raised one of the most delicate problems that have come before the conference. The withdrawal of the Greek forces behind General Milne's line, and the simultaneous inter-allied occupation of the Meander valley hitherto held by the Greeks alone, offered the one solution on which all the Powers were able to agree, and this only after prolonged and somewhat acrimonious discussion. The proposal actually emanated from General Milne himself. None of the possible alternatives were of a kind to obtain the unanimous approval of the Supreme Council. There are obvious objections to (1) bringing back the Turks into places where they have only recently committed terrible outrages against the local Greeks, of whom many have perished; nor could we well (2) let the Italians go in. It was their advance into this region, in direct opposition to the Supreme Council's decisions, that induced the latter to invite Greek occupation. Subsequently the Supreme Council asked Venizelos to come to an arrangement with the Italians as to a line dividing their respective zones of occupation. We could not now honourably insist on the Greeks retiring from a region lying on their side of the line so agreed upon, in order to let the Italians occupy it. The last alternative is (3) to let the Greeks remain where they are. This, according to the opinion in which both the Greeks and General Milne are at one, will compel the Greeks, for purely military reason, to make a further slight advance, which it is admitted is sure to lead to further bloodshed.

Whilst therefore the inter-allied occupation offers the only solution that is satisfactory on its merits, the position is made the more delicate for us owing to the fact that what the Supreme Council has decided is giving effect to General Milne's own recommendation. The War Office complain, rightly, that his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in that theatre is not properly established. I am quite ready to continue to press for this being set right, but any representation to this effect on my part will lose in weight if at the same time I have to announce that in regard to the very question to settle which the Supreme Council definitely authorised General Milne as Commander-in-Chief to act in their name, His Majesty's Government throw him over and refuse to act on his advice.

I earnestly beg that the above may be taken into consideration by the War Cabinet before they definitely decide to instruct me to act on the views expressed by the War Office.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Office communicated a copy of this telegram to the War Office on October 23, 1919. The War Office replied in a letter of October 31, 1919, to the Foreign Office that 'in view of the representations submitted by Sir Eyre Crowe in the above telegram, the [Army] Council have consented to the provision of a British Detachment for the joint Interallied occupation of the Meander Valley, and General Milne has been informed accordingly. I am to add however that the Council would again draw the attention of Earl Curzon of Kedleston to the impossibility of gauging the extent to which they may be committed by maintaining troops in this locality.'

No. 557

*Record by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with the French Ambassador  
in London*

[136765/106312/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 20, 1919

M. Cambon called this afternoon and referred to the Note from M. Clemenceau to the Prime Minister of the 21st September, 1919, relative to the question of the command at Constantinople.<sup>1</sup>

He stated that in spite of the fact that it had been settled that General d'Esperey was assigned the command of the troops in Constantinople, and of the fact that General Milne had transferred his Headquarters to Asia Minor, the latter had left General Wilson in command of the troops remaining in Constantinople and the situation now is that General Wilson has simply been substituted for General Milne and refuses to place his troops under the command of General d'Esperey.

M. Cambon therefore asked that a reply should be given to M. Clemenceau's Note, which so far has not been answered.

H.

<sup>1</sup> No. 518.

No. 558

*Earl Curzon to Earl Granville (Athens)<sup>1</sup>*

No. 258 [144506/519/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 21, 1919

My Lord,

M. Venizelos, in the course of his present visit to England, paid me a call at the Foreign Office, and indulged in a long conversation about the views and aspirations of his country.

He pleaded the cause of the Greeks as against the Turks or the Bulgarians in the whole of Thrace, producing a long series of historical maps, which showed that only once in bygone centuries had the Bulgarians occupied the territories in question, and placing before me stacks of figures which demonstrated the numerical preponderance of the Greek population. He felt deeply hurt by the attitude of the American Government on this subject, and he pleaded earnestly for the support of Great Britain.

I did not venture any observations on a matter which still lay on the lap of the Peace Conference, and contented myself with admiring the formidable argumentative arsenal with which the Greek statesman had provided himself.

He then entered into a prolonged exposition of his views with regard to the future of Constantinople, arguing that at all costs the Turk must be removed, both as a symbol of his defeat and because his continued presence in Constantinople would be a challenge and danger in the years to come. America, he said, was now, in consequence of the illness of President Wilson, not in the

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this despatch was sent to Constantinople as No. 666 on October 30, 1919.

least likely to take a mandate for the city. Great Britain would decline to take a mandate. The Turks themselves would not tolerate France as a mandatory. There remained only an international administration, with a High Commissioner under the League of Nations.

I pointed out to him that, while there were many in this country who shared these views and would use all their influence to carry them out, very powerful opinions had been expressed on the other side in Paris and elsewhere by the spokesmen of India and the Secretary of State for India. They had stated that the expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople would be regarded as an intolerable insult to Islam, and would be followed by disturbances and rebellions in all parts of the Eastern world. They had even said that it would shake our position in India. Such views could not be altogether ignored.

M. Venizelos retaliated by the observation that he believed, from such information as he possessed, that these forebodings were far from being shared by Lord Hardinge and myself, both of whom had been Viceroys, and that he did not see why the present Government of India should be any more right than those who had so long presided over the fortunes of that country.

I thought it only fair to remark that the situation had changed during the progress of the war itself, and that sentiments had been aroused which, a decade ago, had not existed.

Nevertheless, the Greek Prime Minister pooh-poohed the idea that any serious trouble could possibly arise from the expulsion of the Turk, and he argued that the war would be thrown away if the opportunity was lost to get rid of this running sore.

In his view, another reason for the setting up of an international administration in Constantinople was that this was the only form of Government which could successfully withstand, at some future date, the ambitions of a resuscitated Russia. If either the British or the French were to assume the mandate, they would certainly find themselves involved, some day or other, in a bitter conflict with the secular aspirations of the Russian people. On the other hand, an international administration would be in a position to resist Russian encroachment.

When I asked whether M. Venizelos had considered the possibility of combining with the institution of some such administration the retention of the Sultan and his court in Constantinople, he said that he had not the slightest objection to such a solution. He thought the capital of Turkey ought to be removed to Brussa, on the other side of the Straits; but there was no reason why the Sultan should not retain his palaces and buildings, and even reside from time to time in Constantinople, if he cared to do so. It should be quite possible also to draw a ring round the principal mosques, which might remain under Turkish administration. The real business of Government would be conducted in Asia Minor, but the simulacrum of power and prestige (so long as it was unaccompanied by authority) might be allowed to remain in Europe.

I could not help thinking that, in the long argument which he developed

on these lines, the Greek Prime Minister had in view, more than anything else, a hope for the expansion of his own people. British, French, or Russians in Constantinople might close the door for ever to the ambitions of Greece, but it might be that, at some future date, an international administration (always a difficult thing to maintain) would be glad to hand over the reins of power to those who would be the numerical majority both in the city and in its neighbourhood. This idea was not expressed, but M. Venizelos is so ardent a patriot and so far-sighted a politician that I could not but feel sure that it lurked in his mind, even if it did not find expression on his lips.

I had expected him to say something about the position of the Greeks in Smyrna, and had made up my mind that, if he did so, I would be candid in my reply. He did not, however, perhaps fortunately, raise the subject, and I abstained from entering upon so troubled a field.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> During his visit to England M. Venizelos had similar conversations with Lord Hardinge, Mr. Harmsworth, and Mr. Kidston. Mr. Kidston recorded that in his conversation with M. Venizelos on the afternoon of October 20, 1919, the latter had spoken of the future of Constantinople in terms closely similar to those reported by Lord Curzon. Mr. Kidston further noted that 'M. Venizelos then went on to say that it was absolutely necessary to crush Mustapha Kemal's movement. It was quite clearly the resurrection of the Committee of Union and Progress in a new form and Europe could not afford to hand over Turkey again to the Young Turks and to pan-Islamism. But if anything was to be done it must be done quickly. Mustapha Kemal had at present no effective organised army, but he soon would have one if he were not crushed. At present the British, the French and the Greeks had forces enough in the East to deal with him, but this would not be the case for very long. When the Treaty with Bulgaria was finally concluded he would have to demobilise half the Greek army. I said that it would be difficult to persuade public opinion in this country to begin the war with Turkey all over again, and that our great object was to bring back as many of our troops as possible from the East with the least possible delay. To this he replied that the Greek army was still strong, with magnificent material and under the supreme command of a British General would want comparatively little assistance from other sources. I did not venture to dispute this opinion, and told M. Venizelos that I could only report what he had said to me.'

No. 559

*Earl Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)*

No. 441 Telegraphic [144923/106756/44]

ATHENS, October 21, 1919

I have just seen in . . .<sup>1</sup> sections your telegram No. 1172<sup>2</sup> to Astoria of September 23rd.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain. The reference was probably to 'telegram sections': cf. No. 171, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram, subsequently modified and sent as Foreign Office despatch No. 6207 of September 24, 1919, to the British Delegation in Paris, inquired what reply should be made to a request from the Admiralty for advice concerning the proposed attribution of the islands of Lemnos, Tenedos and Imbros since, if they were not to be promptly handed over to Greece, it would be necessary to construct winter quarters for the British garrisons. In reply Sir E. Crowe, in his despatch No. 1876 of September 29 (received October 2), expressed the views transmitted in document No. 568.

Although it was decided at Ambassadors Conference in London<sup>3</sup> that Tenedos and Imbros were to be returned to Turkey Lemnos was to remain Greek; since M. Venezelos formed Provisional Government at Salonica Greek civil authorities have been allowed to administer all these islands under supervision of British military authorities; I venture to urge that in the circumstances refusal now to cede these islands to Greeks would come as a most unexpected blow (?) to Greece and would at once annihilate all pro-British (?) feelings which are now so strong.

<sup>3</sup> See G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley: *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914* (London, 1925 f.), vol. ix, part ii, p. 825.

No. 560

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard (Rome)*

No. 658 [144898/707/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 22, 1919

Sir,

The Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised three points.

He was very much concerned at the opposition of Sir Eyre Crowe, in the Supreme Council in Paris, to the proposal to include Italian troops amongst those occupying the Aidin district,<sup>1</sup> and wished me to telegraph instructions to him to take up a less rigid attitude on the point, which involved Italian *amour-propre*, and on which the majority, if not the whole, of the other Allied representatives were against him.

I said that I was familiar only from telegraphic reports with the attitude taken up by Sir Eyre Crowe, but that I thought it was due to the essential difference between the military position in Asia Minor of the Italians on the one hand and of the Greeks on the other. The Greek troops had been invited to Smyrna with the knowledge and by the act of the Supreme Council. I myself thought that this was the greatest mistake that had been made in Paris, and that it was the starting point of most of the troubles which had since ensued. But, whether the step was right or wrong, the Greek troops had appeared upon the scene with sanction from the Powers, and they could justify their presence by that authority. On the other hand, the Italians, by their descent upon Adalia, Scala Nuova, and other places without the invitation or authority of the Paris Council, had alienated public opinion and put themselves in the wrong. It was not surprising, therefore, that our representative should not be inclined to encourage, still less to expand, an intrusion which had taken place under such conditions.

The Ambassador replied by attributing the Adalia move to the mistaken policy of Baron Sonnino, who had now fallen, but said that a sufficient justification for it could be found in a statement which had been made by Mr. Balfour in the Foreign Office in the autumn of 1917 at a Conference concerning the future Allied spheres in Asia Minor—a Conference in which M. Cambon and the Italian Ambassador himself had taken part. It was

<sup>1</sup> See also No. 87.

true that the actual arrangements proposed at this Conference had come to nothing, but it had been followed by a letter from Mr. Balfour, which admitted in the most ungrudging terms the Italian claims in Asia Minor, and which the Italian Government looked upon as their justification for anything they had since done in that region.<sup>2</sup>

As I had never seen this communication, I could not, without further study, express any opinion about it.

The next point raised by the Ambassador was with regard to the latest proposal with regard to Fiume,<sup>3</sup> which had been brought to Paris by Signor Tittoni within the last few days.

As I had not yet seen this proposal, I was unable to discuss it.

The Ambassador, however, represented that it was the supreme and maximum act of concession to which his Government could agree. He felt sure that it would be accepted by all the Allies, with the possible exception of America; and he urged me strongly—if, after reading it, I approved of its character—to telegraph to Lord Grey to use all his influence in favour of its being accepted in Washington.

His Excellency, without alluding to the recent incident between our two Governments arising out of the Fiume communiqué in the Italian press,<sup>4</sup> descended upon the sensitive and agitated condition of his countrymen, who suspected hostility and opposition at every turn; and he earnestly pleaded that, in the course of the forthcoming visit of General Diaz, some statement of a generous nature with regard to the aspirations of Italy should be made by the Prime Minister or some other Government spokesman, in order to restore matters to a proper footing.

Speaking of the long delay in the negotiation of the Turkish Peace, he expressed a strong desire that it should be taken in hand without further delay, and he flattered me by the remark that, if the matter were left in his hands and mine, he was confident that we could, so far as our respective countries were concerned, settle the whole thing in a week.

I asked him whether he thought that, if a suggestion were made to take up the question at an early date in London, Signor Tittoni would find any difficulty in coming here.

He answered in the negative, and seemed thoroughly to realise the importance of an early solution.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>2</sup> See No. 573.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 87, note 3.

<sup>4</sup> See Chap. I.

### No. 561

*Colonel Meinertzhang (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 25)*

*No. 483 Telegraphic [145744/521/44]*

*CAIRO, October 22, 1919*

Following from my political officer Damascus. Begins—  
Both Zeid and Chief Administrator inform me there is entente between

(? Mustafa) Kemal and the Italians in Konia and (? Kemal) will recognise Italian occupation of specified areas in return for moral support against the Greeks. Ends.

No. 562

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received November 7)*

*No. 1958 [149580/6490/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 22, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter received from Captain S. E. Wiles, British Controller of Enemy Banks, enclosing copy of a letter received from the Deutsche Bank regarding an agreement entered into with the Banca Italiana di Sconto.

2. I also enclose copy of a confidential report by Captain Wiles on the relations between the German and Italian Banks.

3. I would request that I may receive Your Lordship's instructions whether the arrangements in question should be allowed to be carried out, or whether steps should be taken to delay them while the Interallied Control continues.

4. The matter appears to show that there is every probability that the Germans will have regained their banking supremacy in Italy within a very short time.<sup>1</sup>

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 562

*Captain Wiles to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck*

INTER-ALLIED BANK CONTROL,

DEUTSCHE BANK,

CONSTANTINOPLE, Oct. 18, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter that has been received to-day from the Deutsche Bank. I also enclose my confidential report on the same subject as that referred to in the above mentioned letter.

<sup>1</sup> In this connexion His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome was asked in Foreign Office despatch No. 727 of November 17, 1919, to Rome to report upon German influence in regard to Italian banking. Sir G. Buchanan replied in Rome despatch No. 35 of January 16, 1920 (received January 23):

'It would appear that no very direct influence is being exercised at the present moment, though Directors of German Banks have visited Rome, and it is on record that a small Bank was approached indirectly with a view to acting as agents of the Deutsche Bank. There seems to be no tendency at the moment for working agreements to be established between individual Italian and German Banks, nor are German Directors as yet reassuming their places on the boards of Italian Banks.'

'Payments to Germany are effected by all Banks alike.'

'In connection with the Banco di Roma, it may be borne in mind that this is, nominally at any rate, a Catholic Bank, and, as such, is likely to come in touch with the Catholic portion of the late enemy states.'

It is pointed out that the Deutsche Bank has entered into an agreement with regard to the Constantinople branch (which is still under Allied control) without having in any way consulted the controllers and that we are merely asked to take note of an accomplished fact. It would appear impossible for the transfer to be prevented permanently but if it is considered advisable it could be postponed for some time by referring the matter to Berlin before the consent of the High Commissioners is given. The French controller has to-day sent a copy of the letter of the Deutsche Bank to his High Commissioner with a covering letter in the same sense as this.

I have, &c.

G. [sic] E. WILES

Capt.

British Controller of  
Enemy Banks and Concerns

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 562

*Deutsche Bank to the Interallied Financial Control, Constantinople*

Copie.

Messieurs,

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 18 octobre 1919

Nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que par suite d'une entente intervenue entre le Siège Social de la Deutsche Bank et le Directeur de la Banca Italiana di Sconto, le local occupé par la Deutsche Bank Filiale Konstantinopel, sis Rue Voivoda, Galata, a été donné en bail avec tout le mobilier, coffres, etc. y contenus à la Banque Italienne précitée.

Les bureaux de la Deutsche Bank Filiale Konstantinopel seront transférés dans un certain nombre de pièces, affectées à ses besoins dans l'immeuble adjacent sous le nom de Gumuchlu Han, appartenant à la succession du prince héritier défunt Youssouf Izzeddine Effendi.

Nous vous prions de vouloir bien prendre note de ce qui précède et d'agrérer, Messieurs, nos salutations distinguées.

DEUTSCHE BANK FILIALE KONSTANTINOPEL

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 562

*Report by Captain Wiles to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck*

Sir,

I have the honour to report as follows:—

One of the Directors of the Deutsche Bank, Constantinople, during the war was a certain Mr. Rossi, an Italian subject. He did a good deal of valuable work for the Germans during that time chiefly in the matter of their exchange operations and, presumably on account of his nationality, was left in charge of the Bank when the Germans evacuated the town. During the earlier period of the control of the Bank he proved to be rather an obstructionist and I believe that Mr. Wyatt, the British Controller at that time, reported to the High Commission to that effect, and suggested that his services should be dispensed with.

Mr. Rossi left Constantinople in June last saying that he was going on leave to Italy. He was absent about two months and it is understood that during that time he went to Berlin to consult with the Head Office of the Deutsche Bank. On his return he stated that he had been appointed Director of the Constantinople Branch of the Banca Italiana di Sconto and that he would be commencing business for them shortly in premises near Galata Bridge. Early in September he went again to Italy returning here on 14th October. He stated that he had obtained an authority from the Deutsche Bank Berlin to continue to look after their interests and also to take over their premises, partly or wholly, on behalf of the Banca Italiana di Sconto. He proposes to carry on the business of the Banca Italiana di Sconto in a part of the Deutsche Bank premises and to relegate the business of the Deutsche Bank to a few rooms. He also proposed to take over part of the staff of the Deutsche Bank who remain including the late Director of their Stamboul Branch and some other heads of Departments.

By this arrangement the Deutsche Bank will continue to have a footing here where they will be able to resume operations at a later date if they desire.

The position then will be as follows:—

The late Director of the Deutsche Bank now also Director of a competing Bank has been authorised by the Deutsche Bank to continue to look after the interests of the Deutsche Bank and at the same time to occupy their premises on behalf of the competing Bank. It is certain that superficially he should be the most powerful competitor of the Deutsche Bank being in the most favourable position possible to take from them the most valuable part of their clientele. It is incredible that the Deutsche Bank can have made these arrangements unless there is a very thorough understanding between them and the Banca Italiana di Sconto and to my mind the only possible solution is that the Deutsche Bank is, in effect, to be carried on under the shelter of an Italian name.

It is worthy of note that the above is not the only instance tending to show that a good understanding exists between Italian Banking interests and those of the Central Powers. For example, the Banco di Roma have made arrangements by which they have taken over the businesses of the Banque Hongroise in Constantinople and Smyrna; also the late Director of the Wiener Bankverein here is now Director of the Banca Commerciale Italiano recently established here.

I have, &c.  
G. E. WILES

### No. 563

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)*

*No. 1475 Telegraphic [144574/50535/44]*

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1919

Your telegram No. 1887.<sup>1</sup>

I spoke to Secretary of State today and he entirely confirmed impression

<sup>1</sup> No. 550.

I had already conveyed to Your Excellency that there is no chance whatever of Congress authorizing acceptance of Mandates for Constantinople &c.

### No. 564

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 24)*

*No. 1481 Telegraphic [145246/50535/44]*

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1919

I think that I should inform Your Lordship of (? purport of) conversation which I have had since I sent my telegram No. 1475<sup>1</sup> of yesterday.

Mr. Morgenthau thinks after Senate has ratified treaty it may be possible for him with help of General Harbord to create a wave of idealism in favour of Mandate for Constantinople and Armenia.

He intends to embark on campaign for this purpose directly after ratification of Treaty. He suggests Anglo-American or International control of Straits of Gibraltar to show that America is invited to full partnership of East. In return for this he says America should agree to similar control of Panama Canal.

Mr. Elkus, late United States Ambassador, Constantinople, has with Mr. Smith who saw Your Lordship in London,<sup>2</sup> urged possibility of American people being roused to accept mandate for Armenia. Mr. Smith was very vehement as to our leaving that region meanwhile and when I replied that we must go and have already gone replied that we were keeping troops at Batoum and urged that we should let impression spread that country would not be finally abandoned pending decision of Paris Conference and that a British ship of war might cruise round Black Sea and occasionally drill a few marines on shore.

If this can be done it would be desirable. There will apparently be an attempt to get up campaign in this country on behalf of Armenia. I have said we cannot remain and I have protested against (? fix)ing on us any responsibility for what happens there but anything we can do to show goodwill and produce moral effect will be useful and not to do what is possible, however small, will be injurious.

<sup>1</sup> No. 563.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume III, No. 388.

### No. 565

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe  
(Paris. Received October 25)*

*No. 186 Telegraphic [342/1/9/19876]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 23, 1919

Paris telegram No. 152 [? 52],<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 1156.<sup>1</sup> Colonel Haskell left here October 22 on board H.M.S. *Hussar* for Taranto *en route* for Paris; he has been delayed here owing to very severe illness of his

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

wife. He informs me that General Harbord appears to have gathered totally erroneous impression of state of things in Anatolia and Caucasia especially as regards present state of security and well-being of Armenians both of which he appears to consider excellent and despatch of Allied troops unnecessary.

Colonel Haskell has derived an entirely different impression and one with which I am fully in accord namely that situation is extremely precarious, that presence of Allied troops will be indispensable before repatriation of Armenians can commence, and that delay in announcing peace terms is having worst possible effect.

He has letter for Sir E. Crowe.

### No. 566

*Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador in London<sup>1</sup>*

No. 141416/ME/44 [141416/13/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 23, 1919

Your Excellency:—

With reference to the note No. 108816/M.E.44<sup>2</sup> which I had the honour to address to you on the 7th August last, relative to the question of affording financial assistance to the Ottoman Government, I have now to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople has recently reported on the serious financial difficulties met with by the Turkish Government in carrying on the public services, and has stated that a sum of three million Turkish pounds per month is necessary in order to meet urgent requirements such as the pay of the army, the salaries of the civil service, pensions, etc.<sup>3</sup>

2. Admiral de Robeck states that he has been in consultation with his French and Italian colleagues, and, as a consequence, the three High Commissioners have decided to propose to their respective Governments to advance the above-mentioned sum to the Turkish Government, each Allied Government participating equally.

3. His Majesty's Government have given this proposal their careful consideration, but in view of the uncertainty as to the future limits of the Ottoman Empire, the method of Government which is to be sanctioned for the territory remaining under Turkish sovereignty, and the fact of the financial situation of the country being such as to render the repayment of any loan very difficult for a very long period, they have come to the conclusion that it would be extremely difficult to justify the issue, from the British Exchequer, of a loan to an enemy State, under the conditions of financial exigency at present prevailing in this country.

4. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government propose to inform Admiral de Robeck that they cannot contemplate giving any financial assistance to the Turkish Government during the present state of war.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of this note were sent to His Majesty's Representatives in Paris and Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. For the more important part of this communication see note 4 below.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 520.

5. In bringing this decision to Your Excellency's notice, I would wish to invite reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the note I had the honour to address to you on the 7th August last,<sup>4</sup> and to express the hope that Your Excellency's Government will consider the advisability of informing the French High Commissioner at Constantinople in a similar sense.

6. I am addressing a similar note to the Italian Ambassador.

I have, &c.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Paragraph 2 of this note drew attention to 'the policy which, as Your Excellency is aware, has consistently been advocated by H.M.G. since the conclusion of the Armistice with Turkey, namely, that the financial status of Turkey is a matter which should be treated by the Allied Powers conjointly and that no financial support should be given to Turkey by any one of the Allied Powers independently of the others.'

'3. I venture therefore to express to Your Excellency the hope that any demands for financial assistance which may be made by Turks to the French Government or to French financial Institutions may be treated in the same way.'

<sup>5</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

### No. 567

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

No. 1577 Telegraphic [134310/521/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 26, 1919

Your telegram No. 1858<sup>1</sup> (of September 23rd—political situation in Turkey).

War Office propose to instruct General Milne that force should not be used to support civil administration along Anatolian railway, and that all detachments should be withdrawn if their maintenance would mean danger of their being involved in open hostility with Nationalists. I am concurring.

<sup>1</sup> No. 521.

### No. 568

*Earl Curzon to Earl Granville (Athens)*

No. 438 Telegraphic [144923/106756/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 27, 1919

Your telegram No. 441<sup>1</sup> (of October 21st—Imbros, Tenedos and Lemnos). Following view with which I agree was expressed by Peace Delegation.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of Allied occupation of Mudros in 1914 and of explanations then made to justify occupation, Lemnos can well be regarded as having been Greek before present war. Imbros and Tenedos on other hand were expressly excluded by Ambassadors' Conference from among islands to be ceded to Greece, and they have in fact always been regarded as appertaining to power holding sovereignty over Constantinople and Straits.

We have every right to make any arrangements which are convenient in regard to Lemnos. But although it is hoped that Imbros and Tenedos will be eventually ceded to Greece we should not be justified in taking action such as to prejudice their ultimate disposal.

Despatch<sup>3</sup> follows.

<sup>1</sup> No. 559.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 559, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

No. 569

*Memorandum from the Italian Ambassador in London*

(Received October 29)<sup>1</sup>

No. 3266 [147367/70100/44]

*Translation.*

The Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry into the occupation of Smyrna and environs proposed, amongst other things, the replacement of Greek by Allied troops.

Although it is not yet settled when the conclusions of this Commission will be presented to the Supreme Council, Senator Tittoni nevertheless desires the British Government to be informed that, should the Supreme Council be disposed to accept the proposals of the Commission, he would not be able to agree to the exclusion of Italian troops from the inter-Allied occupation as happened in the recent case of Aidin. In such eventuality Senator Tittoni would be obliged to refuse his vote; and it is certain that the British Government realise the irreparable impression which would be produced on Italian public opinion by a second proposal for the exclusion of Italian troops, a proposal which would certainly be considered as an unjust and scarcely friendly step.

The above is of course without prejudice to the definitive solution of the whole question.

LONDON, Oct. 28, 1919.

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was handed to Lord Hardinge by the Marquis Imperiali on October 29, 1919.

No. 570

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Mr. Wellesley<sup>1</sup>*

No. 385/3/3/19917 [149374/83418/44]

PARIS, October 28, 1919

Dear Wellesley,

In your official despatch No. 7196<sup>2</sup> (143299/M.E. 44) of October 18th, I am asked to suggest the terms of a reply to Admiral Webb as to the probable date of the announcement of the terms of peace with Turkey.

The Foreign Office of course know as well as I do that the Supreme Council has decided not to discuss the Turkish settlement until President Wilson announces the American policy regarding mandates. Lord Curzon has suggested, on the other hand, the negotiation of a Turkish settlement as soon as

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain but was not later than November 4.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch drew attention to a passage in Constantinople telegram No. 1970 of October 18, 1919 (received October 19: not printed), concerning the repatriation of Turkish prisoners in which 'Admiral Webb seems to believe that the announcement of the terms of peace with Turkey "is now only a matter of weeks or of two months at most". To avoid the danger of the High Commissioner remaining under a misapprehension that there is a likelihood of an early settlement, I would request you to suggest the terms in which a reply upon this point might be sent to him.'

possible in London. I am, however, quite in the dark as to the prospect of this being accomplished, and clearly the Foreign Office are much better qualified than I can possibly be to form an opinion on which must depend the answer to Admiral Webb. But it is awkward for me to put all this in an official despatch and the question put to me in yours has thus placed me in a position of great embarrassment.

Yours always,  
EYRE A. CROWE

No. 571

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

No. 650 [144283/521/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 29, 1919

Sir,

I have received and read with great interest Admiral Webb's valuable despatch No. 1836<sup>1</sup> of October 10th which I am communicating together with his despatch No. 1535<sup>2</sup> of August 27th to His Majesty's Representatives at the principal Allied capitals in order that they may be informed of the altered conditions which the delay in arriving at a settlement with Turkey has produced.

I think it only right to inform you that I see no prospect of the conclusion of peace with Turkey within the period contemplated by Admiral Webb in the last paragraph of his despatch under reference.

I am, &c.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 543.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See No. 543, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

No. 572

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 7289 [145162/275/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 30, 1919

Sir,

The Prime Minister is receiving numerous telegraphic appeals from Moslems in all parts of India with regard to the Turkish settlement. Some of the senders are apparently reconciled to the loss of the Arab countries, but the majority appear to demand the retention by Turkey of the Arabian Peninsula on account of the Holy Places.

The originals of these appeals are being transmitted to the India Office, who are best able to judge how far the movement is spontaneous.

My own opinion is that this pan-Islamic agitation is being engineered from this country by Sheikh Kidwai<sup>1</sup> and his associates.

I am, &c.,  
[(for Earl Curzon of Kedleston)  
V. WELLESLEY]<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of the Central Islamic Society.

<sup>2</sup> Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

*Letter from Sir J. Tilley to the Italian Ambassador in London*

No. 144898/M.E.44 [144898/707/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 31, 1919

My dear Ambassador:—

In the course of your conversation with Lord Curzon on the 22nd instant<sup>1</sup> you referred to a letter written to you by Mr. Balfour, subsequently to the Conference held at the Foreign Office in the autumn of 1917 to discuss the question of the future Allied spheres in Asia Minor, which, Your Excellency stated, had come to be regarded by the Italian Government as their justification for their actions in Asia Minor since that date.

Except for Mr. Balfour's official note to Your Excellency of August 18th,<sup>2</sup> confirming the terms of what is known as the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, we have been unable to trace any communication corresponding with this description. If this note is not the document to which Your Excellency was referring, I should be very grateful if you could let me have particulars, or even a copy, of any other letter which Mr. Balfour may have sent Your Excellency on the subject.

Believe me, &amp;c.

[J. A. C. TILLEY]<sup>3</sup><sup>1</sup> See No. 560.<sup>2</sup> See Introductory Note.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy. No written reply from the Italian Embassy to this letter has been traced. On November 3, 1919, however, Lord Hardinge minuted as follows to Lord Curzon:

'I obtained from the Italian Ambassador the letter from Mr. Balfour respecting Asia Minor to which he referred in conversation with you. I attach a copy of it.

'You will see that it was given in the spring and not the autumn of 1917. H.'

The attached copy of Mr. Balfour's letter to the Italian Ambassador read as follows:

'Private

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 12, 1917

My dear Ambassador,

'You expressed an earnest desire when we last met that the negotiations with regard to the proposed Italian sphere of influence in Asia Minor should be expedited [cf. No. 6, note 14]. I entirely share your wishes upon this point; but I cannot think that the negotiators in London have been wholly to blame for any delays that may have occurred. These are due partly to the inherent difficulty of the subject and perhaps in an even greater degree to its history.

'With the earlier chapters of that history, I am not immediately concerned. If there were episodes in them which gave umbrage to the Italian Government, I very greatly regret it; but I do not propose to deal with them now. In any case, they are past and over, and the only problem before us is how to meet with a full measure of justice the Italian claims based upon the 9th Article of the London Treaty of April 1915.

'As the Italian Government point out, the 9th article aimed at three objects; the maintenance of the principle of equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean; the concession to Italy of an equitable "or proportional" zone of influence; and the allocation of this zone to regions adjacent to Adalia, where Italy already possesses important rights.

'It cannot be said that the Treaty is so happily worded as to make dispute as to its meaning impossible. "Equilibrium in the Mediterranean" is a phrase which might easily lend itself to controversy, and the words "equitable", "équitable" and "congrua" which respectively

in English, French and Italian are used to describe the relation which the Italian zone ought to bear to the zones of the other Treaty Powers, may obviously be made the subject of endless disputation. For my own part, however, I find it difficult to doubt that what was aimed at by the Contracting Powers was that, between the spheres of influence assigned to Italy and France in the Eastern Mediterranean, there should be a rough equality; and it is this object I have anxiously sought to further.

'I claim no authority for this interpretation, which is a purely personal one. But I believe it to be in general harmony with the view entertained by Baron Sonnino and it was in that belief that at the first Ambassadorial meeting [cf. No. 6, note 14], I proposed to have traced out a zone of influence for Italy which, while equal to that assigned to France, should not interfere with it. I was distressed to find that a suggestion, which I had supposed would be agreeable to all parties, was not one which you thought yourself at liberty to discuss. Your objection, or the objection of your Government, was not founded, as I understood it, upon the view that the proposed sphere was not large enough to be "equitable"; for this clearly would have been a matter for friendly debate, not for blank negation. It was founded rather upon the idea that, since the Italian Note laid claim to certain specified regions (already in part assigned to the French) this proposal and no other should have been chosen as the starting point of the Ambassadorial negotiations. But am I unreasonable in thinking that, since we met together for the express purpose of carrying out the Treaty of London, no scheme which endeavoured to conform to that Treaty should have been ruled out of court?

'Believe me, I am not saying this by way of complaint. It is rather to explain the slow development of the negotiations, which have thus been hampered from the very beginning. I gladly recognise that by sending in, with the consent of Baron Sonnino, your private Memorandum dealing with the proposed Italian sphere, you have materially contributed to the future progress of our work.

'In accordance with my promise to you, I now venture to make a few comments upon your paper, which may serve at least to show that in submitting my proposal to the Conference no injustice was intended to Italy.

'In attempting to estimate the comparative value of different zones, it may perhaps be that the British and the Italian politicians start from principles which are not in perfect agreement. Were we in the position of your countrymen I have little doubt that we should prefer the proposed Italian sphere to that which on historical grounds has been assigned to the French. Italy has a large surplus population, well skilled in the practice of Mediterranean agriculture. In the south-west of Anatolia, this population will find a soil and a climate admirably suited to its needs and its habits, with a better climate than the regions to the eastward, and much nearer both to the Mother-country from which they come and the markets for which they cater. If colonisation be one of the ends which Italian statesmen have in view, there is no part of the world where (as it seems to me) it could be more successfully secured than in the proposed Italian sphere.

'You hold, however, as I understand it, that, in comparing values of the two areas, you should consider, not so much what can be made of them in the future as what has already been made of them in the past. You dwell, for example, upon the fact that, in the French sphere, there is the well equipped port of Beirut and a railway system in working order; and you seem to think that, in the matter of ports and railways, all the advantages whether present or future are with the French, and all the disadvantages with the Italians. But is this really so?

'Let me observe, in the first place, that Beirut has been made what it is entirely by French enterprise, and that both port and railway are due to the investment of French capital. I do not think that this consideration can properly be ignored, nor do I think that, on reflection, you would desire to ignore it. But it is not the most important point that has to be kept in view. Beirut, the only well equipped port in the French sphere, is small and cannot be enlarged. Alexandretta has great potentialities, but is at present not a port at all; it lies in a very bad climate; much time and money will be required for its development; and even when it is developed it will by Treaty be a free port on equal terms to the commerce

of all nations. Mersina is a roadstead, sheltered indeed from many winds, but exposed to the south west and the east-south-east; and, though it may be fairly adequate to its present trade, is scarcely capable of important development.

'These are all the harbours worth mentioning (except Agen Bay) which exist, or which can be made, in the French sphere. In the proposed Italian sphere the case is very different. The coast is rich in natural havens, I should think one of the richest in the world. I asked the Hydrographer of the Navy to send me a list of them without explaining the use to which I intended to put it. I enclose it [not enclosed in filed copy] for Your Excellency's information. It is instructive to observe that after describing nine natural harbours all of which lie within the Italian sphere, he incidentally observes of Adalia and Mersina (the ports on this coast of which we have heard the most) that "they are open roadsteads with considerable trade but in no sense harbours"! If Italy is to restore to south-eastern Anatolia its former prosperity, it is not through imperfect channels like these that a sea-borne trade must flow.

'If I turn from Your Excellency's comments on the harbours of the proposed Italian zone to its railways, there are some further observations to be made.

'Your Excellency complains that the solitary railway actually working in the Italian zone represents for the moment at all events a sort of fetter (*servitū*) belonging as it does to a foreign company, and you compare the situation thus created with the happier conditions which prevail in the zone assigned to the French.

'But if the absence of railways be an evil, and their presence (if foreign owned) be a "servitude", the position is without remedy; for Italian Railways do not as yet exist.

'Surely, however, matters are not so bad as this line of thought would seem to indicate.

'In the first place the Baghdad Railway runs through the Italian sphere, the Aidin Railway is almost wholly within it, and the latter, paying a substantial dividend which it earns from its own traffic and does not extract from the Turkish taxpayer through the machinery of a kilometric guarantee, shows what can be done by energy and enterprise in south-west Anatolia even under Turkish rule. Under Italian administration, and with the help of Italian industry the railway system would be linked up with the ports, and carry Italian goods to Italian ships, would depend not on through traffic from foreign regions but on the productive energies of Italian industry exercised in lands under Italian control.

'Of the mines I have little to say. Your Excellency thinks the Argana mine in the French zone is worth all the mines to be found in the Italian zone. You may be right, though this is not the opinion of the experts whom I have had an opportunity of consulting. There must always be a doubt about the value of imperfectly explored mineral resources which does not attach to the fertility of the soil or the security of harbours. By all means let us make further investigations and try and arrive at a trustworthy conclusion. I ask for no more.

'So much I have been obliged to say in defence of a suggestion which seemed and still seems to me not unworthy of consideration, however much discussion may show that it requires amendment. May I add one word before concluding this long letter. The first principle which the Italian Government find in the 9th Article of the Treaty of London is the maintenance of equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean. Can it be suggested that under this head the Italians are not likely to gain in the end much more than the equitable or "congrua" share to which they are entitled?

'What are the elements which, in the hands of a maritime people, confer influence in any particular region? Surely the possession of convenient harbours supplied and supported by an hinterland which is friendly and prosperous. If, in addition, these harbours and this hinterland are close to the parent-country with no greater Power lying between, so much the greater will be the influence which they will naturally be able to secure.

'Estimate on these principles the relative positions that, as time goes on, will be occupied under the proposed arrangement by England, France, and Italy, in the Eastern Mediterranean. England will possess Egypt with one port, and Cyprus with no port at all. France will possess Beirut, the free port of Alexandretta, and the roadstead of Mersina. The territories served by these ports is without doubt valuable; but the populations by which they are occupied, however loyal, contented and prosperous, can never be British or French by

religion and race; nor can the bonds uniting them to the protecting Powers be as close and intimate as those connecting Italy with the men of Italian birth who will make their homes in southern Anatolia.

'That in such circumstances Italy will possess a superiority in the local conditions which make for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to me certain. And assuredly this is not matter for regret. Before the Byzantine Empire was overwhelmed by the Ottoman invader Italian cities led western civilisation in Eastern waters. If this war should break the power of the Turk, I should rejoice that a united Italy should bear a great share in restoring to civilisation the neighbouring lands which the Turk has so long laid waste. I find it hard to believe that an ample opportunity for fulfilling this high destiny would not be given by the zone of influence which has been tentatively proposed; I find it hard to believe that in itself it is not equal, and that from an Italian point of view it is not far superior, to the zone which, on historical grounds, has been assigned to the French. I may be wrong, but at least let us have an opportunity of discussing the question. I have no right to speak for our allies. But speaking for His Majesty's Government I can most truly assure your Excellency that we should view the growth of Italian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean not only without jealousy but with sympathy and satisfaction. We greatly hope that the war, and the peace which follows the war, will enable these aspirations to be soon fulfilled.

'Pray believe me,

'Yours very sincerely,

'(Signed) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR'

Lord Curzon minuted on this letter as follows: 'I find myself in the unhappy position of disagreeing with almost every proposition in Mr. Balfour's letter which I consider to have been both uncalled for and deplorable. C. 3/11/19.'

## No. 574

*The Italian Ambassador in London to Earl Curzon*

(Received November 5)

No. 3291 [148728/13/44]

LONDON, October 31, 1919

[Translation]

My Lord,

With reference to your note of October 23 last, No. 141416/M.E./44,<sup>1</sup> respecting the question of financial assistance to the Ottoman Government from the three Allied Powers, I have the honour to state that the Italian Government share the opinion of the British Government in this matter.

I have at the same time the honour to inform Your Lordship that the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople has already been furnished with instructions in conformity with the above.

I have, &c.  
IMPERIALI

<sup>1</sup> See No. 566, paragraph 6.

No. 575

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*No. 1325 Telegraphic [146937/70100/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 3, 1919

Your telegram 1418.<sup>1</sup>

French Ambassador informs me that French Government cannot spare any troops to take part in Allied occupation of Meander valley and that French High Commissioner at Constantinople has been so informed.

<sup>1</sup> No. 536.

No. 576

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)*

*No. 839 Telegraphic [145788/70100/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 4, 1919

In view of spread of Nationalist movement in Anatolia General Milne has been authorised to withdraw detachments guarding Anatolian Railway at his discretion if this step becomes necessary to avoid any conflict with Nationalist forces.

Please inform Italian Government accordingly adding that Italian detachment at Konia is considered to be covered by these instructions and that General Milne has been so informed.

If Italian Government raise any objection you should refer them to meeting in Paris on March 21st between Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino<sup>1</sup> at which it was decided that the despatch of Italian troops to Konia was in no way connected with the proposed landing at Adalia and that if troops were sent to the former place they would be under General Allenby's orders (it was subsequently pointed out to Peace Delegation that Konia was in General Milne's area and not in General Allenby's).

<sup>1</sup> See No. 6, note 15.

No. 577

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

*No. 1727 Telegraphic [143299/83418/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 4, 1919

Your telegram No. 1970<sup>1</sup> (of 18th October—political situation).

It is not safe to base any action on assumption that early announcement of peace terms may be expected. Efforts are being made to get this question taken up as soon as possible, but delay of United States in deciding as to mandates coupled with illness of President has made it very unlikely that any definite terms of peace can be announced for some time to come.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 570, note 2.

No. 578

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received November 14)*

*No. 2066 [152025/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 4, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that a few days ago I visited the Sublime Porte in order to return the visit of Mustapha Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. There was nothing of particular interest in the conversation, except that I took the opportunity to question him as to the accuracy of a report I had seen in that morning's paper, to the effect that Mustapha Kemal had telegraphed to the Government demanding that the new Parliament should be summoned to meet at Broussa, and not at Constantinople, so that in conducting their deliberations they might be free from certain undesirable foreign influences. His Excellency hastened to assure me that he knew nothing of any such message. I suggested that if the idea were adopted it would imply the practical transference of the capital to Broussa, but Reshid Pasha explained that the constitution provided for the event of the Parliament being held in any part of the country, and on my further enquiring whether the Sultan would proceed to Broussa to inaugurate the new Chamber, he hastened to reply that the basic law provided for this eventuality also. His Excellency was evidently much perturbed at the insinuation I had made to him, and which I have no doubt whatever is correct—in fact it has received confirmation by the present moment—that Mustapha Kemal has made such a proposal, and in very strong terms.

2. I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which has been written by Mr. Hohler on the question of the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople. I am entirely in concurrence with his views.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 578

*Memorandum by Mr. Hohler*

The idea of convening the Turkish Parliament at Broussa is perhaps one which may be contemplated with favour. We here are in entire ignorance of the real intentions, which at the time of writing may already have become decisions of the Peace Conference, but it must be permitted to believe that the Turkish Empire will be whittled down to Asia Minor, and not even very probably to the entirety of that; that the vast regions of Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Thrace, and the islands will pass under another rule; whilst compliance with an interpretation of the Wilsonian principles may result in the formation of Greek and Kurdish independent States in the West and in the East; and that the Grand Seigneur, whose pompous titles used to fill the first two pages of any treaty he thought fit to conclude, will be reduced to the

status of a petty provincial ruler, with a certain dubious title to a religious leadership.

2. The city of Constantinople is Imperial, both by its geographical position and its historical traditions, and not in all its annals, except in the times of the Palæologi, has it been reduced to such a state of impotence and wretchedness as now. Only in the last few months the writ of its rulers practically could not run beyond its walls, and of the very buildings in Stamboul it may be safely stated that nearly two-thirds lie in ruins, the result of the devastating fires that have occurred during the last few years. Pera and Galata have remained comparatively unscathed, but these districts are the homes of a cosmopolitan crowd, which gives its character to the town far more than does the Turkish population—comprised largely of refugees huddled together in the mosques and medresses<sup>1</sup> and glad to find shelter in any of the old vaults of Byzantium which have become exposed by the flames. It seems unsuitable that the ruler of a third-rate kingdom in Asia should still possess so great a capital, the very upkeep of which is beyond his means as is being proved at this very time; it is as if a petty landowner, whose farm and buildings were in complete dilapidation, should endeavour to occupy and to maintain from family pride some noble old historic castle. Again, if there is any certain lesson to be derived from history, it is that the Turk is incapable of governing even himself, to say nothing of other races, and it is necessary to go no further than Constantinople to obtain at once abundant proof of his maladministration.

3. I cannot find that there is, in actual fact, any real basis for the argument which has of late been frequently advanced that Constantinople is in any way whatever a Holy City of Islam. The edifice of Santa Sophia is merely the symbol of the Turkish conquest of the Greek Empire, and it is no more the symbol of this than is the tenure of Constantinople itself as a whole, and the fane is venerated by the Turks as such, but it is no object of pilgrimage and has no peculiar sanctity for other Turkish Moslems. The only two spots in the city which are held genuinely sacred are the two shrines: the one is the old seraglio in which the relics of the Prophet are preserved, and which the Sultan only is allowed to visit, but which owes its sanctity merely to the presence of the relics; and the other, the alleged tomb—spurious, however, and nothing more than a pious fraud—on the upper waters of the Golden Horn, of Eyoub, who was a companion of the Prophet, and who fell in the Arab attack on Byzantium in 675. Apart from these, the mosques and other religious buildings, splendid as many of them are, have no sanctity beyond that which attaches to all time-honoured places of worship in all countries; the sentiments of pride and of affection of the Turks would be hurt by seeing these places fall from their control, but not those of piety or religious fervour.

4. It is frequently stated, though there is considerable difficulty in determining with how much truth, that the Turks do not know or will not admit that they have been conquered. It is highly desirable that they should not be left with the slightest illusion in this respect, and nothing will bring it

<sup>1</sup> Religious schools.

home to them with such force as to deprive them of their capital. The Sultanate is now become a very tawdry hollow show, and the present sovereign, a man apparently of high principles and aspirations, though of weak character and little courage, and who is entirely averse to the working of the Nationalist party who have brought him into his present position, sits trembling in Yildiz, bereft of all such brilliancy as still existed in the time of Abdul Hamid, and fearful lest some other accident similar to that which occurred in the early summer when the kiosk in which he was sleeping burst into flames, the doors were locked, and His Imperial Majesty escaped in his night clothes through the window, may deprive him of his throne and his life. The house of Osman seems to be exhausted, and there would seem to be no prince who possesses the talents or the energy for ruling his people. But from its very foundation, Constantinople has been the home of conspiracy and intrigue, and it is natural to believe that the scheming which will inevitably grow up among the various minor Moslem States which are about to come into being in the Levant as a result of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is likely to find a more propitious soil in Constantinople than if the seat of the Sultanate, and perhaps also of the Caliphate, were to be transferred to the clearer atmosphere and more peaceful traditions of Broussa, the early capital of the Turks. It appears to me there is danger of over-estimating the shock to Mussulman feeling at large by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and I believe there is greater risk, in reality, in leaving them there to brood over their fallen greatness; they understand no treatment but that of force, and they are fairly prepared now to receive a violent shock, and it can hardly be detrimental that the Mussulmans at large should be given clearly to perceive that it is entirely disadvantageous to stand against the British Government.

5. The difficulties that beset the question of the Government of the town, should it be taken from the Turks, are obvious, and whilst there seems to be no solution save that of placing it under an international régime, the example of Tangier stands as a warning of the deplorable results of a divided control. Still it should not be beyond human ingenuity—if indeed it prove impossible to place it under a single mandatory—to devise some scheme by which an equitable and practical administration may be created that will give liberty and justice to the motley population and the varied interests centred here.

6. Even should it not seem advisable to His Majesty's Government to take the present opportunity to eliminate the Turk from Europe straightaway, even then Constantinople might be held as a hostage, subject to the will of the captor, should there be any recalcitrance in accepting the terms of the Treaty of peace, however harsh or distasteful these may be.

T. B. HOHLER

No. 579

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 6)*  
*No. 689 Telegraphic [149321/70100/44]*

ROME, November 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 839.<sup>1</sup>

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to whom I communicated to-day substance of your telegram at once admitted that Italian detachment at Konia was under General Milne's orders and that if conflict threatened, only sensible thing to do was to retire. He thought however that it would be better were General Milne before instructing it to do so to get into contact with Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople who was in charge of all political questions and to consult him on situation. Latter would not he was convinced raise any difficulties.

<sup>1</sup> No. 576.

No. 580

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 6)*  
*No. 1523 Telegraphic: by bag [149305/70100/44]*

PARIS, November 5, 1919

Occupation of Meander Valley.

Your telegram No. 1325<sup>1</sup> of November 3. French refusal to furnish battalion as part of inter-allied force is presumably one more move in their game of not recognising General Milne's authority over allied troops. I venture to think nevertheless that their decision in this instance may ultimately turn to our advantage, as we shall be able to point to our disinterested readiness to assume burdens for the purpose of keeping order in Turkey, whilst France refuses to go anywhere except Syria where she has her own interests to protect.

I earnestly hope that the question of the inter-allied occupation of the Meander valley will not be reopened, but that General Milne will be authorised, if necessary, to employ a second British battalion. Failing this, I do not see why he should not increase the Greek contingent to the strength necessary to counterbalance the loss of the French battalion.

<sup>1</sup> No. 575.

No. 581

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*  
*(Received November 8)*  
*No. 2033 Telegraphic [150314/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 5, 1919

It has become increasingly evident from course of events at Smyrna that Greek Government is endeavouring to substitute authority of its representatives there for that of Allied High Commissioners and of Turkish Govern-

ment. They are obstructing functions of such inter-Allied bodies as Press censorship and Port and Customs control, and are hindering work of local police and impeding jurisdiction of Civil Tribunals. They are strenuously endeavouring to bring within scope of courts martial not only all criminal cases but even all manner of affairs falling exclusively within the competence of civil tribunals.

Incidents have been becoming more and more frequent and my colleagues and I have drawn attention of Greek High Commissioner to this undesirable state of affairs but without result. We have therefore decided to address our several Governments and request that suitable steps may be taken by Supreme Council to ensure that Monsieur Stergiades shall in future so modify his attitude as to (? allow) free play to all Inter-Allied bodies and to various civil services of Turkish Government.

Above is identic telegram addressed to three Governments.

Despatch<sup>1</sup> follows by bag.

Repeated to Athens No. 144.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

### No. 582

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received November 10)

No. 2040 Telegraphic [150594/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 7, 1919

Mr. Morgan informs me that Greek Military Commander on October 30th wrote Vali forbidding holding of elections in Greek zone.

### No. 583

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 12)*

No. 2123 [151132/70100/44]

PARIS, November 10, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 1537<sup>1</sup> of the 8th November, recording the proceedings at the Supreme Council on that day, I have the honour to inform your Lordship in detail of the attitude adopted by me when the discussion on the report of the Smyrna Commission was resumed on the 10th November by the Council.<sup>2</sup>

2. I began by observing that doubtless the text of the instructions given to the commissioners (see Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 1474<sup>3</sup> of the 31st July)

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The minutes of the proceedings of the Supreme Council on November 8, 1919, are printed in Volume II, No. 17.

<sup>2</sup> The minutes of this discussion are printed in Volume II, No. 18. The report is printed as appendix A to No. 17 in that volume.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This despatch transmitted the text of the instructions as printed in Volume I, No. 17, minute 12.

gave considerable latitude to the Commission in drafting their report and more latitude, I ventured to think, than the Council really intended. What the Council presumably had in mind, was the investigation of various accusations made against the Greek troops and commanding officers by the Turks and from other sources as to action taken contrary to the orders of the senior allied naval officer by the occupation of certain towns and districts, and as to excesses and massacres. The Commission, after investigating the facts, was to present a report on them to the Council. The latter did not, however, intend that the Commission should report as to whether the Council were justified in giving the Greeks a mandate to occupy a certain area round Smyrna, or as to whether the Greeks should be allowed to continue to hold this mandate, until the whole question of Turkey should come before and be settled by the Peace Conference. The drafting of a report with so wide a scope would have involved many other considerations besides those of a purely military nature, and could hardly have been entrusted by the Conference to a purely military commission.

3. I suggested, therefore, that the report of the Commission might with advantage be considered by the Council virtually as falling into two separate parts: first, the facts as to the action of the Greek troops and the allegations against them, together with the assignment of responsibility for the facts; secondly, the more general conclusions as to the future attitude to be adopted towards the Greek occupation. Taking the second part first, I pointed out that this question had really been already settled by the Council themselves, and I recalled the following facts: as explained by M. Venizelos at the Council's sitting on the 8th November,<sup>4</sup> he had on the 23rd June taken responsibility before the Council for ordering the Greek troops to make advances in various directions owing to serious and urgent reports which he was receiving as to organised Turkish concentrations. Between the 18th and 23rd June M. Venizelos had written four letters to M. Clemenceau on this matter, to none of which he received an answer, and he inferred from this that the Council did not disapprove his action. On the 16th July the Council heard M. Venizelos' case<sup>5</sup> and, as a result of that meeting, M. Venizelos and M. Tittoni were brought to make an agreement regarding the dividing line between the Greek and Italian zones of occupation. This agreement had been approved by the Council on the 18th July,<sup>6</sup> and communicated to General Milne, who had at the same time been commissioned by the Council to delimit afresh the zone of the Greek occupation. At the same meeting it was agreed to appoint an Inter-Allied commission of enquiry into the Smyrna incidents. General Milne had since recommended a certain line which he thought the Greeks could hold, except that in the angle formed by the boundary of the Smyrna sandjak and the Venizelos-Tittoni line (the angle including Aidin and the railway as far as Keuschk), General Milne suggested either that the Greek troops should advance from Aidin as far as the Kochak Chai, an advance which might lead to further fighting, or that the angle should be occupied by Allied troops.

<sup>4</sup> See note 1 above.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume I, No. 12.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 461.

4. The Council approved General Milne's recommendations on the 7th October,<sup>7</sup> agreeing that the angle should be occupied by Greek, French, and British troops. Virtually, therefore, the question whether the Greeks could be allowed to occupy a zone round Smyrna until the treaty of peace with Turkey came under discussion, and, if so, what the limits of this zone should be, had already been settled by the Council. M. Venizelos had, moreover, emphasised in conversation with me and informed the Council on the 8th November that the Greek army was now sufficiently strong to hold the zone delimited by General Milne, and he was confident that they could continue to do so.

5. At this juncture I took the opportunity of pressing M. Clemenceau to reconsider his decision not to send a French battalion to the Aidin area, in which I was indirectly supported by Mr. Polk, who pointed out that the alternative offered by General Milne, i.e., advance of Greek troops from Aidin to Kochak Chai (reoccupation by the Turks was unthinkable) might render the Council responsible for further fighting between the Turks and the Greeks. I was also supported by General Bunoust, the president of the Smyrna Commission who was present, and who felt convinced that the Turks would not attack again in the Aidin section if French and British troops were present. M. Clemenceau finally promised to give me a final decision on this point to-morrow, the 11th November, but did not hold out much hope that French troops could be sent. He was quite ready to assent to General Milne's alternative suggestion that the Greeks should remain in occupation.

6. I then returned to what might be termed the first part of the Commission's report. While in no way wishing to call in question the spirit of impartiality and sincerity with which the commissioners appeared to have conducted their enquiry, and while appreciating fully the value of the work which they had done, I could not refrain from sympathising with the reason which M. Venizelos had advanced on the 8th November to explain his inability to accept the conclusions of the commission's report, i.e., the fact that, without the knowledge or approval of the Supreme Council, neither the names of the Turkish witnesses nor their evidence had been communicated to the Greek representative. Possibly the reasons for adopting so secret a procedure might have been excellent, though it was difficult to see why the evidence itself, after the suppression of the names, could not have been placed before the Greek representative; but I could not help feeling that, if the more normal procedure in municipal courts of law had been followed, whereby the accused party would have been able to cross-examine the witnesses, or at any rate to have an opportunity of rebutting their evidence, some of the conclusions of the report might have been mitigated in favour of the Greeks. For the rest, however, and with the above reservation, I felt that the actual facts as regards the excesses and massacres, as recorded in the Commission's report, could be substantially accepted. Moreover, M. Venizelos himself, I ventured to think, accepted them in the main. He had himself caused

<sup>7</sup> See No. 536.

enquiries to be held and the guilty punished, as the report itself pointed out, and General Bunoust, who was present, confirmed this. Lastly, I observed that for a considerable period order had been re-established and reigned both in Smyrna and the neighbourhood, though not, of course, on the fringes of the Greek occupation, where their troops were in touch with the Turks. Even here it might be hoped that the result of General Milne's recent work might effect a material change for the better.

7. My views appeared to be generally accepted by the Council and it was agreed that a letter should be written by M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos, saying that, while the Council sympathised with M. Venizelos' attitude in the matter of the procedure adopted by the Commission, they were impressed with the serious facts brought to their notice in the Commission's report—facts the accuracy of which seemed substantially to be proved, and concluding by urging prudence and restraint on the Greeks, and by repeating that their occupation of this area was provisional pending the final decisions of the Peace Conference regarding Turkey.

8. I venture to transmit for your Lordship's confidential information a copy of a memorandum written by Mr. Philip Kerr for Mr. Balfour's information in July last, after a perusal of the proceedings of the Council of Four, and a *dossier* of papers communicated to him by M. Venizelos. This memorandum contains evidence which I venture to think tells materially in M. Venizelos' favour as regards various occasions on which the Greek troops were said to have advanced without the authority of the Council or of the S.N.O. at Smyrna. Much of this evidence was not, of course, available to the Smyrna Commission, and as it refers to proceedings of the original Council of Four, which are supposed to be and remain absolutely secret, I could not well bring it to the attention of the Council now. A copy of a further memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam<sup>8</sup> comparing *in extenso*, as regards two cases of alleged unauthorised advances by the Greeks, the Commission's report with the evidence of M. Venizelos, as given to Mr. Kerr, and bringing the matter up to date, is also enclosed. These papers may serve to give further reasons which led me to adopt the attitude before the Council which I have set forth above.

I have, &c.  
EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 583

*Mr. Kerr to Mr. Balfour*

Copy.

PARIS, July 13, 1919

I attach a memorandum summarising the history of the Smyrna landing and the subsequent events as they can be derived from the Minutes of the Council of Four, from Foreign Office telegrams and from communications between M. Venizelos and his local representatives.

From this history I infer:—

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

(a) That the decision of the Council of Four that the advance of Greek troops beyond the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali could only take place with the consent of the British Admiral did not reach the Greek local Commander owing to the breakdown of telegraphic communications until June 27th<sup>9</sup> or 28th, that is to say until after the occupation of Magnesia, Kassaba and Aidin.

(b) That M. Venizelos throughout insisted on the scrupulous observance by the Greek local authorities of the decision of the Council of Four. He only departed from it in one instance and that was in response to an anxious wire from the Greek local Commander, when he instructed him to re-occupy the Smyrna-Aidin railway between Aya-Soulouk and Aidin because it was the essential line of communication for the Greek troops in Aidin and was threatened by an Italian advance.

(c) That on June 18th owing to Turkish concentrations and attacks in contravention to the Armistice M. Venizelos asked for permission of the Council of Four to advance a line which would enable him to control the railways which the Turks used for these concentrations, and to cover effectively the Smyrna district. On the 22nd having received no reply from the Council of Four, M. Venizelos decided to authorise the Greek Commander to make the necessary advances locally in order to disperse the Turkish concentration and occupy the railways. He informed the Council of Four of this decision on the following day. Since that date M. Venizelos has regarded the responsibility for the movement of Greek troops as resting upon himself and not upon Admiral [*sic*] Fitzmaurice. He further insists that as he has received no reply from the Council of Four to his letters of June 18th, 20th, and 23rd, the Supreme Council may be taken to have given their tacit assent to his action.

In view of these considerations I don't think it is possible to establish the fact that the Greek authorities have deliberately exceeded the instructions of the Council of Four. Further, the difficulties have been largely the result of Turkish retaliation for the Greek occupation of Smyrna—a retaliation which was probably aggravated by local Greek excesses—or they have been excited by the action of the Italians. There is much to be said against the policy of occupying Smyrna but the responsibility for that decision rests with the Council of Four and not with M. Venizelos. He welcomed it, but did not ask for it. I think, therefore, that our policy ought to be to permit M. Venizelos to take up a line, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement, which will give strategic security to the Smyrna territory. The Sandjak of Smyrna clearly does not give this security for it does not even include Magnesia, which is within striking distance of Smyrna. Moreover in view of the weakness of the Central Government and the revival of the C.U.P. the Greeks may be subject to quite serious local attacks, and it is important that they should not be compelled to maintain more troops in Asia Minor than is necessary, in view of the approaching peace with Bulgaria, as would be the case if they are confined to the Sandjak of Smyrna. Personally I would allow them to occupy Soma, Akhissar, a point beyond Kassaba, possibly Sahlihi, and a point between Aidin and Nazli, say Akche, thence running down the Meander to Aya-Soulouk.

After all the Turks are our enemies. They aided and abetted the Germans. For centuries they have proved themselves incapable of governing. They have murdered millions of their own subjects and have committed incredible atrocities on our own men. The provocation the Greeks have given to them is nothing like the provocation they have given to the Greeks and in concentrating against them they are deliberately violating the Armistice, and defying the authority of the Allies. I am quite sure that in the long run these disputed areas stand a better

<sup>9</sup> It was suggested on the original that this should read May 27 (see below).

chance of progressive development under Greece than under Turkish rule. Hence I would formally notify the Turks that we propose, without prejudice, to fix the limits of Greek occupation as above, and that they must hand the territory over to the Greeks on a named date, failing which we will take the necessary action to enforce compliance with our decision. I think that if we act firmly and make it clear that the line is a final line, pending the signing of peace or a renewal of massacres, there ought to be no local resistance.

P. H. KERR

*July 14, 1919*

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 583

*Memorandum by Mr. Kerr*

*The Smyrna Occupation*

The following is a brief summary of the history of the occupation of the Smyrna district by the Greeks as far as I can ascertain it from their official records.

According to the minutes of the Council of Four the reason for the decision to send Greek troops to occupy Smyrna was atrocities committed by the Turks and the growing danger of a general massacre of the Greek and Christian population. Mr. Lloyd George produced a letter written from Smyrna by a well known and responsible British resident regarding the manner in which the Turks were sniping Greeks in the suburbs. It is plain, however, from the Minutes, that the Council of Four were also influenced by the fact that unauthorised Italian landings were spreading round the coast of Asia Minor towards Smyrna and that the Italians had landed at Scala Nova. They evidently feared that if Smyrna was not occupied by the Allies it might be occupied by the Italians in order to peg out their claims under the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement.

Accordingly on Monday, 12th May, the despatch to Smyrna of the Greek forces assembled at Kavala was authorised by the Four including Signor Orlando.<sup>10</sup> Immediately after this M. Venizelos began to wire to the local Greek Commander in regard to extending the Greek occupation beyond the confines of the town. From the outset he contemplated the occupation of Aidin though at this time he expected that this would be effected with the consent of the Turkish Government. His reason for this haste is shown in a telegram of May 17th in which he says: 'I think it is necessary that you should make haste and occupy Aidin considering that the Italians, having landed at Scala Nova, may get ahead.' On the 18th, after being informed that the Italians had advanced as far as Aya Soulouk he told his representatives that they had to consider the occupying and imposing order in the two Sandjaks of Smyrna and Magnesia, the Kaza of Aivali, and Aidin, though they were not to proceed further south or east of Aidin for fear of coming into collision with the Italians.

On May 19th the question of extending the Greek occupation was considered by the Council of Four.<sup>11</sup>

At the meeting M. Venizelos said that he had given 'general orders to the Greek Commanding Officer to send troops wherever it was necessary for the occupation of localities where disorder had occurred.'<sup>11</sup> He said that he could not say for certain whether Greek troops had been sent to Aidin.

<sup>10</sup> See Volume I, No. 10, note 8.

<sup>11</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. v, pp. 721-3.

Further 'he wished to say expressly that towards the South the furthest point to which he wished to send troops was Aidin.'<sup>11</sup> President Wilson asked whether M. Venizelos did not think it best to await developments before putting into operation any more extended plans for occupation. The Council of Four was always available for consultation. M. Venizelos said that he was prepared, if the Council so ruled, to issue an order that no Greek troops should go inland at all. Nevertheless in order to provide against the possibility of serious disturbances and massacres he would like to arrange some procedure more rapid than that of referring everything to Paris. He proposed, therefore, that no troops should be sent without the authority of Admiral Calthorpe. The Council agreed to this proposal. In conclusion M. Venizelos asked that Greek troops should be allowed to move freely within the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali without obtaining special authority. This was the decision on May 19 which, for convenience of reference, is attached as an appendix.<sup>12</sup>

The decision of the Council was communicated by M. Venizelos to the Commander at Smyrna on the night of May 19th. See Annexure II. Owing, however, to the break down for six days of the cables from Smyrna, the decision of the Council of Four did not reach the Greek authorities at any rate until May 27th or 28th. This is clear from telegrams from the Greek Commander to M. Venizelos. Thus as late as May 27th the Greek Commander telegraphed to M. Venizelos asking if he might occupy Tchesme which is in the Sandjak of Smyrna to the west of the town. During the whole of this period Greek troops were pressing westwards [*sic*]. On the 25th May they occupied Aya Soulouk and Magnesia. On the 28th they entered Aidin. It was reported that these occupations were effected without resistance and that perfect order reigned. The reason for the rapidity of their advance in the south is attributed to the reinforcement of the Italian army and the apparent intention of the Italians to advance up the Meander valley and occupy Aidin themselves. On May 21st the Greek acting Prime Minister who had gone to Smyrna had an interview with Admiral Calthorpe in which he informed him that the 'Greek authorities were compelled to send forces wherever public order had been threatened', and at which he asked Admiral Calthorpe, in view of the request of the English Aidin railway company for the protection of their line, how far they should advance in view of the presence of Italian detachments near Aya Soulouk. Admiral Calthorpe thought it right that the Greek occupation should extend to a point opposite where the Italians were encamped. He declared himself as satisfied with the situation and that his further stay was unnecessary. He then went away.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Not printed. This decision is printed, *ibid.*, vol. v, p. 723.

<sup>13</sup> The above-mentioned conversation between Admiral Calthorpe and M. Repoulis, Vice-President of the Greek Council of Ministers, was apparently that described by the former as having taken place 'on Tuesday morning, 20 May' (report of even date by Admiral Calthorpe at Smyrna). Admiral Calthorpe reported of this conversation that M. Repoulis 'asked for my personal opinion on what course it was desirable to take if the Greeks were appealed to for protection some distance further into the interior than the immediate suburbs. I said I thought the situation would require very delicate handling because the Italians were already in the vicinity of some of these places, and that at all costs the possibility of a collision with them should be avoided. I added that if in any case he considered that the Italians were encroaching on what he regarded as the Greek zone contact with them should be avoided and reference made to Paris'. Admiral Calthorpe continued: 'I propose to leave Smyrna for Constantinople tomorrow afternoon, 21 May, provided the situation here continues to improve, and unless I receive instructions to the contrary.'

During the whole of this period M. Venizelos was getting no reports from his local Commander. The latter complained of this on May 22nd. On the 24th he wired saying that he was convinced that the telegrams between Paris and Smyrna were being held up, as he had received no information himself. On the 27th however he wired that telegrams were again being received. On May 28th M. Venizelos repeated the instructions of the Council of Four to the High Commissioner of Greece at Smyrna in answer to the latter's telegrams in regard to Tchesme above mentioned, he added that:—

'Beyond this district, i.e. Sandjak of Smyrna, you might send troops within the limits of the vilayet of Aidin, but not farther South of Aidin and only on condition that Admiral Calthorpe or his deputy approves of it.'

On the 1st of June the Greek Commander wired that the Italians had been reinforced and were spreading eastwards south of the Meander. They were reported as numbering 8,000 men with a number of guns. He said that their purpose was to:—

'create an Italian zone south of the Meander from Scala Nova towards Denizli and to cut us from the Sandjak of Moughla and Denizli. Kindly let me have general instructions as to the attitude to be taken by us. I am ordering that Nazli be occupied as soon as possible'.

To this telegram M. Venizelos replied as follows on the same day:—

'We cannot proceed south of Aidin, but nothing prevents us from advancing eastwards along the railway line in order to occupy Nazli and Denizli. But even to effect these advances it is necessary to have beforehand the consent of Admiral Calthorpe or of his deputy since these towns lie outside the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali; within the latter we are justified in acting at our discretion. If such approval has been given, then I authorise the occupation of both these towns.

...<sup>14</sup> If we have no authorisation to do so we must obtain it forthwith; and only in case the Italian advance threatens to overtake us, we must act before receiving such an authorisation. I consider quite difficult, however, the quick arrival of the Italians to Denizli as long as we occupy the railway line and they do not even have a coach road at their disposal. So without the existence of any real danger of being overtaken by the Italians, we must not advance before obtaining the sanction of the Allies'.

On the 4th June the Greek High Commissioner reports receiving a letter from Admiral Fitzmaurice in which he stated that he considered as an unauthorised *fait accompli* the Greek occupation of Magnesia and Kassaba. He further laid stress on the fact that the Greeks ought not to have occupied Aidin and Nazli without his authority and asked for what reason the occupation of these two places was considered necessary. The whole of this telegram is attached as Appendix III. In reply the Greek High Commissioner informed Admiral Fitzmaurice in writing that Magnesia and Kassaba had been occupied because the situation was very critical for the Christian population and that perfect order had been maintained there throughout. He went on to say that the same reasons had prompted the occupation of Aidin and Nazli, but that in addition there was a much more serious reason in the advance of the Italians from Sokia. The Greek High Commissioner stated that he would not advance further in the Sandjak without Admiral Fitzmaurice's

<sup>14</sup> Thus in original.

authority, but asked for permission to advance from Nazli to Denizli so long as the advance of the Italians was not stopped. On June 7th Admiral Fitzmaurice while commenting adversely on the haste both of the Italians and the Greeks refused to permit the Greeks to advance from Nazli. He further fixed as the southern point of the Greek occupation, the railway line between Aidin and Nazli, and required the withdrawal of the Greek troops between the railway line and the Meander river. He further required the withdrawal of the Greek troops from the railway from Aya-Soulouk to near Aidin. He further fixed Cassaba as the limit of the Greek advance eastwards from Magnesia. In forwarding this reply to M. Venizelos the Greek Commander stated that he was withdrawing Greek troops as required by Admiral Fitzmaurice but pointed out that the Admiral's instructions to evacuate the railway south of Aya-Soulouk placed the Greek forces at Aidin and Nazli in a very precarious position. It would enable the Italians to cut the railway between them and their base. He, therefore, asked M. Venizelos to secure authority for their remaining along the line. He added that:—

'The occupation of Aidin has taken place after due consultation with Colonel Smith (Admiral Calthorpe's aide-de-camp) because 5,000 armed Turks with artillery were threatening the security of the inhabitants of Aidin.'

On the 6th June M. Venizelos wired again to the High Commissioner of Greece strongly warning him that no further advance must be made without definite authorisation of the Admiral. To this telegram the Greek High Commissioner replied:—

'I have the honour to inform you that after the urgently carried out occupation of Nazli and Aidin which was allowed and recommended to Colonel Zafiriou by the British Colonel Smith, Aide-de-Camp to Admiral Calthorpe, but which authority was not given in writing, and after the urgent occupation of Magnesia and Kassaba, where according to British information, the Christian populations were in danger, I promised to the Admiral's deputy that no other occupation would be carried out in the Sandjaks of Aidin and Saroukhan without his authority.'

The next few days are taken up with telegrams relating to the occupation of Akhissar by the Greeks. It transpired that this place which was outside the Sandjak of Smyrna was occupied contrary to the instructions of the Greek Commander by a local cavalry officer. Directly he heard of it, M. Venizelos wired ordering the immediate evacuation of the town and the severe punishment of the officer who had disobeyed orders, and instructed General Leonardo Poulo [*sic*] to conduct an immediate enquiry with a view of punishing the guilty. M. Venizelos got a reply from the Greek High Commissioner saying that the occupation of Akhissar had been carried out contrary to instructions and that even before the receipt of M. Venizelos' telegram he had ordered the immediate evacuation and the punishment of the offenders. Accordingly Akhissar was evacuated on June 10th.

On June 12th the Greek High Commissioner wired stating that:—

'Admiral Fitzmaurice as well as the official circles in Smyrna are convinced of our good faith concerning the Akhissar question. We are fully agreed with the Admiral on all the points of our occupation as it stands to-day. Order reigns in all the territory occupied by us and no murder or theft has occurred.'

On the 13th June the Greek Commander announced that a detachment of the Italian Army were marching towards a station between Aya-Soulouk and Aidin thereby threatening the communications of the Greek forces occupying Aidin and

Nazli. In reply to this cable M. Venizelos instructed the High Commissioner to occupy immediately the railway line between Aya-Soulouk and Aidin.

He added:—

'You will please inform the British Admiral that in doing so you are conforming with an urgent personal order of mine in order to assure the safety of our Army in Aidin and Nazli and moreover that I undertake the responsibility of this order. For I know well that the Admiral misunderstands the decision of the Supreme Council concerning our occupation, which decision I myself proposed.'

He asked that Admiral Fitzmaurice, if he disagreed, should refer the matter to Paris. The following day, the 15th June, the Greek High Commissioner states that he had received a written communication from Admiral Fitzmaurice informing him that as there was no further *raison d'être* for the Greek occupation of Nazli as well as for places beyond the city of Aidin he was to withdraw his army within the city of Aidin. He asked for the instructions of M. Venizelos. To this M. Venizelos replied on the 19th June stating that inasmuch as the occupation of Nazli had taken place without the authorisation of the British Admiral, Admiral Fitzmaurice, was perfectly within his rights and that the evacuation of Nazli must take place forthwith. He asked that the Admiral should send a British officer to protect the inhabitants.

From about the 15th June telegrams began to come in showing that the Turks were beginning to effect concentrations of troops against various parts of the Greek front and to make local attacks. These concentrations and attacks, it was said, were inspired and encouraged by the Italians and in many cases were conducted from territory in Italian occupation. Accordingly on the 18th June M. Venizelos wrote to M. Clemenceau stating that in view of the threatening situation and of the violation by the Turks of the Armistice, the Greeks should be allowed to extend the limit of their occupation to points which would give them command of the railways and thereby give them strategic security against the strong Turkish concentrations. The line he proposed ran from Edremid-Balikesri-Akhissar-Sahili-Nazli and then along the course of the Meander. On the 20th June he wrote a second letter pointing out that the recent news proved that Turkish concentrations were more serious than he had thought and were evidently organised by the Ottoman authorities themselves. As he received no reply to these communications M. Venizelos on June 22nd authorised the Greek Commander to abandon their ruinous activity [? previous inactivity] and take the necessary action to disperse the Turkish concentrations. He further instructed him to inform the British Admiral that M. Venizelos took full responsibility for giving these instructions. Upon the following morning he wrote to M. Clemenceau informing the Council of Four that the situation was so serious that having had no reply he had decided to take the responsibility into his own hands and to authorise the action as aforesaid. He asked for the Council's approval. To these communications M. Venizelos has never received any reply from which he infers that his action does not meet with the disapproval of the Council.

Directly M. Venizelos received news that the Greeks had been driven out of Aidin he immediately cabled stating that he hoped it would be re-occupied as soon as possible. On the same day Admiral Fitzmaurice and delegate Morgan called upon the Greek High Commissioner and stated that the three Delegates of England, France and Italy had unanimously decided to propose that the Greek troops should not re-occupy Aidin and should withdraw their forces within the Sandjak

of Smyrna. In the event of the Greeks accepting this proposition they would be prepared to form an Anglo-French-Italian Commission to proceed to Aidin and Nazli and negotiate with the Turks for the safety of the Greeks. In making this communication, however, Admiral Fitzmaurice said that the above statement was merely their opinion and not their decision because the delegates had no power to take such a decision and that he himself, namely the Admiral, had not been present during the discussion. At the same time he expressed the opinion that it was better for the Greeks to stop useless military operations. The Greek High Commissioner replied that in the event of the opinion of the three delegates being forced upon the Greeks it was desirable that the British forces should occupy the railway line and the whole Meander valley. To this opinion Admiral Fitzmaurice agreed. In accordance with the direct instructions of M. Venizelos who since June 23rd had resumed responsibility, Aidin was re-occupied. On the 19th July, after receiving Mr. Balfour's personal advice, M. Venizelos sent a wire forbidding any further advance in any direction until further orders.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 583

'Annexure II'<sup>15</sup>

Telegram from M. Venizelos

Very urgent.

May 19, 1919

(1) Colonel Zafiriou

Smyrne

(2) Foreign Office

Athens.

In accordance with the Supreme Council's decision, you may, using your discretion, send the necessary force to impose order and enable the refugees in Greece to return to the Kaza of Aivali and to the Sandjak of Smyrna as soon as possible. But in the latter Sandjak you must not descend further than Aya-Soulouk. Beyond this district you may send forces but not further south of Aidin and only on condition that such an expedition is dictated by a pending threat of the disturbance of public order and that same is approved by Admiral Calthorpe or in case of his departure, by the head of the Allied Fleet in Smyrna.

VENIZELOS

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 583

'Annexure III'

Document 1

Telegram from the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna

SMYRNA, June 4, 1919

Greek Delegation,

Paris.

Last Sunday I sent to Admiral [sic] Fitzmaurice, (who has replaced Admiral Calthorpe) at his request, a report setting forth the different localities occupied by us up to that day. Yesterday, he sent me the following reply in writing.

(1) He considers that we were right in occupying Aivali and the Sandjak of Smyrna, but he requests us not to go south of Aya-Soulouk and to withdraw our

<sup>15</sup> For the omission of annexure 1 see note 12 above.

small detachment which occupied the strategic position of Kerkeskeui, south of Aya-Soulouk, for the protection of the railway.

(2) He considers as an authorised *fait accompli* our occupation of Magnesia and of Cassaba and he limits himself to asking information regarding the situation in these two places and regarding the losses on both sides at the moment of the occupation.

(3) On the other hand he lays stress on the fact that we should not have occupied Aidin and Nazli without his authority, and he asks for what reason the occupation of these two places was considered necessary.

(4) He adds that in no circumstances should we (word missing) south of the railway line Nazli-Aidin-Balalzig.

(5) He states further that, with the exception of the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali, we are not allowed to occupy any other positions without his authority, and he demanded a definite reply on the subject.

(6) He drew attention to Admiral Calthorpe's order (word missing) that we should at all costs avoid any friction between the Greek and Italian troops. I replied to the above to-day as follows:—Firstly, that I had given orders to our detachment to withdraw from Kerkeskeui, which is south of Aya-Soulouk, leaving only a few men to guard the railway and that even these latter would be immediately withdrawn if the Admiral desired and that in future we would not advance south of Aya-Soulouk i.e. towards the southwest portion of the Sandjak of Smyrna occupied by the Italians. Secondly, that the situation at Magnesia and Cassaba prior to our occupation was very critical for the Christian population, according to our information received from several sources; that the occupation was effected without loss on either side; that perfect order had been maintained since the occupation and that he would not advance any further in the Sandjak without his authority. Thirdly, that for the maintenance of order, and to ensure the safety of the Christian population, Aidin and Nazli had also been occupied and that the reasons which prompted the occupation of these two towns still existed and the withdrawal therefore of the Greek army from them would cause the former state of affairs there to be restored in a still worse degree. That in addition to these reasons there existed others of a more serious nature, i.e. the fact of the Italian advance eastward from Sokia along the southern bank of the Meander passing beyond the river Marsyas (              )<sup>14</sup> already the objective of the Italian advance being the occupation of the Meander valley together with the whole of the southern portion of the Sandjak of Aidin including Denizli to the south, with the result that the occupation of these districts by us will be made impossible even if permission to occupy them were given to us by the Allies. Fourthly, that on account of this last reason I ventured to ask that, so long as the advance of the Italians was not stopped, we should be granted permission to advance from Nazli by railway to Denizli. Fifthly, I assured Admiral Fitzmaurice categorically that as far as it lay in our power we would do our utmost to avoid any friction with the Italian troops.

STERGHIADES

#### Document 2

*Telegram from the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna*

Greek Delegation,  
Paris.

SMYRNA, June 7, 1919

Continuing my cable of June 3rd [? 4th]<sup>16</sup> I have the honour to inform you that,  
<sup>16</sup> Document 1 above.

yesterday, Friday, Admiral Fitzmaurice replied in writing to my request asking for permission to occupy Denizli. In his reply he makes an inference to our haste as well as to that of the Italians as to which one of us would first occupy said section and disapproves this policy of competition, adding at the same time that as regards Denizli only the decision of the Conference will prevail and it will be imposed on all concerned. He further assures me that he is expecting definite instructions concerning the zone of the Italian occupation and that he will do his best to restrict them accordingly. On the other hand he refused to permit us to advance from Nazli and occupy Denizli. He also fixed for us at the most southern point of our occupation the railway line between Aidin and Nazli and demands that we should withdraw our army which is between railway line and the Meander river. The force occupying this section is insignificant and consists of three guard posts for the protection of the three bridges of the Meander river and also of a few mobile detachments. According to the opinion of our military men the guards and the detachments in question can be withdrawn without endangering the safety of the bridges since we will be holding the entire railway line. Admiral Fitzmaurice has also stated to me that the section south of Aya-Soulouk which we are not allowed to occupy is limited (on the north) by an imaginary line running straight from Aya-Soulouk as far as the city of Aidin. We can occupy north of this line, but south of it we can only use for purposes of transportation the railway line from Aya-Soulouk to Valadjik as far as Aidin. The west of this line i.e., from Arvalia till Diafali and thence till the eastern slopes of Goumousdag and from there as far as Sokia, is occupied by the Italians who are not (word missing) allowed to advance as far as the railway line, nor to cross it. So between this most eastern point of the Italian occupation on the one hand, and the above-mentioned imaginary straight line from Aya-Soulouk on the other hand, a triangle is formed which will be occupied neither by us nor by the Italians. Furthermore Admiral Fitzmaurice states that inside the Sandjak of Sourahan we cannot advance without his permission further than Cassaba towards Philadelphia as we were preparing to do.

STERGHIADES

No. 584

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received November 22)*

*No. 2052 Telegraphic: by bag [154340/521/44]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, November 10, 1919*

The information contained in your telegram 1727<sup>1</sup> gives rise to serious misgivings. The already extraordinary prolongation of the armistice has brought about a state of real chaos which we have managed to palliate, so far by a series of make-shifts, but if I am correct in interpreting your phrase 'for some time to come' as a period of at all events six months, I feel it my duty to point out some of the principal difficulties we must be prepared to meet.

1. *Finance.* See my telegram No. 1854<sup>2</sup> and my despatch No. 1775.<sup>3</sup> It has been presumable that the new Government would have sufficient control over Mustapha Kemal to obtain now from the provinces the customary revenues, but whilst the situation is very obscure, it is, I think, now certain

<sup>1</sup> No. 577.

<sup>2</sup> No. 520.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

that this is not the case. On the contrary, the Nationalists are reported to be levying forced contributions in the interior only for the support of their movement. Thus to assist the Government in its great emergency is, in a way, to subsidise the Nationalists, whilst not to do so is to upset what is left of the administrative machinery. Moreover, it appears to me impossible to grant any loan without controlling it; presumably this control would have to take an international form, which is most cumbrous and I think undesirable. It could hardly fail also to prejudice the position of the eventual mandatory. Much depends upon internal politics. There is plenty of money in the country if it could be got at as Mustapha Kemal appears to be doing. He shows unwillingness either to take over the Government himself, which he wishes carried on by others who shall do as he directs, or to come to Constantinople; he has, as you are aware, suggested that Parliament should meet at Broussa. The elections which are proceeding are of course the most utter farce and will result in the nomination of practically a pure Committee body. It is just possible that they may be able to raise funds.

2. *Judicial.* The situation is quite unparalleled. Ottoman Courts judge Ottoman subjects, and Allied troops are subject to Allied courts martial. Beyond this no courts of law exist at the moment of writing. The Turkish Government are reluctant to adopt proposed temporary international tribunal, and even this would be a quite inadequate palliative. Criminal charges are dealt with in a rough and ready way by the inter-Allied police, but with no real legal sanction; offenders are often arrested and then released after a few days, as there is no prison accommodation and no tribunal which can deal with, say, a case of fraud. There are measures which it is most desirable to enforce in the public interest, such as the prevention of profiteering, or the speculation in roubles and shipping, passport or customs regulations. Whilst we can, more or less, impose our decisions on the Porte, we have no legal authority over foreigners. This absence of law courts, tolerable as it was for a time, presents every day greater disadvantages.

3. *Police and Sanitary.* In accordance with War Office instructions (see your telegram No. 88<sup>3</sup> of 14th January) the British military authorities assumed control of the Turkish police and sanitary administrations, admitting French and Italians, so that the controls might take on a proper inter-Allied complexion. But to offset our action as regards the police, the French assumed control of the gendarmerie, in which we declined to participate. They have, I gather, made very little progress with their organisation, which they appear to have used, under the guidance of an indiscreet general named Foulon who was employed in the gendarmerie before the war, mainly as a means of propaganda and of obtaining information. The police control under British supervision has given fully as satisfactory results as could possibly be hoped for in the circumstances, directing the action of the Turks, who find the money to meet the expenses; only the cost of the foreigners employed is borne by the respective Allied Governments. Crime is kept within fairly reasonable limits, but the heads of the inter-Allied police have found themselves forced into the position of being a kind of court of summary

jurisdiction, and to give decisions which only by the most elastic interpretation can be brought under the denomination of military necessity.

The sanitary control of the city and environs was similarly taken over by the British military authorities, who adjoined to themselves representatives of the other Allies, as well as Greek and Russian representatives. This body is called the Commission Sanitaire Interalliée, and gives directions to the existing Turkish municipal organisation. Its control, however, has never been entirely effective, as we have furnished no money, and, as the municipality possess no funds (see my telegram No. 2004),<sup>3</sup> they are always able to plead lack of means as an excuse for not carrying out recommended measures. Plague and typhus both exist here, and I am advised that, while the former probably presents no great danger, we must be prepared to face a considerable epidemic of the latter during the winter and the health of the Allied troops has to be safeguarded. The above-mentioned Commission is responsible for all the work that has been done, but it is immensely hampered by lack of means and competent personnel as well as by the action of General Franchet d'Esperey. When the headquarters of the Allies were moved here he, as Commandant en Chef, introduced from Salonica a Commission Internationale d'Hygiène, composed of the directors of medical services of the three Allies, to which he added on arriving here representatives of the navies and of the two Turkish sanitary administrations (municipal and quarantine), as well as of other nationalities. The Allied High Commissioners are also represented. This body possesses properly no executive but only advisory functions, though the French members are continually trying to extend its sphere, and I understand that it issues instructions in quarantine and lazaret matters, though the executive remains in the hands of the Turkish Commission de la Défense sanitaire des Frontières. Here, again, effective action is greatly hampered by lack of funds (see my telegram No. 1946).<sup>3</sup> You will see that no more unsatisfactory state of affairs could well be imagined, but it must continue as long as does the armistice.

4. *Foreign Relations.* I am glad to say that my relations with both my colleagues are entirely satisfactory and cordial, even if the attitude of the Italian Government is ambiguous and lends itself to certain suspicions. When the divergence of our views and interests, as well as the natural and instinctive efforts of the Turks to accentuate it, are taken into account, this result may almost be considered as surprising. This happy situation is, however, constantly and seriously menaced by the attitude of General Franchet d'Esperey, who is consumed with vanity and a sense of his own importance, and who never loses an opportunity to presume upon his position of Commandant en Chef for interfering in every kind of matter, from municipal latrines to the relations of this High Commission with the Turkish Government, none of which depend in the most remote manner upon his responsibilities as Generalissimo. He has treated me personally with studied courtesy. It would be of real advantage were it possible to replace him by some person of a less overbearing and more conciliatory character. It is of course a standing enigma to the world at large here, but especially to

Turks, why the Supreme Command in Turkey is not in the hands of that country which alone overthrew the Turkish Empire.

5. *Internal Situation.* As indicated above, this is very obscure. It seems clear that the present Government has not been able to come to an agreement with Mustapha Kemal and the Nationalist movement, which appears to be meeting with quite serious opposition from the *Entente libérale* party and others who are resolutely opposed to the Committee. Accounts have come to my ears of serious engagements between them in the interior, but especially in the neighbourhood of Caesarea, where regular massacres of Turks are stated to have taken place, the anti-Nationalists being ill-provided with arms. The Christians have not been touched so far. My French colleague learns that the *Entente libérale* were making vigorous attempts to overthrow the present Government, and he seemed to think that I was interested in the movement, but I have most rigidly adhered to your instructions, namely, to insist on the maintenance of law and order and of legally constituted authority, but to take no action which could be interpreted as assistance to any one party, and I have taken special pains to emphasise to the Turkish Government and to my colleagues that this and no other is the policy of His Majesty's Government. It is one which it is not entirely easy to follow; for instance, recently several arrests have been effected, and I am at a loss to know whether they are political arrests, and so contrary to the instructions in your telegram No. 1691,<sup>4</sup> or whether the arrested were implicated in plots against the present Government, i.e., against constituted authority.

At all events, the discord existing among the Turks themselves is undoubtedly on the increase and can only tend to their future weakening. Nevertheless, you must be under no illusion as to the necessity of a considerable military force if it is desired *either* to impose upon the Turks any really onerous conditions of peace *or* to ensure stable safety to the Christians.

6. It is my duty to submit to you recommendations for meeting these difficulties, but before doing so I desire to point out to you one factor which underlies the whole situation and which must not be lost sight of. In the course of the negotiations of the armistice the Turkish delegates absolutely refused to accept the occupation of Constantinople, a point upon which, I think, you might advantageously consult Admiral Calthorpe, with the result that to-day we are not technically in occupation of it. It is a fact which relieves us perhaps of certain responsibilities, but which certainly imposes many limitations. In any case, we have under the armistice no real justification now for declaring an occupation. Arguments based upon an occupation are invalid.

7. My recommendations, then, are as follows:—

(1) The presumption<sup>5</sup> I have made is convenient, and is sufficient to justify procrastination in making an advance till the Nationalists are forced to come out into the open.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 541, note 2.

<sup>5</sup> Noted on original in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office: 'i.e. that the Government can now obtain revenues from the provinces controlled by Mustapha Kemal.'

(2) The situation really can only be met by a declaration of occupation, from which I submit we are precluded by considerations of good faith. But apart from this I can see no sound remedy, and we must get along as best we can, relying upon His Majesty's Government and the Peace Conference to support such action as we may be obliged by circumstances to take should the occasion arise.

(3 and 4) The remedy is clear. It is very necessary to remove General Franchet d'Esperey, whose existence appears no longer justified by circumstances, or, if it is, to replace him by a man of wider views and who understands more perfectly the duties and the obligations of an ally.

8. I venture to hope that the considerations in my despatch No. 1836<sup>6</sup> will meet with your Lordship's attentive consideration.

9. I am reporting separately on the situation with regard to the native Christian population of Turkey. (See my despatch No. 2110/M./2348<sup>7</sup> of 11th November, 1919.)<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> No. 543.

<sup>7</sup> No. 585.

<sup>8</sup> In a further telegram of November 13, 1919 (Constantinople No. 2060: received November 15) Admiral de Robeck briefly reported that he had sent the present telegram by bag, and concluded: 'I desire to impress on Your Lordship the great importance of point raised and would submit that matter may receive earnest and early consideration.'

### No. 585

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received November 22)*

*No. 2110 [154459/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 11, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1727<sup>1</sup> of the 4th November, I trust that it is fully realised what the delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which is foreshadowed therein, means to the country at large and particularly to the native Christian population.

2. Owing to the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor, arising out of the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops, there is a strong and growing tendency on the part of all Christians in the interior to make for the sea-coast, where they arrive destitute and homeless, to swell the crowds of refugees, for whom it is already impossible to provide adequate food and accommodation in the coast towns and villages.

3. Even at Constantinople, under the eyes of the various committees organised for the relief of Armenian and Greek refugees, a recent visit which the Assistant High Commissioner paid to an Armenian refugee camp at Haidar Pasha revealed an almost indescribable state of affairs. Men, women, and children were huddled into tents until there was hardly room to move, the decencies could not be preserved, and in wet weather the whole place was deep in mud. Moreover, there were not enough tents for all and several

<sup>1</sup> No. 577.

families were camping in the open, sitting on their bundles in the daytime and sleeping on the bare ground at night.

4. Some explanation of the difficulty in housing refugees in Constantinople is to be found in the destruction caused by recent huge fires and the requisitioning of buildings required for military needs, but it is always the Christian element that has to bear the chief burden of suffering. If this state of things exists in the capital, it is easy to imagine what the conditions of refugee camps in the provinces must be.

5. No stronger proof could be given of the anxiety which the present situation inspires in the heads of the Christian communities than the fact that the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs recently called jointly upon me, arriving together at the British Embassy, for the purpose of drawing attention to the dangers and sufferings of their peoples—an unparalleled instance of fraternity in the history of their churches (see my despatch No. 1923<sup>2</sup> of the 18th October).

6. The various relief organisations which are endeavouring to cope with this great mass of human suffering never contemplated the possibility of having to continue their operations over another winter, with the fate of Turkey still hanging in the balance, and without the material assistance and support of a controlling Christian Power or Powers, or any decision being arrived at with regard to the fundamental questions of policy raised a year ago.

7. The Armenian Committee, which is dependent on voluntary contributions, has almost exhausted its funds; the Greek Committee was never able to extend its operations beyond Thrace and the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, and it now sees its grant from the Greek Government curtailed by a sum of £200,000; the American Committee for Relief in the Near East is also being obliged to reduce its expenditure and staff in a very large measure, and it is seen with dismay that the great hopes of American political and material assistance which had been aroused by President Wilson's declarations and by the activities of the various American Commissions of Enquiry now seem doomed to disappointment.

8. Meanwhile, the needs are increasing daily and mortality, which from various causes is already high, will be enormously increased by the advent of winter, which must bring about the death of many thousands by starvation, exposure, and disease, unless effective measures for relief on a very large scale are quickly set on foot. Typhus has already made its appearance and there is every reason to fear a rapid spread of the disease, due to malnutrition, overcrowding, and insanitary conditions.

9. The work of the relief officers of this High Commission in obtaining the restitution of their property to returned refugees, which was proceeding satisfactorily, received a check on receipt of the news of the Greek landing at Smyrna. But the full effect of that event did not make itself felt for some months, when Turkish resentment for our share in it had been fanned into a flame by the anti-British propaganda of the Nationalists. Now, when the services of the relief officers would be more valuable than ever, they find

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See No. 552.

themselves met with obstructions and hostility instead of readiness to help. The most flagrant cases of injustice to Christians have to be left unredressed, and the well earned prestige and personal influence which they had acquired with all classes of the population have been seriously impaired.

10. With regard to the question of the personal security of Christians in Turkey, it is true that Mustapha Kemal Pasha proposes to guarantee their safety, provided they refrain from any agitation threatening the integrity of the Empire, but after the experience of the last five years no reliance can be placed in the word of an irresponsible Nationalist leader who regards the surviving Armenians and Greeks as so many hostages for the exaction from the Allies of more favourable terms of peace for his own country.

11. The whole of the Near East might be compared to a jelly. Touch it in one part and the whole trembles. The events at Smyrna have had their repercussion throughout the length and breadth of the land. The Christians are now bewildered and terrified—bewildered by the seeming change of front, when, after proclaiming through the world our solicitude for their welfare, they see us apparently abandoning them to their fate, and terrified—and justly so—as to what their fate may be. Great Britain occupies the unique position in the eyes of both Moslems and Eastern Christians, due, on the one hand, to the existence within the British Empire of vast numbers of Moslem fellow subjects and on the other to our consistently sympathetic attitude towards all downtrodden races, while all alike recognise in her the Power which overthrew the Turkish Empire. The moral effect of what they regard as a betrayal is far greater as coming from us than if it came from our French or Italian Allies, or even from the Americans, who are very much of an enigma to them. Despair must seize upon the Christian, while the Moslem is encouraged in a fresh course of oppression.

12. Another result of the indefinite prolongation of the armistice is to increase and emphasize the chaos already existing in Turkey, militarily, politically, and financially. Signs are not wanting that the present Government is as helpless as its predecessor in establishing its authority over the country, nor can it be otherwise while an Allied occupation interferes with almost every branch of administration. To add to its embarrassments, serious distress is inevitable during the coming winter among the many thousand Moslem refugees from the Smyrna area, who are now homeless and destitute. It is true that a certain number of these refugees have been accommodated in the villages vacated by deported Christians, but in their blind hatred of the Christians, the Turks had destroyed much which might now have served for the maintenance of their own distressed co-religionists, cutting down olive and mulberry trees and wrecking houses and buildings in the most wanton fashion.

13. Meanwhile it is not to be supposed that German and Bolshevik agents have been idle. On this fertile soil they could sow the seed of revolution and anarchy, coupled with insane hatred of the Allies, which would be bound to bring forth a plentiful crop of violence and crime. Every district has its band of brigands now posing as patriots, and even in the vicinity of Constantinople

robbery under arms is of daily occurrence, the principal victims being naturally the unprotected Christian villagers. Behind all these elements of disorder stands Mustapha Kemal and his German trained officers, hating and fearing the British, who they know would stand for a state of things in which their occupation would be gone, and ready to proceed to any length to keep Turkey for the Turks and free from foreign interference—above all, that of Great Britain. A prolongation of the armistice served their purpose well. Every week sees their influence grow as the disorder and distress becomes more acute, and the resulting situation will render the task of imposing terms of peace on Turkey infinitely more difficult when it comes at last to be undertaken.

14. If it must be that the armistice is still to continue for some time to come, it becomes necessary to consider what immediate steps should be taken to ameliorate, as far as possible, the unhappy plight of the Christians. It is hopeless to look to the Turkish Government for this. Representations to the Grand Vizier, notes to the Porte and orders from the Central Government to civil and military authorities in the interior are alike treated with indifference or remain without effect. The Government cannot and will not move a finger to help the Christians and possesses no funds to carry out the necessary relief work, even if it desired to do so, but the reverse is now the case. Turks are again taking possession of property restored to their Christian owners through the instrumentality of our relief officers, and a recent report shows that there is a general tendency on the part of the Moslem population, supported by the local authorities, to render it impossible for the Christians to earn their living, and by boycotting and terrorism to drive them again from their homes, never to return.

15. The only possible remedy, or rather palliative, pending a final settlement of the Turkish question, is to be found in extended relief operations. The resources of the existing relief organisations are already practically exhausted, and voluntary efforts will be quite inadequate to cope with the misery threatening the Christians of Turkey during the coming winter, and provide money, food, medical assistance and clothing for hundreds of thousands of sufferers. Under these circumstances, I venture to urge that Great Britain, who has shattered the fabric of Turkish misrule and raised the hopes of better times in the surviving Christian population, should not abandon them to their fate, but assume the responsibility of their relief until their future is better assured, and that she should do this either alone or in concert with her Allies.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

No. 586

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received November 13)*

No. 2054 Telegraphic [151683/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 11, 1919

On October 31st fighting began between Greek and Turkish troops in area between Bergamos and Soma.

Details are not yet to hand, but this collision was result of Greek Commander-in-Chief ordering his forces to advance to Near East delimitation fixed by General Milne, and approved by Supreme Council, without, however, awaiting General Milne's orders and acting, as he (?) states on orders from Monsieur Veneselos direct.

War Office has doubtless been kept fully informed by General Milne and can supply you with latest details.

Deplorable effect produced in this country by such action is too obvious to need emphasizing.

No. 587

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 13)*

No. 1555 Telegraphic: by bag [151668/70100/44]

PARIS, November 12, 1919

Occupation of Meander Valley. My telegram No. 1523<sup>1</sup> of November 5th and my despatch No. 2123<sup>2</sup> of November 10th. Paragraph 5

M. Clemenceau at to-day's meeting of the Supreme Council<sup>3</sup> stated definitely that the French Government felt unable to furnish a contingent to take part in the proposed inter-allied occupation of the Aidin region. As I understand from my military adviser that the War Office maintain their refusal to send a British battalion if the French sent none, I informed the Supreme Council to this effect. In these circumstances the Supreme Council decided unanimously to authorize the Greek government to maintain their existing occupation of the district, and M. Venizelos is being notified accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 580.

<sup>2</sup> No. 583.

<sup>3</sup> The minutes of this meeting are printed in Volume II, No. 20.

<sup>4</sup> The substance of this telegram was communicated to Admiral de Robeck in Foreign Office telegram No. 1773 of November 14, 1919, to Constantinople.

No. 588

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received November 15)*

No. 2057 Telegraphic [152474/70100/44]

Morgan telegraphs as follows.

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 12, 1919

Begins.

No. 2102 of November 10th.

Leader of Turkish national force has warned Greek General here<sup>1</sup> that if

<sup>1</sup> At Smyrna.

oppression of Moslems in Greek zone continues he will take reprisals on Greek Christians in Moslem areas. Vali has telegraphed to Moslem district authorities deprecating this step and asking them to oppose it.

Ends.

No. 589

*Record by Earl Curzon of a conversation with the French Foreign Minister  
[151671/151671/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1919

Within an hour of the arrival of the French Presidential party in London,<sup>1</sup> M. Pichon attended, by appointment, to see me in the Foreign Office. He was accompanied by M. de Fleuriac. Our conversation, which lasted for more than an hour, covered all the more important questions connected with the Near and Middle East.

After a mutual exchange of friendly sentiments and sincere intentions, M. Pichon proceeded to describe the situation as it was in Paris.

The information which he gave about the state of negotiations with the Emir Feisal<sup>2</sup> was much more sanguine than that which had been reported to us by our own informants. I could not help thinking that it was considerably coloured by hope. He said nothing about the suspension of negotiations between the Emir and M. Clemenceau; on the contrary, he described their correspondence and intercourse as being of the most amicable character. He said nothing of the appeal of the Emir to the Peace Conference, although at the moment I had that appeal in my possession. He said nothing about any difficulties arising out of the military evacuation, which had already begun; nor did he say anything about the prospect of danger in the wider field of Syria as a whole. Instead, he represented the Emir as gradually receding from the position which he had at first taken up; as having put forward extravagant pretensions, which were now being watered down; and as realising by degrees that he had taken himself much too seriously, and probably might not find the support, even in his own country, upon which he relied. M. Pichon evidently desired to give me the impression that the negotiations with Emir Feisal would ultimately eventuate in the manner which the French desired.

I did not dispute this rosy estimate of the situation, although it was far from corresponding with the information I had received from Paris. The important thing to my mind, was that the French and the Emir should not split asunder, and should continue their conversations to a point at which some sort of agreement might be arrived at.

The French Foreign Minister was emphatic in his declaration that any suspicion of our intentions and attitude had been removed, and in his satisfaction at the evidence to that effect which we had supplied, both to his own Government and to the Emir. He clearly did not think that the case was one in which we, at any rate, were likely to quarrel.

<sup>1</sup> President Poincaré, accompanied by M. Pichon, paid a state visit to London, November 10-14, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. II.

While reciprocating his hopes, I expressed the strongest possible view that the real danger was that a situation might arise in which the Emir, if he could not come to terms with the French, would so manage matters that our two nations were brought into disagreement, if not into collision, while he remained outside as *tertius gaudens*.

M. Pichon went on to say that, America having disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement of the East, and all chance of an American mandate for any portion of the Turkish Empire having, in his opinion, vanished, there remained only two parties whose interests had seriously to be considered and reconciled, namely, Great Britain and France. From this point of view, he was authorised to say that his Government were prepared to enter into confidential discussions with us as soon as we pleased. Either M. Clemenceau would come here alone, or he would come with M. Pichon, or he would depute the latter. In any case, conversations must take place, and an understanding must be arrived at, before the Peace Conference addressed itself to the Turkish question.

I accepted with gratification both the necessity of such an interchange of views and the desirability of a meeting with M. Clemenceau. I pointed out to M. Pichon that, quite apart from the larger question of peace with Turkey, there were matters connected with the Emir Feisal's case<sup>2</sup> which could be settled only by some such discussion. There was, for instance, the question of the eastern boundary line of the coastal area in Syria which we were now evacuating, in order that we might be replaced by the French. This had been defined in Paris as the Sykes-Picot line. Had the matter been more carefully thought out, the boundary suggested would in all probability have been the military frontier line of O.E.T.A., since between that line and the Sykes-Picot line were tracts of country and villages which the British troops had not occupied, but had left to the Arabs, and where the intrusion of French forces, if they appeared prematurely upon the scene, might be fraught with serious danger. I myself thought that the military frontier ought to be the limit of provisional military occupation by the French. Then, I said, there were in addition such questions as the division of the subsidy to Emir Feisal between the French and ourselves; the control of the railways; the replacement of British by Arab troops in the areas into which the French were not to advance; the risks of risings or disorders there; and the future boundaries of the protected areas in the Syrian State: all of which questions must be considered and agreed upon by the French and ourselves. They were all of them sources of possible mischief, and the sooner they were examined and composed, the better.

But, I went on to say, there was a much larger issue than the mere settlement of these questions by negotiation or otherwise between the French and ourselves; there was a much larger question than even that of the mandates for Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine—although of course it was highly desirable that these mandates should be arranged, and that we should all settle down to work in these countries as soon as possible. I referred to the peace with Turkey itself, and here I desired to go a good deal beyond the

suggestion of the French Minister, and to submit to him a definite proposal on behalf of His Majesty's Government. I understood that the proceedings of the Conference in Paris dealing with the Peace Treaties, so far as they had at present gone, and the matters arising out of them, were likely to be brought to a close about the end of the present month. There seemed to be a general desire that the Conference in its present form should then dissolve. Why, I asked, should it not meet again, perhaps in another form and in another place, to deal with the Turkish question? The idea which had hitherto seemed to find favour was this: that the Conference, having completed its present labours, would take a holiday; that, when the French elections were completed,<sup>3</sup> it would meet again, probably in Paris; and that, some time in the early part, possibly not till the spring, of next year some sort of agreement about Turkey might, it was hoped, be reached. I earnestly deplored any such postponement. By next spring, I said, there might very likely be no Turkish Government to deal with at all. It was more than possible that there would be no one to accept the sort of treaty which the Allies would desire to impose. It was even conceivable that the defeated Turk, who would then be one of the few parties on the scene with a serious force available, would declare war upon the Allies, and dare them to enforce their terms. If this were the case, I did not see how we were to conquer Asia Minor, or who was to do it; and the ignominious result might be that the weakest and most abject of our foes would end by achieving the greatest triumph. Why then, I asked, should not the Conference meet at an early date next month? It might very well meet after the conversations with the French statesmen in London. For the best part of ten months the British and other foreign statesmen had been willing to reside almost continuously in Paris. The conditions of political life here rendered this no longer possible. The Prime Minister could not go to Paris again for any length of time. It was very difficult for me to go there at all. In this country were to be found most of the experts who were familiar with the Eastern question. The French and Italian Ambassadors were themselves both experts, having served as Ambassadors in Constantinople. M. Tittoni, I knew, was willing to come here. The American Government would, I believed, agree to send a representative here. In these circumstances, would it not be desirable to arrange at once that the Eastern question should be reserved for London, and taken up and determined here? My own impression was that, if this idea were favourably regarded, a settlement might be arrived at in a month, or not much more. The Conference, if it met in December, might, if necessary, adjourn for Christmas, meet again early in January, and complete its work by the middle of that month.

I enumerated to the French Foreign Minister the main headings of the subjects which would have to be decided. They were, it seemed to me, the following: the future of Turkey-in-Europe and the setting up of some form of administration or control in Constantinople, whether or not the Sultan was left in Stamboul; the question whether Greece was or was not to be allowed to remain in Smyrna; the question whether Italy was to have any foothold

<sup>3</sup> See below.

in Asia Minor or not; the question whether a mandate was to be given to any Power or Powers, either for the whole of the Turkish Empire or for any portion of it; the degree of sovereignty, if any, to be left to the Turk; the question whether, if no mandate were given or accepted, some form of international supervision would, or would not, be required; the supervision of the Caucasus; the restitution of Armenia; and the future of Kurdistan. These were matters that required to be handled, quite apart from those questions the solution of which had to some extent been prejudged, such as the fate of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Upon these latter questions, the kind of understanding between France and ourselves which M. Pichon had predicted was most desirable. If we could attain it at the conversations which he had suggested, we might then approach the larger problems with some hopes of success.

M. Pichon explained to me in reply that this was an entirely new proposal, which he would, upon his return to France, submit without delay to the Président du Conseil. He did not himself regard it with disfavour, but he feared that there might be obstacles in the way. For instance, he described to me the system of elections going on simultaneously or in rapid sequence in almost every electoral area and for almost every conceivable elected body in France. He personally was standing, or was affected, in four or five different places and capacities. France would not be quit of these preoccupations till the middle of January, and it might therefore till then be very difficult for French statesmen to go abroad for a discussion. Nevertheless, he promised to put forward the suggestion, with which I told him that M. Cambon had for long been in warm sympathy, and he would let me have an early reply.

In the evening of the same day I mentioned the matter to the President of the French Republic. His attitude, although most friendly and polite, seemed to me on the whole to be antagonistic to the project.

I was left with the impression that the French will fight hard, for many reasons which can be conjectured, to retain in Paris the entire proceedings of the Peace Conference, and to represent France as the only possible or effective pacifier of the world.

I did not conceal from M. Pichon that we should find the greatest difficulty in acceding to any such plan, and I impressed upon him that the proposal I had put forward was one deserving the most serious consideration.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

## No. 590

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received November 20)*

*No. 2058 Telegraphic [152033/1638/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 13, 1919

I understand War Office have sent orders to military authorities here to demobilise all the British personnel on Anatolian Railway leaving Railway to be run by local employés. I submit, first, employés of Ottoman nationality

are quite incompetent to carry on service which used to be done by German employés all of whom we have with great care deported in conformity with Armistice and, secondly, that good working of line is of immense political importance. From local point of view of British interests it is even more important this control should remain in British hands as at present unless it is intention of His Majesty's Government to let Anatolia pass under French influence.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Admiral de Robeck further reported in Constantinople telegram No. 2081 of November 20, 1919 (received that day):

'General Milne informs me lack of British personnel is rendering it increasingly difficult to carry on control of the Anatolian Railway and that British personnel is rapidly disappearing from Allied Police Commission.

'There is a danger that the control both of the railways and the British section of police may cease early (in) 1920 if further personnel is not forthcoming.

'As regards railways it has been suggested to War Office that civilians be sent out with temporary Commissions if necessary.

'Strongly urge you take this matter up with War Office if our prestige and authority in this country is not still further to suffer.'

### No. 591

*Earl Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6)  
No. 215 [159132/27912/19]*

My Lord,

ATHENS, November 14, 1919

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of an interesting report on the 'Royalist Movement in the Greek Army', issued by the General Staff Intelligence, Army of the Black Sea, and communicated by them to the military attaché.

M. Repoullis, Vice-President of the Council, was good enough to come and see me this morning, and Mr. Atchley<sup>1</sup> read to him a summary in Greek of this report. M. Repoullis' comments on the report were as follows:—

1. The Görlitz officers<sup>2</sup> may be divided into three categories, viz.:—
  - (a) The leaders and violent Constantinists, who have all been removed from the army, and most of them interned or expelled;
  - (b) Those who had or have pretty strong Constantinist proclivities and who have been retained in the army, but are carefully watched; and
  - (c) Those who are believed to be Venislists, but were unable to resist or refuse to surrender to the enemy when their comrades did so, and were, in consequence, subjected to special treatment in Germany.

Most of class (b) declare at least that they have been and are true to their country, and are prepared to do their military duty regardless of politics; some of these are no doubt really strong Constantinists, and all are sore at the decision taken by the Government to count service in the National Defence Army, created under the Provisional Government at Salonika, as double in view of promotion, with the result that the National Defence

<sup>1</sup> Second Secretary and Translator in His Majesty's Legation at Athens.

<sup>2</sup> See enclosure below.

officers have been promoted over the heads of their seniors. The Government, M. Repoulis said, is meditating some method of relieving the financial difficulties of these officers. There is no doubt, besides, a certain amount of war-weariness, but M. Repoulis declared his conviction that all proper precautions are being taken, and that there is no danger. I told M. Repoulis that I had been informed that wounded soldiers from Asia Minor in the hospitals here had expressed very strong anti-Veniselist feelings, and had complained bitterly of their service in Asia Minor. He replied that those who had anti-Veniselist sentiments naturally expressed them all the more bitterly when they came home wounded, and that even others might very likely be inclined to 'grouse' over their wounds, but that he did not believe such feelings existed in the army of occupation to anything like the extent suggested.

2. We did not quote Colonel Maroudas<sup>2</sup> by name. M. Repoulis flatly denied the strength of the anti-Veniselists in Athens; in fact, he went to far as to say that the Royalists are weaker there than elsewhere, and he tried to prove by the relative circulation of Veniselist and Opposition papers that the Veniselists are in a very great majority. I do not feel quite so optimistic on this subject as M. Repoulis, but I think that the 'Royalist' portion of the Opposition are very busy and active and make more show than their numbers warrant, while the greater part of the Opposition are dissatisfied with the present Government for various good or bad reasons, are very far indeed from being Constantinists, and when it comes to the point will probably vote for M. Veniselos.

3. M. Repoulis took a note of the names mentioned, some of whom, especially George Adamopoulos, are well known as dangerous Constantinist agents; he made no remark, but evidently intended to look into the matter. The carrying of letters by private persons is so common in Greece that there is nothing particularly suspicious merely in that.<sup>2</sup> Those 'Royalist' newspapers which are allowed to be published in Athens are presumably not prevented from being sent to Smyrna; the *Nomotages* is published in America and is, I believe, prohibited in Greece.

4. M. Repoulis repudiated the suggestion that the Government might be sending Royalists to Smyrna on purpose in order to get rid of them from Athens.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople and am asking the military attaché to send a copy to the General Staff Intelligence, Army of the Black Sea.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 591

*Royalist Movement in the Greek Army*

1. *Constantinist Faction in the Greek Army of Occupation*

A considerable number of officers, particularly the senior officers, are stated to be 'Constantinist' in their sympathies.

They may be divided into two classes—

- (a) The long-standing 'Royalist' officers—including several who were interned at Görlitz during the war—who maintain their loyalty to the late King and are discontented with the present régime, since under it they find themselves professionally handicapped by the promotion over their heads of a number of junior officers of professed Veniselist sympathies.
- (b) A large number of officers and men of every kind of political colour, who have developed anti-Veniselist views as a result of war-weariness, especially in the zone of Greek occupation in Asia Minor, because they are put under the control of a foreign Power. These men do not understand what advantages can accrue to Greece out of the present situation. According to their views the Greek army is merely being used to keep part of Asia Minor in order for the benefit of the Great Powers.

## 2. *Political Parties in Athens*

Lieutenant-Colonel Marouthas, chief of the secret police, Athens, who is a staunch Veniselist, and rendered great assistance to the Allies during the war, expressed the following opinions concerning the state of affairs in Athens while on leave in Smyrna a few days ago.

'In Athens the peoples are divided into three sets, the Veniselists, the Royalists, and lastly the Nationalists, who are neither for the Veniselist cause nor for the Royalist, but are simply patriots not influenced by either party, and wishing only to see Greece in a strong position in the Balkans, regardless of what territory is allotted to her. Their opinions, expressed openly, are that Venizelos has rather rushed matters, and is demanding more territory than he can properly hold, the Smyrna zone being given as an example, keeping a large army under difficult conditions, no help given to Greece by the Allies, which is weakening the position of Greece financially; that the troops are losing their *moral* in not being allowed ever to take the offensive; that the nation is not willing to stand by Venizelos in the present conditions.'

'The Royalists, having a great deal to gain by the return of the King, are making the most of the present situation to stir up trouble, and the Royalist newspapers are writing freely against the Allies, and showing how the King was right in his attitude of remaining strictly neutral.'

Colonel Marouthas states that, if it were put to the vote in Athens, no Veniselist would be elected in the Government.

## 3. *Communications between Smyrna and Athens*

(a) The Greek censorship between Athens and Smyrna apparently does not prevent the export of 'Royalist' newspapers, numbers of which have been brought to Smyrna, and several civilians have been arrested for having these papers in their possession. The following is a good example of what is taking place here: a Greek Royalist newspaper, *Nomotages* ('Obedient to the law'), arrived a few days ago by mail, addressed to Paniotis Triandfilis, a chemist

in Varthi, Kiou Thimitriou Street, Smyrna. A certain Dr. Stavridis passed by the chemist's house on his way to Bournabat, and took a paper to read in the train. Seated alongside of him in the train was a Greek officer, who, noticing that the leading article of the newspaper which Dr. Stavridis was reading was against Veniselos and the Entente, called a guard at Bournabat and had the unfortunate doctor arrested. He is to be tried by court-martial. The next day the police visited the newspaper shops in order to see whether any more copies were about.

(b) There is also apparently a regular service of secret correspondence between members of the Constantinist faction in Smyrna and those in Athens. On or about the 6th September the Greek commandant of the base, General Kalomenopoulos, arrested one George Adamopoulos, a leading active Royalist and Germanophil during the war, who had been interned at Malta. When arrested he was acting as courier between the Royalists of Athens and the Royalist officers of the army of occupation. On him were found about 100 letters from officers, chiefly of the 34th regiment, 2nd division, including Colonel Karakatzonis, commanding the regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vlahos.

It is also stated that various private soldiers are being used as go-betweens for the transmission of correspondence between Asia Minor and Athens, since Adamopoulos is known to have recommended one as a safe man to Colonel Karakatzonis. In consequence of this discovery, the officer commanding the 34th regiment and a number of other officers of this regiment, and also of the rest of the 2nd division, were arrested.

#### *4. Measures taken to Suppress Constantinist Activity*

M. Sterchiades, the Greek High Commissioner, is organising a secret police service to obtain information concerning the Royalist situation here, but he realises that it is extremely difficult to obtain correct information. The ordinary gendarmerie, which is gaining for itself great unpopularity even among the Greeks of Smyrna on account of its arbitrary actions, counts among its officers three known fanatical 'Royalists', Captains Kranakis, Spirou, and Vergoyanopoulos, all of whom are known to the E.M.S.I.B.<sup>3</sup>

It is very difficult to understand what policy is being pursued by the Greek Government, as, notwithstanding the anxiety in Smyrna concerning the Royalists, the Athens Government are still sending 'Royalist' gendarmerie officers to Smyrna. On the 15th October Colonel Katzonas, a native of Tripoli, and well known to the M.C.O.,<sup>4</sup> Athens, for his pro-German ideas, arrived in Smyrna with 200 gendarmes, and has been given command of all the gendarmerie forces in the Smyrna zone. His name appears in the E.M.S.I.B. Black List. It is possible that the Veniselist Government has decided to clear Athens as far as possible of 'Royalist' leaders by sending them to Asia Minor.

#### *5. General*

As far as present information goes, it appears that the 'Royalist' activity

<sup>3</sup> Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau.      <sup>4</sup> Military Control Office.

here is chiefly the product of war-weariness. The majority of these officers and men do not understand why a large Greek force is kept mobilised here in Asia Minor, which might eventually not be given to Greece. Moreover, many of the Greeks have frankly no interest in the acquisition of the Smyrna area. Recently, considerable numbers of men of the older classes have been demobilised, and have been replaced by men of recruit classes from Old Greece, presumably in order to minimise as much as possible the discontent among the men.

It is not known how far the movement in Athens has any positive programme, or to what extent it is a danger to the present Veniselist régime.

Issued by the General Staff Intelligence,

Army of the Black Sea.

3.11.1919

*Constantinople.*

No. 592

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

No. 1779 Telegraphic [149580/6490/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 15, 1919

Your despatch No. 1958<sup>1</sup> (of the 22nd October. Transfer of Deutsche Bank to the Banca Italiana di Sconto).

Transfer should not be permitted during Armistice and Inter-Allied control should take steps to prevent the arrangements being carried out.

<sup>1</sup> No. 562.

No. 593

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received November 29)

No. 2137 [156710/6490/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 16, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch dated the 22nd October last, No. 1958/ S. 2358,<sup>1</sup> forwarding a copy of a letter which I had received from the British Controller of the Enemy Banks regarding an agreement entered into between the Deutsche Bank and the Banco Italiana di Sconto, I have the honour now to inform Your Lordship that this matter has been discussed at recent meetings of the Allied High Commissioners.

2. As a result of these discussions and the representations of my Italian colleague, who gave an assurance that the Deutsche Bank would not be allowed to do business under cover of the Banco di Sconto, though the latter would endeavour to acquire for itself as much as possible of the custom hitherto belonging to the German Bank, it was decided to send a Joint Note to the Interallied Bank Control approving the agreement. I transmit herewith a copy of the Joint Note<sup>2</sup> for Your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

<sup>1</sup> No. 562.

<sup>2</sup> This note, dated November 6, 1919, is not printed.

No. 594

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received November 29)

No. 2143 [156715/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 16, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to previous correspondence relative to the general political situation in this country, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of what purport to be telegrams exchanged between Salih Pasha, Minister of Marine, and the Central Government here during Salih Pasha's mission to the 'National forces'.<sup>1</sup> These documents have reached me from a very secret source. I am unable to verify their authenticity, but they bear on the face of them an impress of genuineness.

2. When Salih Pasha went to Amassia it was announced that though a complete agreement had been arrived at between the new Cabinet and the head of the national movement on all questions of broad policy, various matters of detail remained to be settled, and that the Pasha was being sent to treat about these matters direct with Mustapha Kemal and his companions. Salih Pasha returned precipitately, in circumstances which are still obscure, but which left no doubt that his mission had not been a success. The official version was that it *had* been a success, but that certain matters of detail remained still to be settled, a formula exactly similar to that used before he started.

3. Tewfik Pasha admitted not very long ago that there was a question between the Nationalists and the Government, as to whether the Parliament should meet in Broussa or Constantinople, and in a private conversation on the 6th November the Grand Vizier definitely admitted to Mr. Ryan that Salih Pasha's mission had been a failure. His Highness observed emphatically in the same conversation that the policy of his Government was one of conciliation with the national movement, but not one of complete subservience. They were now sending, he said, two further missions to study the situation in the interior.

4. In a further conversation of the same kind on the 13th November His Highness again admitted that complete accord did not reign between his Government and the organiser of the national movement. He conveyed, indeed, the impression that matters were rather at a deadlock. Though evidently a little anxious over this, he did not appear as disconsolate as might have been expected, or seem to have any immediate fear for his position. The two new missions had, he said, reached the starting points of their labours, Samsoun and Konia, and the Government hoped almost at once to begin to receive reports from them.

5. The real position appears to be that the leaders of the national movement are prepared for the moment to waive minor causes of differences with the Government, either because they feel that they have lost ground, or

<sup>1</sup> See below.

because they think they can afford to hold their hand in Constantinople until they have rigged the elections, and produced out of their witches' cauldron a body of deputies who can be mobilised a month hence here or in the interior as circumstances require. The results of the elections announced so far show that they have no difficulty in inducing the free and independent electors of Thrace and Anatolia to return members of the finest nationalist and even committee flavour.

6. The Government on their side have become more and more a Cabinet of what is called in Turkish 'Idare-i-maslahat', or a 'business Cabinet'. Every kind of rumour is afloat as to the probability of a change. As I observed in section 5 of my telegram No. 2052,<sup>2</sup> the *Entente libérale* are making strong efforts to engineer the advent to power of an 'anti-nationalist' Government, but they are hampered by lack of resources, energetic men of high standing, or real unity. They may succeed in spite of these disabilities, or the Sultan may conceivably try the experiment of asking the present Grand Vizier to make way for Prince Sabahuddin, about whose possible advent to power *ballons d'essai* have been flying.

7. On the whole, however, I think that if the Government goes out before the assembly of Parliament, it is more likely to be as the result of an internal break over the degree of obedience to be rendered to the national movement than for any other reason. The Minister for War, who was, as your Lordship will remember, himself identified with the national movement in its earlier stages, seems a good deal more inclined than the Grand Vizier or his colleagues of Foreign Affairs or the Interior to push matters in the capital in the interests of the movement.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 594

*Telegraphic Correspondence between the Grand Vizier and Salih Pasha*

Document 1

*Salih Pasha, at Amassia, to the Grand Vizier, October 18, 1919*

Following from T. 10. No. 4.

With the blessing of God I have arrived at Amassia and got into communication with Kemal Pasha, Reouf, Rustem, and Vassif Beys, who were awaiting our mission. In the course of our interview I was requested to submit to your Highness the following conditions for the purpose of conciliation following upon those submitted by Kemal Pasha in the name of the National Defence on the 3rd October, 1335, with a request that they be considered by the Council of Ministers, and that the result of the deliberations of the Council be communicated to them.

The following are the conditions and decisions in modification of those taken by the Congress on the last occasion, and brought forward by the representative of the Congress at the time of the reception of the telegram sent to

<sup>2</sup> No. 584.

Sivas, dated the 1st October, by the First Secretary, notifying the fall of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet. These conditions and decisions were submitted to your Highness by a telegram dated the 2nd October:—

1. One-third at least of the members of the delegation to be sent to Paris shall be elected by the National Organisation.
2. The acceptance by the Government of candidates and deputies designated by the National Defence during the elections; the right of candidature and election to be granted to officers and senior officers having ten years' service.
3. The acceptance by the Government, as has already been admitted by the Government and upon which the National Defence had insisted, of a general amnesty; its publication at the desired moment; to make representations to the Allied Powers for the recall of those persons now in Malta and other countries with a view to obtaining their return; later on to bring those who are guilty to trial, either in Constantinople or elsewhere.
4. To bring certain members of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet to trial before a High Court.
5. The National Organisation repeats its petition to His Majesty the Sultan to continue to repose his confidence in it, and for its part the National Organisation will give every kind of assurance necessary by action and by oath to dissipate any kind of suspicion or doubt entertained by His Majesty the Sultan with regard to rumours now current concerning His Highness the heir apparent.
6. As was stated in article 5 of the decisions of the Sivas Congress, the commissioners of the National Organisation will exercise control over the following: (a) conclusion of peace, (b) financial matters, (c) executive and political matters until the opening of the Chamber. In the event of the resignation of the Cabinet, no Ministers will be appointed among the opponents of the National Organisation.
7. To include in the Council of Ministers certain persons in accordance with the decision of the Congress and the demand already submitted.
8. The execution and accomplishment without delay or negligence by the Government of the points decided upon in the Sivas Congress concerning the foreign policy of the Empire; the treaties to be concluded with the Allied Powers and other countries, especially with Russia and Bulgaria, to be based upon the sovereignty of the Ottoman Caliphate and nation; negotiations with the English and French Governments to be undertaken to this end.
9. The Government to check the movement against the Nationalists at Bozkar, Ada Bazar; to ensure security (for the National forces) in any district where similar events may occur.

The National Organisation will not fail to take precautionary measures against any decisions of the Government contrary to the interests of the Organisation. Further, I have been definitely informed that it will not be

convenient for me to proceed to Sivas before I have received a reply to these proposals.

I beg your Highness to be so kind as to reply to my telegram No. 3 and to inform me as to the answer which I am to return to the commissioners of the Organisation regarding the above-mentioned demands. 18th October 1335.

SALIH

## Document 2

*The Grand Vizier to Salih Pasha, October 19, 1335*

No. 1265/8

Reply to telegram of the 18th October, 1335 (262-419).

The decision of the Council of Ministers which has received the assent of His Majesty the Sultan in reply to the conciliatory proposals of the honourable commission (National Organisation).

In view of the principle for which the National Organisation has been constituted, namely, for the defence of the country and of the nation, a principle maintained by the decisions of the Congress of Sivas,

In view also of Ottoman and foreign public opinion, and especially of the present delicate situation and negotiations now taking place with the Great Powers concerning matters of the highest importance,

The Government with a view to ensuring success in these matters, accepts in principle the proposal that the commissioners of the National Defence shall act as councillors to the executive power until the opening of the Chamber, in order that it may not be supposed that a second power exists behind the Government.

It accepts the first article.

It also accepts and approves the first paragraph of the second article, the scrutiny of voting papers by commissions to be formed by the Government with the consent of the population in places where the candidates and deputies of the Organisation may be elected, provided that the elections take place in complete freedom.

As regards the second paragraph of article 2, the draft of a law has been approved by the Council of Ministers and is on the point of being endorsed by the High Military Court, in conformity with which the service of senior officers is fixed at ten years only, and the right of election and of voting as a candidate (*sic*) is granted to these officers.

With regard to articles 3 and 4, the present Government has agreed on principle to negotiate with the Allied Powers, and after these negotiations to rely upon public opinion, and to submit them to the Chamber immediately upon its being convened.

With regard to article 5, the good intentions of His Majesty the Sultan towards the National Organisation are proved by his declarations to the nation. He will never refuse his Imperial protection within the limits of his sovereign rights and those of the Caliphate, and he has deigned to request you to bring to the knowledge of the honourable Commission his Imperial satis-

faction with the assurances, by action and by oath, of the complete fidelity of the nation towards his Imperial person.

With regard to the question of the supervision which is mentioned in article 6, as has already been stated, the principles of admitting the reasonable demands of the commissioners as a Commission of Advisers until the opening of the Chamber has been accepted.

The modification to be effected in the Council of Ministers, according to article 7, would not be advisable at the present moment; His Majesty the Sultan desires that the present Cabinet should regulate all affairs until it can obtain a vote of confidence at the opening of Parliament; and with regard to article 8, since the executive power is responsible for the decisions of the administration of the political affairs of the country, the political arrangements and treaties to be concluded with the Great Powers and other Governments will be submitted in case of necessity to both Chambers.

The Government agrees to an exchange of opinion in case of necessity with the commissioners to be known as the 'Commission of Councillors' until the opening of the Chamber.

The necessary measures for the earliest possible cessation of collisions caused by a certain effervescence at Ada Bazar and Bozkir, resulting from the great attachment of the nation to the National Organisation, have been taken; but the Government requests that the Organisation should also do its part, and draws the attention of the honourable Commission to the fact that it is in Ottoman interests not to bring about undesirable events.

We beg you under present conditions to delay your departure to Sivas and to communicate the present decision of the Council of Ministers to the honourable Commission and to communicate to me the reply; also to return by the vessel placed at your disposal. ALI RIZA, *Grand Vizier*.

October 19, 1935.

### No. 595

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received November 19)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [153751/119886/44]*

PARIS, November 17, 1919

I learn from a letter from Mr. Sperling to Mr. Vansittart<sup>1</sup> that it is contemplated to proceed at once with the cessions to Italy on the west frontier of Egypt and in Jubaland.<sup>2</sup> It had always been—and Mr. Balfour will be able to confirm this—understood here that no definite cession would be made except as part of a general arrangement which would include the questions of the Adriatic and Asia Minor. I earnestly trust that there will be no departure from this understanding, as otherwise we shall be deprived of our most powerful, if not our only lever in inevitable bargaining of the future, which will be of the utmost value to us especially in dealing with Italian claims in Asia Minor.

<sup>1</sup> This private letter is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 17, note 7.

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Mr. Kidston  
(Received November 19)*

No. 342/1/6/20367 [153371/50535/58<sup>1</sup>]

PARIS, November 17, 1919

My dear Kidston,

1. My attention has been drawn to the letter from the War Office of October 23rd about assisting the Armenians with arms and equipment<sup>2</sup> (your printed despatch No. 7467<sup>3</sup> (145108/M.E./58) of November 11th).

2. This letter touches really on two questions, (a) the immediate question of helping the Erivan republic with arms which, as you know, does to some extent concern this Conference and Delegation owing to Haskell's mission, and (b) the future treatment of Armenia by the Conference (whether it be this or another) which deals with the Turkish Peace. We here are not really immediately concerned in the latter question but it is of such importance that I shall also mention this aspect of the matter below.

3. There is, of course, a good deal to be said for not arming the Armenians

<sup>1</sup> This last file number was in error for 44.

<sup>2</sup> For this question see Volume III, No. 429.

<sup>3</sup> This formal covering despatch transmitting the War Office letter of October 23, 1919, is not printed. The War Office letter read as follows:

'Sir,

'1. I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 134168/M.E. 58 [not printed] dated 30th September, enclosing copy of telegram No. 33 from Mr. Wardrop [see Vol. III, No. 429, note 1] relative to a proposal to assist the Armenians with arms and equipment.

'2. In reply I am to say that the Council regret that they have neither arms nor equipment available to meet the demand and that, moreover, they adhere to the opinion expressed in their letter No. 0103/Gen. No. 887 (M.I. 2) [not printed], dated 26th August, that the provision of arms for the Armenians will lead to provocative action on their part and further complicate the difficult situation.

'Other reasons which influence the Council in their opinion that it is undesirable to assist the Armenians by supplying them with arms and equipment are the following:—

'(a) The jealousy which will be created in the neighbouring states.

'(b) The danger of increasing the hostility of Mohammedans in Turkey both to the Armenians and towards the Entente powers.

'In this connection I am to enclose a copy [not printed] of a concrete proposal which has been received from General Korganoff for the establishment of a regular Armenian Army of 30,000 men. Earl Curzon of Kedleston will observe that General Korganoff's proposal is confined to the consideration of a small Armenian state round Erivan. The Council think that this may be a suitable occasion to say that there seems to be no prospects of the creation of a Greater Armenia stretching from Cilicia to the Caucasia, and now that Cilicia appears likely to be placed under a French mandate it would be well to abandon the idea of a Greater Armenia for the present and to endeavour to induce the Armenians to believe that the best prospects for their future lie in the creation of two small states, one in Cilicia and one in the Caucasus.

'I am, &c.  
H. J. GREEDY'

to an extent which might make them an aggressive danger to their immediate neighbours, so long as the Conference is unable to supply them with European or American officers to organise and control the forces to which these arms are to be supplied: (I still hope that when the Turkish peace comes seriously to be discussed, ways and means may be found for doing this). But it seems to us here that it should be possible through consultation with Wardrop and Haskell to provide them with the surely inconsiderable quantity of arms and equipment which would enable them to defend themselves against the Turks, Kurds and Tartars on their borders, equipping them in fact for defence rather than offence, and both Wardrop and Haskell should be able to do a good deal by their influence, which seems already to have been more than once successfully exercised, in seeing that the Armenians did not abuse their increased strength. There is surely more danger of the Armenians, who still exist in this part of the world, being attacked and killed by Turks and Tartars rather than of the latter being attacked and killed by Armenians. For the rest, we appear to be under some obligations to the Armenians in this matter, not only owing to past public utterances by our statesmen but also because of our forced (and doubtless inevitable) withdrawal from the Caucasus.

4. I do not think that much attention need be paid to the possibility of either the Georgians or the Azerbaijanis becoming jealous of Armenia, if moderately equipped by us. Georgia is much better able to look after herself than Armenia and does not fear attacks from the latter. We are already giving her moral support in her relations with Denikin. Azerbaijan seems equally well able to look after herself and in view of recent history and her sympathies (perhaps for the moment latent) with our enemies, the Turks, it seems quixotic to have so much regard for her susceptibilities.

5. It must also be remembered that the future of Georgia and Azerbaijan is linked up with the fortunes of Denikin and the future Russia to a much greater degree than Armenia's and it does not seem likely that Russia will object to an independent Armenia. From this point of view, also, we are justified in treating Armenia differently from Georgia and Azerbaijan.

6. It is difficult to take seriously the second War Office argument as to increasing the hostility of Mahomedans in Turkey. If it were a question of arming Armenians in the Caucasus and sending them into Turkey (which it is not) there might be something in it because Mustapha might then be able to rouse the Kurds in the usual C.U.P. way. At present his agents do not appear to be having much success in Kurdistan proper and his control appears to be chiefly over the central Anatolian and Erzeroum vilayets where he apparently has a force of some 70,000 men and difficulty in getting anything but promises from the Turkish peasantry to fight for him! Nothing to my mind is likely to 'increase' his hostility to the Entente, until the Turkish terms of peace are announced. The growth of his movement (of the C.U.P. Nationalist brand) is already frankly hostile to the Entente and their intentions, and was roused not so much by the Greeks landing at Smyrna, as so many people seem fondly to believe and as Mustapha would doubtless like us to believe, as by the failure of Damad Ferid's Mission to Paris, and by the

publication of the Supreme Council's reply to the Turks<sup>4</sup> last July. The Greek landing was doubtless a concrete sign of the Conference's intentions with regard to Turkey and was useful to Mustapha and the leaders of the movement to organise opposition against the day when the Conference finally announces its terms.

7. As regards the first part of the War Office letter I still, therefore, hope that you may be able to get them to reconsider their decision to some extent. The Armenian delegations here are much disappointed with their attitude.

8. The War Office in the last paragraph of their letter make no attempt to conceal part of that policy which, we know, they would like the Turkish peace terms to reflect, i.e. an independent Turkey as large as possible and continuing its rule over subject races whether they be Greeks, Kurds or Armenians. I trust that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Peace Conference will be influenced in so large a question of policy by what the War Office (or in this case, as we all know, Major Gribbon) thinks. Considerations of much wider importance than the purely military are at stake and ought to be the basis of their decisions, and I personally still hope that the Conference may find means of imposing terms on Turkey according to the spirit and indeed the letter of the Supreme Council's reply to the Turks<sup>4</sup> last July in the matter of the subject races of Turkey.

9. After all, Mustapha or no Mustapha and whatever form of international supervision may be devised for an independent Turkey in Anatolia, we are in possession of Constantinople and could to-morrow, if we like, cut it off from Anatolia and occupy the rest of a Straits zone; the Greeks are in possession of Smyrna and the zone round it, and I believe Monsieur Venezelos to be right in thinking that they could hold it against any force which Mustapha could bring against them: Cilicia and the Arab countries are already virtually in the occupation of ourselves and the French: the difficulty remains as regards the Eastern vilayets—Kurdish and Armenian. But even in that region and on the supposition that America refuses all mandates and that no other single Power is prepared to fill her place, I believe that it should be possible to devise some method of placing the whole of this area under the League of Nations and some form of International control and dividing it into Armenian and Kurdish zones (it seems both possible and desirable to have a Kurdish and an Armenian policy at the same time). The former zone might perhaps link up Cilicia with the Erivan republic, and the latter might cover the really Kurdish areas from Diarbekir to the Persian frontier. Whether the Kurdish zone should be attached in some way to a Mesopotamian mandate or left to an international control, would be a matter for discussion, and I believe that you are already debating the former alternative with Major Noel in London.

10. We have the power to carry out such a policy as that outlined above if we like, and we could get the consent of the Conference to it if we really wished to, but of course there remains the question raised by the attitude of Indian Moslems and the India Office. You, however, know my views on this aspect of the question and I will not repeat them.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 426.

11. Only the importance of the issues raised by the War Office and the disastrous consequences which I believe might follow the adoption of their general views in the matter of Turkey, justify the length of this letter, which I have written to you privately because I can thus express my opinions more freely.

Yours always,  
EYRE A. CROWE

No. 597

*Letter from Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/Turkey]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 18, 1919

Dear Lord Curzon,

I feel somewhat reluctant to add to your preoccupations with a private letter; but it occurs to me that certain impressions which I have formed here may have some interest, the more so as they have been formed, I think I may say, with an entirely detached mind.

In the first place, I am somewhat anxious as to the effect which the delay in settling the Turkish Treaty is having on the Moslem world both in and outside Turkey. At the time of the armistice Turkey was so cowed that she would have accepted almost any terms; but between then and now the Turks have had time to pull themselves together. Above all, the Greek occupation of Smyrna has stimulated a Turkish patriotism probably more real than any which the war was able to evoke. That patriotism has enabled Mustafa Kemal to raise a force which, if he decides to resist the peace terms, might cause the Allies considerable embarrassment.

Besides relying on his troops, Mustafa Kemal is naturally seeking allies elsewhere, and recent indications lead me to believe that he and the Arabs are seeking an understanding. There have been quite lately disquieting reports from Syria, also from Egypt, where in present circumstances the Turkish national movement cannot fail to win sympathy.

I feel it is very necessary from our own point of view and in the interests of the peace of our Moslem Empire that we should retain among Moslems here our reputation for honesty and good faith. In saying this, I do not mean that Turkey should not be punished, but that her punishment should take a form that will not bring that reputation into question.

It must not be forgotten that some of our Allies would be quite resigned to see us discredited in the Near East, and are in fact already working to undermine our position in ways which we cannot stoop to counter. I therefore feel that we need to consider carefully the ultimate effect which the allied decisions on Turkey may have on the British Empire. To take an example, the Smyrna occupation has damaged our reputation for honesty of purpose very considerably in Turkish circles potentially friendly to us. Rightly or wrongly, they attribute the decision to send Greek troops to Aidin principally to

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain.

British influence; and they cannot reconcile that decision with our avowed principles as regards the rights of nationalities. The acceptance and publication of the atrocities commission's report by the Allies would go some way to rehabilitate our reputation, and I trust that this may not be found impossible. I do not underrate M. Venizelos' claims to the gratitude of the Powers, but I hope that those claims can be met without the slur on our good name among Moslems generally which I fear that the suppression of the report would involve. Moreover, what would be the effect on our prestige if the report, after being pigeon-holed in Paris, was published in the American Press, a possibility which cannot be ignored?

To sum up, I believe that if the peace terms with Turkey are to include the dismemberment of the regions predominantly Ottoman in population (such as the Aidin Vilayet, which is moreover the richest agricultural land in Ottoman Turkey) the possibility of warfare, regular or guerilla, must be envisaged. I also fear that our Allies will look to us to exercise the bulk of any force that may be required for this purpose. But above all I fear that, even if such terms are ultimately imposed, a Turkey who genuinely feels that she has been treated contrary to the principles on which the Allies went to war, will remain disturbed, and will continue to foment trouble in the Moslem, particularly in the British Moslem, world.

I hope you will excuse the length of this letter, which I will end with a plea for as rapid a conclusion of peace with Turkey as is possible. I cannot over-emphasise my conviction that each day's delay is making the ultimate settlement more difficult, also that the British Empire is more sensitive to the dangers resulting from the delay than any Allied country.

While nothing eventful has latterly occurred in Constantinople itself, one feels that the situation contains infinite possibilities, mostly unpleasant; and the tension is already noticeable in the temper of several of our Allies. It would be helpful here if there could be some published indication from London or Paris that definite steps were being taken to bring the settlement within sight.

Yrs. sincerely,  
J. M. DE ROBECK

#### No. 598

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

*No. 1793 Telegraphic [152305/521/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 19, 1919

Your telegram No. 2060.<sup>1</sup>

We fully realise the importance of the point you have raised and can assure you that any suggestions made by you to meet the difficulties arising from the indefinite prolongation of the Armistice will receive immediate and careful consideration. We have for some time been pressing for early commencement of Peace Negotiations with Turkey.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 584, note 8.

No. 599

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 2)*

No. 2185 [157503/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 20, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of a note addressed by me to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Turkish Authorities obtaining from reluctant Christian communities signed statements expressing satisfaction and appreciation as regards the present state of affairs.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN No. 599

*The British High Commissioner to the Turkish Foreign Minister*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 15, 1919

No. 5027/157

Sir,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been made aware that the Ottoman local authorities in certain parts of Turkey are endeavouring to obtain, by coercion and intimidation, signed statements from the representatives of the Christian communities to the effect that they are enjoying complete security and such-like assurances of tranquillity and well-being, and, moreover, that the Ministry of the Interior has cognisance of this practice.

2. Your Excellency will doubtless recollect that such a course has been instituted and followed on previous occasions in Turkey during the past twenty or thirty years, at times when, as now, the situation has been far from justifying any assurances of general tranquillity and freedom from molestation. Your Excellency will consequently be in a position accurately to appreciate the small measure of weight which such documents are likely to have in the eyes of Europe.

3. I am convinced, therefore, that Your Excellency will take steps to terminate a course of action which, in the circumstances, tends to arouse, rather than allay, misgivings and suspicion.

I have, &c.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

No. 600

*M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received November 21)*

[385/3/4/20598]

PARIS, le 20 novembre 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat Général de la Délégation Britannique: le texte d'un télégramme adressé par le Grand Vizir de Turquie au Président de la Conférence de la Paix.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 600

*Télégramme adressé par le Grand-Vizir au Président de la Conférence de la Paix,  
Paris*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 15 novembre 1919

'Le dernier délai accordé à la Délégation bulgare pour la signature du Traité de paix devant expirer le 15 novembre courant,<sup>1</sup> et prenant en considération la lettre responsive de V. Ex. adressée au Chef de la Délégation ottomane en date du 29 juin écoulé,<sup>2</sup> je viens La prier de vouloir bien fixer le jour auquel celle-ci pourrait se trouver en France afin de se mettre finalement en relations avec le Congrès des Puissances alliées.'

Le Grand-Vizir: ALI RIZA<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Volume II, No. 11, minute 2 and appendix A (also No. 25, minute 3).

<sup>2</sup> Appendix II to No. 431.

<sup>3</sup> Tewfik Pasha, in a private letter dated at Constantinople, November 20, 1919, to Lord Hardinge (not printed: received December 4), referred to the inconveniences occasioned by the prolongation of the armistice with Turkey and asked him to support the present request from the Grand Vizier and to draw the attention of Mr. Lloyd George to the matter. (Cf. also No. 601.)

No. 601

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 6)*

No. 2204 [159188/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 22, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that I received a visit this morning from His Highness Tewfik Pasha, who dilated at some length on the great difficulties which were being encountered by the Turkish Government by reason of the extraordinary duration of the Armistice, and said that it was vitally necessary above all things that Peace should be made whatever the terms might be. I explained to him that this fact was one which my predecessor and myself had not ceased to do our best to impress upon His Majesty's Government for at least 6 months past; that the Government and people of Great Britain were, I was certain, thoroughly convinced of this necessity, and that the delay

was not due to any procrastination or lack of diligence on their part, but owing to exceptional circumstances which were beyond their control. I knew that His Majesty's Government were, in the first place, awaiting the ratification of the German Treaty by the American Senate and the decision of that body regarding mandates and the League of Nations.

2. His Highness said, as he had previously done to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe, that, just as during the time that he had been ambassador in London<sup>1</sup> he had sought to bring about an alliance of a defensive character between Turkey and Great Britain, so he still hoped that once the peace which would define the rights still appertaining to the Turkish nation was concluded, it might still be possible to come to an agreement on those points on which British and Turkish interests coincide. Great Britain, he maintained, had the greatest interest in the existence of Turkey, whilst the Turkish people, from the Sultan downward, had a confidence in Great Britain which they could place in no other nation. He did not seek to create any difficulties between French and British policy, and at this point I interrupted him to call his attention to Mr. Lloyd George's recent declaration in Parliament that His Majesty's Government could have no other policy than an allied policy in Turkey.<sup>2</sup> The Pasha said he was quite aware of that and approved it, but he still maintained that it was only to the British that Turkey could look for assistance and means for continuance of its integrity and sovereignty.

3. He expressed the conviction that negotiations in this sense could not be begun too soon, but he recognised the impossibility of taking any steps in this direction until the Peace had been signed. He expressed his own regret and that of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan that the continuation of a state of hostility between the two countries precluded any personal intercourse between His Majesty and the Representative of the British Government, as well as the resumption of ordinary social relations between the subjects of the two countries. I reciprocated this regret, but pointed out that I felt it impossible to be too cautious in this matter. I was as ignorant as His Highness himself as to what the terms of the Peace might be, though I could not but believe that they would be very severe, but I felt it most important not to do or say anything which might encourage any false hopes in either the Sultan, the Turkish Government or any highly placed personality, lest such action might subsequently incur a charge or even a suspicion of ill-faith.

4. His Highness referred to the nationalist movement in the Interior, and said that the Government was in a fair way to arrive at an amicable settlement of the difficulty. He said that in troubous conditions, such as the present, forceful means were not always the best and that time and patience and negotiation could be relied on as the best of helpers.

5. He said that the Grand Vizier had sent a fresh telegram to the President of the Peace Conference requesting that Turkish Delegates might be again

<sup>1</sup> Tewfik Pasha had been Turkish Ambassador in London, 1909-14.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is uncertain but may have been to a declaration in the above sense made in the House of Commons by Mr. Balfour on November 17, 1919: see *Parl. Debts. 5th Ser., House of Commons*, vol. 121, col. 768.

summoned for hearing,<sup>3</sup> and that he had been selected by the Sultan as the Turkish Representative, with the approval of all parties in the State, including the Nationalist party.

6. In conclusion he mentioned the matter of the Provisional Interallied Tribunal over which my colleagues and I have been negotiating with the Sublime Porte for the last few months. He expressed himself in favour of the idea, but particularly inquired firstly, whether the Tribunal was to be purely provisional and only for the duration of the Armistice, and secondly, whether it would be limited to French, British and Italian members together with a Turkish colleague.<sup>1</sup> I informed him in reply that it would thus be limited solely to the duration of the armistice and to the members he had mentioned, and I recommended it to his favourable consideration. He undertook to use his best efforts to see that it should be at once accepted by the Turkish Government, and I trust thus that this matter which only the day before yesterday had appeared, according to the reports received at the Meeting of High Commissioners, to have come to a hopeless deadlock, will now receive a satisfactory conclusion.

7. I am informing my French and Italian colleagues of the tenour of this conversation.<sup>4</sup>

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure in No. 600.

<sup>4</sup> Admiral de Robeck was informed in Foreign Office telegram No. 1869 of December 13, 1919, to Constantinople that his language in this conversation was approved.

## No. 602

*Mr. Norman (Paris) to M. Dutasta*

[385/1/25/20580]

PARIS, November 22, 1919

My dear Ambassador,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith a note prepared in this delegation relative to an attempt which has been made to introduce Bolshevik propaganda from Russia into Turkey through Germany by wireless telegraph. As Your Excellency will observe, the only action possible with a view to prevent repetition of such attempts has already been taken, and I therefore doubt whether it is necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Council. Your Excellency may, however, think it desirable to move that body to express an opinion on the steps which have been taken in the matter.<sup>1</sup>

It would appear that, during the three months following the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it will be possible to prevent the transmission of such messages under Article 197 of that instrument.

I have distributed copies of the enclosed note direct to the United States, Italian and Japanese delegations.

I am, &c.

H. N[ORMAN]

<sup>1</sup> The matter does not appear to have been brought before the Supreme Council.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 602  
*Note by British Delegation*

The British Delegation desire to bring the following information to the attention of the Supreme Council:—

In consequence of a Russian W/T Station making an attempt to pass Bolshevik propaganda to Turkey via Berlin, directions were sent to the German Admiral Goette<sup>2</sup> that wireless communication between Germany and Turkey was not permitted. Admiral Goette asked upon what authority these instructions were given. He was informed that by article 23 of the armistice with Turkey such communication was forbidden. It is now claimed by Admiral Goette that the terms of the Turkish armistice cannot be held to bind Germany, and there is no doubt that it is a perfectly legitimate claim.

The action taken by A.N.A.C.<sup>3</sup> appears to have had the effect of stopping this communication, but it must be realised that this body has in reality no power to place any such prohibition on Germany. Steps to prevent these communications can only be taken in Turkey.

This information has already been conveyed to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

November 22, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> President of the German Naval Armistice Commission.

<sup>3</sup> The Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

No. 603

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)*

*No. 1593 Telegraphic [155084/132818/44]*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1919

Before going to New York<sup>1</sup> I wrote to Secretary of State pressing for reply about proceeding with Turkish treaty and handing over to us of *Imperator* and other German ships.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary of State replied by letter while I was at New York that both questions had for some time been before President but that he had not hitherto been in a position to render a decision.

Decision with regard to ships<sup>2</sup> has since been received and telegraphed to you (my telegram No. 1590)<sup>3</sup> but I have no indication that President has taken a hand in this decision.

I am without any further answer respecting negotiations with Turkey and I do not see any course open to other Governments except to proceed with negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> On November 18, 1919, Lord Grey had escorted to New York H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, who was paying a visit to the United States.

<sup>2</sup> For this question see Volume II, Chap. I *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

I suppose Mr. Polk could give a personal opinion as to whether there was serious objection.

State Department here will say nothing without President and President is still too weak to be consulted by those about him.

Private. Secretary of State has hitherto been unable to see President since my arrival.

#### No. 604

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 2)*

*No. 2093 Telegraphic [157713/6490/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 24, 1919

Your telegram No. 1778.<sup>1</sup> As none of us had received any instructions assent was given to German bank premises being taken over by Italian bank, Italian High Commissioner giving assurances that there should be no connection between these two.

It would be very difficult and embarrassing now to withdraw this assent, unless by order of Peace Conference.

French High Commissioner took attitude that it was useless and therefore impolitic to refuse.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Corrected on original to 1779, i.e. No. 592.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 1841 of December 5, 1919, to Constantinople stated in reply: 'In the circumstances we agree that assent cannot be withdrawn'.

#### No. 605

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1391 [156127/151671/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 25, 1919

. . . We<sup>1</sup> then had a brief discussion of the French attitude towards the proposal which I had submitted to M. Pichon more than a fortnight ago, concerning the transference to London of the meetings of the Peace Conference in order to deal with the Turkish Peace.<sup>2</sup>

I said that no official reply to this proposal had been received, though I understood that it was not favourably regarded by M. Clemenceau.

M. Cambon said that, during his recent visit to Paris, he had not been able to see M. Clemenceau, who was away in the country, and he had had only one short talk with M. Pichon. The latter had, however, mentioned the objections of the Président du Conseil, who apparently declined to consider the possibility of the Peace Conference sitting elsewhere than in Paris, or of

<sup>1</sup> The first part of this despatch (not printed) recorded discussion of other matters with the French Ambassador in London on the afternoon of November 25, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 589.

interrupting the work which had been begun there; a labour which, I observed, had been spun out for the best part of a year.

While M. Clemenceau had offered to come with M. Pichon to England in order to reach an understanding with us, and while we should warmly welcome such an interchange of views, I could not share the French view that, even if we did come to an agreement in that way, the proceedings of the Peace Conference in Paris could afterwards be got through in a few days. On the contrary, the questions which remained for settlement, and which I enumerated to the Ambassador, would probably occupy at the very least a month or six weeks of time. Whom we could spare, or how we could spare anyone, to go there to conduct our share of such negotiations I was at a loss to imagine. Considering that members of the British Government, and members of the British Foreign Office in particular, had dislocated their entire lives for nearly a twelvemonth in order to meet the wishes of the French Government, it did seem to me unreasonable that the latter should now insist on retaining the venue in Paris, and be quite unwilling to submit to the slight inconvenience of transferring their activities for a short time to our capital. I contemplated going to Paris myself before long, and, if so, I should perhaps have an opportunity of discussing the matter with M. Clemenceau then.

As regards the situation in America,<sup>3</sup> the Ambassador expressed the opinion—which, however, he was careful to point out was only an *obiter dictum* of his own—that the best course of action would be to accept the whole of the reservations which had been passed by the Senate. He did not think that, even if the covenant of the League of Nations as embodied in the treaty had been accepted without modification by the American Government, the Senate would have been in the least deterred from acting as it might choose on each occasion as it arose under the covenant. The Senate, he was convinced, would insist on retaining precisely the kind and degree of control which it claimed in the reservations.

I did not argue the matter at length, but I pointed out that our view of the reservations was a different and much more serious one; that, so far as I knew, President Wilson himself was not at all likely to take them lying down; and that our latest news as to the attitude of America, derived from our Ambassador there and also from what Mr. Davis and Mr. Polk had said to me here, was that there still remained a possibility of a compromise which might save the covenant of the League and secure American participation. So long as there was still this possibility, it seemed to me very much better to work for that end than to throw up the sponge and admit at this early stage what amounted to practical defeat.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>3</sup> See Volume V, Chap. III.

No. 606

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)*

No. 2199 [156260/70100/44]

PARIS, November 26, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit the accompanying copies of notes exchanged by the Supreme Council and M. Venizelos regarding the Greek occupation of Smyrna,<sup>1</sup> together with a copy of a private letter to me from M. Venizelos on the same subject.<sup>2</sup>

2. I would venture to call attention to M. Venizelos's correction of the statement in M. Clemenceau's note of the 18th November,<sup>3</sup> and I would explain that that statement was added by the French Secretariat without the Supreme Council having been previously informed or consulted. If the Supreme Council had seen the draft of the note before despatch, I should myself have drawn attention to the inaccuracy of the statement contained in the added words.

3. I have thought it unnecessary to raise the point myself in the Supreme Council now, as I do not desire to revive discussion on a subject which generally engenders some heat in the Conference, and also because M. Venizelos himself has, for the same reason, asked me to let the matter drop. He merely desired by this note to me to place on record the true state of things, and I would add that, so far as I can gather from the records available, M. Venizelos's version is entirely correct, the warning as to the provisional nature of the Greek occupation having been given, not at the time when M. Venizelos was invited to occupy Smyrna, but after he had effected the occupation.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 606

*M. Venizelos to Sir Eyre Crowe*

PARIS, November 20, 1919

Dear Sir Eyre Crowe,

I have duly received the letter which the President of the Conference addressed to me under date of the 18th November.<sup>3</sup> As I am desirous of avoiding further dispute with him, I shall not forward an official reply to the above letter. I am taking the liberty, however, of assuring you that the statement which appears in the aforementioned letter, to the effect that I was

<sup>1</sup> These notes were (i) a note of November 12, 1919, from M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos (enclosure 4 in original); this note, not here printed, is printed in English translation in Volume II, No. 20, appendix A; (ii) a reply of November 15 from M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau (enclosure 3 in original); this note, not here printed, is printed in Volume II, No. 25, appendix B; (iii) M. Clemenceau's reply of November 18, printed in enclosure 2 below.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 1 below.

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

'formellement averti au moment où la décision a été prise par le Conseil des Quatre' of the temporary nature of the occupation of Smyrna, is not exact.

When Mr. Lloyd George spoke to me first of the decision regarding the occupation, he made no mention whatever of its temporary character. And when I appeared before Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Wilson, in order to discuss matters relating to the carrying out of the occupation, again no mention was made of its being temporary. Only after the occupation had taken place and I appeared before the Supreme Council—M. Sonnino being present at this meeting as well—for the purpose of discussing the extent of the Greek occupation area, mention was made for the first time in that meeting of 'temporariness', concerning the extent rather than the nature of the occupation.

I do not, of course, infer that the occupation entrusted to Greece is equal to a definite recognition of her sovereignty over the occupied area. But I desire to state that when Greece was asked to proceed to this occupation, not only was there no mention made to me of its being temporary, but on the contrary, the very décision implied—though tacitly—that this occupation was the first step towards giving Greece part of Western Asia Minor. Mr. Lloyd George can testify as to the correctness of my impression.

Believe me, &c.

E. K. VENISELOS

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 606

*M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos*

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX,

PARIS, le 18 novembre 1919

M. le Président,

Le Conseil suprême a pris connaissance de votre lettre du 15 novembre dernier,<sup>4</sup> répondant à la communication qu'il vous avait faite, après avoir entendu la lecture du rapport de la Commission d'Enquête de Smyrne et les indications que vous aviez bien voulu donner à cet égard.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Conseil a estimé que les impressions que vous exprimez au sujet de l'occupation de Smyrne ne modifient en rien la déclaration faite par le Conseil suprême sur le caractère provisoire de l'occupation militaire grecque. Vous en avez été formellement averti au moment où la décision a été prise par le Conseil des Quatre.

Il appartient à la Conférence de la Paix seule de décider, au moment où l'ensemble de la question d'Orient sera étudié par elle, quel sera le sort des différentes régions de l'ancien Empire ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

CLEMENCEAU

\* Not here printed: see note 1 above. For the consideration of this letter in the Supreme Council and its consequent decision relative to the reply which M. Clemenceau should address to M. Venizelos see Volume II, No. 25, minute 4.

No. 607

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

*No. 1813 Telegraphic [153867/1638/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 26, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 2058<sup>1</sup> and 2081<sup>2</sup> (of November 13th and 20th—control of Anatolian railway).

War Office propose to withdraw British personnel and British detachments on railway although they do not apprehend any immediate risk to these detachments. They urge that:—

(a) If railway personnel is replaced by British personnel British troops will have to be left to protect them, and that in case of necessity withdrawal will be more difficult.

(b) Mustapha Kemal has so far shown no inclination to interfere with line; if it were made clear that he would be held accountable for any rupture and that railway was being left in his hands as a mark of confidence this responsibility would tend to steady him.

(c) Now that French are in Syria the railway is no longer required as a British line of communication.

Please telegraph your observations.

<sup>1</sup> No. 590.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 590, note 1.

No. 608

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

*No. 1821 Telegraphic [154972/70100/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 28, 1919

Your despatch No. 2121<sup>1</sup> (November 12th. Situation in Aidin Vilayet) paragraph 9.<sup>2</sup>

Please bear in mind that the present intention of His Majesty's Government is not to accept a mandate for Turkey even if it were offered them.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This despatch (received November 24) referred more particularly to Greco-Italian relations in the Aidin Vilayet (cf. No. 555) and to the growth there of anti-British feeling among the Turkish population: see note 2 below.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 9 of this despatch read as follows: 'If it were the policy of His Majesty's Government to cause the disappearance of Turkey as a state by dismembering it amongst the various interested powers, the opinion of the Turks as to the justice or morality of any action we may see fit to take would matter not at all. I must confess, however, that, on the supposition that the task of establishing security and good government in this country may eventually devolve upon us, the development of anti-British feeling amongst classes of the population which are not inoculated with the venom of the Committee of Union and Progress, fills me with grave concern.'

No. 609

*Letter from Mr. Kidston to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 153371/M.E. 58 [342/1/6/20832]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 28, 1919

My dear Crowe,

I fear that we have kept you in the dark as to the development of the question of arms for Armenia since the date of the War Office letter of October 23<sup>1</sup> which you discuss in your letter of November 17<sup>2</sup> but you have been so insistent in demanding that your correspondence concerning affairs in the East should be cut down as much as possible that we have endeavoured to obey your behests and send you nothing that does not directly concern the Peace negotiations. I now send you copies of the subsequent correspondence<sup>3</sup> from which you will see that, though little or no progress has been made, we have not allowed the matter to drop and are now awaiting information from Wardrop as to the conditions on which officers would be lent to the Armenian Republic.<sup>4</sup>

Our news from the Caucasus seems to indicate that the Armenians could probably hold their own, for some time at least, against such attacks as are at all likely to be directed against them from the South; but the latest accounts from the east are decidedly alarming, though I am told that the attack from Azerbaijan, if it does develop, cannot extend beyond Zangezur, which is separated from Armenia proper by mountains which are quite impassable in winter. I sympathize with the War Office view to the extent of believing that it would be imprudent, to say the least of it, to supply the Armenians with arms and ammunition in any quantity unless we can at the same time supply allied officers to control their use and I hope it may still be possible to do this; I fear that there is not the slightest doubt that the Armenian is at least as good a hand at massacring as his Moslem neighbour and the Dashnak<sup>5</sup> gang who are at present in control at Erivan inspire no confidence. The Dashnak-sutiun<sup>6</sup> in my day at Constantinople<sup>7</sup> were hand in glove with the C.U.P. and have always followed the same policy of secrecy and violence. I hear to-day, by the bye, that our friend Aharonian is a leading light of the Dashnak brotherhood and has fallen foul of Papanjanian<sup>8</sup> who is resigning. These everlasting feuds between Dashnaks and Hintchaks<sup>9</sup> poison the whole Armenian atmosphere and make one despair of ever being able to do anything effective for these unfortunate people. It must also be remembered that the supply of arms to Armenia will come within the terms of the Traffic in arms

<sup>1</sup> See No. 596, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> No. 596.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed: cf. note 4 below.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume III, No. 429, note 1.

<sup>5</sup> An Armenian nationalist party then in sympathy with the White Russian forces under General Denikin.

<sup>6</sup> The leaders of the Dashnak party.

<sup>7</sup> Mr. Kidston had served as First Secretary in His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, 1912-14.

<sup>8</sup> Member of the Armenian delegation in Paris.

<sup>9</sup> An Armenian nationalist party then in sympathy with the Soviet regime in Russia.

Convention<sup>10</sup> and that whatever sanction is required by that instrument will have to be obtained.

The proposal that Haskell should be given control in the name of the Allies of the relations between the Republics<sup>11</sup> has filled us with dismay here. I have seen several men just returned from the Caucasus and they one and all agree that Haskell is the last person who should be entrusted with such a delicate and difficult task. He is accused of not knowing his own mind for two minutes together, of being blustering and peremptory, of depending entirely on interpreters and of being utterly unsuited to deal with Orientals. The whole of the Zangezur trouble is laid to his door as it is said that while at Baku he made a hard and fast arrangement with the Azerbaijanis which he modified to their detriment in several important particulars as soon as he got back to Erivan. Wardrop, on the other hand, whatever his faults may be, has an almost uncanny facility for managing these people and I believe that if he were left alone—by the military with Denikin on the one hand and the Americans on the other—he might yet bring some sort of order out of chaos. He has made the Caucasus a life study, speaks some at least of the local languages and enjoys perhaps a greater prestige there than any European living.

Your second thesis of the future of Armenia raises the whole of the question of the Turkish settlement and I only wish I could share a tinge of the optimism with which you appear to regard it. The idea, for instance, that it will ever be possible now, whatever it might have been a year ago, to join up Cilicia with Erivan in a single Armenian State is to me almost inconceivable. What proportion would the Armenian population of such a state bear to the whole?<sup>12</sup> I agree that Mustapha Kemal will only show his hand when the peace terms are declared and that his trump card then will be his power to massacre every Christian in Asia Minor unless the terms are to his liking. His power of military offence, as distinguished from massacre, is negligible, but so unfortunately is ours, and while his may wax ours must inevitably wane from day to day. I regard with some misgiving the latest report that he is pressing the Government, and the Sultan at Constantinople to remove to Broussa;<sup>13</sup> it sounds like a step to the realization of our dearest wishes, but it may be solely a move to get the only hostages that we hold against his Christians out of our power and may mean that he is so sure of the value of his trump card and so convinced of the weakness of our hand that he feels confident of getting back Constantinople in the end, even if he has to abandon it for a time.

I cannot share your views as to the minor part which the Smyrna incident has played in bringing about the present situation. If it was the failure of the

<sup>10</sup> The Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, p. 909.

<sup>11</sup> See Volume II, No. 23, minute 3.

<sup>12</sup> This sentence was inserted by Sir J. Tilley, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom the draft of this letter was submitted. The draft was also seen by Lord Hardinge.

<sup>13</sup> See No. 578.

Damad Ferid Mission to Paris and the publication of the Conference's intention with regard to Turkey last June which gave birth to Mustapha Kemal's movement it was the landing of the Greeks at Smyrna which acted like the patent food of the advertisements and developed a lusty and mischievous child from a puny and harmless infant. But whichever was the origin of the evil, both were the doing of the Conference and both were due to the same cause—delay, until it was too late, in taking steps which might have been taken with impunity if taken in time. Everything still conspires for delay and I fear much that, unless something very unforeseen happens, the time for your programme is already long past.

I think you do wrong to Gribbon in ascribing to him pro-Turkish ideas; for one thing he is a convinced pro-Zionist and an anti-C.U.P. man. In any case I can assure you that he is a pattern of moderation compared with many of the War Office men. Of the India Office it is quite unnecessary to speak. But I go so far with both Departments as to hold that it would be folly to antagonize all Moslem opinion and so substantiate the wicked C.U.P. cum Bolshevik lie that the British Empire is out to destroy Islam. Accentuation of the Christian v. Moslem aspect of the case, of which the Greeks and Armenians and their friends who ought to know better are far too fond, only gives a handle to our enemies all over the world, from Lenin and Trotzky in Moscow to Marmaduke Pickthall of the mosque at Woking<sup>14</sup> and Mrs. Besant.<sup>15</sup> Surely our aim ought to be to keep the national aspect of the question in the limelight as much as possible and seek about for some Moslem element to encourage in contrast to the Turk. The Arabs of course were indicated, but the French have well-nigh destroyed us there and seem set upon doing so irreparably before long. Then there are the Kurds and the Azerbaijanlis. In spite of your apparent enmity and mistrust of the latter I believe it would be to our advantage to make friends of them; they aspire above everything else to a recognition of their independence and I believe it would pay us to give it to them. Lastly, there is Central Asia and that is a very big problem. The Afghans are apparently out to extend their power there and found a Moslem Empire on the ruins of Russian Central Asia. Their union with the Bolsheviks is probably only a marriage of convenience, contracted in the hope of procuring arms and ammunition for purely territorial conquest.<sup>16</sup> Whether it would be safe or desirable for us to take the

<sup>14</sup> Mr. Pickthall was an English author who had lived in the Near East.

<sup>15</sup> Mrs. Annie Besant was president of the National (India) Home Rule League.

<sup>16</sup> In this connexion Sir J. Jordan subsequently reported in Peking telegram No. 626 of December 13, 1919 (received December 20): 'Russian Minister has received following telegram from Russian Consul at Kashgar (? begins): Bolsheviks have come to an (? agreement with) Afghanistan to whom they have ceded Kushk, Merv having pushed as far as Krasnovodsk with aid of Afghan troops. Complete independence is promised to Khiva and Bokhara if they side with Bolsheviks. Afghan messengers with presents for Madiminibek and his aid (*sic*) Shirmat have gone to Bokhara. Occupation of Pamirs by Afghans (? is) therefore expected. Ends.' M. Sabline, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in the interests of the administration of Admiral Kolchak, had previously, in a letter of November 14, 1919, to Mr. Oliphant at the Foreign Office, drawn attention to the alleged activities, generally in accordance with the tendency of the above report, of M. Souritz, "Plenipotentiary

place now assumed by the Bolsheviks and supply them and so enable them to conquer Central Asia is a very difficult question. So long as they were confined to Central Asia the risk would not be very great but could a state of any size or power remain cooped up indefinitely there and would it not inevitably sweep down through Persia to the Gulf? However, it is an idea and rather a tempting one.

But to go back to facts.—Your summary of the situation as you see it fills me with envy, and I only wish my eyes could have such a hopeful focus.

The value of our temporary possession of Constantinople seems to me to be gauged by the fact that Mustapha Kemal is pressing the Government and the Sultan to leave it at once and establish themselves at Broussa.

Both we and the French may be fighting with the Arabs in Cilicia and the Arab countries to-morrow.

With regard to the Eastern Vilayets, I do not believe there is any possibility of any sort of mandate, international or otherwise, or of dividing the country up into Kurdish or Armenian zones without a military force sufficiently strong to keep the Turk and C.U.P. influence out and to impose respect on the divergent internal elements. And this, I venture to suggest, is the crux of the difficulty, not only here but everywhere else. We have not a man to spare anywhere and the C.U.P. know it. The War Office contemplate having to hand over the Anatolian Railway to the Turks from sheer lack of a sufficiency of men to hold it. In Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, Asia Minor, not to speak of India, our forces are necessarily being demobilized, and from all these places there is a constant shout for more men and fresh drafts which are not forthcoming. Nor is there money to pay for more.

We must cut our coat according to our cloth and, unless the Americans or some one else have conscience enough to come in at the last moment to help, I fear that it may be very difficult to impose on the Turks the terms of the Supreme Council's reply to them of last June. I wish I thought otherwise. If the terms had only been communicated to them immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice instead of in June, how different everything might have been!

Yours very sincerely,  
GEORGE KIDSTON

"Representative" of the Bolsheviks at Tashkent.' M. Sabline commented: 'I think I am not going too far in saying that a well organized plot is on foot in Bolshevik circles to overthrow existing conditions in Central Asia. Not only do the Bolsheviks aim at disintegrating the rich provinces of Turkestan, and at "self-determining" the various tribes which inhabit them, the better to disseminate their pernicious doctrines, but they are bent upon creating a situation which will serve as a foundation for the most formidable development of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism.'

No. 610

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 1)

No. 2219 [157144/1638/44]

PARIS, November 29, 1919

My Lord,

My attention has been drawn to Your Lordship's telegram No. 1813<sup>1</sup> of November 26 to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople regarding a proposal of the War Office to withdraw British troops and personnel from the Anatolian railway.

2. I believe that Admiral Sir J. de Robeck has already raised objections to this proposal, one of them being that such a withdrawal may make the eventual task of the Peace Conference in imposing terms of peace on Turkey more difficult. I entirely agree with this objection, but I venture to draw Your Lordship's attention to another aspect of the matter of a more immediately serious nature.

3. If, as I understand, the Anatolian railway, as far as and including Afion Karahissar is now under British control, a withdrawal of such control in favour of Mustapha Kemal and his followers would free this junction and that part of the Smyrna-Cassaba line which runs from the junction into the present Greek zone of occupation just east of Cassaba, for the despatch of men and material to reinforce the Turkish bands and irregulars who are attacking this zone. It is difficult to believe that Mustapha Kemal would not be quick to make open or covert use of so good an opportunity of increasing attacks on the Greek zone, whatever promises he might give to the contrary and such a result would be particularly unfortunate at a time when fighting in this area, doubtless owing to General Milne's recent delimitation of the frontiers of the Greek zone, appears to have largely died down. I feel sure that Your Lordship will agree that if this were to be the effect of the proposal of the War Office, it would be contrary to the policy of both His Majesty's Government and the Supreme Council and might raise justifiable protests from our Greek Allies.

4. I would add that in my personal opinion Mustapha Kemal's movement is essentially C.U.P. and imperialist in the sense of aiming at keeping Turkey free from all foreign control and as far as possible in continued possession of those parts of the Empire which are largely inhabited by other nationalities, whether Greek, Armenian or Kurd. While doubtless primarily directed against the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the movement is therefore essentially hostile to the general aims and policy of the peace conference with regard to the settlement of Turkey, as sketched by the Prime Minister in a recent speech:<sup>2</sup> of these aims the Greek occupation of Smyrna is for the Turks, at present, the only substantial indication. If this view be correct, I can scarcely believe that the advantages to be gained by bestowing on Mustapha Kemal a 'mark of confidence' at this stage, as suggested by the War Office, can really

<sup>1</sup> No. 607.

<sup>2</sup> At the Guildhall on November 8: see *The Times* of November 10, 1919.

outweigh the danger involved in increasing the power of the movement, which he represents, to resist the final terms of the Turkish peace settlement.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

No. 611

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Mr. Kidston (Received December 3)*

*No. 342/1/6/20832 [157720/50535/44]*

My dear Kidston,

PARIS, December 1, 1919

1. Many thanks for your letter of November 28th about the Armenians and the future of Turkey.<sup>1</sup>

2. As regards the Armenians I am glad to hear that the question of helping them is still being pursued with the War Office. I quite realise how difficult a people they are to deal with, and I am sorry to hear that the Dashnak and Hintchak feuds are coming to the top again: we had gathered here that since the war these party feuds were diminishing and that the Dashnak party of the old school had lost power and influence. I think we must remember, however, that the misfortunes of their past history, for which Europe is in some measure to blame, have led them in self-defence to adopt subterranean methods and to become too prone to massacring their opponents. The Armenian character is now not a more pleasing one than that of any other nationality which has for centuries had to submit to Turkish domination, but it is to be hoped that some measure of freedom to develop on national lines may change this, although a long time and much patience on the side of Armenia's future rulers or helpers will certainly be required.

3. I have had little opportunity of forming an opinion of Haskell and his work but am quite prepared to accept your view of the relative capacities of Wardrop and Haskell to deal with the local situation. Wardrop appears, by the way, from his last telegram to have brought off another successful 'coup' by an Armenian-Azerbaijan agreement over Zangezur.<sup>2</sup> The difficulty, of which we must not altogether lose sight, is that Haskell is an American and represents the Conference while Wardrop only represents us. We never proposed to extend Haskell's powers except in relief matters<sup>3</sup> (the line is, of course, difficult to draw) and, in any case, we shall probably be able here indefinitely to delay a decision on the American proposal if this be thought desirable.

4. As regards the future settlement, I believe and hope that we are really in fundamental agreement as to the principles of that settlement, although you take a rather gloomier view of the possibilities of effecting it now. These principles must, of course, be those of nationality, not religion and I am not clear how my letter of November 17th<sup>4</sup> could have left a different impression. I did not mention 'christians' and only spoke of 'Mahomedans' once where I was quoting from—and criticising—the War Office letter of

<sup>1</sup> No. 609.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume III, No. 564.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 23, minute 3.

<sup>4</sup> No. 596.

October 23rd,<sup>5</sup> which implied that we ought not to help Armenians in the Caucasus for fear of rousing hostility among 'Mahomedans' in Turkey!

Gribbon may be pro-zionist and anti-Committee of Union and Progress, but he and the War Office generally (and the India Office, too) appear to be so obsessed by the pan-islamic bogey that they are really afraid to tackle the Turkish settlement frankly on national lines, or to withdraw Greeks and Armenians from Turkish rule, because the latter are Christians. Instead, they look anxiously about for old or new Moslem states, to which they can show special favours; and their attitude and the policy they advocate of bolstering up the Turk at Constantinople is just the thing to promote pan-Islamism, which is the one thing we ought to try and kill. The idea of winning the Turks from pan-Islamism by truckling to them is insane.

5. I want to see the question settled on the basis and merits of nationality,—Kurd, Arab, Armenian, Greek and Turk. I am sorry that you think my letter showed 'hostility and enmity' towards the Azerbaijainlis. All that I intended to advise was that recent history gave us no reason to pay particular attention to Tartar susceptibilities when considering the question of helping the Armenians. (I was here again criticising the War Office letter.) I think that from a local point of view the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan might be quite good policy for us: only unfortunately our policy in the matter of the future of these countries seems inevitably bound up with our future policy towards Russia.

6. If, as I think, the best solution for us of the Russian problem will be a federal Russian state (more or less in its present boundaries but minus Finland and Poland) with a good deal of local autonomy for the border states, we can hardly prejudice such a solution by any hasty recognition of the absolute independence of the latter. The question of any possible encouragement to Afghanistan to coalesce into an independent central Asian Mahomedan state, which you mention in your letter, must, I think, be equally considered from this point of view.

7. To return to Turkey, I entirely agree that from the standpoint of the ability of the Conference to enforce the desired national settlement, the eastern vilayets are the difficulty, as indeed I said in my letter. I also agree that an Armenian zone stretching from Cilicia to Erivan may be an impossibility (I only gave it tentatively as a matter for examination). The extent of the Armenian (and Kurdish) zone must primarily depend, as you say, on the force (international or that of a mandatory) which the Conference (not, I hope, only His Majesty's Government), when it really comes to examine the question, finds itself able to send there. I am not sure, though, that a large force of men is required, so much as officers and officials. I do not think that whatever the extent of the Armenian zone may be, it will be fair to take too much into account the proportion of the present Armenian population to the rest. The zone or state can only be at first Armenian in name: it will require strong rule by the officials of the mandatory, or the international commission: time alone will show whether enough immigration by Armenians from the

<sup>5</sup> See No. 596, note 3.

rest of Turkey and from abroad will take place to give the government a definitely Armenian complexion. But to consider and decide the Armenian question purely on the basis of present numbers would surely amount to countenancing and encouraging the past Turkish method of dealing with the problem of their subject nationalities!

8. I am glad you agree with me as to Mustapha Kemal's potential military strength. The weapon of christian hostages is, indeed, a danger but we have and shall have many Turkish hostages ourselves (e.g. the Committee of Union and Progress people interned in Malta) and I doubt whether, if the Conference deals fairly with the Turkish state in Anatolia proper, and at the same time shows that it intends to take strong countermeasures in the event of christian massacres, Mustapha will dare to carry out such massacres on a large scale.

9. Lastly, I should like to say a word about the delays of the Conference in dealing with Turkey and in not having imposed peace terms on Turkey soon after the conclusion of the armistice. Among those who have advocated various solutions for dealing with the Turkish question, there are very few, if any, who have not admitted that any good solution involved American participation to a greater or less extent. There are equally few, connected in any way with the peace conference, who thought that such participation was possible without prior sanction by the *senate* of the League of Nations Covenant and prior sanction by *Congress* of the actual taking up of specific mandates by America. If any good settlement was to be secured, delay with all its risks was inevitable. I think many people who criticise the conference's method of approaching the Turkish question are apt to forget this. Looking at the question from this point of view, and remembering that without American assistance a settlement of Turkey on national lines will be much more difficult to achieve in the end, I am inclined to think that the much-criticised decision to send the Greeks to Smyrna last May was really good policy. Apart from the consideration which primarily influenced that decision, namely the importance of preventing Italy from taking Smyrna, it is all to the good that at least one of the national areas will thus be solidly occupied, when our final terms come to be imposed on Turkey and one large section of potential christian hostages will be in safety.

10. You will probably still think I'm being too optimistic but we have gained the impression here, perhaps partly from the French, that in most quarters despondency about the Turkish settlement reigns and that when the conference finally meets, the will to impose a good and lasting settlement on national lines in Turkey will have gone. If we can only keep the will alive, I believe the means may still be found.

11. A continuance of this correspondence may, I fear, occupy too much of your already fully occupied time. So I shall not expect an answer to this letter. As I have already said, I think we are fundamentally in agreement, which is the main thing.

Yours always,  
EYRE A. CROWE

No. 612

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Curzon Papers/France]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 1, 1919

My visit to Paris has been contemplated for first meeting of Council of League of Nations, which I believe cannot now take place for at least a fortnight and is dependent on ratification.<sup>1</sup> I should however be prepared to come over if wanted for following purpose.

It was decided at recent Meeting of Ministers that, Clemenceau having offered to come to London for confidential discussion of Turkish question, it would be discourteous to ignore this offer, unless he found it so difficult to come at an early date that he preferred me to go there instead. You are authorised therefore to consult him without delay as to which alternative he would prefer.

Such discussion would of course not prejudge the question of locality of future Peace Conference to frame Turkish Peace, as to which our views, for practical reasons, remain unchanged. But it will not be necessary to say that at present stage.

<sup>1</sup> Of the Treaty of Versailles. Cf. Volume II, Chap. I *passim*.

No. 613

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received December 15)*

*No. 2252 [161870/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 2, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that although the National movement under Mustafa Kemal has overrun the whole of Turkey, it has in certain districts met with determined opposition on the part of the inhabitants. This opposition is local, although almost certainly connected with activities of the Liberal Entente and Nighiaban parties in Constantinople, and has shown itself strongest in the Konia vilayet and in the districts between Broussa and the Dardanelles. It is to my mind clear that the Nationalists have at present no strong support in the general population of Anatolia; the movement is not so much 'national' as a military-political organisation which, based upon the army, and making use of the elements of the population which come to the front in times of disorder, has dominated the generally docile and law-abiding population of the provinces.

2. As giving a concrete expression to the resentment felt by all Turks alike at the injustice of Smyrna, the movement was in its early days popular. Its main objective, the removal of Damad Ferid's Cabinet, was something definite to be attained. Since that time, except for making the elections, its

role has been one of passive expectation, and enthusiasm has waned. Forced levies of money on towns and villages have caused much resentment amongst the population, already bled white by the costs of a long war.

3. The opposition movement in the Balikesr-Broussa district is now in its full vigour. It is headed by a certain Circassian, Ahmed Anzavour by name, who bears a good reputation, and was formerly a gendarmerie officer and later Governor of the district of Ismidt. He has gathered a considerable body of adherents round him, and has defeated with loss certain forces sent against him by the local military commanders.

4. The movement in the Konia district has officially been settled. Under Damad Ferid's Government, the Governor-General of the vilayet of Konia was Jemal Bey, an enlightened and capable administrator. He took a strong line against the Nationalists, and having many supporters in his province kept his district loyal after the rest of the country had been overrun by the Nationalists; he returned to Constantinople only when the situation had become hopeless, and the Cabinet was on the point of falling.

5. The procedure adopted by the Nationalists was, as a rule, to send detachments of a small number of men under a few energetic officers to the various local centres; these established their own partisans as rulers, and imprisoned or otherwise disposed of any opponents. They then proceeded to levy contributions for the Nationalist cause.

6. Such a party appears to have entered the Bozgir district (about 50 miles south-west of Konia) early in October. It first demanded a contribution; this being objected to, its members attempted to collect it by force, but met more than their match, and only a few returned to Konia. The Nationalist authorities in Konia sent a further force to subdue the 'rebels', but the latter had in the meantime been joined by adherents from the neighbouring villages, and repulsed this attempt, inflicting considerable loss on their assailants and, it is stated, even capturing two machine guns. A third and more considerable force of Nationalist troops, however, then entered the district, and is reported to have burnt two or three villages, the defenders withdrawing into the mountains.

7. Attached is the translation of a petition addressed to the British High Commissioner through the Control Officer, Konia, from the notables of twenty-seven villages in this district.

8. The events at Bozgir attracted a considerable measure of attention at Constantinople, and a mission under General Hurshia Pasha was lately sent to the Konia district by the Government to report on the situation, and bring about some satisfactory arrangement between the opposing forces. This mission has not yet returned, and it is unknown what effect its arrival has produced.

I have, &c.  
(For the High Commissioner),  
RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 613

*Translation of a Petition from the Notables of twenty-seven Villages*

To the British Political Representative, Constantinople, c/o the British Control Officer, Konia.

The Union and Progress Committee, organised at Bozgir (south-west of Konia, near Soughla Geol) under the title of National Forces, have ordered mobilisation in the district. On this occasion they have attacked by surprise, and sacked the houses of the educated classes, the notabilities, and leading residents, by proclaiming the National Forces.

With the object of obliging the population to recognise the National Forces thus formed, they opened fire with artillery and machine guns on the people of Vaskeh village, in the Siristat district, and thus caused the death of a considerable number of both Moslems and non-Moslems. They have also destroyed by artillery fire and bombs some eight or ten houses in Kayajik, Akhirli, Odan, and Epek villages, together with the human beings, the animals and furniture therein. Owing to the interruption of postal and telegraphic communication we cannot report these atrocities to higher authorities.

Since for the space of a month the tranquillity and peace of the district have been infringed, and the re-establishment of peace appears to be an impossibility; since, also, owing to the Armistice terms, our Government is not sufficiently strong to cope with the Nationalist forces, therefore we beg the assistance of the British Government in doing what is necessary with all possible speed.

We beg you, therefore, Sir, upon receiving this report, to stretch forth your hands in help, in order to save Bozgir from the fire and tyranny of the Nationalist forces.

(Signed by notabilities of following villages):—

Soghujak, Kovanlik, Papoushdji, Hadji Yonouslar, Domlu, Karabair, Houlouslar, Seoyut, Gidret, Bekle, Chat, Yalinizja, Kiraz, Elma Aghaj, Baybaghin, Fakiler, Tebe Ersi, Ekitse, Saristad, Akche Pounar, Akhirli, Geundekun, Ali Cherchi, Karaja Erd, Farma, Sorkon, Mervesli.

October 28, 1919.

No. 614

*Sir J. Tilley to Mr. Wise<sup>1</sup>*

No. 154459/M.E. 44 [154459/521/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 3, 1919

Sir,

I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith copies of three despatches<sup>2</sup> which have been received from His Majesty's High

<sup>1</sup> Mr. E. F. Wise was British representative on the permanent committee of the Supreme Economic Council.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to filed copy of original. The principal of these despatches was that of November 11, 1919 (see below), printed as No. 585.

Commissioner at Constantinople describing the critical state of destitution which already prevails among the Greeks and Armenians of Turkey, and which, together with the arrival of winter, threatens many thousands of them with extinction.

2. From paragraphs 7 and 8 of Admiral de Robeck's despatch No. 2110<sup>3</sup> of the 11th November, it will be observed that, while the chief organisations which have hitherto been at work in Turkey are now curtailing their activities, the need for relief is, owing not only to the rigours of the Turkish winter but also to circumstances of disease, semi-starvation, overcrowding and exposure, greater even than before.

3. Lord Curzon has little doubt that reports to the same effect have been received from the representatives of the Supreme Economic Council in Turkey, and endorses the opinion expressed by Admiral de Robeck to the effect that if these populations are to be saved from the fate which hangs over them, the measures taken must be both immediate and extensive. Such measures, it is clear, can only be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers in common, and I am accordingly to request that you will take an early opportunity of drawing the serious attention of the Supreme Economic Council to the grave state of destitution prevailing in Turkey, with a view to the adoption by the Supreme Economic Council of measures to provide relief for the suffering population and to save them from death and disease.<sup>4</sup> These measures might, in Lord Curzon's opinion, well be on the lines suggested by Admiral de Robeck and be applied alike to Moslems, many of whom, for example, are destitute in the neighbourhood of Aidin, and to Christians.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY

<sup>3</sup> No. 585.

<sup>4</sup> This question was raised by the British representatives at the next meeting of the Supreme Economic Council, on February 6-7, 1920: see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. x, pp. 678 and 706-7.

## No. 615

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 5)*

*No. 2248 [158730/151671/44]*

PARIS, December 3, 1919

My Lord,

I have had the advantage of reading your Lordship's despatch No. 1391<sup>1</sup> of the 25th ultimo to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, recording a conversation with the French Ambassador in London, in the course of which the possibility of transferring the seat of the Peace Conference from the former to the latter capital was discussed.

2. M. Clemenceau has two or three times referred to this question in general terms in conversation with me. He has asked me not to report his remarks as he said the question was being treated direct with your Lordship

<sup>1</sup> No. 605.

through M. Cambon, and I accordingly refrained from doing so. It appears, however, to be worth mentioning that, after the meeting of the Supreme Council this morning (the 2nd December),<sup>2</sup> M. Clemenceau spoke to the Japanese plenipotentiary on the subject. He said he wished to inform Mr. Matsui confidentially that in no circumstances whatever would he consent to the transfer to London of the seat of the negotiations for peace with Turkey, and that, were he to agree to it, he would find himself in a minority in the Legislature. He added that he believed that he could count on the support of the Italian Government on this question.

3. M. Clemenceau made this confidential communication to Mr. Matsui in so loud a voice that nobody present in the room could fail to overhear what passed.

I believe that M. Clemenceau's uncompromising attitude is due to a desire to preserve what remains of French prestige in the Near East, which the following facts have, in his opinion, contributed to diminish:—

- (a) That the military operations which have led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire have been conducted almost exclusively by British troops, to whose exertions the victory of the Allies is entirely due.
- (b) That Syria and Palestine have been occupied by British troops to the exclusion of the French.
- (c) That the command of the sea in the Mediterranean has, as M. Clemenceau expresses it, been taken away from France by Great Britain.
- (d) That General Milne, by the predominant position which he occupies in Turkey in Asia, has overshadowed General Franchet d'Esperey, with the result that considerable friction exists between them.

4. M. Clemenceau evidently apprehends that, in the eyes of the population of these regions, France now plays a part subordinate to that of Great Britain, and feels that if, in addition, peace with Turkey were to be made in London instead of at Paris France would sink in their estimation to the level of a Power of the second rank. He believes this to be so well understood in France that no Government which consented to such an arrangement could retain the confidence of the country. At any rate, he has more than once told me that rather than agree to it he would resign.

5. It has occurred to me that a solution of the difficulty might possibly be found if it could be arranged that the negotiations which are to lead up to the conclusion of peace with Turkey should be conducted in London, the signature of the Treaty itself taking place at Paris, like that of the peace with the other enemy Powers. I have not, however, made the suggestion to M. Clemenceau, and have no means of forming an opinion whether it would be likely to meet with a favourable reception on his part.

I have, &c.  
(For Sir Eyre Crowe)  
H. NORMAN

\* See Volume II, No. 34.

No. 616

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received December 20)*

*No. 2271 [163681/3050/44A]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, December 4, 1919*

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan recording a conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on 19th November.

2. Mr. Ryan engaged in this conversation with a definite object, the nature of which is explained in paragraph 8 of his memorandum, and conducted it on lines which had my previous general approval.

3. It seemed to me the more timely to state frankly the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Kurdish question, as there is a considerable tendency in certain circles here to represent His Majesty's Government as being implacably hostile to the national movement, and as wishing actively to support any elements in the country similarly hostile to it.

4. These elements include in the minds of those who imagine His Majesty's Government to be at work on a deep laid intrigue, both the political opponents of the present Government and the Kurdish separatists, whom events have driven into a kind of conjunction.

5. However much I may mistrust the general trend and ultimate objects of the national movement, I have most carefully refrained from any action calculated to identify this High Commission with political opposition to it, or to embarrass the present Government, whose avowed policy is to conciliate without completely surrendering to its organisers.

6. I have been at pains to make this attitude of non-interference in current Turkish politics, and of reserve in regard to the question of the future of Kurdistan, clear to local political circles of every complexion, as well as to my French colleague, who is told of my supposed anti-nationalist activities just as persistently as I am assured that the French are backing the national movement with all their force.

7. The conversation recorded in the enclosed memorandum constitutes one of my efforts to represent matters in a truer light.

8. I venture to draw your Lordship's particular attention to the last three paragraphs of the memorandum, which deal with a matter of more general interest than that of Kurdistan. The delay in dealing with the question of peace with Turkey is a source of daily increasing preoccupation among Turks. The Government feel that the internal situation cannot much longer stand the strain on it, and no opportunity is lost by Turkish Ministers of urging that a solution should be arrived at.

9. Even the organisers of the national movement, who have hitherto gained most by the delay, are, it is said, beginning to be worried by the delay, lest one result of it should be to make it impossible to keep their movement going much longer. This last fact need not of itself trouble us particularly, if

a weakening of the national movement necessarily meant the strengthening of a Central Government disposed to bow to the decisions of the Peace Conference. Unfortunately, such a weakening is more likely to mean an increase of pure brigandage, already most dangerously prevalent, and to conduce to the creation of a situation of utter chaos in Asia Minor.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 616

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan*

I had a long conversation on 19th November with the Minister for Foreign Affairs which presented certain points of interest.

2. After speaking of certain current affairs, I told Reshid Pasha that I wished to tell him something regarding our attitude towards the Kurds, as to which there had been some misunderstanding since Major Noel's visit to Malatia. I had intended to give him this explanation when taking exception to an attempt to arrest the Secretary of a Kurdish club, but as he was in a hurry to get away that day I had postponed it.

3. Soon after the armistice, I said, the High Commissioner had been approached by all sorts of groups, among them the Kurdish club. Our Government had directed us to discourage the sending of numerous delegations to Paris and London, but to undertake to transmit any written statements of aims and aspirations. We had followed that rule with everyone. At the same time we had maintained, equally with everyone, an attitude of complete reserve as to what they had to expect in the future.

4. We had, I said, been not less reserved with the Kurds than with other groups. Our view was that they undoubtedly constituted a separate nationality, whether they wished to link their futures with those of the Turks or to part company with them; and that, now that the future of peoples were being settled, they had the same right as other nationalities to express aspirations. As for the probable fate of their aspirations the High Commission knew nothing, and, so far as I know, His Majesty's Government had not themselves formed any final judgment.

5. I said it was true that the Kurdish question was of great interest to His Majesty's Government and was the object of close study. We were interested in it in the present, because the Kurds were an important element on both sides of our military frontier north of Bagdad, and one of the most important, if not the most important, just beyond the territory occupied by us until a few days ago in Syria. We should have a permanent interest in the Kurds in the future also, because, whatever else happened, we had a future in Mesopotamia, in the northern portion of which pure Arab gradually merged into pure Kurd.

6. Major Noel had been sent on a mission of enquiry in certain areas largely inhabited by Kurds. He had made a short preliminary tour, then visited Constantinople, then started on a more extended tour of which the

Turkish Government was apprised, and for which they had given him recommendations to provincial authorities. This brought him to Malatia, and by a most unfortunate coincidence he got there at the same time as Ghilib Bey.<sup>1</sup> The Turkish Officer Commanding Diarbekr, who had thrown in his lot with the national movement, ordered the arrest of the Bedrhans,<sup>2</sup> and even of Major Noel himself. Major Noel saw in this something different from the reception which he had been led to expect when the Central Government gave him recommendations, and in all good faith he telegraphed to us to protest. Sivas placed its own interpretation on all this, and leaped to the conclusion that there was some hideous partitioning compact between Ferid Pasha, who wanted to quell the nationalists, and perfidious Albion, which wanted to create a Kurdistan.

7. This idea, I said, was moonshine. Major Noel was a specialist in Kurds, and like other specialists, he had personal sympathies with the people he knew all about. His mission has been, however, as I had already said, one of enquiry, not of propaganda. He had express instructions to be impartial, and had sought to be impartial. The only reason why His Majesty's Government had encouraged the Bedrhans to accompany him was the hope that their influence could be used to promote peace and quietness in a troubled region during the transition period. The project of using such influences in that way had been frequently discussed with Ferid Pasha. The Bedrhans themselves had been told distinctly that that was the only purpose for which His Majesty's Government favoured their going to Kurdistan.

8. My object in making this statement was to make it clear that any action taken by us from time to time on behalf of individual Kurds was not to be taken as meaning that we were running Kurds, either as nationalists or as possible elements in a combine against the present Government or the national movement; also to counteract to some extent the sedulous efforts which are being made to work up feeling against His Majesty's Government by attributing to them as an already settled thing a policy of complete dismemberment of Turkey. I was careful to avoid saying anything which might suggest that His Majesty's Government would decide *against* Kurdish separatist aspirations, and I distinguished clearly between the present and the future.

9. The Minister said it was true that our attitude had been misrepresented. He thanked me for the information I had given him, and said it would be very useful. He went on to ask me whether we considered the Kurds, who put themselves forward here to voice Kurdish aspirations, as being really representative. I said that this brought us to personalities, and that while what I had hitherto said was a statement of our attitude which he could use as he chose, I could only answer his present question personally and confidentially.

10. Our practice was, I said, to listen to anyone who seemed to represent any serious element of national opinion. We did not, as in a law court, ask

<sup>1</sup> See No. 512.

<sup>2</sup> A leading Kurdish family.

people to produce powers of attorney before hearing them. We sized them up and formed our own opinion of their seriousness and representative character. In the case of the Kurds it was a matter of infinite difficulty to appraise the claims of leading personages to stand for the whole of Kurdistan, and my own feeling was that the bulk of the Kurds were on too mediæval a plane of thought and custom to make it possible to apply modern democratic criteria. I was, however, satisfied that the Kurdish club came within my own definition of people entitled to a hearing, i.e., they were serious and did stand for important elements of the Kurdish race.

11. The Minister said he had asked the question because he had reason to believe that these people did *not* represent the bulk of Kurdish opinion. I said that if that were so, any other people who *did* represent it would also be accorded a hearing.

12. Reshid Pasha then said that he was going to ask an indiscreet question. What was the real reason for leaving the Turkish question in abeyance? The opinion was gaining ground, he explained—he would not say in Government circles, but in Turkish circles generally—that the Allies were deferring a settlement of set purpose in order that Turkey might be ruined completely, materially and morally. I said that I was sure that, whatever the reason for the delay, it was not that. So far as I knew, it was due simply to the difficulty of the problem. It was desired to provide a special régime for Armenia and some sort of a régime for Turkey proper, i.e., Asia Minor and Constantinople, which would harmonise all interests. The Conference had looked much to the United States and the attitude of the United States had so far been rather disappointing. The difficulty of finding satisfactory solutions in these circumstances was the genuine explanation of the delay.

13. Reshid Pasha then said that speaking as one private person to another, he would tell me that the English attitude had been a mistaken one from the beginning of the armistice. We had had the sympathy of every element in Turkey and we had done nothing to stimulate it. I said I knew that the sentiments of the *major* portion of the country were pro-English. If we had lost opportunities thereby, as we had, it was because His Majesty's Government were perfectly determined not to be parted from their Allies. We had subordinated our own particular interests to that principle.

14. Reshid Pasha asked why it was not possible to discuss the future of the country in an informal way with Turkish statesmen, who after all had governed the various elements for centuries and knew them as no one else could. To his remark that the Turks had governed the country for centuries, I could not resist exclaiming, 'Mais vous l'avez fait si mal!' and adding that, though I was always talking to him about Greeks and Armenians, I pitied the governed Turks just as much. He admitted the justice of this *boutade*, which brought the interesting portion of the conversation to an end. The Minister went off into a long account of conversations with Colonel Seely<sup>3</sup> in London towards the end of 1912, in which he foretold with approximate accuracy the course of events in the Balkans and Constantinople. The point was

<sup>3</sup> British Secretary of State for War, 1912-14.

that the truth of his forecast was due to his knowledge of the peoples concerned.

A. RYAN<sup>4</sup>

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE,  
November 27, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Ryan's language in this conversation was approved in Foreign Office telegram No. 2 of January 1, 1920, to Constantinople.

No. 617

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*  
*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Curzon Papers/France]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 4, 1919

Situation has changed appreciably since our recent correspondence.<sup>1</sup> The general position created by the stiffening of the German attitude consequent upon the American defection,<sup>2</sup> appears to us to be so serious as to necessitate an immediate interchange of views between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries.

This being so, and Mr. Lloyd George being unfortunately unable to go to Paris, we feel that there is no alternative but to press M. Clemenceau to adhere to his original offer and to come to London as soon as possible, accompanied by M. Pichon.

While M. Clemenceau is here, we can discuss Eastern question, which I was to have treated with him in Paris, but which has receded for moment into background, as compared with the general situation, extreme gravity of which demands a conference in which the Prime Ministers will be the principal parties.

Please see M. Clemenceau at once and speak to him earnestly in above sense.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This private correspondence is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume II, No. 34, minute 1 and No. 36, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was shown to Sir E. Crowe by Lord Derby.

No. 618

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*  
*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Curzon Papers/France]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 4, 1919

Prime Minister is seriously alarmed at position into which matters appear to be drifting at Paris, owing to defection of Americans, resistance of Germans, and uncompromising and at times exasperating attitude of France. I have accordingly telegraphed today<sup>1</sup> suggesting that MM. Clemenceau and Pichon should carry out their previous offer to come to England without delay for discussion of these matters.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 617.

Pending this meeting it appears unnecessary to give you more detailed instructions than those contained in my telephone message this afternoon,<sup>2</sup> namely not to agree to any course involving us in military commitments.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> No record of this telephone message has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 36, note 1.

## No. 619

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic: by telephone [Curzon Papers/France]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919

My telegram of last night.<sup>1</sup>

Information of this morning, including visit of C.I.G.S. to Paris<sup>2</sup> of which we knew nothing, renders it, in view of Prime Minister, increasingly important that decisions now to be taken should be taken by principals only, that is by Ministers representing their Governments.

In these circumstances conference with Clemenceau becomes essential, since Crowe has not authority to deal with matters of such vital importance.

Please use these arguments with Clemenceau.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 617.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Major-Gen. Sir C. E. Callwell: *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* (London, 1927), vol. ii, pp. 216-17.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was shown to Sir E. Crowe by Lord Derby. (See further Volume II, No. 37, note 4.)

## No. 620

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received December 20)*

*No. 2311 [163719/3050/44A]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 9, 1919

My Lord.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a report of a conversation which Mr. Hohler had yesterday with the Kurdish chief, Sheikh Said Abdul Kadir Pasha, on Kurdish affairs.

2. I venture to think that the question of Kurdish independence is one which deserves most careful study on the part of His Majesty's Government, as the movement in favour of it appears to be deep and genuine; and whether we wish it or not, the Kurds place their hopes mainly in His Majesty's Government.

3. The fact that the Kurds appear to have arrived at an agreement with the Armenians is one of great interest, and if the agreement is solid it should be of great value in solving many difficulties.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN No. 620

*Memorandum*

I received a visit from Abdul Kadir this morning, who stated that at the present time the Kurds found themselves in a very difficult position, and even in his opinion in some danger. The Entente Libérale party, with Ferid Pasha at their head, were endeavouring to replace the present Government and to come into power, and had made proposals of a very favourable nature to him, promising the Kurds what I understand to amount to complete autonomy under the protectorate of the Turkish Government. Ferid Pasha, however, at the time of his previous accession to power had made fairly large, though far from equally far-reaching promises, but when in power had carried nothing out. On the other hand, the present Government had also been making proposals to him, offering the Kurds administrative autonomy under Kurdish officials, but at the same time they were adopting provocative and unfriendly proceedings towards him and his fellow-countrymen in Constantinople. In the meantime Mustapha Kemal was becoming increasingly dangerous, and he felt great anxiety what this man in combination with the Azerbaijanis, instigated by Halil Pasha and other adherents of Enver, might do. The price he was to pay for the concessions to be given by the Entente Libérale was to throw the Kurds against Mustapha Kemal. What the present Government under Ali Riza wished was that they should receive the support of the Kurds, and should put up with Mustapha Kemal, whom they would endeavour to restrain from any overt action. He said he wished to form his course absolutely in accord with the Allies, but especially with England, for he considered that the fate of Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great Britain, much more so than with that of any other of the Allies, and he was anxious to do nothing which would not have our entire assent and approval.

2. He gave me the information, which was very interesting but quite new to me, that the Armenians and the Kurds had come to an agreement both here and at Paris, and handed to me the documents (copies of which are enclosed herewith),<sup>1</sup> giving an account of the results thus achieved, together with a letter to the heads of the Peace delegations at the Peace Conference, signed conjointly by Cherif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha. These papers are presumably already in the hands of the Foreign Office, but copies<sup>1</sup> are enclosed herewith. I expressed the great satisfaction I felt at hearing that the two races had thus come to an harmonious arrangement. I said that the question he laid before me was one of great difficulty. The policy of His Majesty's Government, to which they intended rigorously to adhere, was not to interfere in any way with Turkish internal politics, so that Turkey might be quite free to choose at this critical moment of its existence what Government and whatever leaders she preferred, uninfluenced by any foreign intervention. In the light of the principles of President Wilson, it was impossible not to feel sympathy with the desire of any nationality to assert its inde-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed: see No. 621.

pendence, but while we were ready to forward any communication to the Peace Conference which the Kurdish people might wish to make, and so to provide them with every facility for giving expression to their aspirations, I warned him most seriously to understand that that implied no kind of promise or undertaking. The information which had reached this High Commission was rather to the effect that Mustapha Kemal's movement was weakening, so that there would be little to fear from him, and I had reason to believe that the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia had been very successful in promoting tranquil relations between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, so that there ought to be no reason to fear what they might do. He had referred to a revival of the Nationalist movement in the spring, but that was three or four months distant, and I could not but believe by that time the Peace Conference would have arrived at certain conclusions, at least in respect to peace with Turkey. His Excellency interrupted me to say that while it was true, and he fully appreciated the fact that it was from the Peace Conference and not from any Turkish Government that the Kurds had to look for the fulfilment of their aspirations, yet, with the progress of time, other things might happen. The Peace Conference would in due course make its decisions, but he was inclined to wonder what measures it would take to enforce them, and he quoted an Arab proverb: 'Though your enemy is only an ant, so long as he is an enemy you should not go to sleep'. With great tact he insinuated the difficulty which the Kurdish people would have in making good their claim to independence, if the Allies had not sufficient forces to overawe the Turks into a full acceptance of the peace terms.

3. I enquired whether the opposition to Mustapha Kemal desired by the Entente Libérale party entailed the use of force; he said it did. I observed that this seemed unnecessary, owing to the weakening of the movement to which I had already referred, and also that, in view of the fact that His Majesty's Government desired, in the interests of all parties, that peace should be established and maintained.

4. With regard to the vexatious treatment which he said the Kurds were suffering in Constantinople, I remarked that His Majesty's Government had stated that they would not tolerate political oppression of one party by another; all depended on the facts, but in case of an emergency it was very probable that we might be able to use our influence to prevent such conduct as he had described.

5. I was again much impressed by the firm resolution that Sheik Abdul Kadir showed in pursuing his aim of independence for Kurdistan and for separation from the Turks.<sup>2</sup>

T. B. HOHLER

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE,

*December 8, 1919.*

<sup>2</sup> This despatch was minuted by Lord Curzon as follows:

'I am all for

(1) Kurdish autonomy

(2) Kurdish-Armenian agreement.

'But who is to find the force to guarantee the former? C.'

No. 621

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)*

No. 1863 Telegraphic [157141/3050/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 10, 1919

A memorandum<sup>1</sup> has been presented to the Peace Conference signed by Boghos Nubar for Armenians, Ohandjanian<sup>2</sup> for Armenian Republic, and Cherif Pasha claiming to represent Kurds, to the effect that the Kurds and Armenians have identical interests and aspirations, and demand freedom from Turkey for a unified independent Armenia and an independent Kurdistan under one Mandatory Power. They leave the delimitation of the Kurdo-Armenian frontier to the decision of the Conference, and profess entire agreement that the rights of minorities in both States should be respected. Text<sup>3</sup> follows by bag.

Please telegraph your views and repeat this to Tiflis with your reply.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dated at Paris, November 20, 1919: cf. No. 620.

<sup>2</sup> M. Ohandjanian was a representative in Paris of the Armenian Republic of Erivan.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Admiral de Robeck stated in Constantinople telegram No. 2135 of December 11, 1919 (despatched before receipt of the present telegram, and received in the Foreign Office on December 16) that he regarded the agreement 'as of happiest augury . . . I can imagine nothing better calculated to tend to safety and happiness of negotiations [sic] than such a (? scheme) and I presume it should be carefully encouraged'. Lord Curzon further instructed Admiral de Robeck in this connexion in Foreign Office telegram No. 1887 of December 20 to Constantinople: 'Every possible encouragement should be given to the movement.' Admiral Webb, however, further commented in Constantinople despatch No. 38 of January 8, 1920 (received January 29): 'Although it is from every point of view most desirable that the Kurds and Armenians should come to an understanding and agree to work together in the interests of the population of the Eastern Vilayets, yet it cannot be said that this agreement between Boghos Nubar and Cherif Pasha does anything to bring this about. The latter claims to be the spokesman of the Kurdish nation, but there is in reality no reason to consider him as being more than an individual of Kurdish descent, who has been so long in Europe that he is entirely out of touch with present conditions in his country. His views are therefore merely expressions of his personal opinion and cannot in any way be taken as representing the aspirations and sentiments of the Kurdish race.'

No. 622

*Letter from Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador in London*

No. 156699/M.E. 44 [156699/146649/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 11, 1919

My dear Ambassador:—

In our conversation of October 30 last<sup>1</sup> I touched on the question of Anglo-American relations at Constantinople and I now send you privately a copy of correspondence which has passed between our respective High Commiss-

<sup>1</sup> See No. 347.

sioners there on the subject of certain news items<sup>2</sup> (specimen copies are also enclosed)<sup>3</sup> which have from time to time been disseminated through the agency of the 'United States Naval Radio Press'. It is suspected that some at least of these messages are put about by the Bolshevik Station at Moscow for

<sup>2</sup> This correspondence was as follows:

(i) *Admiral de Robeck to Admiral Bristol (Copy received in Foreign Office, November 14)*

'Constantinople, October 28, 1919

'Sir,

'I have the honour to inform your Excellency that my attention has been called to a number of items which have appeared from time to time, though fairly continuously, in the United States Naval Radio Press.

'2. I understand that my predecessor has already discussed this question with your Excellency on the 5th June, and that your Excellency then informed Admiral Calthorpe that you would endeavour in future to see that any remarks as regards either the movements or morale of Allied troops were omitted.

'3. The items which recently attracted my notice have dealt with stories of dissensions among the Allied Powers which are still at war with Turkey, as well as among the Allied and Associated Governments whose representatives are assembled in Paris. Other items have also appeared aimed directly at one or other of the Allied Powers mentioned above.

'4. In this latter connection may I not instance in particular the issue of the 15th October, commencing "Mustapha Kemal said," &c.? [see enclosure 3 in No. 549]. The value of this depends entirely on the individuality of the person to whom these words were addressed, and the agency through which it was received, and I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree with me that a good deal is involved by what follows, notably the statement that "British money is spent here to destroy Turkey. We are aware that the British gave £150,000 to Adil Bey," &c.

'5. It is, of course, unnecessary for me to point out that there is not a word of truth in the statement I have quoted, and I find considerable difficulty in trying to estimate whence such a fabrication emanated. It is clear that it would not have come from an Allied or friendly source, and I cannot help thinking that your Excellency's operator may be repeating some message from a source which deliberately desires to do harm to the Allied cause.

'6. In these circumstances, and taking into account the present situation in Turkey as between that country and the Allied Powers, who are still in a state of war against her, I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree that the repetition of these or similar mendacious or harmful statements can serve no useful purpose, and can, in fact, only be most undesirable at such a time as the present.

'I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK'

(ii) *Admiral Bristol to Admiral de Robeck (Copy received in Foreign Office, November 29)*

'Constantinople, November 6, 1919

'Sir,

'Your letter No. R. 1103, of 28 October, 1919 has been received.

'I beg to inform you that the U.S. Navy Radio Press is not an official document. It is a copy of press dispatches that are broadcasted from different high-powered radio stations in Europe and sometimes from America. The news thus broadcasted is public property to anyone who receives this radio news. Copies of this radio press are distributed to the Americans in this country. By special request, I have furnished copies of this press to all the Allied High Commissioners and to the Foreign Military and Naval Head Quarters. This distribution is simply done as a courtesy and convenience to those who desire to get some news of the outside world.

'I understand that the British and French Authorities likewise, have radio press.

'I did discuss with your predecessor the question of certain information that appeared in [Note 3, see over.]

the express purpose of making trouble between the Allies and I think you will agree with me that their distribution in such a storm centre as Constantinople through an Agency with a title which would lead the general public to suppose that it is under the direct patronage of the United States Navy is liable to lead to misunderstandings.

I am &c.

CURZON

our radio press. I also discussed it with General Milne. I informed your predecessor that the information referred to by General Milne had escaped my notice; that it was information regarding the Allied troops and that it would not have appeared in the press except by mistake. I further informed him that no such information would appear in the press in the future, and that in the past I had eliminated such information. I especially called upon General Milne in connection with this incident and everything was most satisfactorily arranged. I further stated to your predecessor that the policy of our Government was strictly opposed to censorship except as a military necessity. However, in order to maintain most cordial relations with His Excellency, I have always scrutinised our press and eliminated from it anything that I thought would be objectionable to him or to the other Allied Powers. I beg to state that I would appreciate if you would indicate the number of items which have appeared from time to time, though fairly continuously, in our press that you refer to. Does this reference of Your Excellency mean that the information given out was undesirable from your point of view? If you will give me these references in detail, I will appreciate it very much, and I can thus understand more clearly your point of view.

Referring to the special item that you quote as appearing on the 15th of October, I beg to invite your attention to the fact that this was a quotation attributed to Moustafa Kemal, and therefore the direct responsibility for this information is this man. This item was brought to my attention before it was given out. I realised that the same information could be picked up by anybody from the broadcasted radio. It seemed to me if I suppressed it, it would give it greater credence than if it was published. I think you will agree with me that to suppress such items when it is known that it is suppressed, give it an importance that it does not deserve. You will note that the source of this fabrication is Moustafa Kemal. Still further I invite your attention to the enclosed copy [see below] of an article that appeared in the *Times* about 25th October 1919; therefore, I am sure you will agree that this information did not come from a friendly source and that our operator, which I have confirmed, simply recorded that which was broadcasted from the radio station at Lyons, France.

Your Excellency can rest assured that I will co-operate with the Representatives of the Allied Powers present in the same manner that I have in the past, taking into account the present situation in Turkey.

'Respectfully,  
MARK L. BRISTOL.'

The above-mentioned 'article' from *The Times* is not here printed. It was a news item, printed under the headings 'Turkish hostility to Britain' and 'Mustapha Kemal's accusations', on page 11 of *The Times* of October 25, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Not appended to filed copy: cf. No. 549, enclosure 3.

### No. 623

*Sir E. Crowe<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Vansittart (Paris)<sup>2</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [385/3/3/21145]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 11, 1919

M. Clemenceau has proposed complete scheme for dealing with Turkish

<sup>1</sup> Sir E. Crowe was temporarily in London in connexion with the visit of M. Clemenceau: cf. No. 398, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was addressed in the original to 'Astoria'. Mr. Vansittart acted as head

question and promises to produce it in written form here at once. It would leave Turkey in Europe and Sultan in Constantinople under France and England who would control finances of whole of Turkey. We explained to Clemenceau objections which we entertained to such a scheme.<sup>3</sup> It has been agreed that both sides shall produce worked out plan showing in detail solution they respectively favour. For this purpose it is essential that Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Forbes-Adam should come over at once and bring with them all necessary papers. They should come accordingly on Saturday.<sup>4</sup>

of the Political Section of the British Delegation after the departure of Sir E. Crowe from Paris.

<sup>3</sup> See, Volume II, No. 55.

<sup>4</sup> December 13, 1919. (See, further, No. 631.)

## No. 624

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 12)*

*No. 2137 Telegraphic [161191/1638/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 11, 1919

Your telegram No. 1813<sup>1</sup> November 26th.

In addition to objections to War Office proposal which were given in my telegram No. 2058<sup>2</sup> November 13th I would urge due consideration be given to very disadvantageous situation for us which will arise if proposed abandonment of railway is carried into effect.

(A) Constantinople depends almost entirely on railway for its wheat supply. Interruption will mean food shortage and create most serious situation in this town of over a million inhabitants for whom our present position gives us a very large responsibility which is so far being fulfilled very adequately in this direction.

(B) Nationalists made great capital out of withdrawal of British troops from Samsoun and are well aware of marked diminution in our military forces in Turkey. Withdrawal from railway will be claimed as victory for anti-Entente and Extremist elements and strengthen resistance to acceptance of peace terms.

(C) Paragraph B of your telegram.<sup>1</sup> Mustapha Kemal's adherents having already blown up a bridge and destroyed train may do so again.

To (? tell) him that we hold him accountable for any rupture without being in a position to bring him to account will, to say the least, not have deterrent effect. To convey to him that we are handing over control of railway to him as a mark of confidence amounts to placing a military asset of first importance in the hands of those elements in this country (?) which are determined on evading consequences of defeat and cannot therefore be too strongly condemned. Hostile and bitterly anti-British attitude of Mustapha Kemal and his adherents was perhaps not fully (?) realized by War Office

<sup>1</sup> No. 607.

<sup>2</sup> No. 590.

when this proposal was mooted. To bestow such a mark of confidence on such a man who is avowedly our principal enemy would be fatal blow to our (? prestige) and a grave danger to safety of our Allies. It would also amaze more moderate elements and mystify our Allies.

In any case if it was decided to (? restore) railway to Turks it is certainly not to Mustapha Kemal elements that it should be confided for that would place in his hands a weapon against us whose value cannot be over estimated while in the event of his downfall he would undoubtedly wreck it before abandonment.

(D) Paragraph C of your telegram.<sup>1</sup> Railway is however a most important link between Allied forces at Constantinople and those in Cilicia and Syria. (? It is) probable that our French Allies would welcome our abandonment of railway as by taking over management themselves and providing necessary troops they would immensely increase their influence in Asia Minor, while we should lose a most valuable commercial and political asset. Under Article 260 of German Treaty provision is made for handing over of German companies in Turkey, and while I am in ignorance of His Majesty's Government's intention (? with reference to) abandonment (? I would omitted) (? point out that) greatest reparations are due from Turks and it therefore seems most probable that this line will form one of them.

Every railway in Turkey is guarded by Allied forces except British Adin Company's line and present condition of that railway would give French every reason to insist on taking over Bagdad Railway should we abandon it. General Milne assures me that withdrawal of British protection from Anatolian Railway would immediately involve paralysis of system as employees would refuse to run trains.

(E) For above reasons it appears to me diametrically contrary to our vital interests that we should withdraw our military control of railway and I strongly deprecate handing over unless it is policy of His Majesty's Government to disinterest themselves totally in the future of Turkey.

I have consulted General Milne who entirely concurs.

## No. 625

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received December 29)*

*No. 2325 [165697/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 12, 1919

My Lord,

A new impetus has recently been given to the stream of telegrams from places in the interior of Turkey protesting against the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the outrages alleged to have been committed on the Moslem population of that region.

2. I have more than once emphasized the genuine character of the resentment aroused among Turks of all classes by the occupation of Smyrna and

subsequent events. I attribute the present renewal of the telegraphic agitation against it however to a circular order from the nationalist leaders rather than to any new spontaneous impulse.

3. This impression is borne out by a telegram from Moustafa Kemal Pacha himself, a copy of which I enclose. Your Lordship will remember that the Pacha has on two recent occasions addressed similar telegrams to my colleagues and myself in connection with the French occupation of Cilicia.<sup>1</sup>

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 625

*Translation of a telegram despatched from Sivas on November 30th by Mustapha Kemal (Pasha) in the name of the Representatives of the Association for the Defence of Rights in Anatolia and Roumelia.*

It is within your knowledge that the Greeks recommenced their oppression of Mohammedans immediately after the departure of the Commission of Enquiry. In addition they are now preventing the election and even go so far as to place sentries at the doors of the mosques.

We consider it our national and patriotic duty to declare that the whole material and moral responsibility of all the crimes and incidents rests with the Entente Powers who are following a policy of indulgence and encouragement towards the Greek oppression, and who do not restore the Vilayet of Aidin to its true and legitimate by [sic] relieving it of these sanguinary forces.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 367.

No. 626

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

*No. 824 [156699/146649/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 13, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 431<sup>1</sup> of August 6th, I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence on the subject of the reports issued in the name of the United States Navy Radio Press which has passed between the British and United States High Commissioners at Constantinople,<sup>2</sup> together with extracts from certain of the more objectionable of these reports.<sup>3</sup>

2. Your Excellency will note the unsatisfactory nature of Admiral Bristol's reply to Admiral de Robeck's representations (see enclosure in Admiral de Robeck's despatch No. 2124<sup>4</sup> of November 13th).

3. I have drawn the attention of the United States Ambassador here to the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For this correspondence see No. 622, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed: cf. No. 549, enclosure 3.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This short covering despatch (received November 29) transmitted a copy of Admiral Bristol's note of November 6 to Admiral de Robeck: see No. 622, note 2.

matter in a private letter<sup>5</sup> but I should be glad if you would approach the United States Government officially with a view to ascertaining whether they cannot, in the present inflamed condition of the Middle East, suggest some method of preventing the circulation of these fantastic accusations against Great Britain.

4. It would seem that the United States Government could at least prevent the use of the term 'United States Navy' Radio Press, under which heading these messages are distributed in Constantinople, and which lends them an official character.

I am, &c.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> No. 622.

<sup>6</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

### No. 627

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

*No. 828 [155226/128163/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 15, 1919

My Lord,

The question of taking all possible precautions for preventing the alienation by the Ottoman Government of any available assets which could possibly be set aside for the satisfaction of the many claims for reparation which the Porte will be called upon to meet under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, has for some time been occupying the attention of His Majesty's and the Allied Governments.

2. Investigations made by the Allied High Commissioners had shown that a considerable number of mining and industrial concessions had been granted by the Ottoman Government to enemy and to neutral subjects during the period of hostilities, and it was evident that unless some action were taken, further concessionary rights were likely to be granted to enemy subjects cloaked by neutrals.

3. In the face of this situation, the British, French and Italian High Commissioners at Constantinople, acting under instructions, informed the Porte in a joint note dated the 19th July last,<sup>1</sup> that as the validity of mining concessions and licences granted by the Ottoman Government since the 1st November, 1914, would be dealt with in the proposed Treaty of Peace, it was desirable that no further concessions or licences should be granted until the conclusion of peace.

4. As this joint note only referred to mining concessions, it was considered by the High Commissioners necessary to broaden the terms of the warning, and to make it applicable to all kinds of concessions. Accordingly, in a second note dated the 22nd August, a copy of which<sup>1</sup> is transmitted herewith, the three Allied High Commissioners invited the Porte to cancel concessions of all kinds (including mining concessions) which may have been granted to enemy subjects during the period of hostilities and intimated that while

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

concessions given to neutrals during the war should be subject to revision, all concessions granted since the date of the Armistice, i.e. the 30th October 1918, irrespective of the nationality of the persons to whom they were granted, should be considered null and void.

5. The question has since been reviewed by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury in a letter of the 21st October, a copy of which<sup>2</sup> is enclosed. While the attitude adopted by the Allied Governments in regard to concessions granted to enemy subjects during the war and during the period of the Armistice seems perfectly clear, I agree with the Treasury that the treatment of concessions granted to neutrals during those periods presents some difficulty, more especially in view of the fact that the United States has not been at war with Turkey, and that the United States Government may well desire to support any concessionary rights obtained by their nationals, e.g. by the Standard Oil Company in Palestine, during the period either of the war or of the Armistice. Indeed, the interest which the United States Ambassador here continues to manifest in questions of this kind (see my despatches No. 681<sup>3</sup> of the 30th October and No. 786<sup>4</sup> of the 3rd instant) gives no ground for supposing that his Government will prove accommodating on this question.

6. A further difficulty arises from the fact that some of the concessions granted will, no doubt, be found to lie within territories to be ceded by Turkey under the Peace settlement, and it seems most desirable that the future authorities of such transferred districts should be left with a free hand to deal with the mineral and industrial development of the territories they will be called upon to administer.

7. Although the position at present is very unsatisfactory, and may in the future, especially should the United States Government dissociate themselves from the Turkish settlement, easily lead to consequences of an even more serious kind, it has been felt that any attempt to secure the co-operation of the United States Government in the policy at present being pursued by the three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, or even to explain that policy to the United States Government with a view to forestalling the difficulties over concessions granted to American nationals which may arise after the conclusion of peace with Turkey, may well produce an exactly opposite result to that intended and serve only to intensify the efforts of American concession-hunters.

8. Nevertheless, I feel bound to bring this subject to Your Excellency's notice, while leaving entirely to your discretion the nature of the action, if any, which should be taken on this despatch.

I am, &c.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Not printed: see below.

<sup>3</sup> No. 347.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This formal covering despatch transmitted to Washington a copy of No. 370.

<sup>5</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

No. 628

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 20)*

*No. 2150 Telegraphic [163881/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 15, 1919

Sultan recently approached me through an emissary expressing his desire to have informal meeting with me, not to ask anything but simply to state his position and views.

He intimated that if answer was favourable he would similarly sound other High Commissioners as he appreciated fact that it was not possible to see anyone of us alone. He did not say whether he contemplated joint or separate audiences but I gather he would prefer to see us separately and that it was myself that he really wanted to speak with.

I consulted my colleagues in strict confidence and while Italian High Commissioner concurred with me in thinking that such a meeting could lead to nothing, he thought it could do no harm. French High Commissioner, however, considered that apart from severance of relations with sovereign we were in fact practically on peace relations, and that consequently such an interview, while capable of leading to nothing, could not fail to be known, and must inevitably lend itself to all kinds of interpretations, result of which would be disadvantageous.

I consider latter view correct and intend (? consequently) to indicate impossibility of such an interview.

I think Sultan's intention was to urge (? on us) necessity for conclusion of peace in as much as continuation of present situation is every day more destructive to Turkish State. I think also that he addressed himself to me because his only hope is in His Majesty's Government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon replied to this telegram in Foreign Office telegram No. 1898 of December 24, 1919, to Constantinople: 'Your attitude is approved.'

No. 629

*Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 18)*

*No. 2295 [162772/106756/44]*

PARIS, December 16, 1919

My Lord,

1. With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 7716<sup>1</sup> of the 29th

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This despatch enclosed a copy of a letter of November 21, 1919, from the Admiralty transmitting a telegram of October 27 from Admiral de Robeck to the Admiralty in which he stated: 'There is no naval objection to Lemnos being handed back to the Greeks now nor does General Sir George F. Milne, General Officer Commanding in Chief Army of the Black Sea, offer any military objection, but politically such a step appears to me undesirable. 2. My colleagues on the High Commission would, I am sure, agree with me that, until the Smyrna question is settled, no further transfer of territory should be made to

ultimo enclosing copy of a letter received from the Admiralty relative to the restoration to Greece of the Island of Lemnos, I have the honour to express my full agreement with the view that no serious political reason can be advanced for further deferring our evacuation.

2. In view of the opinions expressed by Admiral de Robeck and General Sir George Milne it appears that there are no naval or military objections to this course. It would be in the general interest and have the best effect on Greek opinion in its present somewhat troubled state if the island were at once restored to Greece.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

the Greeks.' The Admiralty informed the Foreign Office that it desired to evacuate Lemnos for reasons of economy (cf. No. 559, note 2), and inquired as to Lord Curzon's views. Lord Curzon's despatch of November 29, 1919, to Sir E. Crowe referred to No. 568 and requested his views.

### No. 630

*Letter from the American Ambassador in London to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 22)*

[164231/146649/44]

LONDON, December 19, 1919

My Dear Lord Curzon,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 11th instant (Reference No. 156699/M.E. 44)<sup>1</sup> with which you sent me privately copies of correspondence which has passed between the respective High Commissioners of Great Britain and the United States at Constantinople on the subject of certain news items disseminated through the agency of the 'United States Naval Radio Press', the distribution of which through such an agency you consider liable to lead to misunderstandings.

In view of the fact that Rear-Admiral Bristol in addition to his responsibility to the Department of State in the capacity of High Commissioner of the United States at Constantinople is likewise in his naval capacity under the directions of Rear-Admiral Knapp, Naval Attaché of this Embassy and Commanding United States Naval Forces in European Waters, I have communicated the correspondence in question to the latter Officer for such action as he may deem advisable.<sup>2</sup>

I am,  
Very Sincerely Yours,  
JOHN W. DAVIS

<sup>1</sup> No. 622.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon acknowledged receipt of this letter in a brief reply of December 30, 1919, to the American Ambassador. Lord Curzon stated therein: 'I am very much obliged for the action you have taken. I feel sure that Rear-Admiral Knapp will do all in his power to prevent the circulation of harmful and misleading reports.'

*Minutes of First Meeting of an Anglo-French Conference in the Secretary of State's Room at 11.45 a.m. on December 22 regarding the Turkish Settlement.<sup>1</sup>*

[166415/151671/44]

The following were present at the first meeting:—

For France—

M. Berthelot, Chief Secretary for Political and Commercial Affairs at the French Foreign Office, and  
M. de Fleuriau, Minister Plenipotentiary and Counsellor of the French Embassy.

For Great Britain—

Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  
Mr. Armitage Smith, of His Majesty's Treasury.  
Mr. Vansittart }  
Mr. Forbes Adam } of the Foreign Office.

Lord Curzon took the Chair.

*Basis of Discussion.*

LORD CURZON suggested that it would be convenient to take as the basis of discussion the first part of M. Berthelot's note of the 12th December, point by point, together with the British observations upon it (see Appendix to this Minute).

In reply to M. Berthelot, who explained that the French note had been hurriedly prepared, Lord Curzon said that it seemed to him to present an excellent statement of the case.

*Italian evacuation of Southern Anatolia.*

Lord Curzon first touched on the paragraph on page 4<sup>2</sup> of the French note regarding the principle of particular spheres of influence in Turkey, and asked whether M. Berthelot intended this to cover the spheres of economic priority. It might then be difficult to give Italy the *quid pro quo*, which was apparently required under the Treaty of London, to induce her to evacuate Southern Anatolia. M. BERTHELOT stated that he did not intend the expression to exclude the grant of special economic privileges to Italy. He knew that Signor Tittoni, and he believed also M. Scialoija, would accept some such settlement of the Italian claims in Southern Anatolia.

*Constantinople and the Straits.*

The next question discussed was the new régime for Constantinople and the Straits (pages 4 and 5<sup>3</sup> of the French note).

<sup>1</sup> For the antecedents of this meeting see Volume II, No. 55, minute 2 and note 10, and No. 62.

<sup>2</sup> See page 943.

<sup>3</sup> See pages 943-7.

### *Composition of International Commission.*

M. Berthelot stated that the French Government favoured the administration being entrusted to a Commission composed of France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia (if and when reconstituted), and possibly also Roumania and Greece, for economic (shipping) reasons. France would not, however, much object to eventual participation of the United States. He thought that possibly the Great Powers should alone have votes, and the smaller Powers be represented in a purely consultative capacity. LORD CURZON and MR. VANSITTART pointed out that this might well lead to difficulties: for instance, all the arguments for Italian participation in the new State could be used even more strongly in the case of Greece.

Mr. Vansittart raised the question of the entry of Bulgaria, if and when she became a member of the League of Nations, and pointed out that this would involve the consideration of the case of Germany.

M. BERTHELOT replied that the latter was a point to be considered later.

MR. VANSITTART suggested that, while the smaller Powers might be admitted into the Commission in an executive and not consultative capacity, the voting might be weighted in favour of the Great Powers. There was a recent precedent for this in the procedure adopted by the Financial Commission at the Peace Conference at Paris.

M. DE FLEURIAU thought this might be difficult, and suggested that France, Great Britain, and Italy should be empowered by the Treaty to set up a *de facto* administration, and the conditions for subsequent admission of other States might be settled later by them.

M. BERTHELOT supported his proposal.

LORD CURZON pointed out that it was essential to settle now the question of principle involved in the representation of the different Powers, both small and great. It was much better that the Treaty itself should contain a list of the Powers to be represented, and define their voting strength. He proposed that France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia (if and when she became not only reconstituted but also united), the United States (if they will agree to participation), Greece, Roumania, Turkey (at once), and perhaps Bulgaria (if and when she became a member of the League of Nations) should be represented on the Commission. The first four Powers (and America if she joined) should be represented by two Delegates each, with one vote to each Delegate, and the three or four smaller Powers by one Delegate each, each Delegate having one vote.

This suggestion was accepted.

### *Chairmanship of International Commission.*

The question of the chairman (p. 6<sup>4</sup> of the French note) was then discussed.

M. BERTHELOT did not favour the idea of rotation proposed by the British. There were possible objections to an American chairman, as the interests of America were not so vitally at stake as France and Great Britain. There was

\* See page 945.

still greater objection to an Italian chairman. He suggested that France might accept the principle of rotation among the Delegates of Great Britain and France. The period should be one year.

LORD CURZON thought that two years would be a more convenient period than one year, and proposed that the French point of view would really be met in a manner less likely to encounter hostility from the other Powers if it were laid down that the chairman of the International Commission should always be drawn from and chosen by the representatives of the Great Powers and that he should sit for two years. As the only Great Powers likely to be represented at first on the Commission would (in the probable absence of America) be France, Great Britain, and Italy, it might be privately arranged between the two former that the chairmanship for the first period should go to France and for the second period to Great Britain, or *vice versa*. In theory Italy would not thus be excluded.

To meet a difficulty raised by M. Berthelot, Lord Curzon also proposed that, in the case of the vote being even in the election of the chairman, the casting vote should be given by the outgoing chairman. This would mean that for the first six years, at any rate, Great Britain and France would really decide the elections.

At this stage M. BERTHELOT said that M. Clemenceau had instructed him specially to point out in confidence that the French Government had originally not favoured the policy of expelling the Turks from Europe, the difficulties of which they fully realised, but that they had deferred to the superior arguments of the British Government. They presumed, therefore, that the British Government were determined to carry through this policy and would not go back on it or them.

LORD CURZON in reply said that no final decision had been reached by the Cabinet on the matter, and that although Mr. Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and himself favoured a policy of expulsion, any decisions reached at the present Conferences with M. Berthelot were subject to revision or confirmation by both the French and British Governments.

#### *Frontiers of New State.*

The next point discussed was the question of the frontiers of the zone (page 6<sup>4</sup> of the French note).

It was agreed that the European land frontier should be the Enos-Midia line to be defined later on by an expert Commission. It was also agreed that the British suggestion that the Shilé-Gebse line should be taken as the frontier of the zone at the Bosphorus and [? end] should be accepted, but it might be necessary to substitute for Gebse a point between Gebse and Ismid. It was thought desirable that a similar zone 25 kilom. in depth running from a point opposite to Tenedos to a point about 25 kilom. on the coast of the Sea of Marmora east of the end of the Dardanelles should be treated similarly and included in the zone. On the other hand the whole coast line of the Sea of Marmora between Gebse and the point to be determined upon as the eastern end of the frontier of the zone on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles including

Panderma and Mudania should be excluded and left to the Turks. Thus the territory to be administered by the International Commission on the Asiatic coast would be confined to the zones abutting on the two Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

M. BERTHELOT also agreed to the British proposal to demilitarize the Turkish coast-line and demolish all fortifications on the south shore of the Sea of Marmora.

#### *Mosques in Constantinople.*

It was proposed and agreed upon after a short discussion that an article should be included in the Peace Treaty to the effect that all Mosques in Constantinople should be respected and continued as Moslem places of worship, and that if any differential treatment were thought necessary for Santa Sofia, it might be treated as an ancient monument in which all denominations and creeds would have an equal interest, but which should not be used for purposes of religious worship by any particular faith.

#### *League of Nations and New State.*

At this point LORD CURZON explained to M. Berthelot that he considered it most desirable that the establishment of the New State under an international régime should be placed in some way under the general protection of the League of Nations. This was not only important from the point of view of the acceptance of the settlement by all the Powers, but he believed that the Turk, who was understood to regard the League already as something imposing and sacred, would be more ready to accept expulsion from Constantinople if the League were in some general way to be made his successor.

He did not think it necessary that the protection of the League should involve any very direct interference in the administration, but it would be well if in case of financial or administrative difficulties the International Commission controlling the State could call in the help of the League, and if in the event of any constitutional change being required, the League could be invoked with regard to it.

M. BERTHELOT stated that he accepted the point in principle. He thought that possibly the future legislative body (see p. 7<sup>s</sup> of the French note, which speaks of the possibility of control by an elective assembly), or the future constitution of the native Government of the new State, might be worked out in consultation with the Council of the League of Nations.

It was finally agreed that both the British and the French should try to work out some formula.

#### *Administration of New State.*

LORD CURZON then pointed out that the British observations on this part of the French note raised the general question as to the degree of elaboration required in the departmental Government of the new State, and how far the Turkish officials of the old Turkish Government should be encouraged to

<sup>s</sup> See page 947.

stay on and take part in it. It was important that there should be a small number of departments and as little expenditure as possible.

M. BERTHELOT thought that details might be worked out, as in the case of Upper Silesia, by a special commission working in Paris.

*Danger of Economic Disaster at Constantinople.*

At this point MR. ARMITAGE SMITH explained the danger that a too precipitate expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople might result in an economic situation similar to that in Vienna.<sup>6</sup> M. BERTHELOT pointed out that it was generally agreed that this could be avoided by arranging the transfer of the staff of the Turkish Government departments and their dependents to Konia or Brusa very gradually or over a period of six or eight months, and that the transfer should not be concluded before accommodation at Konia or Brusa was ready. It would, however, be necessary to see that the Turks did not abuse this privilege. This could be done by the Commission at Constantinople.

(*The meeting then adjourned until 3 o'clock*)

APPENDIX TO No. 631

*First part<sup>7</sup> of M. Berthelot's note of the 12th December with comments of Political Section of British Peace Delegation*

*British Observations.*

No comments on this paragraph.

Des conversations échangées entre M. Lloyd George and [sic] M. Clemenceau,<sup>8</sup> il résulte essentiellement que, en présence de l'état d'esprit aux États-Unis, du retard et des réserves apportées à la ratification du Traité de Paix avec l'Allemagne et du doute qui en résulte quant à la participation effective de l'Amérique aux règlements politiques européens et orientaux, la France et la Grande-Bretagne jugent indispensable à la paix du monde et à l'avenir de l'Europe une entente étroite entre elles. Cette entente doit se manifester le plus tôt possible par un accord sur les questions qui les intéressent et à propos desquelles leurs points de vue n'ont pas encore été ajustés. En ce qui concerne le Gouvernement français, il est prêt à manifester l'intérêt primordial qu'il attache à se tenir en parfait accord avec la Grande-Bretagne en acceptant les bases générales suivantes, sauf à en préciser ultérieurement le détail.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 40, minutes 5-6.

<sup>8</sup> See Volume II, Chap. II *passim*.

<sup>7</sup> For the second part see No. 398.

We are in general agreement with the first paragraphs of the French Memorandum, and note with satisfaction the degree to which the French Government are prepared to meet the views of His Majesty's Government.

Presumably the words 'sphères d'influence particulières' are intended to cover spheres of economic priority. We are doubtful if it may not be necessary to give Italy some such sphere in Southern Anatolia in order to secure the withdrawal of her troops. This point is further dealt with below.

This is true, but it must be remembered that British commercial interests were, before the war, nearly twice those of any other Power. For instance, in 1913 Great Britain had 26·7 of the whole trade of Turkey (imports and exports), Germany 14·7, France 12·3, Austria 12·2, and Italy 10·5.

I. *Turquie.* La conversation du 11 décembre au Foreign Office entre M. Lloyd George et Lord Curzon d'une part, le Président du Conseil français de l'autre,<sup>9</sup> a permis de constater que l'opinion du Gouvernement britannique était différente de celle du Gouvernement français sur certains points importants. Cependant il n'est pas impossible d'arriver à un compromis moyennant des concessions de part et d'autre. Ce qui suit expose sur quels points M. Clemenceau est disposé à se rallier au point de vue britannique et sur quels points il demande l'assentiment britannique aux conceptions françaises.

Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord en principe pour n'admettre ni mandats, ni sphères d'influence particulières (sauf dans les territoires de Syrie et de Mésopotamie définis dans les accords de 1916).

#### (A.) *Constantinople et les Détroits.*

M. Clemenceau a défendu, au cours de la Conférence du 11 novembre [? décembre], la thèse du maintien du Sultan à Constantinople.<sup>10</sup> Cette thèse a de nombreux partisans en France parce que les intérêts matériels et moraux de la France sont plus développés dans l'ancienne Turquie que ceux d'aucun autre pays. Elle y possède à l'heure actuelle la grande majorité des capitaux des chemins de fer et des entreprises d'intérêt public et privé où, avant 1914, elle avait placé plus de 3 milliards; elle possède une grande partie de la Dette Publique Ottoman[e] et exerçait une influence prédominante dans l'administration dite des Revenus concédés ou dans celle de la Régie de Tabacs. Son influence morale était assurée et propagée par des centaines d'écoles et d'établissements de bienfaisance, tant

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 55. No record of such a meeting in the Foreign Office on December 11, 1919, has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>10</sup> See Volume II, No. 55, minute 2.

religieux que laïques, répartis dans toutes les villes de l'Empire ottoman. Aussi l'opinion française est-elle favorable au maintien de l'ancienne Turquie, système dont la simplicité plaît à beaucoup d'esprits pratiques et qui ménage les susceptibilités d'une Russie reconstruite.

Cependant M. Clemenceau est disposé à se rallier aux vues du Gouvernement britannique: il apprécie à leur valeur les arguments tirés de la difficulté de garder les Détroits sans une force militaire considérable et de lourdes dépenses si Constantinople et ses 500,000 habitants restaient entre les mains du Sultan et par conséquent à la merci des intrigues d'une Allemagne reconstituée militairement et peut-être appuyée par la Russie.

D'ailleurs, en rompant la paix et les traités qui assuraient son intégrité territoriale et sa souveraineté la Turquie a délié les Puissances alliées de toute obligation autre que le respect des principes directeurs de leur politique. En fermant les Détroits, elle a coupé les communications de la Russie avec les Alliés, causé son effondrement politique et militaire et prolongé la guerre, avec tous ses désastres: une telle catastrophe ne doit pouvoir se renouveler.

Le Gouvernement français se rallierait donc aux principes suivants:

(1) Le militarisme ottoman sera supprimé comme le militarisme prussien.

(2) La garde des Détroits, de la Mer Noire à la Méditerranée, sera confiée à une organisation internationale assurant la neutralité effective du passage.

(3) Les Arméniens seront affranchis de la domination turque.

(4) Les populations arabe et syrienne ne peuvent être replacées sous la domination turque.

On sera ainsi conduit à discerner quatre problèmes: (a) Constantinople et les Détroits, (b) Anatolie ou Asie Mineure, (c) Arménie, (d) Syrie, Mésopotamie.

We agree generally to all 4 points.

We agree to conclusions, but, as a point of detail, the statement that the Christian minorities are of the same race as Musulman majorities in Armenia may be contested.

We agree, but we would wish to put forward the possibility of subsequent American as of Russian participation. We accept also the principle of the participation of other interested States, such as Greece and Roumania, on condition that the real voting power is left in the hands of the *principal* Allied and Associated Powers. We would, however, point out that, unless the control is from the first confined to the latter, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to exclude Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey, if and when they become members of the League of Nations.

We are prepared to accept French proposals regarding Chairmanship, but we venture to suggest that, if the Chairmanship of the Commission were either offered permanently to the American member (on the assumption that America participates at once) or were made rotatory, less hostility from other interested States would be encountered, as the predominance of France and Great Britain would not be so definitely marked.

We agree generally, but are not wholly in favour of including a zone on the Asiatic shore. There might be legitimate economic objection to cutting off the Turkish interior from such natural outlets as Haidar Pasha, Mudania and Panderma. Moreover, the

potamie, Arabie. Partout, vivent côté à côté chrétiens et musulmans. Dans chacune des régions asiatiques la majorité est musulmane. Mais les races diffèrent: turque en Anatolie, indo-européenne en Arménie, sémité en Syrie, Mésopotamie et Arabie. Les minorités chrétiennes qui, dans la zone arabe et la zone arménienne sont de même race que les majorités musulmanes, se répartissent entre trois églises dont chacune a un domaine correspondant [*sic*] à celui d'une des régions et y fait prévaloir sa langue: grecque en Anatolie, arménienne en Arménie catholique et de parler français en Syrie.

En application des quatre principes formulés plus haut, la garde des Détroits sera placée sous la [le] contrôle des États méditerranéens, France, Angleterre, Italie (et peut-être des petits États riverains intéressés, Grèce et Roumanie, bien qu'il y ait peut-être des inconvénients sérieux à les mêler à la question à cause de l'état d'esprit turc); la Russie s'y ajouterait aussitôt réorganisée; quant à l'Espagne, elle ne possède pas d'intérêts dans ces régions.

Ce Conseil de surveillance serait présidé alternativement, par périodes annuelles par les deux pays qui possèdent en Turquie des intérêts et une influence prépondérante, la France et l'Angleterre.

La liberté des Détroits ne sera garantie efficacement que par la neutralisation des rivages des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. On est ainsi amené à constituer autour de Constantinople un petit État neutralisé sous la garantie des grandes Puissances, en attendant la Société des

settlement, as a whole, would appear more arbitrary and less acceptable to Moslem feeling, and, therefore, more difficult of enforcement, if any part of Asia were included in the zone. No clearly corresponding advantage to the Allies would, on the other hand, be gained. There is, however, much to be said on commercial grounds for including the Ismid Peninsula up to the Shilé-Ghebse line in the zone, as the economic life of the two sides of the Bosphorus largely interpenetrate, and the line forms a convenient geographical frontier. Shilé may also be developed as a health resort, attract visitors and become a desirable source of revenue to the zone.

For purposes of defence it would only seem necessary to demilitarise an area (15 to 20 miles deep) from a point opposite Tenedos to Shilé, to demolish all fortifications and to ensure permanent rights of landing and inspection for the officers of the zone on the Asiatic shore. A mixed military and naval Commission might also be appointed under the Treaty of Peace to consider and recommend to the Allies what military and naval fortifications should be maintained and transferred to the international Administration on the European shore of the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and Sea of Marmora, with a view to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Straits in peace and war. All fortifications other than those which the Commission should decide to be necessary for the above purposes should be demolished.

The revenues of the new international State will probably not suffice for some time to meet the expenses of the Administration. It will be for the Governments represented in the Administration to consider whether they will be prepared to advance to the new State a sum of money to cover the immediate deficit between the annual budget of the State and the total required to pay

Nations; le territoire de cet État se composera du Bassin de la Mer de Marmara et des Péninsule[s] des Dardanelles et de la Troade. La population de l'État serait fortement bigarrée comprenant des Grecs orthodoxes, des Musulmans de toute provenance, Turcs, Lazès, Kurdes, Arabes, Albanais, 200,000 Arméniens, 50,000 Israélites, 40,000 Européens, etc. Toutes ces minorités jouiraient d'une complète égalité civile et politique, garantie par un statut formel.

L'État nouveau reprendrait sa part de la Dette ottomane et des engagements contractés par la Turquie.

the expenses and the service of the State's allotted portion of the pre-war Ottoman Debt, or whether it would not be preferable to relieve the State of the payment of this debt service for a certain number of years and recoup the bond-holders from other sources.

We are in general agreement. In greater detail our views are as follows:—The International Commission of the new State would have legislative authority, and the executive would consist of the necessary departments (Interior, Justice, Defence, Public Health and Instruction, Finance and Customs, Public Works, Commerce and Navigation, Posts and Telegraphs and Evkaf).<sup>12</sup> These would be staffed by natives in all the subordinate posts, and consist largely of foreigners chosen irrespective of nationality in the higher ones. All appointments would be made by the Commission. Representation of the governed in the matter of legislation is an eventual necessity. The preferable and, indeed, the only practical, course is that this should be elaborated by the Commission after full consultation with the inhabitants of the new State.

Les intérêts existants de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France devraient être respectés, d'État<sup>11</sup> aurait une autonomie intérieure et serait administré par ou sous la [le] contrôle d'une assemblée élective.

Au point de vue moral et historique l'éviction d'Europe d'un État basé sur le droit de conquête et l'oppression de races différentes et de civilisation supérieure représente un triomphe du Droit. La perte de Constantinople marquera au regard des Musulmans l'éclipse définitive des pouvoirs mystérieux que sa possession conférait aux descendants d'Osman sur les populations musulmanes relevant de l'Angleterre et de la France. La prise de Constantinople par les Turcs avait marqué la fin du moyen âge. Leur exode marquera le début des temps nouveaux.

<sup>11</sup> This passage should read: '... être respectés. L'État... &c.

<sup>12</sup> Commission for the administration of the Wakf: cf. No. 299, note 10.

**(B) Turquie d'Asie**

We are again in general agreement. Two points, however, must be noted:—

1. The French memorandum speaks of 'une organisation judiciaire étudiée'. This question has already been considered both by Paris and by the Allied Representatives at Constantinople. It is generally accepted that the capitulations in their pre-war form must disappear. The question of the régime to succeed them being, however, exceedingly complicated, there is equal agreement that a special Commission must be constituted under the treaty to elaborate the necessary details on the spot.

2. We agree that financial control should be very close ('très étroit'). The French proposal, however, contemplates that it should be exercised through a developed and internationalised administration of the Public Debt, which would, in fact, control the budget of the country.

With this proposal we only partially agree. The method which we advocate is rather that the financial control should fall into three categories:—

- (a) A revised debt administration as proposed by the French.
- (b) An international currency board.
- (c) Detailed control through an international finance commission of the Ministry of Finance and all financial departments.

His Majesty's Treasury have long and carefully investigated this question. They have come to the conclusion that the gravity of the economic and financial situation in Turkey involves not only the interests of the bondholders but the entire industrial and commercial reconstruction of the country. Something more, therefore, than a reform of the debt administration is essential. Details of the British proposals are in readiness.

We fully agree in the suppression of

L'Armée turque disparaîtrait et le

the Turkish army. We presume that the French Government contemplate also the suppression of the Turkish navy. The British scheme aims at the control of all Turkish Departments of State, and therefore of the gendarmerie through the Ministry of the Interior.

We agree as regards the attribution of the Dodecanese to Greece. We understand that a secret agreement has already been reached between Italy and Greece on this point.<sup>13</sup>

We are in entire agreement as to the necessity of a speedy termination of the unwarranted Italian occupation of Southern Anatolia. The French Government appear, however, to expect that this can be effected by specific economic concessions to Italy, such as the coal mines of Heraclea, and the Italian participation in the administration of the new State of the Straits. In view of the Treaty of London, we fear that greater inducement than this will be required. We suggest that this might take the form of priority of commercial enterprise in a zone of Southern Anatolia, as well as of participation in the international control of the Turkish Government. His Majesty's Government have an additional lever in the extent of the cession of territory which Italy desires to obtain from them in Africa.<sup>14</sup>

We are disposed to accept the French view in regard to the occupation of Cilicia. We await, however, fuller explanation of what is understood by the words 'Le maintien d'une souveraineté nominale d'ordre spirituel sur le vilayet d'Adana est admissible pour nous.'

désarmement indispensable des Turcs conduirait à l'institution d'une gendarmerie commandée par des instructeurs alliés. Les paysans turcs parmi lesquels les soldats étaient recrutés par la contrainte seront les premiers à s'en féliciter; l'exemple des Mongols et des Turcs de l'Asie Centrale montre comment les peuples les plus belliqueux et les plus féroces de même race ont aisément évolué vers une vie politique pacifique.

Les Iles du Dodécanèse, dont les habitants sont grecs, seraient conformément aux désirs de ceux-ci et aux principes admis par les Alliés, rattachées au Royaume de Grèce.

L'occupation italienne d'un certain nombre de points d'Asie Mineure, qui a eu lieu contre les principes et malgré le refus de la Conférence de la reconnaître, prendra fin à plus forte raison. Des avantages économiques, par exemple, dans les charbonnages d'Héraclée, pourraient être concédés à l'Italie, qui d'ailleurs fera partie du Conseil International de l'État neutre de Constantinople et des Détroits.

Une satisfaction serait recherchée également pour les Turcs dans la région d'Adana, afin d'apaiser leurs susceptibilités nationales: la France, qui pour des raisons stratégiques ne peut renoncer aux forts du Taurus, défense historique de la Syrie, cherchera une formule respectant la culture turque qui domine en Cilicie. Le maintien d'une souveraineté nominale d'ordre spirituel sur le vilayet d'Adana est admissible pour nous.

<sup>13</sup> See No. 17, note 2.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. No. 595.

This paragraph gives rise to serious and complicated considerations. The problem would no doubt have been simplified if the Greek occupation of the Smyrna area had not been sanctioned by the Supreme Council, at any rate at a date so long before the final Turkish settlement; but it would seem that in practice the Supreme Council is to some extent committed to the continuance of the Greek occupation. At any rate this occupation has been prolonged for such a period that a Greek evacuation at this stage can hardly be decided upon without considering the possible political effect, not only on the present Greek Government but also on the Nationalist Movement in Turkey. The zone round Smyrna, comprising more or less the present line delimited as a strategical frontier by General Milne but excluding Aidin, may have to be ceded to Greece. In this connexion the proposal for the Turkish disarmament and Allied control of the Turkish gendarmerie should diminish the chances of a continuance of the present guerilla warfare on the frontier of the zone. This cession could, moreover, be justified as far as the Sanjak of Smyrna is concerned on a basis of nationality (the Greeks being before the war in a majority in the Sanjak of Smyrna), and the extension from the Sanjak to the present line of occupation can be justified on the ground of strategy. If this cession took place Greece would, of course, have to sign a treaty containing stringent stipulations regarding freedom of commerce and transit via Smyrna, and fully protecting minority rights.

On the other hand, the Smyrna region is important as an economic outlet to Anatolia. If, therefore, it be decided, as we propose, that European Turkey up to the Enos-Midia line should be ceded to Greece, it should be possible to arrange with M. Veniselos a compromise somewhat as follows:—

Smyrna should be left under nominal

Quant au littoral, il semble que, même dans l'antique Ionia, il soit préférable pour les Grecs de ne pas se séparer de l'Asie Mineure, qui leur offre un large champ d'action, s'ils ne provoquent pas le nationalisme turc par une annexion qu'ils ne sont sans doute pas en état de défendre constamment par les armes. Les Grecs pourraient recevoir en Thrace dans la région d'Andrinople de larges satisfactions; ils participeraient d'ailleurs à l'administration de Constantinople.

Turkish sovereignty with a vali chosen with the consent of the Powers and acting in council. The latter would be composed of the representatives of the principal Allied (and Associated) Powers, with, however, adequate and proportional representation of local interests (both Greek and Turkish). This would reduce Turkish sovereignty to an agreeable fiction, and, at the same time, provide proper safeguards for the non-Turkish elements.

A further grave question is raised both in the French Memorandum and by the British proposals, i.e., the future of Adrianople.

It is clear that if (a) the Turk is to be expelled from Europe, (b) the new international State is limited by the Enos-Midia line (and this we consider to be the only practical course), Adrianople must be either Greek or Bulgarian.

Ethnologically, the latter solution has little to recommend it, the Moslem element in so far as it is non-Turk being Pomak and non-Bulgarian, while, politically, objection may well be felt against so rewarding an enemy State.

Ethnologically, the Greeks have a better claim. If, however, they obtain it as some sort of compensation or inducement for the evacuation of Smyrna, it is proposed that the system of the vali in council, suggested above for the Smyrna area, should be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Adrianople area. In this case the majority of the council of the Greek Governor would be Moslem.

We are in general agreement: the rights of non-Turkish elements might be safeguarded by a special treaty for the protection of minorities on the lines of those already negotiated with the smaller European Powers. The effective working of these provisions would be part of the duty of the Allied advisers of the Turkish Government. This minority treaty, like the other minority treaties, would be placed under the aegis of the League of Nations. It might even be

Les droits des minorités devront faire l'objet de l'étude la plus attentive et de garanties spéciales. Il ne faut pas oublier que sous la dénomination commune de Turcs, on comprend tous les Musulmans d'Asie Mineure: des Albanais amenés par le Service Militaire, des Bosniaques, des Thessaliens, les Tatars Nagai immigrés de Crimée, les Tcheresses venus du Caucase, les nomades Yuruts ou Turcomans, qui continuent la vie pastorale sous la tente.

possible to stipulate in the Treaty that the League of Nations, which is understood to be already regarded by Turkish eyes as something holy and magnificent, should have power to disallow legislation which is reported by the Allied adviser or advisers in control of the Turkish Department initiating the legislation to be directed against the legitimate interests of any minorities of the population.

L'égalité uniforme selon notre concept occidental ne répond pas à la situation de ces peuplades trop faibles et trop enchevêtrées pour former des personnalités nationales[;] les groupes grecs, arméniens, kurdes, juxtaposés aux Turcs sédentaires ou nomades, pourront comme ceux-ci avoir leur législation civile et religieuse, leurs établissements scolaires ou hospitaliers, et même leurs juridictions, les affaires mixtes relevant des tribunaux mixtes. Contribuant aux charges de la province et de la commune ces groupes éliront en proportion de leur nombre et de leur importance des représentants chargés de surveiller l'emploi de leurs subsides à des œuvres d'intérêt général sous la direction des Autorités et des contrôleurs des provinces et de l'État.

We wish to make no comments on the observations contained in the first five paragraphs of the Armenian part of the French memorandum regarding the geography and population of the Armenian territories, with which, except for a point of detail dealt with below, we are in general agreement, and which coincides roughly with a proposal already worked out by the British Peace Delegation.

#### (C) Arménie

L'Arménie forme à l'Est de l'Asie Mineure une région différente par sa structure physique et par ses populations, région montagneuse où la race indo-européenne s'est maintenue, représentée surtout par les Arméniens chrétiens et par les Kurdes musulmans. Elle doit être organisée séparément et le désir commun des alliés est de reconstituer une nation arménienne indépendante après les massacres par lesquels le[s] Jeunes Turcs, d'accord avec les Allemands, ont systématiquement essayé de la faire disparaître.

Cette nouvelle organisation présente de grandes difficultés, parce que les Arméniens malgré l'ancienneté de leur histoire ne sont presque nulle part une majorité, qu'ils n'ont plus de cadres politiques malgré leur civilisation et leur intelligence et parce que le pays arménien proprement dit n'a pas de débouché vers la mer. Les Arméniens sont comme les Juifs un peuple dispersé; toutefois, ils se sont moins éparpillés, et, même à l'étranger, se groupent en communautés et ils ont conservé leur noyau dans leur patrie historique où ils

forment des groupes compacts, en Arménie russe, au pied du mont Ararat, sur le fleuve national l'Araxe, auprès d'Erzeroum, sur les rives du lac de Van, sur le Haut-Euphrate et plus loin dans la vallée du Djihoum sur les pentes du Taurus vers Zeitoum. Sinon par leur nombre, du moins par leur travail et leur intelligence ils dominent dans cette contrée de l'ancien Royaume de Grande-Arménie.

L'Arménie comprend géographiquement deux parties: l'Arménie russe (aujourd'hui République d'Arménie avec Érivan pour capitale) et l'Arménie turque à cheval sur les six vilayets. En outre, il y a sur les bords du golfe d'Alexandrette un groupe arménien tout à fait séparé et n'ayant aucune liaison avec la Grande-Arménie, groupe qui recevra de la France toute protection et appui.

Les Arméniens, qui se sentent supérieurs à leurs voisins musulmans (Turcs, Lazes et Kurdes) revendiquent la suprématie politique sur de vastes provinces où ils ne formaient qu'une faible minorité même avant les odieux massacres dont ils ont souffert. Ils invoquent à la fois leur martyre, le droit d'accès à la mer et des souvenirs historiques pour se faire attribuer des pays et des ports situés à plus de 400 kilomètres de la Grande-Arménie (comme si les Suisses revendiquaient tout le pays compris entre leur république et le rivage du Languedoc afin d'assurer leur accès au port de Cette). L'objection capitale à ces prétentions c'est qu'une pareille extension de l'Arménie aurait pour effet certain de placer les Arméniens en minorité définitive dans leur État dès qu'on y ferait une consultation sincère des populations. Il est plus sensé de n'attribuer aux Arméniens que les pays où ils étaient en majorité avant 1895 ou avant 1914, plus certains districts voisins où ils représentaient une fraction importante de la population totale. L'accès à la mer leur sera assuré

d'une part par une ligne ferrée aboutissant à Batoum et de l'autre par deux voies ferrées aboutissant à Constantinople et à la Méditerranée. Au xix<sup>e</sup> siècle, c'est vers Constantinople que s'orientait le trafic de leurs vallées et leur besoin le plus urgent serait de construire la ligne d'Erzeroum à Angora, branche nord du chemin de fer de Bagdad arrêtée par le veto de la Russie.

We think that the present Armenian population of the Caucasus and Turkey may be under-estimated in this paragraph, and in any case it is probable that in the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Marmaret-el-Aziz and Diarbekir, owing to famine, epidemics and the successive waves of invasion and retreat, the Turkish and Kurdish inhabitants have probably suffered losses approaching those of the Armenians. Further the Armenian is more prolific than the Turk, or Kurd.

Avant la guerre 1 million et demi d'Arméniens russes vivaient au Caucase (dont 1 million 100,000 dans la république d'Arménie actuelle auxquels il faut ajouter 150,000 réfugiés au cours de la guerre). Au contraire dans les vilayets de l'Arménie turque il n'y a plus d'Arméniens; la population arménienne des campagnes a été massacrée, déportée, ou a fui: à Erzeroum il reste 500 Arméniens sur 30,000 habitants, à Siwas et à Diarbékir il n'y en a que quelques centaines. Dans le reste de la Turquie, le patriarche arménien de Constantinople estime qu'à l'heure actuelle le nombre des Arméniens s'élève à 600,000 dont 150,000 dans la capitale même. Ces 450,000 autres sont disséminés dans l'Empire Turc; la moitié est un élément citadin qui ne consentira jamais à quitter sa résidence et son négoce et l'autre moitié est composée de paysans qui accepteront peut-être de se laisser regrouper dans l'État arménien. Si on ajoute enfin ceux des Arméniens qui peuvent revenir de Perse, de Bulgarie et d'Amérique, on peut estimer qu'on peut réunir une population de 400,000 âmes pour reconstituer l'Arménie turque.

We sympathise with the desire to incorporate in the Armenian State of Erivan as much as possible of the districts disputed with Georgia (Borchali) and with Azerbaijan (Karabagh and Zangezur). The Armenian population, which is to form the new State, is too small for us to disregard any possibility of including territory essentially inhabited by Armenians in its frontiers.

But, while the final frontiers must necessarily be drawn by an expert Allied Commission, we feel it right to say a word of warning as to the difficulty of attaching to Armenia the Karabagh area. This is not because it does not in itself contain a large Armenian majority, but because it forms a kind of rocky peninsula in Tartar and Kurdish country, which it might be difficult for the Armenian State to defend against Azerbaijan.

We agree generally with the limits proposed for that part of present Turkish territory which is to be attached to Caucasian Armenia. But we feel convinced that the town of Erzerum and the district immediately to the west should be included, and not excluded as proposed by the French. For this, prior to the massacres, there was full ethnological justification. On the other hand if it were excluded, a strong fortress, from which a railway now exists running right into future Armenian territory, and the command of a vital valley would be left in the hand of Armenia's most dangerous enemy. Southern Armenia might thus be easily cut off from Northern Armenia.

We agree generally as to the financial and military resources required for the creation of the new Armenian State. We suggest, however, (a) as regards finance, once the recognition of Armenian independence is given, the Government of Armenia are hopeful of obtaining financial assistance from private sources, particularly American, and (b) that as regards military forces, these will not be much required, as hinted in the French note, to protect the Armenians from each other. If, moreover, as suggested in the penultimate paragraph of that part of the French memorandum relating to Armenia, one great Power alone cannot supply all the

turque, pour conserver la majorité aux 400,000 Arméniens rapatriés, quelle zone doit leur être attribuée?

Le vilayet d'Erzeroum, qui contient 700,000 Musulmans, a une prépondérance turque trop écrasante et tient d'ailleurs moins au cœur des Arméniens que la région foncièrement et historiquement arménienne du Lac de Van, de la plaine de Bitlis et de Mouch. Logiquement, l'Arménie turque à créer pourrait comprendre la partie orientale du vilayet d'Erzeroum (cette ville exclue), la plaine de Mouch et la région du lac de Van jusqu'à la frontière persane. La limite entre l'Arménie et la Turquie serait ainsi marquée par une ligne allant d'Olti à Hassan Kala exclus, passant par le massif du Binkel-Dagh, aboutissant à l'Est de Mouch et suivant au sud la crête très nette du partage des eaux qui borde la plaine de Mouch et qui suit la rive sur [? sud] du lac de Van pour aboutir à la région kurde de Bach-Kala. La réalité et la logique laissent loin le rêve mégalomane d'une grande Arménie allant de Trébizonde à Alexandrette.

Pour créer cette Arménie unie, dont la moitié (l'Arménie turque) n'est encore qu'une conception théorique, il faudra d'abord protéger les éléments arméniens de l'Arménie russe contre une population Tartare ou Kurde très hostile, puis ramener dans l'Arménie Turque des quatre points de la Turquie les Arméniens dispersés et les défendre contre la population Kurdo-Turque qui s'est partagée les terres: une force de 20,000 hommes sera nécessaire. Pendant 2 années au moins, il faudra assurer le ravitaillement de ces Arméniens. Une aide financière et morale sera nécessaire pour reconstituer les villages détruits, refaire les routes, rétablir et compléter

men or officers required, the Allies together should be able to provide a joint force, or at any rate inter-allied officers for the present Caucasian-Armenian troops, who are no negligible factor. Alternatively, the task of helping Armenia with men and money might well be confided to the Council of the League of Nations, by whom the appeal for voluntary assistance would be made with greater effect.

The French memorandum further alludes to the future of the Armenian State *vis-à-vis* of a resuscitated Russia. There are indications that Russia is more prepared to recognise the creation of an independent Armenia than of any other independent border State.

We agree that the Trebizond area cannot be included in Armenia; and the development of the Anatolian Railway and Trans-Caucasian Railway system should take the place of the lack of a port. We suggest, however, that a special convention should be made between Georgia, Azerbaijan (and/or Russia), Persia, Turkey and Armenia regarding freedom of transit and regarding the establishment of a free port at Batoum. Owing to the complex ethnological and political situation, and to the port's extreme international importance, as a commercial centre, it may even be advisable that a special free State under the ægis of the League of Nations should be established round the latter town.

E. G. FORBES ADAM  
ROBERT VANSITTART

December 18th

les voies ferrées d'Erzeroum et de Makou. Ce qui coûtera plusieurs centaines de millions, outre un subside annuel très élevé. Ce n'est pas tout: il faudra encore protéger les Arméniens contre eux-mêmes car ils sont infestés de luttes de partis et l'on devra intervenir dans la direction même des affaires du pays, d'autant plus que la longue servitude dont l'Arménien a souffert lui a ôté confiance en lui-même. Enfin on doit envisager le danger d'une absorption russe dès que la Russie se sera reconstituée: la base de communication restera longtemps le Caucase et le pays a subi profondément depuis plus d'un siècle l'emprise russe.

On a longtemps admis que le débouché naturel de l'Arménie sur la mer était Trébizonde et l'on pensait alors à rattacher la province grecque du Pont à l'Arménie. Mais cette solution ne résiste pas à un examen approfondi; dans le vilayet de Trébizonde l'élément musulman représente 80 pour cent par rapport aux Grecs; le pays doit donc rester turc, de l'avis même des Grecs, qui redoutent des massacres; en outre, la constitution d'une voie ferrée Erzeroum-Trébizonde se heurte en raison des seuils montagneux élevés à une quasi impossibilité, d'autant que la ligne ne ferait pas ses frais. Ce débouché naturel de l'Arménie aboutit à Batoum et il n'y a qu'à compléter la voie ferrée Tauris-Djoulfa-Chah-takhti-Bougdachine, par un embranchement entre Tauris, centre d'échanges de la Perse du Nord et la mer Noire.

## No. 632

### *Second Meeting: Turkish Settlement*

[166415/151671/44]

The meeting opened at 3 o'clock<sup>1</sup> in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office; the same representatives<sup>2</sup> were present.

<sup>1</sup> On December 22, 1919 (cf. No. 631).

<sup>2</sup> As in No. 631.

*Financial Administration of the State of Constantinople and the Straits.*

MR. VANSITTART explained that a possible solution of the difficulty of establishing a new administration for Constantinople and the Straits, and a new and more comprehensive Allied control over Turkey proper, could be met by the same administration running both the Straits zone and the Government of Turkey in Asia. He was not in favour of this for political reasons, but for financial reasons Mr. Armitage Smith wished to explain the solution, even if it was decided to reject it.

MR. ARMITAGE SMITH then explained how complicated he thought the international machinery both for the new State and for Turkey in Asia would be. He believed in any case that Constantinople and the Straits would start practically bankrupt, and the rest of Turkey was nearly in the same position.

M. BERTHELOT disagreed. It was illogical to keep the Turkish Government in any form, even its financial Departments, at Constantinople. Each State should live as far as possible on its own resources, and be quite separate. For the rest, the French did not contemplate any very extensive or expensive Allied control for the Government of Turkey in Asia; financial supervision and the control over the gendarmerie were the two essentials; the rest of the control might be light.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed generally with M. Berthelot. The functions of the new State of Constantinople and the Straits and of the Government of Turkey in Asia respectively were quite different; the distinction between them should be complete. The one was to be an area taken from the Turk and governed by an international body. The other was to be an area left under the sovereignty of the Turk, but subject in certain respects to international supervision. Moreover, he saw no reason for accepting the hypothesis on which Mr. Armitage Smith's argument rested, viz., the bankruptcy of the new State.

MR. ARMITAGE SMITH explained that his view regarding the financial bankruptcy of the new State was based on the lack of means of production in Constantinople, and the chaos likely to result from the exodus of the administrative staffs of the old Turkish Government and their dependents; he did not see whence the revenue was to come.

LORD CURZON thought the financial position of the Suez Canal administration and the method by which it obtained large revenues by shipping dues offered certain analogies.

MR. VANSITTART and MR. FORBES ADAM explained that they had examined the question of the revenue-producing resources of the new State; there were understood to be within the boundaries of the new State coal, oil, and iron concessions; there were marble quarries of value in the Island of Marmora; market gardening, which had already showed its possibilities, and fisheries could much be [sic] developed; the port could be made more attractive for shipping, was the natural centre for a large transit trade, and could be developed as a bunkering depot; it had always been contemplated that a considerable revenue could be obtained from shipping dues as Lord Curzon suggested.

Some discussion then took place as to the population of the zone, and whether for administrative reasons the Chatalja line should be substituted for the Enos-Midia.

It was thought that for working purposes the population of the zone within the Enos-Midia line and the reserved area on the Asiatic side of the Straits might be regarded as about one and a half million.

M. BERTHELOT was entirely in favour of the Enos-Midia line; he thought European administration, honestly and efficiently run as it would be, might enormously develop the resources of the zone; he agreed with Lord Curzon as to the Suez Canal analogy.

It was then agreed that the question of the population and financial resources of the new State might be examined in detail later on by an expert Commission.

LORD CURZON asked M. Berthelot what were his views as regards the number of Departments required for the administration of the new State. M. BERTHELOT replied that, while he would like to postpone till his return to Paris the elaboration of a detailed scheme, he personally thought that it would be possible to cut down the number of Departments named in the British observations on the French note<sup>3</sup> to perhaps four, say, finance, commerce and industry, internal affairs and external affairs, grouping under these the other Departments suggested in the British scheme.

*Question of the Property (a) of the Turkish Government of the Sultan and (b) of Turkish Private Property in Constantinople and the new State.*

In answer to an enquiry from Lord Curzon, M. Berthelot explained that he thought all secular State property (including that of the Sultan) should be ceded to the new State under the Treaty, but the Treaty would lay down that all places of religious veneration and property held under Wakf,<sup>4</sup> &c., would be respected by the Government of the new State.

On the other hand, MR. ARMITAGE SMITH enquired whether it would be right thus to hand over to the new State Turkish public property, which represented one of the assets of the Allies for the payment of the latter's just claims against the Turkish Government.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that the Reparation Commission would be the proper body to whom this question should be referred for a decision.

It was generally agreed that the Imperial and State domains might be taken in liquidation of some at any rate of the claims to be made against the Turkish Government in the Peace Treaty.

It was also agreed that the question of the private property of Turkish citizens might be dealt with on the principles adopted with regard to the peace settlement for Germany, Austria, and Hungary. According to accepted principles, the residents in the new State would have to decide whether they would become citizens in the new State or emigrate; in the latter case they would be allowed to take their moveable property with them and realise their immoveable property on equitable terms.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 631, appendix.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 631, note 12.

### *Defence.*

LORD CURZON raised the question of the army and navy, and gendarmerie in the new State. M. BERTHELOT said that he thought only a small Allied military force, a few police boats, and a gendarmerie would be required. For the Allied forces, Moslem soldiers could be found both in France and the British Empire.

It was generally agreed that in the last resort the new State would have to rely on the British and French fleets and armies for defence in the case of a menace of serious aggression, until, of course, the sanctions, provided or to be provided by the League of Nations, became really effective.

MR. VANSITTART also pointed out that the European land frontier would be coterminous with that of Greece if the present general proposals regarding European Turkey were adopted, and that no danger was to be feared from this quarter, Greece really being at the mercy of the French and British fleets.

### *Question of Popular Control over the Government in the new State.*

M. DE FLEURIAU suggested that the present local organs of Government might be continued.

LORD CURZON pointed out that this was not sufficient, as the population in this area before the creation of the new State would have benefited by the Turkish constitution and the right to elect members for a legislative Assembly. It was agreed on M. Berthelot's suggestion that the principle of legislative representation should be accepted and the details worked out later by the International Commission, as suggested in the British observations on the French note. The League of Nations might participate in this matter.

### *Turkey in Asia. Capital of the New Turkish State.*

A brief discussion took place as to the most suitable town in which the new Turkish Government in Asia should be established. M. BERTHELOT favoured Konia; Brusa was too close to the new State and Constantinople. Aspirations for the recovery of Constantinople might thus be kept alive in Turkey.

LORD CURZON thought that the Turks if left to themselves would probably choose Brusa, although both Brusa and Konia had been Turkish capitals in the past. Brusa had stronger traditions, contained important mosques, and it would be easier to transfer administration from Constantinople to a town as close as Brusa, which was already connected with Mudania on the Sea of Marmora by railway. There was also much to be said for having the new Turkish Government at a place where it could be more easily overawed in case of necessity by the Allies.

M. DE FLEURIAU said that there was much to be said for and against each place. Konia too had a history behind it, and it was a place of religious importance; important notables such as the Tchelebi of the Dervishes lived there.

### *League of Nations.*

At this point Lord Curzon was called away from the meeting, and, as previously arranged, a discussion then took place on a suggestion of Lord

Curzon's that a formula should be drafted outlining the part which the League of Nations might play in relation to the new State of Constantinople and the Straits.

The following formula was agreed upon as a result of the subsequent discussion:—

‘1. Le nouvel État sera, d'une manière générale, placé sous la haute protection de la Société des Nations.

‘2. Il recevra, dans le délai et la forme compatibles avec l'organisation de son administration, des institutions électives placées sous la garantie de la Société des Nations.

‘3. Dans le cas d'un dissensitement persistant entre les membres de la Commission du Gouvernement, la question en litige pourra être, par un vote des deux tiers des délégués, portée pour décision devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations.’

The words ‘sous la garantie de la Société des Nations’ in the second paragraph of the formula were adopted on the proposal of M. de Fleuriau, who explained that it had already been applied in the case of Danzig. He understood that the words were intended to give the League of Nations the power to have the constitution of the new State submitted to it for approval, and that no modification of the constitution could be later effected without the League's assent.

#### *Capitulations.*

It was agreed that, while two different judicial systems would be required for the new State respectively, and for Turkey in Asia (International Courts in the new State and something more closely resembling the Capitulations in Turkey), the precise systems to be adopted in both cases should form the subject of a study on the spot by expert Commissions to be appointed under the Treaty, as suggested in the British observations on the French note.

#### *Financial Control over the Turkish Government in Asia.*

MR. ARMITAGE SMITH explained that in his discussions with the head of the French Ministry of Finance in Paris, M. Sergent, almost complete agreement had been reached as to what was required.

There would be a small revised body representing the Pre-War Debt Council, which would remain for a time at Constantinople paying coupons and receiving the monies paid to it as provided for in detail in the Treaty. At Konia there would be a financial Commission with large powers, and an extensive control on which only Great Britain, France, Italy, and possibly the United States (and possibly later Russia) would be represented.

The large staff working before the war under the Debt Council all over the Turkish Empire and collecting the assigned revenues could now be put, with all its experience and efficiency, at the disposal of the Financial Commission. All the new machinery would not therefore have to be created afresh and the Turkish Government were already used to this large measure of European interference and control.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would agree in principle to the British suggestions on this head, but proposed that in any case the Currency Board which was one of the three financial controls suggested in the British observations, could be suppressed or made a sub-commission of the Financial Commission.

This latter proposal was accepted.

It was also agreed that, as soon as possible, the detailed British financial proposals which would take the form of articles for insertion in the Treaty should be communicated to the French Government for their examination.

#### *Army and Navy.*

There was general agreement that both the Turkish Army and Navy should be suppressed and the gendarmerie placed under Allied control, on which the same Great Powers would be represented as on the Financial Commission.

#### *The question of the Dodecanese.*

It was agreed that these should be returned to Greece. Owing to the secret agreement between Italy and Greece, of which the French and British Governments were aware, no difficulty on this score was now apprehended from Italy.

#### *Italian evacuation of Southern Anatolia.*

M. Berthelot agreed that while the French proposal to give the Italian[s] a predominance in the control of the coal mines at Anatolia might stand, it would not be enough to induce the Italians to evacuate Southern Anatolia, and that something like the British proposal to give the Italians a sphere of economic priority in the matter of future concessions in Southern Anatolia would be necessary.

It was also agreed that the Italians, if they secured control over the mines of Heraclea, would have to agree to continue to supply Constantinople with coal as has been done up to now.

M. Berthelot here referred to the mention in the British observations of British cessions to Italy in Africa.

MR. VANSITTART explained the present position as regards these concessions both in Jubaland and on the Western Frontier of Egypt, and pointed out (in reply to M. Berthelot's contention that Italy had not in practice merited any very favourable treatment in this matter) that Italy stood by the Treaty of London in this respect; that we had done our best to satisfy her, but that, unfortunately, France had not found herself able to make an equal contribution.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Cilicia.*

Mr. Vansittart explained that we were afraid that the French proposal to maintain nominal Turkish sovereignty of a spiritual order over the vilayet of Adana might be intended to recognise past Turkish pretensions to

<sup>5</sup> See No. 17.

the continuance of some kind of spiritual sovereignty in ceded territory by insisting on the right to nominate such functionaries as naibs and kadis. He cited the unfortunate case of the Treaty of Lausanne,<sup>6</sup> where Italy had acknowledged some such right.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that this was a danger, and that he would drop the proposal as regards the words 'spiritual order'. Later during the meeting, in reply to an enquiry from Lord Curzon, he explained that the French expected really to obtain a position in Cilicia under some form of nominal Turkish sovereignty. They had not worked out the details of their scheme, but would do so and communicate them to His Majesty's Government later. He also informed Lord Curzon that they intended to offer a home and protection in Cilicia for those Armenians who wished to settle there.

#### *Armenia.*

M. Berthelot agreed generally with all the British proposals on the Armenian portion of the French memorandum, and as to the inclusion of Erzeroum in the Armenian State. He suggested that the actual frontiers should be decided by an expert Allied Commission later.

As regards military assistance to the new Armenian State, M. Berthelot communicated a report from the head of the French Military Mission in the Caucasus, Colonel Chardigny, as to the number of Allied troops required to assist the Armenians both in the Caucasus and in Turkey in establishing the frontiers of their new State. This report is attached as an appendix to this minute.

It was agreed that this might suitably form the basis for an enquiry by an Allied Military Mission later.

He also agreed that the British suggestion as to confiding to the Council of the League of Nations the task of helping Armenia with men and money might well be adopted, if the French, British, and Italian Governments found later, after examination by experts, that they could not supply the necessary resources alone.

#### *Batoum.*

M. Berthelot agreed with the British proposal that a special free State might be created around Batoum under the ægis of the League of Nations, Batoum being a free port. The details of the scheme could be worked out later on by a special Allied Commission.

#### *Smyrna Area.*

Some discussion followed as to the question of keeping the Greeks in Smyrna. M. Berthelot explained that M. Venizelos had spoken rather strongly to him about the necessity of the Greeks being allowed to keep Smyrna, but had hinted that in certain eventualities he might accept a Greek withdrawal.

M. Berthelot fully concurred with the proposals in the British note that if, as the French desired, the Greeks withdrew, some special régime would have

<sup>6</sup> The Italo-Turkish Treaty of 1912: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cvi, p. 1100.

to be established which would save their *amour-propre* and safeguard the interests of the large Greek population in this area.

It was suggested in the course of subsequent discussion that Smyrna would have to be made a free port; that while nominal Turkish sovereignty remained over Smyrna and the area around it the Greeks might secure some form of preponderant representation in the local Government, that the Allied controls over the Central Departments of the Turkish Government should secure that Greek inspectors, &c., were appointed locally, and that in any case the Greek evacuation would have to be carried out gradually, and an Allied Commission of Officers would have to remain on the spot for a certain time after the evacuation to guard against a policy of retaliation by the Turks.

At this point Lord Curzon returned to the meeting. The proceedings which had taken place in his absence were explained to him, and he approved the terms quoted above for the formula for the League of Nations in connection with the new State of Constantinople and the Straits.

#### *Financial Control over the Government of Turkey in Asia.*

With regard to the question of financial control over the Government of Turkey in Asia, LORD CURZON enquired whether it was intended to place all the revenues or only some of them under the Financial Commission. MR. ARMITAGE SMITH explained that it was essential in order not only to secure the Allies' just demands for reparation but also to restore some semblance of commercial prosperity in Turkey, that all the revenues should be placed under Allied control.

LORD CURZON expressed the fear that if a Financial Commission with these extensive powers was set up, and if, as he understood, the Financial Commission were practically to impose every year a budget which the Legislative Assembly would have to accept, not only the Turks, but many people outside Turkey, and in particular the Moslem world, would say that the Allies were, in fact, destroying an independent Turkish Government, and any possibility of democratic development in Turkey, however unlikely such a development might be in practice. He did not think these objections would be overcome by saying, as M. Berthelot and Mr. Armitage Smith had said, that such a strict régime of Allied control was really vitally necessary to Turkey, and would therefore be welcomed by all thinking Turks.

Lord Curzon finally asked whether it would not be possible to lay down in the Treaty that the financial control should only continue until the pre-war debt obligations of Turkey had been liquidated, and that then the Council of the League of Nations might be consulted as to the régime which was to take the place of the previous Allied financial control.

M. BERTHELOT thought this an excellent suggestion, and it was generally agreed to.

The decisions which had been reached in Lord Curzon's absence regarding the capitulations, the Dodecanese, Cilicia, Armenia, and Batoum were explained to Lord Curzon, who agreed with them.

### *Railways.*

The French representative had no proposal to make on the question of railways, but LORD CURZON suggested that it was essential to provide in the Treaty for some form of international board (French, English, and Italian) to control the running of the railways as part of the general scheme for the economic rehabilitation of Turkey. MR. ARMITAGE SMITH suggested that the Board might take the form of a special commission of one of the controlled Central Departments, possibly a special commission of the Financial Commission. LORD CURZON also pointed out that some agreement should be reached between the French and British Governments as to the German shares in the Anatolia and Bagdad railways; the other existing railways in the new Turkey in Asia being already either British (Smyrna-Aidin Railway) or French (Smyrna-Cassaba).

MR. ARMITAGE SMITH explained that, as regards concessions, a distinction would have to be made between existing concessions and future concessions; he thought that the grant of future concessions should in some way be placed under the control of the Financial Commission, as it was a matter which essentially concerned the economic prosperity of Turkey. As regards past concessions, a clause had already been drawn up by the British Delegation in Paris and might be discussed with the French.

LORD CURZON reverted to the question of the proposal to give Italy a priority in the grant of new concessions in Southern Anatolia, and asked whether it was intended merely to give Italy a priority as against France and Great Britain or a complete monopoly, all other Powers agreeing to abstain from working for or undertaking any concessions in the Italian zone. It was agreed that the former was meant.

As regards railways and concessions generally, it was agreed that general proposals should be drawn up by the British Government and submitted to the French Government in due course.

### *Smyrna.*

The question of the form of Government in this area in the event of Greek withdrawal was then discussed again.

Lord Curzon said that it was essential that M. Veniselos should be informed of details of the proposed régime which was to follow in this area if the Greeks withdrew. Otherwise after having committed himself, as he had done, he might find it difficult to withdraw in the face of Greek public opinion. Lord Curzon suggested the possibility of a local Greek Commission at Smyrna looking after the port and town under a Greek chairman.

As the question of Greek withdrawal was closely bound up with the Greek acquisition of Turkey in Europe north of the Enos-Midia line, the question of the future of Smyrna was really closely connected with the future régime at Adrianople. Lord Curzon pointed out the danger of taking this town with its past associations and traditions from the Turks unless their interests were to be safeguarded. If Adrianople were handed over to the Greeks, it should be stated in the Treaty that the Mosques were in any case to be respected.

M. BERTHELOT entirely concurred, and it was agreed that some formula should be found setting up a régime at Smyrna which might apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the area around Adrianople. For the former, Greek interests would be specially safeguarded (the possibility of the Governor of the sanjak or vilayet being always a Greek on the analogy of the Lebanon was suggested by Mr. Forbes Adam). For the latter, Turkish interests would be similarly safeguarded, and the Governor of the Adrianople area might always be a Turk.

Before terminating the discussion, LORD CURZON said that on the assumption that something like the present proposals for peace terms with Turkey were accepted by the other Allies, he hoped that the military difficulties of imposing them on Turkey would not be ignored. It would be disastrous to dictate a peace which the Allies had not the military strength to enforce.

M. BERTHELOT said that he himself thought that the Nationalist movement headed by Mustapha Kemal was largely bluff, and that a show of force from the points where the Allies had troops would be sufficient to show this.

LORD CURZON was not so optimistic, but he agreed that a way could be found of imposing these conditions if the Allies were united and determined upon it.

(*The meeting then closed and it was agreed to renew discussions at 11.30 on the next day.*)

#### APPENDIX TO No. 632

#### Memorandum by Colonel Chardigny, Head of French Military Mission in the Caucasus

##### *Quelles sont les conditions nécessaires pour créer cette Arménie?*

L'exposé qui précède<sup>7</sup> suffit à lui seul à faire comprendre les difficultés que présente la création d'une Arménie unie dont une des parties, l'Arménie turque, n'est plus aujourd'hui qu'une simple conception théorique.

*En Arménie russe* l'élément arménien ne forme presque nulle part un tout compact, vit mélangé à l'élément tatare ou kurde, qui lui est hostile[,] et doit être protégé contre lui. Les événements de cet été à Nakitchevan<sup>8</sup> ont, en effet, montré que, réduite à ses propres forces, la République arménienne n'était pas capable de maintenir sous son administration les régions musulmanes qu'elle prétend gouverner.

*En Arménie turque* l'élément arménien n'existe plus, il faut l'y ramener des quatre coins de la Turquie, l'y défendre contre une population hostile kurdo-turque qui s'est partagé les terres et qui, par la voix de ses chefs, de Mustapha Kemal Pacha, a déclaré au mois de juillet dernier, au Congrès d'Erzeroum, 'qu'elle était décidée à ne pas céder aux Arméniens un pouce de terrain des six vilayets, et qu'elle était prêt[e] à défendre ses droits par la force des armes'.

Il faut, en outre, pendant deux années assurer le ravitaillement complet de cette population dont les villages sont ruinés.

Pour créer une Arménie, même réduite aux faibles proportions indiquées plus haut, une force militaire étrangère est donc indispensable; une organisation locale

<sup>7</sup> Not included in filed copy of this appendix.

<sup>8</sup> In July 1919 a Tartar rising against Armenian authority had occurred at Nakchevan.

des forces arméniennes avec des instructeurs européens serait notoirement insuffisante.

*Aide militaire.* — J'estime à une vingtaine de mille hommes l'effectif européen nécessaire. Pour obtenir le rendement maximum, cette force militaire me paraît devoir être organisée en groupes très mobiles en pays de montagnes, analogues à nos anciens groupes alpins, et comprenant chacun :

- 1 bataillon d'infanterie.
- 1 escadron de cavalerie.
- 1 compagnie de génie.
- 1 section d'artillerie.
- 1 ambulance légère.

Douze groupes seraient nécessaires; trois pour l'Arménie russe, neuf pour l'Arménie turque.

Le tableau ci-dessous en donne une répartition sommaire :

Arménie russe ..	..	1 groupe Nakitchevan-Zanguezour.
		1 groupe région kurdo-arménienne de l'Ararat-Igdir.
		1 groupe Kars.
Arménie turque ..		1 groupe région Baizet.
(Garde des trois grandes voies de pénétration qui se détachent de la voie ferrée de Makou et de celle d'Erzeroum)	I .. .. ..	Begri Kala.
	I .. .. ..	Van.
	I .. .. ..	Kara-Kilissa-Alachkert.
	I .. .. ..	Meliazgerd.
	I .. .. ..	Bitlis.
	I .. .. ..	Khorosan-Kupri-Kei.
	I .. .. ..	Knys-Kala.
	I .. .. ..	Mouch.

Ces groupes pourraient être réunis par trois pour former des brigades de montagne pourvues des différents services, télégraphique, automobile, chemins de fer.

Ils auraient au début à assurer l'entretien et la garde des voies de communication, et serviraient de cadres d'instruction pour les troupes locales dont l'organisation serait à envisager pour réduire progressivement les effectifs des troupes étrangères d'occupation.

### No. 633

#### *Third Meeting: Turkish Settlement*

[166415/151671/44]

The Anglo-French discussion was continued at a meeting at 11.30 a.m., the 23rd December, in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office.

The same representatives were present as on the 22nd December,<sup>1</sup> but Lieutenant-Colonel Gribbon also attended on behalf of the War Office.

#### *Kurdistan*

LORD CURZON opened the meeting by referring to M. Berthelot's note on Kurdistan<sup>2</sup> which he had just received and glanced at. The note proposed that part of Kurdistan should fall within the British Mesopotamian mandate,

<sup>1</sup> See Nos. 631 and 632.

<sup>2</sup> No. 634.

but that the rest might be formed into a federation of Kurdish tribes under some form of loose Anglo-French control, but with the maintenance in theory of Turkish sovereignty.

Lord Curzon said that he was doubtful regarding the advisability of an even nominal sovereignty of the Sultan in Kurdistan. Nor did he like the idea of dividing it into spheres of control. M. BERTHELOT replied that the tribal divisions made for disunity. But LORD CURZON explained that this was not quite what he meant. It was the idea of a division between France and Great Britain of the Kurdish area that he disliked. He did not think the Kurds would relish it. Lord Curzon said that it was difficult to cover the ground in an exchange of notes or to decide the boundaries of Kurdistan apart from a decision as to the boundaries of the Mosul vilayet and Southern Kurdistan. He ventured, however, to suggest to M. Berthelot the following outlines of general policy which might guide the British and French Governments in coming to a final decision:—

1. No mandate, whether English or French, or Anglo-French, was possible or desirable for Kurdistan as a whole, except perhaps for the more settled areas in Southern Kurdistan.
2. Turkish rule, for obvious reasons which past experience made clear, should not continue in Kurdistan in even a nominal form.
3. The Kurds were quite capable of making (and according to his latest information were disposed to make) a working arrangement with the Assyrians on one side and the Armenians on the other. The Kurdistan question could not therefore be considered apart from the formation of the Armenian State on which the French and British were agreed.
4. Lord Curzon's own idea was to allow the Kurds to decide whether they would form a single State or a number of small loosely knit areas. Time and non-interference by the Turks could alone show what they were capable of.
5. The Kurds should, if possible, be guaranteed against Turkish aggression, but should preferably not have formally appointed advisers, whether French or British.
6. Both from the British and French points of view it was undesirable to create a frontier problem similar to that with which the British were confronted in India.

M. BERTHELOT said that he agreed with these general propositions, and with a proposal subsequently made by Lord Curzon that it would be best to leave the question for the present, and perhaps return to it after a discussion on Mosul and other points regarding the Arab countries.

#### *Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan*

M. Berthelot raised the question of the Allied attitude towards the Caucasian States. LORD CURZON reviewed the position briefly as follows:—

1. It had been agreed upon at yesterday's meeting<sup>3</sup> that Batoum and the

<sup>3</sup> See No. 632.

- area round it might be made a small free State under the League of Nations with a free port.
2. Great Britain was more closely interested than any of the Allied Powers in the present and future of these Caucasian States because of her position in Asia, the recent occupation of the country by her troops, and the presence of her consular officers.
  3. The present British policy was to protect these States on the north from aggression by Denikin, but Great Britain had not so far recognised the *de facto* or *de jure* sovereignty of any of them, because of the assumption of responsibilities which would be involved.
  4. Great Britain would prefer to act in concert with the Allies if there was to be any change of policy in this respect.
  5. For the present it was desirable to wait and see what would happen to Denikin in Southern Russia.
  6. Lord Curzon personally desired to see these States enjoy an autonomous existence with close union and co-operation among them, and possibly a federal association at a later date with a united Russia, if such were ever reconstituted.
  7. If anything catastrophic happened during the winter, the Allies might consider the recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan next spring. Daghestan was in rather a different position, being within the Denikin sphere.
  8. It was clear that neither America, France, Italy nor Great Britain was prepared to take a mandate in the Caucasus.

M. BERTHELOT agreed generally with these propositions. France was interested commercially and as regards oil in the Caucasus.

LORD CURZON added that, on a point of detail, it might be desirable to detach Lazistan, roughly represented by the present sanjak, from Turkey and attach it to Georgia, as the Lazs, although Moslems, were of Georgian race and sentiment and spoke Georgian dialects. Georgian territory might be brought down between the free State of Batoum and Armenia, and joined on to Lazistan. The status of Georgia would not be defined at present, however, or necessarily in conjunction with the Turkish Treaty.

On the other hand, the policy already agreed upon would involve the early recognition of the new Armenia, within the general boundaries decided upon yesterday<sup>3</sup> as an independent State by the terms of the Treaty with Turkey. The question of Armenia would thus be treated differently from that of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

M. BERTHELOT agreed generally with these views.

LORD CURZON then reverted to the question which had been discussed yesterday of the financial and military assistance to be given to the new Armenian State. He said that he thought large sums of money would probably come from America. The Armenian troops were capable fighters and as fierce as the Turks. A force would be required of some five to ten thousand men, which might be raised internationally. Colonel Chardigny's estimate

of twenty thousand men<sup>4</sup> seemed to him too high. The international force might stay in the Armenian State for a period of, say, five years, and then retire if the situation so permitted, or be renewed by the League of Nations.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought that Lord Curzon had admirably sketched the details of the manner in which Armenia might be internationally established. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See appendix to No. 632.

<sup>5</sup> The meeting then passed to a discussion upon the 'Arab Countries', printed as No. 404. The fourth and last of the present series of meetings was likewise mainly devoted to Arab questions, and the minutes of this meeting are printed as No. 405.

## No. 634

### *French Note on Kurdistan<sup>1</sup>*

[166133/3050/44]

La question de la future organisation du Kurdistan pose un problème aussi complexe que celui de l'Arménie à laquelle il est lié géographiquement et militairement.

Il est impossible d'annexer le Kurdistan à l'Arménie, ne fût-ce que pour cette raison que la seule application du suffrage universel mettrait les Arméniens en minorité. Il serait inique et d'ailleurs pratiquement impossible d'assujettir les Kurdes à leurs voisins arméniens qui, même avant les massacres de 1895, étaient moins nombreux qu'eux.

Le Kurdistan correspond au vilayet de Diarbekir et au sud du vilayet de Van; c'est un pays essentiellement kurde, où, à côté de Musulmans kurdes (comprenant une minorité de guerriers pasteurs, superposés à des serfs quatre fois plus nombreux), vivent des centaines de milliers de Kurdes non Musulmans, les Kizilbach et Yezidis, continuateurs du Mazdéisme. En outre, sur le Haut Tigre, vivent les groupes chrétiens des Jacobites, des Chaldéens, des Nazaréens (ou Nestoriens). Ces chrétiens et les Yezidis sont aussi dignes de sollicitude que les Arméniens, ayant été comme eux décimés par les égorgeurs turcs. Quant aux Kurdes, ce ne sont pas de simples brigands; ces montagnards belliqueux sont, comme les Afghans, comme les Marocains du Rif ou du Haut Atlas, auxquels ils ressemblent par bien des traits, comme les Normands du Moyen Age, accessibles à la civilisation: l'illustre et chevaleresque Sultan Saladin était un Kurde.

Cependant, ces populations qui s'étendent entre l'Anatolie et la Perse, entre l'Arménie et la Mésopotamie, malgré leur groupement compact, sont divisées en tribus et clans qui, de même que les Arabes, n'ont à peu près jamais été réunis en un État national.

La situation géographique du Kurdistan, la nature du sol et le caractère des populations appellent une organisation spéciale. Le statut de ce pays, à richesses naturelles, mais peu accessibles, limitrophe de régions délicates

<sup>1</sup> This note was communicated to Lord Curzon by M. Berthelot on December 23, 1919: see No. 633.

(Arménie, Perse, Mossoul, Caucanie), intéresse spécialement l'Angleterre et la France et doit faire l'objet d'un accord entre elles, sans autre interlocuteur.

Sous quelle modalité cette intervention peut-elle se concevoir? Le mandat mésopotamien n'est contesté par personne à l'Angleterre, ni le mandat syrien à la France. Il y a seulement contestation sur la répartition entre ces deux groupements des districts arabes du Nord, que l'Accord de 1916 attribuait à la sphère française. Cet accord plaçait dans la sphère anglaise les cantons méridionaux des Kurdes, une grande partie des autres demeurant avec Mossoul et Diarbekir, du côté français. Jusqu'à la conclusion d'une entente catégorique sur une autre division, cet accord continue à lier l'une vis-à-vis de l'autre les Puissances signataires et à diviser entre elles les pays kurdes.

Nulle part l'intervention de dirigeants et d'aides européens n'est plus nécessaire qu'au Kurdistan. Comme on ne peut en faire une simple enclave turque entre les régions arménienne et arabe, on pourrait prévoir, au moins à titre transitoire, un organisme fédéral sous contrôle européen (français ou anglais, selon les zones, comme cela a été fait pour les pays arabes), organisme dont les relations économiques et politiques avec l'Arménie seront à définir. Il ne faut pas oublier, en effet, qu'il existe à côté des Kurd[es] et enchevêtrés, outre des Arméniens, des Yezidis, des Chaldéens, etc., groupes qui seront opprimés sous tout autre régime que celui de l'autonomie fédérale.

On peut concevoir d'ailleurs le maintien d'une souveraineté théorique du Sultan, au delà de la limite orientale de l'État turc fixé dans les districts du Haut Euphrate, où se trouve un groupe compact de Turcomans, limitrophes des Kurdes. L'on aboutirait alors à un régime de suzeraineté turque nominale avec Conseils locaux électifs sous contrôle franco-anglais, assez voisin de la situation proposée pour l'Anatolie, mais avec atténuation du rôle du Sultan.

L'organisation définitive du Kurdistan ne pourra, du reste, être réglée que lorsqu'aura été défini le statut des pays limitrophes, notamment de l'Arménie et du vilayet de Mossoul.

LONDRES, le 23 décembre, 1919

### No. 635

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received January 8, 1920)*

No. 2384 [168780/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 23, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to communicate to your Lordship certain details which the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, has recently given me on the subject of the present strength of the British forces under his command.

2. The Black Sea Army has steadily diminished in strength during the past

twelve months. Whereas its responsibilities are as great as ever and may be immensely increased if difficulties should arise in connection with the execution of terms of peace with Turkey, its numbers are now so reduced that I venture to suggest to your Lordship that it is desirable that when the Turkish peace settlement is being discussed in London or Paris, the military situation of the Allies in this country should be clearly understood and due weight given to the change which has taken place since the armistice.

3. The figures communicated by General Milne show that on the 5th December the fighting strength of the Army of the Black Sea (exclusive of two brigades of artillery) was as follows:—

	Bayonets.
In the Batoum area ...	1,874
At Salonica ...	562
In the Constantinople area ...	4,469
Along the Anatolian Railway from Ismidt to Afion Karahissar	2,272
Dardanelles area ...	<u>657</u>
	9,834

4. Your Lordship will observe that the total in Turkey amounts to 7,398 bayonets, of which 2,929 are employed in garrisons and detachments along the railway or at the Dardanelles, and 4,469 are in the Constantinople area.

5. Besides these British troops there are, in Constantinople and Thrace, French troops, consisting of six battalions, attached to the Allied Corps under the command of General Sir Henry Wilson at Constantinople, as well as a division under the direct orders of General Franchet d'Esperey. In Adalia and South-West Asia Minor the Italian troops number between 6,000 and 7,000 men, and in the Aidin vilayet there are some 75,000 Greek troops.

6. The Turkish Army has an authorised armistice establishment of 57,000, and, inclusive of the 'National' bands, probably does not at present exceed this figure.

7. Whilst the Anatolian provinces are not now in open revolt against the authority of the Central Government, as was the case when Damad Ferid Pasha was in power, the present Cabinet, except in Constantinople, governs only by and with the consent of Mustafa Kemal and his C.U.P. adherents, and all real power in the provinces is still in the hands of the Nationalists. The latter have undoubtedly been losing ground and arousing the hostility of the peasantry during the last few months; it is, however, to be anticipated that they will renew their agitation when the Allied peace terms are made known, and, should these terms involve the loss of any of the predominantly Turkish provinces, with greatly increased support from the people as a whole. The possibility must be considered, in view of the chauvinist and anti-European sentiments of the leaders of the movement, that, should the Turkish Government, under the threat of the Allied forces at Constantinople, agree to accept the terms proposed, Anatolia may break away and come under the rule of a military junta. Recent events on the Euphrates<sup>1</sup> have shown the

<sup>1</sup> The reference was probably to recent local unrest at Deir-es-Zor.

danger of military adventurers obtaining control and substituting their sway for that of the responsible Government, and there is much in the present condition of affairs throughout the whole of the former Turkish Empire to induce the Turk and Arab to make common cause against the foreigner.

8. It is because of the possibility of events taking the course which I have indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph that I have thought it desirable to invite your Lordship's attention to the present military situation of the Allies in this country. The Italian troops in the south-west of Asia Minor are few in number, of low morale, and scattered throughout a large area. The disadvantages and dangers of associating the Hellenic troops of Aidin in combined operations with our own forces in order to impose peace on the Anatolian provinces are so clear that I need not enlarge upon them. It therefore appears that, should such action become necessary, it is upon the British and French troops that this duty would fall. I cannot believe that His Majesty's Government has any intention of committing itself to undertaking further extensive military operations in Turkey, but the possibility remains of a deadlock arising through the refusal of the Asiatic provinces to be party to a peace which may be accepted by the Government at Constantinople.

9. Experience in the Near East points to the fact that provided demands when made are backed by an overwhelming force in evidence, they are conceded—but great difficulty, if not failure, is to be expected should the support be weak. It would therefore appear essential that the Allies be prepared to show the necessary strength at the decisive point (Constantinople) when the terms of peace are handed to Turkey.

I have, &c.  
J. M. DE ROBECK

### No. 636

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 24)*

*No. 2177 Telegraphic [165000/70100/44]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, December 23, 1919*

Grand Vizier and (? Minister) of Foreign Affairs called on me today. Object of visit was to call attention to report received by Turkish Government that Greek Government intended to proclaim annexation of (? Smyrna area) to Greece on occasion of New Year. They said that if there was any foundation for this report (? most) dangerous situation would arise.

I said that I had not smallest knowledge of any such project and that it seemed to me unthink(?able).

Greeks (? were at) Smyrna by decision of Peace Conference and as representatives of (? Allied) Powers. Assuming purely for (? sake) of argument that annexation were in contemplation it could only be by decision of Allies not by proclamation of Greek Government and I did not for a moment

suppose any change would be made in status of Smyrna except as part of general peace settlement. Grand Vizier and (?) Minister for Foreign Affairs suggest M. Venezelos might attempt coup, and that, even if his actions were declared invalid, consequences in Anatolia would be disastrous, as it would be impossible to convince population that proclamation was bluff on M. Venezelos' part and not work of Peace Conference.

I replied that I had too much respect for M. Venezelos' good sense to suppose him capable of adventure which would place him outside pale of Conference and compromise Greek interests no less than his own reputation.

(?) Minister of Foreign Affairs argued with (?) some ingenuity that M. Venezelos might launch proclamation of annexation in order to . . .<sup>1</sup> up his political position at home, where he was much assailed, knowing that Allied Governments regarded his maintenance in . . .<sup>1</sup> as desirable in Allied interests, and hoping that they would accept *fait accompli* on the ground that domestic situation had made annexation necessary to secure his position. I expressed opinion that if he took this step, he would give proof that he no longer possessed precisely those qualities of statesmanship which made his retention of power so valuable to Allies.

Both Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs displayed unusual pertinacity though they were polite as usual and thanked me warmly for all I said.

On being (?) asked origin of report they said it came from Greek sources in Asia Minor but they declined to accept suggestion that, in that case, it was more likely to (?) have been invented by National leaders than anyone else. Why, asked Minister for Foreign Affairs, were Greeks hurrying military stores of every kind into Smyrna area and Thrace, if their intention was patiently to await decisions of Conference? Against whom were these preparations directed? Turkey was defenceless (?) while Greeks were definitely aggressive. He asked whether he and Grand Vizier might 'prendre acte de mes éclaircissements'.

I said that I was ignorant of any excessive preparations by Greeks. I suggested their position in Smyrna area was for the time being one of such irresistible superiority that they had no need to keep well armed. Turkish regular army . . .<sup>1</sup> redress but 'national forces' were numerous and threatening and suffered from no lack of equipment. I suggested he should ask French about Thrace. As regards my so-called 'éclaircissements' I said that all there was to take note of was (1) that I was absolutely ignorant of project attributed to Greek Government; (2) that under importance attached to report by Turkish Government I would bring it to Your Lordship's notice and (3) that I personally thought it improbable to . . .<sup>1</sup> degree being (*sic*) unthinkable. I promised also to bring it to notice of General Milne, and His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I am informing my French and Italian colleagues . . .<sup>1</sup> conversation and am forwarding copy of this telegram to General Milne.

Repeated to Athens 157.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 637

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received January 15, 1920)*

No. 2399 [170729/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 26, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 2127<sup>1</sup> of the 8th December on the subject of the proposed assembly, under the auspices of the Turkish Nationalists, of a Pan-Islamic Congress at Sivas, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a report giving some further information on this matter, which has been received from a secret source by the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea.

2. As Pan-Islamic activities are doubtless engaging the attention of His Majesty's Government, I venture to express the opinion that this proposed congress at Sivas is but one example of the efforts now being made in Turkey and other Mahomedan countries to develop and direct Islamic sentiment, which are at the present time more than ever deserving of serious investigation and consideration.

3. The Nationalists and Committee of Union and Progress elements in Turkey have realised the extent to which the country has been enfeebled by the war, both in men and resources, and how much it is at the mercy of the victorious Entente Powers it is but natural that they should endeavour to draw fresh strength from other Moslem countries, such as Persia, Egypt, India, and the Arab world. Moreover, both the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists have this in common, that they may both expect to profit from the arousing of an anti-British and Pan-Islamic sentiment amongst the Mahomedans of the Central States, and it is therefore to be anticipated that efforts are being made with this end in view.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram (received December 14) reported that 'rumours have been in circulation for some weeks to the effect that Nationalists in interior (?) are getting together Delegates (?) from different Islamic countries, who will meet at Sivas or Erzeroum, and make some pronouncement regarding solidarity of Islam with Turkey. Amongst countries which Delegates (?) would profess to represent are, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Arabia. At least one Indian agitator of importance is also reported to be on the way to Sivas; these rumours are gaining consistency and have probably good foundation as regards main fact, i.e. intention of nationalists to mobilize (?) representatives) and engineer what could be represented as demonstration of all Moslem sympathy with Turkey.'

'It is worth considering that King Hussein or Feisal or both (?) might be moved to issue statement that no authorised Arab (?) representatives have been deputed to attend Conference, said to be in preparation at Sivas, and that responsibility of leaders of Arabs, faithful as they are to the common principles of Allies . . . [text uncertain] could obviously (?) not countenance any attempt to prejudice issues now awaiting settlement at Peace Conference by means of such conference.'

In Foreign Office telegram No. 1371 of December 22 to Field-Marshal Allenby at Cairo Lord Curzon instructed him, with reference to the above telegram from Constantinople, that he 'should, if you think it advisable, approach Hussein, or Feisal on his return, in sense of last paragraph'.

4. Generally speaking, there would appear to be in varying degrees throughout all the Moslem countries of the Near and Middle East a growing tendency to react against European domination and control. This is perhaps a natural development, consequent on the growth of a political sentiment amongst the dominant classes, which becomes more active as the power of absolutism diminishes and is replaced by that of the political organisations which exercise control under the cloak of democratic institutions. Pan-Islamism may well be the framework upon which will be built up, on the grounds of community of religious and political interests and ideas, and with the object of making a stand against European intervention and exploitation, a general movement in these countries to get rid of foreign control and develop along their own lines. The expression 'self-determination' has echoed throughout the Near East, and though perhaps naturally imperfectly understood, it yet forms the theme of every political scribbler and leader of public opinion. All measures tending to co-ordinate Islamic activities must therefore be of first importance to Great Britain during the next ten or twenty years, and require to be carefully followed up.

5. The activities of political parties or associations which are working to unite a direct Islamic sentiment for political ends should, I venture to think, be considered not as affecting only the country in which they manifest themselves, but more generally as being in relation to the activities of similar organisations in other Moslem countries and therefore having an important bearing upon the general political situation in the Near and Middle East. To allow of this being done it would be necessary that periodical information on the subject should be co-ordinated and the situation reviewed as a whole.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 637

*File on Kurdish Committee*

Karabekir Kiazi Pasha informs by telegram the Turkish War Office that Kurds have risen in arms against the British in Kerkuk and Suleimanie. Sheikh Mahmud has reoccupied Suleimanie and the surrounding villages; also Rowanduz and Erbil are cleared from British troops.

Sheikh Meshal Vel Seid Abbas, chief of Shammar tribe, and Nakib-el-Eshraf Seid Mehmed, chief of the Aneze tribe, have addressed a telegram to the Sultan expressing their attachment to the Ottoman Empire and assuring him that Mesopotamia, Nejd and Meant will by no means recognise any other suzerainty except that of Turkey.

G. S. 'I', C'ple

5.12.1919.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 637

*File:—Panislamic Congress, Sivas 1919*

Mustafa Kemal has convoked a general meeting of different Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab chiefs in Erzerum, in which they will discuss the means to be employed in order to resist the establishment of an Armenian State.

The Azerbaijan representatives also have arrived in Erzerum, and the Congress has begun.

The following persons also take part in the Congress:—

O.C. of 13th Army Corps, Djevet Bey.

„ 20th „ „ Ali Fuad Pasha.

„ 3rd „ „ Selahaheddin Pasha.

„ 15th „ „ Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha.

Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha informs the Turkish War Office that five field howitzers have arrived in Erzerum from Azerbaijan.

Hadi Pasha, Amed Abouk Pasha, Abdurrahman Sheref Pasha, Salih Pasha gathered in the residence of Djemal Pasha, Minister of War, on Monday last, and prepared a project of a new military organisation. This project is examined by the Cabinet to-day.

Mustafa Kemal is busy with a new vast organisation. He has projected a force under the name of Quvva-I-Islamie, Islamic forces, composed of Kurdish and Arabic tribes. Every tribe will have its own part in this force. Kurdish regiments will be commanded by Kurdish chiefs, Arabic tribes of Mardin district by their sheikhs, Turkish regiments by Turkish officers, and Mustafa Kemal will have the supreme command.

In accordance with an agreement with the Government, the Nationalists will double their effective on the Aidin front. The recruits will be raised from Konia and Angora districts. The Government will supply the necessary equipment, funds, and means of transport.

5.12.19.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 637

File:—*Hilaf ve Heuryt*

A new secret committee has been founded in Constantinople. The aim of this Committee is to hold large meetings in Constantinople three days before the opening of the Houses and to demand the dissolution of the elections, as the new members are not elected by the people, but they are nominated by the Unionists, and that they are traitors. They will force the Sultan not to recognise their quality of membership.

This committee is organised by Entente libérale.

G.S.'I.', C'ple,

5.12.19.

No. 638

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received January 10, 1920)

No. 2401 [169418/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 27, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, recently spoke to me on the question of more active operations against Moustapha Kemal such as

- (a) blowing up the Dardanelles forts;  
(b) military efforts to suppress brigand bands.<sup>1</sup>
2. I enclose copy of the letter I have addressed to General Sir George Milne on the subject as the result of our conversation.

I have, &c.  
J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 638

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE.

December 26, 1919

From:—High Commissioner.

To:—General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea,  
Constantinople.

M. 2631.

Sir,

With reference to our recent conversation, regarding a suggestion that the Allies should blow up the Dardanelles forts by way of reprisals against the activities of Mustapha Kemal and his followers, I beg to state that in my opinion such action, far from having the effect desired, would react most disastrously on the position and policy of the Allies in Turkey.

2. That policy consists, as you are aware, in letting sleeping dogs lie and in averting, so far as is possible, the outbreak of civil war in Turkey. It follows that any action tending to lower the prestige of the present Turkish Government, and to give provocation to the party of resistance, would be contrary to that policy. This would, in my opinion, be the inevitable result of blowing up the Dardanelles forts at the present time. The only people it could injure would be the present Government and its supporters; the only ones whom it could benefit would be the National Party.

3. The National Party in Anatolia arose from the unrest among Turks caused by the Greek occupation of Smyrna. It seems to me to be evident that action on our part such as that proposed, far from acting as a deterrent to their activities, would be heartily welcomed by Mustapha Kemal as providing a stimulus to his followers and a further incentive to resistance on their part. It would also probably result in reprisals on the part of Kemal against the Christians in Anatolia, who have up to the present been relatively safe.

4. Again, it must not be forgotten that Constantinople draws its food supply from Anatolia. Were Mustafa Kemal, as a reprisal for blowing up the forts, to hold up the Anatolian Railway, the Allies would be placed in a very difficult situation; for I doubt if they would be in a position to feed even a fraction of the large population at present concentrated in and about Constantinople.

5. So far as my information goes, and in this respect I believe that it tallies with yours, the state of Anatolia, while far from satisfactory, is not worse, but

<sup>1</sup> These suggestions had been made from the War Office and were not favoured by General Milne.

if anything slightly better, than it was, say three months ago. At all events, it is probably little worse than that of the South and West of Ireland at the present time. It would, therefore, I consider be unfortunate to do anything to precipitate disorders in Asia Minor, with which we are at the present hardly in a position to cope.

6. A serious expedition, having as its object the occupation of the chief towns and strategic points in Asia Minor and the suppression of Mustafa Kemal's movement, would no doubt be highly desirable. But for this purpose I presume that a very large force would be necessary, sufficient to overawe the Nationalists, and to prevent the expedition from degenerating into guerilla warfare. A policy of pin-pricks, on the other hand, would be most unwise.

7. If the destruction of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles forts is considered a desirable aim in itself, it seems to me that it should be effected by a provision *ad hoc* in the Treaty of Peace. To effect it now would be a uselessly provocative act, and might tend still further to inflame anti-British feeling among Moslems in India and Egypt.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

#### No. 639

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received January 15, 1920)*

*No. 2403 [170731/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 27, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of two reports Nos. 1021/S. I,<sup>1</sup> dated 8th and 9th December respectively, on the situation in the Kaimakchi area, and at Odemish and Tireh, which have been received from the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea.

2. These reports show a most deplorable situation in this district: the small rectification in the Greek line which was necessary to improve their tactical position has resulted in rendering a further 4,000 people homeless and destitute at the beginning of Winter.

3. One cannot but reflect, as report after report of this nature is received, how entirely opposed these proceedings in Western Asia Minor are to the principles and ideals for which the Allies fought during the war. One of the most unsatisfactory features is that, the Greek Army being under supreme British command, much of the responsibility for the actions of the Greek troops is attributed to us by Turkish opinion.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

<sup>1</sup> Not printed: see below.

No. 640

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received January 15, 1920)*

*No. 2416 [170744/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 29, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter received from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, protesting against the continued occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops, in spite of the unfavourable report issued by the Allied Commission of Enquiry.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 640

*Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British High Commissioner*

*le 20 décembre 1919*

Sublime Porte.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

No:—19562/446.

Monsieur le Haut Commissaire,

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer une nouvelle fois la très sérieuse attention de Votre Excellence sur la question de l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes helléniques.

Ainsi que la Sublime Porte l'a déjà relevé à plusieurs reprises, cette occupation ne pouvait se justifier par des considérations d'ordre ethnique, l'immense majorité de la population du vilayet de Smyrne étant musulmane et turque et n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de continuer à vivre sous l'égide du Gouvernement Impérial.

D'un autre côté, la province dont il s'agit ne se trouvait pas dans un état d'anarchie ou d'insécurité qui eût nécessité son occupation par des troupes étrangères. Au reste, le débarquement des troupes grecques y occasionna les plus graves perturbations. Ces troupes s'y livrèrent, comme Votre Excellence le sait, à d'épouvantables exactions, immolant par milliers avec des raffinements de cruauté hommes, femmes et enfants, commettant d'inombrables actes de viol, brûlant et saccageant tout sur leur passage. La terreur qu'inspiraient leurs forfaits fut telle que dans certaines régions du vilayet des milliers de familles s'enfuirent de leurs foyers, avant l'arrivée des envahisseurs, pour échapper au déshonneur et à la mort. Ces malheureux, privés de leurs abris et de leurs biens, et exposés aux rigueurs de la mauvaise saison, se trouvent dans un état navrant.

Les horreurs et les actes de sauvagerie commis par les Grecs ont été constatés par la commission mixte que les Grandes Puissances alliées avaient chargé d'effectuer une enquête sur les lieux.

En dépit des constatations de cette commission, les Hellènes continuent toujours d'occuper le vilayet de Smyrna [*sic*] et à s'y livrer à chaque occasion à des excès et à des attentats sur l'élément musulman.

Cette situation ne laisse pas que d'exaspérer et de pousser au désespoir la population musulmane dans toute la Turquie. Elle est en contradiction avec les principes wilsoniens admis par toutes les Puissances belligérantes, principes qui ont été ponctuellement respectés à l'égard des autres pays intéressés.

Confiant dans le ferme et sincère désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique d'assurer le triomphe des principes de justice qu'il n'a cessé de proclamer pendant la guerre, je viens prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien intervenir auprès du Conseil Suprême afin qu'il veuille bien aviser au nécessaire en vue de la prompte et complète évacuation du vilayet de Smyrne par les armées grecques.

J'aime à espérer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne voudra pas voir se prolonger l'occupation de cette province qui constitue un de ces actes [? de] violence injustifiés que la Grande Bretagne a toujours flétris et que je n'aurai pas adressé en vain cet appel aux sentiments d'humanité et d'équité qui la caractérisent.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

M. RECHID

#### No. 641

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received January 15, 1920)*

*No. 2412 [170740/1300/19]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 29, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report, dated the 16th December, by Commander H. C. Luke, R.N.V.R., Political Officer on the Staff of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, relative to conditions in Thrace.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

#### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 641

*Commander Luke to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean*

H.M.S. IRON DUKE, AT CONSTANTINOPLE,  
December 16, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on my tour in Eastern and Western Thrace, in the course of which I visited Rodosto, Adrianople, Havsa, and Kirk-Kilisse in the former, and Dedeagatch and Gumuljina in the latter.

By 'Eastern Thrace' is meant the vilayet of Adrianople; by 'Western Thrace' the territory between the Mesta and the Maritza, which was re-

nounced by Bulgaria under the Peace Treaty, and which is now officially known as 'Thrace interalliée'.

I attach a map<sup>1</sup> showing the boundaries of these territories.

2. The organisation of the vilayet of Adrianople from the local and Allied point of view is as follows:—

The ordinary civil administration is conducted by the Vali and his officials. As regards the Turkish troops, Adrianople is the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, which at present consists of about 5,000 officers and men, the number of officers being disproportionately high. Under the 1st Army Corps commander are divisions stationed at Kirk-Kilisse and Keshan. There is also a division stationed at Rodosto, which is under Adrianople for administration, but under the XVIth Army Corps at Balikesri for discipline.

The only Allied troops in the vilayet are a force of about 1,300 Greeks belonging to the Allied Corps. Their nominal function is to guard the railway line between Kuleli Burgas and Chatalja, a duty which at present is probably quite unnecessary, the real object of their presence being to show the Greek flag in European Turkey. From this point of view it seems unfortunate that many of the men are not natives of Greece, but are Thracian ex-Turkish subjects, with local interests, suffering, in many cases, from genuine grievances against the Turks, and, owing to their familiarity with Turkish, able to understand any chance uncomplimentary remarks that may be levelled at them by Turks in the streets, cafés, &c.

The senior British military representative in the vilayet is the area control officer at Adrianople, with military control officers under him at Kirk-Kilisse, Rodosto, and Uzun Keupru.

There is a French intelligence officer at Rodosto. Kara Agach, the suburb of Adrianople, where there is a large French staff, is situated in 'Thrace interalliée'.

3. On the 30th November last the Bulgarians evacuated Western Thrace, and on the 1st December the French, acting on behalf of the Allies, assumed the administration of the territory, with their headquarters at Gumuljina. I can best describe the organisation of this new State by appending a translation of the first proclamation issued by its Government. This interesting document, which was published in French, Turkish, and Greek, gives a complete summary of the administration of 'Thrace interalliée'.

It will be observed from the proclamation that 'Thrace interalliée' is divided into six districts. Five of these districts are garrisoned by French colonial troops, numbering in all about 5,000; while the sixth district, that of Xanthi, although like the others under French administrative control, is garrisoned by no fewer than 16,000 Greek troops under General Leonardo-poulos. The other Allies are represented by a detachment at Gumuljina of sixty Punjaubis, which on two days of the week furnishes General Charpy's guard; and by an Italian company stationed at Ferejik.

4. The actual political position in the vilayet of Adrianople is complicated

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and difficult to probe. Its outstanding feature is that, partly owing to Christian emigration and Turkish immigration, the Moslems form something like 70 per cent. of the total population, and have been organised to a considerable pitch. Whither exactly that organisation tends, towards Turkey or towards an autonomous Thrace, is not very clear, as the Thracian Committee itself seems divided and uncertain as regards its ultimate aims. What, however, admits of little doubt is that, should any part of the vilayet be ceded to Greece, there will be armed resistance on the part of the Moslem population. To prepare an organisation capable of resisting annexation by Greece is, in fact, the immediate object of the Turkish organisations both in Eastern and Western Thrace, however much they may differ in matters of detail or ultimate policy.

They will, I believe, accept peacefully any solution as to their future other than Greek annexation or a Greek mandate.

5. The leading members of the Thracian Committee at Adrianople are, as is known, Shevket Bey, the Mayor of Adrianople; Sheref Bey, an advocate and recently elected a deputy for Adrianople; Shukri Bey, formerly Turkish consul in Kara Agach; and Mestan Effendi, ex-Mufti of Gumuljina and of Adrianople. These men, who are members of the Committee of Union and Progress, are probably in the movement largely for what they can make out of it, and are known to have amassed considerable sums of money in the course of the last year. But the driving force behind the Committee is the commander of the 1st Army Corps, Colonel (formerly General) Jafer Tayyar Bey, who has assumed a role in Eastern Thrace similar to that of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia.

He has a strong personality, is an able and intensely energetic organiser, and is an extreme Nationalist, with little consideration for the Christian elements of the population. At the same time he seems to be a genuine patriot according to his lights, and a man of personal integrity. He alone of the leaders of the movement is believed not to have enriched himself at its expense. While receiving the orders of the Minister of War, he often acts independently of Constantinople, having recently, for example, temporarily moved a division without reference to headquarters. It seems probable that, were he to be recalled, he would refuse obedience. Jemil Bey, the new Vali, is his brother-in-law and nominee, and acts to a considerable extent, though not wholly, under his direction.

6. The material forces at the disposal of the Thracian Committee are, in the first place, the regular troops with their relatively enormous proportion of officers, who preach Nationalism throughout the vilayet. To these may be added the many semi-demobilised soldiers who are back in their villages on indefinite leave. Through the above, and through the gendarmerie, it has been possible for Jafer Tayyar to arm practically the entire Moslem civilian population. The Christian villagers, too, are armed, but to a much lesser extent than the Moslems.

Moral support and organisation are furnished by the Committee of Union and Progress, which was always strong in Thrace, and still has branches

throughout the vilayet. Though it can hardly be said that the Thracian Committee and the Committee of Union and Progress are identical, the two bodies have much in common, and the latter was glad to place its organisation at the service of the former. A third factor which has very greatly strengthened the Thracian movement is the Greek occupation of Smyrna, whose consequences have served to harden Moslem Thracian opinion more than ever against Greek rule. Against this powerful movement, working on the minds of a docile peasantry, the Entente Liberal in Thrace is quite unable to make any headway.

The reason why the Thracian Committee and the Committee of Union and Progress cannot be called identical lies in the fact that the former has obtained the support of members of the respectable, well-to-do class of large landowners, who loathe the Committee of Union and Progress and all its works. These men are very naturally apprehensive of any part of Thrace coming under Greek rule, for in such an eventuality they would be faced with the alternatives of becoming Greek subjects, or if not, of having to surrender their property and leave the country.

7. The position of the non-Moslem elements in Thrace, other than the Jews, who are on good terms with the Turks, is not of the best. At the beginning of the war the Turks deported the Armenians in the vilayet to Asia Minor, and the Greek rayahs<sup>2</sup> living in the seaports and along the frontier either to inland villages in Thrace or to Asia Minor also. Such Armenians as were not done to death in Asia Minor (representing perhaps a third of the total) and the deported Greeks have now returned, and have resumed possession of their property. A number of Greeks, however, anticipating deportation, fled to Greece, where they were given Greek nationality; many of these have now returned to their villages with Greek passports. The Turks decline to recognise such persons as deportees, and, basing themselves on the letter rather than on the spirit of the Græco-Turkish agreement,<sup>3</sup> insist on regarding them as having left the country voluntarily and as having thereby waived their right under the agreement to return to their houses and lands in Turkey. The Turkish attitude is due partly to Turkish disinclination to see in Thrace a large number of Greek subjects with foreigners' privileges, but principally to the fact that many of the houses and farms owned by these people are now in the occupation of Turkish refugees from New Greece, New Serbia, and Bulgaria.

The late Vali, Salim Pasha, whom the Greek Metropolitan of Adrianople described to me as extraordinarily kind and helpful towards the Christians, showed much forbearance in the matter, and in many cases allowed these people to remain. Since the present Turkish Cabinet came into power, however, and especially since the elections, the Turkish authorities have adopted a much harsher attitude, and have expelled, at a day's notice and in the height of winter, families who had been back in their homes unmolested for

<sup>2</sup> Turkish term for members of a subject nationality.

<sup>3</sup> The Græco-Turkish convention of 1913: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cvii, p. 893.

as long as four and six months. The Turkish officials, acting probably under the influence of Tayyar Bey, have with unnecessary cruelty been sending these unfortunate folk, not to Salonica, but over the northern border of Thrace into Bulgaria, where the Bulgarians immediately clap them into prison. I myself saw by the roadside near Havsa, on a bitterly cold day, five such families, who with their few belongings had been expelled on the previous day, after having lived quietly in their homes since last August. The area control officer, Captain Lyster, when he and I visited the Vali the next morning, was able to procure an order permitting their return, and also induced the Vali to send a circular telegram to all his district officials prohibiting them from deporting in future any Greeks who had been back in their homes for four months and upwards.

Other factors besides the elections have had their share in exacerbating the Turkish authorities against the Greeks. In the first place, the Thracian Committee and the local administration, which are practically synonymous terms, are strongly permeated with the anti-Christian traditions of the Committee of Union and Progress. Secondly, the Smyrna situation, with its baneful repercussion on every part of Turkey and on every aspect of the Turkish question, has incensed Turkish feeling very deeply against the Greeks. Thirdly, the presence of Greek troops in the vilayet, and especially the fact that, as mentioned in paragraph 2 above, these troops are largely composed of Thracian Greeks, gives constant provocation to the Turks. In this connection it is interesting to note that at the beginning of this month the British control officer at Uzun Keupru reported the distribution of cases of bombs by Greek military headquarters at Lule Burgas to their detachments in Thrace.

Be it always remembered that whatever hatred the Greeks feel towards the Turks is insignificant compared with their hatred for the Bulgarians, who during their occupation of Thrace inflicted on them not only material but religious persecution. The Metropolitan of Adrianople assured me that in the minds of the Greeks of Thrace 'the worst Turk was an angel compared with the best Bulgar'.

8. The public security of the vilayet varies considerably in the different districts. In the north, around Kirk Kilisse, things are quiet, and good feeling prevails between the Greeks and Turks of the town. This is due to the fact that, partly owing to their having bribed the Turks, partly to the moderating influence of the present Mufti of Kirk-Kilisse (now a deputy), none of the Greeks of Kirk-Kilisse were deported. In the south, especially in the neighbourhood of Rodosto, Malgara, Keshan, &c., the situation is less satisfactory, especially since the departure of the Italian detachment from Rodosto some two months ago. During the presence of the detachment the Greeks and Armenians of Rodosto, expecting that the Allied occupation would be permanent, somewhat injudiciously, perhaps, made no secret of their national and anti-Turk feelings, with the result that they are now apprehensive of the Turks indulging in reprisals when opportunity offers. In the country around brigandage is rife. Greeks and Turkish bands roam about the villages, and, from the fact that they often work in harmony, it would appear that their

object is plunder rather than politics. The latter motive is of course also present, as, for example, when at the end of November a Greek band killed at Daudli a Turkish mudir who had been guilty of pillaging a Christian village. The Turkish bands are largely composed of semi-demobilised Turkish soldiers, and neither the Turkish regular troops nor the gendarmes are able to suppress them. Even were they sufficiently numerous to cope with them, which they are not, they are not paid sufficiently well or sufficiently regularly to render them proof against the brigands' bribes.

The pay of the Turkish soldier was until recently only 10 piastres a month, plus rations, and although it has lately been raised to 20 piastres a month, even the increased rate is ridiculously inadequate as a safeguard against corruption.

Apart from the activities of the brigands, the Moslem and Christian villagers keep fairly quiet. Each is afraid of the other, and the Turks believe the Greeks to be more fully armed than they are.

Adrianople town is quite orderly.

The figures for the population of the town (less the suburb of Kara Agach), as estimated by the Greek Metropolitan, may, perhaps, be of interest. They are of course approximate:—

Turks	...	...	...	...	35,000
Greeks	...	...	...	...	22,000
Jews	...	...	...	...	12,000
Armenians	...	...	...	...	1,500
<hr/>					
Total	...	...	...	...	70,500

9. In 'Thrace interalliée' political interest centres in the intentions and aims of the Gumuljina section of the Thracian Committee. This section is no longer on good terms with the Adrianople section, and may now in fact be regarded as a separate committee. A recent deputation from the Adrianople Committee to Gumuljina to secure moral and financial support met with a decidedly cool reception. The point at issue is whether Moslem Thracians as a whole shall work:—

- (1) For the non-separation of Eastern and Western Thrace from Turkey;
- (2) For an autonomous and undivided Thrace under an Allied mandatory as a preliminary to reincorporation with Turkey;
- (3) For an autonomous undivided Thrace as ultimate aim.

In the minds of the Turkish political leaders in Thrace there is more likelihood of the vilayet remaining Turkish than there is of Western Thrace being placed once more under Turkish rule, from which it was removed in 1913. The two areas have a similar preponderance of Moslem population, both are equally opposed to Greek rule, but, broadly speaking, the vilayet would probably prefer the Sultan to autonomy, while Western Thrace sees in autonomy its only hope of escaping Greek rule.

The above is of course a generalisation only, as there are many Turks in

the vilayet who, if offered the choice between the Sultan and autonomy, would choose the latter. Such persons are for the most part landowners, men with a large stake in the country and above all anxious for peace and orderly administration. Similarly, there are persons in Western Thrace, principally among the lower classes, who would prefer the Sultan to autonomy. Yet there is certainly among Thracian Turks, in contrast to Turks elsewhere, a local patriotism as strong as, if not stronger than, their national feeling. Economically there is much to be said for maintaining Thrace undivided; and from this point of view the country has suffered, and is suffering, much through the divisions which it has undergone. Adrianople, for example, has since 1913 lost enormously in commerce and population, and the pastoral population of Western Thrace, which brings its flocks down to the coast in winter, and returns to the Rhodope mountains in the summer, is equally severely affected.

10. It is regarded as a foregone conclusion by the French as well as by the natives of the district, that the occupation of Xanthi by Greek troops is a prelude to the award of this area to Greece by the Peace Conference. If this assumption proves correct, and if Greek annexation extends no further, there will probably be no armed resistance on the part of the predominantly Moslem population, although they would accept Greek rule over this wealthy tobacco-growing region with extreme reluctance and distaste. If, however, Greek annexation were to extend to, say Gumuljina and beyond, it seems probable that the Turks will resist to the utmost of their ability. In that case the Turks might obtain assistance from Bulgaria, whose plans for the future, I was given to understand by a person who knows the country well and was lately in Sofia, include a rapprochement with Serbia with the object of an ultimate joint attack on Greece. This is no doubt somewhat speculative; not so, however, the prospect of Turkish resistance if Greece aims at extending her dominion beyond Xanthi.

The French, who have in a surprisingly short time established a symmetrical and well-organised administration in 'Thrace interalliée', not dissimilar from that of the British in Batoum military province, would, I fancy, be very willing to take the mandate for the whole of Thrace, Eastern and Western—that is to say, from the Mesta (or, if Xanthi becomes Greek, from Gumuljina) on the west to Chatalja on the east. They are therefore by no means unfriendly to the aspirations of the Gumuljina committee towards autonomy. On the other hand, if Greece were to extend to the Maritsa, I gather that local French opinion would be in favour of the vilayet of Adrianople remaining an integral part of Turkey. There is much to be said for this view, for it would be futile to constitute an autonomous State in this region which did not include both Eastern and Western Thrace.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE  
Commander, R.N.V.R.,  
Political Officer.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 641

*Government of Western Thrace*

*Proclamation No. 1*

(Translation.)

General Franchet d'Esperey, Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Armies of the Orient, ordains:—

*Article 1.* The Allied Powers have entrusted General Franchet d'Esperey, Commanding-in-chief, Allied Armies of the Orient, with:—

- (1) The evacuation by the Bulgarians of Western Thrace as defined in article 48 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.
- (2) The administration in their name of this region.

*Article 2.* General Charpy will exercise, under the authority of the General Commanding-in-chief, the Government of Western Thrace. He will take the title of 'Governor of Western Thrace and delegate of the General Commanding-in-chief, the Allied Armies of the Orient.'

*Article 3.* General Charpy has under his orders:—

- (a) The troops and services of the Allied Armies stationed in Western Thrace.
- (b) The officials of all grades entrusted with any public function in the said territory named by the General Commanding-in-chief or subsequently elected in accordance with the conditions fixed by him.

He will continue to be under the orders of the General Commanding-in-chief French Armies of the Orient, as regards the command of troops.

*Article 4.* The headquarters of the Governor are at present at Gumuljina.

*Article 5.* For purposes of administration of the territory the Governor of Thrace is assisted by:—

- (a) A political and administrative bureau consisting of officers nominated by the 'Général Gouverneur'.
- (b) An administrative Council composed of members belonging to the several races (Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews).

The number of these members and the method of appointment will be decided upon by the General Commanding-in-chief on the recommendation of the 'Général Gouverneur'.

This Council will study general questions, submit proposals, and make all recommendations regarding administrative, political, financial, economic and other questions.

The functions of this Council are purely consultative.

- (c) The heads of the several administrative departments (Justice, Public Worship, Public Instruction, Finance, Customs, Posts, &c.).

*Article 6.* The territory of Thrace is divided into two circles, namely, Gumuljina and Kara Agach.

The circles are subdivided into districts having their headquarters at:-

Xanthi	Circle of Gumuljina.
Gumuljina	
Dedeagatch	Circle of Kara Agach.
Soflou	
Demotica	Kara Agach
Kara Agach	

The boundaries of these districts will be those of the corresponding cazas, modified where necessary by the new frontier.

*Article 7.* The administrative direction of each circle will be exercised by a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, who takes the title of 'Commandant de Circle'.

In each district the civil administration will be exercised by a civil administrator nominated by the General-in-chief on the recommendation of the 'Général Gouverneur'.

The administrators will be selected from natives of the country, having regard to the race and religion of the inhabitants of the district.

Important minorities may be represented in the administration of the district by an assistant administrator, who will be of the race or religion of the minority.

The control of the administrators will be exercised under the authority of the 'Général Gouverneur' delegate by senior officers.

*Article 8.* The administration of communes will be exercised by a mayor assisted by a municipal council.

The number of its members and their method of selection will be decided by the General-in-chief on the recommendation of the 'Général Gouverneur'.

*Article 9.* The decisions of the 'Général Gouverneur' delegate will be published in the name of the General-in-chief in the form of proclamations.

*Article 10.* The Government of Western Thrace being Inter-Allied, the official language will be the diplomatic language (French).

All official documents will be drawn up in French.

It will be permissible to the authorities charged with carrying them out or publishing them to subjoin to the French text a translation in one or more of the languages of the country.

*Article 11.* The territory of Western Thrace remains under martial law.

A subsequent proclamation will regulate the organisation of the administration of justice.

*Article 12.* Subsequent instructions will deal with matters of finance, public works, posts and telegraphs, public instructions, public health, and the organisation of a local gendarmerie.

*Article 13.* Bulgarian officials of all ranks will be retained under the control of Inter-Allied officers until the time when their posts can be entrusted to natives of Western Thrace.

*Article 14.* The decisions contained in the present proclamation will come into force on the 1st December, 1919.

(For the General Commanding-in-chief,  
Allied Armies in the Orient),

GENERAL CHARPY,  
Governor Delegate of Western Thrace.

GUMULJINA, October 28, 1919.

No. 642

*Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

No. 7951 [162772/106756/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 29, 1919

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 2295<sup>1</sup> of December 16 in which you advocate the immediate restoration of the island of Lemnos to Greece. While fully appreciating the reasons which you adduce in favour of this course I am reluctant, in view of the fact that the announcement of the general terms of the Peace Treaty with Turkey is now likely to be made at no very distant date, to take any step which might irritate Turkish opinion beforehand. I consider therefore that it would be better to treat the restoration of Lemnos as part of the general settlement of Turkish affairs and to postpone action for the present.

I am, &c.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 629.

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy of original.

No. 643

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received January 15, 1920)

No. 2425 [170752/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 30, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated 11th December, which I received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, regarding the neglect of General Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, to comply with the orders given to him by General Milne.

2. I have discussed the matter fully with my French and Italian Colleagues, and we have addressed a Joint Note to the Sublime Porte calling attention to the grave consequences attending such action on the part of the Minister of War, and calling for an immediate reply as to the manner in which the Imperial Ottoman Government intends to deal with the matter. A copy of this Note<sup>1</sup> is enclosed.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This note of December 24, 1919, was as here indicated.

3. I also enclose copy of a further letter,<sup>2</sup> dated 16th December, which has been received from General Milne, reporting further instances of the neglect of Djemal Pasha to comply with orders given to him.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 643

*General Sir G. Milne to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

CONSTANTINOPLE,

December 11, 1919

Your Excellency,

In accordance with my instructions from the Peace Conference in Paris, directing me to mark out a line of delimitation between the Greek and Turkish troops on the Aidin front,<sup>3</sup> and to determine a position to which the Ottoman authorities were required to withdraw their troops, on the 3rd of November, 1919, I forwarded to the Ottoman Minister of War a demand that all Turkish troops and armed bands should be withdrawn to a distance of 3000 metres from the line approved by the Peace Conference in Paris by the 12th November 1919. (See enclosure A attached.)<sup>2</sup>

In reply I received Enclosure B attached,<sup>4</sup> dated the 5th of November, which was followed on the 15th November by a further communication from the Minister to the effect that, as his Government had not as yet replied to his communication, he was unable to carry out my instructions (Enclosure C).<sup>2</sup>

As my orders admitted of no change, I merely acknowledged this communication.

Meanwhile the Greek Army, in accordance with my permission, advanced to the line laid down, and suffered casualties owing to Turkish resistance.

On the 1st of December I forwarded to the Ottoman Minister of War the attached letter (enclosure D)<sup>2</sup> in which I called attention to the deliberate disobedience of my orders, for which I held the Ottoman Government responsible.

In reply to this I received the attached letter, dated the 4th of December (Enclosure E)<sup>2</sup> from which it will be seen that the Minister of War endeavours to free himself from all responsibility for the incidents which had taken place, but makes no reply to my accusation.

I desire to bring to Your Excellency's notice

1. That the Minister of War of the Ottoman Government has made no attempt to carry out the instructions issued by me as representing the Peace Conference at Paris and that the disregard of these instructions has caused serious loss of Allied life.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 536.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. In this note General Djemal Pasha protested against the line of delimitation, and concluded: 'Your communication has been transmitted to the Sublime Porte in the exact original, and I have the honour to state that my Ministry will act in accordance with the orders given by the Government.'

2. That though the Greek troops have now advanced to the line laid down, Turkish bands have not evacuated the 3000 metre neutral zone, and are continually harassing the Greek troops. Such action is bound to lead to severe retaliation by the Greek Army, action which I do not propose now to take any steps to prevent;

3. All my information tends to show that Turkish Regular troops are being moved down from Afion Kara Hissar towards the Greek front, and I am certain that this can be done only with at least the passive acquiescence of the Minister of War.

I request therefore that Your Excellency will address to the Sublime Porte the strongest possible remonstrance against the action of General Djemal Pasha, in having so flagrantly disobeyed the instructions of the Peace Conference. I would recommend that the Allied High Commissioners should demand the appointment of some other person to the high office of Minister of War. I consider further that his chief adviser, General Djevad Pasha, Chief of the Ottoman General Staff, should be relieved of his appointment.

I have, &c.

G. F. MILNE  
General Commanding-in-Chief,  
Army of the Black Sea.

#### No. 644

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 1909 Telegraphic [166647/151671/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 31, 1919

French newspapers, probably inspired by French Government, are publishing intimation that removal of Turkish Government from Constantinople has been decided upon in principle by the British and French Governments. It is well that you should know the facts for your confidential information. After the recent Conference in London, a draft scheme for settlement of Turkish Peace was submitted by French and discussed at Foreign Office here.<sup>2</sup> It proceeded on above basis. It was mutually agreed that this scheme in its completed shape should be subject to confirmation or the reverse by both Governments. This will be done. If it is accepted by the two Cabinets, it will form the basis of the proposal submitted to the Peace Conference at its impending sitting.

Addressed to Constantinople No. 1909 and Cairo.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was also sent to Field-Marshal Allenby in Cairo (see below).

<sup>2</sup> See Nos. 631 and 632.

No. 645

*Record by Sir J. Tilley of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador  
in London*

[166782/151671/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 31, 1919

The Italian Ambassador came to see me this morning.

In the course of conversation he said that it was a great pity that M. Clemenceau had spoken as he did about the Turkish negotiations in London.<sup>1</sup> Probably the truth was that the British & French Govts. had not really come to a complete agreement but only made a beginning in that direction. He seemed to me to be hinting at the possibility of treating the matter with Signor Nitti<sup>2</sup> in such a way as to persuade him that he was being taken into confidence before & not after the event, & to be suggesting that this might do good.

He looks forward very much to Signor Nitti's meeting with the Secretary of State on whom he evidently expects that Nitti will make a very good impression.

He has heard nothing of Signor Scialoja's movements.

He asked me if we had heard a rumour that the Greeks meant to declare the annexation of Smyrna at the Greek New Year. I said we had, but did not believe in it. H[is] E[xcellency] said it would create a storm if true.

J. A. C. TILLEY

<sup>1</sup> M. Clemenceau had alluded to these negotiations in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on December 22, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Signor Nitti was shortly to arrive in London on a visit (cf. Volume II, No. 63).

No. 646

*Memorandum by Earl Curzon on the future of Constantinople<sup>1</sup>*

[168210/151671/44]

January 4, 1920

I have only seen for the first time this afternoon (4th January) the printed paper<sup>2</sup> in which Mr. Montagu, following an earlier paper<sup>2</sup> on the future of Constantinople, expresses 'surprise', 'astonishment', and 'amazement' at the proceedings of the recent Conference at which I assisted<sup>3</sup> regarding the bases of the future Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

As a good many of his remarks rest upon what appears to me to be a complete misconception both of the situation and of the facts of the case, I ask leave to offer a necessarily hurried reply. I will first deal with the allegations in his second paper.

What passed at the Downing Street Conference<sup>4</sup> was as follows: M. Clemenceau first stated the French case, which at that time included the

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet (see note 14 below).

<sup>2</sup> Not here printed: see below.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, Nos. 55 and 62, and in the present volume Nos. 631 and 632.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume II, No. 55.

retention of the Turkish Government in Constantinople. The Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, and I argued the opposite case, viz., that for withdrawal. M. Clemenceau remarked that the matter was one of great complexity and difficulty, that he had been much impressed by the British arguments, which he would carefully consider, and that he would instruct M. Berthelot, after such consideration, to draw up the French case, to which I was invited to reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government. M. Clemenceau had every hope that the discussion which was to follow would result in the common acceptance of one or the other plan. The suggestion of the two alternative plans was not made, as Mr. Montagu supposes, in order that His Majesty's Government should state the two sides of the case which are favoured by different parties in the Cabinet. I was instructed to draw up the plan for Turkish evacuation. The French were to submit theirs for Turkish retention.

Before leaving London, M. Berthelot handed to me the French plan,<sup>5</sup> which has since been printed and circulated. No one was more surprised than myself to find that the French had abandoned their position altogether, had accepted the British argument for withdrawal, and proposed the latter as the fundamental basis of discussion. Upon that we proceeded. It was no part of my duty to produce a plan with which I personally disagreed and which the French had given up without the vestige of a struggle.

I understood M. Berthelot's remark at the Foreign Office Conference,<sup>6</sup> as I understood the deliberate press communiqués in Paris, to mean no more than a characteristic French endeavour to thrust upon us the responsibility for a decision which will be unpopular with the more Chauvinistic section of their own people, and which they hope will cause us difficulties in the East.

(Here let me say—what may not at first sight be apparent—that the real reason why the French would at bottom prefer the Turk to remain in Constantinople is this: they know that we have a profound distaste to be involved in a repetition together with them at Constantinople of the old Egyptian condominium at Cairo; they feel sure that we should in time divest ourselves of this burden, and then they would be left at Constantinople in practical control of the Turk and of the Turkish Nationalist movement, soon to be in the ascendant, which they would manipulate to their advantage in every part of the Eastern world. Herein lay the insidious danger of the original French proposal, to which even now they would like to revert. I earnestly pray my colleagues to be on their guard against it.)

Mr. Montagu's second point is a complaint that the proposal to leave the Sultan a residence at Constantinople does not appear in the results of

<sup>5</sup> No. 631, appendix.

<sup>6</sup> In his memorandum of January 1, 1920, under reference Mr. Montagu had drawn attention to the fact that 'the change in front of the French, as they will be careful to publish, was made, as stated by M. Berthelot in conference and in his memorandum, in deference "aux vues du gouvernement britannique"'. (See No. 631, appendix.)

the Foreign Office Conference. He must, I think, be unaware that at the Downing Street Conference,<sup>4</sup> I myself put forward this proposal, which I described as the Vatican proposal, and that it was immediately and emphatically repudiated by M. Clemenceau, who said that in no circumstances would he agree to it. He said it had all the demerits of the proposal to leave the Turkish Government in Europe, without a single one of the compensating advantages. If there was to be a cut, he would only agree to a clean cut. In these circumstances, it was not likely that M. Berthelot would revive a proposal which had been so unmercifully condemned by his chief. Neither was it practicable for me to repeat a proposal that was doomed to abrupt dismissal.

Mr. Montagu complains, as I understand, that, having hypothetically turned the Turk out of Europe we have shown the minimum of consideration for him in Asia by depriving him of even a nominal sovereignty there, while at the same time he will be 'without any opportunity of hearing, or inducement to listen to, our requirements and demands'. I cannot see in this description any likeness to the proposals which we have submitted. Our object in the Foreign Office Conference was, if possible, to free the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor from Greek or Italian or any other foreign territorial encroachment, but to place his Government under so much of foreign financial and administrative control as to ensure that he should not repeat there the outrageous misgovernment of which he has for centuries been guilty in Europe.

As to Santa Sophia, the Foreign Office Conference expressed no decided opinion either way. They were not averse from leaving it as a mosque, though it may be remarked that the 470 years of modern possession to which Mr. Montagu points is more than balanced by the 920 previous years of use as a Christian Church, for which purpose indeed it was built. The Conference merely advised that *if any differential treatment were thought necessary*, Santa Sophia might be treated as a religious monument, without denominational use.

Again, as to the selection of a new capital in Asia Minor, Mr. Montagu seems to have found in our Report indications that the Turk is not even to be allowed to have the choice. If reference be made to the sole and very condensed reference to this subject on p. 15,<sup>7</sup> it will be seen that there is no foundation for the suspicion. I would let the Sultan go where he pleases. But no suggestion of any third alternative to Brusa and Konia was made.

I now turn to the arguments used by Mr. Montagu in his earlier paper about the future of Constantinople. He has frequently reiterated them with profound conviction and with great ability. I will ask leave once again to contest his views, and then to state the opposite case. If there is anyone who by political upbringing and tradition would be inclined to favour consideration for the Turk, I suppose it would be myself. If there is anyone who would *ex hypothesi* desire to conciliate Moslem opinion throughout the Eastern world it would be one who had been for many years head of the Government of

<sup>7</sup> Page 959.

India and who had spent many years of his life in travelling amongst and studying Mohammedan peoples. And yet I remain profoundly of the opinion not only that the present opportunity ought to be taken for terminating the connection of the Turk with Europe, but that if it be not taken we shall be laying up for ourselves a heritage of future trouble, intrigue, and wars in Eastern Europe which we shall regret for generations.

Mr. Montagu quotes with emphasis the alleged unanimity of Indian opinion. I state deliberately that this is a factious unanimity, the result of a prolonged and desperate agitation. I was Viceroy of India for nearly seven years, Lord Hardinge was Viceroy for five. In our time—which after all covered twelve years—there was not, and there never has been till in the last two or three years, any pronounced feeling among Indian Moslems in favour of Constantinople as the seat of the Khalifate or the capital of Islam. The Khalif is Khalif wherever he resides. When he was in Asia Minor centuries ago his residence was 'Roum' to the Eastern world. When he migrated to Europe Byzantium became Roum. If he goes back to Asia Brusa or Konia will become Roum. Constantinople has never had, and has not now, any associations of peculiar sanctity or prestige to the Indian Mohammedan.

When the Balkan War took place and Bulgaria was thought to be on the eve of capturing Constantinople, India showed no emotion. When in the early days of the war Mr. Asquith's Government made a secret agreement with the Czar's Government, in the event of victory over the Turk, to hand over Constantinople to Russia, and when this agreement was published by the Russian Revolutionary Party, there was no commotion in India. When on at least two occasions, to be mentioned presently, one of the published aims of the Entente Powers was declared to be the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, India neither protested nor stirred.

I do not doubt that between that date and this a great deal of feeling has been aroused, and a seeming solidarity of opinion between Moslem and Hindu in India produced. There will be a violent outcry if the Turk is now ejected. But it will be, in my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of all those who know India best, an artificial and an ephemeral explosion, which will before long die down.

Mr. Montagu has more than once cited the words of the Prime Minister, spoken in January 1918<sup>8</sup> when he was endeavouring to draw Turkey out of the war. But he has omitted to quote the Reply of the Allied Powers to the note from President Wilson dated the 12th January, 1917, which was published *urbi et orbi* as the fixed policy of the Allies:—

‘Their war aims are well known. . . .<sup>9</sup> They imply the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation.’

Nor has Mr. Montagu made any reference to the famous explanatory

<sup>8</sup> For this declaration by Mr. Lloyd George on January 5, 1918, see H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920 f.), vol. vi, p. 23.

<sup>9</sup> Punctuation as in original.

despatch of Mr. Balfour (dated the 10th January, 1917),<sup>10</sup> unanimously approved by the British Cabinet, in which he wrote:—

'Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall if possible be brought to an end; and we may hope that *the expulsion of Turkey from Europe* will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France or Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of the other territorial changes indicated in the note.'

In the face of these pronouncements, which were acquiesced in by our Allies including America—indeed, the note of the 12th January was drawn up and discussed in the presence of the French Ministers in the Cabinet Room—it is not possible to contend either that the consequences to the Turk of an Allied victory were not fully foreseen or that there was any disagreement about them. The opinion of the Republican Party, now in the ascendant in America, was also emphatically expressed by Senator Lodge, when he said in the Senate on the 13th August, 1918:—

'Constantinople must be finally taken away from Turkey and placed in the hands of the Allied nations as a free port, so as to bar Germany's way to the East, and hold the Dardanelles open for the benefit of mankind. It would be a miserable outcome to have Turkey retained in Europe, a curse to her subjects and neighbours, a plague spot and a breeder of wars.'

Mr. Montagu ridicules as ludicrous the argument that if the Turk is not turned out of Constantinople it will be regarded throughout the East as an admission that he has not been beaten; and he asks if the Turk loses Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and has to acquiesce in the internationalisation of the Straits, will not that be regarded as sufficient evidence of his discomfiture? In reply, I do not hesitate to advance as serious the argument which he treats with such scant respect. I assert unequivocally that if the Turk, whom the Allies have, as I have pointed out, three times declared their intention to expel from Europe as the price of defeat is nevertheless left in possession of his European capital, it will be regarded throughout the Eastern world as convincing proof not that the Allies would not, but that they could not, evict him. The loss of the border populations, none of them of Turkish nationality, and the majority of them held by the thinnest of ties, will not be regarded in any sense as a national humiliation. It will only be a continuation of the process that has gone on for centuries, successively depriving the Turk of Greece, Macedonia, Thessaly, Bulgaria, Crete, Egypt, and many other possessions, but has nevertheless always left him in possession of the capital of the Eastern world. Constantinople is the symbol to the East not of spiritual predominance, but of political power, and the measure of Mr. Montagu's anxiety to keep the Turk there, in order to placate the Moslem world, is the measure of the importance which its possession carries throughout the East.

<sup>10</sup> This despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington is printed in Cmd. 8439 of 1917.

Mr. Montagu quotes Lord Milner, whose opinion I should be the last to disparage, and who urges the retention of the Turk in Constantinople as best for us in Egypt. I, on the other hand, could quote passages from high authorities in Egypt who hold exactly the opposite view, and who argue that the one thing required to convince the Egyptian that he can get no help from Europe and that his connection with the Turk is severed for ever will be the disappearance of his former sovereign from the Golden Horn.

But if the argument from authority be pressed, I would ask how it is that the vast majority of our Eastern experts, the men who have spent a lifetime in studying or serving in the Near East, are in favour of expulsion. Even if we take the British officials who have served in Constantinople since the Armistice, where they have been exposed to every sort of friendly pressure from the Turks, and whose traditional instincts, particularly in the case of officers in the Navy, might have been expected to inculcate pro-Turk rather than anti-Turk sentiments, I do not know of one who does not think that this opportunity of getting rid of the Turk ought not to be lost. Admirals Calthorpe and de Robeck, who have been successively High Commissioners, hold that view. So do the two British Political Officers at Constantinople, Mr. Hohler and Mr. Ryan. The former wrote in an official report as recently as November last:—<sup>11</sup>

'The city of Constantinople is Imperial both by its geographical position and its historical traditions, and not in all its annals, except in the times of the Palæologi, has it been reduced to such a state of impotence and wretchedness as now. . . .'<sup>9</sup> It seems unsuitable that the ruler of a third-rate kingdom in Asia should still possess so great a capital, the very upkeep of which is beyond his means, as is being proved at this very time; it is as if a petty landowner whose farms and buildings were in complete dilapidation should endeavour to occupy and to maintain from family pride some noble old historic castle. Again, if there is any certain lesson to be derived from history, it is that the Turk is incapable of governing even himself, to say nothing of other races, and it is necessary to go no further than Constantinople to obtain at once abundant proof of his maladministration.

'I cannot find that there is in actual fact any real basis for the argument which has of late been advanced that Constantinople is in any way whatever a Holy City of Islam. It appears to me that there is danger of overestimating the shock to Moslem feeling at large by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and I believe that there is great risk in reality in leaving them there to brood over their former [sic]<sup>11</sup> greatness. . . .'<sup>9</sup>

The above passage raises a point which it is impossible to ignore. It is a commonplace that for wellnigh four centuries the rule of the Turk has been a blight and a curse to the countries which he has misgoverned, and I know of no single good thing that the Turk has done to a single nation or community or interest in Europe. His presence at Constantinople has poisoned the atmosphere of Eastern Europe, everywhere spreading

<sup>11</sup> See No. 578.

corruption, maladministration, and ruin. At Constantinople he has always been able to set the Powers by the ears, to embroil Governments and nations, and to inoculate the West with the worst vices of Eastern intrigue. From there he has ordered the massacres of hundreds of thousands of his Christian subjects. Constantinople in his hands has been, and if left there will remain, a plague-spot of the Eastern world.

There are two other aspects of the case to which I must allude. Mr. Montagu has drawn a picture of the unrest in the Eastern world that will spring from a sullen and embittered Islam. Personally I think that if we rob the Turk of Smyrna we shall do more to fan the flame of racial religious animosity in Turkey in Asia than by any steps that we might take with regard to Constantinople; and my colleagues may have noticed in all the reports that have come to us from our authorities, notably in General Milne's despatch of the 20th October,<sup>12</sup> that has been circulated to the Cabinet, that

<sup>12</sup> This despatch to the War Office (copy received in Foreign Office on December 3) read as follows:

*'Constantinople, October 20, 1919*

'Sir,

'I have the honour to forward a memorandum [not printed] on the Nationalist movement in Turkey, which is in my opinion an accurate and balanced account of events much misrepresented in Europe, but the military importance of which, it is essential, should not be underestimated.

'2. In the first place, the movement has consolidated public opinion in Turkey, and, now that its supporters hold the reins of power, will do so still more.

'3. In the second place, its leaders have been coquetting with the idea of armed resistance. No one can be better aware than they themselves that, in doing so, they are playing with fire and risking a disaster to their country. It was, however, necessary for them to adopt this attitude for two reasons:—

'(a) Because it serves as a veiled threat, which they believe will influence the Peace Conference.

'(b) Because the organisation of the populace in a military way is the normal method of political agitation in Turkey. Military organisation is the only organisation which the Turks understand, and the steps taken by the Nationalist Party are admirably calculated to bring all the political power into their hands, and to make the results of the coming elections a mere instrument of their will.

'4. It is therefore advisable to contemplate a situation in which the use of military force may become necessary, and to consider it in the light of possible decisions to be arrived at by the Peace Conference.

'5. I do not desire in any way to influence these decisions, but it is proper to point out that the force required to enforce the peace terms will vary greatly according to the nature of these terms.

'6. The three main questions, on which Mustafa Kemal and his followers in their defence of the integrity of their country declare a *non possumus*, are the question of Smyrna, the question of Armenia, and the question of Thrace.

'7. The question of Smyrna is important. The events of Smyrna have affected the position so greatly that it is inevitable that its evacuation and return to Turkey will be one of the foremost demands of every Turk.

'8. In Armenia the crux of the question is that there are very few Armenians, and that the more grandiose schemes for the creation of an independent Armenia would require large forces. Feeling on the subject is intense. Even Damid Ferid's Cabinet issued the most stringent orders that no Armenians were to be allowed to be repatriated. It is nevertheless

there is not a dissentient voice about Smyrna. But my point is this: if we have to face, as I think we probably shall, a new form of Turkish nationalism, whether it be founded on religion or on race, or whether it be Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian, will it be a more or a less formidable factor if its rallying point and inspiration is the Sultan at Constantinople rather than a Sultan at Brusa? Will not the retention of the old capital give a prestige and an impetus to the movement which will add immensely to its potentiality for harm? A Nationalist Party in Anatolia under Mustapha Kamal may be a hard nut to crack. But a Nationalist Party with its Sovereign at Constantinople, even if his forts and warships have disappeared, will be a much more anxious problem.

Lastly, ought we not to look to the future? Constantinople has been for centuries, ever since a Roman Emperor moved his capital there, the prize of the Eastern world. To this day its possession is coveted by France, Greece, Russia, and I daresay Bulgaria. How are we to prevent it from becoming once quite possible that there is a prospect of a satisfactory settlement without the use of force, provided that settlement is within certain limits.

'9. The evidence upon which this is asserted was obtained by the... [confidential reference omitted] branch of my staff, and can be studied in detail in a series of reports to the War Office.

'10. The true value can be put on these reports only if it be clearly realised that they are conversations between leading Turks who have no idea that they are being overheard.

'11. These conversations are therefore of very great value. They show the Turks clearly on the defensive on the Erzeroum frontier. They prove that the probability of an offensive against Armenia may be discounted. They also show that the Turk leaders are prepared to make concessions. For instance, Colonel Djevid Bey, the commander of the 11th Division at Van, writes to his corps commander at Erzeroum. He says fuel is a great difficulty, and wood as dear as sugar. Therefore he proposes to break up the rolling-stock on the Bayazid-Karaklis decauville. "Although," (he says), "we may hope by the Nationalist movement to save most of our country, that part must go." Divisional commanders do not in practice express political views in the course of discussing administrative questions unless they know that their superiors hold these views. It, therefore, appears that the corps commander, Kiazim Karabekir, who is the backbone of the national movement on that frontier, considers some territorial concessions inevitable.

'12. On the question of Thrace, I have no reason to suppose that adjustments would be considered inadmissible by the Nationalist Party.

'13. If the decisions of the Peace Conference are so drastic in the treatment of Turkey that the older men, who have the spirit of compromise, are unable to keep the wilder spirits in check, then it will turn out that the national movement has very greatly prejudiced the military position of the Allies. The population is armed, and now united for the first time; it is difficult to calculate the force which might be available in the event of a national rising.

'14. Between the solution without force and the action referred to as possible in the preceding paragraph, there are many other situations in which the Allied force required will vary according to the degree of division of opinion among the Turks, and the extent to which the most balanced opinion amongst them can be brought on to our side. In order that the situation may be considered beforehand, it is most important that a forecast of the peace terms should be presented to the Allied military authorities in time for them to consider what, if any, additional force will be required to meet the situation, which the announcement of the peace terms will create. In this way alone there will be avoided a repetition of the incidents of Smyrna.

"The forces now at my disposal are only sufficient to bring pressure to bear on the Government at Constantinople, who may or may not be in a position to control the country.

'I have, &c.  
G. F. MILNE'

more the prey of rival ambitions and the cockpit of future struggles, except by putting it under international supervision now? If we leave the Sultan there, what is to prevent the German from recommencing his old intrigues? Will not the Bulgarian and the Greek be condemned to a life-long rivalry? Will not a resuscitated Russia once again look to the Bosphorus for the gratification of her secular ambitions? Let us suppose that you have a combination between the Bolshevik, assuming him to be victorious in Russia, and the Turk, assuming him to be left as Sovereign in Constantinople—let us suppose—what is by no means unlikely—that a recovered Germany once again takes a hand in the game—what is to prevent the repetition at some future date, perhaps in a more dangerous form, of the experience of 1914–15? Finally—and here I repeat a warning already given—what is to prevent France from assuming the role of champion of the new Islam, and organising the Moslems of the Western World from Morocco to Syria against the Moslems of the East, i.e., Mesopotamia, Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. I cannot imagine a greater danger to the peace of the world than a division between French and British Islam, of which I do not think that I am fanciful in seeing the omens already above the horizon. I call attention to the fact that on his recent return journey from Syria, M. Picot, the French High Commissioner, and no friend of ours, went out of his way to visit Mustapha Kemal at Sivas.<sup>13</sup>

The conclusion of my argument is that in spite of the immediate risks involved in the policy of expulsion—which in my judgment will have to be encountered anyhow, whether we keep the Turk in Europe or bid him go—the longer view demands that we should not sacrifice the opportunity presented to us by the defeat of an enemy whose entrance into the war prolonged it for at least two years and cost us millions of treasure and tens of thousands of lives, to settle once and for all a question which more than any single cause has corrupted the political life of Europe for nearly 500 years.

C. OF K.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See No. 385 and No. 399, note 2.

<sup>14</sup> At a meeting on January 6, 1920, the Cabinet rejected the policy as regards Constantinople here advocated by Lord Curzon: see the Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (London, 1928), vol. iii, p. 270. Also printed ibid. is Lord Curzon's further memorandum of January 7 protesting against this decision.

#### No. 647

*Admiral Webb<sup>1</sup> (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received January 28)

No. 17 [174130/521/44]

My Lord,

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 4, 1920

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a report submitted to me as Commander-in-Chief by Commander H. C. Luke, R.N.V.R., Political

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Webb was Acting British High Commissioner during the temporary absence of Admiral de Robeck.

Officer on the staff of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, on the effects of Bolshevism on the British Empire.

2. I also enclose a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, remarking on Commander Luke's report.

3. I bring these two papers to your Lordship's attention in view of the experience of the writers.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
Acting High Commissioner.<sup>1</sup>

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 647

*Commander Luke to Admiral Webb*

IRON DUKE AT CONSTANTINOPLE, December 25, 1919

Submitted:

The recent Bolshevik successes<sup>2</sup> are likely to give an impetus to what is, it is submitted, one of the most important of Bolshevik aims, namely, to turn the Moslem world against the British Empire.

It may be doubted whether this aim, and the reality of the dangers to be apprehended therefrom, are as fully realised as they should be.

2. It is recognised that no Allied Power has incurred the hatred of the Bolsheviks so deeply as Great Britain, who is regarded by them as their most formidable enemy. In order to inflict injury on the British Empire, the Bolsheviks will use any instrument and any device, and will readily feign to disavow their own principles if thereby they can enlist Allies in their anti-British machinations. No principles, for example, are more fundamentally incompatible than those of Bolshevism and Islam; no two systems have less in common. Yet Bolshevism is making determined, and by no means wholly unsuccessful attempts, to delude Moslems into believing that the Moslem world would do well to ally itself with Bolshevism in war against the British Empire. These attempts are being made at the present moment in Turkey, Transcaucasia, Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, India, Syria, Arabia, and Egypt; and it is submitted that they merit the most serious attention.

3. Skilfully making use of every circumstance lending itself to misinterpretation or distortion the Bolsheviks have succeeded to make [*sic*] large numbers of Moslems in various parts of the Near and Middle East honestly believe that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam. The despatch of a Greek Army of Occupation to the Moslem province of Aidin, with its deplorable results, has been a useful and much used argument. The delay in concluding peace with Turkey, resulting in the rise of the national movement and the resurrection of the Committee of Union and Progress has provided valuable allies or, more correctly, tools. Another successful argument has been the injudicious policy of Great Britain's ally, Denikin, towards Moslem Daghestan and Azerbaijan.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the failure of the British Government (at all events,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume III, Chap. II.

to the Oriental mind) to inflict drastic punishment on the Amir for his insolent aggression<sup>3</sup> has tended to make the dupes of the Bolsheviks believe that the British Empire can be defied with impunity.

Very skilfully, too, the Bolsheviks are contriving to turn the somewhat vague and unformed aims of the pan-Islamic movement, such as it is, into anti-British channels. Great Britain, until recently regarded by Moslems as their principal protector, is now made to appear in the contrary light; and Mustafa Kemal is reported to be summoning a pan-Islamic conference, with deputies from Persia, India, Afghanistan, &c., to meet at Sivas. This conference, if it meets, will no doubt indulge in much anti-British propaganda; and although any deputies attending such a conference would necessarily be non-representative of real Moslem opinion in their respective countries, they will be capable of doing a considerable amount of harm.

4. An unfortunate factor in the situation is that these activities are creating an atmosphere of suspicion against Islam in Great Britain, where public opinion is not always sufficiently informed to distinguish between what is representative and what is not. To this atmosphere recent events in Egypt<sup>3</sup> have very naturally contributed.

It would seem most desirable that steps should be taken to prevent a barrier of mutual distrust from growing up between Great Britain and the Moslem world. It is suggested that His Majesty's Government might, with this object in view, make some conspicuous public pronouncement, emphasising that Great Britain is now as ever the friend of Moslems; and that from the Moslem side similar pronouncements should be evoked from, say, King Hussein, the Emir Feisal, the Aga Khan, &c. It is also submitted, very tentatively, that a more cordial attitude might be adopted by the British authorities to the ex-Senussi,<sup>4</sup> Sidi Ahmed, now living in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Sidi Ahmed professes to be very pro-British, but his advances have always been ignored by our authorities from a sense of loyalty to the Italians. He still wields considerable influence in Pan-Islamic circles (incidentally he girded the present Sultan of Turkey with the sword of Osman), and he might conceivably prove most useful to us. I submit that we are under no such obligations to the Italians (who are intriguing against us both here and in Egypt) as to refrain, out of deference to them, from utilising Sidi Ahmed should it be found that he could be profitably used.

5. I further submit that the Bolsheviks' menace to the Far East is a very real one, irrespective of whether they now succeed in Russia or whether they fail. If they fail, and carry out their threat to retire via Turkestan into Western China, they may there find much fertile soil for their doctrines. Quite recently, for example, it has been reported that the Koreans, wearied with Japanese oppression, have taken to Bolshevism. The Emir of Bokhara is understood to be strongly opposed to Bolshevism, and, if properly supported, he should prove a valuable stumbling-block to the Bolsheviks' *Drang nach Osten*.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 278, note 8.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the former chief of the Senussi tribe.

6. It is submitted that two ways whereby the Bolshevik plan to deceive Islam can be checked are:—

(1.) The adoption by the Conference, in drawing up the Turkish Peace Treaty, of the principle that no predominately Ottoman districts are to be placed under Greek rule.

(2.) Early recognition by the Peace Conference of the independence of Azerbaijan, which the Bolsheviks are working hard to win over.

H. C. LUKE  
Commander, R.N.V.R.,  
Political Officer.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 647

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan*

I agree almost entirely with Commander Luke's premises. Everything points to converging activities of the Bolsheviks and the political pan-Islamists. The object of the latter is to weld all Moslems into one whole to be used as an instrument against the west, especially against the Allies, and most especially against Great Britain. Constantinople is the natural pivot of this movement on the Islamic side.

2. Community of destructive aim enables both these forces to work in for the time being with extreme nationalist sentiment in eastern and probably in some western countries. In the case of Moslems the argument may be said to be expressed in one of two formulæ employed according to the requirements of the particular situation:—'Be nationalist because it is the only way to save Islam', or 'Be loyal to Islam because it is the only way to save your national inheritance.'

3. How far all the converging activities so made up have a common instigation in Germany is for me a matter of doubt. There can be no doubt, however, that so far as Constantinople and Turkey generally are concerned they are in some measure the creatures and wholly the instruments of what in one aspect is the Committee of Union and Progress, in another the present 'national movement'.

4. While some of the forces in play must exhaust themselves or can be crushed, others contain in themselves the element of growing strength. Bolshevism is in the first category because, in its most ideal form, it is anarchical. Pan-Islamism is in the second. It is specially dangerous for Great Britain because the destruction of British rule over Moslems, even materially beneficent rule, can be represented as a religious ideal.

5. We cannot crush Pan-Islamism any more than we can crush the nationalisms of the West. Our aim must be to divide, to conciliate, and to rule. It is necessary to divide and to conciliate, because we do not want Moslems to rally as a whole round the fundamental but at present half-forgotten principle that Moslems should not be ruled by non-Moslems.

6. The above explains why I have more than once urged—

(a) That the national movement is implacably anti-Entente and anti-British; that we must not lightly think it has lost its strength, which is protean; and that, however reluctant we have been to fight it or even to recognise it as hostile hitherto, we shall *have* to fight it in the end if we want to impose a hard peace on Turkey; and

(b) That on the whole it is not politically desirable to challenge the emnity of the sections of Islam which recognise the Sultan-Caliph coming under the exclusive control of any Power other than Great Britain.

7. Commander Luke's memorandum strengthens my conviction regarding (a). As regards (b) its bearing is this:—I do not feel that any public pronouncement of friendship for Moslems, such as he suggests, would weigh much against the complete destruction of Turkey by depriving her not only of her outlying provinces but also of Constantinople and Smyrna. Considerable sections of Islam would regard the pronouncement as mere hypocrisy, and the withdrawal of Constantinople from Moslem rule as a deliberate blow at Islam. I am inclined to doubt whether even King Hussein and Feisal would now welcome the expulsion of the Sultan from Constantinople.

8. Commander Luke mentions two other specific measures of conciliation, viz., niceness to Ahmed Es-Senussi and early recognition of Azerbaijan. I cannot speak confidently of either. We are awaiting a memorandum from Cairo as to the recent history of the Senussi and can then judge better. In the meantime, I do not think that here in Constantinople Seid Ahmed counts for much, nor do I think his pro-British sentiments amount to more than eagerness to get our help in going home, and a desire to play us off against the Italians. Our attitude to him must be determined by African considerations.

9. I mistrust Azerbaijan politicians profoundly and dislike the idea of giving Azerbaijan any preferential treatment in the matter of recognition. I feel that for a long time to come an independent Azerbaijan will tend to gravitate towards Turkey. I think that pending a general settlement our attitude towards Azerbaijan should be one of amiable reserve.<sup>6</sup>

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE,

December 29, 1919.

<sup>6</sup> The above despatch and enclosures were enclosed in a Foreign Office despatch of February 9, 1920, to Mr. Vansittart in Paris. This despatch, which was not sent owing to Mr. Vansittart's return to London (see No. 680) where he read it, stated notably:

'It has been argued that the Turkish Empire has already been shorn of such enormous territories that to take away Constantinople would further antagonise the Turks without substantially reducing their prestige. This argument seems not only to ignore the prestige derived from the possession of a great city with the historic associations and political importance of Constantinople (Mr. Ryan regards it as the pivot of the danger), but also to ignore the additional prestige which the Turks would derive from such a diplomatic victory. All Islam knows that a struggle is going on about Constantinople, and if the Turks win it, they will be regarded by Islam as people who in spite of a crushing military defeat have successfully defied Europe.'

3. Commander Luke remarks that lenient treatment of the Amir of Afghanistan tends

to make the Moslems believe that they can defy the British Empire. But it must be presumed that this belief would be infinitely stronger if the Turks after their much greater offences remained in Constantinople. The Moslem respects power above all else, and it seems clear that, if she wins this diplomatic victory, Turkey will be assured of a hegemony in Islam which, under the continued direction of the Committee of Union and Progress, she will use for the iconoclastic purposes of the Committee of Union and Progress and Bolsheviks.

'4. With regard to the objection that the ejection of the Turks from Constantinople will produce trouble in India, it must be remembered that the Turks aim at freeing Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, &c., and at asserting their influence in other Moslem countries. Even if they remain at Constantinople, therefore, they must be expected to continue their attempt to subvert the Moslem world. The retention of Constantinople will not satisfy them, but only give them increased strength with which to make the trouble in India which is so much feared.' (A copy of this despatch was transmitted to the India Office.)

### No. 648

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 28)*

*No. 14 [174128/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 4, 1920*

My Lord,

Tewfik Pacha, ex-Grand Vizier, called on the High Commissioner on 1st January and, after wishing the compliments of the Season, spoke at some length about the general situation.

2. Tewfik Pacha said that there had not been any recent change in the internal situation in Turkey since their last meeting some weeks ago. He adverted to the fact that adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress had been elected deputies in various places, but said that some of them had already resigned and that others were likely to do so. On my asking how far deputies of this kind were to be taken as representing the national movement, he avoided a direct answer, but he was at pains in the subsequent conversation to assure him [*sic*] <sup>1</sup> that the National movement did not really reflect the ideas of the country as a whole. He also observed very pointedly that Parliament was being convened for a single purpose, namely, to ratify the peace treaty, and that when this purpose was accomplished there would be no further reason for its existence. Turkey's position *vis-à-vis* of Europe would then be clearly defined, and she could enter on a new era of tranquillity and repose.

3. Admiral de Robeck mentioned to His Highness an incident which had just come to his notice, namely, the arrest by the Russians in the Crimea of two Turkish Officers who had been discovered to be in touch with a German agent there, and whose object appeared to be to establish liaison with the Bolsheviks. One of these was a former Aide-de-Camp of Enver Pacha's, the other a nephew of Mustafa Kemal Pacha's. The Admiral said he attached particular importance to this incident as pointing to the existence of an understanding between the Enver clique and the leaders of the present nationalist movement, and of the desire on the part of both to seek support

<sup>1</sup> Presumably Admiral de Robeck.

in quarters hostile to the Entente. He observed that Mr. Lloyd George had emphasised the fact that the Turkish Peace must be an Allied Peace and must be concluded with the real representatives of Turkey. If the national movement really stood for Turkey, and if its leaders were playing with the idea of a Bolshevik alliance on the eve of the discussion of the Turkish Peace Treaty, the difficulties surrounding the conclusion of peace would be considerably enhanced.

4. Tewfik Pacha begged the High Commissioner to believe that whatever might happen in internal politics, the Government alone still dealt with matters of Foreign Policy in this country, and that the present Government were fully alive to the realities of the situation, and had no intention of being swept along by the national movement into an attitude incompatible with those realities.

5. Admiral de Robeck seized this opportunity of observing that in the Government there was at least one Minister whose attitude was anything but calculated to ease the situation. Only a few days before, he said, he had had occasion, acting jointly with his Allied Colleagues, to present a note to the Porte complaining strongly of the failure of the Minister of War to comply with General Milne's instructions to withdraw to the line laid down by the General, under instructions from the Supreme Council, as the boundary between the Turkish and Greek zones in the Smyrna region (see my despatch No. 2425/M/2613<sup>2</sup> of 30th December, 1919). Tewfik Pacha went off into a discussion of the reasons which made a settlement of this question difficult and of the best means of dealing with it. The Admiral insisted, however, that these were military matters, and did not affect the essential fact of which he was speaking, namely, that on this and other occasions the Minister of War chose to take up an obstructive attitude.

6. Tewfik Pacha admitted that the military element were very difficult to deal with, and said that this was all the more reason for dealing with all questions through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who realized the situation and who could always represent the views of the High Commissioners direct to the Council of Ministers.

7. His Highness went off into a long account of his endeavours in the past to bring about a rapprochement between Great Britain and Turkey on the basis of mutual help. He knew, he said, that the Allies must act together in the question of Peace, but nevertheless what Turkey needed for the future was the support and assistance of a single power and that power should be England.

8. His Highness mentioned a recent conversation with the Sultan in which among other matters the question of his being one of the new peace delegation to Paris had been raised. He said he had impressed on the Sultan the uselessness of his going on such a mission unless he could give some satisfactory account of the situation in Turkey.

9. As Your Lordship is aware, Tewfik Pacha is a very old man, and he varies very much in his power of thinking out, or at any rate expressing, his

<sup>2</sup> No. 643.

political views. On the present occasion he was not in his best form, and the object with which he sought the interview was not clear. The points on which he laid most stress was the unimportance of Parliament for any purpose except that of ratifying peace, and the non-representative character of the national movement. I think he came to us, possibly at the Sultan's suggestion, to counteract the bad impression likely to be created in Europe by the signs of a recrudescence of Union and Progressism in this country, and to convince the High Commissioner that all would be for the best in the best of all possible Turkeys if only England would help.

10. It is significant that in more than one recent conversation with Mr. Ryan, the Grand Vizier has expressed his strong personal conviction that Turkey can only be regenerated by obtaining the moral support of a single power, who should supply her with experts to help in every branch of administration. He admits that any reforms on such a basis would be useless unless the experts were given executive power, and unless Turkey were precluded from getting rid of them or putting them on one side. The Grand Vizier does not seem very clear as to how this could be done, but he waves aside altogether the idea that the existence of a Turkish Parliament would make it even more difficult than it otherwise would be. Tewfik Pacha may have heard of these conversations and have had them in mind when he went out of his way to assure us of the unimportance of Parliament.

11. I need hardly say that in none of these or similar conversations has the smallest hope been held out that His Majesty's Government would consent to occupy the position suggested. My only reason for mentioning them is that I think that the Turkish Government may now be groping about for some scheme of reform, the publication of which would satisfy the Allies of Turkey's intention to regenerate herself. This would be a repetition of the tactics employed on previous occasions, notably on the eve of the signature of the Treaty of Paris.<sup>3</sup> I doubt, however, whether the present rulers of Turkey, surrounded by difficulties of every description, and hampered by the coldness of the one power whose help would be most useful to them, are capable of devising a scheme which would even have the appearance of practicability.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

<sup>3</sup> Treaty of 1856: text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xlvi, p. 8.

#### No. 649

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 6)*

*No. 13 Telegraphic [168172/70100/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 5, 1920

I have just seen in print<sup>1</sup> Sir E. Crowe's despatch to your Lordship 2199<sup>2</sup> of November 26th and M. Venezelos' letter to Sir E. Crowe enclosed therein.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. in Confidential Print of recent diplomatic correspondence circulated to His Majesty's Missions abroad.

<sup>2</sup> No. 606.

I realise that only question at issue in this correspondence is whether Supreme Council explicitly notified M. Venezelos of provisional character of occupation at moment of deciding on it. I can have no views on this point but I consider it important to bear in mind that here on the spot and at moment of occupation Greeks themselves publicly proclaimed that occupation [in no way]<sup>3</sup> prejudged final fate of Smyrna (area).

See paragraphs 3 and 5 of enclosure No. 5 in report from British Naval Commander-in-Chief to Secretary of Admiralty Z 273-5505<sup>4</sup> of May 20th, 1919.

My reason for emphasising this is that correspondence mentioned above excites some little apprehension lest report of Greek Government's intention to proclaim annexation of Smyrna should after all be well-founded.

I still think this report most improbable but matter deserves some attention from His Majesty's Government as any such action on the part of Greek Government would enormously complicate situation in Asia Minor on eve of presentation of peace terms to Turks.<sup>5</sup>

Situation is already quite bad enough. Everything points to difficulty being encountered in imposition of such settlement involving partition of Turkey proper or serious curtailment of its independence. Opinions differ as to whether physical force movement associated with name of Mustapha Kemal, but now again directed from Ministry of War here, is declining, but it is still very important fact and it is only one weapon which will be used to contest decisions of Conference. Every effort is being made to work up Islamic sentiment for same purpose. If Turkish parliament assembles it will be used as means of pressure on Government. Lastly Christian population in interior may become in much more definite sense than [than] heretofore hostages in hands of Turks.

<sup>3</sup> These three words were omitted in error in the original text and were included in a repetition from Constantinople of this passage on January 11, 1920.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 1572 of January 10, 1920, to Sir E. Crowe in Paris stated in this connexion: 'We would call special attention to this rumour about which Italians are also concerned.' Constantinople telegram No. 23 of January 8 (received and repeated to the British Peace Delegation in Paris on January 10) transmitted a further report on this subject communicated to the Allied High Commissioners by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs late on January 6. This telegram stated: 'According to this new report, Greek troops at Smyrna acting doubtless on . . . [text uncertain] instigation from Greece, in collusion with Greek natives, intend to dismiss their officers, and to proclaim independence of Smyrna area on January 14th. Porte sees in this project, obvious idea of "following example set up by certain recent events", (? Greece) leading public opinion of world to believe that declaration of independence is manifestation of popular will, and that independent Smyrna will have no connection with Greece. Porte expresses hope that preventive measures may be taken against any such eventuality.'

No. 650

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 28)*

No. 25 [174137/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 6, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of a letter,<sup>1</sup> dated 29th December, which I have received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, enclosing translation of a protest by the Vali of Smyrna, relative to the plight of the Ottoman refugees who have been evicted from their homes by the Greeks in the occupied area of the Aidin Vilayet.

2. An agreement on the subject of the exchange of population, to which the Vali refers in his letter, was being arranged between Turkey and Greece early in 1914, but I understand that it was never signed, negotiations having been finally broken off when the Turks started fresh expulsions of Greeks. The existence of such an agreement is denied by the Greek Government.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 650

*Copy*

*Translation*

*Vilayet of Aidin*

14. 12. 19.

No. 75279.

952.

To:—The British Headquarters.

According to the clauses of the agreement concluded before the War between the Ottoman and Greek Governments and which was later notified by the Representatives of the Entente Powers the Greeks from the cazas of Cheshme, Focka, Pergama, Karaburun and Menemen leaving for Greece, could not come back to Turkey. However, after the signature of the Armistice they began to return, firstly in small parties and during the last months in large numbers, dislodging the Turkish population and establishing themselves. Thus the Turks, being obliged to seek a refuge in Smyrna or other places, find themselves in the streets. The question of the exchange of the population was from the beginning embodied in a treaty. They do not consider that the violation or the transformation of this treaty depends in the least on the initiation of another agreement. Moreover, the return of these Greek refugees and their manner of dislodging the Turks is even encouraged by the Greek army of occupation. The Turkish refugees, being homeless, are in great misery. The Entente Powers will undoubtedly find this state of things in opposition to the rights of justice; and as our police forces are not

<sup>1</sup> This short covering letter is not printed.

present in the occupied districts to protect Ottoman interests, I am obliged to draw your attention to this important question. I hope that the rights of my Government, which are protected by a special treaty, will not be violated, and that thus the Turkish refugees will not perish during this winter.

The Vali  
IZZET

No. 651

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 28)*  
*No. 31 [174143/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 6, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 2014/M. 2335<sup>1</sup> of 30th October, enclosing papers received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, which gave details of the present strength and dispositions of the Ottoman Army and estimates of the military resources available in Turkey, I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a schedule<sup>2</sup> showing the establishment of personnel and scales of armament to which the Ottoman Army, by order of General Milne, is required to conform during the period of the Armistice.

2. From a comparison of these two sets of papers, showing respectively what the Ottoman Army should dispose of in men and material, and what that army actually does dispose of, it appears that:—

- (a) By General Milne's instructions, the Ottoman Army was not to consist of more than 53,000 men. On the 18th October, its strength is given as 43,000. To this must be added the national bands, which by an estimate dated 18th October (probably somewhat exaggerated), are given as consisting of 15,000 men. The total strength of the army may therefore be taken as 58,000 men on that date.
- (b) The total artillery allowed to the Ottoman Army by General Milne's instructions is 256 guns of various calibres. The Turkish Army possess this number, and there are in addition 236 breech blocks which have not been surrendered. It is not clear whether these are all available to the Turks, but if so, this would give them a possible total of 492 guns available in different parts of the country.
- (c) The number of machine guns allowed to the army is 240. The Turks possess this number and, of those available at the time of the armistice, a further 676 have not been accounted for.
- (d) The Turks have, in various parts of the country, at least 17 million rounds of S.A.A. and 350,000 shells, in their possession.

3. I understand that up till the time of the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the disarmament of the Turkish Army was progressing satisfactorily, and a large number of warlike stores had been, and were, on the point of being

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed: see below.

surrendered to the Allies. One of the results of that occupation was that the handing over of arms, &c., practically ceased, and it is owing to this reason that there is such a considerable discrepancy between the armistice, and the actual, establishment of warlike material in possession of the Turks.

4. As the potential military resources of the Turkish Empire have a direct bearing on the present situation, and on the question of rendering effective the peace terms which it is proposed to impose on Turkey, I have the honour, in this connection, to invite Your Lordship's attention to my despatch No. 2384/M. 2630<sup>3</sup> of 23rd December 1919, which reviewed, in a general way, the military forces of which the Allies at present dispose in this country.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

<sup>3</sup> No. 635.

### No. 652

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 28)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 28 [174140/151671/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 6, 1920

My Lord,

In view of the possibility of an Anglo-French Condominium in what is to be left to Turkey, a suggestion which has appeared in the Turkish press seems to me worth reporting as likely to facilitate a partition of spheres of influence which would satisfy our preponderating commercial and industrial interests.

2. The suggestion referred to above, which has been put forward from the Turkish point of view, quite apart from any question of foreign spheres of influence, proposes the creation of a Ministry of National Economy to deal with the development of the resources of the country.

3. I understand that a Ministry under this title actually exists in Greece; and I am informed that before the war the idea was carried out here in the appointment of the late Sir Richard Crawford as economic adviser.

4. The creation of such a Ministry would permit British control, as a counterpoise to the control of the Ministry of Finance, which will certainly be claimed by the French.

5. The division of work between the two Ministries would be as follows:—

- (a) *Ministry of Finance*: (under French control), collection of revenue (presumably through the agency of an extended Public Debt Administration) and preparation of the budget.
- (b) *Ministry of National Economy*: (under British control) would have under it the following departments dealing with the development of the national resources:—
  - i. Commerce and Industry.
  - ii. Mines.

<sup>1</sup> A brief summary of this despatch was sent to the Foreign Office in Constantinople telegram No. 17 of January 6, 1920 (received January 7).

- iii. Agriculture.
- iv. Forests.
- v. Supplies.
- vi. Communications or Transport. Railways.  
Roads.  
Sea and Inland Water Transport.

It will be necessary to employ foreign directors of these departments, and it is suggested that mines, agriculture and forests should be under French direction, the other three departments under British. It is most important that the direction of Communications should be British.

6. I consider it absolutely essential that the control of the Custom House should be in British hands. The overwhelming preponderance of our import trade is ample justification for insisting on this. The Custom House should be made an independent department, as it was in old Turkish days, and it must be given the control of all quays, warehouses, lighterage, and all that appertains to the discharge of cargo and the clearing of goods.

7. *The Ministry of Public Works* should control tramways, ports, lighting, irrigation, water works, &c. As a set off to our control of the Customs it may be necessary to concede this Ministry to the French; but the directors of the departments of ports and irrigation should be British.

8. *The Ministry of Interior*, including the gendarmerie and police, should be under British Control. As a set off it will be necessary to leave the *Ministry of Justice* to the French but subject to the scheme already sent home for the appointment of judges of all three Allied Nations in the mixed courts.

9. The above scheme is put forward on the assumption that there will be a supreme authority consisting of the British and French High Commissioners. It would be useful for several reasons to add to them the Grand Vizier or Turkish Prime Minister. It would be a sop to Turkish national feeling, and it might on occasions prove useful to avoid a deadlock.

10. No concession of any kind, whether for the construction of railways, ports, or other public works, or for the exploitation of mines, forests, &c., should be granted without the consent of this supreme authority.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

### No. 653

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 9)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 22 Telegraphic [169173/151671/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 8, 1920

Surmise in last paragraph of my despatch No. 14<sup>2</sup> of January 14<sup>3</sup> (*sic!*) which is now on its way to you has been confirmed.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was on January 9 repeated by the Foreign Office to Paris whither Lord Curzon had proceeded with Mr. Lloyd George on a visit: cf. Volume II, Chap. II. (The date of receipt given for this and ensuing telegrams, also despatches, was that of receipt in the Foreign Office.)      <sup>2</sup> No. 648.      <sup>3</sup> In error for January 4: see No. 648.

Following is summary of note addressed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the three Allied and American High Commissioners on January 6 with request that conditions contained in it may be submitted to attention of Peace Conference full text of which has been already published in local Press.

Ottoman Government while realising the situation in which war has left Turkey considers right of political existence of a people cannot be impaired by defeat in war and invokes principles enunciated by President Wilson and accepted by Allies. Any solution prejudicial to unity and sovereignty would result in an endless succession of disturbances in the East.

Failure of reforms which Turkey has attempted to introduce on previous occasions was due to unfortunate circumstances. Porte is now sincerely anxious to adopt new organization on basis of judicial financial and police reform, and guaranteeing rights of minorities.

Porte is ready to accept assistance of one of the Great Powers in this task in such a manner as neither to encroach on Turkish independence nor offend national pride.

Note encloses for . . .<sup>4</sup> formation of 'Corps d'Inspection Judiciaire' and announces that drafts of reforms in other administrative departments will follow.

Main features of proposals for judicial reforms are

1. Institution of Corps of Inspectors consisting entirely of foreigners.
2. Creation of grand Council at Ministry of Justice mainly Turkish and
3. Appointment of foreign Director General with two assistant and provincial agents who may also be foreigners to supervise native 'police judiciaire'.

It is proposed to invest foreign element in this scheme with certain limited executive functions.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is uncertain.

#### No. 654

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 10)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 24 Telegraphic [169544/151671/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 9, 1920

Your telegram No. 1909.<sup>2</sup>

Disclosures of *Journal de[s Débats]*<sup>3</sup> regarding conversations about Constantinople became public here on January 2nd *Pall Mall Gazette* statement on same subject<sup>4</sup> was published here next day.

As former paper, at any rate as quoted here, threw on Mr. Lloyd George responsibility for proposal to transfer capital from Constantinople, and as latter represents him as going to Paris with perfectly clear plan based on

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated by the Foreign Office to the British Peace Delegation in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> No. 644.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was noted on the original that the reference was to the *Journal des Débats*.

<sup>4</sup> See below.

that principle, net result (is to suggest) to people here that Great Britain is thrusting this solution on Allies. Indeed *Temps* is quoted as having said that British view has prevailed over that of French who desired to maintain Turks here.

This impression is . . . er<sup>5</sup> because other things being equal, any British utterance attracts more attention than French. One local paper speaks of *Pall Mall Gazette* as semi-official.

If Turks (?) are to be ejected from Constantinople it is most desirable no doubt should be allowed to subsist as to perfect solidarity of Allies for twofold reason. First, it is not fair that any Ally should seek to gain cheap (? credit) with (?) ruler(s) of future Turkish State on pretence of having been opposed to common decision. Secondly, and more important, nothing could more stimulate schemes for resistance to (?) decisions of . . .<sup>6</sup> than idea that they were not wholehearted and unanimous.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read: 'impression is all the greater because . . .' &c.

<sup>6</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the reading here should be 'decisions of Peace Conference' &c.

## No. 655

*Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup> to Admiral Webb (Constantinople)*

*No. 25 Telegraphic [167965/521/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 9, 1920

General Milne has made following recommendations to War Office:—

1. That on military grounds Turkish Minister of war Jemal and Chief of Staff Jevad who are actively organising bands should be removed.

2. That Supreme War Council should as preliminary condition of peace demand surrender of any Turk charged by an Allied Commander-in-Chief of any zone with breach of military clauses of armistice.

Please telegraph your views.

<sup>1</sup> Lord Hardinge was in charge of the Foreign Office during Lord Curzon's absence in Paris (see No. 653, note 1).

## No. 656

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 12)*

*No. 31 Telegraphic [169568/151671/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 10, 1920

My telegram No. 22.<sup>1</sup>

French High Commissioner told me on January 8th that he took strongest exception to action of the Porte. He, like myself, had seen text of Note (?) in press before official text reached him. He considered this precipitate publication or indeed any publication, without concurrence of High Commissioner

<sup>1</sup> No. 653.

to whom Note was addressed, to be grave breach of diplomatic correctness, moreover he resented pretention of Porte to put forward their own views of future settlement in Note expressly intended for perusal of Peace Conference, before Conference had given any sign of intentions or invited any expression of Turkish views.

French High Commissioner again raised question at meeting of H.H.C.C.<sup>2</sup> on January 9. French High Commissioner proposed collective Note to Porte embodying his point of view. He insisted on it all the more because he believed courtesy of procedure of Porte to have been (? semi-official)<sup>3</sup> intention as Note had been kept secret till eve of publication and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who had called at High Commissions on other business late January 8th had made no mention of it.

I entirely agreed with essence of what French High Commissioner said. Italian High Commissioner also agreed, though with obvious reluctance. There was difference of opinion however as to whether publication of Note without consultation with us was theoretically incorrect as matter of diplomatic procedure. It was decided to modify French High Commissioner's draft Note so as to glide over this (? point) without mitigation of severity of rebuke. Modified collective Note was sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs today. Text<sup>4</sup> follows by bag. Gist of it is contained in last paragraph of which following is abridged translation.

'In these circumstances High Commissioners, while not proposing to publish present documents as they would be entitled to do, (? inform) Porte that they consider null and void Note under reference of which their Governments will in any case have been sufficiently apprised of communication of press [sic].'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> High Commissioners.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that this was in error for 'deliberate'.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> It was suggested on the original that this passage should read '. . . apprised by communication in press'.

## No. 657

*Earl Granville (Athens) to Earl Curzon (Received January 17)*

*No. 9 Telegraphic [171544/70100/44]*

*ATHENS, January 10, 1920*

I read to Minister for Foreign Affairs today Constantinople telegram No. 23<sup>1</sup> of January 8th. He had not heard this version before, but he had heard that a rumour was current at Constantinople, originating, he believed, from Italian sources, that annexation of Smyrna to Greece was to be proclaimed on January 14th. He presumed he need not assure me that unless present Greek Government had fallen, any such action so entirely contrary to all their conduct hitherto was out of the question. As regards this new version, I

<sup>1</sup> See No. 649, note 5.

suggested remote possibility that a kind of (? Royalist) plot might exist to attempt something of the sort with a view to discrediting and embarrassing M. Venezelos. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that such a thing was morally quite possible, but actually not, as Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna had given him most confident and satisfactory assurances of discipline and reliability of Greek troops in Asia Minor.

Repeated to Constantinople.

### No. 658

*Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup> (Received January 15)*

*No. 2 [170654/151671/44]*

*PARIS, January 12, 1920*

Mr. Vansittart presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to transmit copy of a paper communicated by M. Berthelot on the 11th January, respecting conditions of peace with Turkey.

#### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 658

*Note communicated to Earl Curzon by M. Berthelot, January 11, 1920*

(Translation)

#### *Peace with Turkey*

In breaking the peace and the treaties which assured its territorial integrity and its sovereignty, Turkey has freed the Allied Powers from every other obligation other than respect for the guiding rules of their own policy, which are besides in accordance with the general principles of justice. In closing the Straits, Turkey cut the communications of Russia with the Allies, caused Russia's political and military dissolution, and prolonged the war with all its disasters; such a catastrophe cannot be allowed to be renewed.

The following principles appear to be those which should govern the settlement of the Eastern question.

1. The maintenance of an independent Turkish State, composed of the provinces inhabited by a majority of Turkish elements and placed under the sovereignty of the Sultan, remains decided.
2. No mandates and no spheres of political influence will be accorded to any specific Power in the Ottoman Empire as constituted by the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
3. Turkish militarism will be suppressed like Prussian militarism; neither the Turkish army nor the Turkish fleet will be maintained.
4. The absolute freedom of the Straits will be ensured; guardianship over them, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, will be entrusted to an international organisation safeguarding the effective neutrality of the passage.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. to the Foreign Office in charge of Lord Hardinge, Lord Curzon being at that time in Paris (see No. 653, note 1).

5. The Armenians will be entirely free from the Turkish domination and constituted as an independent State.
6. The Arab and Syrian populations cannot be replaced under the Turkish yoke.
7. The rights of minorities represented by numerous peoples of different race and religion will be scrupulously guaranteed by a special treaty placed under the specific guardianship of the League of Nations, which will affirm their right to keep their civil and religious status, their educational and philanthropic establishments, and complete political equality.
8. The reform of Turkish administration (administration, justice, finance, gendarmerie) will be guaranteed by the control of the interested Powers.

Peace with Turkey offers four principal problems:

- (A) Constantinople and the Straits.
- (B) Anatolia and Asia Minor.
- (C) Armenia.
- (D) Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.<sup>2</sup>

(A) *Constantinople and the Straits*

Two solutions are possible: the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople or the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

From the point of view of ethics and history, the eviction from Europe of a State which has remained barren and incapable of progress, and is based on the right of conquest and the oppression of different races and superior civilisations, represents a victory for right. Moreover, the loss of Constantinople would mark in Moslem eyes the definite eclipse of that mysterious power which the possession of Constantinople entrusted to the descendants of Osman over the Moslem peoples dependent on England and France. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks marked the end of the Middle Ages. Their exodus from Constantinople would signalise the birth of a new epoch. To these arguments of philosophy one may add the difficulty of guarding the Straits without a considerable military force and without a very large expenditure if Constantinople and its 800,000 inhabitants remain in the hands of the Sultan, and consequently within the reach of the intrigues of a Germany militarily reconstituted, and perhaps supported by Russia.

The doctrine of the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople has numerous supporters, especially in France, because the development of the latter's material and moral interests in Turkey is larger than that of any other Power (although England had in 1913 more than a quarter of the whole trade of Turkey, and more than double that of any other Power). France possesses in Turkey the bulk of railway capital and of undertakings of private and public interest, in which, before 1914, she had invested more than 3 milliards; she possesses a great part of the Ottoman Public Debt, and had

<sup>2</sup> Section (D) was not included in the filed copy of this note. (Cf. No. 398.)

exercised a preponderating influence in the administration of the so-called assigned revenues and in that of the tobacco *régie*. Her moral influence was safeguarded and propagated by hundreds of schools and philanthropic institutions, religious as well as secular, distributed throughout the towns of the Ottoman Empire. The continuance of the old Turkey is for the rest a system the simplicity of which pleases many practical-minded men, and which may appease the susceptibility of a reconstituted Russia. Even in England a large number of those interested in politics, impressed by consideration for Moslems of India, are opposed to the idea of removing the Caliph from his secular capital. Lastly, the military leaders of the Allied Powers and the Allied Commissioners at Constantinople are unanimous in drawing the attention of the Heads of their Governments to the growing power of nationalist feeling in Turkey, to the organisation of the army of Mustapha Kemal in Anatolia, to the weakness owing to demobilisation of the Allied forces on the spot and of other available troops, and to the extreme difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of making the Turks accept, without a large military expedition, the decision of the Allies, which is to expel from Europe the Ottoman Empire and Caliph.

In view of the considerable weight behind each of these two theories, there would appear to be room for contemplating successively both hypotheses.

### *1. The Establishment of a State of Constantinople and the Straits.*

In the event of the Powers deciding to drive back the Ottoman State into Asia in order to ensure the freedom of the Straits, it would be possible to create a State of Constantinople and the Straits, comprising in Europe the territory situated between the Sea of Marmora and the line Enos-Midia (or confined to the Chatalja lines), and in Asia only the Asiatic shore of the Straits of the Bosphorus (with a frontier running from Shile on the north to Ismid on the south) and of the Dardanelles (with a frontier running from Tenedos and following a line about 50 kilom. from the coast), the Asiatic shore and (*sic*) the Sea of Marmora remaining Turkish. All the islands between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean would be included in the State.

The new State would be placed in a general way under the high protection of the League of Nations. It would be neutralised. The fortifications would be destroyed (to an extent to be fixed by a Military and Naval Inter-Allied Commission), and a zone to a depth of 30 kilom. would be demilitarised on the Asiatic shores.

The administration of the State would at first be organised and directed by a Government Commission ('Commission de Gouvernement'), representing the most interested Powers. This Commission would be composed of two delegates of each of the great Mediterranean Powers (France, England, Italy), to which could be added subsequently the United States, if it desires to participate, and Russia, as soon as the latter Power should have been entirely reconstituted, and one delegate for Greece, one for Roumania, and ultimately one for Turkey.

In the event of a persistent difference of opinion between the members of the Commission the question at issue might be carried, by a vote of two-thirds of the delegates, before the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

The Chairman of the Commission would hold office for two consecutive years; he would be alternatively French and English, on account of the predominant material, intellectual and moral interests of France and England in the Ottoman Empire. The chairmanship might, however, after a period of eight years, be entrusted to one of the other Great Powers to whom the chairmanship would fall by rotation by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Commission.

The Commission would establish the necessary administrations and regulations, would nominate Government officials, and would examine a draft constitution as well as a judicial system to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

The administration would be made as simple as possible, and the Departments reduced to the following:

- (a) Ministry of the Interior (including Public Works, Education, Health, Posts, and Telegraphs).
- (b) Ministry of Finance (and Commerce).
- (c) Ministry of Justice.
- (d) Ministry of Defence (and Peace).

The Commission would exercise the command over the military and naval forces charged with policing the State of Constantinople and guarding the Straits. The strength of these forces would be fixed by the interested principal Allied Powers, and might be eventually modified subsequently by the Commission.

These forces would consist chiefly of a gendarmerie on land, and a naval defence force (both inter-Allied), their strength being such as to enable them to keep order and resist a sudden attack, coming whether from Europe or from Asia, sufficiently long to allow the English and French fleets to intervene.

The State would receive, within a period and in a form compatible with the general organisation of its administration, elective institutions placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. All residents in the State would enjoy complete civil and political equality whatever might be their race or religion.

Should the resources of the State be insufficient at first to defray the expenses of its administration (which expenses would have to be carefully reduced to a minimum), the upkeep of naval and military forces, its own share of the Ottoman Debt and the obligations undertaken by Turkey, the Powers represented on the Commission for Government would have to consider how best they could assist it, either by means of money advances or by the transfer of other guarantees to Turkey's creditors.

From the religious point of view, all mosques would be respected. St. Sophia alone would be set apart and respected as a monument of antiquity,

no religious services being allowed therein (unless services of various religions were celebrated there turn about).

The Commission for Government of the State of Constantinople and the Straits would be entirely independent of the Ottoman State in Asiatic Turkey, and would take no part in the supervision exercised by the Powers with regard to the finance, justice, and gendarmerie of such State, which would be sovereign and independent.

All care would be taken when transferring the seat of government from Constantinople and detaching the same from the Turkish State, all facilities being given to retiring high officials, and the task of provisioning and supply being carried out with care. The principles laid down by the Allies with regard to reparation would be applied to the personal property of the Sultan, as well as to private property in Constantinople and throughout the whole of the new State.

*2. Constantinople to remain as Capital of the Turkish State.*

Should this be the case, the general principles set forth above would apply to European Turkey, as well as to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire in Asia. It would only be necessary to provide for:

- (a) An inter-Allied force of about 30,000 men (one-third each being supplied by the French, the English, and the Italians). Its task would be to guarantee the absolute liberty of the Straits and to occupy the points decided on by military experts, but which should not include Constantinople, where no Turkish troops could be maintained other than the Sultan's small personal guard.
- (b) The limitation of the Turkish State in Europe to a very restricted hinterland to the capital, which should not go beyond the Chatalja lines (to which Greek sovereignty would extend, to balance its limitations in Smyrna), in order to respect the principles of nominal Turkish sovereignty and to facilitate the withdrawal of the Italian troops of occupation.
- (c) Application of administrative reform and of Allied control over the State of European Turkey.
- (d) The proposed formation of an International Straits Company, to be formed by the fusion of the French and foreign companies interested in all matters concerning navigation in the Straits. The inevitable development of traffic throughout the East after the conclusion of peace makes it possible to consider a scheme which would permanently internationalise communications between the Ægean and the Black Sea. Such internationalisation cannot fail to facilitate the settlement of questions concerning the hinterland of these communications by sea.

The board of the company would be assisted by a commission composed of delegates of the interested Powers (or their representatives at Constantinople), which would form a supervisory commission. The funds required to defray

the expenses of such a company would be furnished by supplementary taxes on navigation and trade, which would be settled by international agreement.

(B) *Anatolia and Asia Minor*

The Ottoman Empire, whether existing in Europe or not, will continue to exist in Asia Minor under the national Osmanli dynasty.

Its territory will be bounded as follows:—

1. To the north, by the Black Sea as far as the Lazistan frontier (to be assigned to Georgia) to the east of Trebizond.
2. To the west (by the enclaves assigned to the State of Constantinople on the borders of Asia, of the Bosphorus, and of the Dardanelles),<sup>3</sup> or by the Asiatic side of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmora, then by the Mediterranean as far as the Cilician frontier (the Lama-su River).
3. To the south, by the course of the Lama-su, the Chamarlu Dagh, the division of the rivers beyond Bulgar Dagh, as far as Uch Kapular Dagh, then a line corresponding to the boundaries of the vilayets and marked out by the Kisil Dagh, the Hezanli, and the Belli Gedik Dagh, as far as the Tokhma-su, then the course of the latter and that of the Euphrates downstream as far as the boundary of the vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Aziz and the Diarbekir, then the boundary of such vilayets as far as the Upper Euphrates (Murad-su), and thence downstream until its juncture with the Munzur-su.
4. To the east, along the Munzur-su as far as its source and along the Munzur Dagh, then by a line starting from the eastern end of the Munzur Dagh (Merjan Dagh), rejoining the Black Sea to the east of Trebizond by the Kara Dera river, this town being left to Turkey, together with Erzinjan and the road which runs between the two, and also Kharput. Erzeroum would belong to the new Armenian State and Argana-Maden to the territory for which the French will receive a mandate.

The capital (in which the Sultan would reside) would either be Koniah, Angora, or Broussa (if Constantinople were not retained as capital).

The Ottoman Empire would retain its parliamentary institutions, which would be adapted to new circumstances by the following reforms:—

1. *Military and Naval Reforms.*—The Turkish army and navy to be done away with, as well as the Ottoman War and Naval Ministries. The Turkish gendarmerie would be reinforced, commanded and instructed by Allied instructors, and placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.

2. *Legal Reforms.*—The Ottoman Court to be reconstituted an Inter-Allied Commission, the seat of which would be in Turkey, and which would make use of the work already done in this direction by the Paris Conference and the Allied delegations in Constantinople.

<sup>3</sup> Parentheses as in original.

After the application of these reforms the Capitulations (which would remain in force during the interregnum) would be abrogated.

3. *Financial Reforms*.—It will be impossible for Turkey to carry out her obligations to the Allies without financial control, or even to exist; supervision of all sources of revenue and of the distribution of income are equally necessary. An Inter-Allied Commission (composed of French and English representatives, Italy having no Turkish interests and not having declared war on Turkey,<sup>4</sup> which means that no war expenditure has been incurred by her in that country. She will, therefore, have very little to claim before the Reparations Commission, as her nationals have suffered no damage) shall be entrusted with preparing these reforms and organising supervision by the Powers on the following bases:—

- (a) The Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall concern itself both with finance and with currency. The Ottoman Budget and all financial laws shall be submitted to it for approval before being laid before the Ottoman Parliament.

The Commission shall be charged with all currency questions and shall supervise all State payments.

- (b) The former Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, which has shown proof of integrity and usefulness and which presents the interests of foreign holders, shall have its powers extended and shall be entrusted with the collection of taxes. For this purpose it shall be attached to the Turkish Ministry for Finance and shall be given instructions by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. It will be difficult to alter the present rules and regulations for the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, seeing that they are the result of an agreement between its creditors and the Ottoman State made with the approval and sanction of the Powers; it would be unable to act without the revenues at present granted. It will in all probability have its principal offices at Constantinople.

4. *Administrative Powers*.—Administrative control will be ensured by the presence of three delegates (English, French, Italian), whose counter-signature will be necessary, in each Ministerial Department (except the purely political ones, such as the Grand Vizirate and Foreign Affairs). The controllers will meet in council twice a month under the presidency of the Grand Vizier to examine administrative and financial questions.

5. *Protection of Minorities*.—The particular rights of the numerous populations of different race and religion scattered in Asia Minor will be guaranteed by a special treaty framed in accordance with the principles adopted in the Treaties for the Protection of Minorities already signed in 1919 (by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Serbia, Greece), but adapted to the special needs of Turkey.

This treaty will establish for these populations the right to preserve their civil and religious status, their scholastic and hospital establishments, and

<sup>4</sup> Cf., however, No. 6, note 4.

even, if this seems convenient, their jurisdiction so far as concerns litigation arising in each community in connection with civil and religious status, the persons concerned being entitled in case of need to choose between their special tribunals and the new tribunals whose organisation is proposed.

The exercise of these rights will be guaranteed by the international control of Turkish reform and by the intervention of the League of Nations, which must be carefully defined.

## 6. Situation of Europeans.

(a) *Greek Occupation of Smyrna*.—The Greek troops have occupied Smyrna in consequence of the decision of the Supreme Council, which was due to the disorder and abuses which reigned there, and must only leave the town gradually.

It will be necessary, while respecting the nominal Turkish sovereignty and assuring full liberty of commerce in this port of exit which is so important in Anatolia, to assure a special position for the Greeks in the administration of the town of Smyrna. This port will be constituted a free port under Inter-Allied control. Greece will receive a predominant part in the exercise of military and judicial control in the sanjak of Smyrna, with the exception of the financial control established for the whole of Turkey, which must not be sub-divided.

On the other hand, Greece should receive compensation in Europe by the attribution to her in full sovereignty of Adrianople and Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, the frontier of the State of Constantinople, perhaps even up to the line of Tchataldja, access to the sea being assured to the Bulgarians under the control of a European Commission.

The Greeks would in addition have a share in the governing Commission of Constantinople (in the case of a separate State being constituted there) and will receive doubtless the Dodecanese and Cyprus.

(b) *Italian Occupation of Southern Anatolia (Scala-Nova, Adalia, Koniah)*.—The Italian troops, who are provisionally in occupation of a part of Asia Minor, have not been summoned there by the Allies, and have, on the contrary, called forth written observations by the British, American, and French Governments, and a refusal by the Conference to recognise the legitimacy of this occupation.

The withdrawal of these troops will, in addition, be easily obtained, as well as that of the Greek troops, in consequence of the organisation of the Ottoman State of Turkey in Asia and the control exercised over it by the Great Powers.

The Italians, who have made an agreement with the Greeks for the return of the Dodecanese,<sup>5</sup> and who will have a share in the governing Commission of the State of Constantinople, as well as in the financial, judicial, and military control of Turkey in Asia, will receive as compensation for the withdrawal of their soldiers economic advantages which might consist in a right of priority over all commercial enterprises in Southern Anatolia as well as in a Franco-Italian agreement for the coal mines of Heraclea.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 17, note 2.

(c) The French occupation in Syria-Cilicia, which is the result of an Anglo-French agreement and of decisions of the Conference, implies for strategic and economic reasons the possession of the passes of the Taurus, the historical defence of Syria. The French Government is disposed to organise the administration of Cilicia in such a way as to ensure to the Turkish majority of the population, as well as to the Armenian minority, their rights and the largest measure of protection.

#### (C) Armenia

Armenia will be constituted a completely independent republic under the high protection of the League of Nations.

It will be composed essentially by the reunion of the Russian Armenian Republic (which comprises about 1,500,000 Armenians) and of the former Turkish Armenia where it will be necessary to bring back the greatest possible number of the 500,000 Armenians dispersed in Asia Minor, at Constantinople, in the United States, in Persia, in Bulgaria, &c. In this way there will by degrees be reconstituted in reasonable limits what was formerly the Kingdom of Great Armenia; it may be remarked, that of all the States which are endeavouring to establish control on the Russian frontier, an independent Armenia is that which the Russians are most prepared to recognise.

The territory of the Republic of Armenia would comprise:

1. The existing territory of the Armenian Republic of Erivan, including the districts of Bochelie, of Upper Kanbak and Zanguezour, which are at present contested by the States of Georgia and Azerbaijan.
2. The Turkish Empire: the eastern portion of the vilayet of Erzeroum, including the town and district of Erzeroum, the plain of Mouch, the district of Bitlis, and the region of Lake Van, up to the Persian frontier. The frontiers of Armenia with the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, with Turkey, with the French zone and Kurdistan, will be traced on the spot by an Inter-Allied Commission.

The Council of the League of Nations will be charged to take action in order to give the Republic of Armenia the assistance in relation to supplies and money which one might attempt to obtain from the public, and in particular the American public, by interesting them in the fate of these unhappy peoples.

A force, which may be estimated at a minimum of 5,000 and a maximum of 20,000 men, to be organised in mixed detachments, seems necessary for the maintenance of order in Armenia. This force might be organised by officers supplied by the Allies, under the direction of the League of Nations, which would act by means of voluntary recruiting.

Since the territory of Armenia has no direct access to the sea, or at least does not include any port, the relations of the new State to the other countries will be assured by transit conventions between Armenia and the States which surround it, and by the establishment of Batoum as an independent free city, under the guardianship of the League of Nations. This constitution, similar

to that of Danzig, would guarantee to Armenia and to the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan the use of the port of Batoum.

Armenia would be directly connected with this port, which is its natural outlet, by being linked up to the Tauris-Djoulfa-Chakhtakti-Bouddachine Railway by a branch line between Tauris, over the mountain chains of Northern Persia, and the Black Sea. Armenia would also be connected with Constantinople, towards which the traffic of its valleys was directed in the nineteenth century by the linking up of the line from Erzeroum to Angora, and with the Mediterranean by a branch line towards Alexandretta, which would be connected with the line from Bagdad by Diarbekr and Mardin, the existing southern terminus.

The idea has been considered of attaching the Greek province of Pontus to Armenia and giving it Trebizond as an outlet, but this solution will not stand examination, for in the vilayet of Trebizond the Mahomedan element represents 80 per cent. of the population, and the country must remain Turkish as even the Greeks are of opinion. The construction of a railway from Erzeroum to Trebizond is practically impossible in consequence of the mountainous character of the country, and in addition such a line would never pay expenses.

The great difficulty in establishing Armenia is that the Armenians practically nowhere constitute a majority; the great objection to attributing to them countries such as Cilicia, where there is a strong national nucleus, situated more than 400 kilom. from Armenia, is that such an extension would certainly result in placing the Armenians in a definite minority in their State, and that when a genuine consultation of the inhabitants took place they would elect a majority of representatives hostile to the Armenians. One must never lose sight of the fact that it is further from the historical Armenia to the Mediterranean than from Switzerland to Clette, and that there are on the way only isolated groups of Armenians in a population with an enormous majority and implacably hostile. Reality and logic are equally opposed to the dream of a Great Armenia stretching from Trebizond to Alexandretta.

But in order to create the united Armenia which we have defined, of which half (Turkish Armenia) is still only a theoretical conception, it will be necessary first of all to protect the grouped elements of Russian Armenia against a Tartar and Kurdish population which is extremely hostile, then to bring back into Armenia from the four corners of Turkey and the world several hundred thousand of Armenians who are scattered, and little inclined to leave their businesses, to spend hundreds of millions to rebuild the destroyed villages, to remake the roads, to reconstruct the railways, to ensure the feeding of the population in a region which is absolutely ruined and deserted, and finally to defend the new inhabitants against an energetic Kurdo-Turkish population which has seized the land, a task which is particularly difficult, because the long slavery which Armenia has suffered has deprived her of confidence in herself. With the assistance of America and of the League of Nations this problem, which is very difficult, even in the most reduced form, can no doubt be resolved.

*Letter from Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris) to Mr. Kidston  
(Received January 15)*

*Unnumbered [170485/151671/44]*

PARIS, January 13, 1920

My dear George,

I send you herewith a copy of a memorandum which I wrote for Lord Curzon on January 10th about the fate of Constantinople. Lord Curzon sent it to the Prime Minister. I wrote it as rather a forlorn hope and in great haste, and I cannot pretend that it covers all the ground.

It is almost as difficult to find out what is happening as it was at the beginning of last year, but I am afraid that there are signs to show that the French, the India Office and the War Office are between them going to have their way. In fact Mr. Montagu (and not Lord Curzon) has been instructed by the Prime Minister to draw up the counter-draft to the last French note,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which was sent to you by bag yesterday. We are, however, still fighting hard!

Yours ever,  
ERIC G. FORBES ADAM

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 659

*Memorandum on Constantinople and the Straits*

It is understood that the dangers of Moslem unrest, particularly in India, and of the Bolshevik attack from Central Asia in relation to the British forces available in the Near East and India have turned the balance in favour of keeping the Sultan and his Government in Europe under some form of international control. At the risk of wearisome repetition it may still be worth while to summarise briefly the principal disadvantages which this decision entails from the Foreign Office point of view.

i. *Panturanianism and Panislamism.* It is fair to assume that the Committee of Union and Progress in one form or another will continue to control Turkish politics and the Sultan and his Government. Their policy is imperialistic both at home and abroad; it is definitely against any form of foreign interference (whether British or French). At home their policy is that of a centralised bureaucracy and of Turkification, so far as the subject races of Turkey are concerned. As regards foreign policy they employ two weapons, (a) Panislamism (religious); (b) Panturanianism (secular and nationalist). (a) is employed to influence all Sunni Moslems who look to the Sultan as Caliph; (b) is employed to influence all Moslems of whatever sect, and particularly those of Central Asia who are under alien rule and to whom naturally therefore nationalist aspirations appeal. Both are employed according to circumstances against the Christian rulers of Mohammedan countries and all who threaten Turkish independence. Both weapons depend on the maintenance

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure in No. 658.

of the prestige of Turkey, itself dependent on the retention of the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople, the imperial city, the symbol of Turkish and Moslem power and of their past victory over western Christendom.

The Committee's strength is the strength of these two ideas. These ideas cannot be 'controlled' by the physical power of the Allies nor can the Allies physically control the Committee. All the members and its organisation are not known. Its ramifications are wide. Its members may or may not be members of the Turkish Government but they control by their own indirect means both that Government and the Sultan. Even if the Allies were to establish a Government to their own liking at Constantinople and control the Sultan, as they have done during the Armistice, the Committee may partially transfer their activities to Anatolia and set up something like a counter-government, as that of Mustapha Kemal. For the purposes of propaganda abroad, the fact that the Sultan and his Government would still remain (even under Allied control) at Constantinople will enable the Committee to continue to use their two ideas (Panislamism and Panturanianism). The only method of crippling the Committee's power is to turn the Sultan and his Government out of Constantinople, and thus destroy the basis of the two ideas. The opposite policy will be regarded not with gratitude but as a sign of weakness, making for the moment the rest of the Turkish settlement including the establishment of an independent Armenia more difficult, and in the long run accumulating difficulties for the British Empire in the Near East.

2. *Danger of International control over Turkey.* International condominium can hardly work smoothly (a) where the country under the condominium is important both politically and economically and where nationalist feeling is strong, (b) where the interests of the nations composing the condominium are likely to clash, and their methods of administration widely differ. (a) applies to Turkey and (b) to any condominium in which French and British were concerned (e.g. Egypt). The same considerations would apply much less to an international zone of the Straits after the removal of the Turkish Government. The duties of the international commission would be primarily those of keeping open the Straits, maintaining order and arranging for a Government satisfactory to the mixed populations of the zone. There is no reason why any really vital or controversial issue should arise among the great powers on the Commission.

It is hardly to be hoped that the occupation of European Turkey by Allied forces as now proposed will be permanent, and after their departure Constantinople and the Straits will again be coveted by Russia, and Bulgaria, and possibly by Greece. The Foreign Office policy of making the coveted zone international with Russian, Bulgarian, Greek and Turkish interests represented in the administration should have stabilised the situation.

3. *The Greek settlement.* The new policy entails also the following difficulty the extent of which only negotiations can show. If the withdrawal of the Greeks from the Smyrna area is considered desirable both to facilitate the rest of the Turkish settlement generally from the point of view of Moslem

susceptibilities and to leave to Turkey this important economic outlet, the retention of the Turks at Constantinople makes such withdrawal much more difficult to secure.

No Greek territorial claim before the Peace Conference whether in Northern Epirus, the Aegean Islands, Western or Eastern Thrace has yet been decided by the Conference in favour of the Greeks but the Supreme Council have (indirectly at any rate) entered into certain commitments with M. Venizelos by giving him the mandate to occupy the Smyrna area. The policy recently put forward by the Foreign Office suggested a method of satisfying Greek claims and saving M. Venizelos' position *vis-à-vis* of Greek public opinion by ceding to Greece Western Thrace and Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line on condition that Greek interests in the Smyrna area and Turkish interests in the Adrianople area were safeguarded under Turkish and Greek sovereignty respectively. It is doubtful, however, whether M. Venizelos would now accept this compromise, as Eastern Thrace may become a strategic weakness to Greece with Bulgaria on one side and Turkey (instead of the proposed new state of Constantinople and the Straits) on the other.

4. Lastly there is a consideration which is often overlooked, namely that the settlement now proposed is against the true interests of the Turkish population of Anatolia. Turkey has ceased to be an Empire in all but name, it has ceased to require a strongly centralised and bureaucratic government, removed from the centre of really Turkish country. Most experts (e.g. Sir William Ramsay) who know the interior of Anatolia well and believe in the solid qualities of the Turkish peasant have always hoped that the Peace settlement might enable the Turkish administration to be decentralised and local government on a representative basis developed and given responsibilities. If Constantinople remains the seat of government, such a desirable development is rendered more difficult, if not impossible. It would seem as if the real interests of Turkey were in danger of being sacrificed to the alleged interests of the Moslem world outside Turkey.

E. G. F. ADAM  
*January 10*

#### No. 660

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received February 10)*

*No. 122 [177629/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 16, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith to Your Lordship, the translation of certain documents<sup>1</sup> recently obtained from a very secret source, which describe the formation, meeting, proceedings and aims of a new Pan-Islamic Association in Asia Minor known as the 'Mouvahidin'. This title properly

<sup>1</sup> See below.

means monotheists i.e., believers in the unity of God, and is applied to Moslems in contra-distinction to Christians whose belief in the Trinity is stigmatised as polytheism; but it has probably been chosen for the present purpose because it is susceptible of another interpretation i.e., uniters or advocates of the union of Moslems.

2. The covering letter<sup>2</sup> deals with the more important features and possibilities of this Association. It is clearly an organisation evolved by the C.U.P., and Turkish Nationalists, with the object of enlisting the support and coordinating the efforts of all anti-foreign and disaffected elements in Islamic countries.

3. The aims of the Association are ambitious, but in the present unsettled state of Moslem feeling throughout the world, and bearing in mind the efforts being made by the Bolsheviks to secure the cooperation of Moslems in their fight against civilization, it is capable of causing much trouble, more particularly if, as is probable, it is able to dispose of the large funds in the possession of the C.U.P.

4. I venture to suggest to Your Lordship, that this is a matter of some considerable importance and that it is desirable that the development and activities of this society should be closely followed up.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 660

*The 'Mouvahidin' Society*

(i) A copy of a Turkish document purporting to be a circular distributed to its branches by the Executive Council of a newly formed secret Pan-Islamic association, entitled the 'Mouvahidin' (Monotheists) Society, has recently been procured by . . .<sup>3</sup> and an English translation is attached.<sup>4</sup>

The circular is in four parts.

Part I is an account of the proceedings of the first general meeting of the Society, convened on November 11th 1919 in the Vilayet of Sivas.

Part II is a proclamation addressed to all the Musulmans of the world and calling upon them, on fanatical religious grounds, to rally to the Society as the only means of combatting the attacks of the Christian Powers, which are represented as bent on the annihilation of Islam and the Moslem nations.

The proclamation is referred to in No. VIII of the decisions of the General Meeting (Part I),<sup>4</sup> which lays down that the Executive Council is to take in hand the distribution of the proclamation. It is again mentioned in Part IV which shows that the distribution has since been made and that up to date nearly a million copies have been distributed.

Part III gives the articles of the Constitution of the Society and was evidently drawn up by the founders *prior* to the First General Meeting, the proceedings of which are recorded in Part I.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure below.

<sup>3</sup> A confidential designation is here omitted.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed: see below.

Part IV<sup>s</sup> appears to be a note of the actual practical steps taken by the Society in furtherance of its aims, apart from the decisions of the meeting. This part is marked by the tantalising reticence [*sic*]. Had it been in greater detail, it might have supplied valuable information capable of early verification. It is however believed that the required details have been supplied separately and that they may soon be obtainable by us. In its present form, however, Part IV affords grounds for great vigilance and early enquiry in the countries to which the Society's emissaries are represented as having been already despatched.

(ii) The somewhat ambitious scope of the Society's aims is, briefly, to procure by any and every means the complete and immediate emancipation of all Muslim countries at present under foreign protection or domination, and to unite them all in a kind of world-wide Islamic Confederacy under the Presidency of the Ottoman Khalifate. Adherence to the Ottoman Khalifate, the Osmanli dynasty and the Turkish Empire is the predominant note in the constitution of the Society. The somewhat ill-founded assumption that the whole of Islam (excepting the King of Hejaz, who is censured) is already in agreement on these points, provides the Society (in the naive belief of its founders) with a ready made roll of membership which includes every Musulman in the world.

This arbitrary method of recruiting members together with the establishment of a Supreme Court for the trial of such members for 'treason' (as defined in the document) invests the Society with some of the sinister features of a Terrorist organisation of world-wide scope.

(iii) The First General Meeting, which was to have welcomed delegates from all Musulman countries apparently fell short of the expectations of its conveners as expressed in Part III. For, of the 37 delegates named or mentioned 12 seem to have been representatives of the Turkish Nationalists Movement (including Mustafa Kemal himself and his lieutenant Raouf Bey), and the remainder, 9 excepted, were local Turks. The 9 exceptions are shewn as representing Egypt, Syria, Arabia, the Southern Caucasus and the Crimea, but, pending receipt of information to the contrary, it is permissible

<sup>s</sup> Part IV read as follows:

'So far the Society has sent three delegations to Egypt, three to Syria, two to Iraq, four to the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, one to Afghanistan, one to Tunisia, one to Morocco and one to India. It has also sent a delegation to the nomad Kurdish Tribes in the Mardin districts; another to Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saoud at Nejd, another to the people of Barzan (?) and yet another to the Imam Yahya. Delegations, each of which consists of two permanent members chosen by these latter, have arrived at the central offices of the Society.'

'There exists to-day in Syria, in Egypt, and in Iraq a strong current in favour of the wishes of the Society and the basis of an organisation is being formed on these lines. Centres of the Society have been formed at the following places:—D[a]mascus, Homs, Baalbek, Cairo, Tanta, Reshid, Haifa, Aleppo, Zor, Baghdad, Najaf and Koweit.'

'Somewhat serious differences have occurred at Beirut between Moslem and Christian Arabs, owing to the intervention of the French military forces, these have been temporarily overcome.'

'The Society has published proclamations addressed to all Moslems of which nearly a million copies have been distributed up to date.'

to doubt whether even these were in reality deputed by any consensus of opinion in the parts named and it seems far more probable that they happened to be in Turkey and were drawn into the vortex of the Society's initial effort.

It is therefore evident that, whatever the Society's future potentialities may prove to be, it is still in its infancy and has not yet established roots in the countries where it intends to work, and where it might eventually constitute a serious embr[r]assment to British imperial interests.

(iv) During the last two months persistent reports have been received and circulated regarding a movement favouring a Confederacy of Islamic States, which has been under discussion in Turkey among the representatives of some of the Trans-Caucasian States, the Turkish Nationalists, the Persian democrats and other anti-British Musulman elements.

During a similar period numerous reports have also been received indicating that it was intended to convene a so-called Pan-Islamic Conference at Sivas.

We have not ascertained what definite action had been taken by the originators of these two, apparently separate, schemes. It now seems, however, more than possible, in view of the contents of the present document, that the foundation of the 'Mouvahidin' Society may be the tangible results of the previously reported attempts to form a Pan-Islamic Confederacy, and that the Society's first general meeting may be the basis of our reports of the holding of a 'Pan-Islamic Conference'.

Our last independent information regarding the latter scheme is to the effect that the conference will take place on the 15th January 1920. Should this be true and should it in reality be identifiable with the activities of the 'Mouvahidin' Society, we must suppose that the meeting arranged for 15th January will constitute the second General Congress of the Mouvahidin Society, at which Part I of the document promises all those foreign Moslem countries will be represented whose delegates were unable to attend the First General Meeting.

(v) In common with the programme of all Pan-Islamic schemes the boundless ambition of its aims and the grandiloquence of the language employed seem to detract from the practical dangers which the 'Mouvahidin' Society may have in store for British interests. We must at the same time recognise that the Islamic situation, wherever we may look, is at present peculiarly adapted for the promotion of political agitation on false religious grounds. This society should not therefore, especially in view of its remarkable aptitude for swift action as betrayed by Part IV of the document, be regarded as devoid of practical potentialities for danger.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 30.12.19.

No. 661

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*

(Received February 10)

No. 100 [177613/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 17, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 13/M/2096<sup>1</sup> of 3rd January, relative to the elections recently held in Turkey, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a report,<sup>2</sup> dated 31st December 1919, by Lieutenant P. Slade, R.N.V.R., Relief Officer attached to this High Commission, regarding his tour in the Vilayet of Castamouni.

2. Your Lordship will note the large proportion of persons of criminal character and antecedents elected in the districts visited by Lieutenant Slade. In general his report illustrates the success with which the National Defence nominees were forced upon the people, (who displayed considerable reluctance), by bringing into play all the machinery of intimidation and obstruction of which this organisation is so largely possessed.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This report was as indicated below.

No. 662

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 19)*

No. 45 Telegraphic [171840/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 17, 1920

Your telegram No. 25.<sup>1</sup>

1. Removal of Jemal and Jevad has become not merely desirable, but imperative. Before receiving your telegram I was aware of existence of abundant evidence to show that whole national movement, primary object of which is to intimidate Peace Conference and prepare resistance to drastic peace terms, was again directed from Ministry of War.

On the receipt of your telegram I placed myself in communication with General Milne. He communicated to me a comprehensive statement of charges against Jemal, including his disrespect for decision of Supreme Council in regard to Smyrna delimitation,<sup>2</sup> various flagrant breaches of express conditions of armistice, and other activities, (? all) having for their object . . .<sup>3</sup> Allied authority and preparation for resistance as above. Jevad is known to be not only accomplice, but prime mover in these developments.

General Milne's statement convinced me that immediate action was called for and that only question was what form it should take. My French col-

<sup>1</sup> No. 655.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 643.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read ' . . . their object to scout Allied authority . . .' &c.

league, with whom I conferred, agreed as to desirability of action, but deprecated arrest of Jemal and Jevad by Allied military authorities mainly on the ground that it would expose Allied officers in interior to reprisals. We decided, after I had again consulted General Milne and my French colleague had consulted General d'Esperey, that the best course would be for Allied High Commissioners to demand removal of Jemal and Jevad within twenty-four hours, on the understanding that if demand were not complied with military authorities would be prepared to enforce it.

Advantages of this course are:

- (1) It throws onus of action on Turks in first instance;
- (2) It reduces to a minimum danger of reprisals; and
- (3) If successful, it will discredit importance of Pashas and national movement infinitely more than other arrests by Allies, while it will constitute (? firm . . . effective)<sup>4</sup> warning that Allies (? do not) mean to be trifled with.

We fully realise proposed action may provoke general Cabinet crisis, and the two Pashas may fly to Anatolia. First of these (? contingencies) does not greatly trouble us, as present Cabinet has no real control of situation, and is consequently of no particular value to us. Second will merely add two more to numerous (? fomenters) of disorder in Anatolia.

I have set forth above at length in order to explain why I am taking action and not merely offering observations.

Italian High Commissioner has agreed in principle to course proposed . . .<sup>5</sup> perusal of charge-sheet against Jemal, which he has not yet seen.

Collective note to Porte is in preparation, and will be presented as soon as possible. Demand for removal will be based entirely on clear breaches of armistice.

2. I am opposed to making any 'preliminary condition of peace' of kind calculated to aggravate nationalist feeling and delay negotiations. We have nearly as much interest as Turks in early conclusion of peace. It seems to me most important that all demands connected with peace settlement should be (? formulated) simultaneously in draft treaty.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the words 'subject to' should be here inserted.

### No. 663

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 18)*

*No. 47 Telegraphic [171556/521/44]*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, January 17, 1920*

My telegram No. 45.<sup>1</sup>

Text of collective note was agreed upon by three High Commissioners this afternoon.

<sup>1</sup> No. 662.

Note refers to previous collective note relating to Jemal's failure to comply with General Milne's instructions regarding Smyrna delimitation,<sup>2</sup> and calls Porte's attention to further instances of improper conduct on the part of responsible heads of Ministry of War, as set out in enclosed schedule. It proceeds as follows:—

'Matter enumerated in this list involves definite breaches of article 5 and article 20 of convention of armistice between Allied Powers and Turkey, for which General Jemal Pasha and General Jevad Pasha are directly responsible.

'High Commissioners accordingly require Ottoman Government to remove the above-named two generals from their appointments within forty-seven hours of presentation of this joint note.'

Offences enumerated in schedule are as follows:—

1. Despatch of specially selected officers from Constantinople for staff of National forces.

2. Despatch of men discharged, transferred from XIVth Army Corps to join National forces under orders from Ministry of War.

3. Secret despatch of (? arms) to National forces proved (?) by arrest of two officers caught red-handed.

4. Transfer of two battalions from Zum(?) b)uldak<sup>3</sup> to Constantinople without permission of General Milne, and failure for over a month to obey orders for their return.

5. Transfer of 159th Regiment from Afun-Kara Hassar to Alashehr without permission. Jemal disclaimed knowledge of this, and eventually ordered return, but order was obeyed only by few details, and majority of regiment joined National forces.

[6.] Transfer of 174th Regiment from Brussa to Panderma without permission and failure even to notify movement until enquiry had been demanded.

We are now only waiting for military authorities to fix time for delivery of note which will fit in with their arrangements. (?) This will probably be Monday morning, the 19th January.

Italian High Commissioner displayed almost insuperable reluctance to agree to note. He fought particularly hard against fixing of time limit, but eventually accepted note as drafted. French High Commissioner is preparing French text for signature. Note will be delivered by French political officer. French High Commissioner and I were in favour of presentation by the three High Commissioners in person, but our Italian colleague opposed this also so strenuously that we waived it.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See No. 643.

<sup>3</sup> Amended on original to Zunguldak.

<sup>4</sup> Admiral Webb further reported in Constantinople telegram No. 60 of January 20, 1920 (received January 21): 'Slight hitch occurred at last moment, thus delaying presentation of note for twenty-four hours but last night my colleagues and I met (?) again and decided to

proceed as originally intended. Joint note was handed over to Grand Vizier by French Political Officer at 11 a.m. to-day, January 20, in names of three High Commissioners. My colleagues and I thought it would be well to keep the Sultan apprised and private message was therefore sent to His Majesty through same [?sure] intermediary immediately after delivery of note.'

No. 664

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received February 9)*

No. 102 [177317/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 18, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to a report entitled 'The Nationalist Movement in Turkey',<sup>1</sup> compiled by the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea, under date of the 10th January, 1920, a copy of which has, I assume, been sent to your Lordship.

2. This report is a summary of reports received from the various military control officers in the interior, in reply to a questionnaire issued by the General Staff on the 28th October. There are two points with regard to it on which I submit the following comments:—

- (a) Little or no mention is made of the present unsatisfactory condition of the Christian population in the interior and their precarious future should the Nationalist leaders consider it advantageous to adopt violent methods of oppression as a means to bring pressure to bear on European opinion.
- (b) There is a general tendency to belittle the potential strength of the National movement. Considered from the standpoint of an officer living in a provincial centre, the local national organisations may well appear to have lost ground during the past few months, to have a restricted number of adherents, and to possess no hold over the sympathies of the greater part of the population. Moreover, the very number of the separate local organisations may give the impression that there is no common purpose uniting them, and no general organisation connecting them and directing the movement as a whole.

3. I do not consider that this view is correct. It is true that the supporters of the movement are everywhere in a minority; they are, however, an energetic and unscrupulous minority such as, I understand, has always dominated the situation in this country, whilst the rest of the population is passive and accepts the situation. The announcement of drastic peace terms by the Allies will automatically throw many waverers into the arms of the Nationalists, and again set the organisation working at full activity. At the same time the Allies will not be able to count upon any support in imposing such terms from the moderate and pro-Entente elements of the population

<sup>1</sup> Not printed: see below.

and their political and local leaders, who would otherwise have been at one with them in wishing to destroy the Committee of Union and Progress and to re-establish normal conditions in the provinces.

4. I venture to submit, as I have frequently done before, that if it is intended to enforce drastic peace terms in Anatolia it will not be possible to carry this into effect unless the Allies are prepared to support their decisions by the employment of sufficient physical force to break the National movement.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

No. 665

*Letter from Mr. Forbes Adam (Paris) to Mr. Phipps<sup>1</sup>  
(Received January 20)*

*Unnumbered [172029/151671/44]*

PARIS, January 19, 1920

Dear Phipps,

Van<sup>2</sup> and I appreciate your wish for news of what is happening here<sup>3</sup> but, as I think this letter and its enclosures will show, it is very difficult to give you any coherent idea.

The French sent in their note about Turkey of January 11th<sup>4</sup> of which you have had a copy officially already.

As I told Kidston in my letter,<sup>5</sup> Montagu was told by the Prime Minister to prepare the kind of reply he wanted (see document<sup>6</sup> A). It was drawn up by the India Office and Military Sections here alone. It apparently nearly went straight off to the French but Hankey suggested it should be submitted to the Cabinet and the Secretary of State subjected it to some severe criticisms of the kind which you can imagine after reading it! Then Lord Curzon was instructed to submit a counter draft (document<sup>6</sup> B) which Van and I had to turn out at short notice (therefore its shortcomings must be looked on leniently). Meanwhile M. Venizelos had been asked by the Prime Minister to comment on Mr. Montagu's draft (document<sup>6</sup> A) and sent in a note (document<sup>6</sup> C), part of which we embodied in our document (B).

The Cabinet discussed our note and under the influence of the usual forces decided the controls over Turkey were too severe, and Van, Malkin and I were told to draft another note at short notice, after a discussion between Montagu and the Secretary of State at which we were present. The result was document<sup>6</sup> D which has been circulated to the Cabinet and at present

<sup>1</sup> An Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Vansittart.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Phipps had evidently written a private letter (untraced in Foreign Office archives) to Mr. Forbes Adam in accordance with a minute by Lord Hardinge on No. 659 complaining of lack of information in the Foreign Office on developments in Paris, and requesting that 'somebody ask Forbes Adam to keep us regularly informed. We are at present in complete ignorance'.

<sup>4</sup> No. 659.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure in No. 658.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. appendix.

holds the field but as far as we are aware has not yet been discussed by the Cabinet. Venizelos also sent to the Prime Minister a supplementary memorandum (document<sup>6</sup> E).

Since we wrote document D, the Russian situation<sup>7</sup> has fully occupied the attention of the Cabinet, and the French presidential elections and the absence of a French Government are making them now think of a ten days' or fortnight's adjournment.

So you see, so far as Turkey has been concerned, our time here has not yet been spent on any discussions with the French or Italians (the French note of January 11th remaining unanswered) but on attempts by the Cabinet to make up their own minds on Turkish policy (still unsuccessful!).

This letter must be regarded of course as strictly confidential but only in this way can we give you any idea of what is happening here. I am sure you will realise that it is impossible for Van and me (who have been working up to all hours) to keep the Foreign Office informed step by step of events. Even this resumé leaves out some of the steps and a full account of our journeys to and fro and interviews, &c.!

Yours ever,  
ERIC FORBES ADAM

Van is also writing to Lord Hardinge about ways of keeping you informed and the difficulties.

## APPENDIX A TO NO. 665

### Document I

#### *Draft by Mr. Montagu*

##### *Preamble*

This preamble endeavours to state more clearly the guiding rules of policy referred to but not expressed in the French note.<sup>4</sup>

Having broken the treaties which assured its territorial integrity and its sovereignty Turkey has freed the Allies from all obligations; having broken the peace, Turkey must face the consequences of her unprovoked participation in a war, which was not her concern, and also of the massacres and other excesses which she took the opportunity of the war to commit. In closing the Straits Turkey cut the communications of Russia with the Allies, caused Russia's political and military dissolution and prolonged the war with all its disasters; such a catastrophe cannot be allowed to be renewed. The Allied Powers must therefore safeguard the world from a repetition of the dangers and difficulties to which it was subjected by the Turkish

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Volume II, Chap. II; and Volume III, Chap. II *passim*.

Government, must exact punishment for the excesses which have been committed and must secure the freedom of the subject races of the former Ottoman Empire from the intolerable Turkish yoke.

These objects having been achieved the Allied Powers do not contemplate repression or revenge but on the contrary it is their intention to give a reconstituted Turkey an opportunity of finding a place as a responsible member of the League of Nations.

(Agrees with the French Note.)

Ditto.

It appears necessary to leave the Turks a small regular Army. Otherwise it will be impossible to hold the Turkish Government responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the large country which will still remain to them. It will also be easier to watch the movements, to detect possible expansion of organisation, and to control the ammunition supply of a regular army than it would be in the case of a force of gendarmerie.

This is to cover the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by which Turkey obtained Batum, and any similar agreements made by Turkey during the war with other powers.

The following principles appear to be those which should govern the settlement of this question:—

1. The maintenance of an independent Turkish State.

2. No mandate and no spheres of political influence will be accorded to any specific power in the Ottoman Empire as constituted by the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

3. Turkish militarism will be suppressed like Prussian militarism. The Turkish Army and the Turkish Fleet shall be placed on a voluntary basis and reduced to the minimum dimensions necessary for the preservation of internal security and the policing of the coasts as decided by the Allied Governments.

4. The absolute freedom of the Straits will be ensured. Guardianship over them from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean will be entrusted to Allied Naval and Military forces, who will safeguard the effective neutrality of the passage.

5. Armenia will be entirely free from the Turkish domination and constituted as an independent State.

6. The Arab and Syrian populations will be supported in their national aspirations and will not be replaced under the Turkish yoke.

7. The principles of Article 292 of the German Treaty will be equally applicable to Turkey as regards any agreements made with Russia or other powers.

8. The Allied Powers, notwithstanding their undoubted claim to reparation for the war, waive such claims in recognition of the financial conditions of Turkey.

9. The Allied Powers demand the surrender of certain Turkish subjects for offences against the laws of war. These persons to be named within 15 days of ratification of the Treaty.

### *Clause I. Boundaries*

The boundaries of the independent State of Turkey shall be as follows:—

(a) The suggestion now made by the French of the Chataljah lines as a frontier is unacceptable. Its adoption would leave the western shores of the Dardanelles in presumably Greek territory and would therefore interfere with the internationalisation of the passage to the Black Sea.

(b) The Enos-Midia line could be accepted as the frontier if the Greeks would accept Adrianople as compensation for leaving the sovereignty of Smyrna. In this case Moslem interests should be protected in Adrianople by the appointment of a Turkish Vali and Greek interests should be similarly protected in Smyrna.

(c) Erzerum would be more of a commitment than a source of strength to Armenia. It has always been for the Turks a main defence against their traditional enemy, Russia, and deprivation of it would be a perpetual incentive to the Turks to attack the Armenians for its recovery. The Armenian State would have to maintain a permanent force for its defence. It is not necessary for Armenia unless they are also to have Trebizond, the road between which port and Persia it controls.

It is not actually in the Arax Valley and a frontier could be drawn a few miles east of Erzerum following closely the boundary of an existing Qaza and leaving the actual valley to Armenia.

This frontier coincides with that suggested by the French except for the retention of Erzerum in Turkey.

(a)

The western boundary shall be the pre-war frontier from Aya Stefane to the left bank of the Maritsa opposite Hadi Keui, thence the left bank of the Maritsa to Enos, to include Adrianople, subject to special provisions being made for the Greek population in the Rodosto and Gallipoli sanjaks.

(b)

Alternatively:—

The western frontier will be an approximately direct line between Enos and Midia.

(c)

The eastern frontier shall include Trebizond, Baiburt and Erzerum, but shall exclude the Arax Valley.

The southern frontier will be bounded by the course of the Lama-su, the Charmarlu Dagh, the division of the rivers beyond Bulgar Dagh, as far as Uch Kapular Dagh, then a line corresponding to the boundaries of the vilayets and marked out by the Kizil Dagh, the Hezanli and the Belli Dagh, as far as the Tokhma-su; then the course of the latter and that of the Euphrates down stream as far as the boundary of the vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Asis and Diarbekir, then the boundary of these vilayets as far as the Upper Euphrates (Marad-su), and thence down stream until its juncture with the Munzer-su, thence to the Bingeul Dagh by an alignment to be defined hereafter.

### *Clause II. The Straits*

This force is estimated at two divisions and the French estimate of 30,000 men, formed in equal shares by British, French and Italians, is accepted approximately.

These words include the right to levy dues and leave the Allied Governments, under the advice of the Supreme Military Council, free to concert all necessary safeguards.

Turkey will hand over to the Allies the duty and the responsibility of maintaining the neutrality of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus. The Allies will entrust this duty to a force of such dimensions as they may consider necessary and will assume the right to take such measures, naval, military financial and administrative, as they may consider necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of the Straits. Details of the organisation necessary to give effect to these measures, naval, military and administrative, will be decided by the Allies.

### *Clause III. The Turkish Army and Navy*

It may be to the advantage of the Allies to allow Turkish troops *with their consent* (in addition to the Sultan's Bodyguard) in Constantinople to preserve order.

No Turkish troops other than the Sultan's Bodyguard shall be allowed or moved in Turkey in Europe without the previous consent of the Allies.

The Turkish Army and Navy will be reduced to the dimensions to be prescribed by the Allied Powers. The location of these troops shall also be determined by the Allies.

### *Clause IV. Inter-Allied Control*

The Allies will constitute an Inter-Allied Commission to control the finances of Turkey to such an extent as is necessary to secure the fulfilment by the Turkish Government of its international financial obligations.

This Commission shall be presided over by the representative of one of the Allied Governments selected by the Allies in rotation and will be given power to devise such organisation as it considers necessary to fulfil its functions. It will be the only non-military Inter-Allied body in Turkey. It will control or modify the organisation of the Inter-Allied force which secures the Straits (but vide Note 1).

If the Allies determine to give assistance in the reform and administration of Police and Judicial systems it will be through this body that such assistance will be given. In so far as it deals with other questions than Naval or Military questions it should have a Turkish member in co-operation with the representatives of the Allies.

#### *Note 1.*

The question is being referred to C.I.G.S. whether the Inter-Allied force in the neighbourhood of Constantinople should be placed under control of this Commission.

#### *Note 2.*

This clause embodies a new proposal designed to specify the control contemplated by the French memorandum, which suggests the creation both of an administrative delegation and a public debt administration with extended powers.

This will ensure control of Revenues derived from such concessions and prevent competition among the Allies for such concessions, and it will provide the means of securing the Italian economic priority suggested in a subsequent paragraph in Southern Ana-

tolia. It is submitted that by this means Allied interests can be adequately protected without making the Allies responsible for the good government of Turkey.

N.B. It is for consideration whether it is desired to take any steps to protect minorities in Turkey in Europe or elsewhere. If so, it will be through this Commission that such minorities will be protected.

(French proposals do not contain the second alternative as regards Smyrna.)

This Commission will supervise and control the Caisse de la Dette. The Turkish Government should be bound to submit to it for consent all economic and financial concessions made to foreigners.

The financial powers of the Commission shall determine [sic] when the Ottoman debt is extinguished.

#### *Clause V. Situation of Europeans*

##### *(a) Greek occupation of Smyrna.*

Smyrna shall remain under Turkish sovereignty, but will be constituted a free port under the control of the Inter-Allied Commission of Constantinople. A special position will be secured for the Greeks in the administration of the town and the Sanjak. In the alternative Smyrna shall be given to Greece, but in this case it shall be a free port open to Turkish commerce. If this second alternative is adopted it is suggested that the western frontier of Turkey should be the first alternative in Clause I (vide Note (b) on page [1037]).

(b) The Italian troops will be withdrawn from Anatolia and in compensation Italy will receive economic advantages, which might consist in a right of priority over all commercial enterprise in southern Anatolia as well as in the Franco-Italian agreement for the coal mines of Heraclea.

(c) The Dodecanese Islands will be returned to the Greeks as agreed by Italy.

(d) The proposal of the French Government to organise the administration of Cilicia in such a way as to ensure to the Armenians of that district their rights and the largest measure of protection is endorsed as in accordance with the Allied policy of supporting Armenian national aspirations.

#### *Clause VI. Armenia*

Armenia will be constituted a completely independent republic under the protection of the League of Nations. The territory of the republic of Armenia will comprise:—

(i) The existing territory of the Armenian

Republic of Erivan (the exact frontiers to be considered hereafter).

(a) This is at variance with French proposals.

Immediate action is necessary. It is therefore of great importance to avoid if possible the delay which might be involved in deferring this question to the League of Nations.

(ii) The eastern portion of the vilayet of Erzerum (excluding the town of Erzerum), (a) the Plain of Mush, the district of Bitlis and the region of Lake Van, up to the Persian frontier.

The frontiers of Armenia, with the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, with Turkey, with the French zone, and with Kurdistan, will be traced on the spot by an Inter-Allied Commission.

(iii) The Allies will immediately place in hand the necessary measures for arming, equipping and, if necessary, financing Armenia, to enable her independence to be established. The actual size of the Armenian Army will be decided by the Allies. The Army will be under Allied supervision.

The French proposal to give Armenia access to the free port of Batum by means of transit conventions are accepted in principle.

(iv) The form of Government to be established in Armenia will be such as to guarantee to non-Armenians representation and the protection of their rights.

#### *Clause VII. Georgia*

The province of Lazistan shall be assigned to Georgia.

Batum, of which the exact boundaries will be fixed hereafter, will be established as a free port under the League of Nations.

It is suggested that if these general proposals are agreed, they should be amplified and considered by representatives of the French and British Governments.

#### Document 2

##### *Note by the Imperial General Staff*

With reference to Clause IV of the attached Draft Note<sup>8</sup> the General Staff wish to draw particular attention to Note I. In the absence of, and without reference to, the C.I.G.S. they are unable to concur in the definite proposal that the Inter-Allied Force in the neighbourhood of Constantinople shall be placed under the Inter-Allied Commission or that this Commission shall be empowered to control or modify the organisation of the Inter-Allied Force. If the Force is to be placed under the Commission it would seem an obvious

<sup>8</sup> Document 1 above.

precaution that the President of the Commission should be of different nationality to that of the Commander of the Inter-Allied Force.

There are possible objections to placing the Force under the Commission and the question has, therefore, been referred to the C.I.G.S., whose opinion it is hoped will be awaited before any final decision is made to include the proposal contained in Clause IV in the British Note.

W. H. GRIBBON,  
Lieut. Colonel,  
Genl. Staff.

C. O. PLACE,  
Lieut. Colonel,  
Genl. Staff.

PARIS, January 12, 1920.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 665

Jan. 15th

##### *Treaty with Turkey*

The attached memorandum<sup>9</sup> is an attempt to sketch the preamble, principles and chief chapters of the Treaty with Turkey, on the supposition that the Sultan and his Government remain at Constantinople.

The memorandum<sup>9</sup> accepts some of the proposals made in the French Note of January 11th,<sup>4</sup> but on certain points, such as the eastern frontier of Turkey (western frontier of Armenia), our proposals are more favourable to the Turks. The supposition on which the memorandum is based precludes any discussion of the merits of the alternative proposals put forward in the French Note regarding Constantinople and the Straits.

The memorandum takes note of the suggestions made in Monsieur Venizelos' commentary<sup>10</sup> on Mr. Montagu's Note.<sup>11</sup>

The memorandum endeavours to show in some detail:—

- (a) The control proposed for the Straits.
- (b) The financial and administrative assistance to be given to the Turkish Government.
- (c) The measures proposed for the protection of minorities.

The writers beg to be allowed to state that they do not favour the solution regarding Constantinople, which they regard as inevitably rendering illusory or unworkable in practice the major part of the safeguards proposed for the straits as will appear below.

They consider moreover that even if the immediate practical obstacles could be overcome, the retention of the Turks at Constantinople will soon mean the return of the Committee of Union and Progress to control, backed by a resuscitated Germany with Russia possibly behind her. This would

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. This was the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon by Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Forbes Adam, as explained in the latter's letter above. This counter-draft was the same as the document in appendix D below except for certain passages which are printed in footnotes to that document, q.v.      <sup>10</sup> Appendix C below.      <sup>11</sup> Appendix A above.

make the task of Great Britain and France in the Straits zone a dangerous or impossible one.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 665

### Document I

#### *Notes by M. Venizelos on Mr. Montagu's proposals<sup>11</sup> with regard to Constantinople*

In my Memorandum dated October 27, 1919,<sup>12</sup> which I submitted during my last visit to London, I already stated my opinion to the effect that for the interests of the world at large it would be better, on the termination of the World War, that Turkish sovereignty, in Europe at least, should be abolished. It is therefore unnecessary that I should repeat my arguments on the subject.

On the assumption that it will be decided to maintain Turkish sovereignty in Europe, I have the honour to submit my remarks on the confidential draft submitted to me.

#### *Turkish Area in Europe*

On the above assumption, that Turkish sovereignty is maintained in Europe, I am of opinion that it is essential that the Turkish territory should be restricted to the peninsula of Constantinople, not beyond the lines of Tchataldja and the Lake of Derkos. The Enos-Midia line had been inserted in the Treaty of London as a compromise between the rival claims of the Balkan Allies and Turkey. But this line is neither a strategic one, nor does it correspond with the ethnic character of the population on either side of it; because the district south-east of the line Enos-Midia (Sandjak of Gallipoli, Enos Caza, half of the Caza of Malgara, Rodosto Caza, Tchorlou Caza, Silivri Caza, and half of the Caza of Tchataldja) with a total population of 261,665 contains only 86,193 Turks and 3,365 Bulgarians, as against 145,639 Greeks and 18,368 Armenians. The latter have recently declared by a confidential memorandum of the Armenian Patriarchate to the President of the Peace Conference that they pray for and desire the allocation of Thrace to Greece.

If the Gallipoli Peninsula is freed from Turkish sovereignty and ceded to Greece, there is nothing to prevent its military occupation by the Allied Powers which will be in charge of Constantinople and to which will be entrusted the guardianship of the Straits. On the other hand, if the Conference were to entrust to Greece the military guardianship of the Gallipoli Peninsula, it would be possible to utilise the Anglo-Franco-Italian Military force to which is entrusted the protection of Constantinople and of the Straits, for the more effectual protection of the eastern coast of the Dardanelles and of both the coasts of the Bosphorus.

#### *Protection of the Straits*

It is of course the task of the military and naval experts to decide upon the measures to be taken under which the military occupation of the Straits and

<sup>11</sup> This memorandum is untraced in Foreign Office archives. Cf., however, No. 558.

of Constantinople would render secure the freedom of navigation of the latter. But I am of the opinion that I can safely state that so long as the eastern coast is not occupied by Allied forces as well, it would be always easy for the Turks to launch torpedoes and float mines from their side and thus jeopardise the freedom of navigation.

#### *Military Forces of Turkey*

As regards the naval forces of Turkey, I am of the opinion that clauses 83 to 87 of the Bulgarian Treaty should be applied in this case. By these clauses, the maintenance of warships is forbidden. The same impression is deduced from the confidential draft (page 4, para. 3),<sup>13</sup> though in Clause III, page 7,<sup>14</sup> reference is made only to the reduction of the Turkish fleet. There is no reason whatever why more favourable measures should be taken as regards Turkey in this respect than have been taken in the case of Bulgaria.

As regards the maintenance of an Army or only of a Gendarmerie, I fear that my predilection for the latter might, unconsciously on my part, not be entirely unprejudiced, since permission has been granted to the Bulgarians to retain a reduced military force. But I am of the opinion that it is absolutely essential to have it clearly stated in the Treaty that, with the exception of the Sultan's bodyguard—the strength of which will be naturally stipulated in the Treaty—no military force of Turkey should be allowed to be stationed on the European side, neither on the Asiatic side within a distance of 100 kilometres from the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. In fact, there is no justifiable reason why a Turkish force should approach the Straits, since the latter as well as Constantinople will be guarded by Allied forces. I am, moreover, afraid that, if Turkey should be allowed by virtue of the Treaty to send troops to Constantinople, with the consent of the Allies, this might one day, for the sake of reducing expenditure—a subject on which it is natural that there should be an outcry in Parliaments—lead to the reduction of the international military force and its being supplemented by a Turkish one, which might again prove disastrous in case of emergency.

#### *Economic Terms*

It is provided in the draft that, in view of her financial condition, Turkey should be exempted from the payment of reparations for the war. But if Turkey is to be exempted from such payment to the Allies, this should be considered an additional reason why it should be obliged to compensate the co-nationals of the Allied nations, who during the war were expelled from Turkey or deported to the interior, and whose properties were either destroyed or confiscated by it. For the whole period of five years, Greece was obliged to maintain on its own territory 400,000 refugees forcibly expelled by the Turkish Government. But if the Conference should think it right that Greece should give up her claim to compensation for the expenditure incurred thereby, the most elementary justice, however, requires that Turkey should be asked to compensate in full the populations deported and expelled

<sup>13</sup> p. 1038.

<sup>14</sup> p. 1040.

by her. If this could not be done, then, at the very least, Turkey should be obliged to allow these people to return to their homes, to give back to them their real property and to pay them the necessary expenses for the rebuilding or reparation of the houses that have been destroyed and for their re-instatement therein. These refugees should be also given by Turkey the absolutely necessary capital to enable them to resume anew their work, under conditions that will allow them, if not to regain their former prosperity, at least to earn the daily bread for their families. For this purpose the formation of Allied Committees seems indicated to which would be entrusted the fixing of the compensation to be paid.

### *Protection of Minorities*

The draft<sup>11</sup> says 'If the Allies determine to give assistance in the reform and administration of the Police and Judicial systems it will be through this body (the Inter-Allied Commission) that such assistance will be given'. I should like to remark that provisions for the protection, in so far as possible, of the non-Turkish nationalities, which will remain within the boundaries of the Turkish State, are absolutely necessary. In fact, even after the creation of the Armenian State and the cession to Greece of the district now occupied by her in Western Asia Minor, the Turkish State, in so far as it includes Constantinople, will contain 1,332,000 Greeks, 630,000 Armenians and 300,000 of various other nationalities. Thus, about one quarter of the inhabitants of the remaining Turkish State will be non-Turkish. As regards particularly the Greek populations, I may remark that 478,000 live in the contiguous three vilayets of Trebizond, Sivas and Kastamani (the so-called Pontus) in compact masses: another 384,000 in the contiguous vilayets of Broussa and the Sandjaks of Ismid and Bigha and another 337,000 in the vilayet of Constantinople, in the Caza of Tchekmedje and half of the Caza of Tchataldja; that is, about 1,199,000 live in three dense masses and only 133,000 are dispersed in the other vilayets. If no provision is made for the security of these populations, it is natural to expect the continuation in the future of the persecutions and massacres which we had occasion to deplore in the past.

The protective measures to be taken must not be limited to the recognition in the Treaty of Peace of the rights of the non-Turkish populations to their religious and educational life and of the 'statut personnel' of the different national minorities, as happened in the Treaty of Berlin, but such protective measures should include, as well, the creation of some international control over the Turkish administration. This task is arduous indeed, but it is indispensable that some attempt to solve it should be made. The programs which were in past years prepared for the reforms in Macedonia and Armenia might be used as bases. If advantage is not taken of the military defeat of Turkey to impose some control on its administration, we may be quite certain that on the very morrow of the signature of the Treaty the application anew of the program of 'Turkification' of the Committee of the Union and

Progress and the remorseless persecutions against an innocent population exceeding two millions, will start again.

It is, I believe, unnecessary for me to remark that, in the Peace Treaty, provision should be made for the re-establishment of the capitulations, which Turkey abolished arbitrarily during the War.

E. K. VENIZELOS

PARIS, January 12th, 1920.

Document 2

*Memorandum<sup>15</sup>*

In the event of it being decided that the Sultan should not remain in Constantinople, the question might arise as to the advisability of granting him some compensation, and such might be found in the maintenance of his suzerainty over that portion of Asia Minor now in the occupation of Greece, which latter country would be placed in the same position as Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Erzegovina after the Treaty of Berlin until the year 1908, when annexation took place.

But if it should be decided that the Sultan is to remain in Constantinople, I am of the opinion that there is no reason whatever for any additional satisfaction to be given to him by the application of half measures in regard to Western Asia Minor. In fact, the maintenance of Turkish suzerainty would be a continuous source of friction between Greece and Turkey. One can foretell with certainty that the same difficulties will arise as took place in Crete after the declaration of autonomy and before the full union of the island with Greece.

Moreover, there is no reason—at least if the Sultan remains in Constantinople—why a definite and clear solution of the question of Western Asia Minor could not be arrived at. The claims of Greece on this territory are based on the principle of self-determination. The preponderance of the Greek element in this district not only from the point of view of numbers of population but from that of their economic and educational status, is unquestionable. There is no reason, therefore, why a spurious and incomplete solution should be given which would contain all the seeds of future difficulties not only for the countries directly concerned—i.e. Greece and Turkey—but also for the Great Powers.

PARIS, January 12th, 1920.

APPENDIX D to No. 665

HOTEL CAMPBELL, January 16th, 1920

*Preamble*

Having broken the treaties which assured its territorial integrity and its sovereignty Turkey has freed the Allies from all obligations; having broken

<sup>15</sup> This memorandum was evidently a pendant to the preceding note by M. Venizelos. For his further 'supplementary memorandum' see appendix E below.

the peace, Turkey must face the consequences of her unprovoked participation in a war which was not her concern, and also of the massacres and other excesses which she took the opportunity of the war to commit. In closing the Straits Turkey cut the communications of Russia with the Allies, caused Russia's political and military dissolution and prolonged the war with all its disasters; such a catastrophe cannot be allowed to be renewed. The Allied Powers must therefore safeguard the world from a repetition of the dangers and difficulties to which it was subjected by the Turkish Government, must exact punishment for the excesses which have been committed and must secure the freedom of the subject races of the former Ottoman Empire from the intolerable Turkish yoke.

These objects having been achieved the Allied Powers do not contemplate repression or revenge but on the contrary it is their hope that a reconstituted Turkey may at no distant date<sup>16</sup> find a place as a member of the League of Nations.

The following principles appear to be those which should govern the settlement of this question:—

1. The maintenance of an independent Turkish State.
2. No mandate and no spheres of political influence will be accorded to any specific power in the Ottoman Empire as constituted by the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
3. Turkish militarism will be suppressed like Prussian militarism. Details of the proposals regarding the Turkish Army and Navy will be found below.
4. The absolute freedom of the Straits will be ensured. Guardianship over them from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean will be entrusted to Allied, Naval and Military forces, who will safeguard the effective neutrality of the passage. Details of the disposition and control of the Allied forces will be found below in the paragraph regarding Constantinople and the Straits.
5. Armenia as defined below will be entirely freed from Turkish domination and constituted as an independent State.
6. The Mesopotamian and Syrian Arab populations will be freed from Turkish domination and will be supported in the realisation of their national development upon the agreed principle of self-determination.<sup>17</sup> The independence of the Kingdom of the Hedjaz has already been recognised and will be re-affirmed in the Treaty. Special provisions will be necessary for the rest of the Arabian peninsula on the principles laid down in the London discussions between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.
7. The declaration of the Allied Powers respecting the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine will be effectively carried out.
8. The principles of Article 292 of the German Treaty (treaties made by

<sup>16</sup> In the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon (see note 9 above) this passage read '... may eventually' &c.

<sup>17</sup> This sentence had read in the earlier counter-draft: 'The Mesopotamian and Syrian Arab populations will be equally freed from Turkish domination and will be supported in the creation of self-governing institutions.'

Turkey during the war) will be equally applicable to Turkey as regards any agreements made with Russia or other Powers.

9.<sup>18</sup> The Allied Powers demand the surrender of certain Turkish subjects for offences against the laws and customs of war and humanity. These persons to be named within one month of the entry into force of the Treaty.

#### *Constantinople and the Straits*

1. This paper is drawn up on the assumption that the Turkish Government is to remain at Constantinople. In that case it is proposed that Turkish territory in Europe should be limited to the Chatalja lines.<sup>19</sup> The territory up to this point will<sup>20</sup> then be transferred to Greece, whose strategic position would thus be secured in a manner impossible if only the Enos-Midia line is assigned to her. This transfer is moreover justifiable on ethnological grounds.

2. Within the reduced Turkey in Europe thus left the duty and responsibility of maintaining the neutrality and free passage of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus will be undertaken by an international commission. It is for consideration whether this Commission should take the form originally contemplated when the new state of Constantinople and the Straits was discussed between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot,<sup>21</sup> or whether it should be confined to representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy. There would be grave objection to placing troops<sup>22</sup> provided by these three Powers under the control of a body composed of a number of other Powers.

3. In regard to these troops a force of 30,000 men, provided in equal thirds, has been suggested, and if this were put into practice the officers in command might also have seats on the Commission. It<sup>23</sup> should, however, be pointed

<sup>18</sup> Numbered as paragraph 10 in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon (see note 9 above). Paragraph 9 in that draft, omitted in the present document, read as follows: 'It may be for consideration whether the Allied Powers, notwithstanding their undoubted claims to reparation for the war, should press such claims in consequence of the financial conditions of Turkey. No reason is seen for the preferential treatment of Turkey in this respect as compared with the other enemy states. If financially reconstructed as suggested below, Turkey will be capable of paying some reparation within measurable time. In any case on the analogy of the German Treaty the costs of the maintenance of the Allied armies of occupation and the unpaid coupons of the pre-war debt in so far as the Allies are concerned will not rank as reparation and will therefore be met by Turkey.'

<sup>19</sup> The paragraph began as follows in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'If Turkey is to remain in Europe, Turkish territory in Europe should be limited to the Chatalja lines', &c.

<sup>20</sup> The previous counter-draft here read 'would'.

<sup>21</sup> The preceding passage read in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon '... originally contemplated for a new state of Constantinople and the Straits in the discussions between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot'.

<sup>22</sup> The earlier counter-draft here read: 'Grave objection would be seen to placing any troops', &c.

<sup>23</sup> The following passage read thus in the earlier counter-draft: 'We should, however, point out that the maintenance, as opposed to the provision, of these troops is likely to prove purely illusory, especially in view of the probable trend of public opinion in Great Britain and Italy. Considerations of expense, even if no other factors come into play, will inevitably make for the reduction and eventual evaporation of this garrison.'

out that the maintenance, as opposed to the provision, of these troops may well prove illusory in view of the probable future trend of public opinion in the three countries. Considerations of expense, even if no other factors come into play, will tend to bring about the reduction and possibly even the eventual disappearance of this force. If on the other hand the garrison is not permanently maintained at a high figure, its control, which must inevitably extend to the Asiatic shore of both Straits and the Sea of Marmora, will be ineffectual.

4. If the control were not extended to the Asiatic shore, and to a depth of at least 30 kilometres inland—the exact extent would be a matter for military and naval experts—there would be nothing more than a paper guarantee for the freedom of the Straits.

5. This is one difficulty that must be foreseen. Another is that, for the troops to exercise complete freedom of movement on both shores, there must either be a servitude over an extensive Straits zone, including both Turkish and Greek territories, or be something like an alienation of Turkish sovereignty on a coastal belt on both sides of the water in question. In the second case we arrive at the anomalous position that,<sup>24</sup> while Turkish sovereignty would be nominally respected in Constantinople itself, between the seat of Turkish Government in Europe and its Asiatic territory would be interposed a strip under the effective rule of an Allied military force, whether or no this force be under the direct orders of the International Commission.<sup>25</sup>

6. Further, should the Allied Powers assume the sovereignty of the coastal strips, whether in Europe or in Asia, to which reference has been made, it may be pointed out that the Allied Commission by which they would be represented would find itself charged with administrative functions, e.g. at Gallipoli, Chanak and Scutari, which it is desirable to avoid.

7. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the precise manner in which, consistently with the retention of Greek sovereignty on the northern shores of the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora, and of Turkish sovereignty on the southern shores of the Dardanelles and Marmora and on both shores of the Bosphorus, the demilitarisation of those regions, their occupation by the international forces, and their insurance against any possible naval or military risk may be effectively secured.

8. Within the waters under Allied control the Commission should have power to take all the necessary measures for ensuring the navigation and policing of the waters, and control over the services incidental thereto including quarantine.

9. For the execution of their duties the Commission should have the right of levying dues on shipping and imposing fines. On the assumption that a

<sup>24</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read: 'We thus arrive at the somewhat fantastic position that', &c.

<sup>25</sup> In the earlier counter-draft this passage was immediately followed by this sentence: 'The precise points where allied troops are to be stationed, and the nature of the demobilization to be enforced, will be a matter for subsequent examination.' The counter-draft then proceeded directly to the present paragraph 8. (beginning 'Within the waters under Allied control').

third of the 1913 Suez Canal dues are levied, a sum of over a million pounds sterling should be raised. After defraying the cost of the Allied Commission and the services performed by it, the surplus should be devoted to part payment of the cost of maintenance of the Allied troops of occupation.<sup>26</sup>

#### *Military and Naval*

It is presumed that a small body-guard, the strength of which will be fixed by Treaty, will be left for the Sultan in Constantinople; but that no Turkish troops will be allowed within 30 kilom. of the Straits or Sea of Marmora, i.e. in the coastal strips to be placed under the military control of the Allied Force.

As regards the force to be provided for the protection of the frontiers and the maintenance of internal order in the remainder of the new Turkish state, it is for consideration how far a regular army, strictly limited in numbers and armament, will be required for the purpose, or how far a gendarmerie, supervised by Allied officers, will suffice. It will be remembered that small armies have been left under the Peace Treaties to the enemy States of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria; and the military advisers of His Majesty's Government are disposed to contend that for reasons which they are prepared to state, a similar provision should be made in the case of Turkey.

This is a point to be discussed between the French and British Governments.<sup>27</sup>

The Turkish Navy will be abolished except for such small armed vessels, of a type and tonnage to be fixed by an inter-allied naval commission, as

<sup>26</sup> This paragraph read as follows in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'For the execution of their duties the Commission might have the right of levying dues on shipping and imposing fines. On the assumption that a third of the 1913 Suez Canal dues were levied, a sum of over a million pounds sterling might be raised. Part of this sum might go to defraying the costs of maintenance of the Allied troops of occupation, but as already pointed out above, this sum would not cover the total cost if an effective garrison were really to be maintained.'

<sup>27</sup> In place of the three preceding paragraphs, from the heading 'Military and Naval', the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon read as follows:

#### *'Military and Naval'*

'The Turkish forces will be limited to a figure agreed upon among the Allies and recruited on a voluntary basis. The General Staff have suggested that this should be 60,000. The figure appears to us most excessive. The reason for the General Staff's suggestion is understood to be the necessity for the preservation of internal order and the control of frontiers. The first of these purposes can be provided for by gendarmerie, and the second by a quite small voluntary force of regulars. Our preference for gendarmerie is due to the fact that its equipment would not include artillery and would therefore render it less utilisable for external aggression.'

'As it is proposed to supervise the gendarmerie with allied officers there appears moreover to be little weight in the General Staff argument that expansion and movements are easier to detect in the case of regular troops than in that of gendarmerie.'

'With the exception of the Sultan's bodyguard, the strength of which will be fixed by the Treaty, no Turkish troops should be allowed in European Turkey; and, as stated elsewhere, with a view to preventing any interference with the free passage of the Straits, no Turkish troops should be allowed within thirty kilometres of the Straits or the Sea of Marmora.'

may be necessary for the prevention of smuggling and other purposes of revenue.

#### *Finance<sup>28</sup>*

In order to secure the repayment by Turkey of her just obligations, whether incurred before or during the war, and the re-establishment of the financial

<sup>28</sup> This section was newly drafted as compared with the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon in which the section read as follows:

#### *'Finance'*

'The general principles on which the financial proposals are based are as follows:—

'a. The financial stability of the Turkish Empire must be re-established as soon as possible.

'b. In order to ensure this result (1) the Allied Powers might, though we do not recommend that they should, waive the claims for reparation to which they are entitled. (2) Turkey must in return accept a considerable measure of financial control until, but not after, her more urgent existing obligations have been fulfilled.

'It is accordingly proposed that

'(1) The control of Turkish finance should be vested in a Financial Commission composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey.

'(2) If this Commission is to be in any way efficacious, or anything more than a paper guarantee against the old abuses, it must have real supervision over the collection and encashment of revenue. It must also have power to veto unnecessary expenditure, and the Turkish Budget would be presented to it for approval.

'(3) The Commission should utilise the funds at its disposal in accordance with the following order of priority:—

'(a) The current expenses of the administration of the Turkish State;

'(b) The expenses of the Commission, and of the Allied armies of occupation;

'(c) The service of the pre-war debt, including sums due to Allied nationals on coupons unpaid during the war;

'(d) Other claims for reparation by the Allies, unless waived.

'(e) The rehabilitation of the Turkish currency;

'(f) Obligations contracted towards Turkish nationals during the war;

'(g) The repayment of the claims of the German and Austrian Governments in respect of loans and advances made during the war, which have been transferred to the Allies by the Peace Treaties; but no payment is to be made under this head until the preceding obligations have been completely fulfilled.

'(4) The grant of concessions is to be subject to the approval of the Finance Commission.

'(5) Customs, Internal Revenue, Ports and Telegraphs, Audit and Mint are to be directed by foreign administrators appointed by the Turkish Government on the nomination of the Financial Commission, and subject to its ultimate control.

'(6) States to which Turkish territory is transferred, except the Hedjaz, will bear an equitable portion of the charge for the service of the pre-war debt. Such service will be provided for by a "Caisse de la dette publique ottomane" composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey. All the powers and duties of the old Council of the Debt, other than that immediately mentioned above should be assigned by the Financial Commission to the Departments of the Turkish Government considered most appropriate by that Commission. The staff of the old Council of the Debt for the collection of revenues shall be transferred to the control of the Financial Commission.

'(7) The sum to be transferred to the Allied Powers by Germany and Austria will be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission.

'(8) The Financial Commission will come to an end when the pre-war debt has been liquidated; the method of dealing with the unfulfilled obligations of Turkey, and the extent to which she may continue to require foreign assistance, will then be considered by Turkey in consultation with the League of Nations.'

stability of the Turkish State, Turkey must accept a measure of financial control, the exact degree of which remains to be determined, until such time as the more urgent of the above obligations have been discharged.

It is accordingly proposed that the control of Turkish finance should be vested in a Financial Commission composed of representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy, to whom a Turkish representative might possibly be added.

It is suggested that the order of priority in which the financial obligations of Turkey will require to be met, should be as follows:

(1) Payment of the expenses of the future inter-allied force and of the inter-allied Commissions for the control of (a) The Straits, (b) Finance (except in so far as these expenses may be covered by the shipping dues of the Straits).

(2) The services of the pre-war debt—including sums due to allied nationals—and other pre-war obligations.

(3) Compensation for damage done to the property of allied nationals in Turkey during the war.

(4) The cost of re-establishment with full compensation in their homes and businesses in Turkey, as defined by the Treaty, of Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly evicted during the war.

With a view to the financial re-establishment of the Turkish State as soon as possible, the Allies might waive the further claims for reparation, which they would be entitled to press against a more solvent State, on condition of acceptance by Turkey of the financial and administrative reforms proposed.

States to which Turkish territory is transferred, except the Hedjaz, will bear an equitable portion of the charge for the service of the pre-war debt.

For the purpose of supervising the discharge of the obligations above enumerated, the following alternative functions might be assigned to the Financial Commission.

(1) The Commission would take over from the existing Council of the Debt the collection and disposal of the revenues assigned to the service of the pre-war debt. In addition there would be assigned to the Commission the collection and control of such other sources of revenue as may be necessary to cover Turkey's obligations other than the pre-war debt. The number and extent of such other sources should form the subject of examination by an expert body.

The advantage of this suggestion is that it simplifies administration by reducing the number of Commissions operative in the Turkish State; while the security of the bondholders will be enhanced by becoming a charge on the new, as well as on the old, assigned revenues, so that their consent to the supersession of the old Council should not be difficult to obtain if necessary.

It may conceivably be unavoidable, at the outset in any case, that the control of the whole Turkish revenue may be necessary for the purposes specified above.

(2) In the second alternative the Council of the Debt would continue its existing functions under, however, the supervision of the new Commission,

the latter being merely charged with the collection and control of the further revenues to be selected for the fulfilment of the additional obligations specified above.

The financial departments in which a measure of foreign supervision may be necessary, cannot be specified until the number and extent of the new assigned revenues has been determined. The grant of concessions would, in the interest of Turkey herself, be subject to the approval of the Finance Commission.

The Financial Commission will come to an end when the pre-war debt has been liquidated; the method of dealing with the unfulfilled obligations of Turkey, and the extent to which she may continue to require foreign assistance, will then be considered by Turkey and the Allied Powers in consultation with the League of Nations.

#### *Administrative Reform*

In addition to the financial control, a certain amount of foreign administrative assistance will be needed, not only in the interests of the populations of Turkey, especially the minorities whose position must be safeguarded, but in order to qualify Turkey for the position which she may hope<sup>29</sup> to occupy as a member of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government have recently expressed a desire to accept some such measure of assistance, and this request might well be acceded to,<sup>30</sup> provided that the conditions upon which such assistance is given are of a nature to make it really effective. It may be pointed out to the Porte that experience has shown this to be necessary.

Control over finance alone will in all probability<sup>31</sup> not suffice. The Departments in which assistance so far as can be foreseen will be required are the following:—

*Interior.* This Department<sup>32</sup> will presumably be primarily responsible for the administration of the provisions for the protection of minorities.

*Justice.* This will obviously be particularly important if the Capitulations are replaced by [a] unified system. It has already been agreed at the meeting between M. Berthelot and Lord Curzon that such<sup>33</sup> a system should be worked out on the spot by an expert Allied Commission.

In both<sup>34</sup> the above Departments the best plan might be that the Allied

<sup>29</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read 'but in order to fit Turkey for the position which she may eventually hope' &c.

<sup>30</sup> The ensuing passage read in the earlier counter-draft '... acceded to on condition that it involves effective control, and its scope is somewhat extended'.

<sup>31</sup> The words 'in all probability' were not included in the earlier counter-draft.

<sup>32</sup> This passage read in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'The Departments in which assistance will be required, in order of importance, are the following:—Gendarmerie and police. Interior. This Department . . . ' &c.

<sup>33</sup> This passage read in the earlier counter-draft '... been agreed with M. Berthelot that such' &c.

<sup>34</sup> The ensuing passage from 'In both the above Departments' to 'must be effective supervision' replaced the following passage in the earlier counter-draft: 'Public Work. The

Advisers should combine the functions of Joint Under Secretary of State with those of Inspector-General.

#### *Gendarmerie and Police*

Here there must be effective supervision, and the Allied officials and officers employed should<sup>35</sup> in practice have the power to enforce commands. This is no more than was already agreed to by the Porte in 1914 for the Armenian vilayets.

For the working of this scheme of administrative assistance, two alternatives are suggested. (a) Each department should have a staff provided irrespective of nationality by the three Allies in common; (b) Each department should be assisted for purposes of staff, by one Allied Power, the necessary co-ordination being maintained by periodical meetings of the Allied representatives. This seems the more practical course.<sup>36</sup>

It will probably be undesirable to define in the Treaty the extent of the assistance indicated above; on the other hand past experience has shown that it is indispensable in the case of Turkey that the powers and duties of the Allied officials should be so laid down in advance, as to<sup>37</sup> afford no opportunity for evasion. A possible solution of the problem<sup>38</sup> would be to provide in the Treaty that the Sultan should express his desire for the assistance of Allied officials in certain departments of his administration, and that the position and duties of such officials should be defined by decrees of the Sultan issued in agreement with the Allies, and requiring their assent before they could be withdrawn or modified; and that these decrees, in which the rights and duties of such officials should be carefully defined, should be negotiated at the same time as the Treaty and be issued on its coming into force.

It might be desirable to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations to place this measure of assistance, instituted at the request of the Porte, under the ultimate supervision of the League.<sup>39</sup>

extent of the assistance to be given will vary in proportion to the importance in this connection of the Department concerned. In the case of the gendarmerie and police, there must be effective supervision . . . &c.

<sup>35</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read 'would'.

<sup>36</sup> This paragraph was substituted for the following passage in the earlier counter-draft: 'In the Ministry of Public Works it may be preferable to restrict the Allied representatives to the capacity of technical advisers. In the other Departments the Allied advisers might combine the functions of joint Under-Secretary of State with those of Inspector-General, and have sole power to select and dismiss the inspectorial staff. It would probably be best that each Department should be assisted by one Allied Power, the distribution being made by agreement with the Allies, and the necessary co-ordination being maintained by periodical meetings of the Allied representatives.'

<sup>37</sup> The preceding passage read in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon ' . . . past experience shows that it is essential that the powers and duties of the Allied officials should be so laid down as to . . . , &c.

<sup>38</sup> The words 'of the problem' were not included in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon.

<sup>39</sup> This paragraph read as follows in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'It might be well to endeavour to obtain the consent of the Council of the League of Nations

The above suggestions are submitted on the hypothesis that the rehabilitation of the Turkish State, the recovery of its finances and the restoration of its trade, cannot be achieved without a considerable measure of administrative as well as financial control. Should it be found that the same results can be obtained by any relaxation of the proposed methods of control any proposals to that effect will be willingly considered by His Majesty's Government.<sup>40</sup>

### *Protection of Minorities*

The Turkey left<sup>41</sup> independent by the Treaty will contain more than two million non-Turks, mostly Christians. The effective administrative assistance to be given to Turkey, particularly as regards supervision over the gendarmerie, should afford a considerable<sup>42</sup> measure of protection for these minorities and it is suggested that no difficulty should be found in securing Turkey's assent to a minority treaty on the lines of those<sup>43</sup> concluded both with old and new states, e.g. Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and Greece. It would fall to the supervised gendarmerie to carry out many of the clauses of this Treaty, the ultimate surveillance over which would be undertaken by the League of Nations as in the case of the other minority treaties.<sup>44</sup>

In this connection the British High Commissioner at Constantinople has urged that Turkey should be forced to repeal a law passed during<sup>45</sup> the war (the law of abandoned properties) whereby the Turk who had ejected the owner and seized Armenian and Greek properties was confirmed in the possession of them. This will presumably be covered by the measure of reparation to Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race provided for under the category of Finance.<sup>46</sup>

to this measure of assistance, established at the request of the Porte, being placed under the ultimate supervision of the League.'

<sup>40</sup> This paragraph was not included in the earlier counter-draft.

<sup>41</sup> In the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon these words were preceded by the following passage: 'Even with the exclusion of an independent Armenia and the zone round Smyrna and taking into account some gradual immigration of Armenians and Greeks from the rest of Turkey into these two areas, the Turkey left . . . ', &c.

<sup>42</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read 'large'.

<sup>43</sup> The words 'of those' were lacking in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon.

<sup>44</sup> In the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon there followed this passage: 'Whether or not reparation is to be demanded from Turkey for the Allies, some attempt should be made to complete the work which was begun in the early days of the Armistice in re-establishing in their homes the deported Greeks and Armenians and returning their stolen property. In particular the British High Commissioner at Constantinople has urged . . . ', &c.

<sup>45</sup> In the earlier counter-draft this passage read ' . . . a law passed by them during' &c.

<sup>46</sup> In place of this sentence the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon contained the following passage: 'Monsieur Venizelos has also urged that this should be done and proposed that Turkey should defray some of the expenses for rebuilding and repairing houses, and affording some of the capital necessary for the refugees' return to work. Such a measure of justice cannot be regarded as reparation especially as many of those affected are Turkish

### *Smyrna*<sup>47</sup>

If Greece receives the very large accretion of territory in Europe suggested above, i.e., up to the Chatalja lines, it is submitted that the sovereignty of the Smyrna area should remain with the Turks, subject to the institution of a predominantly Greek régime in the town of Smyrna. A similar Turkish régime, *mutatis mutandis*, should be provided in the town of Adrianople assuming that vilayet to be transferred to the Greeks.

Smyrna would of course be a free port.<sup>48</sup>

### *The Dodekanese*

It is understood that an arrangement has been made between the Italian and Greek Governments whereby the Dodekanese will be transferred to Greece.<sup>49</sup>

### *Italy and Southern Anatolia*

It is proposed that,<sup>50</sup> as a condition of the withdrawal of Italian troops from Southern Anatolia, Italy might receive economic advantages, consisting in a right of priority, over all commercial enterprises in a zone in this region to be defined later, as well as the coal mines of Heraclea by arrangement with the French.

subjects. Supervision over these payments might be entrusted to the Financial Commission already proposed.'

<sup>47</sup> In the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon this section was preceded by the following: '*Economic Provisions*. The question of the régime to replace the economic side of the Capitulations, including especially the subject of the tariff, has, it is understood, already been studied by the Economic Commission of the Conference, who will no doubt be prepared to present proposals under this head.

'The question of future concessions has already been dealt with under the heading of Finance, but it has already been agreed in principle between Lord Curzon and Monsieur Berthelot that Italy, as a condition of the withdrawal of her troops from Southern Anatolia, might receive economic advantages consisting in a right of priority over all commercial enterprise in that region, as well as the coal mines of Heraclea.'

<sup>48</sup> This section on Smyrna read as follows in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'If Greece receives the very large accretion of territory in Europe, as suggested above, it is for consideration whether this should not be treated as compensation for her withdrawal from the Smyrna area, subject to the protection of Greek interests in that region in the following manner. The Government of the Smyrna area would be carried on by a Greek Governor with a Council composed proportionately to the various elements of the area. Similar protection, *mutatis mutandis*, would be provided for the Turkish population in the Adrianople sanjak.

'Smyrna would of course be a free port.

'If the area remains Greek its limit will be the line of present Greek occupation as defined strategically by General Milne. It must be stipulated as before that Smyrna should be a free port and that free transit is permitted along all railways leading to Turkish territory.'

<sup>49</sup> This sentence read as follows in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'The Dodekanese will in any case be transferred to Greece.'

<sup>50</sup> This passage was preceded in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon by the following: 'This point has been dealt with under the heading of Economic Provisions.' (See note 47 above.)

### *Cilicia and the proposed French Zone between Cilicia and Armenia<sup>51</sup>*

His Majesty's Government observe that it is proposed by the French Government to assume charge of the greater part of the Vilayet of Adana, nearly the whole of the Vilayet of Diarbekir and the Sandjaks of Malatia, Marash and Urfa. In Adana there appears to be an overwhelming majority of Turks. In the Sandjaks of Marash and Malatia the Turks also constitute the largest single element in the population. It is presumed that the French Government will assume the control of the whole of these areas only under the same conditions on which it has already been agreed to dispose of the remaining territories, e.g. of Syria and Mesopotamia which belonged to the Ottoman Empire before the war, viz. as a Mandatory of the League of Nations.

<sup>51</sup> This section was substituted for the following two sections in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon:

#### *'Cilicia'*

'In Cilicia the French Government apparently propose to take over roughly the vilayet of Adana, but except that Monsieur Berthelot has withdrawn his original proposal to maintain the nominal spiritual sovereignty of the Sultan, we are not told on what conditions. The province is ethnologically Turkish. An impartial American estimate gives the population as

<i>Moslems.</i>	<i>Greeks.</i>	<i>Armenians.</i>
290,000	20,000	75,000

on a prewar basis. The large majority of the Moslems are Turks.

'The principal basis for the French proposal is of course the Sykes-Picot agreement, according to which this area was part of the blue zone and therefore placed under direct French administration. As however Great Britain is accepting a mandatory position for the red zone allotted to her under that agreement the same rule should certainly apply to France.

'In addition the French appear to claim Cilicia as a strategic defence for Syria. It should be clearly understood that Cilicia has no ethnological connection with Syria. In any case the proposal of the French Government to organise the administration of Cilicia in such a way as to ensure to the Armenians of that district their rights and the largest measure of protection must be insisted upon as in accordance with the Allied policy of supporting Armenian national aspirations. It should be clearly understood that the Armenians attach the greatest importance to being placed in no sense under Turkish administration in Cilicia.

'The French proposal as regards the details of the boundaries of Cilicia requires careful examination by an expert commission to be appointed by the Conference before it is finally endorsed.

#### *'French Zone between Cilicia and Armenia'*

'Apart from the territory which the French propose to take over in Cilicia, they have expressed the intention in both their recent notes of controlling an area running from the North East of the boundary of the vilayet of Adana in an easterly direction to the Euphrates and thence along the Murad-Su until it reaches the western boundary of the sanjak of MUSH, i.e. the frontier of the new Armenian State.'

'This proposal is equally based on the Sykes-Picot agreement (blue area under direct French administration). It includes the Arghana Madon copper mines. Its main object is probably to put a buffer between the Turkish and Arab countries. From this point of view, and owing to the fact that it contains a large Christian element, no ground for objection is seen, provided it is held in a mandatory capacity like Cilicia, and provided Turkish sovereignty ceases. Moreover French contiguity with the new Armenian state should be of material assistance to the latter.'

Such a Mandatory basis would naturally include the provision of facilities for Armenian settlement and complete protection of their rights especially in the Ajana Vilayet in accordance with the Allied policy of supporting Armenian national aspirations. The assent of His Majesty's Government to the French proposals regarding the above territories would be based on these assumptions.

In regard to the frontiers proposed in M. Berthelot's note of January 11th, His Majesty's Government assume that the details of these, like the other boundaries of Turkey, will form the subject of examination by an expert commission to be appointed by the Conference.

### Armenia

His Majesty's Government propose that Armenia should be constituted<sup>52</sup> a completely independent republic under the protection of the League of Nations. The territory of the republic of Armenia should<sup>53</sup> comprise:—

(i) The existing territory of the Armenian Republic of Erivan (the exact frontiers to be considered hereafter).

(ii) The eastern portion of the Vilayet of Erzerum (excluding the town of Erzerum), the plain of Mush, the district of Bitlis and the region of Lake Van, up to the Persian frontier.<sup>54</sup> His Majesty's Government had originally proposed to give the town of Erzerum to Armenia. Their military experts however believe that its possession might be a source of weakness rather than of strength to the new Armenian State. The inclusion of Erzerum in Turkey must however be subject to the condition that the fortifications of Erzerum are demolished.

The frontiers of Armenia with the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, with Turkey, with the French zone, and with Kurdistan, would be traced on the spot by an Inter-Allied Commission.

(iii) The Allies should<sup>53</sup> immediately place in hand the necessary measures for arming, equipping, and, if necessary, financing Armenia, to enable her independence to be established. The Army should<sup>53</sup> be assisted by Allied officers.

Armenia should<sup>53</sup> be given access to the free port of Batum by means of transit conventions with the interested States, and ultimately to Trebizond by a similar convention with Turkey if and when the railway inland from Trebizond is built.

(iv) The form of Government to be established in Armenia should be such as to guarantee to non-Armenian[s] representation and the protection of their rights. This could<sup>55</sup> be arranged by a special treaty between Armenia and the Allies.

<sup>52</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read: 'Armenia will be constituted' &c.

<sup>53</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read 'will'.

<sup>54</sup> The immediately ensuing passage read as follows in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon: 'We had originally proposed to give the town of Erzerum to Armenia but feel obliged to defer to the view of the General Staff that its possession . . .', &c.

<sup>55</sup> The counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon here read 'can'.

*Georgia*

The province of Lazistan will be assigned to Georgia.

*Batum*

A zone round Batum, of which the exact boundaries will be fixed hereafter, will be established as a free city under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The port shall be free.

*Miscellaneous*

Various other matters, as to which draft provisions have already been prepared in the British Delegation, will eventually have to be dealt with in the Treaty of Peace. The following may be mentioned as examples:—

1. Special provision for the vesting of certain areas in Gallipoli containing the graves of Allied soldiers in the hands of the Imperial Graves Commission.
2. Special provision for Allied graves elsewhere in Turkey to be left independent.
3. Sanitary administration.
4. German State property and interests in Turkey.
5. Return of antiquities.
6. Archaeological law.
- 7.<sup>56</sup> Tariff and the economic aspect of the capitulations.
8. Various other economic questions.

APPENDIX E TO NO. 665

*Supplementary Memorandum by M. Venizelos of Jan. 16th [? 14th]<sup>57</sup>*

I have the honour to revert to two questions mentioned in my memorandum of yesterday.<sup>58</sup> The questions are the following: (1) That of reparations to be paid by Turkey, (2) The protection of the national minorities in that country.

I

Taking into consideration the number of her population and the extent of her territory and its resources, Turkey has proportionately a far smaller public debt than any of the Allied countries. If an effective economic control over the finances of Turkey were applied, it would be possible for that country not only to compensate those of her subjects whose property she destroyed—because of their sympathies with the Allies—but to pay to the latter a substantial amount to cover a part at least of the reparations, which, by the terms of the treaties already signed with Germany, Austria and Bulgaria, have been acknowledged as due by these enemy countries. This could be done without imposing on Turkey a taxation proportionately greater than, or even as great as, that of her victors. It would be possible to recognise the principle of a debt due for reparations, the determination of the

<sup>56</sup> Items 7 and 8 were not included in the counter-draft prepared for Lord Curzon.

<sup>57</sup> See at foot of document.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. appendix C above.

amount thereof being left to the decision of the Commission of Control, on the basis of the state of the public income of Turkey after the war, whilst fixing a maximum amount which such reparations could not exceed in any event.

## II

As regards the application of administrative control, in so far as possible, for the protection of minorities in Turkey, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:

The principal Allied and Associated Powers insisted that the newly created States, as well as those whose territory is increased in Middle and Eastern Europe, should sign special conventions safeguarding the rights of the minorities. They considered the importance of this provision so essential that they did not hesitate to show themselves unyielding toward certain of the Allied countries in order to enforce the signing of these conventions. And yet, neither life nor property nor the honour of these minorities residing in the countries referred to above, have ever been placed in jeopardy. This step on the part of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers was vindicated on the ground alone of assuring equality of rights to all minorities.

As is well known, however, in regard to minorities the most elementary rights of men—life, honour and property—have always been disregarded and exposed to the utmost danger in Turkey.

How is it possible for the Allied Powers, when on the point of deciding the fate of Turkey, not to take advantage of this opportunity to impose on that country all the guarantee that may be deemed necessary, to assure to the minorities that remain in Turkey, not only their national entity, but protection for their life, honour and property?

I venture to express the opinion that if it is decided to keep Turkey in Constantinople, her maintenance there should depend on her ability in the future to conform to the requirements of European Public Law; and it should be specifically stated that, if in future Turkey should prove herself incapable of complying with the obligations imposed upon her by the Treaty of Peace, for the protection of minorities, the League of Nations should be entitled to force Turkey to evacuate Constantinople, and limit herself to Asia Minor. I am of the opinion that this constant threat would prove the most effective restraint on Turkish misconduct in the future.

E. K. VENIZELOS

PARIS, January 14th, 1920

### No. 666

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 21)*

*No. 61 Telegraphic [172402/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 20, 1920

It is reported from secret sources that a meeting of Ministers was called on January 4 to discuss report from Hurshid Pasha, one of two inspecting

generals sent into Anatolia who had met Mustafa Kemal on January 1. Report states following programme was (?) decided by Cabinet on this occasion as result of understanding between Government and Mustafa Kemal:—

A. If Smyrna is given to Greece, Nationalists will declare their independence of Government and will attack Greek forces and Greek population. Government support was promised to Mustafa Kemal, and he was informed that Italian Government had promised not to interfere with Turks in their resistance to Greeks.

B. If Constantinople is detached from Turkey Government will publish address by Khalif to Ottoman world and will proclaim general amnesty.

### No. 667

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received February 10)*

*No. 115 [177624/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 20, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of a report which I have received from . . .<sup>1</sup> of business transacted at a Cabinet Council held on 4th January 1920.

2. I am informed that the agent by whom it was reported is well placed to obtain information of this nature.

As certain portions of this report have been confirmed by official announcements since its circulation, there is no reason to suppose that the portion of it dealing with the letter of Ahmed Riza<sup>2</sup> is other than genuine.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

### ENCLOSURE IN No. 667

*Cabinet Meeting of the 4th January 1920*

. . .<sup>1</sup> reports the following particulars of business transacted at a Cabinet Council held of 4th Jan. 1920.

#### (1) *Letter from Ahmed Riza Bey*

This letter, which was addressed to Churuk Soulou Mahmoud Pasha as representing the National Bloc, was sent by the latter to the Grand Vezirate and laid before the Council.

It appears from this letter that after the second visit of MM. Clemenceau and Berthelot to London,<sup>3</sup> the attitude of the French Government had

<sup>1</sup> The designation of a confidential source is here omitted.

<sup>2</sup> Conservative Turkish politician.

<sup>3</sup> M. Berthelot had visited London twice during December 1919, but on his second visit (for 'the Foreign Office Conference') he was not accompanying M. Clemenceau: cf. No. 646, also Volume II, No. 55, note 10.

changed to the detriment of Turkey. This change was in part due to the withdrawal from the French Cabinet of certain persons on whose support Ahmed Riza had believed that he could count.

The letter states that Ahmed Riza was received by Monsieur Clemenceau after his return from London and that though he was personally friendly to him, the French Prime Minister remarked that the policy of Turkey had invariably been an adventurous one and that she had not kept her promises. He continued that the conduct of Turkey since the Armistice had not been such as to merit the goodwill of Europe, and that everything hung on the decision with regard to Turkey, which was now under consideration.

Towards the close of the conversation M. Clemenceau is said to have suggested to Ahmed Riza the idea of an Entente between Turkey, Greece, and the Armenians, which he considered would influence the decision in Turkey's favour. He regretted that those in power in Turkey had not realised the necessity for punishing those responsible for bringing the country into the general war and for the establishment of an administration in conformity with modern needs.

Ahmed Riza Bey's letter urged the importance of a union of parties at Constantinople, or [of] giving satisfaction to the Christians, and of taking steps to ensure that the entire Moslem world had a voice in the destinies of the Caliphate. He considered that although public opinion in Europe was somewhat disturbed by the existence of the National Forces that these were at present necessary for the defence of the Caliphate and the Empire.

The Council decided to refer the report for the opinion of the Nationalists, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Ministers of War, of the Interior, and of Foreign Affairs, and to certain Senators and ex-Ministers. It was decided to continue its discussion at its next meeting.

### (2) *Opening of the Chamber*

The 12th or 14th January was suggested as a suitable date for the convocation of the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>4</sup> It was decided to leave the choice of a definite date to the Sultan.

### (3) *Sivas and Yeni Han Elections*

The council had previously directed the invalidation of the Elections at Sivas and Yeni Han. The deputies for these constituenc[i]es have, however, been sent to Constantinople. As Kara Vassif is deputy for Sivas and the Nationalists' representative, the Government is in a very difficult position. The Council recognised with regret that its orders had not been carried out.

<sup>4</sup> The new chamber was convened on January 12. Admiral Webb reported of the opening (Constantinople telegram No. 38 of January 13, received January 15):

'Sultan pleaded indisposition and did not attend. About seventy-five deputies were present. Speech from throne is comparatively colourless. Most emphatic passage is that which refers to increased difficulty and agitations produced by Greek aggression at Smyrna, which is inseparable portion of Empire. Remainder of speech dwells on troublesome nature of situation; wickedness of those who involved Turkey in general war, and innocence of military authorities.'

The matter gave rise to friction between the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior, the latter wishing to insist on invalidation, whilst the former was in favour of adjournment.

The majority of Ministers and the President favoured invalidation. It was, however, finally decided to adjourn the matter, pending the despatch of a communication to the Nationalists and Mustafa Kemal.

(4) *Anti-Nationalist Movement at Baibourt.*

Communications received from the acting Vali of Erzerum and from Fevzi Pasha report an anti-Nationalist movement amongst the population to the north of Baibourt, the movement being headed by Sheikh Kurd Ali. Part of the local troops and gendarmerie are stated to have joined the movement. The Nationalists accuse the Government of favouring it.

The Council decided to instruct the Vali to assure the Nationalists that the Central Government had no part in this movement. Orders were issued to repress it and it was decided to declare martial law at Erzerum and Baibourt.

(5) *Probable Action in Turkey*

With a view to arriving at an understanding between the Nationalists and the Government as to the line to be followed in the event of the decisions of the Peace Conference including the loss to Turkey of Constantinople and Smyrna, it was decided to ask Mustafa Kemal Pasha to come to Constantinople, or in the event of his finding it impossible to do so, to send the Minister of War and General Hurshid Pasha to meet him at a point to be subsequently decided on to discuss the matter.

Notwithstanding the refusal of four Ministers to sign this decision, it was agreed that it should be submitted to the Sultan.

(6) *The National Forces*

A telegram was read from the late Vali of Smyrna reporting that the National Forces were recruiting in the Sanjaks of Afion Kara Hissar and Akshehir.

(7) *Administrative Changes*

The Council discussed the advisability of detaching the Sanjak of Eski Shehir from the Vilayet of Broussa and forming it into a vilayet to include the Sanjaks of Birejik, Afion Kara Hissar, Kutania, and certain other Kazas at present belonging to the Angora Vilayet. The scheme was referred to the Minister of the Interior who was instructed to discuss it with the Vali of Broussa.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12. 1. 20.

No. 668

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received February 10)*

No. 114 [177623/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 20, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of a report, received from . . .<sup>1</sup> of the matters dealt with at a Military Conference held at the Sultan's Palace on the night of 4th January, 1920.

2. Your Lordship will notice that the Conference is said to have been convened by the Sultan; it is not clear why this should be so, and it is difficult to believe that His Majesty is acquainted with Enver Pasha's movements.

3. With regard to the reliability of the reporting agent, I am informed that although he has not been working sufficiently long to enable his reports to be guaranteed, yet there is strong corroborative evidence that his information is to be relied upon.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 668

*Military Conference at the Palace*

Following from . . .<sup>1</sup>

By order of the Sultan a Military Conference was held at the Palace on the night of 4th January 1920 at which the following were present:—

Prince Abdur Rahim Effendi, representing the Sultan.

Damat Ismail Hakki, Chief of the Palace Staff.

Djevad Pasha, C.G.S.

Bekir Sami Bey of the National Forces Committee.

Kara Vassif Bey, Nationalist delegate.

The following matters were dealt with:—

*1. Azerbaijan, Daghestan, and the Eastern Provinces*

Prince Abdur Rahim Effendi stated that he had shown the Sultan the telegrams from the various Army Corps and those dealing with the work of Enver Pasha in Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The Sultan had expressed himself as insufficiently informed as to the latter and suggested that it might be advisable to send a royal Prince to the Eastern Provinces and a representative whom he would appoint to Daghestan.

Djevad Pasha said that Enver Pasha's work was of great importance and that he did not consider His Majesty's plan a suitable one. He added that preparations for the safety of the Eastern Provinces must be undertaken and that he had given orders to the XV Army Corps to fortify the frontiers.

<sup>1</sup> The designation of a confidential source is here omitted.

## *2. Military Preparations*

Kara Vassif Bey stated that in the event of (?) in preparation for) a rising, the Army Corps should occupy the depots of arms and ammunition which the Germans had left behind in different parts of Anatolia and that these steps should be taken in such a manner as not to attract the attention of the Allied Powers. The arms should then be distributed to the National Forces.

Djevad Pasha was of opinion that as the seizure of these depots by the Army Corps would be contrary to the terms of the Armistice, the French and British would be informed as soon as it occurred and would intervene. He suggested that it would be better to organise a pillage of these depots by the civil population of each district; such organisation to be worked by bands drawn from the National Forces in the Smyrna district.

The regular forces would then intervene and seize the arms and ammunition.

Bekir Sami Bey considered that popular meetings would be necessary to carry out this plan and that the news which had recently arrived from the Peace Conference afforded a suitable opportunity for them. He thought that the depots in the Eastern provinces or in their neighbourhood could be raided by the tribes.

## *3. Turkish Ammunition Factories*

Djevad Pasha stated that as it was impossible to prepare the munitions required in the military factories that these should be closed and the machinery sold piecemeal, nominally for its employment in local industries, that it should be secretly re-purchased and sent to Anatolia where it could be again put together.

He thought that this plan could be carried out without its coming to the knowledge of the Allied Powers.

## *4. Damascus Newspaper*

Abdur Rahim Effendi stated that the Sultan was much annoyed by the tone of the newspaper *Erden* published in Arabic at Damascus which he understood was in receipt of a subvention. He considered that the giving of financial support to an Arab paper for the purpose of defending the Caliphate and the Sultan was dishonouring to both in the eyes of the Arabs.

## *5. Kurdestan*

Abdur Rahim Effendi stated that the Sultan favoured an independent Kurdestan bound to Turkey by political, economic, and financial ties and that he considered such a Kurdestan would be a better corridor between Turkey and the Moslems of the Caucasian and Trans-Caspian countries, than an Armenian Republic.

Djevad Pasha stated that this matter was receiving the attention of the O/C XV Army Corps to whom he would communicate the Imperial views on this subject.

## *6. Loyal Address from Ibn Saoud*

Prince Abdur Rahim announced that the Sultan had received with much satisfaction a loyal address from Ibn Saoud and desired that the matters with which it dealt should receive a favourable solution at an early date. Djevad Pasha begged the Prince to inform His Majesty that the General Staff was already dealing with these matters and hoped shortly to arrive at a decision regarding them.

## *7. Unionists' Activity in Switzerland*

Prince Abdur Rahim begged the Conference to excuse him if he did not in future communicate to the Sultan information from Switzerland dealing with the activity of Talaat, Djemal, and other Unionist chiefs. His Majesty, he stated, was much incensed against these persons and considered that their activity would go far to nullify that of other Moslem Committees working in Switzerland.

Kara Vassif Bey suggested that information on this subject should not in future be communicated to His Majesty.

## *8. The London Islamic Committee*

Prince Abdur Rahim Effendi announced that His Majesty was much interested in the work of the Islamic Committee in London and that he directed that the closest touch should be maintained with it and that all information arriving from it should be immediately communicated to him.

Djевад Pasha replied that Said Ali Bey regularly sent most satisfactory reports from the Committee in question and asked the Prince to inform His Majesty that the General Staff would immediately communicate them to the Sultan.

## *9. The Sultan opposed to Resistance to the Allies*

Prince Abdur Rahim asked whether he should communicate to His Majesty a telegram dealing with the projected despatch to Konia of an Italian Force of 3,000 men and 4 guns.

Kara Vassif Bey thought there was no objection to the matter being brought to the notice of His Majesty and stated that the National Forces had already taken the necessary steps. He considered that the Allied Force in Anatolia constituted no danger to Turkey and begged that the Sultan might be informed accordingly.

Abdur Rahim Effendi replied that the Sultan was opposed to armed resistance to the Allied Powers which he believed would cause unnecessary bloodshed. He begged to be excused from communicating the statement of Kara Vassif to the Sultan.

Djевад Pasha stated that he would discuss the matter with the Minister of War who would seize an opportunity of mentioning it to His Majesty after the Selamlik<sup>2</sup> on Friday.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9. I. 20.

<sup>2</sup> The levée of the Sultan after the Moslem Friday service.

No. 669

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received January 22)*

*No. 64 Telegraphic [172442/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 21, 1920

My telegram No. 60,<sup>1</sup> January 20.

Late on afternoon of January 21 Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed official letters to the Allied High Commissioners stating Minister of War and Chief of Staff have handed in their resignations, which have been accepted by the Sultan. Before decision was taken, Minister for Foreign Affairs called on each of the three High Commissioners to communicate explanation offered by (? Minister of War) of charges enumerated in schedule referred to in my telegram No. 47.<sup>2</sup>

For my part, I replied I was not prepared to enter into any discussion on the subject. I made it quite clear that action of High Commissioners had only been taken after their patience had been completely exhausted by repeated breaches of armistice and other signs of defiance.

My French colleague informs me he held similar language.

Both M. Defrance and I emphasised that [*sic*] the fact that attack was not directed against present Cabinet as such, and that we adhered to resolution of non-interference in internal politics.

As instancing attitude of Minister of War and his Chief of Staff towards Allies, I spoke very strongly of insolent behaviour of Turkish officers in the streets of Constantinople, behaviour which has made itself marked since Jemal and Djevad Pasha went to War Office and which, I said, was so universal that it could only be result of superior orders.

Impression I formed from whole interview was that Minister for Foreign Affairs and Grand Vizier were extremely anxious to meet Allied wishes.

Capitulation of Porte indicates that they have succeeded, at any rate for the moment, in saving situation, but Cabinet has received severe shock and full results of incident will only be known when leaders of national movement here and in provinces have shown how they mean to take this rebuff.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No. 663, note 4.

<sup>2</sup> No. 663.

<sup>3</sup> In reply to this telegram Admiral Webb was informed in Foreign Office telegram No. 62 of January 24, 1920, to Constantinople: 'Your action is approved.'

No. 670

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 22)*

*No. 80 Telegraphic [173051/151671/44]*

PARIS, January 21, 1920

Following from Lord Curzon.

This morning Supreme Council held (? its) final session<sup>1</sup> in two parts,

<sup>1</sup> The minutes of this meeting are printed in Volume II, No. 80.

the first presided by M. Clemenceau who then retired, the second by M. Millerand<sup>2</sup>. . . .<sup>3</sup>

With regard to impending Turkish negotiations a separate Note from the four Allied Powers to American Government was approved stating extreme urgency of question, inviting co-operation of United States but intimating necessity even in their absence of proceeding without delay American (? Government) being kept informed of progress of negotiations at each stage.

It was then agreed that (? Conference of) Ambassadors provided for in resolutions of July 28th and December 13th last<sup>4</sup> should be forthwith set up but that Prime Ministers (?) or Foreign Secretaries of any of Allied Powers might at any time resume their place on the Council should importance of subject under discussion demand their presence. All current business with the exception of Turkish question was left to this Conference.

As regards Turkish peace it was agreed that discussion of this question should be opened in London at earliest date in concert with Ministers concerned. French declared it had already been agreed between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau that Turkish Delegation should be heard in Paris and that Treaty should be ultimately signed at Paris. Having no knowledge on these points I made necessary reservations with regard to them.

The present session of Supreme Council then came to an end.

<sup>2</sup> M. Millerand had lately succeeded M. Clemenceau as French Prime Minister.

<sup>3</sup> There followed a summary of minute 1 of No. 80 in Volume II, q.v. (Reply to Mr. Lansing's memorandum.)

<sup>4</sup> See Volume II, No. 80, minute 3.

### No. 671

*Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 6 Telegraphic: by bag [175085/151671/44]*

PARIS, January 22, 1920

*Future of Turkish Negotiations.*

Please refer to Lord Curzon's telegram of yesterday describing proceedings of Supreme Council.<sup>2</sup> It was decided to send two separate telegrams to the United States Government, one from the British and French Prime Ministers dealing with American participation in the Russian and Italian negotiations which will be handed to Mr. Wallace tomorrow, the other from the Supreme Council announcing the opening of Turkish negotiations.<sup>3</sup> Copies of the two telegrams in question are annexed.<sup>4</sup> The second telegram consisted of the latter part of the telegram originally drafted by the Prime Minister before his departure, but included an opening sentence: 'It has been decided by the Allied Governments that the discussion of the proposed Treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be commenced with as little delay as possible in London.' This

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain, but was probably January 23, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> No. 670.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 80.

<sup>4</sup> The first of the two above-mentioned telegrams is not here printed; for this telegram see Volume II, No. 80, note 3 and appendix A.

sentence was drafted by Lord Curzon as an uncontroversial introduction to the remainder of the telegram.

By Lord Curzon's instructions Mr. Leeper<sup>5</sup> saw M. Berthelot to arrange for the despatch of the telegram to Washington this morning. M. Berthelot raised strong objections to the wording of the opening sentence and proposed that it should be corrected to read 'the preparatory discussion of the proposed Treaty shall be continued with as little delay as possible in London'. It had already become apparent from conversations both between Mr. Leeper and M. Berthelot and between myself and M. Berthelot that the French Government understood differently from our own the future of the peace negotiations in regard to Turkey. The French view may be summarised as follows:-

They are in accord that the general discussion of principles should take place in London, but they intend and understand that the negotiation and all matters of detail, including the actual drafting of the Treaty, should take place in Paris as before.

This matter is being fully gone into in my letter and enclosures to Lord Hardinge which goes by the same messenger<sup>6</sup> and which should be referred to in this connection.

In view of the marked divergence which has arisen and which was incapable of immediate adjustment the first matter seemed to be the despatch of the telegram. With a view to ensuring this Lord Curzon instructed myself and Mr. Leeper to go and see M. Berthelot and to point out to him that Lord Curzon's wording in no way pre-judged the point at issue and that Lord Curzon felt himself quite unable to modify the wording in the sense desired by M. Berthelot. M. Berthelot took an entirely unyielding attitude and declared he could not agree to the despatch of the telegram unless his wording was adopted. He added categorically that he spoke for the French Government. After pressing him for some time without effect, Mr. Leeper and I observed that the matter had reached a deadlock and that in view of Lord Curzon's instructions we had no option but to refer the matter to London.

Consequently it is impossible to despatch the Prime Minister's telegram to the American Government till the matter has been cleared up by the Prime Minister with the French Government. It appears of some urgency that the matter be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister at once as the threatened delay might seriously prejudice the chances of American participation in the negotiations.

#### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 671

*Telegram to be sent on behalf of the Supreme Council to the United States Government through the French Ambassador at Washington*

It has been decided by the Allied Governments that the [preparatory]<sup>7</sup> discussion of the proposed Treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be commenced

<sup>5</sup> Member of the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>6</sup> No. 672.

<sup>7</sup> This word was a pencilled addition to the original: see note in original at foot of this draft.

[continued]<sup>7</sup> with as little delay as possible in London. The Allied Governments have already waited many months in order that the United States might have ample time to decide its policy on the Eastern question, for they were anxious for its advice and co-operation. Apart from the great military expense which has thus been cast upon the countries concerned, Great Britain and France in particular, this delay has allowed the unruly and anti-Ally elements in Turkey to recover much of their power and to enter into dangerous relations with the Bolsheviks. It is important, therefore, to delay the negotiations no longer and it is clearly out of the question to conduct them with the necessary speed and decision, if, in the absence of a fully empowered American plenipotentiary, all the many matters to be settled have to be referred to the United States Government. The Allied Governments, needless to say, attach the highest value to American assistance and co-operation and would gladly welcome the addition of such a plenipotentiary to their Councils. In the event, however, of the United States Government not being able to act in this way, the Allied Governments consider that there will be no other alternative but to proceed with the negotiations of Peace with Turkey without delay, keeping the United States Government fully informed of the course of the discussion and taking every care compatible with the early conclusion of Peace to elicit their views. But with the world in its present state time is the most vital element.

*Note.*

Pencilled words are M. Berthelot's proposed alteration which was unacceptable to Lord Curzon.

No. 672

*Letter from Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [175091/151671/44]*

PARIS, January 22, 1920

Dear Lord Hardinge,

Since the Prime Minister's departure there has arisen in regard to the future of the Peace Conference a situation which I feel I must report to you immediately.

Mr. Leeper saw M. Berthelot who used to him language which made it apparent that the French did not consider themselves in any way to have assented to the transfer of the whole Peace Conference to London, but only to the discussion of general principles. Subsequently I saw M. Berthelot myself. He also made it quite clear to me that the French did not contemplate sending anything in the nature of technical delegations to London or the creation of any machinery such as we have had to organise here. All that the French had in mind was that their statesmen, accompanied possibly by Under Secretaries of State, should go to London for discussions, and then that the drafting and elaboration of details should be resumed in Paris. He made

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain but was probably January 23, 1920.

it clear that the French Government considered any other course impracticable (in view of the organisation already existing here) and in any case unacceptable to them.

I said that I had understood something different to have been agreed upon, but as we seemed to be talking quite at cross purposes I said that I could not continue the conversation unless he put down in writing exactly what the French Government understood themselves to have agreed to. He said that he would do so and sent a note, of which I enclose a copy herewith. The note speaks for itself and confirms what I had thought as to the intention of the French Government. The divergence of view became of immediate importance owing to the necessity of a reply to America. This part of the matter is dealt with in the telegram which I am sending by this bag.<sup>2</sup> I therefore saw Lord Curzon with Mr. Leeper, and he wrote upon the French note the commentary of which I enclose a copy. By his instruction I saw M. Berthelot again accompanied by Mr. Leeper. The result of our conversation so far as the reply to America is concerned is shown in my above mentioned telegram.<sup>2</sup> After terminating the discussion on that point I informed M. Berthelot briefly that I had shown the French memorandum to Lord Curzon, that by his instruction I was referring the matter to London and that I would make a further communication to him when so instructed. M. Berthelot repeated that he spoke for his Government, that they could in no way modify their attitude in this matter and that they had understood the British Government to be in agreement with them. He added that if I had any doubt on this score that I might see M. Millerand myself. I said that a communication from [? for] M. Millerand would doubtless be forthcoming from a higher quarter.

This letter is a very hurried production as I am writing against time to try and catch to-night's bag.

Yours sincerely,  
ROBERT VANSITTART

A copy of the original American memorandum will be sent by tomorrow's bag.<sup>3</sup>

#### ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 672

*Note by M. Berthelot*

Jan. 21, 1920

#### 1<sup>o</sup> Conférence des Ambassadeurs

Les Ambassadeurs des cinq Principales Puissances tiendront des réunions régulières à Paris pour traiter d'accord les questions d'exécution du Traité et les questions diverses posées par la politique commune des Alliés qui ne comporteraient pas de décisions des Gouvernements.

Les principes et les attributions de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs ont été définis dans la séance du Conseil Suprême du 28 juillet 1919<sup>4</sup> et visés dans la résolution du 11 décembre au cours de la Conférence de Londres.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> No. 671. <sup>3</sup> This memorandum is not here printed: see Volume II, No. 80, note 8.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume I, No. 21, minute 1.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume II, No. 62.

Il a été décidé en outre au Conseil Suprême du 21 janvier 1920<sup>6</sup> que les Gouvernements pourraient remplacer ou doubler leurs Ambassadeurs s'ils le jugeaient utile à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, lorsqu'une question d'ordre plus général serait posée.

#### *2<sup>o</sup> Tractation des grandes questions politiques*

La résolution du 11 décembre 1919 de la Conférence de Londres<sup>5</sup> a stipulé dans son second paragraphe que, dorénavant, les grandes questions politiques pourraient être traitées par communications directes entre les Gouvernements eux-mêmes (tandis que les questions de détail seraient réglées par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs à Paris).

Les chefs de Gouvernement pourraient se réunir, selon l'intérêt spécial de la question traitée, dans l'une des trois grandes capitales, à Londres, à Paris ou à Rome, d'accord entre les chefs de Gouvernement.

#### *3<sup>o</sup> Conférence de la Paix*

Le siège de la Conférence de la Paix reste fixé à Paris, selon les décisions prises dès le début par tous les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés.

Deux sessions de la Conférence de la Paix ont ainsi eu lieu successivement à Paris et bien que la date d'une troisième session ne soit pas encore fixée, elle le sera au moment opportun.

#### *4<sup>o</sup> Traité avec la Turquie*

M. Lloyd George et M. Clemenceau ont envisagé, dans des conversations directes et indirectes, les conditions dans lesquelles devrait être préparé, négocié et conclu le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

Une discrimination a été faite entre la discussion des principes généraux de Traité de Paix avec la Turquie entre les chefs de Gouvernement et l'élaboration par la Conférence de la Paix des Traités nécessaires.

Les premiers pourparlers entre Gouvernements ont eu lieu à Londres, spécialement entre les Chefs des Gouvernements français et anglais, dans la Conférence du 11 au 13 décembre 1919.<sup>7</sup>

Une seconde Conférence anglo-française a été tenue également à Londres, du 22 au 24 décembre 1919, entre Lord Curzon et M. Berthelot,<sup>8</sup> spécialement délégués par leurs Gouvernements et assistés d'experts français et anglais.

Une troisième série d'études des principes du Traité avec la Turquie entre les Représentants des Pays Alliés et Associés aura lieu prochainement à Londres, M. Millerand s'étant mis d'accord à cet égard avec le Premier Ministre anglais, et M. Nitti ayant accepté également, tout en demandant à ne fixer la date à laquelle il pourra se rendre à Londres qu'après avoir pris connaissance de ses obligations de Chef de Gouvernement à Rome.

Cette procédure est acceptée par le Gouvernement français, sous la réserve

<sup>6</sup> See Volume II, No. 80, minute 3.

<sup>7</sup> See Volume II, Chap. II.

<sup>8</sup> See Nos. 631-3.

qu'il reste bien entendu que la négociation proprement dite du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, la convocation des Délégués turcs et la signature de la Paix aient lieu dans une session de la Conférence à Paris.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 672

*Note by Lord Curzon*

Jan. 22, 1920

I have proceeded hitherto on the assumption that the arrangement made with M. Clemenceau as to the negotiation of the Turkish Peace Treaty in Paris was personal to himself, and was a tribute to his age and authority. After we have spent a fortnight in Paris without approaching the question at all, now that the British Ministers have retired to London and cannot return, and also now that M. Clemenceau has disappeared, I have further believed it to be agreed upon that the Turkish Treaty should be dealt with in London.

If a promise was given at an earlier stage that the Turks should be heard and the Treaty ultimately signed in Paris that promise must be honoured, but apart from that it is in London that the remainder of the discussions should, upon the above assumptions, be held.

M. Berthelot's contention is diametrically the opposite of this. He contends that the promise to M. Clemenceau still holds good; that the Peace Conference can only meet at Paris; that the discussion in London to which M. Millerand and M. Nitti are willing to come over, is only a preliminary discussion of the principles of the proposed Treaty—similar to the pourparlers which have already taken place in London and that when this is over the venue is to be changed to Paris where the remainder of the business is to be done. This will suit the French very well. Will it equally suit us? And who in that case is to be in Paris and conduct the English case?

This point must be decided between the heads of the Governments concerned and I remit it accordingly to the Prime Minister.

No. 673

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received February 10)*

No. 131 [177634/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 22, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a report<sup>1</sup> which has been received from a secret source giving an account of Bolshevik Pan-Islamic propaganda in the Crimea, to which is attached a reduced facsimile of a coloured poster<sup>1</sup> calling on Moslems to join the Bolshevik forces which, it is stated, has been widely distributed throughout the country.

2. A second report, which is enclosed, has been furnished from the same source, and describes a meeting to discuss Pan-Islamic activities connected with Mesopotamia, India and Afghanistan, which is reported to have been held at the Sultan's palace in Constantinople about the 7th January, and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

to have been attended by representatives of the Turkish War Ministry, the National Forces, and the Sultan's Staff.

3. The reference to the Mahsuds at the end of this second report is of interest in view of the difficulties this tribe has been creating on the Indian frontier.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 673

*Pan-Islamism*

A report has been received from . . .<sup>2</sup> of the proceedings of a meeting of the Staff of the Sultan's Palace which took place about the 7th or 8th January, 1920. The following were present:—Jevad Pasha, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Kara Vassif Bey (Delegate of the Turkish Nationalists), Bekir Sami Bey, Member of the National Representative Committee, Prince Abdul Rahim, on behalf of the Sultan, and Damad Ismail Hakki, Chief of the Palace Staff.

The meeting which was exclusively devoted to the discussion of various items in a Pan-Islamic programme connected with Mesopotamia, India and Afghanistan, reechoes almost completely the contents of two recent telegrams which were circulated under cover of report . . .<sup>2</sup> The meeting was opened by Prince Abdul Rahim who stated that His Majesty the Sultan was urgently desirous of hearing the news which had arrived regarding 'our' activities in India.

To this Jevad Pasha replied that according to recent telegrams the situation was as follows:—it had been determined to send Jabbara and Abu Selman to Sheikh Ibn Saoud but, in order to do so, it was necessary first to warn Ibn Saoud; a telegram had been sent (to him) by the Ministry of War but so far no reply had been received; as, too, the Sulemaniah assembly<sup>3</sup> had not yet come to an end and, as at the same time Ajemi Pasha, who was to form the channel for the communication of such news to the troops (in Anatolia for communication to Constantinople), was still at Sulemaniah the execution of 'our' plan to send Jabbara and Abu Selman to Sheikh Ibn Saoud had been postponed; 'Jabbara and his companions' were at El Ashir near Havzat; their hiding place had been kept absolutely secret and no one, except the Army Corps Commander, knew of it. Jevad Pasha added that the 'officer sent with Wali Gulibad Khan' (see . . .)<sup>2</sup> had reached the Indian frontier and had taken part in Friday prayers there; they had already subsidised the Indian papers of Bandar Bushire and success, in that respect, was assured.

Prince Abdul Rahim then expressed the Sultan's desire to know the strength of the 'Khan' (name not reported; query Babir Khan, vide report . . .)<sup>2</sup> from whom he had received a letter mentioning his 'forces', and also to be informed regarding the strength, moral[e], munitionment and armament of the Afghan Army.

<sup>2</sup> The designation of a confidential source is here omitted.

<sup>3</sup> An unofficial assembly of Islamic representatives.

Jevad Pasha, in reply to the above, stated that, as information on the subject of Afghanistan came via Azerbaijan, whence communication had been deranged in consequence of bad weather, the information was not available; the Sultan's wishes would be communicated to the authorities concerned.

Prince Abdul Rahim then asked on behalf of the Sultan to be informed as to the differences existing between the Mahsud tribe of the Indian frontier and the Afghans. He also expressed the Sultan's wish that every possible effort should be made to reconcile the two Moslem states.

In reply to this Jevad Pasha requested Prince Abdul Rahim to inform the Sultan that already the differences referred to had been adjusted and that the Afghans and the Mahsuds had been reconciled.

The Council then came to an end with the decision that it would in future meet once a week.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 15. I. 20.

No. 674

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received February 9)*

No. 125 [177318/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 22, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of a report by Captain P. Hadkinson, a Relief Officer on the staff of this High Commission, on the general situation in the districts of Asia Minor occupied by the Italians.

2. The Naval Commander-in-Chief has been asked to detail a sloop or other man-of-war to pay constant visits along the coast between Smyrna and Adalia; an officer from this High Commission will be detailed to go in the sloop as often as one can be spared from other duties.

3. Copies of this report are being sent to Athens and to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 674

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 10, 1920

Sir,

After visiting the districts of Smyrna, Scala-Nuova, Mughla, Makri, Adalia and Buldur, I beg to report as follows:—

Although, with the exception of Smyrna (on which I reported separately at the end of November)<sup>1</sup> all the above mentioned districts are under Italian Military occupation, still the situation taken as a whole leaves much to be desired and is no better than in the other parts of Asia Minor to which the National Movement has spread.

At Scala-Nuova there is no security, the outskirts of the town are daily

<sup>1</sup> This report is not printed.

attacked by *tchétédjis*<sup>2</sup> and, notwithstanding the presence of the Italians, the native Christians are panic-stricken.

About a fortnight prior to my visit, a Greek lad, whilst returning from Aya-Suluk in an Italian military cart along with three Italian soldiers, was arrested half way and in the presence of these latter who passively looked on was dishonoured by about ten *tchétédjis* and subsequently butchered in cold blood.

Hadji Mahmoud Bey a prominent ex-C.U.P. Member, and son of Hassan Bey, owner of the Arvalia farm, practically rules the town. No steamers flying the Greek flag are allowed by him to communicate with the port.

Of the 5000 odd Greeks who were deported from this town, only about 1500 have returned to find their homes totally destroyed, for the whole of the Greek quarter was completely burned down during the war by the Turks. They are now living in stables, tumbled down warehouses and dilapidated houses, the property of Turks, for which the Greek Relief Committee pay a rental of 550 liras a month.

The occupation of the Christians having been that of agriculture, and most of their landed property and olive groves being still in the possession of Turks, who appropriated them, there exists today great distress among them. They made repeated applications to the Authorities to be allowed to emigrate, but Hadji Mahmoud Bey not only refuses to let them do so, but even forbids them from going about except within the precincts of the town. Many of the rich Turks are now leaving the district, owing to the heavy sums exacted from them as contributions to the National cause.

Whilst at Scala-Nuova, General Elia, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, who was on a tour of inspection, expressed the wish to see me, so I called on him. He expressed great bitterness against the Greeks for firing on his men in broad daylight, killing one and badly wounding another. He complained that, although he had lodged a protest with General Milne, as Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, so far no satisfaction had been given him, nor was he informed of any action being taken to prevent a recurrence of such regrettable incidents.

I availed myself of this interview to obtain from General Elia a pass for all the Italian Military Posts I intended visiting; this, to a certain extent, facilitated any movements and prevented my being too closely watched or followed.

Owing to the presence of two strong rival Tchété Bands at Mughla, I found the Greek and Armenian inhabitants in a panic, and appealing to the Italian Commando for protection. Yuruk Ali and Djavid Bey, the chiefs of these two bands, about 600 strong, had left the Aidin front and had come over in connection with the general elections, and the dismissal of the Mutessarif Hilmi Bey. As each was decided to have his candidates elected, matters looked very black on the day I arrived. Fortunately, friends intervened at the critical moment and prevented disturbances and bloodshed. Being the guest of the Italian Commanding Officer, I took the opportunity of sounding him as to the action he would have taken had the two *tchété* bands started

<sup>2</sup> Annotation on original: 'brigands'.

fighting against each other, and going for the Christians, against whom high feeling was running. This officer, who had the wind up, admitted that in such an eventuality, he could find himself in a very awkward and unenviable position as his orders were to look on, and in no way interfere in any matters between the Turks and Greeks.

The National Defence Movement in the Mughla district is very strong, and the leaders are bent on enrolling all able-bodied men available. Several young men, who refused to join, were forcibly enrolled and marched under escort to the Nazli Head Quarters.

All the National Movement leaders I met were very determined, and invariably declared that, should General Milne release their Commander-in-Chief from his promise not to attack the Greeks, pending the Peace Conference's decisions, they were today so strong that they would soon drive the Greeks out of the country.

Arms and ammunition are being freely and openly imported into the country, and, from the information gathered on the spot, I am convinced the Italians are helping in this for all they are worth. Several Italian steamers have been seen landing, during the night, rifles and ammunition at 'Otouz Bir', a small cove about a mile and a half to the north of Scala Nuova. Rifles and ammunition from the Military Depot are being systematically smuggled out by the Italian soldiers and sold to the Nationalists at the rate of four liras each rifle, including 50 rounds. It was reported to me that many rifles were being landed at Kuluk, but as General Elia was proceeding there, I considered it advisable to visit this Port at a later date.

At Keudjik, north of Makri Bay, three of my men informed me that during the first week of October, about 60 camels and mules laden with rifles, in bundles of ten, and ammunition in cases, passed through the village on their way to Aidin travelling over the Mughla road. This information I had confirmed at Makri by several witnesses. The said arms and ammunition were landed in broad daylight from an Italian steamer in front of the Government Houses. The Administrative Council, sitting at the time, having been informed of the arrival, got up and witnessed the landing of the cases and their loading on camels and mules which immediately left in the direction of Keudjik.

From Adalia, where the National Movement meets with little sympathy, I motored to Buldur, a distance of 142 kilometres, and there, having heard that Demirdjili Mehmet Effé, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western National Defence Forces, was at Sparta and expected to visit Buldur, I decided to await his arrival and hear what he had to say. He arrived the following day in great pomp, accompanied by over a hundred mounted picked men, and was given an official reception. All the inhabitants turned out to meet him, and the school boys including the Greek carrying Turkish and constitutional flags and singing patriotic songs lined the road leading into the town. The conversation I had with Meimet Effé lasted about half an hour. He naturally gave vent to all his bitter feelings against the Greeks, and wished to know why the Allies had subjected his nation to such a degrading humiliation. Although he was most anxious to convince me that so long

as the Greeks remained, there would be no peace for his country, and that the whole Turkish nation to a man was decided to fight to the bitter end and save their country from the yoke of their racial enemy, still the impression made on me by Meimet Effé's entourage with whom I engaged in conversation, was, that the delay and suspense in settling the Turkish question and definitely deciding whether the Greeks were to stay or not, was killing them. When they asked me, and I replied, that not before another five or six months would peace be signed their faces were a picture of discouragement. In the course of conversation, I alluded to the Italians and asked Meimet Effé whether the National Movement would favour their replacing the Greeks. He replied, 'although we have nothing to complain of the Italians as they are behaving very decently and affording us every help, still, if any Power must control us, we would prefer a bigger and more enlightened nation'.

On my return journey to Adalia we crossed near Tziboucli a caravan of close upon a hundred camels laden with ammunition cases marked 'Mitrail-lösen Patronen'.<sup>3</sup> Further down, and near the Tzibouk Pass, we came across another big string of camels also heavily laden with ammunition, both were convoyed by men dressed in the Turkish uniform. The Italian Officers accompanying me were very anxious to impress upon me that the convoy and ammunition belonged to a battalion [*sic*] stationed at Adalia, which was being transferred to Denizli, but in my opinion the movement of important quantities of ammunition coinciding with the arrival of Meimet Effé and followers at Buldur could not have been a mere coincidence.

Owing to lack of communications, I was obliged to make a prolonged stay in Adalia, and, notwithstanding my being followed everywhere I went, I managed to find out that, not only the above mentioned ammunition was on its way to increase Meimet Effé's supplies, but that this latter had sent twenty of his men from Sparta with a request to the Adalia Italian Commanding Officer to hand over all the Turkish ammunition under control. These men were told (ironically I presume) that Meimet Effé could call for it if he liked.

I am informed on good authority that the Western National Defence Movement is now well supplied with arms which have been and are being distributed to all the followers of the Movement. A great number of these men are at present attending to their business or occupations but are expected, when called upon, to rise to a man and defend their country. The National Army does not possess heavy artillery, only a few field batteries taken over from what remains of the Turkish Army in that part of the country. I am informed, however, that it is pretty well supplied with small q.f.g.s.,<sup>4</sup> and ammunition to last about six months.

The policy followed by the Italians in the districts occupied by them is identical to that followed by them in Tripoli before they claimed that country. They are creating, and preparing the foundations for, big commercial and industrial enterprises with the object of securing a hold on the country. I met two Members of Parliament and a Colonel in mufti, who for the last four months have been travelling all over Asia Minor and reporting on its

<sup>3</sup> German for 'machine-gun cartridges'.

<sup>4</sup> Quick-firing guns.

mineral, agricultural and prospective industrial resources. I had the opportunity of running my eye over one of these reports and found it most exhaustive.

From my conversations with Italian Officers and civilians in contact with these latter, there can be no doubt but that the Italians have come to stay. I was even assured that, should the Greeks clear out of Smyrna, the Italians will at once step in and take possession. At present their whole aim is to curry favour with the Turk and with this object in view are helping the National Movement. They provide motor-lorries to enable *tchété* chiefs to go about the country recruiting and raising contributions, and in one known instance for the transport of arms, which, an English witness told me, were hidden under sacks of sugar and other foodstuffs destined as relief to villagers in the neighbourhood of Sparta.

The advent of a British Officer in the zone occupied by the Italians causes great excitement, and is not at all liked; I may safely say he is objected to. All his movements are closely watched with suspicion. During my tour I was continually followed by spies or accompanied by Officers and in some instances it required all my wits to dodge the former, and get into touch with the persons I wanted to see. The visits of a British sloop of war are also looked upon with suspicion, and, as I was told, very much objected to. Under the circumstances, one cannot help coming to the conclusion that the Italians in Asia Minor are not playing the straight game, and are very anxious their Allies should not find this out.

If I may be allowed to make a suggestion, I would advise periodical visits of a British Officer familiar with the country and its languages, and still more that of a Sloop of War, as the sight of the white ensign inspires the native Christians with great confidence, for they are convinced that, in the event of an uprising against them, they will get very little protection from the Italians whose orders are, I repeat, to passively look on and not interfere, whatever may happen between the Greeks and the Turks.

The conclusion I have come to during the seven weeks I spent over this tour is that great uneasiness and unrest prevails all over the country and the general feeling is that disturbances and massacres on a big scale are sure to take place should the Powers definitely decide to allow Greece to occupy any part of the Turkish soil.

P. HADKINSON

CONSTANTINOPLE, 6 [sic] January 1920.

No. 675

*Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 103 Telegraphic [175091/151671/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 23, 1920

Following for Vansittart.

Your private letter of yesterday.<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister is of opinion that the question of where the negotia-

<sup>1</sup> No. 672.

tions for peace with Turkey are to be carried on can be decided only by the Prime Ministers, and that it is unnecessary to make any reference to it in the telegram to the United States Government.

The first sentence can therefore be omitted and the telegram might begin with some such words as 'with regard to the proposed treaty of peace with Turkey the Allied Governments. . . .<sup>2</sup> &c.'

<sup>2</sup> Punctuation as in original.

### No. 676

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 153 Telegraphic [174748/7067/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 30, 1920

Conference of Prime Ministers.

Signor Nitti has informed the Prime Minister that he hopes to be able to come to London almost immediately after the meeting of the Italian Chamber on the 3rd February.

The French Minister told Lord Hardinge that it was unlikely that M. Millerand would be able to leave Paris before the latter half of February.

The Prime Minister would like you to discuss the question with M. Millerand immediately, pointing out to him how important it is that there should be an early meeting in London if possible within the next ten days. In addition to the Turkish negotiations which have already been unduly delayed there are many very important questions<sup>1</sup> such as the reply to the Dutch note respecting the extradition of the ex-Kaiser, the surrender of German war criminals, the Fiume settlement and other matters on which an immediate agreement amongst the Allies is urgently needed, and which cannot be settled by telegram, but only by conference between Heads of Governments. It is therefore very essential that the French Prime Minister should come here as soon as possible, and I request you to do all you can to persuade him to do so.

<sup>1</sup> For the questions enumerated below see Volume II, Chap. II *passim*.

### No. 677

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 1)*

No. 118 Telegraphic [175167/151671/44]

PARIS, January 31, 1920

Following for Prime Minister.

Your telegram 153.<sup>1</sup>

I have seen Monsieur Millerand who read me a very long telegram which he was sending to Monsieur Cambon. In it he objects to any idea of transferring to London the Allied Conference for making the Peace with Turkey.

<sup>1</sup> No. 676.

Briefly he is of opinion that although preliminary discussions on general principles might be held in London between Prime Minister and Signor Nitti himself,<sup>2</sup> and Japanese and American Ambassadors, all subsequent stages, including drafting treaty into form of principles which may be agreed on, must take place in Paris. Until Prime Minister (is omitted) ready to agree to this he is unable to accede to request that he should go to London for discussion of Turkish Treaty.

I pointed out to him that many other questions had to be discussed but he insisted that he could not go to London at all until this point was definitely settled.

If his point is conceded he would go to London as desired so that his arrival should coincide with Signor Nitti.

I was unable in any way to move him from position he has taken up.  
Am writing fully to Prime Minister on the subject.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> It seems possible that a comma after 'Nitti' may have been inadvertently omitted.

<sup>3</sup> This letter is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

### No. 678

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 170 Telegraphic [175167/151671/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 2, 1920

*Following from Prime Minister:*

Your telegram<sup>1</sup> and letter.<sup>2</sup> Please speak to M. Millerand firmly in following sense, but do not give him anything in writing. I am much surprised at M. Millerand's attitude. He does not seem to appreciate the fact that British Ministers have spent about seven months out of the last twelve in Paris to the great inconvenience of themselves and the great detriment of the public business of the British Empire, while leading French Ministers have not been altogether one week in London. It is quite impossible that this should continue, and I think we have every right to call upon the French Ministry to submit in some small degree to that inconvenience to which everybody else has been subjected. I am not in the least concerned with the question of prestige. I have not the slightest objection to the public negotiation of the Turkish Treaty being conducted in Paris as the winding up of the Peace Conference. I am only concerned that that part of the negotiations for which I have to take personal responsibility should now be conducted with some regard to the convenience and responsibilities of British and Italian Ministers, and not solely from the point of view of the convenience of French Ministers. I should like to know definitely and at once whether it is M. Millerand's intention to make it a condition of his coming to London that a part of the negotiations between principals should be conducted in Paris involving the attendance there of leading British Ministers. In that case a very serious situation arises. Having regard to the industrial position here,<sup>3</sup> British

<sup>1</sup> No. 677.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 677, note 3.

<sup>3</sup> The reference was to prevalent unrest among industrial workers.

Ministers could not go to stay in Paris. On the other hand, we cannot continue in a state of war with Turkey and the British Cabinet would subsequently have to consider how this state of war could be brought to an end so far as it is concerned. France would then have to do the same. The responsibility for producing such a situation would, however, rest with the French Ministers. If, however, M. Millerand is willing to render Signor Nitti and myself the same consideration as we have rendered to the convenience of the French Ministers during the later stages of the war and the whole negotiations of peace, I am willing that the formal and final stages of the conclusion of peace with Turkey and such intermediate work as can conveniently be transacted there, and which does not involve a stay of British Ministers abroad, should be carried through in Paris. You may point out to M. Millerand that four or five British Ministers came over only a week ago<sup>4</sup> with the view of pressing forward negotiations and the fact that no progress was made was in no way due to them, but entirely to the exigencies of French politics.

<sup>4</sup> Several British Ministers had participated in meetings of the Allied Supreme Council in Paris about the middle of January: see Volume II, Chap. II.

### No. 679

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 4)*

*No. 132 Telegraphic [176086/151671/44]*

PARIS, February 4, 1920

Following for Prime Minister.

I saw M. Millerand last night who willingly consented to fall in with your views, namely that all negotiations which necessitated your personal attention, other than formal meetings with Turkish Delegates for presentation of terms of Treaty, signatures and ratification are to be conducted in London.

I have this morning received a letter from M. Millerand<sup>1</sup> through M. Berthelot on same subject. In order to avoid mistakes I have shown a copy of this letter<sup>2</sup> to M. Berthelot who agrees that it embodies substance of letter. M. Millerand will cross on Thursday February 12th.

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure in No. 680.    <sup>2</sup> This word was subsequently amended to 'telegram'.

### No. 680

*Letter from Mr. Vansittart (Paris) to Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [177070/151671/44]*

PARIS, February 4, 1920

Dear Lord Hardinge,

At last I am in a position to report to you more fully about the personnel here in so far as its movements will be effected [*sic*] by the future of the Peace Conference. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter from M. Millerand to Lord Derby<sup>2</sup> and a copy of a telegram from Lord Derby to Lord Curzon<sup>3</sup> with

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain but was probably February 5, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 679.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram is printed as No. 679.

which the Embassy provided me this afternoon. These speak for themselves. There may, however, possibly be one point which might not be immediately obvious, and that happens to be the point which concerns me and the other small fry. You will notice that M. Millerand's letter says that 'la rédaction définitive des clauses du Traité' is to take place at Paris. This obviously means that the commission work will be done here. I understand quite definitely in fact that the French view remains unaltered in this regard. What they do concede is that they will come to London whenever it would be otherwise necessary for the Prime Minister to come to Paris, and that the only occasions on which he *will* be expected to come to Paris are the three headings specified in Lord Derby's telegram.

They intend in fact that the spade work shall be done here, and, as the points at issue now seem to have emerged into something like an agreement between the Principals, I propose to act as follows in regard to the remaining personnel of the Delegation here: as M. Millerand proposes to cross on February 12th I propose to send everyone home as soon as possible, with the exception of the nucleus specified in my letter of January 24th.<sup>4</sup> (Even if the French and Italians only stay for a week or ten days, that will mean it will be at least a fortnight and probably more before we return here, and there will be some saving in this temporary disbandment.) As, however, it now appears so certain that we *shall* have to come back here I do not propose to let any more of the living accommodation slip out of my hands if it can be avoided; otherwise I shall never get them all together round one centre again for, with the approach of the Paris season, the dearth of accommodation is increasing. I therefore propose to try to make an arrangement with the hotels<sup>5</sup> whereby everyone's rooms (except our office accommodation) will be let during our absence if possible and we shall have the right of re-occupation at a few days notice. There will probably be no difficulty in the management letting the rooms for short periods. I hope to get this arrangement in force by Saturday<sup>6</sup> and to get everyone except the nucleus off on that day when I also hope to leave myself.

I am sorry not to have been able to report to you earlier, but, as I have not taken any part myself in this discussion with the French about the future, I have been depending on the Embassy for information and have thus only been able to see clearly this afternoon what our future is going to be.

Yours sincerely,  
ROBERT VANSITTART

I've just had a little further light on the subject. The French do mean that the Prime Minister will not be expected to come over again except for the three matters specified in Lord Derby's tel. They do *not* mean that all the work will be done in London except on those three occasions. (One other point strikes me in Lord Derby's tel.: the Prime Minister is the only Minister mentioned as absolved from further attendance here.)

<sup>4</sup> This letter dealt with administrative arrangements and is not printed.

<sup>5</sup> The Hotel Campbell, at that time the headquarters of the British Peace Delegation in Paris.

<sup>6</sup> February 7, 1920.

I hope you will approve my arrangements. I didn't like to make them sooner: & even now I don't feel quite sure that we mayn't have another misunderstanding.<sup>7</sup>

ENCLOSURE IN No. 680  
*M. Millerand to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

PARIS, le 4 février, 1920

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Comme suite à l'entretien que j'ai eu le plaisir d'avoir avec vous, hier après-dîner,<sup>2</sup> à l'Ambassade, j'ai l'honneur de prendre acte des déclarations verbales que vous avez bien voulu me faire, en réponse à la communication faite tant à Londres, par M. Paul Cambon, que par moi verbalement à Votre Excellence dans mon Cabinet.

Il est entendu que, comme je le demandais, et conformément à ce qui avait été antérieurement convenu, les Délégués turcs, pour la suite des négociations du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, seront convoqués à nouveau, dès la prochaine session de la Conférence de la Paix, à son siège officiel, Paris, où aura lieu la rédaction définitive des clauses du Traité. C'est à Paris également que seront échangées les signatures et les ratifications du Traité.

Je vous renouvelle l'assurance que je serai heureux de me rendre, dans le plus bref délai, à Londres, pour y échanger les vues des Gouvernements alliés sur les importantes questions qui sont à l'ordre du jour.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

A. MILLERAND

<sup>7</sup> In reply Mr. Vansittart was informed in Foreign Office telegram No. 9 of February 6, 1920, to the British Peace Delegation that his proposed arrangements were 'generally approved'.

No. 681

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*  
(Received February 8)  
No. 109 Telegraphic [177142/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 6, 1920

My telegram No. 102.<sup>1</sup>

It is still impossible to say whether recent events in Marash represent beginning of definite forward movement on the part of Nationalists. If it is, we are in presence of commencement of concerted plan devised by leaders who have been in touch with all sorts of elements openly hostile or potentially treacherous to Allies.

Marash incidents must be regarded as complementary to those at Deir Zor.<sup>2</sup> Recent raid on ammunition dump at Gallipoli<sup>3</sup> is another overt act

<sup>1</sup> No. 423.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 635, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> Admiral de Robeck had recently reported that on the night of January 26-7 a 'raid was made upon dumps of surrendered (?) Turkish war material on Gallipoli peninsula. 80,500 [? 8,500] rifles, 33 machine guns, and 500,000 rounds of ammunition were removed. Raid

of similar nature, though of less magnitude. I need not recapitulate evidence of inter-communication between Nationalists and Bolsheviks, and efforts made by both to exploit fanaticism of Moslems both West and East of Caspian to our disadvantage. I still cannot ignore indications of close understanding between powerful elements in Turkey and Azerbaijan, though parties on either side need not necessarily be Governments. Signs of rapprochement between Arabs including perhaps Feisal himself and Turks cannot be ignored either. Theory that Nationalists have made up their minds definitely to take offensive is supported by information received by military authorities here. General Milne takes gravest view of situation in Anatolia where there are many indications pointing to possibility of attack on Greeks.<sup>4</sup> This would bring matters to a head and whole situation of Allies in Turkey would enter on new phase.

We should not be in a position to exercise effective control anywhere, and only course would be to endeavour to dominate situation from Constantinople and coast by strengthening our military position here, and by having ample naval force available.

Necessity of being prepared for every eventuality is enhanced by uncertainty of local political situation. Opening of Parliament has been followed by arrival in Constantinople of prominent Nationalist leaders. Language of open menace to Allies has been used at more than one public meeting. Government are showing signs of cracking up and postpone from day to day declaration of policy in Chamber. It cannot be deferred many days longer and it is absolutely open question whether Government will remain in power with support of bloc composed of moderate Nationalist element or will be thrown out by Extremists. Question of what will happen if it falls is still more obscure.

General Milne considers it necessary to strengthen his military position here at once. Unfortunately strengthening of military position can only be achieved by concentrating on Constantinople all forces under General Milne's command. This means *inter alia* evacuation of Batoum. I cannot (? oppose) this in view of what General Milne tells me of . . .<sup>5</sup> here and impossibility of his receiving reinforcements from outside his command. It is my duty however to draw Your Lordship's attention to political consequences of evacuation. It will not only discourage still further our friends in South Russia and deprive us of power to hold balance in Caucasus necessary to realise the idea of anti-Bolshevik bloc.

It will also react on our position in this country where it will be regarded as fresh sign of failing strength or will power while dream of recovering presumably organised and carried out by Nationalists. . . . Troops responsible for guarding those dumps were French.'

<sup>4</sup> Lord Granville had reported in Athens telegram No. 20 of January 27, 1920 (received January 28) that the French Minister in Athens had told him 'as being facts, not rumours' that the 'Greeks are distinctly nervous at a concentration of some 30,000 Turkish regular troops on Greek front in Asia Minor: Greeks have some 80,000 men but if Turks had even a slight military success they would no doubt be promptly joined by thousands of irregulars'.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain.

Batoum will be a fresh incentive to pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian activity. In this connection please re-read paras. 23 and 24 of my Despatch No. 1836<sup>6</sup> bearing in mind that Turkish Nationalists are being ever driven closer to Bolsheviks by fear of merciless peace terms.

Need for early conclusion of peace and need for complete solidarity amongst Allies pending its conclusion are more imperative than ever. If peace terms are indeed to be merciless i.e. if they involve separation from Turkey of Constantinople and Smyrna and creation of even a relatively great Armenia Allies must be definitely prepared to impose them by force. If they are to be comparatively merciful then use of any considerable Allied forces in interim might perhaps be avoided by building up strong military position here and on coast and by strengthening hands of Sultan and other moderate elements in internal politics. To accomplish latter object we should have to be prepared to abandon a policy of non-interference in internal affairs; to regard extreme Nationalists as definitely hostile; and to hold out to their opponents prospect of tolerable peace terms as reward of complete submission to and collaboration with Allies.

Two other factors in situation must be mentioned. First is that necessity of concentrating forces here may compel General Milne to abandon Anatolian Railway which would facilitate eventual Nationalists [*sic*] operations against Greek front and seriously jeopardise food supply of capital. Other is that Christian population in interior are hostages in hands of Turks. Prudent and firm policy is essential to minimise danger of Constantinople being starved and Christians in interior being massacred.

\* No. 543.

## No. 682

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 10)*

*No. 161 Telegraphic: by bag [177645/151671/44]*

PARIS, February 9, 1920

Lord Derby's telegram No. 132<sup>1</sup> of February 4th.

*Temps* leading article this evening contains the following:—

It is primarily for the purpose of dealing with the Eastern question that the Heads of the Allied Government[s] have decided to meet in London. It is known that at the request of Monsieur Millerand—a request which was immediately granted by the British Cabinet—these conversations will have a purely preparatory character. It is to Paris, the official seat of the Conference, that the Turkish Delegates will subsequently be summoned, and the clauses of the Treaty will be finally drafted there. Moreover, the conversations in London will only last three days and will doubtless deal with a large number of subjects both diplomatic and financial. It would be impossible within this short period to regulate with absolute finality every detail of a question which has

\* No. 679.

been pending for centuries. By attempting to do everything at once one would run the risk of doing nothing at all. We must therefore content ourselves with considering the main features of the problem; the rest will become easy as soon as agreement has been reached on the essential points of the solution.

No. 683

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon  
(Received February 12)*

*No. 118 Telegraphic [E 58/3/44]<sup>1</sup>*

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 10, 1920

My telegram No. 109<sup>2</sup> of 6th February, paragraph 4.

Government has made terms with Nationalists by consenting to jettison certain Ministers.

Reconstruction took place on 7th and 8th February, and reconstructed Cabinet obtained practically unanimous vote of confidence in Chamber on 9th February.

Ministers sacrificed to Nationalists are Foreign Affairs, Interior and Justice. Successors are Nationalist nominees, though not men in forefront of movement. Minister of Agriculture has also resigned.

New Minister for Foreign Affairs is Sefa Bey, who acted in same capacity during Ferid Pasha's absence in Paris last summer. He is diplomatist of second-rate importance with definite Nationalist sympathies.

Government's statement of policy presents no new features. It contains usual references to need for internal reforms with assistance of foreign specialists; protestations of desire loyally to observe armistice; Smyrna . . .<sup>3</sup> principle; gravity of financial situation. Net result is that Nationalist leaders have established complete hold on Government, though they have either thought it unnecessary or lacked courage to put in a Government composed of their own stalwarts.

<sup>1</sup> For the change in notation, cf. the Preface to Volume III.

<sup>2</sup> No. 681.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

## CHAPTER IV

Anglo-French negotiations concerning oil resources,  
from the withdrawal of the Long-Bérenger Agree-  
ment to the opening of the First Conference of  
London

June 17, 1919—February 12, 1920

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

On April 8, 1919, Mr. Walter Long, H.M. Minister in charge of Petroleum Affairs, and Senator Bérenger, Commissioner-General of Petroleum Products in France, initialled in Paris what subsequently became known as the Long-Bérenger Agreement. This agreement was subject to confirmation by the British and French Foreign Ministers. The agreement read as follows:

'Memorandum of Agreement between Senator Henry Bérenger, Commissioner-General of Petroleum Products in France, representing the Government of the French Republic, and the Right Honourable Walter H. Long, M.P., His Majesty's Minister in Charge of Petroleum Affairs.

'In order to facilitate throughout the world and for the benefit of all countries the permanent provision for industrial and commercial purposes of petroleum products, of which the supply is admitted to be increasingly inadequate, and so to assist in re-establishing commercial intercourse and developing the prosperity of all nations, the Governments of France and Great Britain desire to continue the co-operation which has given during the war such gratifying results. They have, therefore, agreed on the basis of a common policy to be followed in the near East and in the countries adjacent to the Mediterranean for the exploitation of various oilfields.

'The principles of this policy are those of cordial co-operation and reciprocity in all those countries where the oil interests of the two nations can usefully be united. This memorandum relates to the following states or countries:—

'Roumania, Asia Minor, French Colonies and Protectorates and British Crown Colonies.

'It is understood that this agreement may be extended to other countries, e.g. Galicia and Russia.

#### *'Roumania'*

'The British and French Governments shall conduct in common negotiations to be entered into with the Government of Roumania for:—

**'(a) The acquisition of oil concessions, shares or other interests belonging to enemy subjects or bodies in Roumania which have been sequestered, e.g. the Steaua Romana, Concordia, Vega etc. which constituted in that country the oil groups of the Deutsche Bank and of the Disconto Gesellschaft, together with any other interests that may be obtainable.**

**'(b) Concessions over oil lands belonging to the Roumanian State.**

**'France and Great Britain will not make any separate agreements with the Roumanian Government regarding the exploitation of the Roumanian oilfields.**

**'Negotiations with the Roumanian Government shall be conducted on lines to be agreed between Mr. Walter Long and Senator Bérenger.**

**'All shares belonging to enemy concessions which can be secured and all other advantages derived from these negotiations shall be divided, 50 per cent. to British interests and 50 per cent. to French interests. It is understood that in the company or companies to be formed to undertake the management and the exploitation of the said shares, concessions and other advantages, the two countries shall have the same proportion of 50 per cent. in all capital subscribed as well as in representatives on the Board and voting power.**

#### **'Mesopotamia**

**'In the event of His Majesty's Government receiving the mandate in Mesopotamia they undertake to make it their duty to secure from the Mesopotamian Government for the Turkish Petroleum Company or the Company to be formed to acquire the interests of that Company, the rights acquired by the Turkish Petroleum Company in Mesopotamia under arrangements made with the Turkish Government.**

**'The French Government to have a share in the capital in the Company as herein indicated, with all the rights of representation and other rights which may be attached to the said shares. The Company shall be under permanent British control. If it is decided to apply the terms of the Agreement to the Turkish Petroleum Company as already constituted, the price to be paid by the French Government shall be that paid by the British Government to the Public Trustee for the shares belonging to the Deutsche Bank, plus 5 per cent. interest on said price since the date of payment.**

**'The capital of the Company shall be divided as follows:—**

British interest . . . . .	70 per cent.
French interest . . . . .	20 per cent.
Native Government interest . . . . .	10 per cent.

**'If the Native Government do not desire to participate to the extent of 10 per cent. the balance shall be divided equally between the British and French holdings.**

**'It is understood that one of the terms to be embodied in the lease to be granted to the Company to work the oilfields will provide that local native**

interests may participate, if they so desire, up to 10 per cent. in the share capital of any subsidiary company which may be formed to work any of the oilfields or in the event of subsidiary companies not being formed up to ten per cent. of the share capital of the original company will be specially provided for this purpose in addition to the amount allocated to Native Government interests. This additional participation shall be provided by each group in proportion to their holding.

'In consideration for said participation the French Government shall agree to facilitate by every means in its power as soon as application is made, the construction of two separate pipe-lines for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and Persia to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean. The port or ports shall be chosen in agreement between the two Governments.

'Should the pipe-lines cross territory in which France has received a mandate, France undertakes to use her good offices to secure every facility for the rights of crossing without any royalty or wayleaves on the oil transported. Nevertheless, compensation shall be payable to the landowners for the surface occupied.

'In the same way France will give facilities at the terminal port or ports for the acquisition by the Mesopotamian Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of the land necessary for the erection of depots, refineries, loading wharves, &c. Oil thus exported shall be exempt from export and transit dues. The materials necessary for the construction of the pipe-lines, refineries, and other equipment shall also be free from import duties.

'This agreement in so far as it relates to pipe-lines, storage refineries, depots, loading wharves &c. is entered [into] solely to facilitate the supply of petroleum and is in no way to be taken as implying that any territorial rights are in existence.

'Should the Mesopotamian Company desire to lay a pipe-line to the Persian Gulf the British Government will use its good offices to secure similar facilities for that purpose.

#### *'North Africa and other Colonies and Protectorates*

'The French Government will give facilities to any Franco-British group or groups of good standing, which furnish the necessary guarantees and comply with French laws, for the acquisition of oil concessions in the French Colonies, Protectorates and zones of influence, including Algeria, Tunis and Morocco. It should be noted that the French Parliament has resolved that groups so formed must contain at least 66 per cent. French interests.

'The French Government will not fail to grant to Messrs. Pearson and Son a concession in Algeria as soon as they have proved the existence of oil in commercial quantities and have complied with all the requirements of the French laws.

#### *'British Crown Colonies*

'In so far [as] existing regulations allow the British Government will give to French subjects who may wish to prospect and exploit petroliferous lands

in the Crown Colonies similar advantages to those which France is granting to British subjects in the French Colonies.

'This note supersedes and is in place of the memorandum of agreement dated 6th March, 1919.

'This Agreement has today been initialled by the Right Honourable Walter Long, M.P., and Senator Henry Bérenger subject to confirmation by the British and French Foreign Ministers respectively.

'Paris,  
April 8, 1919

The circumstances in which this agreement was concluded and subsequently withdrawn are explained in document No. 684 below.

#### No. 684

*Letter from Sir G. Clerk<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Kerr (Paris)*

*Unnumbered [91135/3251/117]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 17, 1919

My dear Kerr,

Lord Curzon received the following telephone message on June 13 from the Prime Minister:—

'The Prime Minister learnt quite casually the other day that some agreement was being negotiated between the French and British Governments as to the Mosul Oil Works. Neither M. Clemenceau nor the Prime Minister has been informed of these negotiations.

'The Prime Minister would like to have a copy of the correspondence on this subject, so as to know what these proposals are and how far matters have gone. He has already informed Mr. Balfour, who has nothing to do with the negotiations, that he has given notice to the French Government<sup>2</sup> that the negotiations shall be considered as cancelled.'

I now enclose, by Lord Curzon's direction, a statement on the Long-Bérenger Agreement for the Prime Minister's information.

Yours ever,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Private Secretary to Lord Curzon.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lloyd George had given this notice in the following letter, dated May 21, 1919, to M. Clemenceau:

'Dear Monsieur Clemenceau,

'I write to confirm formally the statement which I made to you during this morning's meeting, that, inasmuch as you regard the British proposal for railway and pipe-line from the Mosul area to Tripoli as a departure from the Agreement which we entered into in London in December last, I do not propose to proceed further with the proposed arrangement which I hereby withdraw.'

'Yours sincerely  
D. LLOYD GEORGE'

For Mr. Lloyd George's reference to his statement that morning, cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, p. 766.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy of original.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 684

*The Long-Béranger Oil Agreement*

The first suggestion that an agreement should be entered into between the French and ourselves for participation in oil interests was made in a Note dated the 6th January [1919] from the French Ambassador. Lord Curzon immediately expressed the view that it would be wiser to refuse to discuss these matters at all with the French until the Peace Conference had decided the ultimate fate of the districts in question.

On the 15th of January a meeting was held at the Admiralty, at which Lord Curzon's view was strongly upheld by Mr. Weakley, the Foreign Office representative. It was, however, considered by the meeting that His Majesty's Government should at once signify their willingness to co-operate before the French secured American assistance, and before this country was forced by decisions at the Peace Conference to adopt in self-defence and practically under compulsion the policy of co-operation to which it was now invited. But it was made clear that no scheme could be agreed to in detail until after the Peace Conference. On seeing the minutes of this meeting, Lord Curzon expressed his entire disagreement with their proposals, and again expressed the opinion that it was absurd to settle these questions until the fate of the districts in question had been decided on in Paris.

On the 1st of February a second Note was received from the French Ambassador, in which he referred to a 'precise conversation' between M. Beranger [*sic*] and Sir John Cadman,<sup>4</sup> in the course of which they were said to have agreed that the British and French proposals regarding petroleum questions were likely to have a favourable issue. On the same day the question of French participation in the Mesopotamian oilfields was discussed at an Inter-Departmental Conference in Paris, and on the 3rd February Sir John Cadman asked for Mr. Balfour's sanction to inform M. Beranger before he left Paris that His Majesty's Government were ready to admit a 20% to 30% French participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company on condition of their facilitating the construction of a pipe line to the Mediterranean and of their admitting British participation in the development of oilfields in Algeria. The minute by Sir L. Mallet in which this sanction was requested was initialled by Mr. Balfour, but was not acted upon by Sir John Cadman, who returned to London immediately afterwards and communicated a copy of the papers to the Foreign Office on the 6th February. Meanwhile, on the 4th February, Lord Curzon had telegraphed to Mr. Balfour asking him to ascertain from Sir John Cadman the nature of his conversation with M. Beranger, and deprecating any discussion of the question with the French at that stage. On the 20th February Lord Curzon caused a statement which had been prepared in the Foreign Office to be transmitted to Mr. Balfour, in which the different views held by the Foreign Office and by the Petroleum Executive were set out in detail. On the following day Sir John

<sup>4</sup> At that time representative of the Petroleum Executive in the Economic Section of the British Peace Delegation.

Cadman had an interview with Mr. Weakley, in the course of which he explained that in his conversations with the French he had carefully abstained from entering into any details. He also assured Mr. Weakley that nothing had been said to the French about way-leave for a pipe-line, or anything of a nature likely to compromise the political questions which were then at issue.

On the 22nd February Lord Curzon caused a despatch to be written to Mr. Balfour, in which the objections to the proposed agreement being concluded were again pointed out.

Nothing further was heard of the question until the 15th March, when the Petroleum Executive forwarded for Lord Curzon's information a copy of a provisional agreement which Mr. Walter Long was said to have concluded with M. Beranger, acting on behalf of the French Government.

While this paper was under consideration, a despatch dated 17th March was received from Mr. Balfour in which he agreed that subject to Sir John Cadman being consulted, and so long as he had made it clear to M. Beranger that we were ready to admit French participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company, it would not appear profitable to pursue the negotiations in detail until the ultimate nature of the territorial settlement was more clearly indicated. On the 2nd of April Mr. Balfour was asked by the Foreign Office whether the discussions resulting in the Long-Beranger agreement had been conducted with his sanction and approval.

Meanwhile, on the 1st April, a private letter was received by Sir George Clerk from Mr. Tufton<sup>5</sup> enclosing correspondence between Sir John Cadman and Sir Louis Mallet from which it appeared that the latter was under the impression that the various Departments in London, as well as the Cabinet, had been or were being consulted.

On the 11th April a second private letter was received by Sir George Clerk from Mr. Tufton, in which was enclosed a revised draft agreement. This was said to have been concurred in, so far as Mesopotamia was concerned, by Mr. Montagu, on behalf of the Government of India, and by Sir Louis Mallet: as regards Roumania by the Roumanian Section of the British Peace Delegation: and as regards the Colonies by representatives of the Colonial Office. Mr. Tufton asked that confirmation by His Majesty's Government and the French Government respectively should be given as soon as possible through the diplomatic channel.

Lord Curzon was still in some doubt as to the degree of authority behind the scheme and called a meeting of the I.D.C.E.<sup>6</sup> on the 29th April to discuss the subject. In the course of this meeting Mr. Walter Long stated that Mr. Balfour's approval on the original papers was in Paris. It was pointed out that the Long-Beranger agreement formed an important part of the more important negotiations by which H.M. Government hoped to secure control of the Royal Dutch Shell Combine, and the Conference eventually decided that the subject to the final concurrence of the War Cabinet in the

<sup>5</sup> Representative of the Foreign Office in the Economic Section of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>6</sup> Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Affairs.

Shell agreement and to Foreign Office concurrence in the Long-Beranger agreement the latter should be concurred in by His Majesty's Government. A copy of the Minutes of this meeting is appended.<sup>7</sup>

On the 8th May the War Cabinet decided to approve of the heads of the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Royal Dutch Shell Combine, and on the 16th May the Long-Beranger agreement was officially confirmed in a draft from the Foreign Office to the French Ambassador.

Copies of the correspondence referred to above are attached to this statement.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Not appended to filed copy of original.

### No. 685

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27)*

*No. 1097 [94556/3251/117]*

*PARIS, June 26, 1919*

My Lord,

On receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 758<sup>1</sup> (of May 24) on the subject of the Anglo-French Agreement for co-operation between our two Governments in developing oil in Roumania, Mesopotamia, Algeria, etc., a note to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared, acquainting His Excellency with the enquiries received from the United States Delegation and asking whether he concurred in the terms of the Agreement being communicated to Mr. Summers, with an assurance that there was no intention on the part of either Government to exclude the United States or any American interests from adopting a similar policy.

2. Before this note, however, could be despatched, a communication had been made by the Prime Minister to Monsieur Clemenceau, withdrawing from the Agreement on behalf of His Majesty's Government. A copy of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram referred to a letter of May 13, 1919, addressed by Mr. Leland Summers, a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, to Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, head of the Economic Section of the British Delegation, and asking him if he would 'kindly let me have any information possible' concerning a reported Anglo-French agreement regarding oil in Rumania and Galacia and concerning activities 'in connection with the oil properties throughout the Orient'. In the telegram under reference Lord Curzon had suggested that the agreement of the French Government should be obtained to the terms of the proposed reply to Mr. Summers (cf. below). Meanwhile, however, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith informed Mr. Summers in a letter of May 22, 1919, that as a result of enquiries in London 'I find that it is the case that conversations took place between British and French representatives regarding mutual oil interests in Roumania and other Near Eastern countries. I have, however, not been able to find out whether the matter reached the stage of a definite agreement. So far as I can ascertain, however, nothing has taken place which would exclude the participation of American oil interests. If there is anything further which I can communicate to you I will not fail to do so.' In reply to this letter Mr. Summers stated in a further letter of May 23 to Sir H. Llewellyn Smith: 'I think it will be very desirable if you will give us some idea of the negotiations which have taken place as we should like to know that American oil interests are not excluded from participation, and of course the preliminary stages are the ones that would be the most important to America. Will you kindly endeavour, therefore, to advise us just what form the negotiations took or what suggestions have been made?'

Mr. Lloyd George's letter has already, I understand, been communicated privately to your Lordship.<sup>2</sup>

3. Mr. Summers has now reminded me that no reply has yet been returned to him as to whether the Americans would be permitted to participate in developing oil in Roumania, and he suggested verbally that the choice was one between participation and the most strenuous competition. A reply has been returned to Mr. Summers that, so far as I know, the matter is still in abeyance, and that if the United States Government desires to put forward any proposals, the best course for them to pursue is to submit them through the diplomatic channel to the Foreign Office, where they will receive every consideration. A copy of the letter to Mr. Summers is enclosed herewith and I would suggest that the Petroleum Executive should be informed of what has passed if that has not already been done.

I am &c.  
(for Mr. Balfour):  
LOUIS MALLET

ENCLOSURE IN No. 685  
*Mr. Carter<sup>3</sup> to Mr. Summers*

PARIS, June 25, 1919

Dear Mr. Summers,

Mr. Fountain<sup>3</sup> mentioned to me that you had spoken to him about your correspondence with Sir H. Llewellyn Smith on the subject of oil in Roumania; and I am very sorry to find on looking into the matter that no reply has ever been sent to your letter of the 23rd May.<sup>4</sup>

As you know, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith was very pressed with Peace Conference work here, and he is now in London where he will probably remain till the end of next week. In his absence, however, I have endeavoured to find out how the matter stands, and I gather that the question is in abeyance for the present. If the United States Government has any proposals to make, it is suggested to me that the best course would be for those proposals to be communicated to the Foreign Office in London, where they would of course receive the most careful consideration.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
W. CARTER

<sup>2</sup> See No. 684, note 2, and No. 686, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Member of the Economic Section of the British Peace Delegation.

<sup>4</sup> See note 1 above.

<sup>5</sup> See further No. 687.

No. 686  
*Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Kerr (Paris)*  
No. 94556/C/117 [94556/3251/117]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 4, 1919

In a private letter to M. Clemenceau dated May 21st,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lloyd George withdrew the Anglo-French oil agreement initialled by Mr. Long and Senator Bérenger on behalf of the respective Governments. Lord Curzon

<sup>1</sup> See No. 684, note 2.

has received a copy of the above letter privately—in a private letter<sup>2</sup> dated June 5th, i.e. over a fortnight later—but has received no official intimation from Paris that the agreement has been withdrawn.

Lord Curzon wishes to know whether the Prime Minister desires that he should inform the Government Departments concerned of such withdrawal and also the French Ambassador in London, who was notified officially on May 16th, in accordance with instructions received from Mr. Balfour and the Peace Delegation in Paris, that His Majesty's Government approved and confirmed the agreement.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This private letter from Lord Eustace Percy to Sir George Clerk is not printed. In this letter Lord E. Percy stated in particular:

'I understand the Prime Minister's attitude to be that, pending a final agreement with the French on the Syrian question, he would prefer that no further discussions with the French should be undertaken on the basis of the Long-Bérenger Agreement, as Monsieur Clemenceau shows signs of being irritated by what he believes to be the implications of this Agreement. I also understand that Lord Curzon spoke to Mr. Lloyd George about the Agreement when he was here and expressed some dissatisfaction with it. This fact is also, I think, in the Prime Minister's mind.'

'There is only one thing about the Agreement that we want to discuss with the French at the present moment, namely, the replies that we are to return to the enquiries which we are receiving from the Americans. A note to Monsieur Pichon had been drafted here suggesting a general line of reply to such enquiries but this draft has been held up in view of what we understand to be the Prime Minister's wishes.'

'I think it would be a very good thing if Lord Curzon would write a letter to the Prime Minister explaining his present view about the Long-Bérenger Agreement.'

<sup>3</sup> Cf. enclosure in No. 684.

### No. 687

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*

*No. 4576 [97186/3251/117]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1919

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 1097<sup>1</sup> of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter from the Petroleum Executive, relative to the question of communicating the Anglo-French Oil Agreement which has now lapsed to the American authorities in Paris.

2. I entirely concur in the terms of the letter which you addressed to Mr. Summers on the 25th ultimo,<sup>2</sup> and I see no reason why anything more should be said to him until he raises the question again.

I have, &c.

[for Earl Curzon of Kedleston]

VICTOR WELLESLEY

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 687

*Petroleum Executive to the Foreign Office*

No. S. 321

H.M. PETROLEUM EXECUTIVE, July 2, 1919

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Walter Long to acknowledge the receipt of your

<sup>1</sup> No. 685.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 685.

letter No. 94556/C/117<sup>3</sup> dated 28th June forwarding a letter dated 26th June from Mr. Balfour<sup>1</sup> on the subject of the Anglo-French Agreement providing for co-operation in oil questions.

2. It is observed from the first paragraph of Mr. Balfour's letter that there appears to be some idea of communicating the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement to the Americans, but Mr. Long ventures to deprecate such a course.

3. I am to request that you<sup>4</sup> will inform Lord Curzon that, about the time of Mr. Summers' letter dated 23rd May<sup>5</sup> to Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Mr. A. C. Bedford of the Standard Oil Company called on Senator Bérenger in Paris, and enquired what arrangements were being entered into between the United Kingdom and France, as he understood that some agreement had been made regarding Roumania. Senator Bérenger informed Mr. Bedford that the French and British Governments had come to some understanding, but that if he (Mr. Bedford) wished to see the terms of any agreement, he must get it through the usual diplomatic channels. Mr. Long is unable to see any reason why Mr. Bedford, the representative of the Standard Oil Company, should be shown this Agreement, as he undoubtedly will if the American Government is furnished with a copy, and he thinks that Lord Curzon will be interested to learn that the Standard Oil Company evidently prompted this request of Mr. Summers.

3. In reference to paragraph two of Mr. Balfour's letter, Mr. Long is at present unable to understand the situation, for it would appear that, while a note has been despatched by the Prime Minister to Monsieur Clemenceau withdrawing the Anglo-French Agreement, the Foreign Office have ratified that Agreement and the ratification apparently still stands. Mr. Long would consequently be much obliged if he could be apprised of the exact position as soon as possible, as the present state of uncertainty is prejudicing the settlement not only of the matters dealt with in the Agreement but of other important negotiations which are dependent upon it.

I am, &c.

JOHN CADMAN

<sup>3</sup> This covering letter is not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The present letter was formally addressed to Sir R. Graham.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 685, note 1.

## No. 688

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)*

*No. 1279 [101993/3251/117]*

PARIS, July 11, 1919

*Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith 3 copies of the undermentioned papers.*

<i>Name and Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
To Mr. Summers of U.S. Peace Delegation, June 25.	Anglo-French Oil Agreement.
From D°, June 26.	

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 688

*Sir H. Llewellyn Smith to Mr. Summers*

BOARD OF TRADE, June 25, 1919

Dear Mr. Summers,

With reference to our telephone conversation some little time ago on the subject of oil in Roumania, I am writing to confirm what I told you, that the tentative agreement arrived at for co-operation between the British and French has fallen through, or, at all events, is in abeyance. I may add that nothing in the agreement tended to exclude American interests in any way from participating in oil enterprise in Roumania; it was, as I understand it, purely an undertaking to prevent overlapping and competition between British and French interests in dealings which they might hereafter have with the Roumanian Government or interests.

I hope that this gives you the information you require.

I am,  
Yours sincerely,  
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 688

*Mr. Summers to Mr. Carter*

PARIS, June 26, 1919

Dear Mr. Carter:

I beg to thank you for your courteous letter of June 25th.<sup>1</sup>

I do not think the matter mentioned will require proposals by the United States Government at this time. The principal concern of our Delegation was that when matters which have had an international character are parcelled out among national interests to the exclusion of others, there is always a danger of bad faith being charged.

In the case of Roumania, they will require international financing and I think it is very emphatically the opinion of the American Delegates that if the cream of Roumanian interests is parcelled out among the European nations without adequate financing, these same nations will have to hold the bag and continue the financing.

In addition to this, where private interests have been allowed to take undue advantage of an international situation, it gives the public an excellent weapon with which to attack the co-operation of the governments.

As we are winding up our activities here in Paris, I presume American business interests will be permitted to look out for themselves.

With kind regards,  
LELAND W. SUMMERS

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure in No. 685.

No. 689

*Mr. Davies to Earl Curzon (Received July 14)<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered [102249/3251/117]*

10 DOWNING STREET, July 11, 1919

Dear Lord Curzon,

*Your Memo. concerning Anglo-French Oil Agreement.<sup>2</sup>*

I have communicated the above Memo. to the Prime Minister who wishes me to say that he knew nothing about this Oil agreement until it was casually mentioned to him, by someone not connected with the Foreign Office, in the course of a conversation in Paris. He heard of it with great surprise. As the negotiations with the French Government on the Syrian question<sup>3</sup> were in his hands, he certainly thought he ought to have been informed of an agreement which had been negotiated which directly affected the position.

On merits he is against entering into any arrangement about oil with the French until we have first of all determined the boundaries. The proposed agreement seemed to him to place us entirely in the hands of the French and unless we have direct access to the Mediterranean that will always be the case. That is, therefore, the first question to determine and until it is decided these negotiations ought not to be proceeded with.

He has another objection to these negotiations. He feels strongly that the discussions between France and ourselves on important questions of policy ought not to be mixed up with arrangements about oil in which private companies are involved.

Yours faithfully,

J. T. DAVIES

<sup>1</sup> Date of entry on the files. It appears probable that the date of original receipt was earlier.

<sup>2</sup> A note on the original queried whether the reference was to No. 684 or to No. 686.

<sup>3</sup> See Chap. II.

No. 690

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest)*

*No. 333 Telegraphic: by bag [100036/97004/137]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 18, 1919

Your telegram No. 334.<sup>1</sup>

Negotiations have been in progress in Paris between M. Bratiano and British and French representatives and former cordially accepted offer of French and British Governments to co-operate in development of Roumanian oil industry.<sup>2</sup> 20 per cent. export tax will render cooperation impossible. Assistance of large petroleum companies who alone possess requisite ex-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of June 23, 1919, Mr. Rattigan, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest, had reported: 'Roumanian Government have published decree imposing 20 per cent. export tax. Avowed object is to crush all competition with Government trade. I have pointed out short-sightedness of this course, but without effect, as it is in accordance with whole policy of present Government. The only hope is that if Opposition come into power, this policy is not likely to be upheld.'

<sup>2</sup> See No. 694.

perience and technical resources will be indispensable and they will not give such assistance if tax is maintained.

Effect of so high a duty as 20 per cent. will be to cripple export trade and place Roumania at disadvantage compared with other producing countries. It is in interest of Roumanian Government as well as of companies that export trade should be re-established and this is far more likely to be effected if companies are left free to arrange export and find markets. We cannot see that formation of export pool will assist in securing disposal of surplus production.

Please renew your representations to Roumanian Government.

No. 691

*Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador in London*

No. 102249/C/117 [102249/3251/117]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 22, 1919

Your Excellency,

In my note of May 16th,<sup>1</sup> I had the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government confirmed the terms of the agreement reached by Senator Bérenger, Commissioner General of Petroleum products in France and the Right Honourable Walter Long M.P., His Majesty's Minister in charge of petroleum affairs.

2. I now understand that conversations have taken place between the Prime Minister and Monsieur Clemenceau, as a result of which the agreement in question is to be withdrawn. I request therefore that you will consider the note to which I have already referred, conveying the confirmation of the agreement, to be annulled, and I should be grateful if Your Excellency would be so good as to notify me accordingly in writing.

I have, &c.  
(for Earl Curzon of Kedleston)  
VICTOR WELLESLEY

<sup>1</sup> Not printed: see No. 684.

No. 692

*Letter from Sir G. Clerk (Paris)<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Kidston (Received July 29)<sup>2</sup>*

Unnumbered [109356/109356/44A]

PARIS, July 22, 1919

My dear George,

Mr. Balfour is, I think, considerably exercised about the various oil negotiations that are taking place at the present time. He has been told, for instance, as a piece of dinner-table gossip, that the Shell people are shortly bringing out a venture which will yield them millions—shares issued at 2 and rising to 10 almost at once, and so on. Mr. Balfour feels that all speculative oil dealings in any way connected with Mesopotamia or Syria, or any of

<sup>1</sup> Sir G. Clerk was at that time in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Date of entry on the files.

those regions, should be discouraged and, if possible, prevented by H.M. Government until the administrative fate of those countries has been finally settled.

Then again there is a big Anglo-French Syndicate forming itself to acquire oil rights in Syria, Palestine and the Dead Sea. The English side is, I understand, mainly composed of the big steamship interests who foresee great difficulties in the way of coal and regard oil as the fuel of the future and therefore, and very naturally, think it essential to ensure their own supplies. Drogheda<sup>3</sup> was over here on this business this week and I advised him to see Weakley and you, not merely in his own interest but in order that the Foreign Office might be made aware of what is on foot. I believe these Anglo-French people to be perfectly honest and above-board but I do think, and Mr. Balfour holds this view very strongly, that we should have the fullest possible knowledge of all that is going on in regard to oil in the spheres of special interest to us.

Could you let me have, for Mr. Balfour's information, any details you possess as to what is happening in regard to oil? And I should be very grateful if I could assure Mr. Balfour that the Foreign Office are carefully safeguarding the point which is weighing upon him.

Yours ever,  
GEORGE R. CLERK

This letter is all about oil, but Mr. Balfour feels that the sentiments expressed apply equally to all industrial ventures of any magnitude. They should all wait until the question of Mandates is finally settled.

<sup>3</sup> The Earl of Drogheda: see No. 695.

### No. 693

*Letter from Mr. Kidston to Sir G. Clerk (Paris)*

*Unnumbered [109356/109356/444]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1919

My dear George,

Your private letter of July 22nd—Oil.<sup>1</sup>

As you know, oil is not really my province. Weakley was in charge of all oil questions as liaison officer with the Petroleum Executive and when he collapsed the job was taken on by Villiers.<sup>2</sup> Villiers unfortunately is away, but I will deal as best I can with the matters raised in your letter. Weakley is now well enough again to be consulted and I am putting him on the trail and I have spoken to Shuckburgh at the India Office and furnished him privately with a copy of your letter in order that he may investigate the Mesopotamian side of the case.

But first of all, I should like to make it quite clear that we here at the Foreign Office are in no way responsible for the situation which has arisen. From the very first we have held strongly the opinion that in all the areas in our military occupation no sort of penetration by the concession-hunter

<sup>1</sup> No. 692.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Western Department of the Foreign Office.

should be allowed until the Peace Conference had given a final decision as to their future status. We have maintained this point of view over and over again in writing and the breach in the wall has been made, not here, but in other quarters and we are not to blame if the flood is now being let loose. You need only refer to our despatches on the question of the abortive Anglo-French oil agreement<sup>3</sup> and on the efforts of the Zionists to secure preliminary penetration in Palestine<sup>4</sup> which have only been successful because promises were given to them in Paris which we here cannot disregard. The despatch of General Cowan to Mesopotamia<sup>5</sup> was, I understand, a job put through by the War Office about which neither we nor the India Office were consulted.

With regard to the present situation, I do not see what we here can do to prevent combines and syndicates on a large scale being formed for the *eventual* exploitation of oil resources in any part of the world. All we can do is to keep them out of the territories in our military occupation for the time being and even this is rendered difficult by the encouragement given to the Zionists to get to work at once and by such action as that of the War Office in allowing General Cowan to proceed to Mesopotamia and to leave two experts behind him there when he was recalled.

I hear quite vaguely that Lord Inchcape and the Mussageries [*sic*] Maritimes are the moving spirits in the new combine of which you speak.<sup>6</sup> Lord Inchcape is, I understand, a member of the Petroleum Executive and also Director on behalf of His Majesty's Government of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Petroleum Executive, I believe I am right in saying, is largely composed of persons who have a direct personal interest in oil enterprises. What can one expect, therefore, when private and public interests are inextricably mixed up in a Government body of control?

In Mesopotamia, so far as I can see, we ought to have little difficulty in keeping things in our own hands. The rights possessed by the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company apparently cover the whole field and the Administration will presumably take control of the whole thing. But the situation here and elsewhere will of course depend largely on the terms of the Mandate and it is up to you in Paris to see to these.

I will try to find out through Weakley what is going on and hope to write to you again in a day or two.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. enclosure in No. 684.

<sup>4</sup> See Chap. II.

<sup>5</sup> This visit was the one referred to in the fifth paragraph of No. 370.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 262.

#### No. 694

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest)*

*No. 33 Commercial [106954/2621/137]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1919

Sir:—

With reference to my telegram No. 333<sup>1</sup> of July 18th, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter and enclosure received from His Majesty's Petroleum

<sup>1</sup> No. 690.

Executive on the subject of the conversations which, as you are aware, have been taking place with the various sections of the British Delegation in Paris.

2. I request that you will approach the Roumanian Government and ascertain whether they are now prepared to resume the discussion of this subject.

3. I have concurred in the suggestion made by the Petroleum Executive in their letter that a representative of the British companies concerned should proceed to Roumania to confer with you, and I shall inform you as soon as the date of his departure is known.

I am, &c.

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 694

*Petroleum Executive to the Foreign Office*

No. S. 335

H.M. PETROLEUM EXECUTIVE, July 23, 1919

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Walter Long to refer to Foreign Office letter of 13th March No. 34601/C/137<sup>2</sup> regarding proposals for the acquisition by British interests of oil concessions in Roumania and to the conversations which, as Earl Curzon of Kedleston is aware, have since that date taken place on this subject with various sections of the British Delegation in Paris.

2. I am to attach for Lord Curzon's information a copy of the memorandum signed by M. Bratiano accepting the co-operation of the British and French Governments in the development of the Roumanian oil industry in a way which will allow of the fullest possible participation of Roumanian interests.

3. Owing to the departure of M. Bratiano from Paris it has not been possible to consider the proposals in detail, but Mr. Long is of opinion that the matter should be actively pursued and would be glad if Lord Curzon would instruct His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to enquire of the Roumanian Government whether it is now prepared to resume discussions of the subject.

4. I am also to suggest that a representative of the British Companies concerned should proceed to Roumania to confer with Mr. Rattigan and to open up direct negotiations with the Roumanian Government. Mr. Long fears that British interests may be seriously prejudiced unless steps of this nature can be taken at an early date, and he understands that the French Government would be prepared to take similar action.

I am, &c.

JOHN CADMAN

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 694

*Memorandum to form a basis in the negotiations which are now under discussion between the Government of Roumania and the Governments of Great Britain and France regarding the oil policy in Roumania.*

1. It is stated that the Roumanian Government desires to establish in

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Roumania an oil policy having for its object the reasonable and active exploitation of the oilfields in such a manner as to ensure the maximum internal distribution of oil with a view to developing the national industries of Roumania, and with the further object of encouraging the export of all available surplus on the markets outside Roumania.

It is understood that the Roumanian Government's oil policy is to be based on a broad national basis, so as to ensure the largest possible participation by Roumanian Capitalists and by the 'Roumanian Small Holdings'—and at the same time to enclose [sic] measures which will adequately safeguard the industry against the future permeation of German influence.

2. The British and French Governments, who have been approached by their respective oil companies, are prepared to co-operate with the Roumanian Government with the object of developing the Roumanian oil industry on the lines indicated in paragraph 1.

3. The Roumanian Government cordially accepts this co-operation.

(This memorandum has been initialled by Sir John Cadman, Senator Bérenger, M. Bratiano 4. 4. 19.)

No. 695

*Letter from Mr. Kidston to Sir G. Clerk (Paris)*

Unnumbered [109356/109356/44A]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1919

My dear George,

In continuation of my letter of a day or two ago,<sup>1</sup> I now enclose a copy of a minute which Weakley has given me on the oil situation. I do not know that it throws much light on the situation except in so far as it gives the composition of the Anglo-French Syndicate.

Weakley is convinced that the Shipping interests at any rate which are represented in this combination are not out to make a corner in oil or for purposes of speculation, but are genuinely concerned with the coal situation and wish to secure control of some source of oil fuel in the Mediterranean so that they may not be at the mercy either of the coal miners or of a gigantic oil trust. This seems quite likely and legitimate.

You may remember that I told you some time ago that I could not act as Foreign Office specialist in oil matters as I was to a small extent personally interested in oil shares. I think my attitude was justified, for I have received this morning from the Shell Company an option to take up some further shares to the extent, I think, of half my original holding which, I may add, I inherited. I am offered these shares at par and I can only hope that the information which reached Mr. Balfour through dinner-table gossip<sup>2</sup> will prove to be true.

G. K[KIDSTON]

<sup>1</sup> No. 693.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 692.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 695

*Minute by Mr. Weakley*

I have discussed with Sir John Cadman, Director of the Petroleum Executive the questions referred to in Sir George Clark's [six] letter of the 22nd inst.<sup>2</sup>

2. In regard to the reported operations of the Shell Company, Sir John Cadman was unaware of any venture being brought out by them.

3. Mr. Deterding, the manager of the Shell group, had mentioned, some time ago, the difficulties which his group found in getting supplies and materials in this country for the use of the various oilfields worked by them or under their control. It was practically impossible to obtain any of the materials required in this [c]ountry, either because manufacturers were unable to make them or because of the prohibitive cost.

4. The group had therefore been compelled to make arrangements for getting supplies from the United States. The value of such purchases would run into large figures, and in order to avoid a serious loss in exchange, arrangements had been made to pay for these purchases in American money.

5. The Shell group has consequently placed a large number of shares (old or new issues) in their Californian Oil Companies on the American market, with the object of devoting the proceeds of sale to the payment of the purchases. This is the only operation known to Sir J. Cadman, but he said he would make further enquiries.

6. As to speculative dealings connected with oil in Mesopotamia and Syria, this was obviously impossible, for although certain agreements had been arrived at in regard to the participation of the Shell group in the Mesopotamian oilfields, the Company to work and develop these fields had not yet been formed and could not be formed until the fate of Mesopotamia has been decided.

7. In regard to Syria, the Anglo-French Syndicate mentioned and described by Sir George Clark, know nothing definite of any available oilfields in that country. Lord Drogheda called on Sir J. Cadman recently and was informed that nothing could be said about the development of oilfields in Syria until a decision had been reached in Paris regarding Syria and Palestine. I had previously seen Lord Drogheda, and explained, what he already knew, that certain claims which had been put forward by Suleiman Nassif could not be dealt with until a settlement had been arrived at concerning the future administration of Palestine and Syria.

8. The Anglo-French Syndicate referred to, is made up of the following members:—

*British group.*

Lord Inchcape: Chairman P. & O. SS. Co.

Sir Thomas B. Royden, Bart.: Vice Chairman Cunard SS. Co.

Sir John M. Frost: Chairman of Frost Sons & Co.

Mr. W. C. Bagshaw: President Liverpool Commercial Trades Association.

<sup>2</sup> A prewar concessionnaire of the Turkish Government.

Mr. Ernest B. Royden: Messrs. Royden & Sons, Shipowners, Liverpool.  
Mr. J. Settle: Chairman Settle Speakman & Co. L[t]d., Colliery proprietors.

Colonel W. M. Falbe: Messrs. Falbe Halsey & Co.

Earl of Drogheda.

Mr. Charles Livingston: Chairman Messrs. David MacIver Sons & Co.,  
Liverpool.

*French group.*

Demarchy & Co.: Bankers, Paris.

M. de Wendel: Iron founder.

M. Geouin (?): Société des Chantiers des Batignolles.

M. Hersint.

M. de Vaureal: Président du Chemin de Fer Jaffa-Jerusalem.

M. Mirabeau & Co.: Paris.

L'Union Parisienne: Bankers, Paris.

Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas.

Banque Ottomane.

Compagnie Française du Levant.

L'Omnium de Petroles, Paris.

Messageries Maritimes.

E. W.

31. 7. 19.

No. 696

*Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received August 22)*

*No. 550 [119509/119509/45]*

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Mr. Barclay's<sup>1</sup> despatch No. 393<sup>2</sup> of May 15, 1919, respecting certain reports current in the United States with regard to the acquisition of oil properties by British interests, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a speech made by Senator Phelan in the Senate<sup>3</sup> on July 29th.

As you are aware, Senator Phelan has strong anti-British tendencies and his objection to the extension of British oil interests is thus not remarkable. I would, however, draw special attention to the documents printed by the Senator in the record<sup>4</sup> which include a report on the oil situation by Mr. V. H. Manning, Director of the Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, and also a letter from Messrs. Requa, Manning and George Otis Smith to the Railroad Administrator, dealing with the same questions. It will be noticed that the tendency of these papers is to lay stress on the policy of His Majesty's Government, and other foreign Powers, in restricting to their own nations [? nationals] petroleum rights in their own territories and it is urged that

<sup>1</sup> Minister in H.M. Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This speech is printed in *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 1st Session of the 66th Congress*, vol. lviii, part 4, pp. 3304-10.

<sup>4</sup> V. loc. cit.

similar action should be taken by the United States Government on behalf of American interests.

There is no doubt that the general question of oil production is exciting considerable interest in the minds of members of the Administration. It is possible that some of the statements as to the policy of His Majesty's Government made in the enclosed papers may not be fully justified by the facts and if this is the case I should be very glad of any comment which could be forwarded to me for use if the question should become more active in the future.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 697

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received August 13)*

No. 389 Telegraphic: by bag [115606/97004/137]

BUCHAREST, August 7, 1919

Your telegram No. 333,<sup>1</sup> twenty per cent. export tax.

I left at Foreign Office yesterday *aide-mémoire* pointing out that 20 per cent. export tax would for reasons set forth in your above-mentioned telegram render impossible co-operation of British and French Governments in Roumanian oil industry. I concluded *aide-mémoire* with paraphrase of last paragraph of your telegram.

M. Bratiano has not been accessible for some time and in his absence Foreign Office will give no reply to any representations beyond stereotyped one that 'matter will be considered and reply sent'.

I will renew representations on all questions awaiting settlement to M. Bratiano as soon as I can see him.

<sup>1</sup> No. 690.

No. 698

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received August 13)*

No. 17 Commercial [115513/2621/137]

BUCHAREST, August 7, 1919

My Lord,

My French Colleague having received similar instructions to those conveyed in your despatch No. 33 Commercial,<sup>1</sup> we addressed a collective note to the Roumanian Government asking whether they are now prepared to resume the discussions begun in Paris between British, French and Roumanian Representatives on the subject of the development of the Roumanian Petroleum Industry.

I will not fail to inform Your Lordship as soon as we receive a reply to our note.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN

<sup>1</sup> No. 694.

No. 699

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received August 9)*

*No. 392 Telegraphic: by radio [114366/2621/137]*

BUCHAREST, August 8, 1919

Prime Minister informed my French Colleague yesterday that he had (? received) our collective Note regarding resumption of conversations on subject of Anglo-French cooperation in Roumanian oil industry<sup>1</sup> and would reply shortly. Meanwhile he stated he had made no engagement to us. As a matter of fact negotiations had leaked out—he thought in London—with result that Americans had threatened to cut off further supplies and any financial help, if any arrangement of the kind were made with Great Britain and France to exclusion of themselves. He had pointed out danger of this when asked to put something in writing. He had now been obliged to bind himself to do nothing with Great Britain and France without previously consulting America[;] his hands were consequently completely tied as he was dependent both for supplies and financial assistance on America and would be obliged to ask latter for further advances. Consequently only hope of his being able to continue negotiations with us lay in our being willing to extend to him the assistance he would otherwise have to obtain from America and (? thus free) his hands.

I should add that Roumanian Government are much perturbed at reports which I believe true that Americans have been buying up large quantities of enemy oil shares.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 698.

No. 700

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received August 12)*

*No. 393 Telegraphic [115238/97004/137]*

BUCHAREST, August 9, 1919

20 per cent. export tax. (Roumanian Government) have informed me in reply to my representations that a decree of law has been published today removing till further notice 20 per cent. tax on oil exports.

No. 701

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received August 18)*

*No. 129 [117476/2621/137]*

BUCHAREST, August 9, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 393<sup>1</sup> of today's date I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information copy of note I have received from Mr. Bratiano, explaining that he is unable to resume the conversations

<sup>1</sup> No. 700.

begun in Paris on the subject of the cooperation of Great Britain and France in the Oil Industry, in view of the action taken in the matter by the American Government.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 701

*M. Bratianu to Mr. Rattigan*

BUCAREST, le 8 août, 1919

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires,

En accusant réception de votre lettre en date du 5 août dernier,<sup>2</sup> j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que l'examen du projet d'entente sur la question des pétroles entre les Gouvernements Britannique, Français et Roumain a dû être interrompu à la suite de l'intervention des Représentants des Etats-Unis qui ont mis le Gouvernement roumain dans l'impossibilité de prendre des engagements de ce caractère tant que les avances reçues des Etats-Unis pendant la guerre n'auraient pas été remboursées.

J'ai d'ailleurs fait déjà savoir ce qui précède à Monsieur le Sénateur Béranger [sic] à Paris.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

ION H. BRATIANU

<sup>2</sup> See No. 698.

No. 702

*The French Chargé d'Affaires in London to Earl Curzon*

(Received August 13)

[115404/3251/117]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES

Monsieur Paul Cambon a fait parvenir à son Gouvernement la lettre qui lui a été adressée le 22 juillet dernier, sous le Numéro 102249/C/117<sup>1</sup> par Sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon of Kedleston au sujet de l'accord Franco-Anglais sur les pétroles.

En réponse à cette dernière communication, le Chargé d'Affaires de France a l'honneur de communiquer, ci-joint, à Son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères une note de Monsieur Pichon sur cette même question et il saisit cette occasion pour Lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.

ALBERT GATE HOUSE,

12 août 1919

ENCLOSURE IN No. 702

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES

Copie.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Londres a communiqué au Gouvernement Français une note de Lord Curzon, du 22 juillet,<sup>1</sup> l'informant que le Gou-

<sup>1</sup> No. 691.

vernement Anglais, revenant sur l'agrément proposé à l'accord sur les pétroles intervenu entre Monsieur Henry Bérenger et M. Walter Long, retirait son assentiment, en s'appuyant sur une lettre particulière adressée par M. Lloyd George à M. Clemenceau<sup>2</sup> postérieurement à une conversation sur les affaires de Syrie.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette communication, dont il prend acte.

Ainsi disparaît le dernier vestige des conversations des Présidents du Conseil Anglais et Français au sujet des zones et des intérêts de la France et de l'Angleterre en Syrie et en Mésopotamie telles qu'elles furent réglées par l'accord Anglo-Français de 1916,<sup>3</sup> qui subsiste seul comme base possible de tout règlement entre les deux pays sur les affaires d'Asie-Mineure.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See No. 684, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. the Sykes-Picot Agreement: see Introductory Note to Chap. II.

<sup>4</sup> After the withdrawal, hereby effected, of the provisional Long-Bérenger Agreement, Anglo-French negotiations concerning oil resources lapsed until they were resumed during M. Clemenceau's visit to London in the first half of December 1919: see Volume II, No. 55, minute 6, and No. 58, minute 11.

### No. 703

#### *Memorandum by Mr. Weakley on M. Bérenger's note to M. Clemenceau relative to petroleum<sup>1</sup>*

[166303/3251/117]

The first three pages of M. Beranger's [sic] report dwell upon the great activities displayed by Great Britain for securing control over oilfields in Asiatic countries, and her determination to free herself of dependence on the United States for all oil supplies required for British Naval, Military and commercial purposes.

British policy in Asia Minor from the Caucasus to India, in Persia and Mesopotamia, has not been framed or pursued as a purely territorial policy but essentially as a petroleum policy, and in this M. Bérenger finds the explanation for

- (a) the recent Anglo-Persian agreement,<sup>2</sup> which was negotiated and concluded without the knowledge of the United States or of the European Powers.
- (b) the difficulties Britain has created for France in the Caucasus, and in the recent autocratic nature of the British occupation of Batoum, Tiflis and Baku and the influence exercised over the newly formed republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.<sup>3</sup>
- (c) the tension which was shown by Mr. Lloyd George during last spring and summer on the petroleum questions of Mosul, Kerkuk and the rest of Mesopotamia.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. Bérenger's note is untraced in Foreign Office archives. It seems likely that it was the untraced memorandum 'prepared personally for M. Clemenceau' which M. Berthelot communicated to Lord Curzon on December 11, 1919: see Volume II, No. 55, minute 6.

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. V.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume III, Chap. II.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Curzon noted against sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c): 'This is great nonsense.'

The British Government has in fact in view the creation of a British petroleum interest extending from Egypt to Burmah, and from Circassia to the Persian Gulf which is intended to be an offset to the great American petroleum interests.

2. In a footnote on page 3 this policy is justified, but it is observed that in view of the relations existing between Britain and France, and of the necessary understanding which must exist between them in the cause of peace and civilisation, the French Government must demand a legitimate share in oil enterprises as France, at the moment, has no petroleum whatever.

3. France stands in great need of petroleum and its products; her needs for fuel oil were greater than ever, owing to the shortage of coal, M. Beranger [sic] estimates that over three milliards of francs will soon have to be sent out of the country in order to obtain oil supplies, if the French Govt. do not secure a direct share in the oil industry in regions where it exists, and in which France can rightly participate, i.e. in the territories of the Caucasian republics as also in Mesopotamia and in Persia.

4. M. Beranger therefore urges that the French Government should come to an understanding with H.M.G. and with them should work out a petroleum policy intended to assure to France a proper participation in oil development.

The oilfields specially mentioned by M. Beranger, in which he urges that there should be French participation are those in

South Russia.

Mesopotamia especially at Mosul and Kerkuk.

Roumania and

Persia.

Emphasis is laid on the importance of protecting French rights in the Caucasus.

M. Beranger's report shows the great need of France for oil, and seems to put forward the French view for the revival of the Long-Beranger agreement of the 6th [8th] April last, which was withdrawn by the Prime Minister on the 21st May,<sup>5</sup> and has since remained in suspense.

5. This agreement provided for the cordial co-operation and reciprocity of both Govt.s in all countries where the oil interests of the two nations could be usefully united. The countries referred to were Roumania, Asia Minor, French Colonies and Protectorates, British Colonies and the agreement was also extended to Galicia and Russia.

6. As regards *Roumania*, the British and French Govt.s were to conduct negotiations in common with the Roumanian Govt. for the acquisition of enemy oil interests sequestered by the Roumanian Govt., and of concessions over oil lands belonging to the Roumanian State.

7. In Mesopotamia the French were given a 20% share in the Turkish Petroleum Co. or the Company to be created to take over the rights obtained from the Turkish Government. The British share was fixed at 70%, and 10%.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 684, note 2.

was set aside for local capital. The French, on their side, agreed to afford facilities for pipe lines across Syria.

8. This agreement thus provided for the mutual co-operation of the two Governments in acquiring new concessions for oil in all the countries which M. Beranger mentions, except Persia. He has now added Persia to his list. There can, I think, be no question of admitting French participation in oil areas covered by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession,<sup>6</sup> whether they be situated in Persia proper or in territories transferred from Persia to Turkey in which the Company's concession nevertheless remains operative. North Persia is, as far as we know, an open field, but no doubt the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. have not lost sight of the possibilities of that field.

9. The question of the advisability of reviving the Long-Beranger agreement has recently been reviewed by Sir Hamar Greenwood<sup>7</sup> in a statement submitted to the Cabinet; Sir Hamar suggested the probability that the French participation of 20% in the Mesopotamian oilfields may not in reality exceed 18%. I am however under the impression that since the agreement, the French have expressed views to equal participation in the Mesopotamian oilfields in the event of their giving up Mosul. M. Beranger may therefore ask for more than a 20[%] interest when discussions in regard to the French share in Mesopotamia take place. The Long-Beranger agreement as it stands seems to represent a fair scheme for joint co-operation and should satisfy all French demands.

E. WEAKLEY

13. 12. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Note by Lord Curzon: 'Out of the question.'

<sup>7</sup> Minister in charge of Petroleum Affairs in succession to Mr. Walter Long.

No. 704

*Minute by Sir J. Tilley*

[164597/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 18, 1919

*Oil Agreement.*

Sir J. Cadman has seen M. Bérenger and discovered that M. Bérenger has come over to talk not about Mesopotamia but about S. Russia and is indignant with his Foreign Office for not making this clear. M. Berthelot is to discuss Mesopotamia.<sup>1</sup> M. Bérenger admits that the 20 per cent. is a very good agreement for France but says some of his friends think they should have 50 per cent. However he says that is not his business at present.

Sir J. Cadman suggests that if the French want our help in S. Russia this may help us in making our bargain, though it is difficult to see how we are to help them.

J. A. C. T.<sup>2</sup>

18/12

<sup>1</sup> See Nos. 398 and 404.

<sup>2</sup> This paper was minuted as follows by Lords Hardinge and Curzon:

'I gathered in conversation with M. Cambon that the French are anxious to get hold of a share of the enormous quantities of oil stored at Baku, all of which he said is under British

military control. I expressed doubts as to our having any military control in Baku at present. I presume this then is the object of M. Bérenger's mission.

H'

'M. Bérenger gave me a much longer and fuller account of the case, which I begged him to put upon paper.

C.

19/12'

No memorandum by M. Bérenger, such as was suggested to him by Lord Curzon, has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

## No. 705

*Memorandum of Agreement between Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., M.P., His Majesty's Minister in Charge of Petroleum Affairs, and Senator Henry Bérenger, Commissioner-General of Petroleum Products in France, representing the Government of the French Republic.<sup>1</sup>*

[166303/3251/117]

1. By order of the two Governments of France and Great Britain the undersigned representatives have resumed, by mutual consent, the consideration of an agreement regarding petroleum.

2. It is understood on both sides that there shall be omitted from this agreement all questions of territories, mandates, and spheres of influence, which must be the subject of an agreement between the two Foreign Offices of France and Great Britain.

3. The undersigned have decided to adhere to the principles of the Franco-British arrangements initialled on the 8th April, 1919, by Mr. Walter H. Long, Minister in Charge of Petroleum Affairs, in the name of the British Government, and Monsieur Henry Bérenger, Commissaire-Général aux Essences et Combustibles, in the name of the French Government, an agreement which was subsequently suspended as the result of difficulties of a general political nature.

4. This agreement is based on the principles of cordial co-operation and reciprocity in all those countries where the oil interests of the two nations can be usefully united. This memorandum relates to the following states or countries:—Roumania, Asia Minor, Territories of the old Russian Empire, Galicia, French Colonies, and British Crown Colonies.

5. The agreement may be extended to other countries by mutual consent.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Hamar Greenwood sent a copy of this provisional agreement to Lord Curzon under cover of a letter of December 23, 1919, in which he stated in particular: 'Although M. Bérenger at first expressed himself unable, in view of his instructions, to discuss the question of the Anglo-French Agreement, he subsequently consented to do so on hearing of the understanding which had taken place between the Prime Minister and Monsieur Clemenceau.'

'As you will see, the Agreement as initialled is in substance the same as the previous draft which was negotiated by Mr. Long, but which the two Premiers were unwilling to have ratified. The most important alteration is the addition in Clause 11 of the word "railways", which I pressed to have inserted in accordance with the wishes of Mr. Lloyd George.'

'Sir John Cadman, Director of the Petroleum Department, is highly satisfied with the conclusion of the Agreement as it stands, regarded from the technical point of view. I think we can congratulate ourselves on having secured the acceptance of the Agreement with the addition of the provision regarding two railways without having found ourselves compelled to concede any increase in the percentage of French participation.'

### *Roumania*

6. The British and French Governments shall support their respective nationals in any common negotiations to be entered into with the Government of Roumania for:

(a) The acquisition of oil concessions, shares or other interests belonging to former enemy subjects or bodies in Roumania which have been sequestered, e.g. the Steaua Romana, Concordia, Vega, &c., which constituted in that country the oil groups of the Deutsche Bank and of the Disconto Gesellschaft, together with any other interests that may be obtainable.

(b) Concessions over oil lands belonging to the Roumanian State.

7. All shares belonging to former enemy concessions which can be secured and all other advantages derived from these negotiations shall be divided, fifty per cent. to British interests and fifty per cent. to French interests. It is understood that in the company or companies to be formed to undertake the management and the exploitation of the said shares, concessions and other advantages, the two countries shall have the same proportion of fifty per cent. in all capital subscribed as well as in representatives on the Board and voting power.

### *Territories of the late Russian Empire*

8. In the territories which belonged to the late Russian Empire the two Governments will give their joint support to their respective nationals in their joint efforts to obtain petroleum concessions and facilities to export, and to arrange delivery of petroleum supplies.

### *Mesopotamia*

9. As regards Mesopotamia participation has been guided by the fact that the Turkish Petroleum Company had secured before the war from the Turkish Government the petroleum rights in the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad, and its shares are now all in British hands.

10. The British Government places at the disposal of the French Government a share of twenty-five per cent. in the Turkish Petroleum Company with all the rights of representation and other rights which may be attached to the said shares. The price to be paid by the French Government shall be that paid by the British Government to the Public Trustee for the shares belonging to the Deutsche Bank, plus five per cent. interest on said price since the date of payment.

11. In consideration of said participation the French Government shall agree, if it is desired and as soon as application is made, to the construction of two separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their construction and maintenance and for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean. The port or ports shall be chosen in agreement between the two Governments.

12. Should such pipe-lines and railways cross territory within a French sphere of influence France undertakes to give every facility for the rights of

crossing without any royalty or wayleaves on the oil transported. Neverthe less, compensation shall be payable to the landowners for the surface occupied.

13. In the same way France will give facilities at the terminal port or ports for the acquisition by the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of the land necessary for the erection of depots, railways, refineries, loading wharves, &c. Oil thus exported shall be exempt from export and transit dues. The material necessary for the construction of the pipe-lines, railways, refineries, and other equipment shall also be free from import duties and wayleaves.

14. Should the Turkish Petroleum Company desire to lay a pipe-line and a railway to the Persian Gulf the British Government will use its good offices to secure similar facilities for that purpose.

#### *North Africa and other Colonies*

15. The French Government will give facilities to any Franco-British group or groups of good standing, which furnish the necessary guarantees and comply with French laws, for the acquisition of oil concessions in the French Colonies, Protectorates, and Zones of influence, including Algeria, Tunis and Morocco. It should be noted that the French Parliament has resolved that groups so formed must contain at least sixty-seven per cent. French interests.

16. The French Government will grant to Messrs. Pearson and Son a concession in Algeria as soon as they have complied with all the requirements of the French laws.

#### *British Crown Colonies*

17. In so far as existing regulations allow, the British Government will give to French subjects who may wish to prospect and exploit petrolierous lands in the Crown Colonies, similar advantages to those which France is granting to British subjects in the French Colonies.

18. Nothing in this agreement shall apply to concessions which may be the subject of negotiations initiated by French or British private interests.

This agreement has to-day been initialled by Sir Hamar Greenwood and Senator Henry Bérenger subject to confirmation by the British and French Prime Ministers respectively.

H.G. 21.12.19.

H.B. 21.12.19.

December 21, 1919.

1. In connection with the agreement entered into on the twenty-first day of December, 1919, between the undersigned on behalf of the British and French Governments, it is clearly understood that native government or other native interests shall be allowed if they so desire to participate in the Turkish Petroleum Company up to a maximum of twenty per cent. of the share capital. The French shall contribute one-half of the first ten per cent. of such native participation and the additional participation shall be provided by each group in proportion to their holdings.

2. It is also clearly understood that the Turkish Petroleum Company shall be under permanent British control.

HAMAR GREENWOOD  
21/12/19.

HENRY BÉRENGER  
21/12/19.

December 21, 1919.

No. 706

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest)*  
*No. 2 Telegraphic [167090/2621/137]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 1, 1920

Deutsche Bank are ready subject to certain conditions to sell their holding of 51% in Steaua Romana to Anglo-French group. If terms can be arranged do you consider present moment suitable for representatives of group to come to Bucharest and negotiate with Roumanian Government in order to obtain their consent to transfer of German holding and what are your own views as to probability of obtaining Rumanian consent?

Above of course strictly confidential.

No. 707

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received January 17)*  
*No. 17 Telegraphic [171546/2621/137]*

BUCHAREST, January 9, 1920

Your telegram No. 2.<sup>1</sup>

I do not think that present moment is propitious to broach here question of acquisition by Anglo-French group of German holdings in Steaua but I should . . . (? know).<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister is however leaving in a few days (? for) Paris and it might be well to sound him there. Roumanian Government were incensed with Americans for attempting to acquire in Switzerland German holdings in oil companies. Of course our proposal is different in that there is no question of going behind the backs of Roumanian Government, as stated. I do not know how far alleged engagement by Bratiano towards Americans—reported in my telegram No. 392<sup>3</sup> of August 8th last—affects the matter under discussion.

<sup>1</sup> No. 706.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> No. 699.

No. 708

*Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received January 23)*  
*No. 22 Telegraphic: by bag [172752/2621/137]*

BUCHAREST, January 11, 1920

My telegram No. 17.<sup>1</sup>

German holding in 'Steaua Romana'.

It appears to be universally held here that such enemy holdings have become Roumanian property. I gather that Prime Minister when in Paris

<sup>1</sup> No. 707.

hopes to arrange large foreign loan and intends to use these enemy holdings as part security.

No. 709

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 185 [166395/3251/117]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 15, 1920

My Lord,

On December 21st last Sir Hamar Greenwood, on behalf of His Majesty's Government and Senator Bérenger, on behalf of the French Government, initialled an Agreement in regard to Petroleum,<sup>1</sup> subject to confirmation by the British and French Prime Ministers respectively. This Agreement follows the lines of the Anglo-French Agreement, initialled on April 8th last by Mr. Long and Senator Bérenger which was subsequently suspended.

2. It is possible that Mr. Lloyd George may take advantage of the presence of Sir Hamar Greenwood and Sir John Cadman in Paris<sup>2</sup> to discuss the Agreement with Monsieur Clemenceau and I desire, therefore to call attention without delay to a point in the Agreement which may lead to difficulties in the future.

3. Article 15 of the Agreement reads as follows:—

'The French Government will give facilities to any Franco-British group or groups of good standing, which furnish the necessary guarantees and comply with French laws, for the acquisition of oil concessions in the French Colonies, Protectorates, and Zones of influence, including Algeria, Tunis and Morocco. It should be noted that the French Parliament has resolved that groups so formed must contain at least sixty-seven per cent. French interests.'

The French Government will, no doubt, interpret this Article to mean that all groups formed for the acquisition of oil concessions in Morocco must necessarily contain sixty-seven per cent. of French interest. Presumably, however, His Majesty's Government have no intention of waiving the rights secured to British subjects in Morocco by treaty and I would suggest, therefore, for the consideration of the Prime Minister, that this should be made clear in any discussions with Monsieur Clemenceau. In the event of the Agreement being confirmed by the two Prime Ministers, a formal reservation of British treaty rights in Morocco could be inserted in the British note recording the approval of the Agreement by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(For the Secretary of State,

G. S. SPICER<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 705.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lloyd George and other British Ministers were at that time in Paris for general discussions: see Volume II, Chap. II.

<sup>3</sup> No further records of these Anglo-French negotiations concerning oil resources for this period have been traced in Foreign Office archives.

## CHAPTER V

# Anglo-Persian relations after the signature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919

August 9—December 21, 1919

No. 710

*Memorandum by Earl Curzon on the Persian Agreement<sup>1</sup>*

[114911/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 9, 1919

My colleagues may have noticed for many months past a series of telegrams passing between the Foreign Office and our representative in Tehran concerning a contemplated agreement with the Persian Government. These negotiations commenced here at a time when the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet was in charge of this branch of our foreign policy, and Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, the Secretary of State for India, and the Treasury were from the start cognisant of these negotiations. In their final form they have had the approval of Mr. Montagu and Mr. Chamberlain<sup>2</sup> here and of Mr. Balfour in Paris. I now submit to the Cabinet a brief résumé of the transactions that have led to what I venture to regard as a most satisfactory result.

At the outbreak of the war the situation in Persia was somewhat as follows: our own hands were tied by the unfortunate Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907,<sup>3</sup> which, although it was entered into by the then Government with the object of bringing to an end friction between Russia and ourselves in Persia and ensuring the stability of Persian institutions, had throughout been regarded with intense hostility by the Persian Government, and had in practice been used as an instrument for tightening the Russian grip upon the northern part of the country. The consequence was that, when hostilities began and Russia and we were allies in a common cause, the ill-feeling generated in Persia by Russian conduct was passed on to ourselves. We were thought to be identified with Russian policy and to be hostile to all Persian aspirations, and the sympathies of the country in the early stages of the war were unmistakably on the side of the Central Powers. Though Persia remained nominally neutral, she lent what aid she could to enemy activity and intrigue; and the situation in the country, arising partly from German propaganda, partly from Turkish invasion, and partly from the hostility of the native Government, became so acute that, for the defence of the Afghan

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet. <sup>2</sup> Chancellor of the Exchequer.

<sup>3</sup> The text of this agreement is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. C, p. 555.

border, of our own interests in the country, and of the interests of the Entente, we were compelled to treat Persia almost as a theatre of war.

Violent outbreaks occurred in the southern part of the country, where a native force, entitled the South Persia Rifles, had been organised under British officers as a sort of gendarmerie to keep the trade routes open and to maintain the peace. At one time this force and its British officers were in great danger, and had to be reinforced by troops from India. On the eastern side of the country active steps were necessary to preserve the integrity of the Afghan border. After the Russian revolution, there was the threat of a Bolshevik invasion in the north. Meanwhile, on the north-west, while the Turks and Germans were in undisputed occupation of the Caucasus, they threatened a descent upon the Persian frontier province of Azerbaijan, which at one moment placed the capital in danger and almost led to the flight of the Persian Government. In order to prevent this eruption, to maintain our position in the Caspian region, and to prevent the Germans from obtaining access by way of that sea to Asia, we were obliged to push forward a strong military force from the direction of Bagdad. British troops still occupy the line from Bagdad to Kasvin, although it is hoped that they may be withdrawn at no distant date.

The whole of these military operations, which involved considerable peril and a great outlay, have been more than justified by the results. Persia has been freed from the enemy and tranquillised. The fact that we have no hostile intentions against the country or its Government is now thoroughly known. It only remains for us to construct a policy which will stabilise conditions in the future.

A year ago, when our fortunes in the western theatre of operations were drawing towards a successful issue, and when Persia herself had ceased to contemplate a German victory, a leading Persian statesman named Vossug-ed-Dowleh, who had always been friendly to British interests, was appointed by the Shah as the head of the Ministry. With him in the Persian Cabinet were two other Ministers equally convinced that the future of Persia lay in friendly reliance upon ourselves. The Shah himself adopted the same line and backed his Ministers. Simultaneously we had sent to Tehran as our Minister Sir Percy Cox, for many years British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and latterly chief political officer in Mesopotamia. His object and his instructions were to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government by which British interests in that part of the world should be safeguarded in future from a recurrence of the recent shocks, and by which Persia, incurably feeble and unable to stand by herself, should be given the support that would enable her to maintain her position among the independent nations of the world. The negotiations which have proceeded during the last nine months, and which have now reached a satisfactory conclusion, are the result of the joint efforts of the Persian Government and Sir Percy Cox.

What they mean in practice is this: not that we have received or are about to receive a mandate for Persia—on the contrary, the attempts of the Persian representatives in Paris to be heard by the Peace Conference have been

attended by uniform failure; not that Persia has handed over to us any part of her liberties; not that we are assuming fresh and costly obligations which will place a great strain upon us in the future; but that the Persian Government, realising that we are the only neighbouring Great Power closely interested in the fate of Persia, able and willing to help her, and likely to be disinterested in that object, have decided of their own free will to ask us to assist Persia in the rehabilitation of her fortunes.

If it be asked why we should undertake the task at all, and why Persia should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesque decay, the answer is that her geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now—just as it would have been impossible for us at any time during the past fifty years—to disinterest ourselves from what happens in Persia. Moreover, now that we are about to assume the mandate for Mesopotamia, which will make us coterminous with the western frontiers of Persia, we cannot permit the existence, between the frontiers of our Indian Empire in Baluchistan and those of our new Protectorate, of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos, and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be left alone, there is every reason to fear that she would be overrun by Bolshevik influences from the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of the oilfields, which are worked for the British Navy and which give us a commanding interest in that part of the world.

In these circumstances, the desire of the Foreign Office and India Office in combination has been to make an arrangement by which, without assuming a direct control over Persian administration or involving ourselves in continued financial responsibilities on a large scale, we should yet be able to provide Persia with the expert assistance and advice which will enable the State to be rebuilt.

Under the terms of the agreement which has now been negotiated, we undertake to supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such expert advisers as may be considered necessary for the various branches of the Persian Administration. Amongst other things, the Persian Government desire to establish a uniform force, into which shall be incorporated all the various elements—Persian regulars and gendarmerie, the Cossack Brigade, the South Persian Rifles, &c.—which have hitherto existed in various parts of the country.\* We propose to lend such officers as may be required to organise this force. Further, the Treasury has agreed to make an advance to the Persian Government of £2,000,000, to be shared equally by the Government of India and the Treasury, and to be secured upon the Persian customs revenues, in order to allow the Persian Government to initiate the reforms which are in contemplation. It is formally stipulated that the first instalment of this shall not be paid until the British financial adviser has assumed his duties. In the remaining parts of the agreement will be found various provisions which will enable us to back the Persian Government in realising several of their unsatisfied claims.

The upshot of these arrangements is, not that Persia will be converted in any sense into a British Protectorate: on the contrary, the first article of the agreement pledges His Majesty's Government to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of the country; but that the reign of foreign intrigue and of jealous competition between rival Powers, with the consequent disorganisation in Persia, will be, if we are successful, brought to an end, and that Persia herself, if she plays the game, will have the best chance of recuperation that she has enjoyed at any time during the past century. Finally, this agreement, if satisfactorily carried out, will be a valuable guarantee for the future peace of the Eastern world.

The Shah of Persia, who has throughout participated in and favoured these negotiations, is about to visit this country as a proof of his goodwill; and the publication to the world of the agreement which I have here described will, I hope, be regarded as a convincing testimony that the relations of the two countries, so long and closely interconnected, will be placed henceforward on a sounder and surer basis.

C. OF K.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Appended to the original were the five documents (not here printed) published in Cmd. 300 of 1919, *Agreement between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Persian Government*.

### No. 711

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon. (Received August 10)*

*No. 534 Telegraphic [114336/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 424.<sup>1</sup>

Agreements with Persian Government and the four separate letters<sup>2</sup> duly signed with the two verbal alterations reported in my immediately preceding telegram<sup>3</sup> to Foreign Office.

Sent to India.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of August 8, 1919, to Tehran, Lord Curzon had stated:

'I authorise you on behalf of His Majesty's Government to sign the two agreements with the Persian Government and four separate letters addressed to the Prime Minister as follows:—

'1. Principal agreement comprising a preamble and six articles.

'2. Agreement relating to advance of £2,000,000, comprising a preamble and four articles.

'3. Letter to Persian Government relating to Persia's three desiderata.

'4. Letter to Persian Government relating to claims.

'5. Assurances to His Majesty the Shah.

'6. Assurances to the Prime Minister, Sarim-ed-Dowleh, and Nosret-ed-Dowleh.'

Items 1-4 above were published in Cmd. 300 of 1919 (cf. No. 710, note 4). For the text of items 5 and 6, which remained secret, see No. 734, note 2 and enclosure 7 respectively.

<sup>2</sup> See note 1 above. The 'four separate letters' were items 3-6 respectively in Foreign Office telegram No. 424.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of even date (received August 10) Sir P. Cox had reported: 'General agreement. Article 1. At last meeting Prime Minister after further consideration presse<sup>1</sup> for elimination of word "territorial", although it was at the request of

the [Persian] Cabinet that it was inserted. I agreed to its omission.' (It was not clear to the Foreign Office where the insertion had been made.) Sir P. Cox had reported secondly that the Persian cabinet strongly objected to the substitution, suggested by the Foreign Office, 'of word "advance" for word "loan" on the ground that, in the eyes of the public, "advance" would appear to be merely charity dole by British Treasury to Persian Government. As they felt very strongly about it and further reference to you before the Shah's departure was not possible I took the responsibility of reverting to use of the word "loan" instead of "advance" in article 4 of principal agreement and in "loan contract," believing that the point was not of essential importance.'

## No. 712

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 431 Telegraphic [114336/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 11, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 533<sup>1</sup> and 534<sup>2</sup> (of August 9th).

1. I congratulate you heartily on successful termination of negotiations, which you have conducted with so much ability.

2. I approve your action in not delaying signature over points mentioned in your telegram No. 533.<sup>1</sup>

3. As regards publication of agreement, your telegram No. 532<sup>3</sup> speaks of publication by Persian Government of principal agreement and letter re desiderata. Please telegraph immediately exactly which documents are to be published. I presume general agreement, loan agreement, and separate letter No. 1 (desiderata) are to be published in any case, and that letters Nos. 3 and 4 (assurances to Shah and triumvirate)<sup>4</sup> are *not*.<sup>5</sup> As regards letter No. 2 (claims of His Majesty's Government and Persian Government against each other) I see no objection to publication. Please state what Persian Government are doing as to this.

4. It would be well if publication could take place simultaneously here and in Tehran. If you can delay publication till, say, Wednesday or Thursday<sup>6</sup> this would be possible. I will telegraph, as soon as I know, earliest date when we can publish here. In the meanwhile, please answer questions in preceding paragraph as to which documents are to be published.

5. Now that agreement is signed, I propose to invite Mushaver<sup>7</sup> to London for a few days; this may result in improvement in his attitude.<sup>8</sup> Have you any comments?

6. I presume that separate letter as regards assurances to triumvirate was signed in form contained in my telegram No. 381.<sup>9</sup> You did not telegraph this with the rest of the text of the agreement.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 711, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> No. 711.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The three Persian Ministers (respectively Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and Foreign Minister) referred to under item 6 in Foreign Office telegram No. 424: see No. 711, note 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 711, notes 1 and 2.

<sup>6</sup> August 13 or 14, 1919.

<sup>7</sup> Mushaver-el-Mamalek had until recently been Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and head of the Persian delegation in Paris.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Nos. 719 and 730.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 734.

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 11)*  
No. 535 Telegraphic [115243/150/34]

TEHRAN, August 11, 1919

*Sent to India.*

In pursuance of agreement just concluded with Persia directions in which we need to (? get) to work immediately are in appointment of financial Adviser and assembly of Military Commission.

Principal problems which will have to be dealt with by latter will be:—

Class 1. Numbers, composition and distribution of forces required, organisation of units and formations and absorption of existing formations into uniform force. Training of officers and men.

Class 2. Provision of personnel and system of recruiting and payment of officers and men.

Class 3. Provision of munitions, equipment, transport remounts, quarters.

I have considered matter carefully in consultation with Military Attaché and I am of opinion Commission should be composed on lines of a divisional staff with certain modifications as follows:

1. General Officer Commanding as President.
2. General Staff Officer first grade.
3. Assistant Adjutant General.
4. Assistant Quartermaster General.
5. Officer of Royal Air Force.
6. Officer of Artillery.
7. Political Officer.
8. Medical Officer.

(? Commission) should meet in Tehran and after studying general conditions at capital should visit Headquarters of provinces in order to acquaint themselves with local conditions before submitting a report.

It is very desirable that British members of Commission should have experience of Indian military system and essential each should have competent knowledge of either French or Persian.

Whether this agreement with Persia is to prove a success or failure will depend mainly on wisdom of selection of British personnel who will work it.

I therefore avail myself of the first opportunity very respectfully to ask His Majesty's Government and Government of India to recognise that I am *prima facie* in best position to judge of type of men needed for purpose in view: to give due weight to any individual recommendations I may make in public interest; and above all not to impose upon us individuals against whom I see specific objections.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 436 of August 14, 1919, to Tehran, Lord Curzon con- curred in the view expressed in the last paragraph of the present telegram.

No. 714

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 13)*

*No. 540 Telegraphic [115339/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 12, 1919

Your telegram No. 431,<sup>1</sup> paragraph 3.

Only two documents which are being published here are actual principal agreement without loan contract and (? separate) letter re desiderata.

They have already appeared in Persian papers on Sunday.<sup>2</sup> It was urgently necessary to publish them with Shah's concurrence before he left, otherwise his departure would have been put down to desire to dissociate himself from them.

Other points in above-mentioned telegram will be answered in later message.

<sup>1</sup> No. 712.

<sup>2</sup> August 10, 1919.

No. 715

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 433 Telegraphic [113451/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1919

Your telegram No. 526.<sup>1</sup>

I think there is a misunderstanding. Statement in my telegram No. 416<sup>1</sup> that proposed letter quoted in your telegram No. 507<sup>1</sup> 'must be cancelled' is not intended to mean that subsidy at present being paid to the Shah is to cease at once. In fact your statement that undertaking as regards subsidy was reaffirmed in writing after receipt of Foreign Office telegram No. 662 of last year<sup>1</sup> (a fact of which I have been hitherto unaware) makes it impossible to discontinue subsidy forthwith.

<sup>1</sup> In Tehran telegram No. 507 of July 27, 1919 (received that day) Sir P. Cox had submitted to Lord Curzon the draft of the (subsequently cancelled) secret letter to the Persian Prime Minister, printed in enclosure 6 to No. 734, q.v. Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office telegram No. 416 of August 5, 1919, to Tehran: 'I have examined the telegrams exchanged on this subject and I see no justification for the proposed letter undertaking to continue the subsidy of Tomans 15,000 a month to the Shah. I call your particular attention to my private telegram of 9th May [not printed], in which I said the House of Commons would never consent to the continued subsidy to the Sovereign. I cannot therefore authorise you to send this letter, which must be cancelled. The farthest length to which I intended to go is represented in text given in your telegram No. 506<sup>1</sup>, which transmitted the draft text of the letter printed in No. 734, note 2. Sir P. Cox replied in Tehran telegram No. 526 of August 7, 1919 (received August 8):

'As regards my telegram No. 507 and your Lordship's comment upon it I feel sure that complete papers were not before you when you reached conclusion intimated to me.'

'I submit that question which has been under discussion in connection with these negotiations has been grant of permanent subsidy to Shah.'

'Payment of present subsidy of tomans 15,000 monthly is in no way dependent on or connected with conclusion of present agreement, but was announced (? without) qualifications'

As you say, this subsidy has no connection whatever with present agreement. This is one of the reasons for not mentioning it in the agreement. Position in regard to it is, generally speaking, that as Persian customs and other finances gradually improve under administration provided for by the agreement, Shah's income from Persian sources will correspondingly improve and subsidy will become unnecessary (see my telegram No. 225<sup>2</sup> of 17th April).

There is no question of going back on anything already said, but there is also no intention of raising matter of subsidy again or of emphasising it by bringing it into the agreement.

Now that agreement is signed you should regard above as being for your information only. It would be better to let the matter rest now, but if Shah or Persian Government return to the question, you should be guided by this telegram, while being careful not to commit us as regards the subsidy to a greater degree than is absolutely necessary in order to avoid trouble.

by Sir C. Marling in May 1918 for "as long as Shah retained Vossugh in office and supported him loyally."

'Payment was sanctioned by His Majesty's Government on same basis.

'This undertaking was reiterated by His Majesty's Government, and reaffirmed in writing to Shah in pursuance of Foreign Office telegram No. 662 of 26th December, 1918 [not printed].

'I am still making these payments regularly, and there has never been any suggestion that they would cease on conclusion of this agreement, and I submit that to stop them while Vossugh retains office would be flagrant breach of (? faith), but I feel sure that on seeing papers cited below your Lordship will alter your conclusion. Sir C. Marling's telegram No. 458, May 26th, 1918, Foreign Office telegram No. 293, May 28th, Sir C. Marling's telegram No. 685 (? August 6th [7th]), Foreign Office telegram No. 408, August 9th, Foreign Office telegram No. 506, September 24th.' (These papers are not printed.)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In this telegram Lord Curzon had stated in particular: 'His Majesty's Government could not commit themselves to maintenance in perpetuity of Kajar dynasty, or to subsidy to Shah, which would amount at present rate to £120,000 a year. If Persian finances are properly administered rise in revenue would beneficially affect civil list of Sovereign.'

## No. 716

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)*

*No. 541 Telegraphic [116167/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 13, 1919

I beg to offer following observations and suggestions in . . .<sup>1</sup> with attitude of my Belgian and French colleagues, both in general as representatives of Allied Powers, and in particular in regard to these negotiations:—

The former, Monsieur de Raymond, who joined his post last November, has been a completely straightforward and loyal colleague. He has always recognised that it should be Belgian policy to stand in closely with us, and that if we failed to secure a predominant participation in reform of Persia it

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

was probably Belgian Chargé d'Affaires who could fill the breach with the least inconvenience to us. In return I have always let him believe, should we come to any special arrangement with Persia, it was my personal view that we should need the services of Belgians now here to the extent that they were now ready to continue service and to work loyally with us. If you see no objection I think it would be politic at this stage if you could express to Belgian Government appreciation of attitude of Monsieur de Raymond and at the same time assure them that, in the belief that they would work in cordial co-operation with us, we had no designs against Belgian functionaries now employed in Persia.

As regards my French colleague the position is converse. From the moment of his arrival he has adopted an attitude of undisguised and unfriendly rivalry. This has been a matter of general comment amongst members of Cabinet and the elements friendly to us and the fact that he has overdone it and made himself somewhat ridiculous does not alter aspect of his attitude from our point of view. You are aware of his action in regard to the wireless installation,<sup>2</sup> French advisers, and French officers for gendarmerie. He is now supplying to Persian papers and to Shah communiqués of news considerably quicker than Reuter, purporting to issue from 'French Intelligence Agency'. Captain (? Duc)rocq whom he brought as military attaché is by profession a civilian who during the war has been working for propaganda department of French Government. Belgian Minister informed me recently that they made definite overtures to him to co-operate in getting dominant influence of Imperial Club here in order to use it for French propaganda.

Prime Minister informed me yesterday that at Nusret ed Dowleh's first weekly reception as Foreign Minister on 11th August M. Bonin expressed himself in very heated terms regarding our agreement and was beside himself with indignation; and that he is now busy talking against it. Of course these accusations would be difficult to substantiate severally in form of official complaint, but it seems to me important either to get Bonin transferred or to get him instructed to alter his (? attitude) and Vossugh has specially asked me to request you, when discussing agreement with French Government, to ask (? that he) be instructed to adopt more friendly attitude. I venture to suggest that Belgian Government be asked what reports they have received from their Minister and if they have not received any, call for an appreciation from him. I feel sure that he would report very much as I have. If so, it might be easier to ask French Government either to transfer him or . . .<sup>1</sup> him.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The reference was to a wireless receiver recently installed in the French Legation at Tehran. In this connexion it had been decided to supply Sir P. Cox with a wireless installation. Cf. No. 862.

<sup>3</sup> Sir P. Cox further reported in Tehran telegram No. 552 of August 16, 1919 (received August 20): 'My Belgian Colleague . . . tells me he has sent three reports to his Foreign Office regarding French Minister's attitude, reporting his secret importation of wireless and commenting on his general proceedings as being incompatible with British and Belgian interests. In the circumstances perhaps joint or simultaneous remonstrance would be possible.'

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

No. 1061 [116385/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 13, 1919

Sir,

I asked M. de Fleuriau to call upon me this afternoon, in order to draw his attention to an announcement, which had appeared in the French newspapers, of the impending despatch of a French judicial mission to Tehran. I recapitulated to the French Minister the previous history of this question, and read to him verbatim my notes<sup>1</sup> of the last conversation which I had on the subject with M. Cambon when the latter visited me in the Foreign Office on July 4th.

I had explained to M. Cambon on that occasion that, while I had no reason to object to the deputation to Tehran of French professors skilled in medicine, surgery, and mathematics, I was at a loss to understand why the institution of a Law School or the sending of French Professors of Law should be required. I had pointed out that, the frontier between law and politics being admittedly thin, there was some reason to fear that the French lawyers, in the absence of any serious occupation, might feel tempted to take a hand in the local political game. I had also put to the French Ambassador the hypothetical case of what his Government would have thought and said had the British attempted a similar move in some sphere of clearly French influence. In reply, M. Cambon had said that, upon his approaching visit to Paris, he would discuss the question of the French legal professors; and he had left upon my mind the impression that it would not be necessary to persevere with that part of the French programme.

In these circumstances, I had been considerably surprised at reading in the *Temps* only a few days ago an announcement to the effect that a French Judicial Mission had been formed by the French Minister of Justice, with the consent of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was to leave for Persia next month to found a School of Law in Tehran. The names of the members of the mission were given, and it had been added in the *Temps* that the mission itself could not fail to benefit French influence in the East.

The ground which I had taken in my conversation with M. Cambon was, I now told M. de Fleuriau, greatly strengthened by what had passed in the interval. The British Government had for some time been engaged in negotiations with the Persian Government, culminating in an agreement which I had just concluded and which was about to be published in both countries. I gave the French Minister a general sketch of the contents of this agreement, and I said that it seemed to me singularly inappropriate that—at a time when the Persian Government had themselves recognised the predominant political interest of Great Britain by inviting her assistance in the manner provided for in the agreement—the French Government should think it fit to appear upon the scene almost in the guise of rival competitors, suggesting

<sup>1</sup> See No. 439.

to Persia and to the world that the old competition between European nations (in former times usually Russia and Great Britain) was about to be revived, and that France regarded with some jealousy the occupation of the field by England.

M. de Fleuriau undertook to verify what I had said to M. Cambon, and to communicate to Paris the substance of our conversation to-day.

I went on to say to the French Minister that indications had reached me lately from more than one quarter of an inclination on the part, not, I hoped, of the French Government, of whose loyalty I was convinced, but of certain advanced sections of French colonial and public opinion, to pick causes of quarrel with this country, and to adopt an attitude towards Great Britain that was scarcely consistent with the close and cordial alliance between us, which was still in being. One day it was Syria,<sup>2</sup> another day it was Tangier, again it was some other part of the Eastern world. I told him that I thought we had said good-bye to the policy of pin-pricks, which had done so much to exacerbate relations between our two countries in the past; and, when on the part of the two Governments there was still the firmest intention in the public interest to pursue a policy of close co-operation, it seemed to me little short of scandalous that any encouragement should be given to those who sought to poison the wells. I reminded M. de Fleuriau that, upon my instructions, Sir Ronald Graham had spoken to him with great frankness last week on the question of Syria,<sup>2</sup> pointing out to him that, while we desired no mandate for that region, and would certainly refuse it if offered, the only reason for which a military occupation of Syria by the French had not been encouraged by our military authorities was that such an occupation would be absolutely certain to lead to collisions between the French and the native populations.

Upon the French Minister doubting whether this was the case, I informed him—and this he had not previously heard—that on a recent occasion a French official of the highest rank had actually been fired upon and wounded by the population of a district of the Lebanon in which the French claimed a long-standing political predominance.

Further, I asked whether a stronger evidence of our disinterestedness could be forthcoming than the fact that, though France had no legitimate claim to Cilicia, had not received a mandate for that part of the Turkish Empire, and might indeed in the future not receive one at all, yet we had voluntarily invited French troops to occupy that country, of which they were now in possession. Not a word of recognition was given to this fact; while, on the other hand, inspired writers in the leading French newspapers endeavoured to make mischief as regards Syria by bringing wholly unfounded charges against this country.

M. de Fleuriau disputed the inspiration under which these writers penned their articles; but I said that I could not doubt seriously that such had been the case.

I urged him to help to keep the relations between our two countries free

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. II.

from this atmosphere of suspicion and insinuation, of which there appeared to be too many propagators in the French press.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 718

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 435 Telegraphic [115339/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 14, 1919

Your telegram No. 540<sup>1</sup> (of August 12th).

I am publishing the following

1. Principal agreement.
2. Loan agreement.
3. Separate letter as to desiderata.
4. Separate letter relating to second desideratum.

I did not consider it desirable to publish the agreement piecemeal as it might create impression that we are keeping something back.

House of Commons and the press will have the above on August 16th.

<sup>1</sup> No. 714.

No. 719

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)*

*No. 543 Telegraphic [116253/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 14, 1919

Your telegram No. 431.<sup>1</sup>

1. I am most grateful for Your Lordship's kind appreciation, as I have been for your keen (?) and close interest in details of negotiations while in progress. I hope they will be justified by sequel.

5.<sup>2</sup> I have consulted Prime Minister. We are of opinion that invitation to Mushaver to London would be advantageous in some (respect)s provided that you can tax him with (?) grudgingly giving lie to statement to which he had repeatedly given currency to effect that British Government stated it was Cabinet in Teheran which was working against him. I venture to suggest that the best line to take with him is that extravagant pretension put forward by him made it impossible to deal with him as representing Persian Government and you preferred to deal direct with Teheran.

6. Separate letter was given to each three individuals in precise terms authorised in your telegram No. 381.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 712.

<sup>2</sup> The numbering of paragraphs corresponds to that in No. 712.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 711, note 1 and No. 734, enclosure 7.

No. 720

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 18)*

*No. 545 Telegraphic [117646/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 14, 1919

Your private and personal telegram No. 408.<sup>1</sup>

Best I was able to do was to reduce amount to 400,000 tomans equivalent to £131,147-11/- . In my official telegram following,<sup>2</sup> I am asking for payment in London in usual way. Kindly make sure (? my) telegram is in order.

In justice to Vossugh I feel bound to tell you in confidence that it was not he but other two members of Triumvirate who gave me all the trouble in this connection and Prime Minister was doubtless not in strong enough position to risk a split with them over it.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram of July 30, 1919, referred to a proposed allocation of an advance on the British loan to the Persian Government.

<sup>2</sup> No. 721.

No. 721

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 18)*

*No. 546 Telegraphic [117650/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 15, 1919

With reference to recent Agreement. Pay Imperial Bank of Persia £131,147. (? £131,147.11.)

I hold letter dated August 9th from Minister of Finance stating that 'Persian Government accepts this sum as a first instalment on account of loan of £2,000,000 stipulated in Agreement signed to-day'.

Approval of Financial Adviser has been dispensed with by (? common) consent in respect of this first instalment as proceeds were required to repay advances made by Legation to Persian Government for special expenditure.

No. 722

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 15)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [117755/150/34]*

PARIS, August 15, 1919

My private telegram yesterday.<sup>1</sup>

I have received a letter from Mushaver-el-Mamalek expressing his deep regret at being unable to accept kind invitation to London which he explains has reached him just at moment when he has ceased to be either Minister for Foreign Affairs or President of Persian Delegation and when in accordance

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this Paris telegram No. 956 (received August 14) Sir G. Grahame had reported that he had, in accordance with instructions, conveyed to Mushaver-el-Mamalek an invitation 'to proceed to London as soon as possible as guest of His Majesty's Government. He promised to give me answer (? tomorrow).'

with instructions from Teheran he is about to immediately . . . to<sup>2</sup> Constantinople to meet the Shah.<sup>3</sup> He refers in letter to his repeated attempts to see Your Lordship during his six months stay in Paris and he added in conversation that he hoped that you would still afford him an opportunity of discussion of Persian affairs with him in the event of his accompanying Shah from Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> The text as received was here uncertain. The text as sent read ' . . . is about to proceed immediately to Constantinople', &c.

<sup>3</sup> The Shah of Persia was passing through Constantinople on his way to England.

### No. 723

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 16)*

*No. 550 Telegraphic [117013/202/34]*

TEHRAN, August 16, 1919

My telegram No. 494.<sup>1</sup>

If payment of Cossack Division<sup>2</sup> is now discontinued (?) by us it is probable payment of Division will fall into arrears as I do not see from what source Persian Government can now provide the amount.

In that case immediate real grievance will be added to uncertainty naturally occasioned in the Division by agreement of August 9.

I request your authority to continue (?) this monthly payment of tomans 100,000 during your pleasure as an advance to Persian Government on same conditions (?) as monthly advance of tomans 350,000.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> This Russo-Persian formation in the Persian service (cf. No. 710) was then in receipt of a British subsidy: see below.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office telegram No. 446 of August 21, 1919, to Tehran: 'I am meeting the July instalment but you should inform the Persian Government that it will be treated as an advance out of the loan. . . . I am considering question of further payments on the same basis.'

### No. 724

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 16)*

*No. 554 Telegraphic [117092/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 16, 1919

From my point of view, it would be well if Reuter in their message for Karochi [*sic*] and Persia could be inspired to send communiqués in following connections.

i. A full communiqué regarding agreement emphasising its advantages for Persia: absence of all suspicion of tutelage and clear intention on our part to work it in no rigid spirit and not necessarily to exclude or drive out all (?) local) employees.

2. Shah's visit to Europe: mention of arrangements made by His Majesty's Government for escort on Caspian and through Caucasus and British man-of-war onward and intention to invite him to England.

3. Make much of Mushaver's visit to London<sup>1</sup> and identify it with inauguration of these new and closer relations. This will make it difficult for him afterwards to intrigue with any effect against agreement.

<sup>1</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 440 of August 18, 1919, to Tehran, Lord Curzon informed Sir P. Cox that Mushaver-el-Mamalek had declined his invitation to visit London at that time (see No. 722).

### No. 725

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 439 Telegraphic [117207/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 16, 1919

My telegram No. 435<sup>1</sup> (of August 14th).

Texts of Agreements were published morning papers of August 16th and generally well received.

The *Temps* and *Débats*<sup>2</sup> on the 14th published somewhat garbled accounts of the agreement and the *Débats* is particularly bitter, describing it as an arrangement placing Persia on the footing of Egypt. The paper adds that the agreement was not well received in Persia by public opinion.

What are the facts?

<sup>1</sup> No. 718.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. *Journal des Débats*.

### No. 726

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 19)*

*No. 960 Telegraphic: by bag [117647/150/34]*

PARIS, August 17, 1919

My despatch No. 800<sup>1</sup> of August 16.

Anglo-Persian Agreement.

Leading article in *Temps* of to-day's date refers to explanation published in *Daily Mail* to the effect that the new Agreement could not be harmful to France's commercial interests and declares that French preoccupations are not of a commercial character.

The writer, who is probably Monsieur Jean Herbette the Foreign Editor, describes the wonderful geographical position of Persia which he says lies at the cross-roads of the three influences, English, Russian and German, which have opposed one another in the East: and points out that it is impossible to calculate the advantages which Persia in twenty or thirty years may bring to a Power which employs modern methods of exploitation there.

He says that the new Anglo-Persian Agreement explicitly maintains the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This despatch (received August 19) reported adverse French press comment on the Anglo-Persian Agreement.

integrity and independence of Persia but that the same expression was used in the preamble to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31st, 1907, the object of which was to divide Persian territory into a British and a Russian zone. The same words integrity and independence now reappear, and it is difficult to give them in 1919 a different meaning to that attached to them in 1907: namely a purely oratorical precaution.

The writer affirms that it is easy to see that the new Treaty is prejudicial (*porte atteinte*) to the independence of Persia: and the fact that the Persian Government promises to entrust her Army to British Officers and her finances to British experts shows that it has no independent force nor resource where-with to exercise her sovereignty and to carry out the policy which suits her. He insists on the fact that the political independence of Persia will no longer be after the Treaty what it was before. Article 10 of the Pact of the League of Nations is quoted as laying down that the Members of the League guarantee to respect and maintain against all foreign aggression the territorial integrity and the present political independence of all its Members. Persia is mentioned in the Annexe as being among the States invited to accede to the Pact: therefore in virtue of the Treaty of Versailles which contains the Pact the present political independence of Persia ought to be but has not been respected. It would be a very pharisaic argument to say that the Treaty of Versailles has not yet been put into force or that Persia is not yet a Member of the League of Nations, and the British value too highly their reputation for rectitude to invoke such arguments.

The writer draws attention to the fact that the new Anglo-Persian Agreement does not exist until it has been duly voted and passed by the Persian National Assembly in accordance with Article 24 of the Persian Constitution of December 30, 1906. The regular elections to the Assembly, which have only taken place in certain divisions, cannot be completed while the present state of affairs continues, and the country is under a régime of British military occupation. If there exists any doubt on this score, it is only necessary to send an International Commission of Enquiry to make investigations on the spot.

Still pursuing the same line of argument, the writer puts the supposition that British troops leave Persia in a few months, that the elections for the Assembly are successfully concluded, that the Assembly (which seems unlikely to the writer) ratifies the Treaty, and then asks what would be the result. By that time the Treaty of Versailles would be in force and Persia would be a Member of the League of Nations. Article 10 of the Pact would then apply, the dismemberment of Persia's independence would be illicit, and the Anglo-Persian Agreement would be annulled by Article 20 of the Pact, which states that if a Member before joining the League has entered into any engagements incompatible with its terms, it must take immediate steps to rid itself of these obligations.

The writer denies that he has any 'arrière-pensée' in thus drawing attention to the legal aspect of the case, or any idea of saying to the British 'Give us compensation elsewhere and our scruples will vanish.' 'We remain', he declares, 'faithful to the principle which President Wilson proclaimed on

February 11, 1918.' 'Peoples and provinces should no longer be bartered for among Governments like cattle or like the pawns on a chess-board.' The maintenance of right in the East as in the West is the only safeguard of peace and that is why, he adds, the case of Persia appears to be disquieting.

The writer concludes by pointing to the indefensible contradiction that exists between the policy which Great Britain has pursued in Persia in carrying on long negotiations at Tehran while a Persian Delegation was waiting in vain to obtain a hearing from the Peace Conference in Paris, and the engagements into which Great Britain has entered in Paris: and he speaks of the security of France in the Europe of tomorrow depending in part on Great Britain's engagement in connection with the Pact of the League of Nations. 'We cannot tolerate the thought that British promises can be the subject of discussion, even when they apply to Asia.'

Communicated to Peace Delegation.

No. 727

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)*

No. 477 [118250/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1919

Sir,

I asked the American Ambassador to come and see me this afternoon, in order to acquaint him, as I had previously omitted to do, with the recent conclusion of the agreement between His Majesty's Government and Persia. I told him, however, that his Government had not been kept in entire ignorance of the matter, because, when I was in Paris some months ago, I had called upon Colonel House, specially to mention to him the nature of the negotiations in which I was engaged, and I had asked him to inform President Wilson on the matter, so that the President might be guided in his attitude towards the Persian Delegation in Paris, should their claim to be heard at the Peace Conference be entertained. Colonel House had subsequently told me that he had informed the President. I had no reason, therefore, to suppose that what had since passed would meet with anything but American approval.

I went on to tell Mr. Davis that our information was to the effect that the French were somewhat incensed at our having, as they alleged, stolen a march upon them in respect of Persia, and that they regarded with a certain amount of wounded pride our success in Tehran as compared with the failure which had so far attended their efforts in Syria. The French Minister in Tehran, M. Bonin, was, I had been informed, doing his best to disparage and belittle the agreement; and it was not unlikely, I thought, that he might endeavour to enlist the co-operation of his American colleague in pursuing that policy. In these circumstances, and assuming that the American Government would be, generally speaking, in favour of the agreement now concluded, I asked the Ambassador whether he could see his way to suggest

that the American Minister in Tehran should be advised to facilitate the acceptance of the agreement and to give it his blessing.

Mr. Davis remarked at once that he saw no objection to doing this; that he thought the agreement an excellent one (much better, indeed, for the Persians than it was for ourselves); and that he would gladly act<sup>1</sup> upon my suggestion. . . .<sup>2</sup>

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919*, vol. ii, pp. 699-700.

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of this despatch (beginning: 'Having barely recovered') related to Armenian affairs and is printed in Volume III, No. 388.

No. 728

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 443 Telegraphic [116167/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 19, 1919

Your telegram No. 541<sup>1</sup> (of August 13th).

I am glad to hear of satisfactory attitude of your Belgian colleague.

A strong representation has been made to the French Embassy regarding your French colleague's unfriendliness. The French Government have been asked to instruct him to alter his attitude. The French Chargé d'Affaires assured me that the attitude complained of was not in accordance with the instructions or wishes of the French Government which were to an altogether contrary effect, and undertook to report the matter at once to French Government.

Confidential.

I gather that the French Government are not unaware of M. Bonin's activities.

<sup>1</sup> No. 716.

No. 729

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 22)*

*No. 561 Telegraphic [119680/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 19, 1919

Following is brief summary of Bolshevik activities in this part of world during past month.

1. Bravin's Mission to Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> At Herat he definitely invited Afghans to re-occupy Panjdeh district and Kushk seized by Russians in 1885 and it is rumoured that he made proposals for entry into Afghanistan of Bolshevik troops where available. Governor of Herat replied he did not need Bolshevik assistance but would shelter them as refugees. Towards end of July feeling

<sup>1</sup> M. Bravin was a Soviet representative in Afghanistan.

against 'infidel' Bolshevik Mission was strong and on their departure for Kabul military band refused to play.

2. Bolshevik overtures to Persia. On occupying Askabad Bolsheviks made following proposals to Persian Consul (a) Bolsheviks professed friendship for Persia, (b) enquired Persia's attitude, (c) asked that Transcaspian refugees should be arrested and disarmed, (d) that Persia should co-operate against armed bands of Mensheviks South of Kizil Arvat.

Persian Governor General . . .<sup>2</sup> replied he hoped both sides would observe neutrality; that he was not authorised to discuss question of relations and that Persia would disarm armed forces of any kind crossing frontier but would take no action beyond her frontier.

3. At end of July apparently in consequence of defeat North of Tashkend Bolsheviks withdrew part of their forces from Askabad. About same time Kazim Beg notorious Turkish agent arrived there and is carrying on very active propaganda and editing Bolshevik newspapers.

4. Bolshevik military operations on Persian shore of Caspian. Early in August some four hundred Bolsheviks landed . . .<sup>2</sup> in Astrabad. At the request of Persian Government British Commodore[e] co-operated on land, destroyed Bolshevik base at Ashurada and captured ships, guns and prisoners.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 730

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 445 Telegraphic [717944/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1919

Persian Minister in Paris has informed Mr. Balfour indirectly that Mushaver and Hussein Khan<sup>1</sup> have since their arrival been engaged in anti-British propaganda in Paris. He said they had been largely incited by the Americans and encouraged by the French. Persian Minister has broken off relations with Mushaver in consequence and he was anxious that Vossuk-ed-Dowleh should know the facts, as he fears that Mushaver may, in consequence of his quarrel with Samad<sup>2</sup> and of disappointment at not being heard by Peace Conference, use his influence to have Samad removed from Paris.

You might make a communication to Vossuk privately in the sense desired by Samad as he has behaved tactfully and sensibly during recent difficult times.

<sup>1</sup> Hussein Khan Ala was a member of the Persian delegation in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Samad Khan was the Persian Minister in Paris.

No. 731

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup> (Received August 24)*

*No. 571 Telegraphic [120163/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 22, 1919

Your 1684 to Foreign Office.<sup>2</sup>

I imagine Mushaver has ostensibly accepted post.

It is out of question that he should return to Persia now, and should he show any intention of so doing Persian Government will do the necessary and should have our support.

Addressed to High Commission, Constantinople.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

<sup>1</sup> Repetition to the Foreign Office of a telegram to the British High Commission at Constantinople: see below.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Constantinople telegram No. 1684 of August 20, 1919, to the Foreign Office (received August 21) was a repetition of a telegram to Tehran wherein Admiral Webb reported that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, then in Constantinople in the suite of the Shah of Persia (cf. No. 722, note 3), 'has heard Mushaver is coming here but does not know whether he intends to accept post of Ambassador here. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that he may ask permission to proceed to Teheran instead and asks to be informed urgently of views of Persian Government in this contingency.'

No. 732

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 23)*

*No. 569 Telegraphic [120074/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 22, 1919

Effect caused in Tehran by publication of agreement is very much what was expected and somewhat better than anticipated.

Bulk of public have received it favourably as in provinces but signs of disapproval in varying forms and degrees come from following categories.

1. Extreme demands [*sic*] headed by well-known individuals, Mudarris and Imam Juma Khoi.
2. Political enemies of Prime Minister, and certain politicians out of work who have little to expect from us.
3. Officers, Russian and Persian, of Cossack division.
4. French, American, and Russian Legations, as far as they can oppose it with safety.

First category, supplied with (? sinew)s of war by second category, are endeavouring to excite popular opinion against Vossugh and against agreement and have been making overtures to French and American Legations to see what help they can expect.

Attitude of French Legation since arrival of present Minister has been actively . . .<sup>1</sup> and so unlike attitude of ally as to be (? subject of) general

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

comment. French Minister's attitude towards agreement is apparently much the same as that of French press.

United States Minister returned from leave the day after agreement was published (?) and was no doubt good deal surprised and disappointed and while unable to find much fault with terms of agreement has been singing Mushaver's praises and saying that Persians might have got much better terms from Americans if Mushaver had been given free hand.<sup>2</sup> He has refused to receive any of malcontents in (?) conference but has said that he would communicate their protests to his Government.

Dislike of Russian officers and Russian Legation is only natural. Latter's attitude shows itself in making much of bad social conditions in England and consequent weakness of Government and prophesying an early *revanche* by Germany. Regarding Cossack brigade I will telegraph separately. Two local newspapers hedged somewhat at first to see how public opinion was tending, but are now supporting Vossugh investigation (?) in favour of agreement fair. . . .<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Sir P. Cox had previously reported the substance of this sentence in Tehran telegram No. 544 of August 14, 1919 (received August 16). Sir P. Cox commented therein: 'As in case of French Minister it would be convenient if when acquainting French and American Governments with agreement you at same time ask that their representatives here be instructed to support our policy in general interests, or at least, not to propagand against it.' (Cf. Nos. 727 and 728.)

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read '... supporting Vossugh and are in favour of giving agreement fair trial.'

### No. 733

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 25)*

*No. 570 Telegraphic [120553/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 22, 1919

I have called for weekly reports on Mondays from all consulates regarding trend of public opinion on subject of agreement, and will keep you informed.

Cabinet issued no communiqué to provinces, preferring to wait until Teheran papers containing text of agreement and separate letter with Prime Minister's explanatory preface regarding them. Following reports refer to brief details made known by consular officers, to whom I communicated summary in circular telegram.

Tabriz. Merchants and respectable . . . s<sup>1</sup> very glad: also Syrians. Extreme democrats suggest that we intend to make Persia into second Egypt. (?) Armenians who did fairly well under Russian régime dislike idea of cleaner administration. Kazvin. Better class of landowner and merchants favourable. Certain officials and local politicians suggest independent Persia is at an end. People generally apathetic.

Resht. This unfavourable comment [*sic*] but details of agreement not generally known to public.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

Hamadan. Agreement popular where majority are concerned and accepted by all.

North Arabistan. Agreement most favourably received.

Khorassan. Large public meeting held on 18th August. Terms of agreement which we had published were read and unanimously appreciated.

Shiraz. Reception generally favourable—full details not yet published.

Kerman. Public feeling in favour of agreement, which is on the whole approved by all classes particularly business men. (Merchants) pretend not to credit news, but general opinion is that Persia will now prosper.

Gulf reports not yet received.

Repeated to India and Baghdad.

#### No. 734

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)*

*No. 143 [141044/150/34]*

My Lord,

TEHRAN, August 22, 1919

I have the honour to enclose the text of the agreement signed with the Persian Government on the 9th instant together with copies of the connected documents, as follows:—

1. Principal Agreement.
2. Loan Agreement.
3. Letter to the President of the Council regarding Persia's desiderata.
4. Letter to the President of the Council regarding claims between the two Governments.
5. Letter from the President of the Council accepting the proposal contained in the foregoing.

The above five documents<sup>1</sup> have been published—

6. Further letter to the President of the Council respecting the Shah and his successors. (French text.)<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not here printed.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 6 below. In Tehran telegram No. 669 of October 1, 1919 (received October 6) Sir P. Cox expressed his regret, however, that this enclosure 6 had been inserted 'through inadvertence. . . . Letter in question was not sent to President of the Council. Please (?) eliminate it': compare No. 715, note 1. Sir P. Cox supplied, in place of this cancelled letter, the original French text of the secret letter which he had in fact sent to Vossough-ed-Dowleh in accordance with the authorization to him to sign item 5 in Foreign Office telegram No. 424 of August 8, for which see No. 711, note 1. This text read as follows:

*'Sir P. Cox to Vossough-ed-Dowleh.*

*'Téhéran, le 9 août 1919*

'Altesse,

'Par rapport à l'arrangement conclu en date de ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, je suis autorisé de faire savoir à votre Altesse que Sa Majesté Sultan Ahmed Shah et ses successeurs jouiront du soutien amical du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique tant qu'ils agiront d'accord avec notre politique et notre conseil.'

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
P. Z. Cox.'

7. Letter of assurances to Vossough-ed-Dowleh, Prince Nosret-ed-Dowleh,  
and Prince Sarem-ed-Dowleh.<sup>3</sup>

The Enclosures 6<sup>4</sup> and 7 are treated as confidential.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and to the Acting Civil Commissioner at Bagdad.

Copies of the first five documents are also being circulated to His Majesty's consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

P. Z. Cox

ENCLOSURE 6<sup>5</sup> IN NO. 734

*Sir P. Cox to Vossough-ed-Dowleh [cancelled and not sent]*<sup>6</sup>

LÉGATION D'ANGLETERRE, TÉHÉRAN, le 9 août 1919

Altesse,

Par rapport à la l'arrangement [sic] conclu en date de ce jour entre les deux Gouvernements, ayant pour but un projet de réformer [sic] en Perse, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Altesse, selon votre désir, le résultat des communications que j'ai eues avec mon Gouvernement en ce qui concerne les interète [sic] de Sa Majesté le Shah en cette matière.

Après mûre réflexion et considération sympathique des représentations faites par Votre Altesse au mon [nom] de Sa Majesté, mon Gouvernement est d'avis qu'il lui serait impossible d'obtenir le consentement du Parlement à ce qu'un subside soit accordé à Sa Majesté pour la durée de sa vie. D'autre part mon Gouvernement est tout disposé de continuer le subside qui Lui est accordé à présent, en tant que Sa Majesté continue de tout cœur a soutenir le Cabinet de Votre Altesse.

Apart [sic] ces assurances je tiens à observer que Sa Majesté à toute raison de se fortifier avec la réflexion que quand les finances persanes seront régulièrement administrées en vertu du présent arrangement, la Liste Civile et le Souverain devront forcément bénéficier d'une manière importante de l'augmentation de prospérité et des recettes qui ne manquera pas de s'en-suivre.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

P. Z. Cox

ENCLOSURE 7 IN NO. 734

*Copy of a Letter, dated the 9th August, 1919, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to their Highnesses Vossough-ed-Dowleh, Prince Firooz Mirza Nusret-ed-Dowleh, Prince Akbar Mirza Sarem-ed-Dowleh.*

Your Highness,

It gives me much pleasure to inform your Highness that His Majesty's Government authorise me to intimate that, in view of the agreement

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure 7 below.

<sup>4</sup> See note 2 above.

<sup>5</sup> For the omission of enclosures 1-5 cf. note 1 above.

concluded this day, the 9th August, 1919, between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government, they are prepared to extend to your Highness their good offices and support in case of need, and further to afford your Highness asylum in the British Empire should necessity arise.

I am, &c.  
P. Z. Cox

No. 735

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28)*

*No. 574 Telegraphic [122081/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 24, 1919

As Persian delegates to League of Nations Prime Minister proposes to appoint Ihtesham Humayun who has been eight or nine years secretary to Legation in London and Zuka-Ul-Mulk one of late delegation to Peace Conference. Sadeg-es-Sultaneh<sup>1</sup> will supervise them as long as they are in America. The first named I do not know but he must be well known to Foreign Office.

As regards second I questioned advisability of selecting one of Mushaver's party but they assured me that Zuka does not? support Mushaver's views and can be trusted.

I shall be glad to know views of His Majesty's Government.

<sup>1</sup> Persian Minister in Washington.

No. 736

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 27)*

*No. 1722 Telegraphic [121470/150/34]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 26, 1919

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs is somewhat perturbed by French press criticism of Anglo-Persian Agreement. He seems to think French may contrive to represent present Persian Government as having tied Persia to Great Britain in defiance of (? all endeavours), and to dish up agreement as instance of faithlessness of both parties to Wilsonian principles.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested to me indirectly that it would be useful to give publicity in Europe and Teheran to interview which he has given here to *Wakt* newspaper. Translation of this follows by despatch.<sup>1</sup> Gist of it is as follows.

Actual document had not yet reached Constantinople, as Shah's party outstripped messenger sent with these to Constantinople Embassy. Embassy would be instructed to give necessary information on their arrival. Agreement was political, as well as economic and financial. Persia naturally preserved complete sovereignty and independence, but England was helping

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Persia financially and economically, and object of agreement was to (? widen) and improve connections resulting from this help. France was providing Persia, not with legal advisers as reported, nor with judicial corps, but with four professors for law school, which Minister for Foreign Affairs himself had founded when Minister of Justice.

Persian relations with America as with all Great Powers were excellent. He could make no statement as to situation on Russo-Persian frontier. Persian internal situation was excellent.

Sent to Tehran.

No. 737

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28)*

No. 579 Telegraphic [122082/150/34]

TEHRAN, August 28, 1919

I feel sure that Nusret-ed-Dowleh may be relied upon to be loyal to us in connection with agreement but owing to his private tastes (? and) upbringing he has strong French sympathies and in view of attitude of French I think it would be well if you asked him to come straight to London for a day or two to see you (before he?) becomes anchored in Paris. You could give him advice which would help him to (? withstand) blandishments and intrigues to which he may be exposed.

No. 738

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 30)*

No. 584 Telegraphic [122514/150/34]

TEHRAN, August 28, 1919

The following for information.

On 26th instant French Minister, who is charged with Swedish diplomatic interests, wrote officially to each of the three Swedes now here referring to document 'signed by Vossugh-ed-Dowleh and British Minister on (? 19th) [9th] August,' and enquiring (whether) it would have any unfavourable consequences for his future in Persia. If so, would he inform writer in order that he might communicate with Swedish Government. Swedes replied after consulting Prime Minister that they had received full assurances from Prime Minister regarding their future. Gleerup<sup>1</sup> tells me that French Legation has never taken any interest in them before, and they of course recognise this overture as a pure intrigue on part of French Minister. He endeavoured also to alarm the Belgian(s) but with little success.

Situation in Tehran was progressing satisfactorily until yesterday when either from French Legation or by leakage from Persian Foreign Office reports of extremely hostile attitude of French press got abroad and barometer fell somewhat in consequence. It is also reported French Government

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Gleerup was the Swedish chief of the Persian gendarmerie.

have protested officially against agreement and that British press is replying to French attack. Kindly let me know what real position is as regards attitude of French and American Governments. If they have resigned themselves to agreement it would be well for Reuter to say so.

No. 739

*Note by Mr. G. P. Churchill<sup>1</sup> of a conversation with Mr. Williams*

[123969/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 28, 1919

*The Shah's Visit*

Mr. Williams, a Secretary of the United States Embassy, called to-day and after talking about matters concerning Tiflis as to which I referred him to the Eastern Department, he mentioned the report in the newspapers about the Shah's intention to visit the United States before coming to England.

I told him that so far as I knew the Shah's present intention was to spend his time in Switzerland *Incognito*, and I did not think that he intended to go to the United States between now and the time for his visit to England.

As Mr. Williams reverted to the subject of the Shah's journey to America I asked him whether there was something more in it than I knew and whether the United States Government contemplated inviting him. Mr. Williams said he thought that if the Shah was likely to be willing to go to America, an invitation would probably be sent to him.

G. P. CHURCHILL

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Central European and Persian Department of the Foreign Office.

No. 740

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 29)*

No. 580 Telegraphic [122403/150/34]

TEHRAN, August 28, 1919

Reference to High Commissioner Constantinople telegram No. 84<sup>1</sup> August 22nd.

Persian Government have urged upon me also how greatly their (?) direct interests in past have been prejudiced by their inability under Treaty of Danmanchay<sup>2</sup> to police their own coast and how especially they are endangered now owing to our withdrawal from Caspian<sup>3</sup> at a moment when they are suffering from Bolshevik intrusion which Azerbaijan Government and Denikin are in no position to cope with.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram was noted on the file as being a repetition to Tehran of document No. 397 in Volume III.

<sup>2</sup> Amended on original to Turkmanchay. The text of the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turkmanchay, concluded in 1828, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xv, p. 669.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume III, Chap. II.

They beg that His Majesty's Government will consider possibility of providing officers to organize naval detachment on principles of recent agreement and of acquiring for Persian Government services of two or three armed vessels now on Caspian.

*Private.*

In latter connection my local information is that vessels *President Kruger* and *Biblioval* are now at Enzeli awaiting despatch to Denikin and that three armed vessels already delivered to Denikin are lying unemployed at Petrovsk because Denikin cannot supply crews for them.

To leave Caspian under these conditions is in my opinion an action of menace to joint interests of ourselves and Persian Government and is likely to result in our having to take coordinate measures by land to repel Bolsheviks; for instance addition of cavalry to Norperforce<sup>4</sup> to patrol Gilan and Mazanderan coast.

If above suggestions can be considered I would urge Commodore<sup>5</sup> be instructed, clear the line,<sup>6</sup> to delay departure of vessels from Enzeli.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the British North Persian Force.

<sup>5</sup> Commodore D. T. Norris, British Senior Naval Officer, Caspian.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. with priority in transmission.

No. 741

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 30)*

*No. 585 Telegraphic [122994/202/34]*

TEHRAN, August 29, 1919

Sent to India:

Regarding attitude of Cossack division with reference to recent agreement.

Since moment when we began paying subsidy through Cabinet instead of direct to Starosselski<sup>1</sup> latter has been very much more amenable both to Prime Minister and myself and during Jangali operations<sup>2</sup> there was cordial co-operation between him and our military authorities.

Just before signature of agreement, when details leaked out, Starosselski was busy discussing it in interview with Council of Ministers; he adopted a tone partly of banter, partly of menace, saying men had been trained by Russian officers by Russian methods and they would never serve (?) under officers of another nationality; if pressed they would probably melt away or go over (?) in a body to Denikin or even turn Bolshevik.

Meanwhile I instructed military attaché to tell him casually that as soon as I was in a position to do so I hoped to discuss the subject with him and that meanwhile there was no cause for him to be disturbed.

As soon as agreement was signed I asked him to see me. I informed him

<sup>1</sup> Russian commander of the Cossack Division.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. recent operations against the Jangali band of nationalist guerrillas in the province of Gilan.

that there was no question of division being hastily disbanded or their pay stopped. As he was aware, the desire in principle was to form a uniform force into which all separate organisations now existing would be amalgamated; but that precise details and means of carrying out project depended on recommendations of military commission about to assemble. It must be some weeks or even months before their recommendations could be received and acted on. Meanwhile he might rest assured that our object would be to arrive at such a solution as would be in best interest of Persian Government and fair to individuals affected. The line he took in reply was that he had naturally been doing his best as a good Russian to maintain his position and that of division during this difficult period and that he did not feel justified in (? spontaneously) becoming a party to propose(?d) alteration in organisation or status of division, which was based on treaties between Russian and Persian Governments. Being assured that no precipitate action was contemplated on our part, he agreed that there was no need for disturbance on his part. Immediately after interview he left with Shah and stayed away a fortnight during which time there was a good deal of ferment amongst officers and men here, who were evidently being misled by intrigues into think(? ing) that they were being disbanded or placed at once under British officers. I accordingly saw Russian Chargé d'Affaires on subject and gave him same explanations, adding that this movement amongst Cossacks at this stage was purely gratuitous, especially in view of my conversation with Starosselski. He gave me the same reply as Starosselski; namely that he himself did not feel qualified to co-operate or to refuse co-operation and thought he had better try and get instructions from Sazouoff (? Sazonoff). I repeated there was no intention on our part to proceed hastily and that in any case, as result of publication of agreement, you would possibly be discussing with Sazouoff [sic] or other Russian representatives the bearing of agreement on Russian interests. I urged on him the importance meanwhile of discouraging any unwarrant(? ed) excitement on the part of rank and file here, and pressed him to use his influence with Starosselski in that direction. Meanwhile the commission would soon assemble and report on the whole military situation and in meantime the division should continue to work and be paid as usual. He agreed. The upshot is that I do not anticipate any further active opposition or movement on the part of division for the present. Ultimately however they will not (? accept) situation unless Starosselski receives instructions from Sazouoff or Denikin through his Legation or alternatively unless we have sufficient force at hand to compel them if occasion should arise.

Repeated to India and Bagdad for General Officer Commanding.

No. 742

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 29)*

*No. 586 Telegraphic [122515/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 29, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

At same interview Russian Chargé d'Affaires asked me to tell him frankly whether, in pursuance of agreement just concluded with Persia, we intended to alter our policy in regard to Russian interests in North Persia.

I replied that he was aware of policy which, under instructions, I had pursued for past year; and that I had received no instructions to modify it. He mentioned as a case in point Russian road (? from) Teheran to Kasvin, which he said Persian Government were trying to resume on plea that no repairs were being carried out. I replied that I had heard nothing about it, and it was (?) at any rate not at my instance.

I should be glad if His Majesty's Government would consider anew the general question raised above, and send me any instructions that may be indicated.

Repeated to India and Baghdad for G.O.C.

<sup>1</sup> No. 741.

No. 743

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (Received August 30)*

*No. 1746 Telegraphic [122862/150/34]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 29, 1919

My telegram No. 1722.<sup>1</sup>

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to the subject in conversation on August 26th. He asked that attention of His Majesty's Government might be called to danger of unfortunate effect being produced . . . (Persia)<sup>2</sup> if unfavourable criticism of agreement found unbridled expression in French and even American Press and if such criticism were reproduced in Persia.

He urged desirability of considering best means of counter-acting this. He would himself he said hasten to Paris as soon as possible after Shah's arrival in Switzerland.

Repeated to Tehran No. 95.

<sup>1</sup> No. 736.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 744

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 31)*

*No. 591 Telegraphic [122997/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 29, 1919

Among the arguments used against agreement by . . . s<sup>1</sup> and Persians, and pressed upon Prime Minister by deputation referred to in my news telegram

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

of date<sup>2</sup> were (1) that signature should have been postponed pending assembly of Majlis, (2) that no time limit is attached to it.

First can be the more easily combated in any case, but can be more easily disposed of if popular opinion is humoured in regard to second.

The terms of agreement really contain their own time limits firstly in period stipulated for (? repayment of) loan and secondly in periods to be attached to contracts of advisers; Vossuk-ed-Dowleh recognises this but represents that it would assist him greatly in silencing hostile criticism if we could agree to a subsidiary article or letter stating that agreement would be subject to renewed revision or termination at desire of either party (? after a) certain period. He suggested ten or fifteen years. I suggested fifteen or twenty.

It seems to me that we can afford to dictate<sup>3</sup> them to this (? extent) and I submit proposal for wise consideration of His Majesty's Government. If it is decided that we can agree, I would request that draft of proposed terms be telegraphed to me.

Repeated to India.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is uncertain. Cf. No. 749.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that this word should have been 'humour'.

#### No. 745

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 30)*

*No. 590 Telegraphic [122996/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 30, 1919

Sent to India.

Prime Minister has received report that, in reply to protests of French Government, His Majesty's Government have agreed to submit (? agreement with) Persia for approbation of League of Nations.

Please inform me if this is true, and if so, whether it is possible or likely that League of Nations will be in a position to upset it, or whether its submission would (? simply) be a formality, for information and record.

#### No. 746

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 31)*

*No. 593 Telegraphic [122998/150/34]*

TEHRAN, August 30, 1919

Prime Minister urges the necessity for taking . . .<sup>1</sup> measures without delay to interpret agreement into action and asks me to enquire when His Majesty's Government will be prepared to inaugurate discussion of measures to be taken for realisation of three desiderata<sup>2</sup> respectively. In particular as regards

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> The three Persian desiderata specified in item 3 listed in No. 734: cf. Cmd. 300 of 1919.

rectification of frontier he fears that, if action is not (? taken) now before affairs of small nationalities are settled the psychological moment will pass.

In latter connection he urged reconsideration of question of Nakchuvair<sup>3</sup> where he maintained that we had clearly pursued a mistaken policy in endeavouring to impose Armenian domination with untoward results now evident.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that this should read 'Nakchivan'.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 632, note 8.

No. 747

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 4)*

*No. 846 A [124917/150/34]*

PARIS, August 30, 1919

My Lord,

In the course of his speech on the subject of the Peace Treaty yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies, Monsieur Albert Thomas<sup>1</sup> alluded to the Anglo-Persian Agreement in the following terms:—

'I have set forth our faults, our errors: I am not the first to speak of them. There are also those of some of our Allies, and these errors become ours when we accept them without warning, without protesting, without demanding that they also do their duty, their whole duty for a just peace. As for me, I am a passionate zealous friend of England. I am convinced that there will be no great democratic development in the West and in the world, unless there be agreement, deep, intimate, constant agreement, between the British and French peoples. But precisely because I am convinced of this necessity, precisely because I am a declared friend of England, because I have confidence in the development, I will not say of her Imperialism, but of her Empire, because I believe that, by its deeply-rooted traditions, the British Empire is, in the world, a power of emancipation, a power of liberation, for that reason precisely, I cannot remain silent in face of acts such as those which have been announced to us in regard to Persia. It is for that reason also that I ardently hoped, immediately after the war, for the solution by England of all the questions which still weigh upon her: the question of Ireland, the question of Egypt. The most magnificent proof which she could give of her liberating and emancipating ideas would have been acts of this kind—instead of still further extending an Empire as to which one no longer knows, now, whether it is an Empire of domination or of liberation.'

Monsieur Thomas went on to say, addressing himself directly to the President of the Council, that what was required in the Covenant of the League of Nations, were precise rules of universal policy, defining the rights of peoples to dispose of themselves, and uniformly binding on all alike.

I have, &c.

GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>1</sup> Former French Minister of Munitions.

No. 748

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 458 Telegraphic [122514/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 1, 1919

Your telegram No. 584<sup>1</sup> of 28th August.

The French Government have not protested against the agreement, and my telegram No. 443<sup>2</sup> of 19th August will have shown you that the French Minister's attitude is not in accordance with the wishes of the French Government.

The United States Ambassador, to whom I spoke on 18th August regarding attitude of United States Minister, said he thought the agreement an excellent one, much better, indeed, for the Persians than it was for ourselves.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 738.

<sup>2</sup> No. 728.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 727.

No. 749

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 1)*

No. 595 Telegraphic [123784/150/34]

TEHRAN, September 1, 1919

Following is a summary of reports for past week on effect of (?) principal agreement.

Reports from provinces and Bagdad continue to show that agreement is regarded by great majority very favourably, even by moderate democrats. Just extreme democrats and anti-foreign elements including some mullahs are discontented at being tied to Great Britain, and profess to fear loss of independence, but they are in too great minority to make themselves felt.

In Teheran position improving, but there is still a good deal of subterranean intrigue going on. Early last week deputation of notables, professing to represent public of Teheran, asked for audience of Prime Minister, who granted it.

Deputation was organised by well-known Moin-ut-Tujjar and Imam Juma Khoi and, besides them, included Ain-ed-Dowleh, Mushir-ed-Dowleh . . .<sup>1</sup> and his brother, late President of Medjliss. Leaders did most of talking; said that they had no doubts (?) Prime Minister's intentions were good but that Persia was now bound hand and foot to Great Britain, and agreement was against interests of country and should not have been concluded without consulting those who had a right to a say in the matter. Interview took about two hours and Prime Minister considers that he confounded all their arguments.

It is believed that Ain-ed-Dowleh and Mushir and his brother are convinced but Moin and Imam Juma are still active. Main feeling among local opponents is said to be not against us or against terms of agreement but against Cabinet.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

As regards Allied Legations, there has been certain amount of American propaganda in . . .<sup>1</sup> letters to press from anonymous correspondents urging how much more profitable it would have been to have come to terms with America.

French Legation seems to have been less active as regards publicity, but Bonin and Minorski of Russian Legation and Starosselski have been in close communication, and according to information from reliable source, attitude of Russian Legation is that agreement obviously most injurious to Russia and that Russian Legation, being in too weak a position to offer any effective opposition to it, look to French to do their best to support Russia in connection 'dans les intérêts des deux pays'.

If you have reason to think that there is likely to be truth in this it accentuates advisability of our keeping (? Belgium) with us.

Sent to India and Baghdad.

### No. 750

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 463 Telegraphic [122994/202/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 585<sup>1</sup> of 29th August.

I approve your language to Starosselski and to Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

It will be better to await the assembling of the Military Commission before considering the future of the Cossack division, and I do not think the moment opportune for raising the matter with M. Sazonof.

Repeat to India.

<sup>1</sup> No. 741.

### No. 751

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 465 Telegraphic [122515/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 586<sup>1</sup> (of August 29. Russian interests in N. Persia).

I approve your reply to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

I think that in view of my telegram No. 342<sup>2</sup> (of June 16) the matter may be allowed to rest for the present on that basis.

Repeat to India.

<sup>1</sup> No. 742.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram instructed Sir P. Cox that if necessary he should make representations to the Persian Government 'urging them to maintain the *status quo* regarding Russian subjects for the present.'

No. 752

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*  
No. 462 Telegraphic [122403/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 580<sup>1</sup> (of August 28th).

The Admiralty have received a telegram from S[enior] N[aval] O[fficer] Caspian from which it appears that the vessels were handed over on August 29th. We regret therefore that nothing can now be done.

Repeated to Constantinople 1445.

Repeated to Bagdad.

<sup>1</sup> No. 740.

No. 753

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*  
No. 460 Telegraphic [122998/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 591 A of 31st [sic] August.<sup>1</sup>

As you are aware there is no intention of discussing Persia's desiderata at the Peace Conference and it seems to me that it would be better to await the termination of the Conference before taking them up.

If however it is desirable to discuss the matter at once the first step should be for the Persian Government to appoint a special representative to discuss with me here and I would propose that the ex-Regent<sup>2</sup> would be a suitable appointment.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was renumbered as No. 593, printed as document No. 746; its official date of dispatch was August 30, but it was not telegraphed until the following morning.

<sup>2</sup> Nasr-el-Mulk had been Regent of Persia, 1910-14.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was inadvertently dispatched without having been approved by Lord Curzon who, in a minute of September 4, 1919, referred to the proposal in the last paragraph as a 'suggestion of which I should certainly not have approved had I seen it'. The telegram was not, however, cancelled.

No. 754

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 6)*  
No. 602 Telegraphic [126059/150/34]

TEHRAN, September 3, 1919

I informed Prime Minister (?) to-day of purport of your telegram No. 458<sup>1</sup> of 1st September which he was very glad to hear. He requested that if possible a Reuter communiqué should be inspired saying either that reports said to be current among hostile elements in Teheran to the effect that the

<sup>1</sup> No. 748.

Governments of France or America had lodged protests, were entirely unfounded; or, alternately, American and French Governments had commented very favourably on agreements.

Prime Minister also mentioned that French Minister had not altered his attitude, and was still active. Also that Minorski was very actively intriguing against agreement; Minorski is by way of being under . . . [? orders]<sup>2</sup> from M. Sazonof to proceed to Paris via Petrovsk. If relations with M. Sazonof admit of his being asked to expedite Minorski's departure it would be convenient.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 755

*Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 4)*

*No. 566 Telegraphic [125049/150/34]*

ROME, September 3, 1919

Your telegram No. 720.<sup>1</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Wickham who travelled with Shah from Teheran to Taranto informs me that so far as he knows latter has no intention of going to United States adding that rumour probably invented at Constantinople where continual mis-statements on such matters appeared.

As Shah is not passing through Rome I was unable to make enquiries from his suite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of September 1, 1919, Lord Curzon had asked Sir R. Rodd to ascertain from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his way through Rome, whether there was any truth in a report in the press that the Shah of Persia intended to visit the United States.

### No. 756

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Teheran)*

*No. 472 Telegraphic [125610/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 4, 1919

Following is substance of intercepted wireless proclamation issued by Soviet Government on August 30th.

After lengthy preamble strongly criticising Tsarist regime in Persia the recent agreement is denounced and the Persian Government are accused of selling the country to England.

The cancellation and abolition of all treaties with Tsarist Russia, concessions to individuals and 'institutions which placed the Persian people in an unfavourable position or which signified an intervention in internal affairs of Persia' already announced in a note of June 26th 1919 is reiterated.

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 8)*

*No. 606 Telegraphic [127499/842/34]*

TEHRAN, September 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 343.<sup>1</sup>

Maclean<sup>2</sup> has furnished a memorandum showing pressing importance of enabling our trade from South to take full advantage of markets formerly held by Russia in Northern Persia and of creating there sound trade connections. Re-opening of Caucasus route to Persia makes these Northern markets available for competitive trade from Europe with us. He admits advantage of railway on road but holds that until (? present) conditions of Persian finances have been properly examined it will not be possible to say whether imperative administrative and military reforms will leave any margin of revenue available for railway guarantees and therefore it is uncertain whether railway construction on any large scale will be practicable in near future whereas motor transport on road (? gives) immediate support to our Southern trade.

He points out that our war expenditure on roads has no sale value as it was sunk in Persian roads without agreement of Persian Government and these roads revert to Persia as soon as our military occupation ceases.

He recommends one large company to administer upkeep of all southern roads out of toll revenue for account of Persian Government with remuneration (? for) services (or even?) commission on toll(?) s also to carry on a separate business as carriers to all important commercial centres.

It should obtain a concession from Persian Government to install motor transport services on suitable main roads and advance on security of tolls capital for construction still necessary to make these roads capable of carrying motor traffic. The capital thus sunk in motor transport installation would have to be protected against piratical competition by a royalty (apart from tolls) payable to Company on any other wheeled transport (? us)ing these roads. If a syndicate or Company will come forward with a scheme it should appoint a representative in Teheran to negotiate with Persian Government and also to enlist Persians as shareholders in concern.

I generally agree with above, except that I think (? an) enterprising Company who meant business would be able to find fresh sources of security or revenues to warrant their taking up urgent railway construction. It is of utmost importance in view of agreement that this should be done. Our own interests seem to be in development under those railways from Gulf ports to plateau and to Northern Persia.

From purely Persian point of view Mohammerah-Khorrimabad-Teheran line is indicated as it enters no foreign jurisdiction and will help to develop Arabistan. From our point of view Khanikin-Hamadan-Teheran is *prima facie* most in our interests provided that we are (? sure) Kermanshah will

<sup>1</sup> This telegram of June 16, 1919, is not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Honorary Attaché in His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

revert<sup>3</sup> to Russian sphere of influence. Colonel Wallace<sup>4</sup> . . .<sup>5</sup> doubtless wish to start his negotiations again now that agreement has been concluded so I should be glad to learn your views as to how far his negotiations should be encouraged.

I doubt moreover if Cabinet will dare to face the onus of another important bargain with us until an<sup>6</sup> intrigue against agreement has ceased.

<sup>3</sup> It was suggested on the original that this passage should read ' . . . will not revert' &c.

<sup>4</sup> Representative in Tehran of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

<sup>5</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the word 'will' should be inserted.

<sup>6</sup> It was suggested on the original that this word should be deleted.

### No. 758

*Note by Mr. G. P. Churchill of a conversation with Mr. Williams*

[126461/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 5, 1919

Persia

Mr. Williams, 3rd Secretary of the United States Embassy, called today and with reference to our conversation a few days ago concerning the Shah's visit,<sup>1</sup> stated that he had been thinking the matter over and he now believed that there would be no question, in any circumstances, of an invitation to the Shah to visit the United States.

I thanked him for telling me this and said that in any case I believed that the Shah was not at all fond of travelling by sea and would probably not have liked to face so long a sea voyage.

G. P. CHURCHILL

<sup>1</sup> No. 739.

### No. 759

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 475 Telegraphic [123860/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 590<sup>1</sup> (of 30th August).

There is no obligation to submit the agreement to the League of Nations which, until the ratification of the treaty with Germany, has no formal existence. It would probably, however, be desirable when League has been constituted and Council of League has come into effective existence to transmit copy of agreement to them. Whether matter would be raised by any Powers cannot at present be foreseen. If it were, or if it were considered desirable by ourselves and Persian Government in combination to secure approval of League to agreement, it ought not to be difficult to make a case that would be assured of success.<sup>2</sup>

Repeated to India.

<sup>1</sup> No. 745.

<sup>2</sup> In this connexion the Foreign Office had informally consulted Sir Eric Drummond,

Secretary-General designate of the League of Nations, which temporarily had its preparatory headquarters in London. In a letter of September 1, 1919, to Sir R. Graham, Sir E. Drummond had agreed with the view of the Foreign Office 'that, according to the strict letter of the Covenant, His Majesty's Government are in no way bound to submit the Agreement to the Council. Had the Agreement been concluded after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Article XVIII would have been applicable and the Agreement would not have been valid until it had been registered by the International Secretariat. This, however, makes no difference to the right of any member of the League to bring the agreement before the Council or the Assembly. . . . In this connexion, it might also be well for you to look at Articles XIX and XX of the Covenant which also have a distinct bearing on the subject. You must remember that Persia is invited to accede to the Covenant, and, if she does so, will send three representatives to the meeting of the Assembly. Any of these representatives could raise the question of the Treaty at one of the meetings. . . . I entirely agree with the point made by Lord Curzon as to the advantage which would accrue to the League if the Agreement were made dependent on the Council's approval. As already explained, the Agreement can, if not brought before the Council voluntarily, be raised by any member of the League. Forgive my presumption and let me say that if I had to deal with the question on behalf of the British Government, I think I should conclude a formal and open arrangement with Persia, by an exchange of notes or otherwise, that the Agreement should not come into force until it had been approved by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. There is no doubt that if this course was adopted, opposition to the Agreement—which is largely based on ignorance—would be diminished, and the sore feeling which at present exists in certain quarters abroad would be done away with. I also believe that the precedent thus created would ultimately be as much to British interests as to those of the League of Nations. It is, of course, just possible that some Power might try to drive a bargain with you in respect of recognition of the Agreement, but I hardly think this could succeed if the Agreement were brought before the Council voluntarily by the two parties to it and the decision taken by a majority. If it should happen, I trust the attempt would be most strongly resisted.' Sir E. Drummond further stated in a supplementary letter of September 3 to Sir R. Graham: 'If by any chance the suggestion which I made to you in my letter the other day of an exchange of notes or some open arrangement with Persia providing that the new Agreement should not take effect until approved by a majority of the Council is being favourably considered, I believe that the best wording to follow would be that of our proposed treaty with France, providing for immediate help if a hostile act should be committed against France by Germany. It is stipulated in Article III that that treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League, and be recognized by the Council, *acting if need be by a majority, &c., &c.* It will be very desirable in the case of the Persian agreement also, if possible, to secure unanimous approval by the Council, and to avoid a vote, since, if that line were taken there seems to be some doubt, from a legal point of view, as to whether the Powers voting in the minority would be bound by the decision. If the wording I propose is adopted, you will give "unanimity" every chance.'

## No. 760

*Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (Received September 7)*

*No. 1226 Telegraphic [126051/150/34]*

BERNE, September 6, 1919

My telegram 1221.<sup>1</sup>

I have given Nusret-ed-Dowleh your message.

He says he will leave Switzerland next Tuesday September 9th, spending

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In Foreign Office telegram No. 747 of September 2, 1919, to Berne, Lord Curzon had, in connexion with the Shah of Persia's visit to Switzerland, requested

Wednesday in Paris where he wishes to see some Persians and will go on to London following day Thursday.

He will instruct Persian Legation in London to inform you of exact hour of his arrival.

Nusret spoke of campaign in Swiss Press against Anglo-Persian agreement and seemed much perturbed by it.

He stated Shah would probably stay eight or ten days longer in Switzerland and that His Majesty's intention had then been to spend a week in Paris *incognito*, afterwards proceeding to Biarritz. This programme might however now be somewhat modified in view of Nusret going straight to London where he expects to stay eight days or so.

Sir H. Rumbold to report on his probable movements and had stated: 'From Admiral Webb's telegram No. 1746 [No. 743] of August 29th repeated to you, it appears that Nusret-ed-Dowleh intends to proceed to Paris as soon as possible after Shah's arrival in Switzerland. It would certainly be preferable that he should come to this country and see me first. You should take an opportunity of informing His Highness that it will be a pleasure to me to see him here before he goes to Paris.'

### No. 761

*Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (Received September 7)*

*No. 1227 Telegraphic [126369/150/34]*

*BERNE, September 7, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Nusret-ed-Dowleh called on me early this morning to say that he had been reflecting over our conversation (?) of yesterday. He wished me to put following considerations before you.

He thought, as he had openly announced his intention of going to Paris on September 12th he would, by going straight to London, play into the hands of clique of Persians in Paris, headed by former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who were actively working up French press against Agreement. They would point to his journey to London as another proof of Persian subserviency. I replied that (?) answer to this was that it was only logical that he should wish to discuss matter relating to Agreement as soon as possible with Government which had concluded it. I said that it was precisely because you were aware of criticism of Agreement that you attached importance to discussing with him best means of meeting them. Finally I told him 'I had already telegraphed to you upshot of our conversation of yesterday'.

Nusret-ed-Dowleh then agreed to proceed to London on September 11th as already arranged.

<sup>1</sup> No. 760.

**No. 762**

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 478 Telegraphic [122081/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 574<sup>1</sup> (of August 25th).

I do not like the two appointments and I am surprised to hear that they have been actually made.

I propose to discuss the matter with the Minister for Foreign Affairs when he comes here, when I shall advocate appointment of Sadigh-es-Sultaneh as principal delegate.

<sup>1</sup> No. 735.

**No. 763**

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 479 Telegraphic [122997/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 591<sup>1</sup> (of August 29th—Length of validity of Anglo-Persian Agreement).

I share your view that terms of agreement really contain their own time limits. Moreover in view of the fact that the agreement has already been laid before Parliament and published to the world it seems to me very undesirable that any alteration should now be made in it.

Any variation is capable of being regarded as a sign of weakness and may lead to further inconvenient demands. Unless therefore you regard it as a matter of vital importance to humour Prime Minister in this matter I would greatly prefer to make no alteration. If, however, it appears to you essential you will no doubt make further representations to me before taking any action.

<sup>1</sup> No. 744.

**No. 764**

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

*No. 1073 Telegraphic [127411/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 9, 1919

Nusret-ed-Dowleh new Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs is proceeding through Paris to England where he intends to arrive 11th September.

You should inform His Excellency that I look forward greatly to seeing him here and am arranging an official banquet in his honour 19th September. Unfortunately I am precluded from being in London before then. In these circumstances His Excellency will doubtless consult his own convenience regarding actual date of his journey hither towards end of this week.

*Confidential.* It is not desirable that he should remain long in Paris on this occasion.

**No. 765**

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 613 Telegraphic [128016/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 460.<sup>1</sup>

Prime Minister agrees to appointment of Ex-Regent for purpose if he is willing. He is instructing Nusret-ed-Dowleh to discuss matter with him and give him up to date information.

<sup>1</sup> No. 753.

**No. 766**

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 614 Telegraphic [128017/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 479.<sup>1</sup>

I will refer again to (intended) steps [*sic*] to induce Prime Minister to drop the request.

<sup>1</sup> No. 763.

**No. 767**

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 12)*

*No. 621 Telegraphic [128404/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 445.<sup>1</sup>

I spoke to Prime Minister in sense desired and he will bear it in mind. It would appear however from reports of (? interalia) (? That) [*sic*] Samad Khan is not altogether friendly element. It is he who has sent (? these exaggerated reports) alleging protests of French Government and referred to League of Nations. He also reports that it is not a case of one or two newspapers being inspired by Mushaver to attack agreement, but that whole of French press without (? exception) and Belgian press are hostile to it and even some of British press.

<sup>1</sup> No. 730.

**No. 768**

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 12)*

*No. 624 Telegraphic [128496/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 462.<sup>1</sup> It is clearly not the case that (? vessel)s were handed over on August 29th because on September 2nd in reply to

<sup>1</sup> No. 752.

telegraphic enquiry and request from me dated August 28th Commodore Norris wired: Begins:—

Much regret I cannot comply with your telegram. I have sent a telegram to Rear-Admiral Black Sea urging necessity (?) of retaining at least one of ships at Enzeli. I have received peremptory order to turn over all ships to Denikin. Last ship turns over on September 2nd and I leave for Black Sea. Ends.

In my opinion British Persian interests have been unnecessarily sacrificed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In Tehran telegram No. 647 of September 28, 1919 (received October 2) Sir P. Cox reported further: 'Since my telegram No. 624 [No. 768] . . . another vessel, the *Chassory*, has been lying at Enzeli. Denikin has now sent an armed vessel *Mercury* from Petrovsk to take her over. I have asked that she may not be handed over pending a reference to His Majesty's Government, but I gather that she will probably be handed over on the strength of orders left by Commodore Norris. Persian Government are much disappointed, especially as I understand that Minister for Foreign Affairs has been pressing matter in London [see Nos. 789-91] and they asked me to move you again from here. (?) There appears to be question in regard to flag. Persian Government, of course, are highly anxious that Persian flag should be flown and ask me to urge this.'

## No. 769

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 618 Telegraphic [127632/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 10, 1919

My telegram No. 595.<sup>1</sup>

Following are developments of past week.

Reports from provinces same as last week except that in some places there is general impatience for evidence that agreement is being put into action and some scepticism (?) as to whether we mean business.

In Tehran the small gang of irreconcilables mentioned in my last telegram continued their activities. Thus Mudarris sent an invitation to Ministers, officers of gendarmerie, and Cossack Brigade asking them to come to a meeting (?) to protest against agreement. Three or four gendarmerie officers are said to have gone but no Cossack and gathering was a frost.

On September 3rd a seditious leaflet professing to emanate from 'students' of Tehran and with which a few scholars of School of Art and French School were identified, but which is believed to have been the work of Mosteshar-ed-Dowleh,<sup>2</sup> was distributed in town but quickly seized by police. It attacked Vossugh and agreement; called on clergy to drape the mosques in black, and on all patriotic Persians to rise and demand its cancellation; meanwhile the members of gang continued to meet at each other's houses and hatch plans. Prime Minister, who hitherto had thought it best (as majority of public (?) were with) him to let people talk and not to threaten the activities of gang too seriously, now decided that in view of approach of Moharrum<sup>3</sup> activities

<sup>1</sup> No. 749.

<sup>2</sup> A former Persian Minister of the Interior.

<sup>3</sup> The first ten days of the month of Moharrum are held as a Shia festival.

must be stopped. Accordingly on 9th instant he issued a communiqué in continuation of that of August 10th. In it he explained that a month had elapsed since promulgation of agreement and that he had purposely given public every opportunity for expressing their opinions. That it was abundantly evident that vast majority of peoples both in town and provinces welcomed agreement and that only a small clique of malcontents and old enemies with axes to grind were obstinately engineering agitation against it. He considered he had given them sufficient rope and in interests of country he now proposed to suppress their mischievous activities. The same evening the five principal non-clerical agitators were apprehended and sent off by automobile to Kashan; and about fifteen smaller fry were placed under police (?) surveillance). Effect of this step has been excellent and is regarded by public and press with relief and approbation. On this occasion neither of Mujtaheds<sup>4</sup> was included but they were warned that if they interfered any further in politics they would be served likewise. The names of the five individuals deported were: (1) Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh; (2) Moin-et-Tujjar; (3) Mosteshar-ed-Dowleh; (4) Mumtaz-el-Mulk; (5) Muhtasham-es-Sultaneh.

Repeated to India and Bagdad.

<sup>4</sup> Mohammedan dignitaries.

#### No. 770

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 619 Telegraphic [127878/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 10, 1919

Last night American Minister addressed following communiqué to three vernacular papers and simultaneously distributed a number of typed copies throughout city. Editor took it to Prime Minister and it was too late for to-day's issue, but it has already become public property in town so Prime Minister sees no object in suppressing it, and it will appear in to-morrow's paper with suitable comment.

In circumstances above explained I see no use in making any protest to American Minister, and can only leave it to His Majesty's Government to take such action as may seem expedient with American Government. To me personally paragraphs two and three seem a gross breach of diplomatic comity and almost an act of extreme unfriendliness. It is fortunate that individuals referred to in my immediately preceding telegram<sup>1</sup> of to-day have been arrested (?) otherwise they would have derived splendid capital from this communiqué. Prime Minister asks that if possible American Government be induced to send another (?) communiqué with copy to you saying this communiqué was merely designed to remove any misapprehension caused by *Raad* article, and was not intended to cast any aspersion on Anglo-Persian Agreement which American Government realise is in Persia's

<sup>1</sup> No. 769.

interest and that America could not have offered a better one. Communiqué begins:—

'In view of misrepresentations contained in an article published in *Raad* of August 19th last with reference to attitude of President Wilson, American peace mission and of America towards Persia, it is thought proper to submit herewith a communiqué just received from United States (? State Department) at Washington.

' "To American Legation, Teheran.

' 1. The United States Government instructs(?) you to please deny to Persian officials and to any other Persians or persons who may be interested that United States has refused to aid Persia. America has (? uniformly) shown . . .<sup>2</sup> interest in welfare of Persia in many ways.

' 2. The American members of the Peace Commission at Paris often earnestly tried to obtain a hearing for Persian delegates before the Peace Conference, and American Commission was surprised that it did not receive more aid and support in its endeavour but announcement of new treaty probably explains the reason why the Americans were unable to get such a hearing for Persian delegates.

' 3. It also appears that Persian Government at Teheran lent no strong support to efforts of its delegates sent to (? Paris omitted). The American Government is surprised to learn of the recent Anglo-Persian Treaty which would seem to indicate that Persia does not wish America's aid or support hereafter and this in spite of well-known fact that Persian Peace Commission at Paris openly and urgently sought American aid and assistance." Ends.

Repeated to India and Bagdad.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 771

*Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 622 Telegraphic [127473/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 10, 1919

My telegram No. 618.<sup>1</sup>

I would emphasise fact that no copy of communiqué was addressed to Prime Minister or Persian Government; former was first informed of it by being shown a specimen by (? Persian) press who had received it in distribution. As newspapers are well under influence of Prime Minister and Legation, and as chief antagonists of agreement have just been eliminated, I do not think publication will have any serious effect, but had document been published a week ago it might have put us in serious difficulties. I venture to hope that His Majesty's Government will feel able to inform American Government that should any lawless opposition result from their Minister's action, such steps as may be necessary to safeguard our interests and uphold agreement will be taken by us.

Repeated to India, Bagdad 320.

<sup>1</sup> No. 769.

No. 772

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 625 Telegraphic [127993/150/34]*

TEHRAN, *September 11, 1919*

Prime Minister informed me last night that during day the Munshis<sup>1</sup> of American Legation had distributed a great number of copies of communique's in English and Persian amongst Ulemas<sup>2</sup> of Teheran and (others).

Repeated to India, Bagdad 320.

<sup>1</sup> Persian clerks.

<sup>2</sup> Leading Mohammedan theologians.

No. 773

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 626 Telegraphic [128019/150/34]*

TEHRAN, *September 11, 1919*

Simultaneously with American communique French Legation has issued communique stating French Government place French vessel at disposal of Persian Peace Delegation from Batoum to Constantinople and that French Government have conferred Legion of Honour on Mushaver.

This is all part of combined French and American intrigue against Vossugh and agreement.

Repeated to India, Bagdad, 322.

No. 774

*Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador in London<sup>1</sup>*

*[128532/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 11, 1919*

My dear Ambassador,

You will remember that on the 18th August I asked you to favour me with a visit at the Foreign Office in order that I might acquaint you with the recent conclusion of an agreement between the British and Persian Governments.<sup>2</sup> I informed your Excellency that your Government had not been kept in entire ignorance of the matter, because when I was in Paris some time ago I had called upon Colonel House especially to mention to him the nature of the negotiations in which I was engaged, and I had asked him to inform President Wilson on the matter, so that the President might be guided in his attitude towards the Persian Delegation in Paris, should their claim to be heard at the Peace Conference be entertained. That Colonel House undertook this mission is certain because at a later date in London he informed me that he had carried it out, and had informed the President of what I had said.

<sup>1</sup> The text of this letter, as telegraphed to the State Department of the United States, is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919*, vol. ii, pp. 708-10.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 727.

2. No hint of doubt or disapproval was conveyed to me and I have ever since remained under the impression that the agreement was one which would meet with the cordial approval of your Government and country. This impression was more than confirmed by our interview on the 18th August. On that occasion I mentioned to you that the French, vexed as I believed at the failure which had so far attended their efforts in Syria, had assumed a hostile attitude to the agreement at Teheran, which their Minister was doing his best to disparage, and I said that I thought it not unlikely that he would endeavour to enlist the co-operation of his American colleague in pursuing this policy. In these circumstances, and assuming, as I think I was entitled to do, that your Government would be generally speaking in favour of the agreement, I asked your Excellency whether you could see your way to suggest that the American Minister at Teheran should be advised to facilitate the acceptance of the agreement and to give it his blessing.

3. You very readily and courteously consented to take this step, and you further told me that you thought the agreement a good one, better indeed for Persia than it was for Great Britain.

4. As my reports from Teheran led me to doubt whether the American Minister could have taken action in the sense suggested, I have during the last few days sought more than once for an opportunity of seeing your Excellency in order to ascertain what reply your Government had returned to your representations. Your absence from town has, however, unfortunately prevented me from seeing you, and now I am obliged to take my own departure. In these circumstances I venture to write this letter.

The case for doing so is rendered much more urgent by information which has reached me only this morning by wire from Teheran. It appears that on the night of the 9th September the American Minister, without any communication to the Persian Prime Minister or the Persian Government, addressed the following communiqué to three vernacular papers, and simultaneously, through the agency of the native staff of the legation, distributed a great number of typed copies throughout the city. . . .<sup>3</sup>

I have, of course, no responsibility for what may have appeared in the *Raad* newspaper, nor have I any right to object to the United States Government or its representative seeking to correct newspaper misrepresentation. But in view of the facts which I have before stated to your Excellency and have repeated in this letter, I find considerable difficulty in understanding the passage about the surprise of the United States Government at learning of the agreement, while I may be pardoned if I point out that such action, taken without warning or notice by the Minister of a great and friendly Power at the Persian capital, while hardly in accord with the ordinary forms of diplomatic procedure, would undoubtedly be regarded locally, and indeed was regarded, as a challenge to the Anglo-Persian Agreement of an unfriendly and almost a hostile character.

That such can have been the intention of the American Government I am unable, in view of what your Excellency said to me, to believe. Nor can I

<sup>3</sup> The note here cited in full the American communiqué given in No. 770.

discover anything in the agreement itself to justify an attitude of suspicion on the part of any friend of Persia. Indeed the agreement possesses a striking resemblance in many particulars to that which the American Government have lately been negotiating with the Liberian Government as the 'best friend' of Liberia.<sup>4</sup> This agreement provides for an American credit of \$5,000,000, for the administration by the Americans of the customs and inland revenue of Liberia, for a similar administration by American citizens of the Liberian hinterland, and for the creation of a military police under American officers, provisions which postulate a far greater control, both political and economic, over the fortunes of Liberia than any that is even remotely suggested by the Anglo-Persian Agreement, notwithstanding that the latter is justified by the additional arguments of geographical contiguity to the Indian Empire of Great Britain and of the enormous expense to which Great Britain has been put in sustaining the interests of the Allies in Persia during the war, and in upholding the Government of that country. His Majesty's Government, in deference to the urgent request of the American Government, not only assented to the American proposals with regard to Liberia, but even deferred to the strongly-expressed American desire that they should not be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

In these circumstances I cannot help thinking that there must still be some misunderstanding which it is desirable to clear up. I should hope that by now instructions may have reached the American Minister at Teheran to act in the spirit to which your Excellency had given your ready adhesion; and as regards the regrettable incident to which I have called attention in this letter. I would<sup>5</sup> venture to express the further hope that your Excellency's Government may see their way without delay to inform the Persian Government and the Persian press that the communiqué, to which I have referred, was intended not to cast any aspersion on the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which is designed in the best interests of Persia, but only to refute any misapprehension caused by the article in the *Raad*. It would indeed be a misfortune if at this turning point in the fortunes of Persia, grounds were given for the suspicion that the great Powers, whose joint exertions and sacrifices have won the war, were divided in their conceptions of Persian policy, and if that country were thrown back into the vortex of international jealousy and competition from which it has suffered so sorely in the past.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919*, vol. ii, pp. 464 f.

<sup>5</sup> The punctuation is evidently incorrect.

No. 775

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 1007 Telegraphic [128010/150/34]*

Your telegram No. 1073.<sup>1</sup>

PARIS, September 11, 1919

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs arrived here this morning and your message was communicated to him. He at first expressed his intention to leave for England tomorrow but on learning that you could not be in London before September 19th now proposes to leave Paris September 15th or more probably September 16th. He explained that he had much to do in Paris and that his original idea had been to see you first and then return immediately to Paris. Though it was conveyed to him that His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive him in London as soon as possible he prefers not to arrive in London so long before being received by you.

He asks to be informed whether this arrangement meets with your concurrence.

<sup>1</sup> No. 764.

No. 776

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

*No. 1078 Telegraphic [128010/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 11, 1919

Your telegram No. 1007<sup>1</sup> of 11th September (Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Date of banquet has been advanced to 18th September and we should be glad if His Highness would arrive here Sunday or Monday<sup>2</sup> when all arrangements will be made for his reception and entertainment.

Confidential.

You should press the matter as much as possible as we do not wish him to see much of those in Paris before he comes here.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 775.

<sup>2</sup> September 14 or 15, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> In Paris telegram No. 1012 of September 12, 1919 (received that day), Sir G. Grahame reported that the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs had consented to leave Paris for England on the morning of September 14.

No. 777

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 12)*

*No. 628 Telegraphic [129032/150/34]*

My telegram No. 541.<sup>1</sup>

TEHRAN, September 12, 1919

Belgian Minister is still being pressed by his (? nationalists [? nationals]) (e.g. individuals wanting to go on leave) for authoritative statement from

<sup>1</sup> No. 716.

their position under our Agreement with Persia. Has any exchange of views taken place with Belgian Government? Belgian Minister suggests that he and I should formulate a draft agreement for approval. In any case I think it is desirable to allay their anxiety by some authoritative announcement.

No. 778

*The American Ambassador in London to Earl Curzon*

(Received September 13)<sup>1</sup>

[130246/150/34]

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, LONDON, *September 12, 1919*

My dear Lord Curzon,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's communication of the 11th September<sup>2</sup> and regret that my absence on yesterday and the day before debarred me from the pleasure of a personal interview. While the particular incident to which your letter refers now comes to my notice for the first time, the general subject is one which I have desired to discuss with you in a personal interview but for this, by reason first of your absence and then of my own, no opportunity has offered, notwithstanding my efforts to that end.

I shall, of course, communicate the sense of your letter to my Government without delay, as I did the request which you made at our interview of the eighteenth.<sup>3</sup> Prior to that meeting my only knowledge touching the Anglo-Persian Agreement had been gathered from the public announcement of its conclusion made some three days earlier, and it is perhaps unfortunate therefore that you gathered from our conversation any impression as to the attitude of my Government, of which I was then unaware. But I should tell you that, upon communicating with Washington, I learned that neither the President nor the Secretary of State were favourably impressed by what they conceived to be the secrecy with which the agreement was negotiated and felt that there had been some lack of frankness in the matter more especially as the presence of the Persian Delegation in Paris seemed to offer numerous occasions for a full statement of the intentions and purposes of the British Government in the premises; and that they were therefore indisposed to take the responsibility of any steps which would indicate their approval of the treaty thus negotiated.

Upon receipt of this information I put myself in touch with Colonel House, repeating to him the conversation at Paris between him and yourself as you had detailed it to me. His recollection confirms your own as to the fact that you presented to him the inadvisability of receiving before the Conference the Persian delegation, representing that the subject of Persia should be otherwise dealt with—all which he repeated to the President. But, unfortunately,

<sup>1</sup> The text of this letter, as telegraphed to the State Department of the United States is printed op. cit. vol. ii, pp. 710-11.

<sup>2</sup> No. 774.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 727.

he cannot recall any allusion to the contents or character of the instant treaty or to the intention to negotiate an engagement of this sort, and is thus unable to dispel the feeling of surprise which the President and Secretary entertain.

I welcome your Lordship's letter, therefore, as affording an opportunity to clarify the situation and remove any misunderstanding which may exist.

Believe me, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS

No. 779

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 15)*

*No. 633 Telegraphic [129482/150/34]*

TEHRAN, *September 13, 1919*

Sent to India.

Following for information.

Colonel Gleerup reports (1) French military attaché came (? to his headquarters) two days ago and asked to see his latest returns of strength, and disposition of gendarmerie. He was shewn these papers and everything he wanted to see. He then asked that copies might be sent to him regularly as French Legation, being in charge of Swedish interests, was much interested in progress and welfare of gendarmerie. He concluded by enquiring again whether gendarmerie, both officers and men, were sure that their interests would not be prejudiced by Anglo-Persian Agreement. Gleerup replied that Prime Minister had given all assurances.

2. M. Malzac, French vice-consul, during past week got into personal communication with Mullah attached officially to gendarmerie and is said to have told him to make it known in gendarmerie that French, American (? and Russian Legations) would support them in refusing to enforce Anglo-Persian Agreement. Gleerup will send Mullah to some out-station.

Local papers have replied strongly and effectively to American communiqué. Apart from above there is general expression of opinion that United States Government could never have contemplated communiqué being delivered in such a way, and United States Minister's procedure in distributing it as a leading . . .<sup>1</sup> is a subject of much adverse comment.

It has had no special effect yet except that Starosselsky, etc. are making the most of it in conversation, and suggesting that result will probably be assassination of (? Vossugh). The latter will be anxious to hear what, if any, (? action) you take with United States Government, or recommend here. He says that he will find it difficult to do business with Mr. Caldwell after this.

Repeated to India, Bagdad 325.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 780

*Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador in London<sup>1</sup>*

[130246/150/34]

September 14, 1919

My dear Ambassador,

I am away in the country and can therefore only return the briefest reply to your letter of September 12,<sup>2</sup> on the subject of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. I shall be quite ready to discuss this with you at any time, and I only write the present line in order to clear up the point about my meeting with Colonel House at Paris.

It was with the knowledge and on the advice of Mr. Balfour, with whom I had discussed the matter, that being unable, during my brief stay in Paris, to find the President disengaged, I called upon Colonel House for the precise object mentioned in my last letter. The only reason for which I could mention to him the case of the Persian Delegation, and my sole ground for preferring that the question of Persia, which the Conference had for 6 months shown no inclination to touch, should not be settled there, was, as I told him that on behalf of the British Government I was negotiating an agreement with the Persian Government myself. On no other ground could I have had any right to mention the matter at all or to ask that President Wilson should be informed. On my return from seeing Colonel House I at once reported what had passed to Mr. Balfour, and upon Colonel House informing me later that he had passed on what I said to the President, I assumed, and have ever since proceeded upon the assumption, that the American Government was at least aware of the general intention of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed op. cit. vol. ii, p. 712.

<sup>2</sup> No. 778.

No. 781

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16)*

No. 634 Telegraphic [129872/150/34]

TEHRAN, September 15, 1919

According to telegram received by Prime Minister from Persian Minister at Washington the attitude of inspired section of American Press is strongly opposed to agreement and it is proposed to raise a (?) protest in (?) Senate). They are endeavouring to make (?) use of a Parsee member of last Majlis named Arbab Kai Khosrou now in America and quote him as having spoken against (?) agreement.)

Parsee is said to have denied doing so.

Situation here is quite satisfactory. Caldwell's communiqué has been well (?) counter(ed) by press (?) and three of (my colleagues) have expressed to me much astonishment and disapproval (?) of his action from diplomatic and

Allied point of view. It seems (?likely to) recoil on him (?as a) bad (?tactical) error; but both Cabinet and newspaper editors are (?most) anxious to retain backing from His Majesty's Government and such action as may be calculated to square (?French and) American Governments and put an end to unfriendly activities of their representatives here.

Repeated to India and Bagdad.

### No. 782

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 17)*

*No. 636 Telegraphic [130213/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 16, 1919

Prime Minister informed me recently that he had instructed Persian Minister in Paris to complain of objectionable attitude of Monsieur Bonin.

I learn from " " [sic] that this having come back to Bonin and Bonin having taxed Prime Minister with it, latter replied that he had not given Persian Minister specific instructions to that effect but that in view of contents of papers which were constantly being sent to Persian Minister he saw that it was his duty to complain.

### No. 783

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 492 Telegraphic [129032/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 17, 1919

Your telegram No. 628<sup>1</sup> (of September 12th. Belgian Employees in Persia).

In reply to enquiry<sup>2</sup> from two<sup>3</sup> Belgian Chargé d'Affaires here as to the effect of the agreement in [on] Belgian officials in Persia I wrote on August 30th that 'in concluding the agreement His Majesty's Government had no designs of any description whatever against the Belgian officials now employed in Persia of whose loyal cooperation they are very sensible'.

<sup>1</sup> No. 777.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 25, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> In error for 'the'.

### No. 784

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)*

*No. 640 Telegraphic [132432/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 19, 1919

Following sent to India.

Feeling regarding agreement.

Reports from provinces continue satisfactory but mention nevertheless same unreasoning impatience for signs of its taking effect.

In Tehran as far as concerns factors within (? our) control, situation is (? quite satisfactory) but . . . and retinue<sup>1</sup> do not cease their direct or indirect activities.

Nusret-ed-Dowleh instead of proceeding direct to London (? stay)ed two or three days (? in) Paris and as I feared sojourn has upsetting effect. Prime Minister to-day read me a long, pessimistic and somewhat alarmist telegram despatched by Nusret-ed-Dowleh before leaving (? Paris). His numerous friends there had doubtless chance of working on him. Please (? ask him to) show it to you. Information which I have so far received from His Majesty's Government gives me no (? reason to) think that situation or (? opposition) to agreement on the part of other Powers is so serious (? as he) appears to think.

When hostile foreign newspaper articles to which he refers reach here I fear that they will have a very deleterious effect unless you can previously provide me with material which will neutralise them in advance.

Chief hostile arguments which Nusret-ed-Dowleh cites are, firstly, that agreement is incompatible with principles of the League of Nations, and, secondly, that its mere existence (? will) make (? Persia) ineligible for League (? owing to) being under British protection.

I have expressed to Prime Minister belief that views (? quo)ted by Nusret-ed-Dowleh are merely those of our . . . s<sup>2</sup> in Paris and America, and do not represent attitude of two Allied Governments and that he should await Nusret-ed-Dowleh's report from London after official (? dinner) party.

Sent to India (? and) Bagdad.

<sup>1</sup> The text here was uncertain. This passage was subsequently amended to read ' . . . but American and French Legations do not cease', &c.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

### No. 785

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)*

*No. 150 [150068/150/34]*

*TEHRAN, September 19, 1919*

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit a translation of a vernacular letter which I have addressed to the Prime Minister on the 9th September, and which he caused to be published in the local press in the following circumstances.

The stock-in-trade of the faction which has been attacking his Highness Vossugh-ed-Dowleh in connection with the agreement has been gross misinterpretation of its contents, e.g., that the provision of advisers by us is not only to be rigidly exclusive, but is to include transfer of the Shara Courts<sup>1</sup> from the hands of the clergy to those of British Officials, &c.

When the American Minister circulated his communiqué among the public and sent it to the local papers, his Highness Vossugh-ed-Dowleh expressed

<sup>1</sup> Persian religious courts.

the view that it would serve in a great measure to discount the communiqué if I could first give the newspapers something to enlarge upon in the way of friendly reassurances, on the lines indicated in the letter enclosed, before they printed and replied to the American communiqué. The circumstances were urgent, and I consented to comply. The letter was used as intended, was very favourably commented on by the papers, and had an excellent effect, and I trust His Majesty's Government will find its contents innocuous.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to India and Baghdad for information.

I have, &c.

P. Z. Cox

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 785

*Sir P. Cox to His Highness Vossugh-ed Dowleh*

September 9, 1919

(Translation.)

Your Highness,

I notice that a small faction of the people of Persia habitually prefer that the relations between the British and Persian States should be clouded and disturbed, and, either from ignorance or failure to appreciate facts, become a source of trouble and difficulty for their own country.

I notice also that at the present juncture these persons seek to excite apprehension in the minds of the public regarding the agreement recently concluded between the two Governments by the wilful misunderstanding and misinterpretation of it; and although I am well aware that in the communiqués on the subject which you have issued to the public your Highness has fully explained the true intentions of the two Governments in concluding the recent agreement, nevertheless it seems opportune for me to assure your Highness once again that essential objects of this agreement which the two Governments have considered it expedient to conclude are: the complete internal and external independence of the Persian State; the preparation of means of strengthening the power of the Persian Government to enable them to maintain internal order and guard against frontier dangers; and, finally, to devise means for the development and progress of the country.

In no way has it been the aim of the British Government by this agreement to limit the independence and authority of Persia, on the contrary, it is their desire that this ancient kingdom that has so long been in jeopardy from internal weakness and discord should be made capable of preserving its own independence, and (having regard to the important geographical position of Persia) that the mutual interests of the two States should, by the conclusion of this agreement, be the better respected and safeguarded.

Persons who seek to put other interpretations on the document, incompatible alike with its text and its spirit, are simply perverting it for their own evil purposes.

I have thus assured your Highness once more as to the motives of His

Majesty's Government in concluding this agreement in order that you may be better able to refute the false interpretations which a handful of self-interested opponents seek to place on it. I can further assure you that the provisions of the agreement will be carried out in accordance with principles which in no way conflict with the independence and authority of Persia.

I take the opportunity to renew to Your Highness the assurances of our high regard.

P. Z. Cox<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 241 of November 13, 1919, to Tehran, Lord Curzon approved the terms of this letter.

No. 786

*Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received September 22)*

*No. 1373 Telegraphic [131915/150/34]*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1919

There has so far been little or no comment about Persia in ordinary papers although there is plenty in minor propagandist Press and a considerable propaganda is being carried on in conjunction with Hindoos, Egyptians and Irish. Arbab Khusrow is very active in this and (? write)s strong anti-Treaty pamphlets.

Most striking thing at present is effect Treaty has had on moderate(?) ly omitted) educated men normally friendly to England. I have heard of several cases and I have been quite surprised for instance to find how much assistant Secretary of State had been shocked by it. These people think that as a result of Peace Conference Persia had been swallowed up by Great Britain. It is easy to defend action of His Majesty's Government to point out that power which controls Caucasus controls Persia and that America refuses a mandate; or to say that Great Britain is unwilling to follow in Persia policy adopted in Mexico by United States Government. Force of these arguments is admitted but they do not convince and unfavourable impressions are based on sentiment rather than on reason.

Repeated to Canada by post.

No. 787

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 26)*

*No. 644 Telegraphic [134170/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 22, 1919

Saiyid Zia, editor of *Raad* newspaper, who is staunch supporter of Vossugh and agreement, has sent me fourteen questions to consider and wants me in our joint interest to give him answers as far as possible in course of an

interview for publication. Questions are as follows. I will make suggestions regarding answers separately. (Begins.)

1. When shall we be ready to take up question of rectification of frontier?
2. Shall we be ready to discuss rectification of North Amara (? occupied) zone?
3. Asks for my personal opinion as to possibility of rectification at (? Nakchiwan).
4. Do we consider approval of Persian Parliament to agreement essential or not?
5. When are we prepared to take up railway and motor transport prospects?
6. At what stage should we take up question of larger loan?
7. What would be attitude of England now if Persia were attacked by a neighbour?
8. When (? adviser)s come for Ministry of Justice shall we be prepared to promote gradual abolition of capitulations? If not then, then at what stage?
9. (? On) establishment of new policy will our provincial consuls be allowed to intervene in local affairs to extend [? extent] which they now find it necessary to do?
10. What is to become of (? South Persian Rifles)?
11. Are we prepared to give advisers for municipalities of most advanced provincial capitals, necessary funds being raised by municipal loans?
12. Are we willing to provide staff for schools of art, science, technical subjects, agriculture, and commerce?
13. Could we not give Persia right to appoint the 'mutawallis' of shrines<sup>1</sup> at (? Kerbala), Najaf and Samarra? If we could also appoint Persians as civil governors so much the better, but not so important.
14. Would Great Britain be prepared to consider conclusion of offensive and defensive alliance with Persia now or when she has put her house in order?

<sup>1</sup> Custodians of shrines.

### No. 788

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received September 23)*

*No. 652 Telegraphic [132904/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 22, 1919

Addressed to Simla. Repeated to Teheran [*sic*].

Following from Malmiss,<sup>1</sup> Meshed September 20th. Begins:—

At a large meeting held under Bolshevik auspices in Askabad (? last week) subject of British . . . (? Agreement)<sup>2</sup> with Persia was discussed. Principal speakers Khan Lar Beg . . .<sup>3</sup> Caucasus, Ali Zimmieh, Tabriz . . .<sup>2</sup> Tyranny and outrage of British in Persia denounced. All Persians were asked to combine (? with) Caucasus and Bolsheviks to drive British out of and prevent

<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic designation of General Malleson's Mission at Meshed.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> Punctuation as in original.

defilement of Holy Places. British were leeches and parasites who only existed by sucking the blood of others. Afghans had now concluded close alliance with Bolsheviks so had also Turkish Caucasus with object of delivering Mohammedan world from slavery. Persia also must join this Alliance and . . .<sup>2</sup> Allies would help her. Otherwise she would be absorbed by British. Persia requires raising of status of poor rather than re-organization of administration recommended by British. Money advanced by latter will only go into the pockets of the rich. The poor will remain unrelieved. Bolsheviks alone can bring relief to the poor; with their aid alone can Islam be free. All (?) Persians therefore save hangers on of British should unite to expel these robbers, free Islam and establish new and better Persia.

### No. 789

#### *Note by Earl Curzon of a conversation with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs*

[133307/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 23, 1919

His Highness Prince Firouz Mirza Nosret-ed-Dowleh came to see me this afternoon to discuss the preliminary arrangements to be made with regard to the early execution of the Anglo-Persian Agreement before his impending return to Paris. The following were the points with which he dealt.

He expressed the strongest desire that the British officers or officials sent to assist the Persian Government in the recuperation of the country should be men of the highest class, carefully chosen, and likely by their character and conduct to justify the new régime in the eyes both of Persia and of the world. He represented very strongly that none of them should be Indian officers or Indian officials: not so much because he personally distrusted individuals with that experience, as because there was a popular impression in his country that they did not treat the Persians on equal terms.

When I said that, at least, such persons had experience of Eastern peoples and had sometimes displayed an extraordinary capacity for dealing with them and winning their attachment, he said that, even at the cost of getting a number of wrong men, with only a smaller batch of right ones from England, he would prefer to have men with no Eastern experience at all. In fact, he advocated that such men be chosen, as he thought that—always provided they had the requisite ability, character, and technical or other experience—they would be more likely to get on with the Persians if they came fresh to the field. He was of opinion, indeed, that the best solution of the problem would be that the Mixed Commission provided for by the Agreement should be constituted as quickly as possible of the best possible men, and that these, if they justified their appointment, should remain on to act as advisers and officers under the new system.

As regards a Financial Adviser he said that, so much importance did his Government attach to getting a man of established reputation for the post, there was no salary within reason that they would not pay in order to tempt a candidate of that description.

I pointed out the great dearth of men of financial experience, and the danger of appointing anyone without it; but the Minister was insistent upon obtaining only the best, at whatever cost.

Incidentally, while conversing on these matters, I asked him to explain from the Persian point of view the situation that had arisen as to the Frenchmen who had been, or were about to be, appointed to certain professorial posts in Persia.

He explained that these were, in almost every case, merely new appointments to posts which had already been filled by Frenchmen before the war, in such departments as Medicine, Surgery, Chemistry, Literature, and the like.

When I asked how he justified the proposed appointment of four French legal professors or experts, he replied that, though the Persian Government had not adopted the Code Napoleon, they had set up a system both of courts and of jurisprudence which was largely modelled upon it. As this system, which was already in successful operation in Persia, was derived from French instruction and French models, the Persians were merely turning to those who were responsible for the system, in order to ensure its proper understanding and development.

The Minister added that, before leaving Persia, he had discussed and settled the matter with Sir Percy Cox, who thought it undesirable to make a further protest about it.

I said that I thought a pretty good case had been made out for the appointment of a Frenchman here or a Frenchman there, but I was a little alarmed at the prospect of a dozen discontented Frenchmen—and I assumed that they would be discontented with the new régime, because that was the attitude of the French Government and of the French Minister in Tehran—forming themselves into a group or knot of petty conspirators who would very likely intrigue and make things as unpleasant for the British as they could.

The Minister answered that this was a danger to be guarded against. If the Frenchmen were found to be abusing their position in such a way, they would have to be got rid of.

With regard to the presentation of the Persian case at the Peace Conference under the altered conditions predicated by myself in my recent speech,<sup>1</sup> his Highness said that he proposed, on returning to Paris, to send to the Peace Conference an official intimation that the Persian Delegation had been reconstituted, and that at a later date they would ask that their case be heard. He intended, while in Paris, to place himself in telegraphic communication with Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, in order to determine the points which

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon had delivered a speech on Anglo-Persian relations at a banquet given in London in honour of the Persian Foreign Minister on September 18, 1919. The text of this speech is printed in *The Times* of the following day.

it was desirable to bring forward. He would then, on coming back to London, come to an understanding with me on the subject.

He was particularly anxious to know against whom would lie the Persian claims for damage done to Persia during the war. Was there, he asked, any prospect of getting any compensation out of the Turkish Government or the Russian Government?

I replied that, as regards Turkey, if he succeeded in persuading the Peace Conference of the justice of Persia's claim, it might be possible to introduce into the Peace Treaty with Turkey—whenever that treaty was settled—some demand for pecuniary reparation. As regards Russia, in the absence of a Russian Government I did not see against whom a claim could be made. The British Government had written off most of the Russian obligations to them as bad debts, and I thought it more than likely that Persia would not be able to recover anything from Russia.

The Minister suggested that a part of the Persian debt to Russia might be written off in satisfaction of these claims.

I said that I thought this suggestion was worthy of examination.

His Highness then expressed to me the strong desire of his Government to see the Persian flag upon the Caspian, and their disappointment at hearing that we had handed over the whole of our Caspian flotilla to General Denikin, without remembering that the Persian Government would have been very glad to have had a few of the ships.

I told him that the Persian request—which I should have been only too happy to consider had it reached us in time—had come too late in the day, and all the ships had already been transferred. I had, however, enquired at the Admiralty, and had learnt that the vessels disposed of were practically useless, and that the Persian Government would have had a very bad bargain if they had taken any of them. I pointed out also that the naval control of the Caspian was still undetermined, and indeed it was quite likely that, in the event of a naval conflict between the forces of General Denikin and those of the Bolsheviks, the latter would be victorious. In such a case, I asked, what would have been the fate of a Persian flotilla of two or three more or less useless vessels? It might have been better to have had no Persian navy at all. The general question of Persian ships upon the Caspian should however, I thought, be considered independently; and I would enquire whether any means were likely to be available by which her not unreasonable ambitions in this respect might be satisfied.

Finally, on the question of railways, communications, and economic and industrial development in general, his Highness was very anxious indeed that there should be a plan agreed upon by his Government and ours upon which both might proceed in selecting the applicants and providing for the schemes.

I said that I quite agreed with this, because it was important to remember that, while the British would be apt to regard a road or a railway, for instance, from the point of view of the effect it would have on British trading and other interests, it was the good of Persia that both parties ought to have in view,

and the Persian Government ought to take the initiative in suggesting the communications that they desired to have established.

The Minister wished to have time to think over these matters, and then, when he returned to England, he would like to be placed in touch with some official with whom he could discuss them. The subject might then be dealt with by a conference between the two Governments, and the right choice of projects might be made by common consent.

I asked his Highness whether he proposed to depute, during his absence, Nasr-ul-Mulk to act for the Persian Government in any particular.

He replied that he had suggested to the latter the possibility of his doing so, but that Nasr-ul-Mulk, although he had promised his assistance to his countrymen to any extent that they might desire, was reluctant personally to take any part in negotiations on their behalf. The Persian Minister in London would, therefore, be the intermediary through whom his Highness would convey anything that he desired to say.

C. OF K.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this document was sent to Sir P. Cox at Tehran on September 25, 1919.

No. 790

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 194 [133304/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 24, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nosret-ed-Dowleh, called at the Foreign Office on the 15th instant and was received by Sir J. Tilley who, while expressing to him my regret at not being in town at the moment, explained that I should be coming up on Thursday<sup>1</sup> for the dinner to his Highness.

The main points of the conversation were the following:

*The Shah's Visit.*—Nosret-ed-Dowleh explained that the Shah was already very tired of the monotony and dullness of Switzerland and was hoping shortly to go either to Biarritz or some similar place in the south of France or possibly to San Sebastian.

His Highness added that in doing so the Shah might possibly spend five or six days incognito in Paris, deferring his official visit until after he had been here; on this latter point his Highness enquired the actual date which would be suitable. He was informed that while no definite date was yet decided, it was understood that it would suit the Palace if the Shah would come to this country early in November. When the lateness of this date was brought home to him his Highness remarked that it might be necessary for the Shah to pay his official visit to Paris before coming here. The matter was not pursued further except that an enquiry was made regarding the suite which

<sup>1</sup> September 18, 1919.

the Shah would bring with him, and his Highness was told that the matter would be mentioned to me.

Nosret-ed-Dowleh remarked in connection with Samad Khan's presence in Paris that the French Government had never been willing to part with Samad Khan; his brother however had just been arrested by Vossugh-ed-Dowleh and removed to Kashan and, in his Highness's opinion, the two brothers held similar views. The inference of this is obvious—that Nosret-ed-Dowleh considers Samad Khan as unsympathetic with the views of the Triumvirate in Tehran as is his brother, and I doubt whether it would have been a wise move to urge the retention of Samad Khan in Paris. I have often had doubts as to the desirability of Samad Khan, though during the Peace Conference I have no reason to suppose that he was not useful to us in contradistinction to Mushaver-ul-Mamalek.

Nosret-ed-Dowleh stated that he had seen no representatives of French officialdom while in Paris as he had intentionally avoided them; he had however met various old friends including a great international lawyer. The last-named gentleman went so far as to say that the Anglo-Persian Agreement had openly flouted the statutes of the League of Nations and that if the Anglo-Persian Agreement were not revoked it would be the end of the League. His Highness, who was evidently considerably disturbed by the feeling which he found in France, said that it appeared to him essential to combat and correct the mistaken views held well-nigh universally regarding the agreement; possibly it might not be necessary to have any supplementary agreement of an explanatory nature, but some clear summary of the true situation appeared essential. He was told that I intended in the very near future to make an important pronouncement on the subject of the agreement, and it was thought well-nigh certain that my speech would have the desired effect. Nosret-ed-Dowleh was disposed to concur, adding that were this not so, there would then be time enough to think about a written supplement. He added, however, that some points of the agreement appeared to require some written form of supplementary agreement in the shape of exchange of notes in connection with the rectification of the frontier, &c. If such a rectification could be brought to public notice forthwith it would doubtless have a steady influence. His Highness pointed out that while the Triumvirate in Teheran were disposed to take forceful action when necessary, any Government which lived perpetually by force must expect to be extinguished by force in the long run and he therefore wished if possible to have some trump cards by which to win over to his side public opinion. By 'public opinion' he meant those who sincerely held that the agreement was a mistake; he was not, of course, aiming at those who were merely out to make trouble.

It was suggested to Nosret-ed-Dowleh that if he were to give a list of the headings on which he would like me to lay special emphasis, the matter would be brought to my notice.

The Prince demurred at doing so forthwith and suggested that Mr. Oliphant<sup>2</sup> should call on him at three o'clock the next afternoon in order to

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Central European and Persian Department of the Foreign Office.

hear his views and submit them by Tuesday's messenger to me in order that it might be possible for me to consider the matter in connection with my speech.

One point on which Nosret-ed-Dowleh laid great emphasis was the desirability of maintaining British officers and crews in the Caspian. If, as he understood might be the case, objection was taken at the flying of the British flag, could not British officers and crews be 'loaned' to the Persians in accordance with the recently concluded agreement as part of the military mission.

It was explained to his Highness that we were making certain enquiries of the Admiralty and he expressed the earnest hope that he might hear their result.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 791

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Teheran)*

No. 195 [133305/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 24, 1919

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 194<sup>1</sup> of to-day's date, in accordance with the wish of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Oliphant called on his Highness on the 16th instant in order to hear his views and desires regarding the recent agreement.

Nosret-ed-Dowleh prefaced his remarks by saying that he proposed to speak with perfect frankness as thereby the situation would be perfectly clear. He then stated that a recent leader in the *Temps* regarding Persia and also a speech by Mr. Russell (Mr. Caldwell's predecessor as United States Minister in Tehran) protesting against the exclusive nature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement and stating that the Senate should take action in the matter, were causing him considerable anxiety in view of the strong criticism levelled hitherto against that instrument. What he therefore considered to be essential was to calm public opinion in Persia and to place Vossugh-ed-Dowleh in a position to show forthwith the benefits accruing to Persia from the agreement. His Highness, therefore, hoped that he might be pardoned if he called my attention to the three following points, in the hope that I would emphasise them in my forthcoming speech.

1. *Reiteration in the most categorical manner of the undertaking contained in article 1 of the agreement that His Majesty's Government will respect absolutely the integrity and independence of Persia.*

Criticisms have been reaching him on all sides that Persia was now little more than a British protectorate and if this undertaking were reiterated yet again it could do nothing but good.

<sup>1</sup> No. 790.

## *2. Support in the League of Nations.*

His Highness stated that by article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations the respective members 'undertake to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. . .'.<sup>2</sup>

His Majesty's Government were thus definitely committed in the eyes of all the world to act in this sense towards Persia who was also a member of the League.

## *3. Persian desiderata.*

His Highness stated that you had informed the Prime Minister in your first letter of the 9th August<sup>3</sup> that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to co-operate with the Persian Government with a view to the realisation of the three desiderata, especially regarding (2) 'the claim of Persia to compensation for material damage suffered at the hands of other belligerents,' (3) 'the rectification of the frontier of Persia at the points where it is agreed upon by the parties to be justifiable.'

His Highness stated that I had previously informed the Persian Government that the question of compensation and the rectification of the frontier could be settled by the Peace Conference alone.

In these circumstances he hoped that I would state publicly that His Majesty's Government were prepared to support at the Peace Conference such claims as the Persian Delegates would put forward, it being, of course, fully understood that they would not put forward any claims regarding which they had not come to a previous understanding with His Majesty's Government.

A point to which his Highness attached importance, but which was obviously not for any public announcement, was article 4 of the Loan Agreement, which runs as follows: 'The Persian Government will have the right of repayment of the present loan at any date out of the proceeds of any British loan which it may contract for.' His Highness stated that he had on various occasions been attacked for this word 'British', which was regarded by critics as amounting to a vicious circle, and exposed his Government to the accusation that they were bound hand and foot to His Majesty's Government, and could not escape even by paying off the loan. He himself explained that the clause had crept in from the Persian draft, and that towards the end of the negotiations, when everyone was becoming weary, he himself said to you one day 'put anything in and let's get finished with it'. He realised, however, that this point was open to criticism, and in view of the whole wording of the rest of the agreement he would call attention to the word as being unnecessary in case it might be possible to delete it and thereby avoid much criticism.

His Highness then passed on to various other points which, of course, would not be dealt with in my speech, but which might be of great benefit to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh.

<sup>2</sup> Punctuation as in original.

<sup>3</sup> Item 3 listed in No. 734: see Cmd. 300 of 1919.

### *1. Policing and the flying of the Persian flag on the Caspian.*

If any of the Russian ships which were recently in the Caspian could be handed over to the Persians and manned by British officers and crews it would be an enormous asset to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh in view of the fact that it would appear that for the first time for a century the Persian flag was able to be flown on the Caspian Sea as a result of the good understanding come to by the agreement.

### *2. Royalties of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

A settlement of this question,<sup>4</sup> which his Highness had mentioned to Sir J. Tilley the day before, would go a long way to ease public opinion in Persia. His Highness was told that the matter would be considered.

### *3. Belgian Customs Officers.*

His Highness asked whether His Majesty's Government had been approached on the subject of their position, and he was informed that the Belgian Legation had recently enquired whether the recent agreement would affect the position of the Belgian subjects in question. In reply it was stated that their status would in no way be affected.<sup>5</sup> His Highness entirely agreed with this view, and pointed out that practically all Belgian officials had only two years to run, their three-year contracts having been renewed about a year ago. He therefore was quite prepared to hold similar language at Teheran.

### *4. French Professors.*

His Highness smilingly enquired whether Mr. Oliphant recollects the trouble which there had been in Teheran in connection with the engagement of certain French professors. He then said that the engagement of the few to which we had agreed would be very useful, as he would make capital out of this in the face of the criticism which was now universal throughout France on the subject.

### *5. Revision of the Tariffs.*

A point on which his Government was being most criticised was article 6 of the agreement wherein the two Governments agree to the appointment of a joint committee for the examination and revision of all existing customs tariff. The contention was whether the customs tariff was a matter of purely internal concern of a country, in which case there was no reason for British exports to be called into Persia, or was it a matter for a treaty, in which case presumably all Powers trading with Persia would be entitled to arrive at separate treaties with Persia.

His Highness added that in their present commercial treaty there was no

\* The Anglo-Persian Oil Company had recently been in negotiation with the Persian Government concerning certain questions arising in connexion with the payment of royalties to the government, notably the question of altering the basis of their calculation from a percentage to a tonnage basis. A provisional agreement in this matter was reached on September 23, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 783.

time limit, and it thus run 'eternally'. If we were prepared to revise this clause it would be helpful, and any other Powers desirous of making commercial treaties with Persia could then act similarly.

Having no papers before me I<sup>6</sup> could merely take note.

#### 6. British Embassy.

His Highness said that one point to which Vossugh-ed-Dowleh attached considerable importance was the desirability of turning the Legation into an Embassy at Tehran. (His Highness made no mention of the Persian Legation in London.) This is clearly a case of Persian vanity.

In reply, Mr. Oliphant said that at first sight the objections to giving effect to the suggestion might be both on financial and political grounds, and also that if His Majesty's Government were to create an Embassy at Teheran it would remind people of the recent stages of our diplomatic post in Egypt. In pre-war days the Mission in Cairo had been an Agency and was after raised to the Residency. If the Legation at Tehran were now raised to an Embassy, there might be some people who would say it was the beginning of a High Commissionership, and that their fears regarding Protectorate were already being justified. To this his Highness replied that if not only the British, but some other Legations in Tehran, were raised to the rank of Embassy, this exclusive monopoly on our part would be avoided. Mr. Oliphant replied that he would mention the matter to me, adding that as it was our Legation in Teheran was held by many to be one of the best Legations in our service.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>6</sup> The present despatch was based, with only the necessary verbal alteration (inadvertently not here made), upon Mr. Oliphant's note of this conversation. 'I' thus refers to Mr. Oliphant.

#### No. 792

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 503 Telegraphic [133564/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 24, 1919

At the request of Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs I have paid the September instalment<sup>1</sup> for the Shah in London.

<sup>1</sup> Of the British subsidy.

#### No. 793

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 506 Telegraphic [132874/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 25, 1919

In conversation September 22nd Lord Hardinge called attention of French Ambassador to active campaign of hostile propaganda against Anglo-Persian

Agreement now being carried on in Teheran and headed by French and United States Ministers.<sup>1</sup>

His Excellency was reminded that twice he had declared to me complete political disinterestedness of French Government in Persia of which I had taken note. It was therefore all the more astonishing that French Minister should assume hostile role towards His Majesty's Government in Teheran at present moment.

Lord Hardinge hoped these facts would be brought to notice of French Government and that your colleague would receive severe reprimand.

French Ambassador agreed that Lord Hardinge's statement that His Excellency had twice declared disinterestedness of France in Persia was absolutely correct and that position remained precisely the same in that respect. As regards remarks made in French Press against Agreement His Excellency said a certain feeling of surprise existed that French Government had not been warned that such agreement was contemplated and absence of such warning to an Ally had wounded French susceptibilities but he could not believe there was any serious opposition in French Press to agreement. He knew nothing about your French colleague or latter's actions but he would bring your French colleague's activities to notice of French Government in hope that stop might be immediately put to them.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 294.

#### No. 794

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received September 29)*

*No. 1392 Telegraphic [134895/150/34]*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1919

I have not discussed Anglo-Persian Agreement with any American since United States Ambassador in London mentioned it to me on 12th September.<sup>1</sup>

Embassy here tell me that subject has not attracted much attention in press, but feeling in State Department is very strong; they think move has been kept in the dark intentionally, and represent agreement as a (?) policy of virtual annexation of Persia but friendly senator has also spoken of it with regret in this sense. I do not know what is happening in Persia but I fear action of United States Minister at Teheran in misconstruing agreement in same way as State Department may excite anti-British nationalist agitators in Persia. Persian Government may repress this in their own way and His Majesty's Government will be regarded as responsible for acts of Persian Government which is now regarded as their creature. I shall tell United States Government history of agreement and draw attention to your Lordship's speech on Persia.<sup>2</sup> But I propose to explain our policy is not one of annexation but of encouraging a strong independent Persia as a buffer State on Indian frontier.

My own view is that this would be greatly helped by employment of some

<sup>1</sup> Cf. op. cit. vol. ii, p. 711.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 789, note 1.

Americans by Persian Government for gendarmerie officers or public services. In fact I should propose saying we should be glad if United States Government would become partners in this loan and in accompanying conditions of agreement. American policy will never be aggressive against India and (? no doubt) Americans in Persia would secure at any rate moral influence of United States Government against any revival of aggression from Russia or elsewhere.

These suggestions if (?) made by us to United States Government would be evidence of our good faith in assuring a policy of Persian independence.

Have I approval of His Majesty's Government in (?) giving this explanation of policy to United States Government and suggesting to them that Persian Government might apply to United States Government for selection of some Americans for Persian service? I shall make it clear exclusive employment of Americans is not contemplated.

Failure of Shuster experiment<sup>3</sup> a few years ago was due to his quarrel with Russians and conditions are entirely different now. Employment of some Americans now would be a benefit to Persia, would remove suspicions of our policy and have advantage of enlisting American sympathy against aggression by Russia or any other foreign countries against Persia.

Actual participation in loan would require consent of Congress, and it is therefore most unlikely United States Government would go as far as that; but I think that we should propose it (?) openly to show that we are whole-hearted in opening the door to American assistance to Persia and on broad political grounds I think it would be an advantage if United States Government did participate.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Shuster was an American financial adviser to the Persian Government in 1911: see G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, vol. x, part i, p. 746 f.

### No. 795

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 508 Telegraphic [132432/150/44]*

*FOREIGN OFFICE, September 29, 1919*

Your telegram No. 640<sup>1</sup> of 19th September.

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit to London and my speech on 18th September have cleared the air, and his Excellency, who has now gone back to Paris, will, I feel confident, no longer take so gloomy a view of the situation.

Repeat to India.

<sup>1</sup> No. 784.

No. 796

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 1)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [135600/150/34]*

PARIS, September 30, 1919

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday and asked me to give you following message: 'Russian element is playing a great role in intrigue against Persian Government and its policy in favour of agreement. Russians are endeavouring to stir up trouble and to rouse popular feeling in North Provinces where there are Russians everywhere. They even go so far as to wish to create relations between Persian elements of disorder and Bolsheviks. This situation derives its gravity and importance from fact that the Russian officers who command Division of Persian Cossacks unite completely with their compatriots in their policy against agreement. Thus by their influence they can put this armed force, of which part is quartered in North Provinces, more or less indirectly and at their own good will at service of this policy'.<sup>1</sup>

His Excellency further enquired how many English troops there were at Kasvin and whether officers to go to Persia as members of Commission provided for by Article . . . [3]<sup>2</sup> had yet been chosen and what were names of officers who would probably be selected.

<sup>1</sup> In Tehran telegram No. 684 of October 16, 1919 (received that day) Sir P. Cox expressed the opinion that it might be assumed that this representation by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was based on the 'same letter and information' as in No. 799. Sir P. Cox further stated: 'In referring to creation of relations between Persian element of disorder and Bolsheviks, I think he only alluded to Starosselsky's alarming picture of state of affairs and outlook in Azerbaijan'.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 797

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 510 Telegraphic [134779/202/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 30, 1919

Your telegram No. 550<sup>1</sup> (of August 15th.)

You may continue to advance the Persian Government Tomans 100,000 a month up to December 31 next for the upkeep of the Cossack Division, but it will be treated as an advance out of the loan.

<sup>1</sup> No. 723.

No. 798

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 5)*

*No. 665 Telegraphic [137162/150/34]*

TEHRAN, September 30, 1919

My telegram No. 640.<sup>1</sup>

Reports from provinces continue good. At one or two centres public opinion has been disturbed somewhat by report from Teheran of antagonistic attitude of French and American Legations and by communiqué of 9th September but this is only a passing phase, and is of no importance.

As regards Teheran Lord Curzon's speech has been translated and published and has given unbounded satisfaction.

American and French Legations have apparently received instructions to modify their attitude and unfriendly propaganda from those quarters has ceased.

As far as Persian public is concerned both in Teheran and in provinces agreement may be regarded as accepted by public opinion.

Only cause of anxiety now is opposition from several Russian elements interested and represented by (1) Starosselsky and Cossack Division, (2) Russian Legation and elements connected with them and (3) Bolsheviks. I am dealing with Russian problem separately.

Repeated to Government of India, Political, Bagdad, and General Macmunn on tour.

<sup>1</sup> No. 784.

No. 799

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 1)*

*No. 666 Telegraphic [135878/202/34]*

TEHRAN, September 30, 1919

(? My immediately preceding telegram.)<sup>1</sup>

A few days ago the Prime Minister wrote to Starosselsky enclosing report from Ardebil (*sic*) complaining of unlicensed behaviour of the Cossack detachment towards the inhabitants and asking for disciplinary action. He also called attention to Shasevend<sup>2</sup> lawlessness in neighbourhood.

In reply Starosselsky stated that he was instructing local commander to report; he then proceeded to give Prime Minister a very long appreciation of situation in northern provinces. As document is significant and interesting I give a summary of it: begins:

Writer expresses view that Shasevend unrest is engineered by enemies of Cabinet in Persia, assisted by Azerbaijan Republic and Bolsheviks, with whom they are (? associated). He warned Persian Government two years ago that a movement was on foot among inhabitants of Persia from which to make a bid for independence in concert with Moslem provinces of Russia.

<sup>1</sup> No. 798.

<sup>2</sup> A Persian frontier tribe.

Movement was suspended temporarily on entry of Turks into Tabriz<sup>3</sup> as they were then not inclined to encourage independence of (? Russian) Azerbaijan. Later with the help of Bicharakinca [Bicharakoff]<sup>4</sup> the British occupied Baku and though they were there as Allies of Russian State they allowed the formation of a so-called (? independent) republic at Baku which though professedly anti-Bolshevik was really anti-Russian. This republic having failed in its efforts to expand first at expense of Georgia and then of Armenians, now seeks to absorb Persian (? Azerbaijan), Gilan, and Mazanderan in association with Lenin and Young Turks.

Writer as a good Russian personally welcomes this development because there is no doubt that as soon as Russian State is re-established these territories together with Caucasian Moslem principalities will fall into her hands: on other hand it is possible that new Russia may find it more to her advantage to gain friendship of (? Persia). Writer is confident that new Russia will soon emerge and that when the moment for settling accounts comes she will be found healthy and powerful.

In writer's opinion present movements in Azerbaijan, Gilan, and Mazanderan are all inter-connected and their object is to use agreement lately concluded with Great Britain to excite public feeling which they will turn to their own account. Russian officers especially are being tampered with at present time and are being persuaded that agreement is against the interests of Russia and that as good Russians they should assist Persians to overthrow (? it). Writer then goes on to enlarge upon great work which various propagandists are doing e.g. Haji Baba in (? Ardebil), Kazim Beg in Khorassan and Bravine in Turkestan, adding that similar forces are at work in Teheran.

Having thus described situation he proceeds to suggest remedy.

He explains that only force available to cope with this menace is Cossack Division now about 7,000 strong but of which only about 4,500 are effective at the moment and those are broken up into detachments. He proposes a re(distribution) of forces as follows:-

Under new agreement British should begin increasing (? existing) gendarmerie which should be entrusted with garrisoning of Teheran itself and southern provinces and perhaps Mazanderan. British should continue to look after Khorassan as at present.

Cossack division should be now concentrated in Azerbaijan and Gilan where martial law should be proclaimed and whole civil administration including control of finances (which should be allotted in a lump sum in advance) should be placed in the hands of military commander-in-chief (i.e. Starosselsky). Great Britain should pay the piper because should Bolshevism advance into Persia and present Cabinet unfortunately fall, not only would British interests in Persia be damaged but India would be endangered.

I will comment in separate message.

Sent to India, and Political Bagdad who will please give copy to G.O.C. in Chief.

<sup>3</sup> Tabriz was temporarily occupied by Turkish forces in January 1915.

<sup>4</sup> Russian general commanding a contingent in Persia.

No. 800

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6)

No. 668 Telegraphic [137710/150/34]

My telegram No. 665.<sup>1</sup>

I submit following comment.

TEHRAN, October 1, 1919

Russian Legation, Starosselsky and other Russian elements with which (? we are) in relations in Persia are relics of old régime and live in hopes that Russia will come into her own again in Persia. Our agreement with Persia is wholly opposed to their conception of Russian interests (? and) where Starosselsky puts expressions of hostility to agreement into mouth of (? Leni)n and Azerbaijan Government he really expresses sentiments of himself and his fellow workers.

Motives of his particular proposals are obvious. As a good Russian he is anxious to maintain his own position and present status of the division until Russia is re-established. At present division is split up in detachments, and he cannot muster more than 1,000 or 1,500 men in Teheran and he realizes that with British force sitting at Kasvin any *Coup d'État* on the part of division even if possible would be (? short) lived. He is therefore ready to abandon his position at Teheran and desires, before British military (? power)<sup>2</sup> gets to work, to get the division concentrated in Azerbaijan and (? Gi)lan. This arrangement will (? both) increase its efficiency and withdraw it (? from) operations of (? Anglo)-Persian agreement provid(? ing for) a uniform force. Furthermore place is independent and isolated position which he contemplates he will [sic] be in a position to continue increasing his numbers and to (? bargain and) intrigue with Caucasian Republics and act (? in communication with) Denikin as occasion may require.

Starosselsky's letter has greatly disturbed Prime Minister. Of course he regards his proposals as wholly unacceptable but is impressed by seriousness of outlook in northern provinces and satisfied that some alternative measures are immediately necessary. He asks His Majesty's Government to recognize that it is (? in our) joint interests that steps should be taken without delay to make position safe both as regards Bolshevik menace in northern provinces and in regard to Cossack division whose loyalty can now no longer be relied upon.

As regards Azerbaijan although His Majesty's Government have lately agreed to supply some British officers to raise local gendarmerie, this will take time, meanwhile situation is daily deteriorating. Prime Minister begs firstly: that a strong mixed detachment be sent to Tabriz for the time being. (Probably most expeditious method would be to send from Kasvin and reinforce Kasvin from Bagdad.) Secondly: that Kasvin be reinforced, especially with aeroplanes, up to such strength as will suffice should occasion arise to deal with Cossack detachment in Teheran. Meanwhile he suggests that

<sup>1</sup> No. 798.

<sup>2</sup> It was suggested on the original that this word should be 'commission'.

(? South) Persia Rifles, Kerman and Shiraz, should be recruited as quickly as they can and meanwhile should send detachments as strong as can be spared for despatch to Tabriz under their British officers to replace our troops. Meanwhile if British officers promised for Tabriz arrive they can start training recruits. No doubt Starosselsky has painted an exaggerated picture of Bolshevik menace but outlook is undoubtedly disquieting and above proposals seem to be reasonable and in our joint interests. As regards Cossack division we now know fairly well what we are confronted with and I trust His Majesty's Government will take an opportunity to form definite plans for effectively dealing with problem. It seems quixotic that we should be giving so much help to (? Denikin) and should have maintained division itself for so long (? and) now allow them to remain a (? serious) menace to successful progress of our policy.

Repeated to India, Bagdad. Reference my telegram No. 344 who [sic] will please communicate to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief on tour.

No. 801

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 513 Telegraphic [133307/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 1, 1919

My telegram No. 460<sup>1</sup> (of September 2nd).

With regard to presentation of Persian case at Peace Conference under altered conditions predic[a]ted in my recent speech, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs said he proposed on returning to Paris to send to the Peace Conference an official intimation that the Persian Delegation had been reconstituted and that at a later date they would ask that their case be heard. He intended while in Paris to telegraph to Persian Prime Minister to determine the points which it was desirable to bring forward. He would then on returning to London come to an understanding with me on the subject.

Repeated to Washington No. 1783 and India.

Repeated Peace Delegation (Paris) No. 1196 for information of Paris Embassy.

<sup>1</sup> No. 753.

No. 802

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Lord Hardinge (Received October 6)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [164227/150/34]*

TEHRAN, October 1, 1919

Your telegram of (? September 29th).<sup>1</sup>

As regards Vossugh's subsidy I would like it to continue if possible until financial adviser has taken over his duties and agreement thus begun to operate. That would give definite opening for suggesting discontinuance.

<sup>1</sup> This private telegram is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

As regards payment to Farman Farma's family<sup>2</sup> Nusret ed Dowleh (? particularly) asked (? that it) should not be (? discontinued in) his absence. I think charges cease when he returns or his father resigns whichever occurs first.

<sup>2</sup> Farman Farma was father of the then Persian Foreign Minister and was at that time governor of Fars.

### No. 803

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

No. 1789 Telegraphic [134895/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 1, 1919

I am repeating your telegram No. 1392<sup>1</sup> (28th September) to Sir P. Cox for his opinion and I naturally attach great importance to your advice. But at first sight I am doubtful whether it is desirable for us to take any initiative in further modification of agreement. No protest against it has reached us either from French or American Governments, official attitude of whose representatives here has been uniformly friendly. To tear up the agreement in order to conciliate an unexpressed opposition from America, whose interest in Persia is exceedingly remote, would appear to me to be unnecessary. No British monopoly of employment or assistance in Persia is postulated by agreement. French and Belgian employés are at present in service of Persian Government. But deliberately to invite Americans also at this stage would, it seems to me, open door to similar pressure from other Powers, would shake confidence of Persian Government in our ability to carry out our undertaking—as to which Persian Foreign Minister went away from London quite convinced—and would merely drive Persia back into the rut of international rivalry in Teheran from which it was main object of agreement to relieve her. Moreover the employment of American officers for gendarmerie when put before Vossugh-ed-Dowleh by us in August 1918 was strongly opposed by him.

I send these preliminary observations in deference to your suggestion, but will defer considered opinion until I have heard from Cox.

Repeated to Tehran, No. 514.

<sup>1</sup> No. 794.

### No. 804

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 3)*

No. 1404 Telegraphic [136480/150/34]

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 513<sup>1</sup> to Teheran.

If occasion arises, may I say to State Department that Persian Government is now considering whether it should apply afresh to be heard at Peace

<sup>1</sup> No. 801.

Conference and that should such application be made His Majesty's Government (? would omitted) probably raise no objection?

Repeated to Canada.

No. 805

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1121 Telegraphic [135471/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 3, 1919

The King has invited the Shah to England from October 3<sup>rd</sup> to November 3<sup>rd</sup>.

(To Paris only.)

You should inform Persian Ministry<sup>1</sup> for Foreign Affairs accordingly, though official invitation has been sent to Persian Legation here.

Repeated to India,

Repeated to Teheran No. 520.

<sup>1</sup> In error for 'Minister'.

No. 806

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 5)*

No. 1421 Telegraphic [137193/150/34]

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1919

Your telegram No. 1789<sup>1</sup> of 1st October.

I do not propose to meet trouble half-way by raising question of Anglo-Persian Agreement with United States Government unnecessarily.

My desire is only to be prepared in advance to meet . . .<sup>2</sup> that may develop.

Fact that Belgian and French officers are already in Persian service would make it invidious to object to Americans if point were raised by United States Government.

Repeated to Canada by post.

<sup>1</sup> No. 803.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 807

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

No. 1809 Telegraphic [136480/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 6, 1919

Your telegram No. 1404<sup>1</sup> of 2nd October.

You may go further and say that Persian Foreign Minister when here announced to me intention of his Government to reconstitute Persian Delegation at Paris, appointing him chief representative, and to appeal to Conference for consideration of revised Persian claims. I informed him that, should they do so, I would gladly support application.

Repeated to Teheran, No. 523.

<sup>1</sup> No. 804.

No. 808

*The American Ambassador in London to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 679 [138909/150/34]*

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, LONDON, *October 7, 1919*

My Lord,

I have communicated to my Government the contents of your letter of September the 11th<sup>2</sup> and also of your subsequent letter of September the 14th<sup>3</sup> and am now directed to transmit the observations of my Government upon the matter in question.

My Government notes your Lordship's statement that by reason of your conversation with Colonel House you were under the impression that it was aware of the character of the negotiations which were being conducted with the Persian Government and that you believed that the United States would give the agreement its cordial approval. I am permitted in this connection to quote a recent letter from Colonel House to the effect that:—

'I have no reason to doubt that Lord Curzon's memory as to what occurred between us is correct. Nevertheless the fact remains that there was no discussion of details and I was left with no impression as to what the agreement with Persia was to be. It was all so casual that I am sure it made no impression upon the President either.'

My Government notes that your letter takes exception to a communiqué issued by the American Minister at Teheran on the 7th September and published in the local press of that city and which your Lordship states to be of a nature which might be regarded as a challenge to the Anglo-Persian Agreement of an unfriendly and almost hostile character; that you point out in your letter what you conceive to be the striking resemblance between the British agreement with Persia and that which the American Government has under consideration with the Liberian Government; and that you request in conclusion that the United States should without delay inform the Persian Government and the Persian press that the communiqué above referred to was intended only to refute any misapprehensions caused by an article in the Persian *Raad*, and not designed to cast any aspersions on the Anglo-Persian Agreement.

I am instructed by my Government to advise Your Lordship that the United States was not aware until its formal announcement that an agreement was being negotiated by the British and Persian Governments, and that the communiqué above referred to sets forth the facts of the situation as viewed by my Government and which it does not seem necessary to repeat.

On August the 23rd my Government was informed that there had appeared in the *Raad*, the official Cabinet organ in Teheran, the following article:—

'America, the only Government able to assist Persia, abandoned her.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 714-17.

<sup>2</sup> No. 774.

<sup>3</sup> No. 780.

The Four Great Powers at Paris decided that Persia should be under protection and that it is a part of Great Britain's portion. Persia has been deceived by President Wilson's good words and Persia is in the same position as Egypt.'

Other telegrams followed from the American Legation in Teheran indicating that the highest Persian officials openly stated that America had refused to aid Persia. In this connection I am asked to remind Your Lordship that the people of the United States have always been deeply interested in the welfare of Persia and during the recent terrible famine American philanthropy came to the relief of suffering Persians on a generous scale and did what it could to mitigate the unhappy conditions then existing.

My Government, therefore, having in view the statements of the Persian officials and press, deemed it essential to authorise the denial by the American Minister at Teheran of the statement that the United States had refused aid to Persia and it is not surprising that the Minister's denial soon became publicly known in Teheran. It asks to be pardoned for pointing out that the source of this action arose solely from the act of His Majesty's Government in concluding, without its preliminary knowledge and acquiescence, an agreement with the Government of the Shah which promises to affect so materially the relations between Persia and the United States.

Having in mind the fact that your Lordship takes occasion to dwell upon the alleged similarity of the Liberian and Persian problems, and of the relationships of the United States and Great Britain to those respective countries under the prospective agreements, my Government deems it not amiss to point out once more the underlying circumstances concerning the relations of the United States and Liberia.

The Republic of Liberia was founded 100 years ago through the joint agencies of the United States Government and the American Colonisation Society, the latter a private enterprise, and ever since its foundation the United States has taken a deep interest in the welfare of Liberia and has been of repeated aid to her in boundary troubles arising from extensive encroachments by foreign Powers. Of late the assistance of the United States, as a friend completely disinterested, has been especially necessary to the Republic because of the threatened attempt of foreign nations to infringe for their own ends the sovereignty of Liberia either by means of a direct character, such as the control of Liberian frontier forces, or indirectly through the acquisition by their nationals of concessions granting extensive control over the industrial, commercial, and financial life of Liberia. In 1886 Secretary of State Bayard announced to France the traditional attitude of historic responsibility which the United States has always held towards Liberia in the following language:

'We exercise no protectorate over Liberia but the circumstance that the Republic of Liberia originated through the colonisation of American citizens and was established under the fostering sanction of this Government gives us the right as the next friend of Liberia to aid her in preventing any encroachment of foreign Powers.'

This language has furnished ever since the keynote of American policy towards Liberia. Especially should it be noted that whenever the Government of the United States has interested itself in Liberian affairs it has done so at the express request of the Government of the Republic and with the fullest approval of the Liberian people. Indeed, throughout her history, Liberia has evinced the fullest confidence in the disinterested attitude of the United States and has repeatedly expressed the desire that the United States should interest itself most closely in Liberian affairs. In fact, an arrangement similar to the one now contemplated was spontaneously suggested by the Liberian Government as long ago as 1908; and the present plan of reorganisation has received the widest approbation of the Liberian Government and people.

Accordingly I am directed by my Government to point out with all earnestness that whatever may be the apparent similarity of the contemplated agreement between the United States and Liberia and that consummated between Great Britain and Persia, there is an underlying dissimilarity between the two problems as indicated above and that in addition the character of the negotiations leading up to the agreements were of an entirely different nature. On the one hand, in the case of Persia, an agreement was entered into by His Majesty's Government with the Shah which affected the relations of Persia to the United States without obtaining the views of the Government of the latter country. In the case of Liberia on the other hand, the American Government has been scrupulously careful not to enter upon direct negotiation with Liberia in a matter which diametrically touched upon the relations of Liberia with Great Britain until there had been reached a preliminary understanding with His Majesty's Government. To this end the British Government was made aware by a memorandum to the British Embassy in Washington in November 1918 of the vital needs of Liberia and of the desire of the United States Government to come to its assistance. It was only after protracted negotiations, however, and not until September 1919 that the approval of His Majesty's Government to the contemplated agreement with Liberia was obtained,<sup>4</sup> thus causing a delay of ten months in extending to Liberia the contemplated assistance.

In conclusion, I am directed to say that my Government welcomes the opportunity afforded by your Lordship to express its views in the matter with frankness and to say that it does not feel itself in a position at the present time to give its approval to the Anglo-Persian Agreement unless and until it is clear that the authorities and people of Persia are united in their approval and support of that undertaking.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919*, vol. ii, pp. 464 f.

<sup>5</sup> Lord Curzon noted in a minute of October 10, 1919, on this letter: 'Mr. Davis has written me a private letter offering to discuss any points in the official letter which I may desire to raise. But I do not feel much inclined for polemics on a question on which the U.S. Govt. have gone out of their way to be nasty. Perhaps on some future occasion they may find us less enthusiastic about some proposal of theirs than they would desire.'

*Note by Mr. Oliphant of a conversation with the Persian Minister in London*

[142253/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 7, 1919

The Persian Minister called to-day and made various observations for my personal information. He stated that he understood from Firouz Mirza that the Shah was to pay a State visit to Paris, of the date of the beginning of which the Minister was ignorant although he knew that it was to terminate on the 10th November; he greatly feared therefore that a visit in early November to the Court of St. James' would not be possible but he had telegraphed to ascertain definitely from Firouz Mirza the Shah's plans and he hoped to receive a reply by tomorrow.

Prince Ala-es-Sultaneh told me that the suggestion that the Shah should stay at Lansdowne House and not in a palace would, he feared, create an unfavourable impression. He pointed out to me that both Nasr-ed-Din-Shah<sup>1</sup> and Muzaffer-ed-Din-Shah<sup>2</sup> had stayed, the former at Buckingham Palace, the latter at Marlborough House, and that in view of the close relations now prevailing between the two countries any curtailment of the honours paid to the Shah might give rise to misunderstanding. I remarked that the allocation of palaces was clearly a matter for the Court and that I myself could only promise to report it to the Secretary of State. (When a few days ago the Persian Minister made some remark to me about Lansdowne House and said that previously Marlborough House had been used, I remarked that now Marlborough House was used by the Queen Mother and I doubted whether there was accommodation in Buckingham Palace. Since then, however, I have heard that Monsieur Poincaré might stay at Buckingham Palace;<sup>3</sup> I therefore did not pursue this line of argument at the Minister's visit to-day.)

The Persian Minister stated that his Foreign Secretary had instructed him to ascertain what decoration would be bestowed on the Shah during His Majesty's visit. He pointed out that both the above mentioned Shahs were given the Garter and in view of our present relations the Persian Government earnestly hoped that it might be found possible to bestow this decoration on Sultan Ahmed Shah. I merely took note of this remark.

The Minister then enquired of me what procedure should be followed at the termination of the State visit. He himself was strongly of opinion that it would be of great benefit to the Shah were His Majesty to visit some of the towns in the North and get a view of English life apart from that of London. I said that speaking personally I shared His Highness' view. He then asked me to explain what Sir Douglas Dawson<sup>4</sup> had meant by saying that when the

<sup>1</sup> Shah of Persia, 1846-96: visited England in 1873 and 1889.

<sup>2</sup> Shah of Persia, 1896-1907: visited England in 1902.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 589, note 1.

<sup>4</sup> Comptroller in the Lord Chamberlain's Department.

State visit was over the Palace were no longer responsible for the Shah (or words to that effect) and that other matters would devolve on the Government Hospitality Fund.

I said that until it was definitely known whether the Shah was or was not coming to this country it was not easy to make plans. When, however, a decision had been come to I would willingly ascertain whether the Shah might possibly remain here as the guest of His Majesty's Government, as opposed to a State visit, with a view to adequate accommodation being allocated to him here and in the Provinces.

The Minister stated that on the last occasion of a Persian royal visit a Lord in Waiting, Mr. Lindley and a Colonel had been attached to the suite of the Shah with whom arrangements had been made. He surmised that some such action would be taken on this occasion.

I think it would be well from the Foreign Office point of view if Mr. Churchill were to be attached to the Shah during His Majesty's visit and also Colonel Wickham, whom Sir P. Cox attached to the Shah for the journey home from Kazvin.

L.O.  
7 Oct.

No. 810

*Note by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with the Persian Minister in London*

[139196/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 8, 1919

I sent for the Persian Minister who called this afternoon.

I told him that we had been greatly surprised to learn yesterday from a communication made by him to Mr. Oliphant,<sup>1</sup> as well as to Sir Douglas Dawson, that the Shah had no intention of accepting the King's invitation to come to London on the 31st October and that he was engaged in Paris up to the 10th November. I reminded him that the Persian Foreign Minister when in London had urged that the Shah's visit to England should be arranged to take place as early as might be convenient to the King. His Majesty had intended at first to receive the Shah towards the middle of November but in view of the Persian Foreign Minister's remarks you had persuaded His Majesty to invite the Shah to come on the 31st October, the earliest date on which it was possible for His Majesty to receive him. I pointed out to the Persian Minister that the King would be receiving a Chilean Delegation about the 5th November and that the President of the French Republic would be coming to England almost immediately after, and that consequently if the Shah did not accept the King's invitation to come to London on the 31st October it was impossible to say when it would be convenient to His Majesty to receive him. I therefore urged him to telegraph at once to Paris to say that on political and other grounds, and especially in

<sup>1</sup> See No. 809.

view of the King's convenience, and in accordance with what the Persian Foreign Minister had himself said when in London, the visit must stand for the 31st October.

The Persian Minister told me he fully realised the point of view of the King and of His Majesty's Government and he was delighted to be able to telegraph in this sense to Paris, since he had already been writing in similar terms on his own initiative.

With your permission<sup>2</sup> I propose to send Mr. Churchill over to Paris to-morrow in order to clinch the matter.<sup>3</sup>

H.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. Lord Curzon's permission.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. G. P. Churchill flew to Paris on October 9, 1919.

## No. 811

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)*

No. 1075 Telegraphic [139391/150/34]

PARIS, October 9, 1919

Following from Mr. Churchill for Lord Hardinge.

'Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs authorizes me to say that Shah accepts His Majesty the King's invitation for October 31st. Formal acceptance will be sent through official channel.'

## No. 812

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 13)*

No. 673 Telegraphic [140357/150/34]

TEHRAN, October 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 516.<sup>1</sup>

I am entirely in accord with views expressed in your telegram No. [1]789<sup>2</sup> to Washington. It seems to me that such an invitation to United States could only be justified by dire necessity in order to save agreement from being wrecked. And at any rate in so far as my horizon is concerned there is nothing in outlook to warrant it. On the contrary agreement has 'gone down' throughout the provinces wonderfully well, and your speech of 18th September which is being promulgated everywhere will further establish it in public mind. In Teheran some opposition from disappointed politicians was inevitable, especially in view of attitude of French and American Legations, but it (? has) fizzled out and it is satisfactory to report critical first ten days of Moharrem are just over and have passed without demonstration or preaching against agreement.

Communiqué published by American Legation which seemed to me less offensive to us than to Persian Government naturally caused some talk when it reached provinces but it was accompanied by very fearless and able

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram of October 2, 1919, asked for Sir P. Cox's observations on No. 794.

<sup>2</sup> No. 803.

rejoinder in *Raad* with result that for the present at any rate it has recoiled on the head of United States Minister.

Tone of American communiqué, especially last few lines, made it clear to Persian Government that United States were much chagrined at their action.  
(? Mass) wash their hands . . .<sup>3</sup>

That being the case any invitation by us to United States at this stage to become partner in agreement would, I am sure, be extremely unpalatable to Persian Government, who had allowed *Raad* to take up gauntlet thrown down by American Legation; and would be misunderstood to the great detriment of our good name by public who would naturally suppose that we had been forced by American pressure to invite them to come in with us; furthermore, it may be taken for granted that France would expect to be similarly treated and we should find ourselves committed to 'Salade Russe' of advices which I earnestly deprecated before. Entering in the circumstances French<sup>4</sup> and Americans would certainly combine to compete with British influence, to great prejudice of Persian interests and progress.

Majority of thinking Persians have arrived at conclusion that it was necessary for Persia to put herself in hands of one Power in order to put an end to rival(ries of the) past which had been Persia's undoing. There was difference of opinion as to whether England was best friend to choose but I think most people have come round to opinion that no other solution but recourse to Great Britain was practical politics.

United States Government has done nothing and could do (? nothing) during past critical period to keep Persia on her legs. They are (? quite) unable to give her practical help in emergency as we have been doing at enormous expense either for restoration of order within or for repulsion of Bolsheviks or Afghan menace from without. There seems to be no reason therefore why United States should expect for a moment to be brought into agreement now with us; as you say it is not rigidly exclusive and there is nothing in wording to prevent employment of any individual American subject to our concurrence in consultation with Persian Government.

I would recall that Judson Mission<sup>5</sup> left here with no illusions and promptly told their Persian friends that in any case United States Government was not sufficiently interested in Persia to lend the State money; that private capital might be forthcoming but not until Persia could guarantee security for life and property, which at present did not exist. It is pertinent to ask who could bring about such a state of security except ourselves.

Sooner than bring any jealous partner into agreement I would much sooner see it abandoned as I believe that would be more in our ultimate interests.

Sent to India.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the words 'of the question' should here be inserted.

<sup>4</sup> It was suggested on the original that this passage should read: 'Entry in the circumstances of French', &c.

<sup>5</sup> An American relief mission which had operated in Persia in connexion with a recent famine: cf. No. 808.

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*  
*No. 142 Telegraphic [140189/150/34]*

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1919

Mr. Engert who is going as Secretary to American Legation at Teheran came to see me, I understand, at friendly suggestion of State Department.

I told him our policy was that Persia should be a strong buffer State but Persia must for her civil services have Western assistance without which she could neither have good finance nor gendarmerie &c. This was basis of Anglo-Persian Agreement but we did not contemplate exclusive employment of British officials nor did we desire anything but open door for trade.

Mr. Engert who has been in Constantinople said he recognised the impossibility of (Oriental) statesmen doing without foreign assistance but he explained very frankly the feeling here about Anglo-Persian Agreement and volunteered statement that it was construed as meaning that if Persian Government desired to employ an American official in its service this would not be permitted. In view of your telegram in reply to my enquiry on this point I made no comment but inconvenience of being unable to contradict his impression is obvious.

I gave him full report of your speech on Persia to read. I said I realised Anglo-Persian Agreement had made a bad start here (? as) United States Government thought they had been intentionally kept in the dark. I said this was not so and explained what had taken place at Paris and said that I was sure that Anglo-Persian Agreement would not be worked in Persia by British Government in the way Americans apprehended. I asked him to watch its working at Teheran in this light and report fairly to his Government on it.

I told him Persian Delegation at Paris might again apply to be heard before Conference and if they did members of British Government would certainly not oppose and might possibly support their application. Mr. Engert said this alone would do something to remove misapprehension. His tone was very friendly throughout and he expressed a strong and, I think, genuine desire to get things put in right light. He emphasised impression prevailing that object of Anglo-Persian Agreement was to exclude American commerce or influence. This impression is no doubt due to belief that agreement was carefully kept concealed from them.

I hear from friendly source that Engert has been instructed to cultivate most friendly relations with British Legation at Teheran. Engert told me Persian Minister here had told him feeling in Persia against our agreement was so strong that it would never be ratified by Medjlis. I said our information was that (the only) opposition in Persia was due to Russian and Bolshevik influence. I suggested Persian Minister might be influenced by Persian habit of making mischief between foreign countries, Medjlis playing off one against the other.

Repeated to Canada by post.

No. 814

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*

*No. 675 Telegraphic [140181/150/34]*

TEHRAN, October 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 493<sup>1</sup> September 17th.

Prime Minister makes an urgent appeal for reconsideration of your proposal to make these<sup>2</sup> or any other current subventions a first charge on two million loan.

His arguments are as follows:

1. That it is inconsistent with whole object of loan which has specific province for inauguration of urgent reforms, recommended by advisers, when they materialise.
2. That two months have already elapsed since agreement was signed, and at this rate it may be weeks or even months before financial commission begins to function; consequently if loan is discounted for current expenses in the meanwhile, contrary to terms of Article 1 of Loan Contract, there will be little left by the time the advisers get to work.
3. That object[s] on which several existing subsidies are expounded<sup>3</sup> (*sic*) have by virtue of agreement become a joint interest of both Governments and it is only by their aid that administration can be carried on and a political situation maintained favourable to progress of our joint policy and any action on the part of His Majesty's Government likely to paralyse administration is clearly dangerous at a time when in view of Bolshevik menace special and costly measures of precaution are necessary.

I fully realise difficulty of position between Foreign Office and Treasury in regard to these payments now that war is over, but I would earnestly urge conclusion of Agreement makes it not only vitally important but also worth while for us to refrain from taking any decision calculated to act prejudicially on general situation and weaken position of Cabinet. In view of large figure which our advances to Persia since war began have...<sup>4</sup> I submit that (it can) make little difference if existing payments continue on old basis until Financial Commission takes up its duties.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed: see below.

<sup>2</sup> The reference was to the British monthly advance of 350,000 tomans to the Persian Government: cf. No. 723.                   <sup>3</sup> 'Expended' was here suggested on the original.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 815

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)*

*No. 678 Telegraphic [140183/150/34]*

TEHRAN, October 11, 1919

My telegram No. 644.<sup>1</sup>

Question 1 is answered by your Lordship's speech of 18th September in

<sup>1</sup> No. 787.

which you express readiness to discuss (? boundary) with Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. We are not in a position to discuss the particular items until peace with Turkey is signed and future of Mesopotamia finally decided. In principle we should then be prepared to examine either item on receipt of detailed proposals.

3. I must ask for instructions as to how to reply. (? Armenian) policy pursued by our Caucasian Mission has from beginning seemed to me short-sighted and mistaken. It has proved very unfortunate for Armenia and has aroused some resentment amongst Persians.

4. We regard convocation of Persian Parliament much in the same light as we do that of League of Nations. Clearly it could not be expected that satisfaction of most urgent needs of Persia should wait indefinitely formation of League of Nations or Persian Parliament.

When either body assembles we consider it desirable that text of agreement should be communicated to them as an accomplished fact. We should of course welcome retrospective approval of Medjlis but would not regard it as essential.

5. At once! In fact matter is being discussed in lively way with Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. As soon as financial mission has had time to master financial situation and make recommendations for conduct of administration to the best advantage in the interest of State.

7. In the absence of any specific alliance we should do our utmost diplomatically and before League of Nations to support just representations of Persian Government (with a view to) preventing such a contingency.

8. Abolition of capitulations depends on ability of Persia to satisfy foreign Powers in treaty relations with her that her courts and codes of law and administrative system have reached such a stage of efficiency as to make it safe for foreigners to become amenable to them. It is hoped that with the assistance of advisers this stage will be gradually reached but it is impossible to say when.

9. Legal intervention of consuls in local affairs has almost invariably been resorted to in the interests of Persian State either in order to support authority of local Governor or occasionally to prevent gross injustice or maladministration. Obviously need for such intervention should gradually and automatically disappear with improvement of administration under new regime and it is our wish that it should.

10. Understanding hitherto has been that South Persia Rifles should be handed over to control of Central Government and in due course become merged in uniform force. This understanding was arrived at on the understanding that Cossack Brigade should be similarly dealt with. But this problem amongst others of a (general) nature will be examined by joint military commission now about to assemble and it is difficult to say anything definite on subject until commission have submitted their report and recommendations.

11. Yes, in principle but questions must depend on possibility of raising funds.

12. Yes, gradually according to demands of Persian Government acting on recommendation of their advisers.

13. In principle His Majesty's Government would be disposed to discuss sympathetically appointment of Persian nominees as mutawallis of shrines in Mesopotamia, but lively consideration cannot be given to this question until peace with Turkey is concluded and it is definitely known who is to be responsible for government of Mesopotamia.

14. I cannot venture to suggest a reply to this query and must leave it to His Majesty's Government. It seems possible that when Persia is reorganised a basis may be found for a treaty setting forth attitude which we might adopt in Mesopotamia and India in the event of Persia being attacked and Persian attitude in converse case.

### No. 816

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)*

*No. 163 [150080/150/34]*

TEHRAN, October 15, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose translation of a note which I received from the President of the Council acknowledging in appreciative terms the references made to Persia, and to the recent agreement in your Lordship's speech at the dinner to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 18th and expressing his Highness' confident belief in the benefits which the agreement will confer upon the two countries.

I have, &c.

P. Z. Cox

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 816

*Vossugh-ed-Dowleh to Sir P. Cox*

TEHRAN, October 8, 1919

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

In view of the appreciation by the Imperial Persian Government and its special gratitude for friendship shown, at different times, by His Britannic Majesty's Government towards that of Persia, and since the latter has made efforts to perfect and consolidate friendly relations in the mutual interests of the two Governments, and now that the weighty speech of Lord Curzon, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, prepares ground for further and more definite proof of the goodwill of the British Government towards that of Persia, I consider it my duty to express, in the name of the Imperial Persian Government, my pleasure and to offer my thanks, with the same sincerity as Lord Curzon displayed in his admirable speech.

In a banquet given on the 18th September last in honour of Prince Nosrat-ud-Dowleh, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon had expressed a sound opinion on the special and traditional relations existing between the two countries, their mutual interests, the importance of the position of Persia in Asia, and the obligations which these considerations impose upon the British Government to help Persia. In the clearest language his Lordship had explained the principals of the integrity, full independence and the liberty of Persia in its international relations, and explained how the agreement of the 9th August, 1919, was in accord with those principles. (His Lordship had further explained) that there is nothing in the spirit of the agreement which would curtail the sovereign rights, or the full liberty of Persia, or would, in any way, be contrary to the relations between those two Governments and other nations. Lord Curzon considers the liberty and the authority of Persia to be the bulwark of the peace of Asia and even that of the world. He considers this point essential in British interests. To dispel any doubt in this matter, he gives one to understand that British assistance, in giving experts for the military and financial organisation, and for the improvement and establishment of the means of communication, is for the purpose of strengthening the authority of the Persian Government under the above-mentioned principles. He also gives an explicit undertaking as to the support the British Government will afford to Persia in putting her claims forward at the Peace Conference in Paris.

Although the above statements are not new to me, and up to the present the real friendship existing between the two Governments has had no other objects still, in view of the recent agreement and the different constructions put on it, and also in view of the fact that the above statements explain and strengthen the former guarantees, the speech has been received and noted with the seriousness which becomes such important and formal utterances.

I do not need to repeat that in admitting the mutual and indisputable interests of the two States the Persian Government consider the principles put forward by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs the best and firmest basis of relations between the two Governments.

I feel confident that with goodwill on the part of the two parties in carrying out the stipulations of the agreement in question Persia will, in the near future, with the mental help of the able experts, who enter the service of the Persian Government with the object of making useful plans of administrations and instructing the Persian departments in new and beneficial principles, succeed in introducing due reforms and acquire such power as will enable her to preserve her high historical and geographical position, and to be more useful to Great Britain by reason of her sincere friendship.

In requesting your Excellency to be good enough to communicate the above to your Government, I avail, &c.

VOSUK UD DOWLEH<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office dispatch No. 246 of November 15, 1919, to Sir P. Cox: 'I desire you to seek an early opportunity of thanking Vosouk-ed-Dowleh for the flattering words used by him with reference to our recent collaboration which so happily

led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9th, and I wish, in my turn, to congratulate His Highness on his Statesmanship. I have every confidence that under his able guidance Persia will now be able to establish herself in a strong and independent position and that the hopes to which I gave expression in my more recent speech at the Guildhall on the 1st of November will be fully realised.'

### No. 817

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

No. 1867 Telegraphic [140357/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 15, 1919

Sir P. Cox's telegram No. 673<sup>1</sup> (October 9th.—Anglo-Persian Agreement).

I agree with the opinions therein expressed and am hopeful that they will be of use to you should matter be again broached.

Repeated to Teheran, No. 540.

<sup>1</sup> No. 812.

### No. 818

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)*

No. 1463 Telegraphic [142965/150/34]

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1919

Your telegram No. 1867.<sup>1</sup>

I will drop question of American participation in Anglo-Persian Agreement. I recognize difficulty of it at this late stage and it would be unreasonable for me to press it as Americans themselves do not seem likely to raise it.

For the rest I do not find telegrams I have received help (? situation). They oblige me to be silent when Americans say that even if Persian Government wished to employ individual Americans they would not be permitted under Anglo-Persia[n] Agreement even though Belgians or others might be allowed (see my telegram No. 1443 [1442]<sup>2</sup>). I wish to be able to state categorically that neither Anglo-Persian (? Agreement) nor our policy is opposed to employment of individual Americans in Persian public service should Persian Government desire it. I should be glad of an answer on this point.

Sir P. Cox . . .<sup>3</sup> in effect advocates a virtual British protectorate of Persia. If Persia is put exclusively in our hands both she and we shall gain for the time being: but we shall become solely responsible when Russia again becomes strong for protection of Persia—a burden which in my opinion is most undesirable. We shall in effect drift into an extension of our frontier from Himalayans to Caucasus. We shall have no friend to help us for our Persian policy will have permanently alienated all other powers as Anglo-Persian Agreement has temporarily through a misunderstanding alienated United States already. That Anglo-Persian Agreement<sup>4</sup> worked badly in Persia was

<sup>1</sup> No. 817.

<sup>2</sup> No. 813.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> It was suggested on the original that this should read 'Anglo-Russian Agreement' (of 1907).

due to the fact that Russians were already in Persia and that they were what they were. There is no reason to suppose that with Russians out of the way employment of American officials amongst others by Persian Government would reproduce evils inherent in cooperation with Russians. The maritime customs service in China with a British subject at its head (? has been) an International Service; has been effective and has avoided and not stimulated international jealousies. Policy with regard to Persia involves issues of greatest importance and as a frank statement of it may at any moment have some bearing on our relations with United States, I will ask that it be carefully considered by Prime Minister and His Majesty's Government and that I may be told whether policy as advocated in this telegram and as expressed in my telegram number 1442<sup>2</sup> recording my interview with Mr. Engert is approved.

No. 819

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 551 Telegraphic [140183/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 18, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 644<sup>1</sup> and 678<sup>2</sup> (22nd September and 11th October respectively—proposed interview by *Raad*).

Question 1. Your answer is approved.

2. To avoid reference to Mesopotamia, omit last six words of first sentence in your draft reply.

3. I do not see any prospect of a rectification of frontier at Nakchiwan and can only suggest that if necessary it be stated that question of frontiers is one with which Peace Conference alone can deal and that it will no doubt give much serious and friendly consideration to Persian claims.

4. Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated recently in Paris that agreement will be referred to Medjลiss. It will be well to omit last sentence and also last four words of penultimate sentence of your draft.

5. Reply approved.

6. Substitute word 'after' for the words 'as soon as'.

7. Reply may stand.

8. Approved.

9. Approved.

10. Omit second sentence as containing undesirable reference to Cossacks.

11. Matter can only be discussed with Persian Government.

12. Approved.

13. Confine reply to following words, 'In principle His Majesty's Government would be disposed to consider sympathetically appointment of Persian nominees as mutawallis of shrines in question.'

14. Reply might be that this must depend on future developments.

<sup>1</sup> No. 787.

<sup>2</sup> No. 815.

Above are replies to your specific questions but any possibility of a discussion or cross-examination in the press is of course undesirable, and in view of the time which has elapsed since suggestion was made by editor of *Raad* and the satisfactory reception which my speech has had I think it would be preferable to avoid interview unless in your opinion such a step is essential.

Since above was drafted matter has been mentioned to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers that in any case questions 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12 would serve no useful purpose and should not be put.

I leave matter to your discretion and local knowledge.

### No. 820

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20)*

No. 689 Telegraphic [143404/1015/58]

TEHRAN, October 19, 1919

My telegram No. 676.<sup>1</sup>

Russian Charge d'Affaires called to-day having heard that Persian Government were contemplating recognising in some form Government of Azerbaijan. I told him position as (? reported) to you in my telegram above-mentioned; and he earnestly expressed hope that we should adhere to advice previously given on the ground that reception of an Azerbaijan agent here would make position of his Legation extremely difficult.

He said he believed Persian reports of ill-treatment of Persian subjects by Azerbaijan Government were overdrawn and in any case if Persia was seen to be coerced by such maltreatment into complying with Azerbaijan demands it would be easy for Denikin to follow suit and obtain compliance with his demands on Persian Government by adopting unfriendly attitude towards Persians within his reach. I hardly know what to recommend but think that I should acquaint you with Russian representations.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram of October 10, 1919 (received October 11) Sir P. Cox had reported that 'Persian Government again asks advice as to expediency of their receiving a representative of Azerbaijan Government of Baku at Teheran. They are placed in a difficult position in the matter. Owing to their refusal to give recognition to said Government Persian subjects and interests are receiving short shrift at Baku and elsewhere and Azerbaijan is (it appears) more or less openly encouraging rebellious Persian subjects such as Jungalis and Shahsevends.'

### No. 821

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)*

No. 169 [154949/150/34]

TEHRAN, October 21, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose the translation of an extract from a Caucasian newspaper which reached the Persian Government, and was shown to me unofficially by the latter.

It purports to be a declaration, signed by Chicherin, of the Russian Soviet Government's policy towards Persia, reaffirming the intention to abrogate all Russian treaties or other agreements which encroached upon Persia's rights and declaring that the Soviet Government refuses to recognise the validity of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9th last.

I have, &c.

P. Z. Cox

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 821

*Translation of an extract from an Azerbaijan Newspaper*

One of the first and firmest opinions of the Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry has been to declare that all nations, weak and strong, independent, or forced to be under other Powers, must be free and must not be under foreign influence, and no Government should bring them under its own authority by force.

My colleague, Trotski, in his note of January 14th, 1918,<sup>1</sup> declared to the Persian nation the abrogation of all secret treaties between Russia and Great Britain and other Powers violating the rights of Persia.

The Russian nation will return to Persia whatever has been taken from her by the Imperial Russian generals. The Persian Government has, on the other side, declared all such treaties null and void.

Under these circumstances we expected Persia to have a new political life and to put an end to the oppression of savage foreigners.

Now that the victorious, but cruel, English are strangling Persia and want to bring her under their yoke the Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry most emphatically declares that it will not recognise the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which will lead to the slavery of Persians. Russian labour considers the Persian labourers as their sincere friends and brothers and that they must share its liberty.

The Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry regards that weak agreement as a scrap of paper having no legal validity. The agreement shows that the Persian statesmen have sold themselves and the independence of their nation to the oppressive English.

We have cancelled all the guarantees which the Persian Government, under pressure, had undertaken towards the Russian Imperialism. Henceforth the Russian Government will not interfere in Persian affairs. The delimitation of the Russo-Persian frontier will be in accordance with the liberty of the local inhabitants. The Caspian Sea has been cleared of the formidable ships of English Imperialism and commercial ships, under Persian flags, will sail on that sea with full liberty. All Government privileges will be abolished. The extra-territorial rights will be abolished, the Banque d'Escompte in Persia, railways, roads, buildings, harbour administrations, telegraphs, and telephones will be handed over to Persia. All

<sup>1</sup> A text of this note is printed in the War Office publication, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, Series 5, No. 78, p. 748.

Russian administrations and arrangements which may interfere with the domestic affairs of Persia will be abolished and cancelled.

CHECHERIN, *Foreign Commissioner*.

NARIM[AN]OR, *Commissioner of the Muslem Affairs of the South-East*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume III, No. 453.

## No. 822

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 229 [144505/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 21, 1919

Sir,

At a recent interview with me, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup> expressed the following views with regard to certain minor aspects of the Persian situation, which in its general bearings we had so often discussed together.

He was a good deal concerned at the attitude that had been taken up by Colonel Starosselski, the Commanding Officer of the Cossack brigade in Tehran. This officer was an openly avowed supporter of the old Russian régime in Persia; he would gladly ally himself with any force that was likely to bring back Russian predominance in that country; and he could not be expected to welcome any such arrangement as that which had recently been concluded between the British and Persian Governments. Indeed, the conversations which had already been reported to us showed what a serious menace he might become. At the same time, the Minister and his colleagues were faced with this difficulty, that the Shah placed great reliance upon Colonel Starosselski, whose force he looked upon—as in a sense it actually was—as a personal bodyguard, securing and protecting his throne. Colonel Starosselski was also a pleasant man, and he had rendered himself personally agreeable to the Sovereign. His Highness thought that, as long as the Colonel remained in command of the brigade, and could at any time collect its forces, he would be a potential danger to the stability of Persia. He informed me, therefore, that his colleagues and he were seriously discussing the question of terminating the employment of Colonel Starosselski on their own account—which they could easily do—and of keeping the brigade split up in relatively small units, so that there would be no chance of an unfriendly combination.

I did not express any view as to the wisdom of this policy, which was one for the Persian Government rather than for ourselves. I asked if, in the absence of the Shah, they would be able to carry it out without difficulty, and the Minister seemed to have no hesitation in replying in the affirmative. Personally, I should be glad to see the disappearance of this Russian element, both because it is an absurd anomaly that the British Government should have continued for years to pay, and should now be paying, for a force upon the

<sup>1</sup> The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently returned to London.

loyalty of which we cannot count, and because the danger anticipated by Nosret-ed-Dowleh is one which I could not ignore.

The second point raised by the Foreign Minister was the question whether, in the interval before the creation and arming of the new uniform Persian force, we could supply a number of arms and aeroplanes from Mesopotamia or elsewhere to the already existing Persian gendarmerie in the north of Persia, with a view to the protection of the north-west frontier.

This, I said, seemed a not unreasonable request, and I would make enquiries about it.

Thirdly, the Minister spoke to me about the large number of Russian representatives and agents still in Persia, even at the Russian Legation in Tehran, who were, he believed, by an aggravation of the anomaly already described, paid for by Great Britain. By what Government these persons were accredited, or whom they represented, he was at a loss to know. He supposed that they would claim authority from M. Sazonof, who was a sort of self-constituted Foreign Minister to Koltchak, Denikin, and company. Whether this was so or not, the Minister thought their presence in his country both an anomaly and a burden; and his Government were inclined to get rid of them as quickly as they could.

In the fourth place he mentioned the overtures that had recently been made to his Government by the Azerbaijan Government, and argued that it was worth while entering into relations with them,<sup>2</sup> in order to stop the movement, which might otherwise become a serious danger, for the incorporation of Persian Azerbaijan with the Azerbaijan across the border. This was the object for which the Turks were striving, and the Pan-Turanian idea was one which appealed to many. He felt that the north-western provinces of Persia might be seriously imperilled by this sort of propaganda, and the Persian Government were anxious to arrest it by every means in their power.

I had not sufficient information about the position and prospects of the Azerbaijan Government to offer any remarks upon this proposal.

Lastly, the Minister, with marked trepidation, opened to me the question of the possible grant of the Garter to the Shah on the occasion of his approaching visit to this country. He argued that the Shah, whose grandfather and great-grandfather had received the same decoration, would be placed in an invidious and humiliating position if he were not similarly honoured, particularly on the morrow of the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. It would hardly be worth his while to visit this country if the Order were not to be bestowed, and the Minister's own position would be gravely jeopardised if he did not succeed in procuring the Garter for his Sovereign.

I said that the bestowal of this Order was not a matter for me or for any Department of the Government. It involved the prerogative of the Sovereign, and I had no right to express a definite opinion upon the matter without knowing what views were likely to be entertained at the Court. I felt, however, that the Minister was hardly well-advised in putting the case in the way he had, and he must not be surprised if objections were entertained

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 820, note 1.

which it might not be easy to overcome. For instance, I said the two previous Shahs who had received this honour had, as he knew, received it only after considerable difficulty. They were men in the prime of life, one at least of whom was a great Sovereign, and had been for many years upon the throne. The feeling was strong in some quarters that the Garter was a decoration that should be as far as possible confined to Christian monarchs, and if this rule had on occasions been departed from it was only because a justification was found in the special conditions of the cases concerned. The present Shah was a young man, only 21 years of age, who had attained to the throne by the accident of the expulsion of his father. He had not yet had an opportunity of showing the metal of which he was made. This was his first visit to Europe; the ink was barely dry upon the agreement which had just been concluded between us; and it seemed to me a rather strong order if His Majesty expected in these circumstances that he should receive as a matter of right the honour which had on previous occasions been conferred only in such different circumstances.

I went on to say that I thought the position might very well be taken that it would be more appropriate to raise the question of this decoration when the Shah again visited these shores, when the Anglo-Persian Agreement had justified itself by its success, and when the Shah had had the opportunity, by his conduct on his return to Persia, of showing that he was loyal to the agreement and had by his action contributed to its success. None of these conditions existed at the present moment, and although I was speaking for myself only in making these observations, I felt that it was only right to point out to his Highness that the road might not be altogether smooth.<sup>3</sup>

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>3</sup> In Tehran telegram No. 694 of October 23, 1919 (received October 24) Sir P. Cox stated: 'Prime Minister hears from M.F.A. that question of conferring certain high order on the Shah is under consideration in high quarters. He fully recognises difficulty of problem regarded from other cogent points of view but begs me to say on his behalf that grant or non grant will probably have considerable permanent influence on Shah's future line of conduct and in the interests of our joint policy he much hopes that if it is at all possible Your Lordship will support the idea.'

### No. 823

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*  
No. 557 Telegraphic [142630/842/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 21, 1919

My telegram No. 524<sup>1</sup> (of 6th October. Persian communications.)

At meeting of representatives at [of] Foreign Office, India Office, and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this telegram Lord Curzon had informed Sir P. Cox that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had 'suggested, rightly enough, an examination of the entire problem of Persia's communications resulting in a co-ordinate plan in preference to piecemeal action, and I agreed with him. He is now examining the question, and on his return to London the matter will be taken up. . . . His Highness does not propose in the meantime to give any concessions.'

Department of Overseas Trade on 9th October it was thought desirable that motor transport on existing roads should be encouraged in the following order.

1. Railhead to Kermanshah, Hamadan and Tehran.
2. Bunder Abbas to Saidabad, and from there to Shiraz and to Kerman.

3. Railhead via Seistan to Meshed. The railway line favoured by the committee was same as above-mentioned route 1. Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs whose views were asked on October 15th is strongly of opinion that this line should be built forthwith and should go from Hamadan to Tehran by the direct route via Nubaran. He urged that the line should be continued from Tehran to Meshed via Shahrud whence a branch line should run to Astarabad and another branch eventually from Meshed to Lutfabad.

He was of opinion that a motor service should be run between railhead and Tehran in connection with the railway. Another line which he advocated was Mohamrah-Khoramabad, but only as of secondary importance.

He agreed that a motor service of importance would be that referred to above as No. 2 and he saw no objection to No. 3 to which you refer in your telegram No. 657<sup>2</sup> (of September 29th).

I concur generally with the views of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Line No. 1 should certainly come first. The northern trace to Meshed is designed to protect the northern frontier of Persia. It will be easy to lay as the country for the most part is flat, though it may not prove profitable commercially.

I am consulting competent departments as to the best means of giving effect to His Highness's views on route 1, and I will keep you informed of developments.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

#### No. 824

*Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)*

*No. 1899 Telegraphic [142965/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 21, 1919

Your telegram No. 1463<sup>1</sup> (of 17th October).

Interpretation placed on Anglo-Persian Agreement by Americans whom you quote to effect that Persian Government would not be permitted to employ an individual American while they may employ Belgians and French is not borne out by anything in agreement, and was contradicted by Sir P. Cox in anti[ante]-penultimate paragraph of his telegram No. 673<sup>2</sup> (of 9th October) and by me in my speech of 18th September. There is this difference between the two cases that Belgians and French in Persia are survivors of continuous pre-war employment, whereas an American appointment now would be a fresh start. But if Persian Government desired to make it, with our approval, there is no obstacle.

<sup>1</sup> No. 818.

<sup>2</sup> No. 812.

Your views expressed in your telegram No. 1442<sup>3</sup> of 10th October correctly represent those of His Majesty's Government. But our information does not support opinion expressed in your telegram No. 1463<sup>1</sup> that our Persian policy either has alienated or is likely to alienate all other Powers. France has made no protest, has enjoined a friendly attitude upon her Minister at Teheran and has through M. Cambon again expressed her full and loyal concurrence in British predominance in Persia. No other Power has indicated faintest disapproval. American Government appear so far to have made no official representation to you. American Ambassador sent to me on October 7th reply to<sup>4</sup> his Government<sup>5</sup> to my letters of September 11th<sup>6</sup> and 14th.<sup>7</sup> This reply is in main concerned with correction made by American Minister at Teheran of alleged misstatements in Persian newspaper *Raad* and with a discussion of Liberian analogy, which it disputes at great length, while judiciously refraining from any reference to my point about League of Nations. The point is repeated that American vexation is due to their not having been consulted in advance, and the despatch ends with statement that American approval of agreement will depend upon approval and support accorded to it by authorities and peoples of Persia.

I have had friendly conversation on the matter since then with Mr. Davis, to whom I fully explained the very sound reasons for not revealing our negotiations while they were still in progress, and who exhibit[ed] no desire either to repeat or renew complaints, and I am disposed to think that with the assurances that you have already given or are now in a position to give if challenged, American Government will not wish to reopen case.

I know of nothing in agreement which would require us alone to protect Persia in the event of a revival of Russian power or a[g]gression in North.

Repeated to Teheran No. 556.

<sup>3</sup> No. 813.

<sup>6</sup> No. 774.

<sup>4</sup> In error for 'of'.

<sup>7</sup> No. 780.

<sup>5</sup> No. 808.

## No. 825

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1271 [144470/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 25, 1919

My Lord,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called at the Foreign Office on the 16th instant—during his last visit to London—and stated that when he returned here with the Shah he would doubtless be able to discuss with me the question of the rectification of the Persian frontier which forms the subject of Desideratum No. 3 dealt with in the Separate Letter of August 9th from Sir P. Cox to the Persian Prime Minister,<sup>1</sup> of which I enclose a copy<sup>2</sup> for convenience of reference. His Highness expressed the view that it would be of the utmost use to him if, before doing so, he could be given any indication

<sup>1</sup> Item 3 listed in No. 734: see Cmd. 300 of 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to filed copy.

of the views of His Majesty's Government regarding two districts in question, namely:—

- (a) Turkestan.
- (b) Kurdistan.

It was, he said, the one wish of the Persian Government to make their view tally with that of His Majesty's Government and if he knew in advance what our main desiderata were, it would be easier for his Government to make theirs fit in accordingly.

2. I gathered that as regards Turkistan the Persians would still like some rectification in the neighbourhood of Sarakhs.

3. In connection with Kurdistan Nosret ed Dowleh stated that it was, in his view, a mistake to talk about Turkish Kurdistan and Persian Kurdistan as really it was all one Kurdistan and any so-called boundary between the two was purely fictitious. He said that were he even to be told that His Majesty's Government saw no alternative but one Kurdistan, he would be prepared to work accordingly, provided that Persia were to have the controlling voice or influence over the region. In any case, however, he begged that he might receive the detailed view of His Majesty's Government regarding this frontier question.

4. I have considered these points and I now wish you to inform the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply, that my one wish is to learn his Government's desiderata in order that I may consider how far His Majesty's Government can profitably afford them their support.

I am, &c.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

## No. 826

*Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

*No. 1502 Telegraphic [146299/150/34]*

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1919

Your telegram No. 1899<sup>1</sup> will enable me to repeat if need be general view of our Persian policy expressed in my telegram No. 1442.<sup>2</sup> But this view seems to me in conflict with policy advocated in latter part of Sir P. Cox's telegram to Your Lordship, No. 673,<sup>3</sup> October 15th [sic].

I will explain this further by letter.<sup>4</sup>

I should like to be able to contradict impression here that if Persian Government desired to employ individual Americans in their service it would not be permitted. Statement in Your Lordship's telegram that if Persian Government desired to do this with our approval there is no obstacle does not meet the point. Indeed if I repeated it here, it would confirm impression that we treat Persia as a Protectorate.

<sup>1</sup> No. 824.

<sup>2</sup> No. 813.

<sup>3</sup> No. 812.

<sup>4</sup> No such letter has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

Question is not one of letter of Anglo-Persian Agreement but of policy that is behind it and of how it will be worked and I fear that when Mr. Engert gets to American Legation at Teheran and becomes acquainted with Sir P. Cox's views he will report that your policy is one of virtual Protectorate of Persia and exclusion of United States influence or co-operation.

I think United States influence in Persia is one of<sup>s</sup> foreign influence that would be entirely without danger to Indian frontier and most helpful in opposing foreign aggression in Persia. I agree that at present there is no chance of obtaining co-operation from United States Government but that makes it none the less inadvisable that we should incur odium of appearing to desire to exclude it even in mild form of employment of individual Americans in Persia.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> This word should probably be deleted.

<sup>6</sup> Lord Curzon minuted on this telegram as follows:

'Nothing that we can say or do will give satisfaction to Lord Grey & I propose to desist from the attempt. He was not sent to America with a view to making trouble about the Persian agreement. But he seems to regard that as his main preoccupation. C. 30/10.'

### No. 827

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 571 Telegraphic [146328/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 27, 1919

Shah's State visit takes place October 31st. He crosses on board 'Royal Yacht' and will be met at Dover by Pris[n]ce Albert. The Shah, Princes Nosret es Saltaneh and Firony [Firouz] are guests of the King at Buckingham Palace. The Shah will be entertained at Guildhall and presented with an address of welcome in a gold box on November 1st, visit Windsor November 2nd, Aldershot November 3rd and leaves for Manchester November 4th. Edinburgh and Rosyth November 6th and 7th.

He will return to France November 8th.

### No. 828

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 574 Telegraphic [145518/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 29, 1919

Your telegram No. 668<sup>1</sup> of 1st October: Persian Cossack Division.

War Office agree with you as to Starosselsky's motives, and consider that division should be kept split into detachments as at present.

Persian Prime Minister's proposals for strong mixed detachment at Tabriz are regarded as useless, as transference and upkeep of detachment as suggested by G.O.C. Mesopotamia (see his telegram No. 7548<sup>2</sup> of 4th October), which

<sup>1</sup> No. 800.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

was to be sent from Batoum, would conflict with policy of His Majesty's Government.

Past history of South Persia Rifles precludes any possibility of their employment in Azerbaijan.

It is considered that British forces at Kazvin, reinforced as reported in G.O.C. Mesopotamia's telegram No. 7536<sup>2</sup> of 4th October, are capable of dealing with any eventuality.

The War Office hope that the Cossack Division will be disbanded at the earliest opportunity, but this cannot be done till the Military Commission has assembled.

I concur generally in the above views.

Sent to India.

No. 829

*Mr. Oliphant to M. Sabline<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 143404/ME. 58 [143404/1015/58]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 29, 1919

Dear Monsieur Sabline:—

We have heard recently from Tehran<sup>2</sup> that the Persian Government contemplate receiving a representative of the Azarbajian [*sic*] Government, the reason alleged for this step being that they hope thereby to put a stop to the discrimination which they state is being exercised against Persian subjects and interests at Baku and elsewhere and generally to prevent rebellious Persian tribes deriving encouragement from Azerbaijan.

In discussing the Persian proposal with Sir P. Cox the Russian Chargé d'Affaires stated that if Persia allowed herself to be coerced by the maltreatment of her nationals into compliance with the Azerbaijan demands it would be easy for General Denikin to adopt the same course in order to enforce his wishes on the Persian Government. I need scarcely point out to you what embarrassment a threat of this description, if it were actually made, would cause to the friends of General Denikin and the well wishers of Russia in this country and I am asked by Lord Curzon to invite you to be so good as to bring the matter privately and in the most friendly way to the notice of Monsieur <sup>3</sup> and to point out to him the danger of his subordinate in Persia adopting any such minatory attitude with the Persian Government.

L. OLIPHANT

<sup>1</sup> Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in the interests of the administration of Admiral Kolchak.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 820.

<sup>3</sup> Omission in filed copy of original. The reference was to M. Sazonov.

No. 830

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)*

*No. 708 Telegraphic [147547/842/34]*

Your telegram No. 557.<sup>1</sup>

TEHRAN, October 31, 1919

Colonel Wallace recently sounded Sarem-ed-Dowleh privately as to possibility of his suspended negotiations<sup>2</sup> being reopened on modified basis. The latter advised Wallace to drop other three desiderata of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and submit proposal for a single railway project without mining rights. Wallace accordingly gave Sarem-ed-Dowleh a few days ago a skeleton proposal for a line joining Mohammerah, Khorremabad, Makhzen, Ker-manshah, Hamadan, and Enzeli, and was informed that it would be put before Cabinet at an early date. If proposal were favourably received by Cabinet in principle Wallace intended to ask his directors for authority to go through with it after consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Evening before last Prime Minister, who has been laid up for a fortnight with facial neuralgia, asked me to see him on general business. In the course of the interview he asked if I had any special news from you, and I informed him roughly of purport of your telegram No. 557<sup>1</sup> and asked if he had received anything on the subject from Persian Minist(er) for Foreign Affairs. He said he had not yet but he no doubt would. I informed him that you had promised to keep me informed of developments and would doubtless instruct me if any action was needed here. Last night, October 30th, Wallace came in to tell me that Sarem-ed-Dowleh had just informed him verbally that his project had been discussed in Cabinet Council yesterday, had been accepted in principle and that he could inform his directors accordingly.

I did not for a moment expect this and fear it may clash with your negotiations with Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs but there is no doubt that I (sic) will accept any modification of alignment which His Majesty's Government may advise.

<sup>1</sup> No. 823.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Wallace (cf. No. 757, note 4) had recently been in negotiation with the Persian Government concerning railway concessions.

No. 831

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [147547/842/34]*

TEHRAN, October 31, 1919

My telegram No. 708<sup>2</sup> of October 31.

I hesitate to say it officially and could not of course prove ? it but only explanation of precipitate action of Cabinet is that they were determined not to lose pickings obtained from Wallace, hereby allowing<sup>3</sup> bargain to be

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> No. 830.

<sup>3</sup> It appears that this passage should read '... from Wallace here by allowing', &c.

concluded at a loss to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs at your end. In my interview with Prime Minister the (? evening) before last he displayed no disapproval of Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversations with you and I came away in full understanding he would await a communication from Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 832

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 236 [147145/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1919

Sir,

The French Ambassador called at this Department on October 27th and read to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst a despatch which he had just received from his Government, offering excuses for the non-publication in France of the complete text of the speech which I made on September 18th on the occasion of the dinner given to His Highness Nosret-ed-Dowleh.

Monsieur Paul Cambon also read at this interview telegrams which had been despatched to Monsieur Bonin, instructing him to co-operate with you closely and directing that no unfavourable comments on the Anglo-Persian Agreement should be allowed.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 833

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 577 Telegraphic [143239/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1919

My Despatch No. 194<sup>1</sup> of 24th September. Penultimate paragraph. Admiralty state that there are at present in this country plenty of officers and men who could be spared from Royal Navy and be usefully employed in consolidating British position in Persia, by assisting in development of Persian Marine both Government and mercantile.

It would be well to ascertain views of Persian Government and you should report what officers and men would be required as a nucleus and on what terms. We could then call for volunteers.

My telegram No. 518<sup>2</sup> of 2nd October.

Has *Parabonia* been handed over to Persian Government in accordance with my request?<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 790.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram Lord Curzon had informed Sir P. Cox that he had requested the War Office to send instructions for the transfer of the vessel *Parabonia* to the Persian Government.

<sup>3</sup> In Tehran telegram No. 714 of November 3, 1919 (received November 6), Sir P. Cox replied that this ship was 'duly delivered to Persian Government'.

No. 834

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 3)*

*No. 715 Telegraphic [148244/150/34]*

TEHRAN, November 3, 1919

Your telegram No. 577.<sup>1</sup> Second paragraph.

See my telegram No. 580<sup>2</sup> of August 28th. Before communicating with Cabinet I should be glad to learn for certain whether sphere of Persian Government's marine in contemplation would include Caspian or not.<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister is sure to ask pronouncement on this point.

<sup>1</sup> No. 833.

<sup>2</sup> No. 740.

<sup>3</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 588 of November 7, 1919, to Tehran Lord Curzon replied: 'Yes'.

No. 835

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 4)*

*No. 716 Telegraphic [148576/150/34]*

TEHRAN, November 3, 1919

Following from Malleson, begins:—

Agent who left Merv October 22nd reports

(a) Afghan Consul is busily enlisting Afghans in Bolshevik forces (local or (? Travelling) Afghans), nothing to do with Afghan troops arrived in Merv.

(b) Herat shows that Custodians<sup>1</sup> in Panjdeh are conducting an (? active) anti-British campaign and denouncing British seizure of Persia and oppression of Mahometans everywhere.

(c) (? Disunion) combined with Bolshevik and Afghan interference in Persia is common talk in Merv. Report received there from Tashkend states that Enver<sup>2</sup> who is now in Russia will at appropriate time lead all Mahometans of Russia into Persia, drive out British and establish Mahometan Communist rule in Teheran.

(d) Bolsheviks claim to have completely (? suppress)ed rising in Ferghana.

(e) All Persian news sheets and pamphlets published in (? Turkestan) are rabidly anti-British.

(f) Persian Consular Agent at Merv (one Mehr Ali) is very active on Bolshevik side and denounces anyone suspected of British sympathies.<sup>3</sup>

Addressed to Simla, repeated to Teheran, Quetta. Ends.

Is it desired that I should repeat such telegrams to you or does Foreign Office receive them through some other channel?

<sup>1</sup> The reference is uncertain but may have been to custodians of shrines: cf. No. 787, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 477, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> With reference to the foregoing Lord Curzon stated in Foreign Office telegram No. 600, of November 12, 1919, to Tehran: 'Paragraphs e and f should be brought to the notice of the Persian Government who should be pressed to recall the Consular Agent at Merv.'

No. 836

*Sir M. Findlay<sup>1</sup> (Christiania) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11)*  
No. 204 [150799/150/34]

My Lord,

CHRISTIANIA, November 4, 1919

I have the honour to report that this morning's *Morgenblad* publishes an interview with Kaikhosrow Shahrokh who is stated to be a member and 'Chief Custodian' of the Persian Parliament, Director-General of the Persian Chamber of Commerce and Director of Telephones in Teheran.

This gentlemen [*sic*] is said to have been in America on business and states that he has negotiated purchase of telephone apparatus in Sweden and paper in Norway; he has been summoned to London by the Shah and is to leave to-day.

During the interview this Persian politician is reported to have said that the Persian constitution is very democratic and that the Shah is unable to take any political action without the consent of the Parliament; that, owing to public opinion, the Upper House will probably be deprived of most of its powers; that the Anglo-Persian Treaty had been concluded by the Government without the approval of Parliament and was consequently, as yet, not legally valid. As regards relations with foreign countries he said that, previous to the war, Persians had hated the Russians very bitterly; at first their sympathies had been with Germany, not because they loved the Germans or knew much about them, but because they were fighting Russia. In future Persia hoped to be on friendly terms with all the Powers with whom they had intercourse. The Persian Government, he said, hoped to continue to employ Swedish officers in the gendarmerie.

I have, &c.  
M. DE C. FINDLAY

<sup>1</sup> Sir M. Findlay was H.M. Minister at Christiania (Oslo).

No. 837

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11)*  
No. 719 Telegraphic [150609/150/34]

TEHRAN, November 6, 1919

Governor-General of Khorassan reports to Persian Government that General Malleson has visited him and given him following appreciation of situation:—

Bolshevik Afghans, Caucasus Government, and Enver party of Young Turks have entered into an offensive and defensive agreement and contemplate early invasion of Khorassan.<sup>1</sup> Weakness of Admiral Koltchak has

<sup>1</sup> With reference to this passage Sir P. Cox stated in Tehran telegram No. 756 of November 27, 1919 (received December 4): 'Malleson (? asks me) to explain he does not anticipate any concerted attack at an early date. Governor General must have misunderstood him.'

enabled them to obtain reinforcements via Orenburg, and they count upon seizing Krasnovodsk and obtaining control over the Caspian.

They then contemplate invading Khorassan and effecting junction by landing between Persian Turkestan, southern shore of the Caspian and Persian Azerbaijan. Khorassan is consequently in imminent danger. English are being reinforced but in any case our hold of particular point is most seriously threatened. Persian troops also need reinforcing in order to maintain internal order and garrison (?) open places. Governor-General can do nothing more than he is doing on his present budget, and asks for the necessary increase of funds.

End of Governor-General's telegram.

Prime Minister, in communicating the above to me, represents first that reason, or at any rate excuse, made for hostile intentions of Bolsheviks, &c., towards Persia is latter's agreement with Great Britain, anxiety secondly that danger which threatens is no less a menace to British interests than to Persian. Persian Government would be bankrupt now but for the assistance received from His Majesty's Government, which just keeps it going, and cannot possibly stand any further expenditure in Khorassan.

He hopes, therefore, that, in virtue of agreement, His Majesty's Government will, as a war measure, give such financial assistance as may be necessary.

Sent to India.

### No. 838

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 586 Telegraphic [147547/842/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 6, 1919

Your telegram No. 708<sup>1</sup> of 31st October: Railways.

Matter has been mentioned to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who admitted having failed to keep Vossugh-ed-Dowleh fully informed of previous discussions here. He had, however, since done so.

His Highness suggested that you should inform Prime Minister that, in view of the broad principles laid down in London after careful consideration and discussion of whole problem of railway construction in real interests of Persia herself and in view of impending further discussion here, the negotiations of Tehran with Colonel Wallace should be at once suspended.

You should act accordingly.

As yet, no communication has been received from the Colonel's principals here.

<sup>1</sup> No. 830.

No. 839

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)*

*No. 726 Telegraphic [150297/842/34]*

TEHRAN, November 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 586.<sup>1</sup>

I will act as directed. Meanwhile I have been informed that on receipt of Minister for Foreign Affairs' telegram Prime Minister replied that proposals made by Wallace and those made to Minister for Foreign Affairs could be compared and considered and most favourable scheme accepted. Prime Minister considers it important from Persian point of view that line from Mohammerah should be started forthwith as well as one from our railhead.

<sup>1</sup> No. 838.

No. 840

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 10)*

*No. 727 Telegraphic [150586/150/34]*

TEHRAN, November 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 535, last sentence.<sup>1</sup>

Passage quoted from note of United States Ambassador is not a translation of any portion of article in question, but merely a (? mislead)ing summary. Writer apropos of references to United States. . .<sup>2</sup> article is very long (? one) written in support of agreement. Writer starts by saying that it was the express opinion of Persian Parliament that foreign advisers were necessary and it was only question of where they were to be got. Recourse to some first-class Power was necessary because it was not only advisers but some millions of money that were wanted. Writer then refers to Russia, Germany, Turkey, Italy, France, and America (? in their) turn and explains why recourse to none of them was practicable.

Referring to France he says that country never had any political interests in Persia and after their alliance with Russia their sympathetic interest became subsequently Russia's wishes and convenience and they took no pains even to keep here advisers whom they had already got such as Bizot.

Writer refers to America in two passages. Following is first, begins: Just as Government of United States emitted sentiments of philanthropy and benevolence towards all the nations of the earth in a specious form of words so also did she express them towards Persia. Nevertheless when Russia presented an ultimatum to Persia demanding Schuster's expulsion, although

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 535 of October 13, 1919, to Tehran (not printed) had summarized the contents of document No. 808 and had, in particular, repeated the quotation from the *Raad*, as given by the American Ambassador (beginning 'America, the only Government' and ending 'same position as Egypt'). The last sentence of the telegram asked Sir P. Cox for 'a correct translation of the paragraph in the *Raad*'.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

entire Persian nation with one mind and voice urged his retention and appealed to whole world for it yet considerations of high international politics, interests of United States, principle of Monroe doctrine and lastly exigencies of secret diplomacy did not permit Government of Washington to utter one word or move one step to assist Persia.

What had America, France, Great Britain, and Italy to offer us? Resignation to a mandatory arrangement. There was no seat for us at (Peace) Conference but complete and unfriendly silence in regard to Persia for reason that surface of globe had been divided into three (zone)s and Persia fell into that of Great Britain. Her destiny was thus settled (? here). We were sacrificed to greater and more important interests. Intellects of weak cannot properly interpret thoughts of mighty and unfortunately we misinterpreted President Wilson's fourteen points. Egypt too was misled by them. She revolted to gain complete independence but after great deal of bloodshed (? first) announcement made in Cairo came from American representative and was to the effect that President Wilson did not consider British control of Egypt inconsistent with his fourteen points.

In these circumstances nothing remained for us Persians (? but) to accept defence duly arranged and if present Government had not taken prompt measures in connection with the general situation in East to secure British help we should have had no way of escape. Even our membership of League of Nations would have been problematical. None paid attention to us except the power whose own position in the East obliged it to take Persia into consideration. We criticised action of Peace Conference, we protested against acts of President Wilson and diplomatists, we knew final decisions rested with the Council in Paris which debated question in private conclave, we knew what would be world's destiny with Russia and Germany's non-existence, with Turkey wiped out and Italy without any interests. French and Americans for their own profit and interests had sold or surrendered portions of universe. In view of these international phenomena, and this complicated situation, what alternative had we?

End of first passage.

Later on with reference to proceedings of Mushaver and his party he writes

Falling under influence of President Wilson's 14 fallacious points and misled by his pious words of justice and (? in that case) delay became presumptuous (? and loss of) confidence.

Second passage ends.

In a later article on 11th September (? written) in reply to United States Minister's communiqué, writer amplifies his former statements and *inter alia* enquires:

1. If America was most anxious of help of Persian delegation and yet was quite (? unable to) get it a hearing at Conference, interpolation of her help did not amount to much.

2. If Persia had made a similar agreement with some other power and

result had been an ultimatum from Great Britain would America have gone to war for sake of Persia?

I am sending by next bag article (? enclosed) in . . .<sup>2</sup>

No. 841

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 592 Telegraphic [150547/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 8, 1919

Lord Grey's telegram No. 1442<sup>1</sup> (of October 10th).

Mr. Engert who arrived recently in this country but whose appearance in Persia will be delayed by a halt at Constantinople has been to see me and promised after my exposition of the Anglo-Persian Agreement to lend every possible assistance to us in carrying it out.

When he pressed me about American appointments I replied that if a good American professor for instance was recommended to us by the Persian Government for some employment for which he had exceptional qualifications, we should of course not object.

Repeated to Washington No. 2009.

<sup>1</sup> No. 813.

No. 842

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11)*

*No. 732 Telegraphic [150610/150/34]*

TEHRAN, November 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 554.<sup>1</sup>

Financial Adviser.

Presuming that contract<sup>2</sup> will be arranged before his start I trust terms will be telegraphed before it is concluded. It will be (? understood) how vitally important it is that he should have adequate powers. We call him 'adviser' but for Financial Representative purely advisory powers will obviously not suffice.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram of October 20, 1919, to Tehran stated that H.M. Treasury had recommended Mr. Armitage Smith, Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, for the post of Financial Adviser to the Persian Government.

<sup>2</sup> The Financial Adviser's contract of engagement.

No. 843

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 599 Telegraphic [150609/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1919

Your telegram No. 719<sup>1</sup> (of November 6th).

(Defence of Khorassan.)

My telegram No. 347<sup>2</sup> (of June 20th) authorised the advance of 20,000 tomans a month for the defence of Khorassan.

Please say what further sum is necessary to meet present Bolshevik menace.

<sup>1</sup> No. 837.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

No. 844

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 601 Telegraphic [151339/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1919

I understand that Sarem-ed-Dowleh may be appointed Governor General of Tabriz and that the Shah has authorised the Prime Minister to appoint him. Please report whether this takes place. You might then find an opportunity to impress upon Prime Minister that Sarem's successor as Minister of Finance should be most carefully chosen in view of the advent of a British Adviser.

*Confidential.*

The above is sent with the knowledge and at the request of Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs who is now in London, but who does not wish to combat on any *personal* grounds Prime Minister's selection of Sarem-ed-Dowleh's successor.

No. 845

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 249 [152743/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 13, 1919

Sir,

This afternoon the Persian Foreign Minister renewed his visits to me, which had been suspended during his engagements with the Shah. I will briefly enumerate the points which he raised.

His Highness somewhat startled me by producing a map<sup>1</sup>—with an accompanying typed explanation<sup>2</sup>—on which were drawn the particular rectifications of frontier for which his Government desired to press at the Peace Conference, and with regard to which he sought our backing: for I discovered that two, at least, of these rectifications involved very considerable

<sup>1</sup> Not printed: see below.

<sup>2</sup> No. 846.

and, as it appeared to me, impracticable extensions of Persian territory at the expense of neighbours who would not be at all likely to acquiesce in the change.

The first proposal was for the annexation of a considerable tract of Kurdish territory lying across the Turco-Persian frontier to the west of Lake Urmia, and eating right into the heart of the Kurdish country.

I remarked that, as far as I remembered, this region had been for centuries in Turkish occupation. Indeed, I could not remember that the greater part of it had in modern times ever been Persian at all. The proposed new frontier went far beyond the boundary line between Persia and Turkey which had been demarcated only a short time before the beginning of the war.

The Minister explained that this region was inhabited by Kurds, who were in the habit of moving across the present frontier at certain seasons of the year.

I said that I would look into the matter, but I did not hold out to his Highness any hopes whatever that such a proposal could be profitably advanced.

The second proposed extension covered a considerable area to the north of the River Aras (Araxes), and was meant to include in the Persian dominions a block of territory extending from the neighbourhood of Erivan on the west to the Caspian Sea south of Baku on the east. The Minister defended this change on the ground that it would include the lands in the watershed of the River Aras.

In this case, as in the former, I hinted that such a demand might not be at all favourably received by the neighbours of Persia on that side.

The third rectification, about which his Highness did not say anything, but which on the map appears to be equally indefensible, involved the pushing out of the Persian frontier of Khorasan for a considerable distance in the direction of Merv and the River Murghab.

If these are the kind of demands that the Persian Government expect us to put forward or to secure on their behalf, I am afraid that they will be exposed to very considerable disappointment.

His Highness passed on to discuss the question of railways. He asked me to give an opinion as to the form of arrangement which it would be best for the Persian Government to favour, involving as it does the respective parts to be played in the transaction by the Persian Government on the one side and the constructing company on the other.

I declined to give a reply. I said that in India we had different railway systems. Some railways were constructed and owned by the State. Some were constructed by companies and run by the State. Some were both constructed and run by companies. I had found that different systems were suited to different conditions, and their existence side by side was sometimes useful as a means of comparison and as a test of administrative efficiency. I thought it might well be that a uniform system for any future railways that might be built in Persia would not be the best for the country, and that a better plan would be that each case should be judged on its merits.

When his Highness asked me what was the system which I would advise for the first railway which it was proposed to construct, I said that I should prefer to examine the various alternatives before offering an opinion on the subject.

In connection with railways, the Minister informed me that, during the conversations in Paris in which he had sought to remove the suspicions of M. Berthelot with regard to the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and in which he had asked the French what it was that they either complained of or desired in regard to Persia, M. Berthelot had indicated to him that a time might come when the French would be very much interested in a line running from Tabreez to Tehran, and then across the north of Persia to Meshed, and on through Central Asia to China.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, M. Berthelot had hinted not obscurely that the French might before long be found projecting a line running through the northern parts of Asia Minor from the Bosphorus towards Erzerum, and approaching the Persian border from that side. When this happened, they might like to construct a line to Tabreez and thence in the direction of the Persian capital.

I told the Minister that these ambitious designs on the part of our French neighbours did not altogether surprise me, as they seemed to fit in very accurately with what I conceived to be their scheme of political expansion in the East, but I thought that his Government would be ill-advised to pay any attention to such projects for the time being, and that they had much better proceed with the more modest plan of the railways that were required in the interests, not of foreign countries, but of Persia herself.

The third topic of our conversation related to the impending danger from the Bolshevik forces and agencies to the north and north-east of Khorasan.

His Highness said that his Government were very much agitated at the serious character of this menace, and they wished to know what we could do to assist in repelling it.

I replied that we also realised the gravity of the situation, not as it actually existed, but as it might develop, and we were looking carefully into the matter. Meanwhile, we had authorised you to advance up to 20,000 tomans monthly for the defence of Khorasan, and we had asked you to advise us as to any other steps to be taken to help the Persian Government should the emergency become acute. Besides this, from our own point of view we were considering the possible reinforcement of General Malleson's force, and we would do everything in our power to cope with the situation before it became really dangerous.

The Minister raised a small point about damages claimed by British and other foreign subjects from the Persian Government owing to loss or detriment to property in Persia suffered during the war. He implored the British Government to desist from these claims, which the Persian Government had no means to meet.

I said that the matter was one with which I could not deal myself. I should have to ask the Department to examine it.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 398.

His Highness told me that he proposed to spend another two months or more in Europe, in order to be present when the Peace Conference took up the question of Turkey. He then hoped to put forward—and he trusted that he would have our assistance in this—the claims of Persia.

While in Paris he had had correspondence with the Azerbaijan Delegation, who had been lingering there for some time, and he handed to me a paper which represented their political desires.<sup>4</sup>

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>4</sup> See Enclosure in No. 846.

### No. 846

#### *Persian Memorandum<sup>1</sup>*

[152744/150/34]

Les réclamations territoriales de la Perse et les rectifications de frontières qu'elle demande sont basées sur les arguments et les raisonnements suivants:

1. Occupations antérieures.
2. Considérations militaires et géographiques.
3. Prise en considération de la situation des tribus habitant les districts des frontières.
4. Aspirations des habitants à s'unir à la Perse par suite de leurs attachements ethnographiques et historiques, en même temps que par la communauté de religion, de mœurs et de langue.

La plupart des régions avoisinant les frontières actuelles de la Perse faisaient, dans un passé proche ou lointain, partie du territoire persan. Ce ne fut généralement que par suite de quelques abus de force tels que guerre, violations de frontières, &c., qu'elles ont été arrachées à la Perse.

Cependant, étant donné que le Gouvernement Impérial persan n'a nullement des visées d'agrandissement territorial, et qu'il ne poursuit que le but de rectifier ses lignes frontières, et vu qu'il n'entend nullement faire valoir des réclamations de nature à créer des difficultés aux autres Puissances et à lui-même, il réduit ses revendications à leur expression la plus simple. Ainsi, il juge à propos d'analyser en résumé ses vues de la manière suivante:

A l'ouest, le Gouvernement persan réclame une languette de terre qui sera souvent de pâturages aux bestiaux des nomades persans, qui, dans les différentes saisons, séjournent en deçà et au delà de nos frontières. L'annexion de cette languette de terre à la Perse porte en quelque sorte les frontières occidentales de la Perse à ses limites naturelles. D'autre part, il est à noter que ladite languette de terre est arrosée par les eaux des montagnes persanes et qu'elle est, par la nature de son sol et les mœurs de ses habitants, comme la partie intégrante de la Perse. L'annexion de ce liséré de terre à la

<sup>1</sup> This undated memorandum was handed to Lord Curzon by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 13, 1919: see No. 845.

Perse aura encore un autre avantage: elle mettra fin aux altercations qui pourraient faire naître des difficultés entre la Perse et son voisin, altercations qui se produisent toujours par suite de violations de frontières et de ses suites commises par les nomades.

Au nord, le Gouvernement persan se borne à demander une petite partie d'Érivan et la région de Nakhdjavan et ses environs jusqu'à l'adjonction de la rivière Kor à Arax, de sorte que le territoire de Moghan soit annexé à la Perse. Les habitants de cette région sont presque tous musulmans et ont exprimé, plus d'une fois, leur désir de se réunir à la Perse. D'ailleurs, sans la région susindiquée les frontières d'Azerbaïdjan persan n'auront aucune sécurité et pourraient, par suite des événements éventuelles d'au delà d'Arax, être exposés à toutes sortes de dangers. Du côté de Turkestan, la frontière commencera comme actuellement de l'embouchure d'Atrak et suivra le cours de ce fleuve. Ainsi, quelques régions qui ont été au fur et à mesure arrachées à la Perse par le Gouvernement tsariste russe seront annexées à la province d'Astrabad et de Khorassan. Après avoir suivi le lit d'Atrak dans une certaine distance, la ligne frontière se dirigerait presque directement sur Merv, de sorte que cette ville soit enclavée dans le territoire persan. De là, elle suivra le cours de la rivière Morghab jusqu'à la frontière septentrionale d'Afghanistan. L'annexion de cette région à la Perse mettra fin aux difficultés qu'éprouvait le Khorassan par suite du manque d'eau et garantira cette province des incursions des Turkomans. Les habitants de cette région, Persans durant des siècles, ont toujours exprimé leur désir de se réunir à la mère-partie [sic].

Vers l'est du Khorassan, les frontières persanes ne sont pas sujettes à des changements notables. Seulement étant donné que les frontières perso-afghanes n'ont pas été délimitées avec une exactitude rigoureuse et que des bornes n'y ont pas été encore érigées, les Afghans se sont permis sur certains points de petites violations frontières à notre détriment. Ainsi, le Gouvernement persan juge à propos d'organiser une commission à l'effet de délimiter les frontières persanes avec l'Afghanistan. Cette commission devra naturellement se rendre sur les frontières pour y ériger des bornes et s'entendre sur place avec les Afghans pour mettre fin à des violations illégales faites sur notre territoire.

En ce qui concerne Sistan, la ligne frontière actuelle, tracée en 1904, est dénuée de toute logique. En effet, le territoire situé en deçà de Hirmend était, jusqu'à la date précitée, regardé comme étant persan et occupé par la Perse. Ce territoire a cessé en 1904 à faire partie de la Perse. Ainsi, il est juste que le cours de Hirmend soit, jusqu'à Bandé-Kamalkhan, la frontière sistano-afghane. De Bandé-Kamalkhan, la frontière des deux pays devrait se prolonger en ligne droite jusqu'à Kouhé Malek Siah. Par ce qui précède, considérant qu'un arrangement définitif n'est pas encore intervenu quant au partage des eaux de Hirmend entre la Perse et l'Afghanistan, ce qui met, par suite du manque d'eau en été, une grande partie de terrains de Sistan en jachère; considérant également qu'il est juste et équitable que la moitié des eaux dudit fleuve arrose Sistan et que l'autre moitié le territoire d'Afghanistan,

le Gouvernement persan, afin de faire étendre les frontières de Sistan à ses limites naturelles et de faire rendre à cette province les terrains perdus à l'occasion de la dernière délimitation, et pour mettre fin aux difficultés qui s'ensuivent du partage des eaux du Hirmend, juge indispensable qu'à partir de Bandé-Sistan jusqu'à Bandé-Kamalkhan, la frontière de Sistan soit le cours de Hirmend et de Bandé-Kamalkhan une ligne directe aboutissant au Kouhé-Malek Siah.

Il est à noter que même dans ce cas, une grande partie de territoire occupé par la Perse avant la délimitation susindiquée restera aux Afghans.

Par ce qui précède, les lignes frontières de la Perse devront être tracées de la manière suivante:

A l'ouest, la frontière devrait suivre la crête de Djabal Kohnarig jusqu'à la vallée de la rivière Naft. Après avoir coupé ladite rivière il se portera à la hauteur des coteaux les plus proches des montagnes de Baghtchah qui se trouvent dans la plaine de Dar Khorma et suivra la crête de la montagne en question et passera à l'ouest des monts du Baghtcheh-Koutchek pour atteindre par le coteau occidental de Tangé Chafi Khan à la rivière Alvand. A l'est de la colline de Hatammil, la ligne frontière sera dirigée à la droite de ladite rivière et sera parvenu à Mala Mardazama, les sommets des montagnes de Cotereh, Agdag, les monts de Ghachga Sirvani et Tangheh Ghounaghoun. De là, elle tombera à la rivière Sirvan et suivra le cours de cette rivière jusqu'au mi-chemin entre le bourg Meydan et le Ghalayé Tabizan, où il coupera cette rivière et aboutira à la frontière de Kurdistan. En cet endroit il passera à l'ouest des cantons Chimran, Tavilah, Biarah, et Alabtchah, qui seront abandonnés à la Perse. Ainsi, du Ghalayé Tabizan, la ligne frontière se portera sur Ségermédag et suivra la ligne du partage des eaux de cette montagne de sorte que Souleimanieh, Goy-Sandjagh, Nowtchah, Bradust et enfin le canton d'Abaghah seront réunis à la Perse. Tout en suivant la crête de la montagne préરappelée, elle passera le mont Schouan en mettant Goy-Sandjagh à l'est et Arbel à l'ouest, atteindra le mont Safandagh et se joindra au cours de la rivière Darab-Roud pour aboutir au Zab supérieur. Quelques parassangs<sup>2</sup> plus loin vers le nord, elle atteindra la crête de Barat-Dagh, suivra cette crête et se portera dans la direction de Sourdag, Prisdagh vers le nord-ouest pour passer le mont Kourki et atteindre le sommet de Koukou Boland. De là, elle se dirigera sur le mont Tchokhdagheh, en abandonnant Salkhaneh à la Perse, elle traversera le sommet du mont Galadizeah en mettant la plaine et Ghazayé Mahmoudieh ainsi que Sarah sur le territoire persan, et aboutira dans les environs d'Avad-jigh à la borne No. 123 de la frontière actuelle. De ce point jusqu'à mont Ararat, les lignes frontières ne subiront aucun changement.

Du Caucase, la ligne frontière partira du Grand Ararat, suivra la crête des montagnes pour mettre le district de Charour en deçà de la frontière persane. Elle se dirigera ensuite en avant par la crête des montagnes Daralagueuse et Gharabagh, de sorte que tout le bassin du fleuve Arax sera annexé à la Perse.

<sup>2</sup> Persian unit of measurement, approximately 3½ miles.

Du village Afatlou où va commencer la plaine elle se portera directement au village Gragoyoun, situé sur le confluent d'Arax et la rivière Kor, et suivra cette rivière jusqu'à la mer Caspienne le cours du fleuve.

Du côté du Turkistan, la frontière n'est d'abord que le lit réel d'Atrak. A la source de ce fleuve elle suivra la frontière actuelle jusqu'au mont Dochakh et, en contournant le village Firouzah elle se portera directement à Bayramali, de sorte que la ville de Merv restera persane. De là, elle atteindra avec la rivière de Morghab la frontière d'Afghanistan. A part les rectifications de frontières entre le Khorassan et le Turkestan, le Gouvernement persan juge à propos d'attirer l'attention sur les protocoles imposées à la Perse par les Russes, protocoles ayant trait au partage des eaux et qui exposent les habitants des frontières en question à de grandes difficultés. Il espère que lesdits protocoles seront soumis à de nouvelles études et que cette question soit solutionnée d'une manière équitable et juste.

#### ENCLOSURE IN No. 846

1. L'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase, dans les limites indiquées dans les revendications présentées par la Délégation azerbaïdjaniennes à la Conférence de la Paix et dans les cartes annexées à ces mémoires, se sépare une fois pour toutes de la Russie, quelle que soit la forme du Gouvernement qui s'établira en Russie.

2. La République azerbaïdjaniennes, qui existe depuis le 28 mai 1918, sera reconnue comme République démocratique libre et indépendante, avec Bakou pour capitale, un Président électif et un Parlement agissant selon les lois organiques, votées par l'Assemblée constituante de l'Azerbaïdjan, qui est sur le point d'être convoquée par le Gouvernement de l'Azerbaïdjan et élue par le suffrage universel.

3. La République démocratique de l'Azerbaïdjan établit avec son voisin l'Empire de la Perse un lien politico-économique sous la forme de confédération dont les bases et la forme, de même que les moyens de réalisation seront élaborés et discutés d'un commun accord par les Gouvernements persan et azerbaïdjaniens et devront être soumis à l'approbation des Parlements de l'un et de l'autre pays. Mais elle déclare d'ores et déjà que les relations extérieures des deux États seront unifiées.

4. Pour la réalisation des buts ci-dessus indiqués (points 1 et 2), la République azerbaïdjaniennes désire le concours réel de la Grande-Bretagne pour faire reconnaître et maintenir son indépendance, pour assurer contre toute atteinte son intégrité, ainsi que pour développer ses forces politiques, économiques, culturelles et militaires, concours pareils à ceux qui sont accordés à la Perse.<sup>3</sup>

P.S.—Ces quatre points sont étroitement liés ensemble et devront être communiqués par la Délégation azerbaïdjaniennes à qui de droit.

<sup>3</sup> For the above four points cf. Volume III, No. 615.

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 243 [151339/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called here on the 10th instant and said that the Shah had been exceedingly gratified by his State visit to London and his subsequent provincial tour,<sup>1</sup> and especially by the admirable arrangements made at Rosyth, where His Majesty inspected the Home Fleet under Admiral Sir Charles Madden.

2. Nosret-ed-Dowleh stated that the Persian Prime Minister had agreed to the appointment of Mr. Armitage-Smith as financial adviser, but had suggested at the same time that, while the contract should be signed here, main questions as to his duties, position, &c., should be discussed and settled in consultation with, and through, your intermediary<sup>2</sup> in Teheran, and had suggested that for this purpose a clause should be inserted in the contract to the effect that an annex would be added thereto after the financial adviser's arrival in Teheran. Nosret-ed-Dowleh had, at first sight, seen no objection to this course, but on reflection, thought it preferable that the big lines of the contract should be settled here, as thus it ought to be possible to avoid on Mr. Armitage-Smith's arrival in Teheran an atmosphere of barter, bickering, and intrigue, which might be inevitable unless his position had previously been properly defined.

His Highness was told that, in the view of the Foreign Office, it was beyond all question right that matters should be settled here and not left to local intrigue in Teheran, where, if Mr. Armitage-Smith, and possibly a new Minister of Finance, had to discuss matters through the intermediary of interpreters, endless intrigue and trouble might begin from the outset.

3. His Highness explained at some length the differences which had arisen between the Prime Minister and Saram-ed-Dowleh. Vossugh-ed-Dowleh had sent various telegrams recently, stating that it was impossible to allow him to remain as Minister of Finance, and proposing to send him to Tabriz: the Shah, being somewhat frightened of this prominent member of the Zil-e-Sultan's family, had opposed it until just before leaving England, when His Majesty, after embarking on board the steamer at Dover, had agreed; and Firuz Mirza was telegraphing accordingly to the Prime Minister. He would

<sup>1</sup> His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Calais had reported in Calais despatch No. 23 of November 10, 1919 (received November 12) that he had had a conversation with the Shah of Persia on his return from England on November 8. The Shah had 'expressed in exceedingly pleasant terms his appreciation of the manner in which he had been received and made welcome in England and that [sic] he would never forget his visit and the kindness bestowed upon him.'

<sup>2</sup> The filed text of this despatch here ends, the remainder of the despatch being supplied from Confidential Print. This printed text was based textually upon Mr. Oliphant's note of the conversation entered upon the same file.

he said, be grateful if I would telegraph at the same time to you, and this I did in my telegram No. 601<sup>3</sup> of the 12th instant.

It was understood that these differences of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance were of somewhat long standing, although patched up from time to time.

Vossugh-ed-Dowleh had expressed to Firuz Mirza his intention of appointing as Minister of Finance a man who can talk nothing but Persian, and who is not a successful person in his dealings with Europeans. Firuz Mirza hoped, however, that he had dissuaded the Prime Minister from this course.

4. His Highness then expressed the desire of the Persian Government to engage two civil engineers—one for railways and one for roads, electricity, &c.—to be attached to the Ministry of Public Works.

He was told that the Foreign Office would willingly endeavour to assist the Persian Government in this.<sup>4</sup>

5. Nosret-ed-Dowleh stated that recently he had received from the Persian Prime Minister a telegram about Major Moore's scheme for an air service in Persia. His Highness had, however, when previously in this country a few weeks ago, been in communication with various big firms (Holt Thomas, Vickers, &c.), and his one wish would be to enter into direct communication with some of these houses rather than to act through Major Moore, who, not being himself a man of capital, would, in his Highness's opinion, inevitably have to place his concession with some other firm. His Highness did not see the need of engaging this intermediary or middleman, and proposed to act accordingly.

6. His Highness again pressed the question of the supply of certain arms and ammunition to the Persian Government in anticipation of the findings of the Joint Military Commission.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Oliphant explained that, after his Highness's recent conversation with me, a letter had been written by my direction to the War Office mentioning in general terms that the Persian

<sup>3</sup> No. 844.

<sup>4</sup> In a note of November 11, 1919, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had requested Lord Curzon to 'faire prendre les mesures nécessaires pour provoquer, dans le plus bref délai possible, les candidatures nécessaires' for the two posts in question.

<sup>5</sup> In a note of 11 November 1919 to Lord Curzon the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had drawn attention to: '(1) L'effervescence sur les frontières de l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase, produite par le mauvais traitement de nos ressortissants, l'envoi d'émissaires au Moghan et à Ardebil, parmi les tribus Shahsevans, et par le contact des éléments de troubles d'au delà nos frontières. (2) Les difficultés que nous avons sur nos frontières du Turkestan avec les éléments bolchevistes, arrestation de notre délégué à Merv, vexations multiples envers les sujets persans, saisis de leurs biens, etc. Des événements plus récents dans ces contrées prouvent la gravité du danger qui nous menace et la nécessité pour nous de prendre d'urgence des mesures pour protéger notre territoire. (3) Les difficultés que nous avons de nous servir de notre division de Cosaque[s], vu l'état d'esprit des Russes et la politique d'intrigue et d'agitation qu'ils poursuivent en Perse.' In the light, more particularly, of these facts the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Lord Curzon to arrange for the urgent supply of a minimum quantity of arms and munitions for current needs pending the findings of the Joint Military Commission. This requested minimum included 5,000 rifles, 25 machine-guns, 4 field-guns, 20 mountain-guns, and 1,000,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition as well as other varieties of ammunition.

Government would be in need of such arms and munitions, and adding that when I should have received the actual details of what they required I would address a further letter to the War Office. His Highness appeared much pleased, and said that he would let the Foreign Office have at once a detailed list of their requirements. He pointed out that the supply of these arms and munitions in the near future might in the long run prove to be a considerable saving as well as a temporary benefit, as if they were sent up to Persia now from Mesopotamia it might save such additional subsequent transport as would be necessary were they removed from Mesopotamia in the meanwhile.

7. The question of railways was next discussed, and his Highness was informed of a recent letter from the Director of Overseas Trade, a copy of which is enclosed,<sup>6</sup> giving the names of various firms. He asked that he might receive a copy thereof, if possible, with a view to requesting me subsequently to put the Persian Government into communication with some of the firms in question, and this has been done.

8. As regards the appointment of Mushaver-ul-Mamalek to Constantinople, recent telegrams on the subject were read to him. He explained the position as follows: Mushaver not being a man of means it was essential that he should not return to Persia, where he would cause endless trouble, and his Highness therefore thought that he would do less harm in Constantinople than elsewhere, and he hoped that Mushaver might be allowed to hold the position of Ambassador (which is purely honorific). Should Constantinople become an important post once again, his Highness would not hesitate to remove him, but at present he thought that it was a judicious solution of the difficulty. The possibility of intrigue with the Young Turks, &c., there or even with the ex-Shah<sup>7</sup> was mentioned to his Highness, who, however, thought that the ex-Shah was now 'exploded' and that Mushaver would not be of much account, and he did not fear any possible intrigues with the Young Turks.

In the circumstances I am not pressing the matter further, as it is a question for the Persians themselves to settle.

9. In conclusion his Highness raised the subject of Khorassan and read the substance of various telegrams from the Governor-General, sent after conversations with General Malleson. His Highness regarded the situation in Turkestan as extremely grave and mentioned that the Bolsheviks might be advancing from Orenburg through Bokhara to the frontier in the neighbourhood of Sarakhs; the Governor-General was pressing for reinforcements, and what the Persian Government most required was financial assistance from His Majesty's Government to enable them to send the reinforcements in question.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>6</sup> Not enclosed in filed copy.

<sup>7</sup> Shah Mohammed Ali had been deposed in 1909. In 1919 the former Shah was resident in Constantinople.

No. 848

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 607 Telegraphic [151336/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 15, 1919

General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, in his telegram No. X. 7672<sup>1</sup> of November 6th to War Office reports tendency to Bolshevism and general unrest in Persian Azerbaijan and in regions bordering on Ghilan and proposes, if called upon by Persian Government through you, to lend such military assistance as the situation and forces at his disposal in Persia permit.

I have asked War Office to authorise him to act accordingly if necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

No. 849

*The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Earl Curzon*

*(Received November 18)*

*[153030/150/34]*

LONDRES, le 17 novembre 1919

Monsieur le Ministre,

Pour faire suite à l'entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec votre Excellence le 13 courant,<sup>1</sup> au sujet des rectifications de frontières demandées par mon Gouvernement, je crois devoir expliquer et développer un peu l'exposé<sup>2</sup> que je lui ai communiqué confidentiellement.

Votre Excellence pourra ainsi mieux apprécier les considérations très modérées de la Perse, et elle sera à même de formuler, en connaissance de cause, le point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à notre prochain entretien. Cet échange de vue[s] amical me permettra, d'autre part, de compter sur l'appui très précieux de votre délégué au moment où nos revendications viendront à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence.

Je me permets donc d'attirer, au début, votre bienveillante attention sur les arguments que la Perse pourrait faire valoir à l'appui d'une demande de restitution territoriale à l'ouest, au nord et du côté du Turkestan, et sur une mesure bien plus large que celle ayant servi de base pour les demandes de rectifications que votre Excellence connaît déjà.

Votre Excellence n'ignore pas, en effet, qu'en général les droits de la Perse sur ces régions reposent sur les bases suivantes:

1. Possession antérieure, et cela, pour la plupart, jusqu'à une date très récente; ce n'est qu'à la suite de guerres sanglantes ou de menaces que ces provinces ont été arrachées à la Perse;

2. Communauté de race, de tradition, de langue, de mœurs, de religion; les populations des contrées en question sont en grande majorité de race aryenne, elles parlent le persan, elles sont de religion musulmane;

<sup>1</sup> See No. 845.

<sup>2</sup> No. 846.

3. Considérations stratégiques et géographiques; toutes les fois que la Perse a pu réaliser son unité et rétablir ses limites naturelles, ces territoires ont fait partie de l'Iran;

4. Prise en considération des migrations des tribus habitant les districts des frontières; c'est en effet à la frontière que les tribus sont les plus pillardes et turbulentes; elles se transportent d'un point sur un autre pour échapper à toute juridiction. Le retour à la Perse de ces régions contribuerait, donc, à mettre fin à l'état de désordre qui règne actuellement et aux dépréciations constantes infligées par les tribus aux populations sédentaires et paisibles;

5. Manque de capacité des groupements en question de former des États indépendants. Du moment qu'aucune grande Puissance n'a l'intention d'accepter un mandat sur ces régions ou d'y maintenir des troupes considérables, il serait naturel qu'elles reviennent au pays avec lequel elles ont des attaches très fortes, ethnographiques et historiques surtout;

6. Aspiration des populations elles-mêmes, manifestée, dans plusieurs cas, de rentrer dans la mère-patrie, e.g., appels réitérés des habitants de Nakh-djevan (Caucase), de Sarakhs (Turkestan), propositions faites par certains chefs religieux et notables du Kurdistan.

Ayant esquissé les considérations générales qui militeraient en faveur du rattachement à la Perse des territoires qui lui ont été ravis, je citerai brièvement les particularités de chacune des contrées en cause. Je ferai remarquer d'abord:

(a) Que les Kurdes sont divisés en un grand nombre de tribus, toutes jalouses les unes des autres; ils ne sont point constitués en nation, et ils sont loin de pouvoir former une union politique. Leur rattachement à la Perse — dont l'influence s'est déjà exercée d'une manière efficace en rendant sédentaire et en adoucissant les mœurs d'une grande partie des Kurdes, e.g., dans le Moukri, à Gharrous et à Sehne — constituerait une solution de ce problème difficile, d'autant plus que de nombreuses colonies de Kurdes se trouvent déjà éparses sur tout le territoire persan. Jamais les Kurdes ne se soumettront à la domination arménienne; leur communauté de race, de langue, de religion avec les Persans les rapprocherait bien plus naturellement de la Perse;

(b) Les provinces caucasiennes ont été arrachées à la Perse par la Russie en 1813 et 1828, après de longues guerres et une douloureuse résistance encouragée par l'Angleterre. L'histoire démontre que ces contrées ont été le centre de la religion de Zoroastre, qu'elles ont fait partie intégrante de la Perse, et, malgré tout un siècle de séparation, elles conservent encore les traits caractéristiques de leur ancienne origine; à l'exception d'une petite minorité, les habitants sont tous musulmans, ils sont restés persans de sentiments, et professent, en plus, avec ferveur la confession chiite, qui est celle de la Perse. Nous citerons des chiffres d'après des statistiques russes défavorables à notre cause: d'une population totale de 3,271,000 habitants, 1,250,000 sont Tates d'origine purement iranienne; 1,140,000 sont Tartares également mahométans, la plupart chiites; le reste consiste en éléments hétérogènes:

Arméniens, Géorgiens, Circassiens, etc. En outre, les populations, notamment celles de Nakhdjevan, ont déjà exprimé le désir de revenir à la Perse, l'unique grande patrie musulmane qui existe indépendante à l'heure qu'il est. D'après les principes mêmes énoncés à la Conférence et consacrés par le Traité de Paix, il serait juste et équitable que ses provinces caucasiennes soient restituées à la Perse, comme l'Alsace et la Lorraine l'ont été à la France et les pays yugo-slaves à la Serbie;

(c) Les provinces transcaspiennes ont de tout temps appartenu à la Perse; elles ont été un des foyers de la nationalité persane; des Persans illustres — poètes, littérateurs, savants, philosophes — sont en grand nombre originaires de ces provinces; la langue persane y est répandue et les habitants sont en grand nombre Persans (Kurdes, Tadjiks, Persans émigrés), le reste sont des Turcomans, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont de la même origine que les tribus habitant la région d'Astrabad, province actuellement persane; ils entretiennent avec leurs compatriotes d'au delà de la frontière les relations les plus intimes et les plus suivies.

Excusez-moi, Milord, si j'abuse de vos instants, mais le récit que j'ai tâché de tracer ci-dessus le plus succinctement possible était nécessaire pour en venir aux revendications très modérées et raisonnables que nous allons soumettre à la Conférence. Je tiens à vous les présenter au préalable pour connaître votre manière de voir et pour obtenir l'aimable concours de votre Gouvernement devant le Conseil suprême, comme il a bien voulu nous le promettre.

Laissant, donc, de côté toutes les considérations historiques et ethnographiques énoncées plus haut, la Perse, consciente de la nécessité absolue pour elle de se consacrer entièrement à la réorganisation et au progrès intérieurs dans ses limites actuelles, et loin d'avoir des véléités [*sic*] d'extension de territoire, ne cherche aujourd'hui au point de vue territorial qu'à se procurer les rectifications de frontières indispensables exposées dans le mémo-randum,<sup>2</sup> accompagné d'une carte, que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de remettre, à titre privé, à votre Seigneurie.

Fort des assurances et de l'encouragement donnés par la Grande-Bretagne dans la convention récemment conclue, le Gouvernement persan eût pu être tenté à augmenter ses prétentions justifiables, mais il se borne à demander:

(a) A l'ouest, une étroite bande de territoire dont la majeure partie lui avait été prise, en dernier lieu, en vertu du Traité d'Erzeroum (1847) par les Turcs, qui menaçaient de lui enlever Mohammerah. Il est à noter que la nouvelle frontière suivra la limite naturelle fournie par une chaîne de montagne[s] qui assurera en même temps à la Perse une protection et un rempart contre les incursions des tribus venant de l'autre côté;

(b) Au nord, nous ne demandons qu'une petite partie de la province d'Érivan, et la région de Nakhdjevan et ses environs démarquée par une ligne aboutissant à la jonction de la rivière Kura avec l'Araxe; à partir de ce

point la frontière de la Perse sera la Kura jusqu'à son embouchure. Cette demande est motivée:

1. Par les appels réitérés des habitants de ces régions de faire retour à la Perse et d'obtenir sa protection. Si la Perse a hésité à envoyer des troupes à leur secours et à occuper ces districts pendant la guerre et après l'armistice, cela n'a été que par respect pour les conseils du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, qui lui promettait une solution favorable à ses justes revendications devant la Conférence de la Paix;

2. Par la nécessité absolue de réparer le tort fait à la Perse par la Russie lors de la délimitation de la frontière en 1828; au lieu de laisser à la Perse la limite naturelle convenue, c'est-à-dire les rivières Araxe et Kura, les Russes s'attribuèrent arbitrairement une grande partie des provinces de Moghan et de Talisch, partageant sans raison légitime des populations qui avaient coutume de vivre unies et en relations constantes. Ce faisant, ils suscitaient pour eux-mêmes et pour la Perse des embarras perpétuels, causés par les tribus dont les migrations de leur campement d'étaient d'un côté de la frontière à leur quartier d'hiver de l'autre côté donnaient lieu toujours à des désordres et des déprédations.

(c) Dans la Transcaspie, le Gouvernement persan se contente d'une rectification qui lui assurera une frontière plus régulière, garantira le Khorassan des incursions des Turcomans et mettra fin aux difficultés éprouvées par les cultivateurs persans du fait de l'injuste partage des eaux imposé par la Russie. Ainsi la nouvelle démarcation suivrait le lit de la rivière Atrak et aboutirait presqu'en ligne droite à Merv; de là elle suivrait le cours de la rivière Morghab jusqu'à la frontière nord de l'Afghanistan.

En conclusion, je dois ajouter que nos observations concernant la frontière de l'est et le Seistan ont été formulées uniquement dans l'intention d'y intéresser la Grande-Bretagne, qui a été plusieurs fois l'arbitre de la délimitation des frontières entre la Perse et l'Afghanistan, et que nous voudrions encore voir intervenir pour régler cette question d'une manière plus équitable et plus conforme aux intérêts de la Perse. Toutefois, si votre Excellence le juge nécessaire, nous pourrons insérer cette rubrique dans la nouvelle brochure qui sera présentée à la Conférence.

Dans l'espoir d'obtenir les bons offices et le précieux concours de votre Excellence à l'effet d'appuyer la délégation persane à la Conférence dans les justes revendications de mon pays, je me mets à sa disposition pour lui fournir les explications et les données complémentaires qu'elle pourrait juger nécessaires, et je profite, etc.

FIROUZ

No. 850

*The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Earl Curzon*

(Received November 19)

[153188/150/34]

LONDRES, le 17 novembre 1919

My Lord,

En vous remettant, lors de notre dernière entrevue, une copie des 4 articles rédigés par la délégation de l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase à Paris,<sup>1</sup> je me suis abstenu d'y ajouter mes vues personnelles, afin que votre Excellence puisse étudier ce document tel quel, et dénué de toute addition étrangère.

Pour faciliter la conversation que j'espère avoir bientôt avec votre Seigneurie à ce sujet, qui me semble présenter une importance de premier ordre pour l'intérêt commun de nos deux pays, je crois nécessaire maintenant de vous communiquer mon point de vue en la matière.

Je crois inutile d'insister sur le principe de la grande nécessité pour la Perse de suivre de très près les événements intéressant l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase et ce, non seulement à cause du voisinage immédiat, mais encore à cause des liens historiques, d'une communauté de race, de langue et de religion, qui entretiennent entre cette contrée et mon pays des relations très étroites et des points de contact très nombreux et très délicats.

Après mon entrevue avec votre Excellence, en date du 13 courant,<sup>2</sup> et quand j'ai appris par vous-même, seule autorité en la matière, que le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne se refusait à toute idée d'accepter un mandat ou n'importe quelle obligation qui le forcerait à intervenir directement dans les affaires caucasiennes; et quand j'ai entrevu la possibilité d'autres ingérences ou la formation de groupes locaux, une grande inquiétude est venue s'ajouter aux considérations d'ordre général qui me faisaient intéressé à la question de l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. En effet les événements ainsi canalisés pouvaient créer sur nos frontières de Djulfa jusqu'à la Caspienne un grand danger pour l'avenir de la Perse, spécialement pour notre grande province d'Azerbaïdjan, réelle mère-patrie de cette partie du Caucase qui reconnaît si bien sa provenance qu'elle va jusqu'à se croire le droit d'user de ce nom pour établir sa séparation avec l'ancien Empire russe.

Encouragé, d'une part, par les avances des représentants de cette contrée venus à Paris avec mandat spécial pour faire reconnaître et accepter leur séparation avec la Russie et leur indépendance; pensant d'autre part que dans les circonstances actuelles et avec les liens étroits et les intérêts communs qui existent entre la politique de nos deux pays, l'intérêt britannique et sa politique dans le Caucase, surtout dans les régions si riches et si fécondes de Bakou, s'accorderaient facilement avec l'idée d'une prédominance de la Perse sur l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase; fort surtout des droits légitimes et indiscutables de la Perse d'avoir des visées, même les plus étendues, sur toute cette contrée — partie intégrante de son territoire et arrachée uniquement

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure in No. 846.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 845.

par la cupidité appuyée sur la force brutale — j'ai accepté de discuter de la situation avec les représentants azerbaïdjanis et d'envisager avec eux une solution capable de contenter tous les partis. Après de longues conversations, où, à côté de certaines hésitations dues aux circonstances étrangères et assez compréhensibles, j'ai trouvé la meilleure des bonnes volontés et la plus touchante des remémorations d'origine et de sentiments communs, je leur ai demandé de formuler eux-mêmes et indépendamment de toute suggestion leur point de vue. Les quatre articles, augmentés d'un P.S. caractéristique,<sup>1</sup> en sont le résultat.

Votre Excellence a remarqué sans doute l'incohérence et le paradoxe des idées et des termes qui s'entrechoquent dans ce document; par exemple, la reconnaissance de la liberté et de l'indépendance de la république démocratique et son lien politico-économique avec la Perse et une représentation étrangère unifiée d'ores et déjà avec elle, ce qui entraîne dans leur idée même et selon leurs explications verbales l'unification de l'armée, des frontières, etc.

Mais toutes ces questions de détails ne me semblent pas très difficiles à résoudre, car l'essentiel et le principal étant admis, il n'y aurait qu'à éclairer ces messieurs sur les suites logiques d'une pareille politique et les formules aptes à concrétiser ces idées.

Il est inutile d'ajouter que tout ceci représente, à mon point de vue, un objectif à atteindre et non un fait acquis, même dans le cas où les délégués azerbaïdjanis apposeraient leurs signatures à Paris au bas de ces articles corrigés et refaits.

Ce qui importe pour moi, c'est de connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique et votre acquiescement personnel à poursuivre une politique dans ce sens, soit à Paris avec les représentants de l'Azerbaïdjan et à la Conférence de Paix, soit à Téhéran et à Bakou par le moyen des pourparlers déjà entamés et une mission que Wossough-ed-Dowleh compte envoyer spécialement dans cette contrée.

Je crois personnellement que la réalisation d'un tel plan, naturellement modifiable avec les circonstances et les événements futurs, serait la meilleure solution d'une partie du problème du Caucase et la solution la plus favorable, non seulement pour les intérêts joints de l'Angleterre et de la Perse, mais encore pour les intérêts de l'Europe tout entière, si étroitement liés, comme votre Excellence l'a maintes fois répété, à la Paix et au calme dans l'Asie centrale et dans le monde musulman.

Je suis certain, d'autre part, que si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voulait bien appuyer cette politique, il nous serait très facile avec l'aide de vos représentants de rallier à cette idée l'unanimité de la population de cette contrée conservant encore très vivace le souvenir de la Perse — leur mère-patrie — et les atrocités qui ont été la cause de leur amputation.

En attendant l'honneur et le plaisir de reprendre en détail cette question de vive voix avec votre Excellence, je vous prie, etc.

FIROUZ<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This letter was minuted as follows by Lords Hardinge and Curzon: 'This is a very bold

scheme. But I can hardly imagine any country caring to come under Persian control & maladministration. It seems to me like a castle in the air with no prospect of realisation.

H.'

'Nosret ed Dowleh talked to me about a friendly understanding with Azerbaijan which I applauded. But he is really out to swallow it. I think we had better stand out of the game. C.'

### No. 851

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)*

No. 745 Telegraphic [156488/150/34]<sup>1</sup>

TEHRAN, November 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 574<sup>2</sup> of 29th October.

I am about to submit separately some further observations regarding Bolshevik outlook and Russian position in Northern Persia, including Azerbaijan, but there are certain points in your telegram above mentioned on which I venture to comment:—

1. Our proposal was that detachment for Tabriz should be sent, not from Batoum, but from Kasvin. There seems nothing in that opposed to policy, nor any difficulty save that of expense.

2. Sphere of influence having by common consent ceased to exist, and South Persia Rifles having already been advantageously employed in Isphahan province as far out as the neighbourhood of Kashan at the request of Persian Government and without demur from Russian Legation, it is not clear to me on what grounds their employment in Azerbaijan is open to objection.

There can hardly be question of Cossack division being disbanded on assembly of commission. Their services are needed until they can be replaced by something else or given a new form.

Sent to India.

<sup>1</sup> The file copy of this telegram is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> No. 828.

### No. 852

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 23)*

No. 747 Telegraphic [154739/150/34]

TEHRAN, November 21, 1919

I beg to offer following observations on situation in Northern Persia.

Referring to telegram No. 574<sup>1</sup> of October 29th I submit force at Kasvin as at present constituted is not more than sufficient for such measures as might be necessary at Teheran in the possible but unlikely event of Staroselsky attempting a *coup d'état*. It has no effect at all upon Tabriz and South Caucasian situation. I have no desire to seem alarmed, and agree that we

<sup>1</sup> No. 828.

have (? apparently) no cause for imminent anxiety but I am strongly of opinion that both outlook on east and north with reference to Bolshevik menace and our policy towards old Russian interests in Northern Persia, which are to some extent connected, need be considered afresh and as a whole.

As regards Khorassan. I believe General Malleson's frequent news telegrams are repeated indirectly to London, and War Office and Government of India are in better position than I am to appreciate their portent and liveliness of danger. Reports, however, seem to indicate serious (? possibility of) ultimate action against Persia by Bolsheviks or Afghans or both. But presumably that field of activity is the care of Government of India who are undoubtedly watching it closely.

As regards Southern Caspian coast. For a long time past track from Gumesh Tepe to Bunder Gez has been used without hindrance by Bolsheviks and Turkish agents and propagandists as channel of intrusion into Khorassan and Northern Persia generally. There is also some filtration through Mazanderan ports, while Turkomans round Astrabad are disaffected and receptive of enemy influences. Persian Government are powerless to (? deal) with evil except through their Cossack detachments whose loyalty cannot now be relied upon.

In Gilan situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Although only a few months ago our troops in co-operation with Persian Government practically stamped out Jangali movement yet behaviour of Cossack detachments sent to occupy various points has been so atrocious and incompetency of Persian (? administrative) officials so complete that peasantry would welcome the return of the Jangali régime, and movement is gathering head<sup>2</sup>way omitted again in close collusion with Bolshevik and Turkish elements in Baku.

From Astara through Ardebil to Tabriz we are confronted with Shahru<sup>3</sup> problem. Apart from the fact that this is the time for their usual autumn manœuvres they are badly disaffected and are being worked upon by Bolsheviks and Turkish agents from Baku. West of Tabriz Kurd Simko with a strong backing of (? Turk)s in men and money, holds country from Khoi to Urmia completely terrorised. It has recently been necessary to withdraw our vice-consul from Urmia owing to his helpless position. Thus whole of Azerbaijan situation is a source of anxiety and pending despatch of or creation of armed force, Persian Government have no means of asserting their authority.

Recently General Officer Commanding Norper Force visited me and I asked him, with the concurrence of General Officer Commanding, Bagdad, to give me his views as to how situation could best be dealt with from a military point of view, supposing any co-operation on our part were contemplated and possible.

He expresses opinion that to control situation effectively (leaving Khorassan out of the question) it would be necessary (1) to maintain present force

<sup>2</sup> Amended on original to Shahsavan: cf. No. 799, note 2.

at Kasvin; (2) to establish a cordon from Astara (port of intrusion) through Ardebil and Sarab to Tabriz with headquarters at Tabriz and a strong detachment at Urmia. (A full brigade would probably be required for this purpose); (3) to hold Bunder Gez, Astrabad, and Shahrud with small detachments so as to close channel of intrusion referred to in paragraph 4 of above.

To this is to be added location of a detachment at Ashuradeh.

General Officer Commanding (Wintle) pertinently points out that this arrangement, which includes strong detachments at Urmia, would render possible return of Urmian refugees from Baquba for maintenance of whom His Majesty's Government are understood to be paying £3,000 a year,<sup>3</sup> which is likely to continue indefinitely if no action is taken. Presence of these troops would also greatly facilitate peaceful disposal of question of Cossack division. While realising that His Majesty's Government may find it difficult at this juncture to adopt such measures, I agree that they are what is needed to stabilise situation effectively and relieve us from anxiety, and they would be greatly welcomed by Cabinet. I trust therefore that they will receive consideration.

As regards Russian interests and position in Northern Persia, concrete Russian interests or institutions apart from Cossack division are:

1. Bank and Legation in Teheran.
2. Road company holding concessions for Hamadan-Enzeli and Kasvin-Teheran road.
3. Company holding concession for control of port of Enzeli.

All these institutions exist solely by our moral or material support. Up to now our policy has been to uphold these.

Russian Bank has been struggling for existence for some time. A representative has just been sent to Denikin to see if he thinks it worth while to keep it going, and if his reply is unfavourable it will go into liquidation.

The Russian Legation received some funds from Omsk but these have long ago ceased to come and legation is in dire straits for money. Apart from that it is only by reason of my constant co-operation that Chargé d'Affaires is able to get any attention paid to him at all. He endeavours to keep up appearances but it is daily becoming more difficult for him to do so and he might at any moment throw up the sponge.

Russian Road Company. Present position is this. As regards Hamadan-Enzeli section, company retain lien on road, charge tolls on civilian traffic, but Norper Force supervises and pays for the upkeep and repairs and sends bill to company for eventual settlement. Kasvin-Teheran section, though used to a considerable extent (?) by our military transport, is not kept in repair by us or by the company, which has no funds. Under above arrangements it is problematical whether we shall ever recover from company the money we are spending on the road, and military authorities consider

<sup>3</sup> This was amended on the original to '£3,000 a day'. This was the cost of the camp at Baquba for Middle Eastern refugees generally, including Urmian refugees.

it highly unsatisfactory that this arrangement should continue indefinite and suggest either that we should formally recognise afresh company's permanent rights and (make) fresh agreement with them or, alternatively, allow Persian Government to consider concession to have lapsed owing to failure and inability of company to keep road in repair, and (then) arrange with Persian Government that we should manage it on their behalf.

As regards company's rights over port of Enzeli position is much the same.

Although military authorities recognise that it is necessary on all grounds that we should retain control, they are dissatisfied with their present working arrangement with company's representative(s) and suggest some alternative courses as in the case of road.

In both these cases, but for our subsidies to companies on one hand, and restraint from imposition by us on Persian Government on the other hand, companies would (? have omitted) long since had to close down, and Persian Government would have resumed possession. Our action therefore is clearly against practical interests of Persian Government.

Lastly, I would invite attention to question of Russian and Persian interests on Caspian. As before stated all Russian elements with which we are dealing here live in hope that Russia will regain her old footing in Northern Persia. The moment Denikin's fortunes in this direction are in the ascendant these elements become stimulated and it is certain from attitude of naval representatives recently sent by Denikin to Enzeli that they will take first opportunity to reoccupy Astrabad and establish their old control on Persian coast of Caspian.

In view of effect of recent agreement are we called upon to sit still and watch this process which has only been made possible owing to our assistance with ships and money? Are we not now rather under an obligation to assist Persia to re-establish her rightful position on her Caspian coast and prevent restoration of Russian influence? If military (? measures) suggested by General Officer Commanding were taken, they would strengthen our hands in regard to all these matters.

I beg that His Majesty's Government will be (? pleased) to review what situation above set forth and instruct me as to policy they wish to be pursued.

Sent to India and Bagdad by post.

### No. 853

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 620 Telegraphic [152251/842/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 22, 1912

My telegram No. 557<sup>1</sup> (of 21 October. Communications in Persia).

War Office in view of the fact that strategical considerations are vitally involved desire the following principle observations [sic] to be brought to your notice.

<sup>1</sup> No. 823.

(1) Motor Transport.

(a) In order to facilitate supply of British troops in N.W. Persia it would be preferable to improve road service from Railhead to Teheran via Kazvin.

(b) From military point of view it would be preferable if direct road from Duzdap via Neh were improved instead of road from Railhead to Meshed via Nasratbad as former would shorten distance between Railhead and Meshed.

(2) Railways.

Grave strategical objections are seen to proposal to link up Central Asian Railway with Meshed by means of branch line from Lutfabad.

No. 854

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 259 [157613/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 28, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me by appointment this afternoon for a final discussion of the various points concerning his country which still remained unsettled between us, before his impending departure for Paris.

On the occasion of his previous visit, he had left with me a map<sup>1</sup> on which he had traced the demands for rectifications of frontiers which the Persian Delegation desired to put before the Peace Conference, whenever that body should take up the question of Peace with Turkey, and as to which he had sought my advice and, if possible, our support.

I informed him that, having made a careful study of these demands, I would speak to him with absolute frankness. The First Persian Delegate in Paris, Mushaver-ul-Mamalek, had, in my opinion, wrecked all chances of success in the summer by the extravagance of the territorial claims that he had put forward. The Peace Conference would simply have treated them with ridicule. Although the rectifications now suggested were on a very different scale, I felt, nevertheless, bound to tell the Minister that, in their present form, I thought that their chances of realisation were remote. If the Persian Government desired to put them forward on their own responsibility in Paris, they were, I said, fully entitled to do so. The claims would then represent their political and territorial aspirations, and the Persian Delegates could advance in their favour all the arguments which he had used, or would use, with me. I had no right, nor did I desire, to veto such action on their part. On the other hand, I must candidly say that the majority of these claims were such as, in present circumstances, it would be practically impossible for us to support, and that he must balance the desirability of stating the full national claims of Persia before such an audience as the Peace Conference against the advantage of putting forward a more modest case with our support behind him.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 845, note 1.

Taking the suggested rectifications in geographical order from east to west. I began with the proposed readjustment of the Persian frontier in Seistan, involving the acquisition of a not inconsiderable angle of Afghan territory.

His Highness informed me that he had no desire to bring this point before the Peace Conference, and that it was a matter for domestic discussion and arrangement between the Persian and British Governments. He would be prepared to bring it up with us at a later date.

This, I said, he was quite entitled to do, though, from my knowledge of the Seistan question and of the Afghan attitude towards it, I could hardly conceive that we should receive any assistance from the Afghan Government in arriving at the conclusion he desired.

The next extension of Persian territory was that which was to embrace a large slice of Transcaspia, starting from near Askabad, including Lutfabad, Tejend, Sarakhs, Merv, Yletan, and Penjdeh, as far south as Kushk.

I asked the Minister if he really thought that there was the slightest use in making such a proposal. The country in question was at the present moment in the military occupation either of the Bolsheviks or the Afghans, or of both. What was the relation between these two parties it was difficult to determine. Although they were now ostensibly friendly, they might presently fall out. But that both of them, or either of them, would ever consent to surrender this triangle of territory to Persia was, I thought, out of the question. Sarakhs, it was true, had been in Persian territory in the course of the last century; but Penjdeh was an Afghan place, which had been stolen from the Afghans by the Russians; Merv was an important centre on the Transcaspian Railway, which no Government of that region could be expected to surrender; and I failed to see what advantage there was in putting forward a claim which could be substantiated only by military occupation: an operation which the Persian forces were quite unable to undertake, and one in which we could not assist them. I could not myself understand why the Persian Government were not content with the line of the mountains, which formed a very good frontier in this region, and beyond which I thought they would be ill-advised to endeavour to push.

Nosret-ed-Dowleh answered that it was solely a question of water; that troublesome questions between the Persians and the transborder Turkomans and Russians were continually arising over the waters of the streams that flowed into Khorassan; and that, although the moment might not be propitious, the claims could be justified both by logic and by expediency.

I replied that I feared neither would be of much avail in the presence of a greatly superior enemy force, and that, personally, I thought the Persian Government were making a mistake in pressing, for instance, for a connection at some future date between their proposed Tehran-Mashed Railway and Lutfabad on the Turkoman side of the frontier.

The Minister, I think, was persuaded that this particular extension of territory was out of the question, and he went so far as to admit that it had been put forward only in order to satisfy the *amour-propre* of his Government.

When he subsequently put to me the question: if the rectification was not

urged or conceded now, how could the Persian Government ever afterwards obtain satisfaction, I reminded him that his country was a member of the League of Nations, and that it was to that body that reference should be made.

He appeared to think this a somewhat slender and speculative form of protection, and asked why his Government should not proceed to come to terms with the Afghans and the Bolsheviks without delay.

To this I made the rejoinder that such an attitude appeared to be quite inconsistent with his recent appeals to me to protect the frontier of Persia in that quarter from her hereditary enemies, and that, if he seriously contemplated entering into negotiations with the latter, he must not be surprised if the British force under Colonel Malleson, which we had been augmenting with a view to helping the Persians, was withdrawn from the scene of action.

This prospect seemed somewhat to discourage the Minister, who hastily abandoned the subject.

The third rectification which the Minister had proposed was the absorption of a part of Russian Armenia and Azerbaijan from a point south of Erivan to the Caspian Sea.

He had explained to me on a previous occasion that this was intended to include in Persian territory the watershed of the River Aras (or Araxes), i.e. the streams flowing into the main channel from the north.

I pointed out to his Highness that this was a proposal on the part of his Government to acquire Astara and Lenkoran on the Caspian coast, and Nakhichevan in the interior. I reminded him that, at the present moment, his Government were contemplating discussions with the Azerbaijan Government, and I asked him what the latter would think of their Persian friends, and what would be the chance of success, if the first indication of friendship on the part of the Persians was a demand for a considerable slice of territory, bringing them almost up to Baku?

The Minister conceded the point about the Caspian ports, but seemed to think that the demands in the interior were quite reasonable, and that his Government would not find much opposition on the part of Azerbaijan.

I expressed some surprise at hearing this, but said that I would await with interest the result of the contemplated discussion between the two parties.

When his Highness asked me if we would accept any line of demarcation upon which they agreed, I said that I could not at present give any such pledge, because we had not so far recognised the Azerbaijan Government, and therefore I could not feel sure that any decision at which they arrived would be either obligatory or lasting.

I added, however, that I thought the Persian Government were probably quite wise in entering into negotiations with the Azerbaijan Government, and in seeking to come to a friendly arrangement with them. The Azerbaijan Government seemed likely to continue to exist in some form or other; Persia had large interests in the region under their control; there were a good many of her people in Baku; a strong party in Azerbaijan, as he had told me, was in sympathy with Persia, and represented Moderate, as opposed to Extremist, opinions; in these circumstances, I thought it desirable that amicable

arrangements and relations should be established between the two neighbours, and I wished success to the endeavour.

Passing on to the fourth extension of the boundary suggested by the Prince, on the western or Kurdish side of Persia, I abstained from giving any opinion upon the particular line that had been drawn on the sketch-map by his Highness. I said, however, that I could not fail to note with some astonishment that it proposed to add considerably to Persian territory in an area over which the Persian authority was so slight that the British vice-consul, for instance, had just been obliged to leave Urumia, while the entire Assyrian community who lived to the west of the lake of the same name had been driven out at an earlier stage of the war, and were unable to return, owing to the complete lack of local security, moreover the neighbouring mountains appeared to be in the hands of a Kurdish bandit named Simko, who ravaged Persian territory and did pretty well what he pleased. This did not seem to me a very favourable omen for an extended exercise of Persian authority; nor did I think that even the attractions of tribal unity would induce the Turkish Kurds to ally themselves with their Persian brethren in a single community on the Persian side of the frontier under Persian rule. Although, however, I regarded the extreme pretensions of the Persian Government in this quarter with a good deal of doubt, I had always believed that it was on this part of their frontier that some rectification could fairly be pressed for in Persian interests. I could not, I said, in reply to the Minister, point out exactly where the new line might be drawn; but if, after a study of the geographical and ethnographical features, we were able to support his Government in making claims in this direction, we should be very glad to do so.

I should add that Nosret-ed-Dowleh justified his general attitude, not on the ground of the feasibility of the particular proposals, but on the plea that the present opportunity should not be lost of stating claims which, unless formulated, might be treated as abandoned, and some of which, in the general Asiatic welter, there might be a chance of realising. Why should not the Persians be given as good a chance of recovering territories that had once belonged to them, as Afghans, or Russians, or anybody else?

To this, without for a moment contesting the absolute right of Persia to state her claims in her own way, I gave the double and obvious reply (1) that if other claimants or pretenders were more successful it was because they had the military force with which to sustain their pretensions—which Persia unfortunately had not; and (2) that, so far as I was aware, Persia was the only neutral State that, having taken no part in the war and borne none of its burdens, having indeed only been saved from serious invasion, and from the probable overthrow of the dynasty by British intervention, and having recovered its pre-war frontiers owing exclusively to the same agency—now sought a wide extension of its territory, as a reward for its inaction. His Highness must remember that his case would not be decided by this country, which would naturally be sympathetic, but by the Allied Powers in Conference; and he could judge for himself whether, when the Conference reassembled to discuss the Treaty with Turkey, and would be yearning to

arrive at an early decision, they would be likely to devote several days, or even hours, to the investigation of ancient territorial claims, or to the task of reconstructing the entire map of Central Asia.

The Minister said that he would report my views to his Government, and acquaint me at a later date with their reply.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 855

*Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)*

No. 102 [165447/150/34]

TIFLIS, November 28, 1919

My Lord,

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit for Your Lordship's information copies of two letters from Prince Mirza Riza Khan<sup>1</sup> and of an anti-English proclamation,<sup>2</sup> believed to be printed in Switzerland, which is I understand being widely circulated.

Copies of the present despatch are being sent to Sir Percy Cox and to Colonel Stokes<sup>3</sup> for their guidance.

I may remark that His Highness somewhat exaggerates the length of my acquaintance with him.

I have, &c.  
O. WARDROP

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 855

TIFLIS, ce 28 novembre 1919

Monsieur le Haut Commissaire,

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de Vous l'exposer hier, le jour de mon arrivée à Tiflis, le gérant de notre Consulat Général s'est rendu immédiatement chez moi et m'a mis au courant de ce qui se passe ici et à Bakou parmi la colonie persane. Il m'a dit que la semaine passée les leaders des différents comités Libéraux et Démocrates se sont rendus à la mosquée et ont décidé de protester auprès des représentants des Puissances et des nouvelles républiques du Caucase contre le dernier arrangement anglo-persan. Ils ont en outre décidé de former, éventuellement, un comité National, dans le but de diriger leurs affaires courantes sans l'aide du consulat, auquel ils refuseraient leur confiance. Le gérant m'a dit en outre que quelques-uns parmi la jeunesse

<sup>1</sup> Persian diplomat and politician.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This manifesto was headed 'Appel du parti national persan' and was signed Ayn-Lam-Ber. The manifesto began: 'Après cinq ans de protestations contre l'impérialisme, la Grande-Bretagne se propose aujourd'hui d'annexer la Perse à son Empire. L'accord qui vient d'être signé à Téhéran nous ravit notre indépendance. D'aucuns prétendent que cette convention a l'assentiment du peuple persan. L'affirmation est mensongère.' The manifesto concluded by demanding (1) the withdrawal of British troops from Persia; (2) 'qu'on mette un terme aux persécutions et qu'on libère les déportés'; (3) that the Anglo-Persian Agreement should enter into force only with the consent of the League of Nations.

<sup>3</sup> British representative at Baku.

inexpérimentée à Bakou invitent constamment les Persans de cette ville, qui sont au nombre d'au moins 20,000 ainsi que les habitants de l'Azerbeidjan persan, qui sont plusieurs millions, de protester en bloc contre le dernier traité et au cas où une réponse satisfaisante ne leur serait pas donnée, de s'unir à la république de l'Azerbeidjan du Caucase.

Gholam Riza Khan m'a prié d'appeler les notables commerçants et les leaders des partis susmentionnés, de les calmer et de les empêcher de mettre leur plan en exécution.

Je n'ai pas eu besoin de les appeler, car quelques instants après Ali Eliber Cheidaief, notable commerçant, vint me trouver de la part de toute la colonie pour me questionner sur les conséquences de cet arrangement. J'ai fait de tout mon mieux pour lui expliquer l'intérêt que notre pays pourra tirer du traité, et je lui ai montré le journal *L'Eclair*, où, à la tête d'un article, est imprimé la manchette suivante : 'L'Angleterre respectera l'indépendance de la Perse'.

Hier après avoir eu le grand plaisir de renouveler avec Vous notre connaissance de trente années, j'ai reçu la visite de quatre notables commerçants choisis par notre colonie. Ils m'ont déclaré venir de la part de tous les Persans pour me poser deux questions brèves auxquelles ils demandent une réponse aussi nette que possible.

1. Le gouvernement persan pouvait-il arranger ses affaires financières et militaires sans s'adresser à l'aide d'un gouvernement étranger?

2. En cas de nécessité, ne pouvait-il s'adresser à l'aide de la France ou de l'Amérique, sans avoir recours à notre puissante voisine qui peut à chaque instant oublier sa promesse et annexer notre pays?

Naturellement, je répondit [sic] non aux deux questions. Pour calmer leur crainte, je leur ai répété le dernier discours de Lord Curzon au Gild Hall, en présence de S.M. le Shah, et leur ai assuré que la Grande-Bretagne était sincère. Ils sont partis très satisfaits et je les ai priés d'informer de ce que je leur ai dit la colonie persane à Bakou, où je me rendrai dans quelques jours, et où, si l'occasion se présente, je tiendrais aux Persans le même discours.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

P. M. RIZA KHAN

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 855

TIFLIS, ce 28 novembre 1919

Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire,

J'ai reçu hier la visite de Mr. Vekilof, représentant de la république de l'Azerbeidjan du Caucase, avec son secrétaire.

Je leur ai dit que leur gouvernement doit empêcher par tous les moyens que des gens irresponsables et ignorant les relations internationales ne fassent une propagande dangereuse pour les deux pays, à Tabriz.

Leur intérêt vital est d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec la Perse et de gagner la sympathie anglo-persane.

J'ai dit qu'on ne peut comparer le sort de la république de l'Azerbeidjan avec celui des autres républiques du Caucase.

Dénikine et les Bolchevistes peuvent facilement renoncer à la Géorgie et à l'Arménie, mais comme ils l'ont déjà déclaré, ils ne peuvent abandonner les richesses pétrolières de Bakou.

Lors du règlement des comptes, qui pourra aider à la république de l'Azerbeidjan du Caucase, si ce n'est la Grande-Bretagne?

Vekiloff me dit que les républiques transcaucasienes veulent faire une confédération entre elles. Je lui ai fait remarquer qu'il serait plus logique à l'Azerbeidjan de se confédérer avec la Perse, car, vu le dernier arrangement anglo-persan, il s'assurera ainsi l'appui de la Grande-Bretagne.<sup>4</sup>

Sur ce, ils m'ont remercié et m'ont prié de les recevoir encore avant mon départ.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

P. M. RIZA KHAN

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume III, No. 600.

### No. 856

*Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)*

*No. 103 [165448/150/34]*

TIFLIS, November 29, 1919

My Lord,

Supplementary to my despatch No. 102<sup>1</sup> of November 28 I have the honour to submit for Your Lordship's information the following:

Referring to the present situation in Persia, Prince Mirza Riza Khan told me he thought there was no real opposition to the British policy, but unfortunately the Persian statesmen now in office imagined they had an opportunity of permanently establishing their power and getting rid of their rivals, so they had exiled all the leaders of the opposition to Kashan, 'a place', said His Highness, 'with a disagreeable climate and a large quantity of scorpions'.

These unhappy persons were not *au fond* anti-British and would be quite amenable to kindness, but they naturally thought they were being harshly treated and were thus disposed to seek sympathy in other quarters.

I have, &c.

O. WARDROP

<sup>1</sup> No. 855.

### No. 857

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 2)*

*No. 758 Telegraphic [157710/150/34]*

TEHRAN, December 1, 1919

I am of course fully aware that settlement of preliminaries in connection with engagement of advisers necessarily (?) takes omitted considerable time but, speaking from point of view of Persian public, nearly four months have elapsed since conclusion of agreement, and as yet there has been no visible

sign of (? its) operation. This fact is having a disturbing effect on political atmosphere. On one hand interregnum gives our opponents time to make propaganda and intrigue against Cabinet (? and ourselves) while on the other hand all progress and energy on the part of Government is suspended pending arrival of advisers. As soon as latter come and (? get) to work public will have something to think about besides their own local intrigues.

Apart from this, relations between Prime Minister and Sarem-ed-Dowleh have been (? strained) for some little (? time and) I have had a difficult task to prevent an open rupture, which would be disastrous. Prime Minister is not satisfied with state of Ministry of Finance after a year of Sarem-ed-Dowleh's management, and there is no doubt that department is in most corrupt state. On the other hand Sarem-ed-Dowleh maintains that no one else could have done more and resents Prime Minister's want of confidence. Upshot is that it is very urgent that Financial Adviser and staff should arrive (? very soon) and also that we should make whatever pronouncements are possible on this and other subjects in order to show public that we are not sleeping on agreement and to distract their attention.

Is an early announcement of decision re railway construction or aviation or (? technical) commission for tariff revision likely to be possible? Have (? any) members of Military Commission left England yet? When will Financial Adviser arrive? I beg that it be noted that Caucasus route is quite passable now both for officers and ladies and there is no reason for anyone to travel via (? Baghdad).

#### No. 858

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 8)  
No. 759 Telegraphic [159671/150/34]*

TEHRAN, December 1, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram<sup>1</sup>:

Foreign advisers other than financial and military.

Attitude of Prime Minister is that he would prefer to await arrival of financial adviser and his appreciation of the situation before asking us for advisers for other departments.

This is quite sound in principle but in recent speeches and communiqués so much emphasis has been laid on the fact that we do not claim (? as a matter of fact) monopoly of the advisers that I rather fear other Powers may take advantage of our statements to offer advisers in other departments, and it may be difficult for Persian Government and ourselves to refuse them. One such instance has, in fact, occurred.<sup>2</sup> On (? these) grounds I think it would

<sup>1</sup> No. 857.

<sup>2</sup> In reply to a request from the Foreign Office for further information on this point Sir P. Cox reported in Tehran telegram No. 788 of December 14, 1919 (received December 20). First case in point was that of Camille Molitor, [?who] on proceeding home on leave asked if Legation would object to his bringing out an agricultural expert. Belgian Minister also asked my views on same proposal. I replied that I did not think that it was feasible pending

be prudent on our part, in order to earmark important posts, to take advantage of Cabinet's present opportunity for expedition in despatch of financial and military advisers to intimate to them that in order that time may be saved when actual need arises we should like to know now what departments or branches of the administration are first likely to make the calls on us for men, so that His Majesty's Government can look out for likely candidates.

If such communications were exchanged Prime Minister could reply, if (? occasion) arose, to other legations that Persian Government was already in negotiation with us for this or that adviser.

arrival of adviser and examination of Persia's most urgent needs. Second instance was that Heynssens wrote to Minister of Finance saying that MM. (1) Vibier, (2) Stas, (3) Leccoffre, formerly in Financial Department under Mormald, were prepared to return to Persia. He enquired whether their services could be accepted. I advised Minister of Finance to give same reply, viz., that as Financial Adviser would shortly be here Persian Government would prefer to defer consideration pending his arrival.' (MM. Molitor and Heynssens were both Belgian experts employed in the Persian customs administration.) Lord Curzon replied to this telegram in Foreign Office telegram No. 670 of December 24 to Tehran: 'I approve your language to which you should adhere on any subsequent occasion pending arrival of Financial Adviser.'

### No. 859

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6)*

*No. 768 Telegraphic [159340/150/34]*

TEHRAN, December 4, 1919

Your telegram No. 577.<sup>1</sup>

Foreign Office Despatch of September 24th<sup>2</sup> has not yet reached me. Prime Minister replies that at present only serviceable vessel which Persian Government foresees<sup>3</sup> is launch *Parabonia*.

If she is to remain their sole naval possession there would obviously be no justification for naval adviser or loan of officers; but if His Majesty's Government are inclined to assist Persian Government to acquire other vessels for use in Caspian and Persian Gulf Persian Government would be highly grateful and would welcome loan of necessary officers.

At this stage it is difficult for Cabinet and myself to suggest precisely what officers and men would be required and on what salary. Would it not be better to associate a naval officer with Military Commission to study question and advise?

Commodore Norris recently Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf and then Senior Naval Officer Caspian has experience of both seas and would seem well qualified for the purpose.

<sup>1</sup> No. 833.

<sup>3</sup> Amended on filed original to 'possesses'.

<sup>2</sup> No. 790.

No. 860

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 11)*

*No. 765 Telegraphic [160766/150/34]*

TEHRAN, December 4, 1919

My telegram No. 747<sup>1</sup> of 21st November.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires informs me for reasons of economy he proposes to close Russian consulates in centres such as Kermanshah where there are (? practically no) Russian subjects.

At the same time he states that Denikin has telegraphed to him that he requires to make use of (? Russian) wireless station at Enzeli and proposes to take it over, and asks Chargé d'Affaires to make arrangements necessary. Latter asks whether we are prepared to hand over.

Apart from above our Military Intelligence Officer at Enzeli reports that a certain Colonel Ballas, who claims to be representative of Denikin at Enzeli, asks whether there is any objection to Denikin keeping a guardship at Enzeli for use at Enzeli and south-east Caspian ports, and also whether Denikin can have a detachment of Russian troops on shore at Enzeli 'for protection of Russian property'. Military Intelligence Officer has replied in regard to these matters he should approach His Majesty's Legation.

There can be no doubt that these activities are part of organised effort on the part of Denikin, in communication with Russian Legation and Staroselski, to restore or strengthen Russian position in Northern Persia.

As regards wireless I request instructions as to what answer to give and request General Officer Commanding, Bagdad, to communicate his views to me and repeat to London.

As regards Colonel Ballas and his two enquiries, I had understood that he had not been recognised by us in any way and had been advised by us to leave Enzeli. I note, however, that Military Intelligence Officer addresses him officially as 'Volunteer Army representative at Enzeli'. He has no *locus standi* as such and as far as I know has received no recognition from Persian Government. Is there any reason why he should? I request views of General Officer Commanding, Bagdad, and instructions of His Majesty's Government as to what (? reply) I should give re detachment and guardship if approached by Russian Legation.

Repeated to General, Bagdad.

<sup>1</sup> No. 852.

No. 861

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 638 Telegraphic [156488/130/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 4, 1919

Your telegram No. 745<sup>1</sup> of 20th November: Cossack division.

The transformation of the Cossacks and the elimination of the Russian

<sup>1</sup> No. 851.

officers at the earliest possible date is very desirable, and we are anxious to cease as soon as possible paying for a force of which the policy and composition are opposed to our interests.

*Secret.*

I understand that Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs is proposing to Prime Minister on his own initiative to dismiss Starosselsky though he knows how distasteful such a measure would be to the Shah.

I am making further enquiries of Minister for Foreign Affairs and will let you know later how this matter now stands.

## No. 862

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 640 Telegraphic [157863/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 737<sup>1</sup> (of November 17th). (Wireless.)

You may use the proposed portable lorry set forthwith pending further development.

India Office think that we should endeavour to come to agreement with Persian Government for erection of medium power installation also as a first step towards establishment of a British controlled wireless telegraph system in Persia. This would presumably be run as a public service on commercial basis.

What are your views?

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 716, note 2.

## No. 863

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 643 Telegraphic [157710/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 6, 1919

Your telegram No. 758<sup>1</sup> of 1st December: Anglo-Persian Agreement.

Every effort is being made to hasten execution of agreement.

Financial adviser will start soon after his contract and powers are settled. Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs offered him 10,000 tomans a year, which is not adequate. He should receive equivalent of £5,000 plus outfit allowance and travelling expenses. Minister for Foreign Affairs has referred question to Teheran and awaits reply. You should urge Prime Minister to accept these terms without further delay, in which case financial adviser should reach Tehran by end of February.

*Military Commission.* Moens, Fortescue, Steel, and Lamont<sup>2</sup> leave Mar-

<sup>1</sup> No. 857.

<sup>2</sup> Members of the Military Commission.

seilles on the 12th or 15th via Batoum, and Dickson<sup>3</sup> has received his orders from War Office.

*Tariff Revision.* You are aware of correspondence regarding Watkins<sup>4</sup> and the commission should reach Tehran soon.

*Aviation.* Nothing definite has been decided yet.

*Railways.* My telegram No. 557<sup>5</sup> of 21st October gave you the general conclusion arrived at.

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs is negotiating with various groups, and there is every reason to suppose that Khanikin-Tehran line will be built first. It might be possible, if you see no objection and Prime Minister agrees, to make some announcement regarding probable early construction of this line.

<sup>3</sup> General W. E. R. Dickson was the President designate of the Military Commission.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Watkins was a British expert on the joint commission for the revision of the Persian customs tariff.

<sup>5</sup> No. 823.

## No. 864

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 265 [159327/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 6, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called here on the 25th ultimo, and the principal point he dealt with was the question of Persia's territorial claims which form the subject of my despatch No. 249<sup>1</sup> of the 13th ultimo.

2. His Highness explained that, news having reached Tehran that the Conference in Paris was about to adjourn, the Persian Prime Minister was pressing him not to lose the opportunity of submitting the Persian case to the Conference. He said he would like, if it were possible, to receive the views of His Majesty's Government on his memorandum of the 13th November, a copy of which will be sent to you by next bag. He had, however, realised that this was a question which concerned more than one Department of this Office, and required careful consideration. His Highness therefore suggested that if it were not possible for him to receive the views of His Majesty's Government at once, it would be desirable for him to obey his instructions from Tehran and submit to the Peace Conference forthwith a case based on the memorandum, and that he should then subsequently hear, as soon as His Majesty's Government had come to a decision, on what points his Government could count on receiving the support of His Majesty's Government.

3. As, however, no definite decision had yet been come to, it was impossible to express any opinion on the subject at that interview.

4. His Highness then referred to the arms of which the Persian Government are in urgent need and for which an application had recently been made.<sup>3</sup> He raised the question as to whether such arms as there may be at Bagdad at present were new or whether they had already been subjected to a great deal of use. He expressed the opinion that when the Anglo-Persian

<sup>1</sup> No. 845.

<sup>2</sup> No. 846.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 847, note 5.

Military Commission eventually decide on Persia's needs, the Persian Government will apply for the arms and munitions recommended by the Commission; thus those for which he was now asking were really the first instalment, and would be payable out of the loan.

5. He suggested that if the War Office were not yet in a position to agree to advancing the small quantity of arms for which he had already applied, he might be authorised to place with some armament firm in this country the small order which was now required and obtain transport for it forthwith. He thought that this might in the long run prove as expeditious as getting the arms from Bagdad, and would, moreover, be an advantage in that the arms would be new.

6. I have since placed His Highness's views before the War Office, and have urged them to make arrangements for delivery as soon as possible.

7. His Highness next referred to the question of the engagement of two engineers by the Persian Government,<sup>4</sup> and requested that he might be given some advice as to the rates of pay such officials would require. He was quite willing to be guided by us on the subject, and enquiries are being made through the India Office as to the rates of pay of British engineers employed in other countries under similar conditions.

8. Before leaving, His Highness again raised the matter of the claims of British subjects against the Persian Government for losses suffered owing to the inability of the Persian Government to maintain order in their country in consequence of the presence of foreign troops on Persian territory. He stated that there were two solutions, namely (a) to include in the Persian claim against the Turks and Germans all the losses suffered by British subjects, and subsequent to recovery from the enemy to pay the claims in question, or (b) to refuse all liability on the ground of *force majeure* owing to the presence firstly of Russian and subsequently of other foreign troops in Persia during the war.

9. His Highness was told that I had received a despatch<sup>5</sup> from you on the subject, and that it was being considered. He was given no encouragement, however, to think that the matter would be allowed to pass.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

\* See No. 847.

<sup>s</sup> Not printed.

### No. 865

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 264 [157900/150/34]<sup>1</sup>

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 6, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called here on the 1st instant and

<sup>1</sup> This file contains Mr. Oliphant's note of the conversation recorded below. The present despatch, based textually upon this note, subject to minor alterations of form, is supplied from Confidential Print.

stated that after reflecting on his interview with me of the 28th ultimo (see my despatch No. 259<sup>2</sup> of the 28th November) he was afraid that any telegram which he could draft to the Prime Minister in Tehran would only be of a very discouraging nature. He added that he himself saw the full force of a great many of my arguments, but he was in some doubt whether Vossough-ed-Dowleh would be as convinced when receiving them from him and he had, therefore, abstained from reporting his interview.

His Highness explained that he had been considering how he could possibly furnish any encouragement to the Prime Minister when reporting the interview, and expressed the opinion that a satisfactory solution might be found in one direction, namely, in the matter of Azerbaijan.

His Highness realised that our hands were somewhat tied *vis-à-vis* of the Azerbaijanis by the fact that we had not recognised the Republic; but he was convinced that if I were to let it be understood by the Azerbaijanis that at any future date His Majesty's Government would not be prepared to extend sympathy and support to them unless they came to a working understanding with Persia, it would have both a very good effect locally and also prove an asset to Nosret-ed-Dowleh himself when telegraphing to the Prime Minister. He said that so far as he could see such observations by our local representatives would not commit us in any embarrassing way, and he earnestly hoped that some such statement might be agreed to.<sup>3</sup>

His Highness then raised the question of Persia's claims consequent upon the war, and explained that had he not hesitated to lengthen unduly his conversation with me on the 28th ultimo he would have mentioned the matter to me then.

His Highness thereupon handed in a memorandum<sup>4</sup> on the subject and asked for my observations. A copy of this document, which is now being considered, will reach you shortly.

His Highness then drew attention to the fact that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are about to issue new shares up to £7,500,000 sterling, for which applications from existing members of the company and the Burma Oil Company will be given special consideration. His Highness understood that two-thirds of this new issue would be offered to His Majesty's Government, and the remaining one-third would be taken up by existing holders of shares, and he pointed out that it would be most deeply appreciated in Teheran if His Majesty's Government were to offer to the Persian Government some of

<sup>2</sup> No. 854.

<sup>3</sup> In this connexion the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed in a Foreign Office letter of December 5, 1919, that a record of this conversation had been submitted to Lord Curzon who 'is prepared to instruct the local British representatives to inform the Azerbaijan Authorities that it would be a source of gratification to H.M. Government to hear that the Azerbaijan Authorities and the Persian Authorities were well disposed to each other and that any strengthening of the bonds between the two countries could not but increase the satisfaction of H.M. Government.' See Volume III, No. 615.

<sup>4</sup> The reference is uncertain but was probably to an undated Persian memorandum (not printed) entitled 'Droit aux Réparations'. This memorandum advanced Persian claims to reparation for losses due to Russian and to Turkish action and to German responsibilities.

their new shares in view of the fact that they were not procurable by any other means. His Highness was unable to say how many shares the Persian Government were likely to be able to take up, but expressed the view that it would not be a very large sum.

As I believe that it would be desirable on political grounds to give the Persian Government a further financial interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I am asking the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury whether anything can be done in the matter.

Prince Firouz then expressed great appreciation of the decision taken some time ago to develop a boys' school in Teheran. He added that one means of excellent propaganda and of great utility in establishing British influence throughout Persia would be to develop some educational establishment for women and girls in Teheran; as if English could be spread in the 'Anderuns'<sup>5</sup> it would have a very far-reaching effect. He was told that we had great difficulty with the Treasury in getting any help for the boys' school in Teheran, and that there was some doubt whether we could do much in this direction.

His Highness then referred to the appointment of Prince Ain-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Azerbaijan, and stated that his first act, before even proceeding to his post, was to insist on the recall from Tabriz of Prince Firouz' younger brother, Mohammed Vili [Vali] Mirza, whose presence at Tabriz was of the utmost use to his family in looking after their properties there. His Highness stated that his own position in the matter was somewhat complicated owing to the fact that when Vossugh-ed-Dowleh intended to send Saram-ed-Dowleh to Tabriz the other day his Highness made strong representations against the appointment, as he considered it essential that Saram-ed-Dowleh should remain in Teheran as Minister of Finance in view of the fact that he gets on well with foreigners. If, therefore, he now protested against the appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh, the Prime Minister could retort by saying that it was his fault that the appointment had been made. I therefore have telegraphed to you on the subject (No. 636<sup>6</sup> of 3rd December).

His Highness addressed a letter<sup>7</sup> to Mr. Oliphant on the 29th ultimo respecting a decoration for the Persian Prime Minister (a copy of which I transmit herein), and in view of the important part Vossugh-ed-Dowleh has taken to bring about the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, I am recommending that the King should confer upon him the G.C.B.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>5</sup> Women's quarters.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. In this telegram Lord Curzon stated that he would be glad if Sir P. Cox would, if he found it possible, express the hope that Mohammed Vali Mirza 'may be left at Tabreez, if necessary even without an official post'.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

No. 866

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 645 Telegraphic [159842/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 8, 1915

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs has formally notified Secretary of League of Nations of Persia's adhesion.

No. 867

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 17)*

No. 776 Telegraphic [162301/150/34]

TEHRAN, December 9, 1915

Following from Malleson, December 4th.

Begins.

Following from Tashkent newspaper *Turkestan Communist* received yesterday. In connection with our<sup>1</sup> successes on the Transcaspian front a series of problems and possibilities is opened to us giving a wide perspective for operations in the friendly and awakening Orient. These points have necessarily been neglected in the past owing to favourable [*sic*] military position. Now have we in our hands not only that facts of desired victory but also its fruits. Have we [*sic*] now before us a wide field of operations in Persia which country is offering us a friendly hand as stated in telegram from Askabad which insists upon the immediate despatch to Persia of the representative of the Soviet Republic. At the present moment relations between Soviet Republic and Persia are completely in our hands. The Persian Consul General at Askabad is preparing to transfer his office permanently to Tashkent. Persia asks that Soviet representatives may be sent to Persia in order to establish commercial relations. Many goods are obtainable there which we require in our markets. Amicable relations thus established would enable us to introduce into the life of Persia those ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity which are the life blood of the Soviet Republic. Under our influence indeed it is likely that Persia herself will play a prominent part in the freeing of the East.

Ends.

Another issue of same paper has article with large headlines called 'The Awakening of Persia' and states that general wish of Persian working classes is to rise and expel the English and that such risings are imminent.

Ends.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. Soviet.

No. 868

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 20)*

*No. 786 Telegraphic [163929/150/34]*

TEHRAN, December 14, 1919

Reference to question of rectification of frontiers of Persia.

Prime Minister informs me that subject is under lively discussion between His Majesty's Foreign Office and Nus(? ret)-ed-Dowleh and that he has sent latter lengthy telegram on the subject,<sup>1</sup> general purport of which he mentioned. He asks me to urge on Your Lordship great importance of showing public (?) that British Government is giving substantial help in regard to this question.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the enclosure in No. 877.

No. 869

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

*No. 654 Telegraphic [156488/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 15, 1919

My telegram No. 638<sup>1</sup> (of December 4th).

Dismissal of Starosselsky.

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that on receipt of telegram from Teheran giving information contained in your telegram No. 666<sup>2</sup> (of October 1st) he telegraphed to Prime Minister urging Starosselsky's dismissal and appointment of a British officer to take his place. He favours this course as against disbanding Cossack Division. I understand that the question was not pursued.

Please telegraph your views.

<sup>1</sup> No. 861.

<sup>2</sup> No. 799.

No. 870

*Note by Mr. Oliphant of a conversation with M. Sabline*

*[162671/150/34]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 15, 1919

Monsieur Sabline called to-day saying that he had been instructed from Irkutsk<sup>1</sup> to ascertain whether His Majesty's Government had ever denounced the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 either officially to any Russian Government or through any Military Mission to Denikin or otherwise.

I replied that more than a year ago now it had been decided that it was impossible to denounce this instrument while there was no Government in

<sup>1</sup> At that time the seat of the administration of Admiral Kolchak.

Russia which His Majesty's Government recognised, but that the Persian Government had been told that we regarded it as 'in suspense'.<sup>2</sup>

Monsieur Sabline, who is a very old friend of mine, and who feels very deeply the present position in Russia, did not pursue the subject further.

Before leaving Monsieur Sabline told me that he had had a conversation recently with General Brigg[s]<sup>3</sup> who assured him that Denikin's position was exceedingly satisfactory, that the Bolsheviks were absolutely at the end of their tether and were making a final effort! But this appeared to Monsieur Sabline to be a most unduly optimistic view of the situation.

L.O.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon noted on this: 'No. I went further in my speech at the Persian Dinner on September 18, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Former Chief of the British Military Mission at General Denikin's headquarters.

<sup>4</sup> In a letter of December 16, 1919, to Mr. Oliphant, M. Sabline further stated with reference to this conversation: 'I should very much like to know if the question of the abrogation of this Agreement [of 1907] has ever been raised in the House of Commons.' This letter was not answered.

## No. 871

*Earl Curzon to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs*

[15d987/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 19, 1919

Your Highness,

I have the honour to inform your Highness that I have given careful consideration to the telegram which you were so good as to hand to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst on the 16th instant<sup>1</sup> regarding the claims for territorial adjustment which the Persian Government desire to submit to the Supreme Council in Paris.

I greatly regret that a detailed examination has shown the claims to be of so comprehensive a character and of so ancient a nature as not to come within the range of those frontier re-adjustments which His Majesty's Government could, with any chance of rendering a real service to the Persian Government, undertake to support at the Peace Conference.

Your Highness will recollect that when last I had the pleasure of seeing you I explained to your Highness that, in my opinion, there were two alternatives open to your Government: (1) that a full statement of Persia's claims should be presented to the Peace Conference by the Persian delegates in Paris, on their own responsibility, and independently of any support on the part of His Majesty's Government; (2) a more moderate assertion of Persian *derata* backed by the support of His Majesty's Government.<sup>2</sup>

It does not appear to me to be possible to combine these two alternatives in the manner which, as I gather, is now proposed.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 877 for the conversation of December 16, 1919, between Lord Hardinge and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and for the telegram communicated by the latter.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 854.

Your Highness suggested, I understand, that the Persian Cabinet would be satisfied were a resolution to be recorded by the Peace Conference to the effect that 'the Conference recognises that the territorial claims of Persia in Transcaspia are well founded, but that the whole of this question, depending as it does upon the solution of the Russian problem, cannot be decided at present.' I do not see, however, if I were in Paris how I could say that in my opinion the Persian territorial claims in this region, as enumerated by your Highness, are 'well-founded' seeing I have already explained to your Highness that whatever their origin in ancient history, they bear no relation to modern facts. Moreover, even if this were not the case, and if I could conscientiously advocate the claim, I remain in grave doubt whether the Peace Conference would not be both startled and shocked at the magnitude of the pretensions. I cannot believe that it would be seriously entertained by them, and I am unable to see any advantage to the Persian cause that would result from the rejection or relegation to obscurity of the claim, even if it were accompanied by compliments of a platonic description.

I am, however, as I have had the honour of telling your Highness on previous occasions, prepared to do what may be possible, after full examination of the geographical and ethnographical features of the case, to give support to your Government's interests on the western frontier of Persia for the reason that their claim[s] in that quarter, apart from the question of their intrinsic justification, concern the future disposition of Ottoman territory, which it is the special province of the Peace Conference to decide.

[I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON]

## No. 872

*Note by Mr. Oliphant of a conversation with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs*

[164472/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

The Persian Foreign Secretary called on me this afternoon before proceeding to Paris to-morrow morning. He handed to me the accompanying letter<sup>1</sup> in reply to Lord Curzon's last note<sup>2</sup> about Persian territorial claims. In doing so he wished to amplify the statements therein with the observations which I set out below. He appeared to me exceedingly desirous of falling in with Lord Curzon's wishes to the utmost possible and told me more than once that his one object and wish was to be guided by His Lordship's advice and that in no case did he propose to act independently thereof.

As regards Turkestan, he said that there were two points to which Persia did attach the utmost importance. If His Majesty's Government was unwilling to support the Persian claims as hitherto set forth, he did most

<sup>1</sup> See annex below.

<sup>2</sup> No. 871.

earnestly hope that they might find it possible to support Persia on two points:

(a) As regards Sarakhs. On this point Colonel Grey, Consul General at Meshed, told me two days ago that he did think that the Persians had a very strong claim as Russia had been acquiring parts of Sarakhs surreptitiously for years past.

(b) The district of the Yaourt Yamut, a migratory tribe in the neighbourhood of Astrabad. He explained that they wandered from one side of the frontier to the other in connection with their winter and summer quarters and if the whole of their territory could be included in Persia it would save endless troubles and would be a permanent advantage.

H.H. further said that the question of Ashurada required settlement. To be perfectly candid, he himself had been under the impression that since the Persians drove the Bolsheviks out it had been Persian territory; but he had just been told that it was not so. When I asked him who was at present in possession he said he did not know. The Russians had never acquired it by treaty but merely had acquired it gradually, and if it could be made Persian, as it undoubtedly ought to be, it would be a great asset.

He then explained his views regarding Nakhitchevan. He stated that it was both Shiah and Persian in religion and sentiment, and that the Persians had, since the collapse of Russia, received repeated requests from the inhabitants to incorporate it in Persia. It was a matter of the utmost importance to Persian sentiment, and he earnestly hoped that we might support him in his attitude regarding it. He thought that it was in the interest of *both* our countries to do so. Without our support he would not put it forward at the Conference. On the other hand if it were known that it was not put forward owing to the unwillingness of H.M.G. to support Persia, it could not but create an unfortunate impression in Persia. He therefore earnestly pressed for our support to the following extent. He would propose to inform the Peace Conference that if the Conference decided to deal with the questions of Armenia and Azerbaijan they should also consider the question of Nakhitchevan and its desire to be incorporated in Persia. He would be quite prepared to agree to the self-determination of Nakhitchevan and that an International Commission should go there to see whether or not it opted for inclusion in Persia. If the vote were to go against Persia he would be absolutely content that it should not be incorporated, but he had no doubts whatever on the subject. He added that he heard that the Armenians had recently turned the Azerbaijani out of Nakhitchevan and were in possession of it at present. In any case thousands of families had fled from Nakhitchevan as refugees to Persia.

H.H. appeared to me to desire to follow the advice of His Majesty's Government far more implicitly than ever before.

He added that as soon as he had Lord Curzon's views on the above points and on Part 3 of his previous Memorandum<sup>3</sup> he would at once draw up the Persian case for submission to the Peace Conference.

<sup>3</sup> The reference was to the memorandum referred to in No. 865, note 4. This memo-

Qu[ery.] Agree on conditions given.

H.H. then referred to the recent publication in the Paris *Midi* of Lord Curzon's correspondence with the Americans about the Persian Agreement.<sup>4</sup> He said that his Prime Minister was taking the utmost interest in the matter and it would be very helpful to him, especially during his stay in Paris, if he might be given the gist of the correspondence in question. I said that I would submit the matter to His Lordship. Qu[ery] give him gist.

Qu[ery.] Record to Sir P. Cox.<sup>5</sup>

L. O.

#### ANNEX TO No. 872

*The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Earl Curzon*

(Received December 23)

CARLTON HOTEL, le 20 décembre 1919

My Lord,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 19 courant<sup>2</sup> concernant les demandes de rectifications formulées par mon Gouvernement.

Je regrette vivement de constater que votre Excellence trouve difficile de réconcilier les différents points de vue selon la suggestion que j'avais eu l'honneur de soumettre à son Excellence Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

Quant aux deux alternatives proposées par votre Excellence, lors de notre dernière entrevue, et auxquelles vous faites allusion dans votre présente lettre, je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que je ne suis pas enclin, dans l'intérêt de la politique de mon pays et de mon Gouvernement, à choisir la première. Considérant la communauté réelle d'intérêts existante entre nos deux pays, et convaincu du désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de voir les frontières de la Perse garanties par une rectification justifiable quant aux conditions géographiques et ethnographiques, je pense qu'il est de première importance pour moi de m'assurer d'abord le concours et l'appui efficace de votre Gouvernement et de soumettre ensuite les propositions de mon Gouvernement au Conseil suprême.

Laissant de côté la frontière ouest de la Perse et la question du Kurdistan, où votre Excellence se trouve d'accord, en principe, avec les vues de mon Gouvernement, je désirerais connaître d'une manière plus précise les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en ce qui concerne les rectifications demandées sur les limites du Turkestan et du côté de Nakhdjavan. Je voudrais savoir ce que représente pour votre Excellence la deuxième alternative ainsi formulée: 'Une assertion modérée des desiderata de la Perse soutenus par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.'

Veuillez agréer, &c.

FIROUZ

random as a whole was noted on the file as being 'Chapter III of the [longer] memorandum which Prince Firouz proposes to lay before the Peace Conference.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 876, note 2.

<sup>5</sup> This conversation was not recorded to Sir P. Cox.

No. 873

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 662 Telegraphic [164227/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

My telegram No. 638<sup>1</sup> (of December 4th. Cossack Division). India Office refuse categorically to share in the monthly subsidy to Cossack Division any longer and we cannot continue it after the end of this month. You should inform the Persian Government accordingly.

<sup>1</sup> No. 861.

No. 874

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 665 Telegraphic [156012/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

You may continue to pay Persian Government tomans 350,000 monthly till February 20th.

No. 875

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 280 [161963/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called again at the Foreign Office on the 11th instant, and was asked whether he had any information on the question of Advisers who had been offered to the Persian Government by some Foreign Power (as stated in your telegram No. 759<sup>1</sup> of the 1st December). His Highness replied in the negative, but added that he was fully aware of the desire of the United States Government to obtain some footing in Persia.

2. His Highness stated that he had been considering this question of late and was disposed to think that it would be to our joint benefit to interest the United States in financial questions in the north of Persia. He himself had derived the impression that His Majesty's Government were not entirely at their ease wherever Russian interests in North Persia were at stake; and in his opinion it might be very useful if the United States were to take an interest in North Persia and thus in some measure form a commercial barrier against Russia. In this eventuality they would naturally be interested in the maintenance of order and the protection of Persia, and as the Anglo-Persian Agreement was aimed at gaining both these points, the Americans would look to that instrument for their success, and we should in the long run obtain their benediction for the agreement.

<sup>1</sup> No. 858.

3. His Highness then referred to questions relating to the Republic of Azerbaijan, and said that during the war the Turks had shown considerable energy in propaganda in Azerbaijan and Georgia and had thus stolen a march on the Persians in those districts. He did not think that the telegram which I had informed him would be sent to Mr. Wardrop at Tiflis, expressing the hope that the Republic of Azerbaijan should live in amity with Persia,<sup>2</sup> would meet the requirements of the case. If, however, the recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan by His Majesty's Government (to which the inhabitants themselves attach, he felt sure, the utmost importance) were to be held out as a bait, it would then enable the Persians themselves to induce the Azerbaijanis to side with them and not with the Turks. He then said that, without wishing to be indiscreet, he would like, if it were possible, to know the views of His Majesty's Government regarding Azerbaijan and Georgia. He surmised that in both cases His Majesty's Government intended in the long run to see them not reincorporated with Russia but existing as separate States. He had grave doubts whether Azerbaijan could ever maintain its position without help from outside, and he concluded by expressing the view that for Azerbaijan as a separate State to look to Persia for support and co-operation was surely more desirable in the interests of His Majesty's Government than for Azerbaijan and Georgia to be perpetually at loggerheads and always to be a prey to Turkish intrigue.

4. His Highness was informed that His Majesty's Government cannot possibly make the recognition of Azerbaijan conditional upon the policy that it pursues towards Persia.

5. Turning to another subject, Prince Nosret-ed-Dowleh said that he had recently been informed by the Persian Railway Syndicate that Messrs. Vickers and Messrs. Armstrong had joined them, thereby strengthening the group. They had told him categorically that they were prepared to examine and make proposals for the extension of the railway (which runs at present from Bagdad to the Persian frontier) *via* Kermanshah and Hamadan to Tehran, and would undertake the survey at their own expense. The line itself would eventually be constructed at the expense of the Persian Government, and his Highness seemed to consider this a suitable arrangement.

6. His Highness added that the Mohammerah-Khoramabad Railway would also be taken in hand, in view of the concession accorded to the Persian Railway Syndicate some ten years ago, but that this would be of secondary importance.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>2</sup> See No. 865, note 3.

No. 876

*Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received December 22)*  
No. 796 Telegraphic [164275/150/34]

TEHRAN, December 21, 1919

American Minister has given his colleagues to understand that he has achieved great success in Washington, in that as result of his efforts United States Government has secured some modifications of Anglo-Persian Agreement.

Prime Minister and I have both been asked what truth there is in this statement and I believe Prime Minister gave same reply as I did, namely, that he had no knowledge of anything of the sort.

United States Minister's statement may be merely an echo of correspondence commencing with Lord Grey's telegram of September 28th<sup>1</sup> re possible employment of Americans and American participation in loans to Persia but in any case I should be glad to know if there have been any later developments or discussions with United States Government with those. . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 794.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain. Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office telegram No. 672 of December 25, 1919, to Tehran: 'There has been no further discussion with United States Government and I do not contemplate any modification whatever in the agreement. There appeared recently in the press some reference to my correspondence with United States Ambassador last September and mention was made of my allusion to Liberia and my remark that Colonel House had been informed by me of our negotiations with Persia. Leakage respecting this correspondence must have taken place in American circles and United States Embassy here has been assured by State Department that matter is being investigated.'

No. 877

*Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)*

No. 284 [166066/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 30, 1919

Sir,

As I was unable to receive the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Highness called on Lord Hardinge on the 16th instant and handed to him a copy of the telegram enclosed herein, which he had received from the Persian Prime Minister.

2. Prince Nosret-ed-Dowleh emphasised the possibly critical situation of the Government in Persia and the difficult period through which they might have to pass in the event of the British Government not giving greater support to Persian territorial claims than had been promised to him in his interviews with me. He said that in a few days' time British officers would be arriving in Tehran to carry out the military part of the agreement, and the difficult moment would then arise, as the Persian people would only notice their presence, and would, of course, not be able to realise any of the good that the presence of these officers would in the end entail. He anticipated serious

difficulties with the Majliss when it reassembles in about a month's time, and he was all the more anxious that the Prime Minister should, in explaining the agreement, be able to assure the people that England would support Persia in her claims to territorial readjustment.

3. Lord Hardinge asked his Highness to what territories he specially alluded. His Highness replied that his Government felt they had the strongest possible claims, both historically and ethnographically, to Merv and the territory around it in Transcaspia as defined in the map which he had already submitted. Previous to the Treaty of Turcomanchi all these territories had been under Persian domination, and the Turcomans even now were of the same race, religion, and language as those within the Persian frontier to the north of Meshed. At the present moment there were rumours of an alliance between the Afghans and the Bolsheviks, and surely this was a situation which would be intolerable to Great Britain. He urged, therefore, that we should give our strong support to his proposals for the restitution of these territories to the Kingdom of Persia.

4. Lord Hardinge pointed out that the territorial claims which his Highness had presented could hardly be interpreted as an adjustment of frontier, and whatever might be said about our agreement with Persia it was clear that we were in no sense bound to embark for the sake of Persia on any aggressive action for an increase of territory which could only be achieved by sacrifices on our part in the way of troops and war material, of which the Persians have practically none at the present time. Further, no Government in this country would last a day if it were felt that they were embarking upon an enterprise of this kind for the sake of an increase of Persian territory. The aim and object of our agreement were to make Persia strong and independent within her frontiers, and although such a case does not seem likely to arise in the near future, it was obvious that we would do all we could to help Persia in resisting any infringement by any other Powers of her existing territories.

5. As regards the contention that Merv and its district were historically and ethnographically Persian, it was certainly under its own native rulers, who were independent of Persia, before the Russians took possession of Merv about the year 1880. Consequently Merv and its district might put forward claims to its own independence if the Bolsheviks and the Afghans were successfully removed. Nor did Lord Hardinge think that it would be either honest or politic on our part to promise our support to the Persian Government to put in their claims before the Conference when it would be impossible for us to assist them to give effect to them if the Conference recognised the justice of those claims.

6. To these arguments his Highness replied that he fully realised that His Majesty's Government would be very unwilling to make any kind of sacrifice in Central Asia in order to press the claims of Persia to such a considerable increase of territory as Merv and its district would entail, but what would satisfy the Persian Government would be that the Conference should discuss the Persian claims, which should be pushed with our support, and that they

would be satisfied with a resolution couched in somewhat similar terms to the following:—

‘The Conference recognises that the territorial claims of Persia in Transcaspia are well-founded, but that the whole of this question, depending as it does upon the solution of the Russian problem, cannot be decided at present.’

7. His Highness argued that with a resolution in those terms the hands of the Persian Government would be greatly strengthened in their forthcoming discussions in the Majliss upon the Anglo-Persian Agreement.

8. Lord Hardinge told his Highness that he would submit the matter to me, but he did not hold out any hope of these proposals being accepted.

9. I am of opinion that the Persian claims are utterly unreasonable, and it never occurred to me when speaking of supporting Persia’s claims for frontier readjustments that we were to dig into bygone history—a century or more old—in order to revive these pretensions.

10. I had put before the Persian Minister the two following alternatives:—

(1) A full statement of Persian claims by their delegates, on their own responsibility, and with no assurance of our support.

(2) A moderate assertion backed by us. It is impossible for His Majesty’s Government to say at Paris that they think the Persian territorial claims well-founded, because that would be contrary to the truth, and we cannot undertake to support them, because we should be making ourselves ridiculous by so doing. It is inconceivable that the Peace Conference would devote any time to the consideration of Persia’s demands for territorial expansion on her eastern border, and Persia would be merely courting a rebuff by asking them to do so—a rebuff in which His Majesty’s Government, at any rate, must decline to be involved.

11. I have therefore addressed a reply to Prince Nosret-ed-Dowleh,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which I transmit to you herein.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

#### ENCLOSURE IN No. 877

*Translation of a cable received by Prince Firouz from the Persian Prime Minister*  
*(Translation.)*

Your telegram of 9th December.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to frontier questions and certain remarks made by Lord Curzon in conversation with your Highness, I think it necessary to set forth the matter very clearly.

When the agreement between Great Britain and Persia was signed, the general situation in the world, as far as Persia is concerned, was not very

<sup>1</sup> No. 871.

<sup>2</sup> Not in Foreign Office archives.

different from what it is to-day. The position in Russia and Bolshevism, conditions in Afghanistan and Kurdistan, were more or less the same as they are now. No one knew better than Lord Curzon and Sir Percy Cox that Persia lacked necessary means and forces.

The object of the agreement was to help Persia to restore internal order, recover her prestige, and acquire a strong position in the Middle East. If the letter of the agreement, and the spirit in which the negotiations were carried on in Tehran for several months, are not a sufficient proof of this, the speeches of Lord Curzon and your Highness's replies, the assurances given from every quarter and on all occasions, especially as regards the restoration of Persia to her former greatness and to the important position due to her in Asia, should leave no room for doubt. Indeed these same declarations and assurances have served as a weapon of defence in my hands and in those of your Highness against the attacks on [of] internal and external foes and critics who have not yet given up hope and who still look upon us and the agreement with anger and resentment. If ever the people become conscious of the fact that the purpose and spirit of the agreement are neglected and ignored, you may rest assured that friends and foes will join hands against both of us, and against the agreement, and all British influence; in such a contingency no amount of repression will avail, and it is quite possible that upheavals like those in Egypt and Afghanistan may take place in Persia, the least result of which would be the sacrifice of the agreement. It is my duty to foresee that the smallest degree of unwariness in the present circumstances will most certainly lead to a catastrophe; already there are ominous signs, and I can justly claim that I alone have hitherto stemmed the tide.

Your Highness says that Lord Curzon assures you that he himself and the British delegates will not oppose the claims of Persia when they are submitted to the Peace Conference. An indifferent attitude on the part of the representatives of Great Britain would not suffice; their active support will be essential to our cause, more especially as our requests are quite moderate and justifiable.

Again, Lord Curzon states that as Turkestan and Nakhdjavan are not part of the territories of the vanquished Powers, the Conference is not competent to deal with their disintegration from Russia. But the recognition by the Great Powers of the separation of Finland, Poland and other northern provinces from old Russia, and the fact that the Conference has interfered in their affairs, should show that there are exceptions to the rule.

Moreover, it appears difficult to understand how the Great Powers, and especially Great Britain, whose interest in the maintenance of order and tranquillity in Central Asia is paramount, could afford to delay indefinitely the settlement of the problems brought into being by the complete and certain break-up of the former Russian Empire; by putting off this final readjustment they are, among other evils, tolerating the existence in the Transcaspian provinces of a hot-bed of anarchy and unrest which threatens to spread and extend to all the neighbouring countries.

Your Highness represents Lord Curzon as saying that the Afghans, having

joined hands with the Bolsheviks, are following a far-reaching policy in Asia and pretend to certain rights on Merv, Bokhara and other districts in Transcaspia. This is more reason why Great Britain should help Persia to counteract such ambitions fraught with evident dangers to the vital interests of the two countries. Persia's rights on Merv and Sarakhs, and generally in Turkestan, are well-founded and ancient, whilst the pretensions of Afghanistan are based on brute force. Are not Persia's relations and associations with Great Britain more friendly and intimate than those of Afghanistan?

It has also been asserted that the Afghans are now pressing on in those regions with considerable forces. True, but Persia also began such tactics in Sarakhs and occupied some territory there in deference to the wishes of the inhabitants; nevertheless instead of receiving encouragement and support from Great Britain, they were made to evacuate Sarakhs. Finally, in order to arrive at a clear understanding of the situation, it would be well to enquire whether Persian or Afghan intervention in Turkestan is more in accord with British interests and whether any other policy but strong co-operation with Persia will save Great Britain from the consequences of the dangerous line taken up by the Afghans. It must not be forgotten that the Afghans are now embittered against Persia on account of our friendship with England, and if at this crisis effective support is denied to Persia, the Afghans will thereby have been indirectly encouraged in the pursuit of their ambitions.

On the other hand, the soundness of the view of Lord Curzon that our claims in the Caucasus are in conflict with the initiation of friendly relations with the Caucasian Azerbaijan Republic, and with the steps taken to draw them ultimately into union with Persia—and this policy would seem to be approved and welcomed by Lord Curzon—and his Lordship's scepticism as to their agreeing with our demands, must to a certain extent be admitted, but it is certain that if the Caucasian Azerbaijan Government, whose very status depends entirely on the decision of the Conference, are made to feel that Great Britain and the Allied and Associated Powers will recognise and support Persia's rights in Nakhdjavan and the district of Moghan and Astara, they will have no alternative but to yield.

As regards Kurdistan, I am glad to note that, in principle, Lord Curzon is in agreement with our views.

Apart from the above consideration, I feel bound to add that the vital question now lies in the proper interpretation of the spirit of the agreement and its execution in the true sense as we understand it, and as we have explained it to the people; if the purport and intent of the agreement are still what we understood them to be, and Lord Curzon's speeches corroborate this view, then this agreement will bring to Persia strength and power and enable her to become an important factor in the Middle East and the link between East and West; it will also render feasible the task of the Persian Government to procure progress and prosperity for the country with Great Britain's assistance. But if, on the contrary, as I am led to suppose from your Highness's telegram, the British Government are reluctant to incur heavy charges in respect to Persia and, in view of probable contingencies, they

hesitate to increase their commitments to the extent of even not being inclined to give effective moral support to Persia in order that she may obtain recognition at the Conference for her moderate and legitimate claims, then it must be said that the agreement is being interpreted in a narrower and more restricted sense and in quite a different spirit from the one we gave out to the people.

If such be the case, we shall be deprived of the means of resisting the fierce onslaughts of the opponents of the agreement and of those who encourage an opposite policy in Persia, for it cannot be denied that with a half-hearted and hesitating attitude not only will the interests and rights of the country be jeopardised but all that we have been anxiously at pains for a long time to set up will only have served to expose your Highness and myself to everlasting recrimination and execration.

I consider it necessary that you should put the matter clearly and frankly before Lord Curzon in order that by a prudent anticipation of contingent events your Highness and myself may fulfil the duty we owe not only to our country but also to our friendly relations with Great Britain.

### No. 878

*Earl Curzon to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs*

[164472/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 5, 1920

Your Highness,

In reply to your note of the 20th December<sup>1</sup> respecting the Persian Government's claims for the rectification of frontiers, I have the honour to remind your Highness that my note of the 19th ultimo<sup>2</sup> has already furnished you with a very complete expression of my views on the subject.

In our conversation of the 28th November<sup>3</sup> I explained to you with absolute frankness the real position of affairs in this matter and expressed my views regarding the four zones marked in the map which your Highness had previously handed to me with a memorandum on the subject.

With regard to the enquiry in the final paragraph of your note under reply as to what I consider to be a 'moderate assertion of Persian desiderata backed by the support of His Majesty's Government', I doubt very much the wisdom of putting forward claims in North-Eastern or Eastern Persia which, even if they possess historical foundation, stand in no relation to existing facts, and, even if they were conceded, which is unlikely, would involve the Persian Government in military obligations that it might be exceedingly difficult to sustain. The same observation applies to the territories north of the Araxes River. It is quite open to the Persian Government to put forward these or other claims at the Peace Conference, and His Majesty's Government will give them in each case their dispassionate consideration. But it is impossible to determine here in advance, and without all the available data, the degree

<sup>1</sup> Annex to No. 872.

<sup>2</sup> No. 871.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 854.

of support which they may be held to merit, and it must always be borne in mind that the Peace Conference is charged with the task not of remodelling the boundaries of the neutral States who may in a greater or a less degree have been affected by the recent war, but in making the redistribution of territory that is demanded by the principles of justice and right between the victors and the vanquished in the struggle.

I am, however, prepared, as I stated in the last paragraph of my note of the 19th December,<sup>2</sup> to do what may be possible to give support to your Government's interests on the western frontier of Persia so soon as I shall have received and examined a full account of the geographical and ethnological details of the case.

There are two other respects in which it would give me the greatest pleasure to be able to support the Persian claim. The first is that of the Russian Yomut Turkomans, which you mentioned in conversation at the Foreign Office on the 20th ultimo.<sup>4</sup> If the tribe in question were to express in any definite manner their desire to come under Persia, and if the Persian Government were in a position to guarantee the security of the frontier so obtained, there may be a good deal to be said for incorporating them in the Persian State.

The second case is that of Ashurada, to which the Persian Government appear to have an incontestable claim.

For many reasons it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to support the suggestion that a plebiscite should be taken with regard to the future of Nakhitchevan.

I have, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

\* See No. 872.

## APPENDIX

### TWO ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO BRITISH POLICY IN REGARD TO SYRIA AND PALESTINE, JUNE 1919

(i)

*Record by the Earl of Derby of a conversation in Paris with M. Tardieu*

[PARIS,] June 2, 1919

#### Memorandum

I went this afternoon to see Tardieu with reference to the Syrian matter. He had promised to explain to me the exact situation with the aid of a big map he had.

He told me that he had spoken to Clemenceau with regard to our former conversation<sup>1</sup> but that Clemenceau had shown himself very unbending and while not in the least objecting to Balfour and Tardieu talking the matter over he said that he was not going to have any further discussion. That in December last he had agreed to Mosul and a certain part round it being given to the English for their sphere of influence. He was not prepared to go any further than that and if he was asked to do so he would withdraw that offer and fall back on the existing Treaty which he said we were bound to honour.

Tardieu repeated the arguments he had used to me yesterday<sup>1</sup> and there was one used by us which appears to rankle. Whenever there was a question of asking for certain territories to be given to the French the answer given was that that was impossible as it was Arab property that was being dealt with and we must keep faith with them. Tardieu pointed out that while this argument held good when it was a question of giving up territory to the French it apparently was non-existent when it was a question of giving Mosul to the English. I did not argue the point but asked him what he thought was the best way now of dealing with the matter. He said he thought it would be better to leave the matter quiescent for the moment. Let us get the answer to Germany out of the way first and then perhaps he and Balfour might discuss the matter. It would probably be found that Clemenceau would have quieted down by then. At the same time he told me that Clemenceau seemed inclined to begin direct negotiations with Feisul and apparently thinks that he could come to some arrangement with him. Tardieu thinks it extremely dangerous if this is done as we probably shall find that an agreement which might be arranged and be satisfactory to the French and to Feisul might be very much the reverse to us. That would bring England and France into even more direct conflict than they are at the present moment. I promised to put these views before Balfour.

He wound up by saying 'Remember it is to be Balfour and not Milner'. I asked him then to let me know what it was that Milner had done to give such offence to Clemenceau. Apparently it was on this very subject of Syria, and dates back to four or five months ago. The question was to be discussed between Clemenceau and Milner; Milner had asked to have it postponed saying he would give an

<sup>1</sup> The reference is uncertain.

answer to various questions that were asked within 48 hours. From that day to this Clemenceau had never heard a word from him and this had given great offence. I asked him whether he thought under the circumstances it would be advisable for me to let Milner know that there was this feeling, and he said if I did so he did not think it could do anything but good.

(ii)

*Memorandum by Mr. Frankfurter of an Interview in Mr. Balfour's Apartment.  
23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Tuesday, June 24th, 1919, at 4.45 p.m.<sup>1</sup>*

*Present:* Mr. Balfour, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Lord Eustace Percy and Mr. Frankfurter.

Mr. Balfour expressed great satisfaction that Justice Brandeis came to Europe. He said the Jewish problem (of which the Palestinian question is only a fragment but an essential part) is to his mind as perplexing a question as any that confronts the statesmanship of Europe. He is exceedingly distressed by it and harassed by its difficulties. Mr. Balfour rehearsed summarily the pressure on Jews in Eastern Europe and said that the problem was, of course, complicated by the extraordinary phenomenon that Jews now are not only participating in revolutionary movements but are actually, to a large degree, leaders in such movements. He stated that a well informed person told him only the other day that Lenin also on his mother's side was a Jew.

Justice Brandeis stated that he had every reason to believe that this is not so and that Lenin on both sides is an upper class Russian. He continued to say that after all this is a minor matter, that all that Mr. Balfour said was quite so. He believes every Jew is potentially an intellectual and an idealist and the problem is one of direction of those qualities. He narrated his own approach to Zionism, that he came to it wholly as an American, for his whole life had been free from Jewish contacts or traditions. As an American he was confronted with the disposition of the vast number of Jews, particularly Russian Jews, that were pouring into the United States year by year. It was then that by chance a pamphlet on Zionism came his way and led him to the study of the Jewish problem and to the conviction that Zionism was the answer. The very same men, with the same qualities that are now enlisted in revolutionary movements would find (and in the United States do find) constructive channels for expression and make positive contributions to civilisation.

Mr. Balfour interrupted to express his agreement, adding: 'Of course, these are the reasons that make you and me such ardent Zionists'.

The Justice continued that for the realisation of the Zionist programme three conditions were essential:—

*First* that Palestine should be the Jewish homeland and not merely that there be a Jewish homeland in Palestine. That, he assumed, is the commitment of the Balfour Declaration and will, of course, be confirmed by the Peace Conference.

*Secondly*, there must be economic elbow room for a Jewish Palestine; self sufficiency for a healthy social life. That meant adequate boundaries, not merely a small garden within Palestine. On the North that meant the control of the waters

<sup>1</sup> No British record of this interview has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

and he assumed that Great Britain was urging the northern boundary necessary for the control of the waters. That was a question substantially between England and France and, of course, must be determined by the Peace Conference. The southern and eastern boundaries, he assumed, raised internal British questions.

Mr. Balfour assented that that was so as to the southern boundary but questioned as to the eastern boundary.

The Justice added that, of course, the interests of the Hedjaz were involved, but after all, the disposition of questions between the Arabs and the Zionists was, in effect, an internal British problem. He urged on the east the Trans-Jordan line for there the land is largely unoccupied and settlement could be made without conflict with the Arabs much more easily than in the more settled portions of the North.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that in the East there is the Hedjaz railroad which can rightly be called a Mohammedan railroad.

The Justice replied that there is land right up to the railroad and Mr. Balfour stated that he thought that Feisul would agree to having an eastern boundary of Palestine go up to the Hedjaz railroad.

Thirdly, the Justice urged that the future Jewish Palestine must have control of the land and the natural resources which are at the heart of a sound economic life. It was essential that the values which are being and will be created because of the cessation of Turkish rule and due to British occupation and Jewish settlement should go to the State and not into private hands.

Mr. Balfour expressed entire agreement with the three conditions which the Justice laid down. He then proceeded to point out the difficulties which confronted England. He narrated at length the Syrian situation and the appointment of the Inter-Allied Commission which finally terminated in the present American Commission. Feisul was a comrade in arms with the British; he undoubtedly was of military help and by sheer force of events the British and the Arabs find themselves together in Syria. Feisul interpreted British action and British words as, in effect, a promise either of Arab independence or of Arab rule under British protection. On the other hand, are the old interests of France in Syria and the Prime Minister has given (and in Mr. Balfour's opinion, rightly given) definite word that under no circumstances will Great Britain remain in Syria. It would involve a quarrel with France which would not be healed. But Feisul prefers Great Britain to France, (at least, so he says), and all advices indicate that French rule in Syria will meet with the greatest opposition and even bloodshed on the part of the populace.

The situation is further complicated by an agreement made early in November [1918] by the British and French, and brought to the President's attention, telling the people of the East that their wishes would be consulted in the disposition of their future. One day in the Council of Four, when the Syrian matter was under dispute, the President suggested the despatch of a Commission to find out what the people really wanted. It began with Syria but the field of enquiry was extended over the whole East. Mr. Balfour wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister, and he believed it went to the President, pointing out that Palestine should be excluded from the terms of reference because the Powers had committed themselves to the Zionist programme, which inevitably excluded numerical self-determination. Palestine presented a unique situation. We are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to re-constitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future. He has great difficulty in seeing how the President can possibly reconcile his adherence to Zionism

with any doctrine of self-determination and he asked the Justice how he thinks the President will do it. The Justice replied that Mr. Balfour had already indicated the solution and pointed out that the whole conception of Zionism as a Jewish homeland, was a definite building up for the future as the means of dealing with a world problem and not merely with the disposition of all [an]<sup>2</sup> existing community. Mr. Balfour stated he supposed that would be the President's line. He continued to point out the great difficulties that are now besetting Great Britain in the East, namely, the ferment in the whole Eastern world, the Mohammedan restlessness, the new Arabic imperialism and the relations with the French. Then there is also the Sykes-Picot Agreement; that is dead, but its ruins still encumber the earth. He was anxious that the Justice should know these difficulties for they all bear upon the Palestinian situation. He expressed the greatest satisfaction that the Justice was going to the East to study the problem at first hand.

The Justice hoped that while he was away at least nothing would be done which would embarrass the fulfilment of the three conditions which he laid down as essential to the realisation of the Zionist programme.

Mr. Balfour then stated that he understood Justice Brandeis' request that no decision be taken as to the boundaries and the extent of control over the land in any way counter to his views until his return in about four or five weeks. He thought it was perfectly safe to give him the assurance that no decision will be taken on those matters during that time to embarrass the aims which the Justice indicated.

Mr. Balfour stated that he would be either in Paris or in London when the Justice returned and he hoped that he will report to him at once upon his return on the questions as they appear to him from a study on the spot.

No statesman could have been more sympathetic than Mr. Balfour was with the underlying philosophy and aims of Zionism as they were stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, nor more eager that the necessary conditions should be secured at the hands of the Peace Conference and of Great Britain to assure the realisation of the Zionist programme.

F. F.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain. It would appear that a correction of 'all' to 'an' is imperfectly shown on this copy.











